A/31/PV.34 General Assembly

Monday, Oct. 18, 1976 — Session 31, Meeting 34 — UN Document ↗

THIRTY·FIRST SESSION

122.  Question of the Comorian islandof Mayotte

Before going into the substance of the item on the agenda of this plenary meeting, my delegation would like to recall that it opposed the inclusion of agenda item 122 when the General Committee of our Assembly held its 1stmeeting on 23 September. It is contrary to the Charterto bring before .this forum the internal affairs of a State. Moreover, it seemed to us inappropriate to provoke a publicdebate at a time when the French Government is making fresh efforts to defuse the situation on the spot. 2. My delegation is, however, participating in the debate for two reasons. The first is that it cannot allow inaccurate allegations and groundless attacks to' go unanswered. The other, and more general and positive, reason is that France believes in the virtues of dialogue. It has sufficiently advocated this approach as a means of dealing with the most varied problems to be able to hope, despite its reservations, that today's discussion will be held in an atmosphere of frankness and moderation. 3. To come to the substance of the question, I shouldlike to begin by saying that it is completely false to claim that the Mayotte affair is the result of deliberate intent on the part of the French Government. France has not acted to keep Mayotte or to separate that island from the others, It simply reacted to the particular circumstances which emerged when the archipelago was consulted about its future. Too often here, we are quoted a statement by the President of the Republic to the effect that the Comoros should accede to independence within their natural admin- istrative and geographic context. AsMr. de Guiringaud said in the SecurityCouncil,' the statement in questionis proof of the French Government's good faith rather than of a plan to separate Mayotte from the Comoros. It is really difficult-in fact, quite impossible-to question our inten- tionson this point. 1 See Official R~COI'd, of th, e,cu,lty Council, 71tlrtY-/lrst Year, 1886th m"tin•• N E~W Y 0 R K 4. Some have failed to understand why Mayotte should follow a different course to the rest of the archipelago. This is largely due to the history of the archipelago. Because they have long been rivals, were not colonized by France at the same time and have often had disputes, even in our' time, the three islands to the north and Mayotte have developed certain characteristic features. It is, to say the least, unfortunate that certain Comorian leaders should have taken a deliberately hostile attitude in regard to the inhabitants of Mayotte at the very time when the archi- pelago was acceding to independence. Although the leaders in question are no longer in charge of Comorian affairs, the fact remains that the passions and misgivings thus aroused contributed to the disunity of the populations at the time of the act of foundation of the independentComoros. 5. On the part of the French legislators there were perfectly understandable reactions, and a desire not to oppose the clearly expressed preferences of the inhabitants of Mayotte. Here I should like to dispose of two much too facile accusations made against France. Some have said that we were wrong 'to resort to separate referendums to measure more accurately the problemraised by the votesof the people of Mayotte who wished to remain French. Others have assured us that independence means placing power in the hands of the dominant party. But it so happens that the same partiesarenot dominant in the three islands and in Mayotte, and it is at the level of political parties that the opposition is strongest. Incidentally, the referendum procedures which have been applied in several other groups of islands in the Caribbean and in the Pacific have not been regarded as anomalous, In mentioning these examples, I do not seek to establish a parallel between cases that differ in so very many respects; I simply wish to recall that the problemof the territorial defmitionof archipelagos sometimes arises in specific terms and to emphasize how paradoxical it would be to condemn so democratic a process as the referendum, the usefulness of and need for which have beenrecognized by the United Nations. 6. Turning to the representatives of Africa whoparticipate in our debate and are naturally following it with interest, I must tell them that France is not indifferent to their fears and appeals. We understand the misgivings that can be aroused among them by the suspicion, however slight,that any Power might wish to divide countries whose territorial integrity is the main treasure, the vet)' framework of their organization and of their future. All I ask is that it should be remembered here that self-determination is a principle no less sacred. The wishes of populations freely consulted must always be respected. That rule cannot be ignored without resulting in practices of oppression that none of us could defend. France has based all ita hiltory on achieving harmony between the principle of self-determination and 7. May I recall here what the head of the French delegation, Mr. de Guiringaud, said at the present sessionof the Assembly. "The right of peoples to self-determination is written into our Charter. It has been the guiding principle " throughout our policy on decolonization, and it is still the foremost criterion in defming the future of peoples and the framework for their existence. "With regard to the Comoros, France has scrupulously applied this principle, and we intend to remain faithful to it. Although we have raised no obstacle to the admission of the State of the Comoros to the United Nations, our attitude has frequently not been understood. I do not wish to harp on misunderstandings that I should like to see overcome. What is past is past; we are looking only to the future. I can tell you that the proposal on the status of Mayotte, to be submitted to the French Parliament, will indeed leave open all possibilitiesfor the future, with due respect for the wishes of the peoples." [9th meeting, paras. 115 and116.1 8. It is obviously desirable that our debate should not threaten the future to which the Government of France and its Minister for Foreign Affairs desire to devote their complete attention. A language of accusation will in no way assist the enterprise of reason that is needed. We must all start from the facts. It is true that there is a geographical reality, that there are four islandswhich geographicallycan be considered as ar. archipelago. It is true that the ethnic composition, the religion and the way of life of the Comorian islands are very similar. It is also true-it is an historic and present reality-that the inhabitants of Mayotte are not on good terms with the inhabitants of the other islands, an all the more negative factor in that the sea diviides rather than unites them. Finally it is true-and this cannot be disregarded because it is the political reality that we face-that the populations concerned have differing concepts of their relations and their future. To determine their future, we must all take into account the factors, whether natural or temporary, that I have just listed. We must take them all into account and endeavour to reconcile them. 9. How can we contribute to a favourable evolution and to breaking the deadlock? France realizes that, not far from Mayotte, the State of the Comoros is now sovereign master of its affairs. It is our hope that the best possible human relations may be restored among the islands. That is a first practical aim which the French authorities are prepared to pursue. Secondly, certain institutional questions will have to be dealt with and resolved. This is a matter that falls within the internal affairs of France and is dependent upon its legislative branch, which will also have to consider the facts I have mentioned, Our Parliament will shortly be seized with the various aspects of the problem of Mayotte. I can confirm here that one of the ministers concerned said on 17 September last that the French executive would not propose the adoption of a rigid formula to the legislature; Mayotte will have an originalstatus as a local collectivity in 10. To "leave open all possibilities for the future"-those were the words used here three weeks ago by the French Minister for Foreign Affairsin connexion with the status of Mayotte that is now under discussion. We shall jeopardize nothing; we shall freeze nothing; we shall not remain indifferent in the future to the destiny of the populations we administered in the past, one part of which has wished to link its fate with ours. We shall encourage the people of Mayotte and the Comorians to review their relations at all possible levels. To that end, a spirit of dialogue is and will remain essential; one day it will be desirable that that dialogue should be as thorough and real as the existing reasons for disagreementare deep and real. My country will not impose formulae or close its eyes to the wishes of the people. We shall always be prepared to assist in bringing about pacification and in overcoming contradictions, end we are the first to wish that such contradictions should be overcome. 11. This is the general statement prepared by my delega- tion for this meeting; I would wish to add, however, a few words in regard to what the representative of the Comoros said at !Pe previous meeting in rather surprising terms- surprising in their form because of the use of excessive words which it seemed to me went beyond what the speaker had in mind. At least I hope so. I would naturally have a great deal to say about the inaccuracy of some of his strong expressions. Since when, for example, is a free vote considered to be "aggression"? What "omnipresent mili· tary occupation" is there in maintaining order whereby, at least, we limit the serious disputes between the people of Mayotte and of the other islands? 12. When Minister Himidi said that the purpose of France was "to humiliate the Comorian people and stifle its iegitimate claims" does he recall the threats of humiliation and death that certain leaders of Moroni made not long ago to the inhabitants of Mayotte? One inaccuracy among others concerns the withdrawal of the candidacy of the Comoros from the United Nations which France is supposed to have demanded. Every delegation present here will no doubt have recognized the injustice of this allegation and can bear witness to the fact that France did not raise any obstacle, as it could have, to the admission of the Republic of Comoros to our Organization. And, indeed, the delegation of Comoros is here and can exercise its sovereignty at any time. It has the same right to speak as the delegation of France. As I said, I am prepared to have a frank dialogue but I would express the hope that the right to speak, which we all have here equally, will not be the subject of abuse which will compel me to make replies which may alter the constructive spirit with which my delegation approaches this question.
I would like to stress the satisfaction that our delegation feels in participating in the debate on such an important and delicate question. 14. This feeling of satisfaction is very understandable because. as an African country, Mauritania and its delega- 15. Thefact that this matter hasnow come directly before the General Assembly and is being considered by the Assembly itself and not by a committee of this Organiza- tion makes it possible to assess the importance of this subject. It could not be otherwise, because this is a matter of completing the work of instituting the national unity and restoring the territorialintegrityof the Republic of the Comoros, which is an independent State Member of the United Nations. 16. The Comorian Republic, which was admitted to membership in this Organization a year ago, has never ceased to claim that the whole of the Comorian people should be united within the Comorian State in order to proceed with the task of its national reconstruction in solidarity and concord. 17. This need was often stressed by the Comorian Govern- ment, but despite this France hasinvoked, or seems to wish to invoke here the principle of self-determination which, of course. we recognize as one of the fundamental principles of our Organization. But, important though this principle is, it cannot be regarded as more important than the principle of the national unity and territorial integrity of the States Members of this Organization. 1B. U is because territorialintegrity and national unity are the very elements on which the order and harmony of international relations are based that the United Nations has recognized the principle of self-determination as a principle which should be approached in a flexible way to enable it to be adapted to any specific reality. Therefore, this principle should not be invoked as a postulate in order to challenge the national unity of the Republic of the Comoros because this wouldmake our Organization lose its veryraison d'etre and main purpose. 19. Mauritania, which is very much attached to the principles of territorialintegrity and national unity, and the States Members of our Organization cannot accept that our sister Republic of the Comoros should remain divided in the name of a principle. the application of which, in this particular case, would threaten us with creating a very dangerous precedent and which could, in fact, jeopardize the very existence of many States whose only defence is their just cause and their faith in this Organization. 20. Thisis why we want to support the territorialintegrity and national unity of the Comoros and we are convinced, besides, that France, which hasfollowed sucha wise policy in matters of decolonizatlon, will certainly find a solution to this problem, a solution which will safeguard both the respect that all its African friends feel for France and also the relations of friendship and trust which must exist between Franceand the Republic of the Comoros.
Mr. Kante MLI Mali [French] #299
The question of ,4\e Comorian island of Mayotte, which is the subject of our debate today, is one of the last sequels of colonization in the IndianOcean. 23. The characterof high priority which our Assembly has given to this matter in the programme of its work at the specific request of the African groupin the UnitedNations, which has acted in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it in resolution CM/RES.497 (XXVII) adopted on 3 July 1976 by the last session of the Council of Ministers of OAU, held at Port Louis, Mauritius [see A/31/196 and CO"./, annex], shows the significance that the international community attaches to this question and the extensive support which the just cause of the Comorian peopleenjoys throughout the world. 24. This could not be otherwise because the attempts by the former administering Power, which was France, to dismember the Republic of the Comoros is not only a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations but also of the Declaration on the Grantingof Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in resolution 1514 (XV)of 14 December 1960. 25. This is also a unique example in the history of colonization, which challenges such fundamental principles as the respect for territorialintegrity and the sovereignty of States. 26. However, nobody could have foreseen such an agoniz- ing outcome for the decolonization of the Comoros, which was proceeding on the basis of a procedure agreed upon by both the French Government and the Government of the Comoros in their communique of 15 June 1973. 27. Many far from insignificant steps had already been taken when, to the general surprise, France, under the pressure of the colonialist circles in Paris, went back on its commitments and, violating its laws, completely and spectacularly changed its policy wit-It a view by force to recolonize Mayotte,one of the four provinces that make up the Republic of the Comoros. 28. In this regard it should be recalled that it was as a result of the discussion of 22 December 1972 in the Comorian Chamber of Deputies, which gave a mandate to the Comerian Government, under the regime of internal " 29. In the course of the negotiations between the French and the Comorian Governments on the future of that coontry, both authorities signed on 15 June 1973in Paris a joint declaration in which they recognized the right to independence of the Comoros and reaffirmed the unity and the territorial integrity of the archipelago and stated that they would hold a referendum to consult the people on its future. 30. On 26 August 1974, a few months before the referendum, Mr. Olivier Stim, Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories of the Government of France, declared: "The French Government has opted for an archi- pelago-wide consultation for three reasons: first,for the legal reason that under the rules of international law a territory retains the frontiers that it had as a colony; secondly, a multiplicity of different statuses for the various islands of the archipelago isinconceivable; thirdly, it is not for France to set the Comorians against each other; on the contrary, its role is to help to bring them closer tOiether...". 31. The President of the French Republic, Mr. Valery Giscard d'Estaing himself, speaking on the future of the Comoros, stated on 24 Oc.ober 1974 during a press conference the following: "[The Comoros] are an archipelago which constitutesa single entity... The population is homogeneous, with practically no people of French origin, or only very few. . . was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have for its inhabi- tants, shouldretain a differentstatus? "I believe that one must acceptcontemporary realities. The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a commonfate...". 32. It is in this climate of trust and comprehension that the referendum of 22 December 1974was organized. 33. As we all know, a majority of 94.56 per cent of the Comorian people voted for independence against 5.44 per cent for the continuation of the French presence in the archipelago. And we will recall here that 93 per cent of all the voters participated in the referendum, that is, 154,184 35. Moreover, the President of the French Republic, Mr.Valery Giscard d'Estaing, speaking of that vote, said that "the dignity which had characterized the voting showed the maturity of the Comorian people". The Head of the French State added that "the results of the poll, which showed very clearly the desire of the population to accede to independence, would be submitted to the French Parliament for ratification at the next parliamentary ses- sion". 36. The Comorian people, which has scrupulously res- pected all the agreements which its representatives have concluded with the French Government, could not remain indifferent to the law of 3 July 1975, which was the starting-point for the Machiavellian operation staged by reactionary and ultracolonialist circles in Paris with the object of dismembering the Comorian entity and destroying the unity of its people. 37. This is why, in conformity with the spirit of the French law of 23 November 1974, the Chamber of Deputies of the Comoros, at an extraordinary meeting held on 6 July 1975, confirmed the results of the referendum of 22 December 1974 by proclaiming the independence of the Territory. The new Republic was to be admitted to OAU on 18 July 1975. 38. However, on 14 July 1975, the Paris Government appointed its representative to Mayotte and its troops disembarked there, while the men-of-war of the French fleet in the Indian Ocean were placed on alert in the ports or were patrolling off the islands. Aircraft were constantly flying over the Territory and 2,000 lnhnbltants of Mayotte who favoured independence were expelled from the prov- 39. On 12 November 1975, the thirtieth session of the General Assembly confirmed this pertinent recom- mendation by adopting by acclamation resolution 3385 (XXX), which made the new Republic a State Member of the United Nations and which bound all Governments to respect "the unity and territorial integrity of tile Comoro Archipelago, composed of the islands of Anjouan, Grande-Comore, Mayotte and Moh6li...". 40. This latter provision, which defines the geographical configuration of the new Republic, has also been strongly affirmed over the years by the competent organs of the United Nations in all the decisions which they were called upon to take to promote the decolonization of that Territory. 41. We can recall, inter alia, the following resolutions: first, the resolution of 6 September 1974 of the Special Committee in which that organ took note of the French Government's statement to the effect that the consultation on the independence of the Comoro Archipelago wouldbe organized on an "archipelago-wide" basis; that the Terri- tory would retain "the frontiers that it had as a colony"; and that, for the French Government, "a multiplicity of different statuses for the various iC!tands of the Archipelago is mconcetvable",» secondly, General Assembly resolution 3291 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974, in which that high body of our Organization took note of "the statement by the representative of France that the French Government has affirmed the readiness of the Comoro Archipelago for independence and its intention to respond faithfully to the aspirations of the Comorian people" which couldbe validly expressed at any time by the Comorian Government. 42. The situation was therefore clear, as regards both the geographical configuration of the Comoros and the process agreed upon to bring about the decolonization of the Territory. 43. France, defying the results of the referendum, waited until the Republic of the Comoros was admitted to the Organization to promulgate, on 31 Dece-nber 1975, a law recognizing the independence of three of the four provinces of the countries, namely, Grande-Comore, Anjouan and Moh6li. As for Mayotte,the fourth, its population,accord- ing to this arbitrary action, was to be consulted separately and for a secondtime on its political future. Under the law, it would have to choose between the integration of the 3Ibid., Twenty·ninth Session, Supplement No. 23, vol. Ill, chap.XI, para. 11. 44. Despite the unanimous condemnation of the inter- national community, France went ahead with this travesty of consultation on 8 February last, in order to give some semblance of legitimacy to its operation of recolonization of the Comorian province ofMayotte. 45. In this connexion, it should be recalled that, without the right of veto which was used by France, the Security Council would have adopted on 6 February 1976 draft resolution S/11967,4 which, let us recall, received 11 votes in favour, with! against (France) and 3 abstentions (Italy, the UnitedKingdom and the United States). 46. France couldnot have beenmoreisolated. Besides, the abstention in which its traditional allies took refuge on the conclusion of this debate, didlittle to hide theirembarrass- ment with the pertinence of the facts. 47. What divides the international community and France today is the deliberate violation by France of the cardinal principles of the Charter on which rest international peace and security,in other words,the very future of mankind. 48. This new colonial adventure is therefore anextremely dangerous precedent. Over and above the Comoros, it threatens each and every one of our nations In their very existence because, as we have stated so often, which country doesnot have its Thieu,its Ky, its Synghman Rhee, its Marcel Henry? Which country does not have its Mayotte? 49. This adventure is all the more grave in that France has embarked on it by flouting its commitments, by defying the United Nations and by Violating its own laws and the fundamental principles of the Charter. 50. The French,Government has never contested, before the referendum of 22 December 1974, the geographical configuration of the Comoros. The statements of the high French authorities which we have already quoted elo quently confirm this. Furthermore, the French law of 9 May 1946 expressly mentions that the religion of Islam gives the Comoro islands the necessary unity, while the local dialect is spoken by all the inhabitants of these islands. 51. We can therefore understandthe embarrassment of the representative of France in vlew of the pertinence of the facts. They can fmd no justification for their new colonial undertaking aimed against the unity and territorialintegrity of the Republic of the Comoros. This arbitrary action also consntutes blatant interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State. 52. Is it intended to repeat in the Comoros the senseless adventure of the Frenchextremists in Algeria'-! It shouldbe well understood that, just as in Algeria, it wiIJ certainlyfail 4 See Official Recorth of the Security Council, Thirty·ftrst Year, 54. Resolution CM/RES.497 (XXVII) of the most recent session of the OAD Council of Ministers dated 3 July 1976 and resolution NAC/CONF.5/S/RES.7 of the Fifth Con- ference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries bind it to do so [see A/31/197, annex IV/. 55. The United Nations knows only Governments. Its Charter and its decision can commit only Governments. Therefore it cannot take into consideration arguments of an internal character advanced by French authorities in an effort to justify the colonial reconquest of the Comorian province of Mayotte, and the United Nations can also not interfere in the interplay of French institutions. It is up to the French Government and the French Government alone to assume all its responsibilities in this matter, and it certainly has the means to do so. The Government of General de Gaulle found at a dramatic moment in the history of France the means necessary to bar the road to the Organisation armee secrete, which unconsciously favoured the Algeria of the past. While we take note of the assurances given by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, we must say that France must in any case decide to restore the island of Mayotte to the Comorian Republic. 56. It is in France's interest to do so, because its reconciliation with itself first of all and then with Africa and the non-aligned countries would otherwise be jeopard- ized, for both have firmly condemned France's attempts to dismember the Comorian State. 57. On behalf of the African group, of which I have the honour to be the Chairman this month, I want here to assure the people of the Comoros of the total and militant solidarity of our continent in the struggle which it is waging with such eo '~e and self-denial against the French ultra-colonialist. .J their henchmen. 58. This struggle which has mobilized Africa and the third world will cease only when the province of Mayotte has been restored to the Republic of the Comoros. 59. We are certain that at the end of this debate the members of this Assembly will share our determination, because our cause is just and our struggle is being waged for peace and for the freedom of peoples.
Mr. Moreno Martinez (Dominican Republic), Vice- President, took the Chair.
The General Assembly has before it today, in its turn, a question the importance of which need hardly be empha- sized. Indeed the problem which has given rise to our present debate has already been the subject of lengthy discussions in the Security Council at the time of the adoption of resolution 376 (1975) of 17 October 1975, 61. In taking such a precaution our Assembly simply confirmed a de facto situation recognized and accepted by France itself for approximately 130 years. To this we must add that the geography, history and social economic traditions have always made the Comoro archipelago a single territorial entity. The President of the Republic of France himself recognized this fact in his statement of 24 October 1974. Part of what the Head of the French State said has already been quoted and I should like to quote only a part of that statement to prove that the meaning given to it here by the representative of France is not the same as that given by us. On 24 October the President of France said: "The population [of the Comoros] is homogeneous... was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have for its inhabitants, should retain a different status? " ... The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate, even if some of them... may have wanted a different solution. "On the occasion of tue attainment of independence by a Territory, it is not for us to propose to shatter the unity of what has always been the single Comoro archipelago." This statement by the Head of State of France clearly proves that the French Republic has never 'questioned the unity of the Comorian archipelago, at least not until the day of the referendum, which was held two months later on 22 December, the results of which, as you know, were 94 per cent of the votes in favour of the independence of that territory. France has never declared that the results of the referendum should be considered island by island. 62. Furthermore we must remember that in a joint declaration signed by the Governmen t of France and the elected representatives of the Comoros it was stipulated that "...the Government of the French Republic, faithful to its tradition, affirmed the fitness of the Comoro Archipelago for independence" and that "accession to independence shall follow a consultation of the population of the archipelago at a date to be jointly agreed upon...".5 Thus, it is by virtue of this joint declaration that the law on the referendum, which ~ed to the electoral consultation of 22 December 1974, was enacted by the French Parliament, one paragraph of which lays down "that the Comorian populations will be consulted to determine their position regarding the accession of the archipelago to indepen- dence."! 64. That country was immediately recognized as a sover- eign and independent State by the United Nations and by the group of non-aligned countries. 65. On 17 October 1975, in resolution 376 (1975), the Security Council, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, recommended to the General Assembly to admit the Comoros to membership in the United Nations, and it was as a result of that recom- mendation that the General Assembly adopted its resolu- tion 3385 (XXX), which I mentioned earlier. 66. It is therefore incontestable that by deciding to install its administration on the island of Mayotte, France is illegally occupying a sovereign and independent territory which is a member of OAU, of the non-aligned movement and of the United Nations. 67. We do not believe that by fomenting ethnic rivalries within the Comoro archipelago France has 'found the best means of justifying its occupation of a part of the Territory of the Comoros, when only 6 per cent of the entire population of that country voted negatively in the refer- endum of 22 December 1974. 68. Just now in his statement, the Permanent Represen- tative of Mali, speaking on behalf of the African group, quoted a statement by Mr. Olivier Stirn, the French Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Terri- tories, affirming the need to preserve the integrity of the Comoros. I, too, would like to quote the same French statesman to prove to what extent French policy regarding Mayotte is hesitant arid irrational. 69. On 9 February 1976, in commenting on the French presence on Mayotte, Mr. Olivier Stirn stated: "Just as it is normal that frontiers should be preserved on the continent after the independence of the various Territories, so it would be absurd to keep them in the case of islands, where there is an element of insularity." This is a dangerous thesis for many countries and even for France itself in view of the sporadic troubles that occasion- ally arise on the island of Corsica. It goes without saying that we are not going to follow the logic of the French statesman to the point of considering that the inhabitants of Corsica should also be invited to exercise their right to self-determination. We believe, on the contrary, that what is absurd is to start from the specific characteristics of a region or national minority to consider that it is appro- priate to call into question the unity and territorial integrity of a State. 70. In the various statements made in the United Nations, the representatives of France have often referred to the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 regarding the rights of self-determination of peoples. However they forget that while resolution 1514 (XV) 71. It is a matter of abiding jurisprudence that the rules of international law which are freely accepted by the parties must always prevail over the rules of internal law of the States involved. 72. The General Assembly, in admitting to membership the State of the Comoros at the recommendation of the Security Council, specified that it was the archipelago in its territorial integrity, including the island of Mayotte, that was admitted. France, which is a founding Member of the United Nations whose Charter it has adopted and ratified and, what is more, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, is bound to comply with the provisions of Article 25 of our Charter, which renders binding all decisions and resolutions of the Security Council, especially since, as was stated just now by the representative of France, that country enjoys the right of the veto which it could have used if at the time the intentions of its Government had been not to comply with the binding nature of the decision taken by the Council on the admission of the Comoros to the United Nations. 73. On the other hand, our General Assembly can in no way accept tne French theory according to which this new turnabout of France is due to the fact that the Parliament did not ratify the commitments undertaken by its Govern- ment and solemnly proclaimed by 'the President of the Republic concerning the integrity of the Comorian State. 74. While France now invokes legal considerations to justify its presence on Mayotte, I very much doubt that these were .the prevailing considerations when 130 years ago it established its sovereignty over that island. 75. In fact, the problem of Mayotte is not a legal problem; it is a political problem, and France should approach it by taking into account the need to safeguard the capital of prestige and sympathy which it still enjoys among the vast majority of the African populations. 76. The measures of retaliation taken in regard to the Comoro archipelago by France have strongly eroded the precious capital of prestige and sympathy. 77. A few days after the admission of the Comoros to the United Nations on 12 November 1975, France took the unilateral decision on 28 November to discontinue all its technical assistance and economic and financial aid to the new independent State, thus leaving hospitals suddenly without doctors and schools without professors. '(t Nevertheless the population of the Comoros received calmly this disagreeable news, the purpose of which was obviously to bring about economic and social unrest in the country. 79. Relations between France and the Comoros were based on relations of a colonial type identical to those' 80. On the other hand, food and consumer goods that were urgently needed by the population had to be imported from abroad. Thus, by so brutally breaking its economic and' political ties with the Comoros, France placed that country in enormous difficulties, for which it bears a heavy moral responsibility. That the Comorian State has been able to survive so far' despite that catastrophic situation is due to the determination of its people and the effective solidarity of many friendly countries. 81. In view of the-to say the least-disturbing position of France, one cannot but wonder about the motives under- lying the French presence on Mayotte. 82. For our part, we should like to believe that it is :11 a misunderstanding which the authorities in Paris willnot fail to dispel as soon as possible; for, by obstinately continuing its illegal occupation of the island of MayoUe,France takes its place in the vanguard of the last colonial Powers of Africa. This situation serves neither the prestige nor the greatness of France and, in the shorter or longer term, may cause the most serious difficulties for the island and for the population of Mayotte. 83. It would be truly regrettable and unfortunate if the policy of France in the Comoros were to make of that great country the target of anti-colonialist Africa, as was Portugal in the days of Salazar and Caetano, of unhappy memory, not to mention the connexion that some will undoubtedly draw between French policy on Mayotte and the illegal occupation of Namibia by the South African racists. 84. It must incidentally be pointed out that; on the Comorian side, readiness for dialogue and compromise has constantly been expressed at all levels. For example, at the meeting of the Security Council on 5 February 1976 dealing with the situation in the Comoros, the spokesman of the Comoros stated: "The destiny of the Comoros was bound-whether the Comorians liked it or not-with the destiny of France. They fought the Great wars together. France instituted its ideas of democracy, and the Comorians cherished those ideas. They want to continue to have very good relations with France, of course, as much as they wish to continue their friendship with other people and to co-operate with•.. the United Nations".6 Such words, devoid of all resentment, should be listened to and heeded with the utmost understanding by the French authorities. 85. We believe that there is stij} time for France to reconsider its present policy on the Comoros and to resume its former relations with that country, which it should never have jeopardized, and to do so before it is too late, 6 See OfflcW Records of the Security Council, 11Iirty-firslt Year, 1887thmeeting. 87. The admission of the Comoros to the United Nations occurred after the referendum on self-determination that was organized on 22 December 1974 by the French Government throughout the archipelago and in which 95 per cent of the voters favoured independence for their country. That referendum should normally have closed the period of French colonial domination of the Comoros, which, in accordance with the unambiguous vote of its population, should have immediately acceded to indepen- dence. 88. Unfortunately, this was not the case because, very unexpectedly and apparently inexplicably, the French Government began to point out that, on the island of Mayotte, two thirds of the votes were not in favour of independence and, beginning on 6 July 1975, it took a set of measures which substantially strengthened the French presence on Mayotte, pending the regularization of the separation of Mayotte from the State of the Comoros through the organization of referendums limited to the population of that island. 89. The Security Council was seized of this matter last February. As a result of a veto cast by France, the Council was unable to adopt a draft resolution calling upon the French Government to abandon the referendum which it intended to hold in Mayotte. The draft resolution, which was supported by 11 members of the Security Council, also asked France to respect the unity and the territorial integrity of the State of the Comoros and requested the French Government to begin immediate consultations with the Comorian Government with a view to taking measures that would safeguard those two principles. 90. The attitude of the French Government, which con- tinued to implement its policy of keeping the island of Mayotte under the sovereignty of France, hardly seems to us to be justified by the only argument so far advanced by the representatives of France, namely, the need to take into account the view of a minority in an electoral consultation in which the whole of the population. is supposed to take a decision on its future. This argument itself is rather specious, because in a consultation of this kind inevitably a smaller or larger minority will emerge that will not agree with the rest of the population. Is this a reason to disrupt the unity of a people or to dismember a nation into groups of variousallegiances, perhaps even opposed to each other? This would obviously be a very dangerous procedure, fraught with risk, which would expose nations, even those whose unity is oldest and strongest, to the danger of certain and immediate erosion. 92. We are happy in the nrst place to stress that apparently the French Government adheres without any reservation to the doctrineof the UnitedNations in matters of decolonization, a doctrine which is basedexclusively on the exercise by the colonized peoples of their right to self-determination. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs said here in this chambera few weeks ago that "the rightof peoples to self-determination is written into our Charter. It has been the guiding principle throughout our policy on decolonization and it is still our foremost criterion in defining the future of peoples and the framework for their existence"{9th meeting, para. 115/. 93. Therefore,it is not on this aspectof the problemthat we oppose the French position. If the original position of the French Government really consisted in asking the Comorian people to express its choice regarding its destiny by organizing a referendum on 22 December 1974,then the later decision by France contradictsthe principle of respect of the territorial integrityof colonized territories,for this is a sacrosanct principle which is an integral part of the United Nations doctrine in matters of decolonization and which very .properly is aimed at protecting the boundaries of colonial territories while at the same time it is based on the sovereign will of the peoples of those territories. Resolution 1514(XV), which is at the base of this doctrine, indeed indicates in the clearest possible manner that "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". 94. The action of France devised to detach the island of Mayotte from the Comorian State is obviously ID contra- diction with this provision of resolution 1514(XV). The representative of France in the Security Council, who was none other than the present French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was very well aware of this when he attempted to explain that in respect of territorial integrity it "is a custom-or an ideal, if you prefer-which yields in impor- tance however, to the requirement of self-determination." In my view, this explanationisnot very convincing, because it leaves room for the surmise that there may be a contradiction between the principle of self-determination on the one hand and the principle of territorial integrity on the other, and that in such a case priority should be given to the first principle. Even if such a contradiction could 7tua, 1886th meeting. 95. We apologize to the Assembly but we want to recall once again what the Head of the French State, President Giscard d'Estaing, said on 24 October 19'74, as it seems to us that this isextremelyimportant. Hesaid: "The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate, even if some of them... may havewanteda different solution. "On the occasion of the attainment ofindependence by a Territory, it isnot for us to proposeto shatter the unity of what has always been the single Comoro archipelago." 96. This statement made by the highest French authority is, first of all, a complete adhesion to the principle of the territorial integrity of Statesacceding to independence, but it is also a reaffirmation and a solemn recognition of the unity of the Comoros or, to use the wordsof the President of the French Republic, it is a reaffirmation and a solemn declaration of the unity which was always characteristic of the Comorian archipelago. 97. If further proof is needed to show that the French Government initially was aware of its duty to respect the territorial integrity of the future Comorian State, it will suffice to repeat what was saidin a very significant manner by the French Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories: "The vocation of France is not to divide the country which gains its independence. This is the case of the' Comoros where the inhabitants have the same language, the same religion, the same political and economic interests." 98. So here wehave yet another statement which not only reaffirms the unity of the Comorian archipelago but explains the elements on whichthis unity is based. Faithful to this concept, the French Government, in the first place, did not carryout separate consultationsfor eachone of the islands in the archipelago. On the contrary, it organized a referendum whichcovered the whole of the archipelago and the result of that referendum, with a majority of 95 per cent of the voters in favour of independence, is sufficiently eloquent to eliminate any other interpretation.. 99. I regret to have to say that the attitude of the French Government in the matter of the decolonization of the Comoros seems thus to be entirely devoid of logic and continuity and it is because of our friendship that we feel for France that, while we stress th:s discordance, wedo not want to seek the true reasons for it. The needs of parliamentary life in the political system of France, which were mentioned by the French representative in the SecurityCouncil, cannot be opposed to the unchallengeable right of the Comoros to accede to independence with full territorial integrity. The French Government must accept its responsibilities in that field and, after having considered 100. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave us the hope that political realism, if no other consideration, would lead to a change in the position of France in this matter. ''What is past is past," he said, "we are looking only to the future. I can tell you that the proposal on the status of Mayotte, to be submitted to the French Parliament, will indeed leave open all possibilities for the future with due respect for the wishes of the peoples" [9th meeting, para. 116/. . 101. This, of course, is what we can very well call highly diplomatic language which affords a glimpse of certain openings without, however, indicating any specific commit- ment. However France has given other examples illustrating its capacity to give life to the principles which made it great and which can still ensure its prestige throughout the world. The quarrel over which it wants now to involve the young Comorian State is not worthy of France. It is for this reason we appeal to the French Government to remain faithful to the position which the first magistrate of the French Republic had clearly outlined when he wondered: " ... was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have for its inhabi- tants, should retain a different status? " His own answer was that the Comoros were indivisible. This is also our opinion: "The Comoros are indivisible."
The question which is being considered in the General Assembly has already been the subject of review at another United Nations forum, namely the Security Council, during the course of this year. The delegation of my country, like many other delegations, closely followed the discussions which were held when the Comoros submitted its complaint to the Security Council because of the unilateral measures taken by France against the unity of the Comorian islands on separating the island of Mayotte from that group of islands, submitting argu- ments on the basis of the results of a referendum in which a minority of the inhabitants of the Comoro islands voted to remain with France. 103. As a result of that referendum and of the legal dialogue, and in accordance with the United Nations Charter, a draft resolution was submitted on a constitu- tional basis by a group of friendly non-aligned countries which, however, never saw the light of day in this century of enlightenment and in the last quarter of the twentieth century, which has seen the triumph of the national liberation movements and people gaining their right to self-determination, freedom, sovereignty and independence. It never saw the light of day because of the French veto. Now the question is being considered at this forum in the General Assembly comprising 145 States representing the entire world. 104. I do not wish to reiterate here all the arguments and convincing proof which are so factual and which have been 105. We express our whole-hearted wish that the necessary human and cultural relations will prevail so that a dialogue may be held on the basis of truth, justice and the law. My delegation, in contributing to this dialogue, bases itself on the following considerations. First, the Comorian people constitute a complete and complementary unit from a political, human and geographical point of view. This unanimity has been expressed and was endorsed in the popular referendum which was held in December 1974 with the participation of 94 per cent of the population of the Comoros which chose unity, independence and sovereignty. Secondly, the Republic of Comoros was recognized and welcomed on the national and international levels in November 1975, that is to say a year ago. This happened on the basis of the territorial unity and integrity of the Comoros as a sovereign and independent State. Thirdly, any constitutional or legal justification which France might introduce in respect of the referendum it imposed, in February and April of this year, is in no way convincing and in no way in accord with contemporary human and political evolution. On the contrary, as has been stated by the non-aligned countries at their summit meeting and at the Colombo Conference in which my country participated, this is aggression against the people of the Comoros and a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 106. My delegation, in proclaiming this, at the same time expresses its sincere hope that France-that cradle of human rights and of public freedoms, which after the great French Revolution affirmed the sacred rights of human beings and which has consistently given proof of its support for texts on human rights in Asia and Africa-will proceed along its cultural and civilizing course in all future negotiations with the part of the Comoros which we are now discussing. 107. France must respect the sovereignty and the political and geographical unity of the Republic of the Comoros and remove its troops from the island of Mayotte, thus adding to its cultural prestige and earning respect from the international community. This we would view with much appreciation and sympathy. 108. My delegation is pleased to state that the Syrian Arab Republic automatically joins the Arab and non-aligned and other friendly countries which have proclaimed that they are prepared to give every support-economic, cultural, scientific or other-to the Comoros so that that young Republic may be able to overcome every obstacle it encounters and to assume all its economic, social and political responsibilities.
Mr. Jamal QAT Qatar [Arabic] #302
The people of the Republic of the Comoros has expressed its will by an overwhelming majority of over 95 per 112. This situation also contradicts the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which very clearly proclaimed that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 113. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the four islands of the Comorian Republic chose independence, and the percentage of the vote was very high; it was over 95 per cent, as I have already said. In other words, 287,000 persons voted in favour of the independence of this country and its territorial integrity, while approximately 9,000 of its inhabitants, on the island of Mayotte, were opposed to the will expressed by the majority of the population. We feel, therefore, that it is not logical that the vote of that minority should be taken as a pretext and that France, which has always favoured equality, freedom and fraternity and which has such close ties with the African and Arab countries, should engagein the dismemberment of a nation. Here I want to refer to the statement made by President Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic, at a press conference on 24 October 1974, when he said: "{The Comoros] are an archipelago which constitutes a single entity.... The population is homogeneous, with practically no people of French origin, or only very few ... was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have for its inhab- itants, should retain a different status? "I believe that one must accept contemporary realities. The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate, even if some of them... may have wanted a different solution." 114. The cultural and historic links between the Republic of the Comoros and the Arab peoples prompt us to proclaim here the support of our country for all steps and "... that France respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the young State of the Comoros anti immediately withdraw its military occupation troops from the Comorian island of Mayotte". 115. We launch an appeal to our friend the Government of France; it is our friend. We also appeal to all countries which favour freedom and independence to exert every effort to preserve and to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Comoros so that the Republic of the Comoros may plan an active role in the international community and so that it can again proceed along the path of its social and economic development, which is so necessary. In conclusion, may I proclaim here the total support of my country for the Government and people of the Comoros in their struggle to preserve the unity, independence and territorial integrity of that country, and we hope that this debate on this matter will bring about a durable and just solution. I also wish to state that we are prepared to co-operate in any joint effort aimed at fulfilling the ideals which are basic to this Organization.
Since the Security Council considered the matter without arriving at a conclusion, we are bound to note with regret that the question of Mayotte has in no way developed in a direction that can lead us to expect an early solution. 117. The problem remains in its entirety and may even be said to have been made more complicated by France's determination to evoke the results of popular consultations which were illegally organized. In this regard, the response of the African heads of State and Government can leave no room for misunderstanding. They have condemned and declared null and void the so-called referendums of 8 February and 11 April 1976. They reject outright any other form of referendum or consultation which might later be organized by France in the Comorian territory of Mayotte, and any law or regulation adopted by a French legislative or government authority having the effect of legalizing any French colonial presence in that island. 118. In other words, the countries members of OAU remain opposed to any unilateral solution arbitrarily imposed by France in regard to a problem which the latter itself does not consider to be solved. 120. It all started by the resort to an electoral technique, apparently innocent, but which contains within it possi- bilities of unilateral interpretation running counter to the assurances given to the Comorians. In fact, law no. 74-965 of 23 November 1974 organizing the consultation of the Comorian populations provided that the results would be classified by electoral districts, which is a normal procedure since the territory of the Comoros is divided into four electoral districts corresponding to the four main islands. 121. The Comorian authorities, reticent at the outset because of the wording of the law and a provision which would enable the French Parliament to decidewhat follow-up to give to the results, nevertheless went along with the formula because they thought in all good faith that the unitary entity of the Comoro archipelago was ensured under point 4 of the joint Franco-Comorian declaration of 15 June 1973. 122. It must also be added that the statements made by the French Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories and of the President of the French Republic, dated respectively 26 August and 24 October 1974-that is to say, before the vote on the law on the referendum-gave the Comorian Govemment formal assur- ances as to the intentions of France to recognize the homogeneity and joint destiny of the Comorian people, to preserve the unity which has always characterized the Comoro archipelago and to respect its territorial integrity. 123. In this respect it is fitting to point out that the law of 23 November 1974, despite its imperfect wording, was in accord with the spirit of these Government declarations, because nowhere did the text state that the French Parliament was to consider the results of the consultation island by island. The consultation washeld on 22 December 1974: the results were announced on an over-all basis, the break-down of votes by electoral district was given for reference purposes and for the classification needs of the census and evaluation commission. 124. The Government of the Comoros readied itself confidently to start the transitional period provided for in the joint declaration of 15 June 1973 when those who defend French presence at all costs, instead of strictly and honestly adhering to the official reeults proclaimed, sought 125. This initial provocation found its ultimate expression in law no, 75-560 of 3 July 1975 regarding the indepen- dence of the Territory of the Comoros. In this new law, new conditions which were not in the joint declaration and still less in no. 74-965 of 23 November 1974 were placed by the administering Power on the accession to indepen- dence of the Territory of the Comoros, which was still considered to be a single entity. 126. Under that law, the draft constitution was to be adopted island by island; the preservation and affirmation of the rights and interests of regional entities became a constitutional guarantee of the political and administrative personality of the islands, imposed moreover by a Parlia- ment to which the Constituent Assembly of the Comoros was no longer responsible, as provided for in the transi- tional period. In a desire for compromise, the Comorian authorities accepted a constitutional committee with organic or legal ties to French State bodies, but did not wish to subscribe to a policy skilfully presented as apparently complying with constitutional forms but really intended simply to politicize a division which had until then been administrative and to destroy the unity and territorial integrity of a country. 127. It is not surprising therefore that on 29 June 1975, before the law wasenacted, the Chamber of Deputies of the Comoros, by 30 votes to 2-seven deputies, including five from Mayotte, 001"'8 absent-rejected the proposals of the French Government and adopted a four-point resolution regarding in particular the drafting of a Constitution andits adoption after, and not before, independence. 128. This act of the Chamber of Deputies was ignored although, under article 28 of law 68-04 of 3 January 1968 on the specific organization of the Comorian territory, the act could in no way be construed as jeopardizing national defence or the maintenance of extemal security, both of which remain within the non-exclusive competence of the French State during the transitional period. This was 'i second manifest provocation by France, since the law on independence was to be enacted only four days after its formal rejection by the appropriate Comorian authority. 129. It is therefore inaccurate to have us believe that the law of 3 July 1975 established a procedure which was accepted by the parties and that the proclamation of independence on 6 July 1975 was contrary to that proce- dure which, incidentally, was prepared unilaterally. 130. The third provocation of France was to install in the Mayotte district, an integral part of the independent State of Comoros, a representative of the Government of France on 14 July 1975, encouraging the authorities of the district to expel 2,000 Comorians, a number of which curiously coincides with the 20 per cent of the votes which were needed for the Mouvement mahorais at the time of the consultation with the people of 22 December 1974. 131. It has been affirmed that France took note serenely of the proclamation of independence of the Comoros. But 132. Independence has been proclaimed; the international community has recognized that this included all four islands of the archipelago. This independence, though not recognized by France, has legal effects at the international level which no Member of the United Nations can evade, if only because of a moral obligation which remains the most valid and most acceptable form of obligation required by the Charter. 133. Thus Mayotte, from 6 July 1975, is no longer a territory of the French Republic; were it so, it would at best be governed by law number 68-04 of 3 January 1968. However, such a hypothesis is untenable, since this law can and must be considered as null and void on the signature of the joint declaration of 15 June 1973. France has sought to justify its position by the action of five deputies out of 39, and by the votes of an electorate representing 5 per cent of the votes cast in the entire archipelago. We cannot agree that the international community should be brought to accept law number 75-1337 of 31 December 1975, on the consequences of self-determination for the Comoro islands, as a substitute for the expression of the sovereignty of the Comorian people, as manifested in this proclamation of independence and in the vote on 22 December 1974. 134. It is this claim that constitutes the fourth deliberate provocation by France. Two weeks after the suspension of negotiations, on 15 October 1975, the French authorities had already made known their intention to dismember the Comorian ·Territory by giving the people of Mayotte an opportunity to adopt a status which could even ignore the gains of internal autonomy. We know what happened afterwards: the so-called referendums of 8 February and 11 April 1976 were organized despite the unanimous protests of the international community and, in particular, of the independent African States and their friends. 135. I have listed in detail the four serious and clear-cut provocations for which the French Government is respon- sible towards the Comorian people. Exemplary patience, or the blindness of bad faith, is needed not to see that these threats to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros is a form of aggression worse than armed aggression, because it is more insidious and adorns itself with pseudo-legalsad pseudo-historical arguments. 136. Is this how France intends to respect the principle of self-determination for Mayotte: the self-determination which France speaks of is not the one we mean, whether according to resolution 1514 (XV) or according to United Nations practice and jurisprudence. Without bringing up the case of certain peripheral regionsof France, I should like to refer to the experience of my country in September 1958. Seventy-eight per cent of the Malagasy population had voted in favour of the referendum proposed by the French Government on the future of the then colonial territories. The negative votes and abstentions amounted to 57 per 137. By wishing at all costs to satisfy a minority, France has ignored the legitimate and validly expressed aspirations of the majority, which by a singlular turnabout is reduced to agreeing that these rights be neither recognized nor respected. 138. In the Security Council, and here again today, France has sought to question the homogeneity of the Comoro archipelago by insisting on the individual character of each island and on the argument that the unity of the Territory was derived from measures taken for reasons of adminis- trative convenience. The reply is clear; it was given by the President of the French Republic on 24 October 1974, and I shall quote it again: "The population [of the Comorcs] is homogeneous, with practically no people of French origin, or only very few... was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have for its inhabi- tants, should retain a different status? "I believe that one must accept contemporary realities. The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate, even if some of them... may have wanted a different solution. "On the occasion of the attainment of independence by a Territory, it is not for us to propose to shatter the unity of what has always been the single Comoro archipelago." 139. I do not think that these remarks by the highest political authority in France need to be ratified by the French Parliament to remain fully relevant, particularly since they are' also in accord with the terms of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as follows: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." To maintain the contrary would be to give the measure of the omnipotence of the French Parliament, as well as that of its fallibility and vulnerability to mischievous pressures, which is amply demonstrated in this particular case and which cannot be resolved by substituting the responsibility of one political institution for that of another. 140. It is further argued that France in all these operations has no special interests to defend. The delegation of Madagascar r"grets that it cannot share this opinion. The 142. As may be seen, the problem of Mayotte has complex ramifications, and an aggravation of tensions in that subregion would have serious repercussions in the Indian Ocean region, which we have declared to be a zone of peace. 143. The United Nations cannot derogate from the provisions decided on for the Comoros. The Comorian State has its justification in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, narticularly resolutions S/1514 (XV), 3161 (XXVIII), 3291 (XXIX), and 3385 (XXX). 144. The Comorian State requests that the principles of sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity be strictly complied with and that the commitments assumed to this end by the highest authorities of the former administering Power be honoured without restrictions or conditions. 146. Since France alone in this Assembly questions the territorial composition of the sovereign State of the Comoros, it is for us solemnly and unanimously to indicate to France that it is futile to do violence to realities and to accommodate private interests, the permanence and validity of which are highly questionable. 147. The present problem of Mayotte could have been avoided if the opinion of the French Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories had been accepted when he declared in 1974 that the problem wasan internal Cemorian problem. In all fairness, we cannot say that the responsibility for the contradictions, misunderstandings and distortions of the situation is to be laid on the Comorian authorities, who reaffirmed even after 6 July 1975 that they would respect the particular character of the islands and grant them greater autonomy. The Comoros are turning to us so that we may help them to safeguard their independence-an authentic expression of that personality which the French'colonialist and neo-colonialist circles are continuing to deny them in the name of falsely universal principles and because of a deep misunderstanding of Comorian reality, We must help them; this is only justice! The.meetingrose at 5.55 p.m.