A/37/PV.120 General Assembly

It is with deep regret that the delegation of Haiti has learned of the death of the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations. We should like to express our sincere condolences to the relatives and family of the deceased, and request you, Mr. President, to convey to them our feeling of deep loss and sympathy. 3. The Assembly's consideration of the question of Cyprus once again brings before the States Members of the United Nations one of the thorniest problems of our time, which private interests constantly use to the detriment of both parts of the populati~n of the island of Cyprus. This leads to a situation the persistence of which prolongs the indescribable sufferings of the peo- ple and further endangers international peace and security. 4. The history of peoples offers many examples of ethnic groups to which force of circumstances or geographic chance offers no option but peaceful coexistence. This is root~d in a kind of social contract according to which- individual interest is subordinated to the imperious need to find a modus \'il'endi which will guarantee the well-being of all. 5. The case of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities is therefore nothing new. In- deed, they were very naturally called upon, as time passed, to overcome the divergences born of their different cultural experiences and to find the harmony 2015 A/37/PV.120 NEW YORK which is so essential to progress and collective well- being. There can be no doubt that, free from any external constraint, they would finally have under- stood the need to find this balance, the path that leads to conciliation and reconciliation. Unfortunately, the intervention of an army of occupation, in flagrant violation of fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, has resulted in the systematic destruction of the efforts undertaken. 6. The tragedy of which the island of Cyprus is the arena touches the people of Haiti particularly, because it has had the harsh experience of foreign occupation in the past. No one can better understand the suf- fering involved and the deep feelings of frustration than the victims themselves. 7. That is why my delegation deplores the fact that the intercommunal talks have stalled at present, although they still seem to be the b~st way offinding a solution acceptable to all. We appeal to the parties to demonstrate more flexibility, as well as a spirit of conciliation, and to allow themselves to be guided only by the concern to put an end to the tragedy which afflicts the inhabitants of the island. 8. My delegation believes that the withdrawal of the occupying forces is the most urgent and meaningful step to be taken in order to arrive at a final comprehen- sive settlement of the question of Cyprus..This would have the dual advantage of effectively getting the process for a peaceful settlement under way and of checking the widely disseminated idea that the invasion troops consider their presence in Cyprus to be an irreversible occupation. 9. Finally, I wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation at some of the measures undertaken by the United Nations, among them the supervision of the cease-fire lines carried out by UNFICYP and other functions ofa humanitarian nature, such as the transfer of Greek Cypriots from the north to the south of the island. I appeal for a spirit of co-opemt!nn on the part of the parties in supporting the efforts of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and to giving that Committee all the necessary assistance in carrying out the mandate entrusted to it. 10. This is my delegation's position on the question of Cyprus. Concerted efforts by all, and in particular the parties concerned, under the auspices ofthe Secretary- General, are the course my delegation advocates, so that the island of Cyprus, free from any foreign interference, may recover its territorial integrity and its people may regain the~r outraged dignity. That is the wish of the Government and the people of Haiti, and it is without a doubt the dearest wish of the two communities which have to share in harmony the sover- eignty of the island of Cyprus. 16. My delegation has carefully studied draft reso- lution A/37/L.63. Unfortunately, the draft does not place sufficient emphasis on the urgency to find politi- cal breakthroughs within the context of the intercom- munal talks. My delegation is of the view that there is no alternative to the intercommunal forums, which should be conducted on the basis of the guidelines upon which the two parties have already agreed. It is therefore most unconstructive to attempt to interna- tionalize the Cyprus question as this will only con- tribute to the hardening of positions by the two negotiating parties. 17. The Government of Malaysia is firmly committed to the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. In this regard, we support the framework agreed upon by the two parties and carefully negotiated by Mr. Denkta§ and Archbishop Makarios, who was later succeeded by Mr. Kypriamm. We believe that the 18. My delegation welcomed the decision .of the General Assembly, taken at its I 16th meeting, to invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communi- ties an opportunity to express their views. Conversely, my delegation feels that the question of Cyprus can adequately be dealt with in the Special Political Committee and that a general debate on the problem is not likely to be useful. We should refocus our attention on the intercommunal talks and give our unstinting support to them, if a comprehensive, over- all settlement is eventually to be achieved. 19. Concerns have been expressed over what some chose to call "'an interruption" in the intercommunal talks. But such interruption was inevitable because of the complex nature of the negotiations. However, given the political will on both sides, my delegation is confident that the talks can be resumed. In this connection, my delegation would Eke to appeal to the two communities to show the necessary determination and good will to achieve a breakthrough which would greatly enhance peace and stability in that region. 20. The international community, if it is to be con- structive, should now attempt to bridge the gulfof mis- trust and suspicion pjaguing the two communities and to adopt an impartial approach, bearing in mind the sensitivities of both communities. The 19 May 1979 agreementI provides a good basis upon which to achieve this objective since it calls for direct negoti- ations between the two communities and goes a step further by calling upon the two parties involved to desist from taking steps which could prejudice the prospects of such negotiations. 21. Bearing in mind our commitment to the inter- communal talks as the only pragmatic avenue to the resolution of the Cyprus question, my delegation regrets it cannot support draft resolution A/37/L.63 because this draft will have the effect of impeding the goal of achieving peace and harmony in Cyprus. The adoption of such a draft resolution would not be conducive to building confidence and trust between the two communities, elements which are indeed pre- requisites in the searoh for ajust and lasting settlement of the problem. The draft resolution is also lopsided and partial, for it does not seem to take into account the views of the Turkish Cypriots, one of the principal actors in the Cyprus drama.

I have already expressed, at the be- ginning of the thirty-seventh session, our congratu- lations, Sir, on your election as President, and I now avail myself of this opportunity to express to you our good wishes for success in your leadership of this resumed session and my hopes that, und~ your wise guidance, we may reach just decisions that take into account the interests of the Republic of Cyprus and the legitimate rights of the two communities involved. 43. It was in response to an invitation of the Govern- ment of the Republic of Cyprus that the Contact Group of the non-aligned countries went to Nicosia after the New Delhi Conference. On that occasion. we met President Kyprianou and held talks with the Foreign Minister and his close associates. W,e also ~et Mr. Denkta~, the representative of the Turkish CYPflot community, and his close associates. Lastly, we were in touch with families of missing persons and groups of refugees of the two communities. 44. The mission concentrated its attention on the possibility of creating better conditions for the inter- communal talks to continue so that a solution accept- able to all the parties could be found promptly under the auspices of the Secretary-General. In this respect, we are pleased to note the renewed willingness of the Secretary-General to participate in this en- deavour. as stated in his report: ·'It is my intention to strengthen my personal involvement within the framework of my mission of good offices. In particular, I shall make every effort to give fresh impetus to the negotiating process, following up the work done during the current phase of the negotiations. As I have reported on this subject to the Security Council, my efforts will seek to encourage the parties to develop an overall synthesis covering the rem~ining major unresolved issues, and I and my Specaal Representative shall do 0111' utmost to assist them in this endeavour," [Ibid., para. 5.] 45. This is precisely one of the essential components of draft resolution A/37jL.63, submitted by the seven members of the Contact Group and co-sponsored by some thirty delegations. 46. The Contact Group, in preparing this draft reso- lution, was guided by two basic and equally in- dispensable considerations. The first lies in the .in- tangible principles which must be recalled and which constitute the basis of the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on the question. These re~wlutions" . 47. The second basic consideration motivating the Contact Group was the desire to promote and en- courage all possibilities for a definitive settlement of the question. The emphasis was thus laid on the inter- communal talks, which we firmly believe in and which seem to us clearly the best way to end the crisis once and for all. This is the purpose of paragraph 10 of draft resolution A/37/L.63, which recapitulates paragraph 8 of resolution 34/30 but also refers to relevant United Nations resolutions and to the high- level agreements adopted in 1977 and 1979. hi para- graph 10, the General Assembly: "Calls for meaningful, result-oriented, con- structive and substantive negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to be conducted freely and on an equal footing, on the basis of retevant United Nations resolutions and the high- Jevel agreements, with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities.,. 48. Similarly, we have emphasized the crucial role that the Secretary-General could play. In paragraph 16 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly: ••We/comes the intention of the Secretary-Gen- eral, as expressed in his report, to pursue a renewed personal involvement in the quest for a solution of the Cyprus problem and, in view of this, requests the Secretary-General to undertake such actions or initiatives as he may consider appropriate within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council for promoting a just and iilsting solution of the problem and to report to the General·Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the results of his efforts." 49. The group of sponsors on whose behalf I have the honour to speak hopes that this draft resolution, which, while recalling the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. attempts to strike a balance, will enjoy broad support in this Assembly. 50. Mr. KIRCA.(Turkey): We have just learned with sadness of the sudden death of the Permanent Rep- rest:ntative of the Mongolian People's Republic. We extend our condolences to Mr. Narkhuu's family, to the members of the Permanent Mission of Mongolia, to his Government and to his country, with which, once, Turks shared a common and glorious history. 51. The Government ofTurkey approaches the pres- ent debate on the question of Cyprus with some misgivings. What concerns us is the damage !his iII- conceived exercise could do to the prospects of the 54. We must all augment the desire and the capacity of the two communities to negotiate. Unless the out- come of the present exercise is balanced and positive, however, it will be rather difficult to avoid a set-back in the current effort to resolve the question ofCyprus. 55. This, then, is our general understanding of this debate on the question of Cyprus..I should first like to dwell on how the Greek side views the Cyprus problem and to offer an analysis of some of the prin- cipal elements of the Greek point of view. I shall then present the Turkish position on the subject. 56. First, let us see what the main theses of the Greek side are. The foundation of the Greek posture is that the problem of Cyprus came intp being because Turkey committed aggression aga~nst the Republic of Cyprus in 1974 and that the question exists today because Turkish troops still occupy part ofits territory. 57. For the Greeks, the Turkish Cypriots, numbering more than 150,000 in a total population of slightly more than half a million, are but one of several ethnic minority groups in Cyprus, such as the Maronites and the Armenians. The Greeks seem to feel, there- fore, that the Turkish Cypriot community should be treated only as a minority and accorded only those rights which are appropriate to that status. 58. Secondly, let us examine what, according to the Greek side, is impeding a solution. To begin with, the Greeks suggest that the negotiations between the two communities have produced no results and that no progress has been achieved, all as the result ofTurkish intransigence. The Greek side also asserts that, unl~ss the Turkish troops are withdrawn first, the inter- communal negotiations cannot su~ceed and are doomed to failure. Hence, the Greek side advocates the constant internationalization of the Cyprus issue 59. Thirdly, let us understand what the objecti~e of the Greek side is concerning Cyprus. The pre-emment fact about the Greek attitude is that Greece regards Cyprus as Greek in character and vi~ws it as an i.ntegral part of the Greek motherland. ThiS posture IS very much in conformity with the sinister precepts of the Megali idea-that is, the dream of regaining the lands of the Byzantine Empire at its zenith. Thus, even the Greek Cypriot struggle against the British was originally intended and conceived of ~s a fight not for independence but rather for the umon of Cyprus with mainland Greece-that is, enosis. 60. Lastly, let us look at what the Greek side is proposing as a solution fo.r Cyprus. The ~reeks call for the withdrawal offorelgn troops from the Island and the restoration of its sovereignty, unity and ter- ritorial integrity. They propose the compl~te demili- tarization of the island. In order to achieve these results, they ask that the resolutions of the United Nations and the decisions of the Movement of Non- Aligned Countries be implemented. Turkey, according to the Greeks, must be made to abide by them. 61. These then are the principal components of the Greek and Greek Cypriot position on the question of Cyprus. While there might have been differen,:es between'Greek leaders in Athens and Greek Cypriot leaders in Nicosia on given aspects of the Cyprus issue in the past and there might still be some now and in the future, these differences are never fun- damental nor are they long-lasting. There is, for all practical 'purposes, a single Greek position on this matter. 62. Now let us examine together the foundations and the verity of the elements of the Greek position on Cyprus as we have just identified th~m. Can the island of Cyprus be regarded as Greek m character by virtue of its history, or, iJ.ldeed, .by ~ny. other pertinent criterion? To answer thiS question, It might be useful first to establish the facts about Cyprus and delineate the milestones of its evolution. 63. I shall begin with the most elemental historical fact about Cyprus. The island has never in its history come under the direct rule of Greece or the Greeks. In the early stages ofits history, Cyprus was dominated by a variety of races and cultures. In more rec~nt history, Cyprus successively formed part ofthe Persian and Roman Empires. 64. Before the island was conquered by the Turks in 1571 to be made part of the Ottoman Empire, it had been a Venetian dependency. The Venetian influence had, in turn, been preceded by the French ~usigna.n Knights in the 13t:-t, 14th and f5th centuries until 1489. The Ottoman rule in Cyprus lasted for more than 300 years, until the administration of the island was transferred to Great Britain in 1878. The island was recognized as a Britis~ colony in 1923. and re- mained so until 1960, when mdependence arrived and the Republic of Cyprus came into being. Histo~cally, then Cyprus was never part of Greece, nor was It ever ruled directly by the Greeks. This is the first truth about Cyprus. 66. Following the arrival of the Turks, the pre- ponderant majority of the population of Cyprus was always composed of two culturally, ethnically and religiously different and distinct. p.eoples-the Muslim Turks and the Orthodox Christian Greeks. There never has been and there is not now in Cyprus a single ··Cypriot" nation. There have always been two separate communities, Turks and Greeks, that are but microcosms of the two mother nations. Each community has more in common with its respective national entity than it does with the other, in spite ofthe fact that they have lived together in this small island for almost half a millenium. 67. Indeed, the story of Cyprus is ultimately the story of the interplay of these two communities, and the evolution of the island's history cannot be understood fully and properly except in terms of this relationship between the Turks and Greeks and the consequences of this relationship over time. The emergence of Cyprus as an independen~ Sta.te .must also be viewed in its proper context, that IS, wlthm the framework of the status of the Turks and Greeks l'is-ii-l';S each other "in Cyprus. 68. According to the Cyprus Mail of 28 March 1963, it was none other than this truth to which Arch- bishop Makarios was attesting when he revealed.with surprising candor his conception of the newly mde- pendent Cyprus: "No Greek who knows me can ever believe that I would wish to work for the creation of a Cypriot national awareness. The Agreements have created a State, but not a nation". 69. Herein lies the paradox. The Greeks have never relinquished their misc~nceived dream that Cyprus is Greek and that it should belong to Greece. Yet Cyprus has never been Greek nor has it ever belonged to Greece. Let us take one more glimpse at history. 70. The agitation and the armed struggle waged by the Greek Cypriots against the British was, according to well-publicized statements of their leaders, aim~d at uniting the island with Greece. In order to attam this openly declared objective, the underground Greek Cypriot organization EOKA murdered more th~n 800 Greek, British and Turkish opponents of enosls between 1955 and 1958 alone. 71. The Greek campaign to achieve enosis was, however, not confined to Cyprus alone: Greece further engaged in more insidious schemes for the rea!iza!ion of the same objective in an effort to use the Umted Nations as a stepping-stone to claim the island. Greece first brought the question of Cyprus to the United 76. That was 10 years ago, and it was a Greek Cypriot leader. Today it is Mr. Karamanlis, the President of Greece, who only a month ago recited the same theme on the occasion ofan official dinnerfor Mr. Kyprianou, when he pointed Qut that: •·Cyprus should have been given its independence in 1960 to develop into an exemplary east Mediter- ranean State without dismissing the hope for enosis"-that is, union with Greece-··undercertain prerequisites." That was in the Athens News Agency Bulletin of 7 April 1983. 77. The words of President Karamanlis speak for themselves. The irony is that it was the same Mr. Kara- 78. However, to this psycho-historical dimension there is a very practical corollary that further explains the persistence of Greek leaders in their pursuit of enosis. According to the warped logic of enosis, Cyprus is a Greek island, and the presence ofa Turkish community is therefore an incidental fact of secondary importance, at worst an obstacle that must be over- come or removed, if necessary, no matter what the cost. That is why, in the period prior to the gaining of statehood and independence by Cyprus in 1960, the Greek Cypriots, in their endeavours to achieve enosis, ran into opposition not only from the British but also from the Turks. For the Turkish Cypriots, enosis meant the replacement of the British by the un- predictable and hostile Greeks. Enosis would have meant for the Turks being deprived of their human rights and would have subjected their lives and secu- rity to the whims of the Greek majority. It is not sur- prising, therefore, that the Turkish Cypriots resisted all Greek designs and attempts at enosis. This is why the Turkish Cypriots became victims of EOKA, with hundreds of them losing their lives, 6,000 of them being turned into refugees and 33 of their villages being completely destroyed by the Greeks between 1955 and 1958. The Turkish Cypriots knew that, in order to preserve their status as a national community equal to that of the Greek Cypriot community, the union of Cyprus with Greece had to be rigorously opposed and prevented. The Turkish resistance to enosis was consequently one of the main factors contributing to the eventual establishment ofa new and independent Republic based on the equal partnership ofthe Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. 79. It is to the last two decades that I now wish to turn. The Republic of Cyprus came into being in 1960 after protracted negotiations between the Turkish and Greek communities ofthe island, as well as among Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. 80. If we are to name the defining feature of the new Cypriot State, taking into account its Constitution and the international treaties that brought it into being, we must without a doubt refer to its bi-national charac- ter. It was the fact of the existence of two national communities that determined the conduct, the substance and the final outcome of the negotiations in London and :n Zurich in 1959, resulting in the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. 81. It was this same reality that had determined all relations on the island for centuries. This parameter dominated all the important facets of the Constitution of the new State and all major arrangements for· the internal and external life of the Republic. The execu- tive, legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the State were all based on the principle ofthe status of equality between the two communities. The Turkish Cypriots were assured the same power as the Greek Cypriots in the realms of foreign relations, defence and security and were given autonomy in managing their communal affairs in cities, towns and villages. Thus, the principle of bi-communality cut through all layers of life in Cyprus, and the constitutional 83. That obligation was accepted by the Republic of Cyprus not only in article 182 of its own Constitution but also in the Treaty of Guarantee of 16 August 1960,4 to which Turkey, Greece and the United King- dom were also parties as guaranteeing Powers. This unique arrangement gave the Basic Articles of the Constitution the validity and force of contractual rules of international law above and beyond their status as domestic constitutional law. 84. It is essential to keep in mind that the Greek Cypriots began to agitate against the state of affairs created by the 1960 agreements, regarding them as contrary to their national aspirations from the very start. The aim of the Greek Cypriots was to subjugate the Turkish Cypriots, while constantly challenging and trying to change the basic constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, it was the failure of the Greek Cypriot leaders to abide by their obligations under their own Constitution and under the Treaty of Guarantee that eventually and ultimately led to the emergence of the problem of Cyprus as we know it today, not the Turkish intervention of 1974, as is alleged. 85. On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios made sweeping proposals, consisting of 13 different points, for amendment of the Constitution, including the proposal to eliminate the powers of the Turkish Vice-President, as well as the abolition of separate municipalities and of the Communal Chambers. When the Turkish side rejected those proposals, to no one's surprise, since their acceptance would also have entailed the amending of some of the Basic Articles and thus the restructuring ofthe foundations ofgovern- ment, Archbishop Makarios retaliated by proceeding to apply'them unilaterally. This was nothing other than a coup against the Constitution and the total disruption of the established state of affairs, and thus rendered Archbishop Makarios and all his successors in govern- ment henceforth illegal and illegitimate. 86. This pursuit of the destruction of the bi-com- munal nature of the Republic became acute and espe- cially dangerous after 21 December 1963, threatening the very existence and survival ofthe Turkish Cypriots. On that day, the Greeks launched the infamous Akritas Plan, which was designed to accomplish nothing less than the overthrow of the existing constitutional order through-the complete elimination ofTurkish resistance by all means, including the use of force, as it rep- resented an impediment to their goals. Details of that plan may be found in the official records of the Security Council.5 Again, in 1967, the Turkish Cypriot community ~as threatened very gravely and its very survival was at stake. 89. It was this mechanism provided by the Treaty of Guarantee that Turkey resorted to again in 1974 before carrying out its obligations under international treaties and law. But I shall come to that historic event in a short while. 90. The misery and the suffering of the member.s of the Turkish Cypriot community, especially be- tween 1963 and 1974, are too painful and their in- ventory is too long to recall here in this Assembly. But it must never be forgotten that the Turks of Cyprus were murdered, persecuted, deprived of their fundamental human rights and property and denied, in a capricious and arbitrary manner, even the basic necessities of life for more than a decade. 91. The world at that time looked on and remained impervious to the tragedy being staged on that small island, wrongly believing that what was happening there was purely an internal matter and of no concern to outsiders. While it provided some temporary and limited relief, even. the introduction in 1964 of UNFICYP could not put an end to the oppression and persecution of the Turkish Cypriot. community by the Greek Cypriot community. The New York Tribune reported on 16 September 1964 "degrading subhuman standards of life" in Cyprus for the Turks, a fact even more forcefully corroborated by the Secretary-General himself in his report to the Security Council of 10 September 1964: "The conclusion seems warranted that the eco- nomic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances have been so severe as to amount to a veritable .siege, indicate that the Government of Cyprus"-I mean the Greek Cypriot Government, of course- "seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action."6 94. Pending an overaIi solution of the Cyprus ques- tion and until such time as the new structures of the Republic are agreed upon by the two communities within a federal framework, the Turkish Cypriot community, by having already created one of the two pillars of the future federal structures of the Republic, is in reality demonstrating its commitment to the existence and independence ofthe Republic ofCyprus. 95. The reality ofthe Turkish Federated Statefurther- more invokes the question of whether there exists today a legitimate Government ofCyprus. Thequestion may be asked: Why does Turkey not recognize Mr. Kyprianou and his Ministers as the Government of Cyprus? This is an important question. In this regard, we have been meticulously consistent in our position from the very inception of this question. What then is the Turkish position on this issue? 96. To begin with, we should like to reaffirm that Turkey respects the sovereignty, independence, ter- ritorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. We thus· recognize the legal existence of the Republic of Cyprus as an entity of international law. So does the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. But we recognize no existing organ that legally or legiti- mately represents this State in international relations; nor does the Turkish Cypriot community. In our view, there currently exists no legitimate body which can be validly recognized as the Government ofthe Repub- lic of Cyprus. 97. The Greek Cypriot leaders have, since late 1963, continued to usurp this title, even through they sabotaged the constitutional regime at that time and completely destroyed its foundations by challenging and violating its Basic Articles. What today presents itself as the Government of Cyprus is, therefore, in fact the administration of the Greek Cypriots and represents only the Greek Cypriot community. The affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community are managed by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and ~nly 102. The peace operation by Turkey consequently had as its primary objective "re-establishing the state of affairs" created by the Treaty of Guarantee, including those conditions created by the Basic Articles of the Constitution. Simply put, Turkey sought to restore the independence of Cyprus and a legal con- 112. It is quite simple. The Turkish Cypriots will not again be abandoned to the malice and vagaries of the Greeks. Until such time as a lasting political settlement is achieved, with the necessary guarantees, and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community is ensured, the Turkish troops will remain there. But let me hasten to add that we also believe that a political settlement envisaging a federal, bi-com- munal and bi-zonal stru~ture would lead, as the natural corollary, to the withdrawal of troops from the Republic of Cyprus on the basis of security arrangements to be agreed upon by the parties con- cerned. 113. We have recently heard calls from Athens, repeated also by the Greek Cypriot leaders, for the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the expansion of UNFICYP-the cost of which, we are told, would be financed by Greece, according to Mr. Papandreou, the Prime Minister of.Greece. We believe that such unrealistic and flippant suggestions do not do justice to the serious problems we have in Cyprus and that they make ~ mockery of the peace-finding process. It should not be forgotten that during the decade preceding 1974, whenever they wanted to harass the Turkish Cypriots the Greek Cypriots always rendered UNFICYP completely powerless. The Greek Cypriots simply ignored the United Nations troops as they .chose, and the Turks remained as vulnerable as ever. 115. What, we ask, is the Turkish Cypriot com- munity to do in response to a determined, relentless and continual Greek Cypriot effort aimed at depriving its members of their means of livelihood and at sub- jugating it through economic pressure? The Turkish Cypriot community, as any self-respecting people would do in such circumstances, is trying to ensure its economic survival and well-being, in dignity, and with the limited resources available to it. The Turkish Cypriots will not succumb to the economic embargo imposed on them by the Greek Cypriots and sustained through their unabashed abuse of the self-styled title of "Government ofCyprus" . The Greek Cypriots should desist from hostile acts against the Turkish Cypriots and cultivate instead ties of friendship and co-operation. 116. There is, in this context, one other aspect of the Greek Cypriot allegations which, for the benefit only of this body, might be worth answering. The Greek Cypriots claim that the territory of the Turkish Cypriot community belongs not to the Turkish Cypriots but to the Greek Cypriots. The more contrived formulation of this same point is that, and I quote from a document, "the Government of Cyprus should be enabled to exercise its authority throughout its entire territory and to enjoy fully its resources". What does this mean as far as north Cyprus is con- cerned? It means that as soon as they regain control of north Cyprus the Greek Cypriot armed forces, headed by a Greek general and Greek officers from Greece, will enter and occupy the area-that is, north Cyprus-and the Turkish Cypriots would be under the rule and occupation ofGreek Cypriot troops, who in turn would be commanded by mainland Greek army officers. Why, for any reason, should Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot community ever allow such a thing to happen? Naturally, this will never happen. 117. In Cyprus today, the two national communities live in their respective zones, the Turkish in the north and the Greek in the south. With the popu- lation exchange agreement of 1975 conduded in Vienna between the two communities and its implementation under the supervision of the United Nations, perhaps the primary source of intercommunal tension and con- flict, namely, the obligation to live in mixed areas or in enclaves surrounded by the other COIT .munity, 122. Cyprus is an issue that has been on the agenda of the United Nations since 1954. It is most instructive to note that it is the only such issue with regard to which the principal sides are engaged in direct, comprehensive and substantive negotiations with a view to reaching an overall political settlement. The same cannot be said for many of the other issues now before the international community. 123. The Greek side protests that the intercommunal negotiations are useless since they have not resulted in concrete progress. The Greeks then proceed to the ~ngagl~d in the enterprise of finding a solution. In his report to the Security Council of 15 June 1982, the Secretary-General states: "The interlocutors have succeeded in arriving at common formulations of the 'points of coincidence' in a number of cases. In addition, there has been a significant narrowing of differences as r~gards many of the general provisions of the Constitu.tion as well as of the articles concerning fundamental rights and liberties and certain organs of the federal government. The atmosph1ere has been co- operative and constmcti~e throughout, as acknowl- edged by both interiocutors- The process is con- tinuing at a deliberate but reasonable pace, which mmeover has now been accelerated to two meetings a week." 12 126. At the risk of stating the obvious, I should like to say that, on the subject of Cyprus, we prefer the objectivity of the Secretary-General to other quarters. 127. In the past year, the Greek Cypriots have been requesting eit.her the slowing down of the pace of intercommunaR negotiations or their temporary suspension, for a different reason each time. First, it was the Greek Cypriot presid\,;ntial election that led to a signifiednt diminution in the intensity of the negotiations during the summer of 1982. Then the Seventh Confe:renc~ of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March,.was present~d by the Greek Cypriot side as grounds for suspending the talks in February and March. The last occasion on which the Greek C./priot side requested an intet'mission in the talks was at the last meeting of the intercommunal negotiations, on 14 April 1983, when the Greek Cypriot interlocutor referred to such a. need in view of the forthcoming debate in the General Assembly. 129. Since 16 Septemberl 1982, th~re have been only 10 meetings and these were all devoted to an incon- ~equential general exchange of views. Once again, and at the request of the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, the intercommunal talks have been suspended until 31 May. Yet the Greek Cypriot leaders, in open defiance of the facts of the case, have the temerity then to go on to complain about lack of progress in the negotiations due to Turkish intransigence. We do not regard such behaviour as serious or responsible. 130. Why are the Greek Cypriots procrastinating and resorting to dilatory tactics? The answer to this question is of ~rJcial importance. The Greek Cypriots are trying to render ineffectual the process of inter- communal negotiations so as to be able to accuse the Turkish Cypriot side and the Government ofTurkey of obstructing progress and, much more significantly, to evade the prospect of having to continue to negotiate on the basis of the suggestions of the Secretary- General. The Greek Cypriots continue to give all indications of being most unhappy with the Secretary- General's ideas aimed at bringing about a just and lasting solution to the question of Cyprus. At the present stage it is the United Nations "evaluation" paper that the Greek Cypriot side wishes to do away with and to have placed on the shelf. 131. No, whatever the tactics, whatever the provo- cations, the Turkish Cypriot side will not be a party to this dangerous and destructive game. Turks are capable of living with the unwarranted Greek accu- sation about their being intransigent since they know they are not. But Turks will not help the Greek side to ruin the prospect and the possibility of a peacefu¥ and just settlement in Cyprus. It is the view of the Turkish Cypriot community that the ongoing negoti- ations can be based only on the high-level agreements, the opening statement of the Secretary-General of9 August 1980 and the United Nations "evaluation" paper of 18 November 1981. The Government of "~'urkey supports this position of the Turkish Cypriot community. 132. The process of negotiations between represen- tatives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities has been accepted as a viable and effective method to use in the search for a settlement of the Cyprus question. Intercommunal talks have also been widely regarded by third parties as the best means to an agreed solution. But, most significantly, it is the Secretary-General, entrusted since 1975 by the Secu- rity Council with a mission of good offices, who has been most consistent ~n his support for the process of intercommunal negotiations. Both the present Secretary-General and his predecessor, after being intimately involved with the question of Cyprus from its very inception, have always emphasized the impor- 137. We desire and actively encourage the peaceful settlement of the question of Cyprus in accordance with the purposes and principles ofthe United Nations. 138. We believe that the intercommunal talks offer the greatest hope for achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem and represent the best means of pursuing an effective and sustained negotiating process. 139. We are ofthe view that the intercommunal talks currently being conducted within the framework of the ideas formally submitted on behalf of the Secretary- General on 18 November 1981, ideas known as the United Nations "evaluation" paper, are conducive to a political settlement. The Turkish Cypriot C?!ll- munity has accepted the set of. ideas and modabtles contained in this "evaluation" paper as a basis and framework for negotiations. In this regard, we also note with satisfaction that the Turkish Cypriot community presented, on 5 August 1981, a set of compreh~nsive ~onducted in the light ofthe guidelines already agreed upon by the leaders of the two communities, the first between Denkla§ and Makarios on 12 February 1977, and the secon~ between Denkta§ and Kyprianou on 19 May 1979. These principles have also been reiter- ated by the Secretary-General in his opening statement of 9 August 1980, which specifically declares that ,.Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bi- zonal solution of the territorial aSRect of the Cyprus problem." 11 In conformity with the provisions ofthose high-level agreements and in line with the opening statement of the Secretary-General, the Turkish Cypriot community remains committed to the objective of a bi-communal, bi-zonal and federal solution on the basis of the equality and the partnership of the two national communities, ensuring the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. 141. It is clear that perhaps the most crucial con- dition for the success of the negotiations is for the Greek Cypriot side to renounce its perception of its relationship with the· Turkish community as one be- tween a majority and minority, and acknowledge ~he equality of the two communities. It is this under- standing and principle that has been underlying the intercommunal talks, and it is high time for the Greek side to accept this elementary fact and act accordingly. This is imperative for the success ofthe.l)egotiations. 142. We express appreciation an4 gratitude to the Secretary-General "and to his Special Representative in Cyprus for their unceasing and dedicated efforts to help the two communities in finding a solution. We support the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices, and we pledge our full co-operation to him and to his Special Representative. 143. The question of Cyprus is extremely complex and has many attributes that resemble or recall elements and aspects of other problems in different parts of the world. This is why most of us find something familiar and of specific interest as soon as we take a surface loo~ at the ,roblem of Cyprus. 144. The issue, however, has political, economic, social, ethnic, religious and historical dimensions which are all intricately interrelated and which, while the} are capable of individua~. identification, are inextricable. The different and numerous elements that total up to the question of Cyprus constitute, however, a unique whole. Cyprus is unlike any other problem. It is this unique and complex nature of the Cyprus issue that makes it very difficult to be judged in terms of simple and familiar criteria. We emphasize the necessity to evaluate the Cyprus question in all its complexity and on the sole basis of its own particu- lars, keeping always in mind the most fundamental and permanent characteristic of Cyprus-.its bi-natio- nality. 145. The Turkish nation sustains a special relation- ship with the Turkish community of Cyprus. This spe- prot6~tioTf and certainly not as one of occupation. 157. In the light of the above explanations, it should be evident that the de facto situation, referred to in paragraph 12 of the draft resolution, can be none other than the de facto situation created by the Greek Cypriots at the end of 1963 when they 'completely destroyed the constitutional order b}' force of arms. 158. The eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is, to say the least, contrary to the facts. Those armed forces in Cyprus, commanded by a Greek general and by Greek officers, assigned from Greece by the Greek Government, are certainly as "foreign" as the Turkish troops. 159. The tenth preambular paragraph of th~ draft resolution is superfluous, because there is no question of changing the demographic structure of. the island. 160. In paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, all State5 are called upon to support and help the so-called Government of Cyprus to exercise the right of full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus. As I hav~ explained earlier, we recognize the existence of the Republic of Cyprus as a legal entity at the international level, but the Greek Cypriot administration is not the legal and legiti- mate Government of that State. For those who give credl..ince to that false interpretation of this paragraph, its meaning is a call upon all States to ~upport and help the Greek Cypriots to reoccupy the lands .n- habited by the Turkish Cypriot coml11unity and to dominate and subjugate them again. I need not explain how unrealistic and imaginary this approach is. Needless to ~ay, if this foolish attempt. were to su(;- ceed, then the situation would revert to the pre-July 1974 position, and in such an event it would no longer be necessary to try to find a solution through the intercommunal talks. 161. Paragraph 5 of the draft resolut~on expresses support for the high-level agreements of,12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979. This paragraph, though positive, is incomplete..These are not the only elements on the basis of which the intercommunal talks are being held. There are also the c:pening.statement of the Secretary-General of9 August 1980 and the United Nations "evaluation" paper. Moreover, many of th~ . operative paragraphs of the draft resolution are inconsistent with the provisions oi the high-level . agreements. ParagrRph 4 is a case in point. There is in the high-level agreements clear provision concerning I 168. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has decided to reassess its position if this gravely defective draft resolution is passed, and the Federated State has requested me to convey this decision. to the General Assembly. When the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has completed its assessment, it will appropriately communicate its views. 169. The Turkish Cypriot community possesses the necessary political will to co-operate in finding a reasonable, just and realistic solution to the Cyprus problem through intercommunal negotiations on an equal footing. Turkey supports this endeavour. How- ever, it should be made abundantly clear that the Turkish Cypriot community will never in the future be subjugated or dominated by the Greek Cypriots or by Greece. Furthermore, Cyprus will never become a Greek island. I would advise those who, owing to the traditional fertility of their imagination, have such fallacious dreams to come down to earth, to realize as soon as pC'ssible that the mythical objectives of their so-called icng-term struggle is an absolutely un- attainable and puerile mirage, and to accept the existing and eternally unalterable reality before them. That reality is this: since the dawn of history, Turks have always been free and independent; Turkey will ~ever collapse; likewise, -the Turkish Cypriots win nflver collapse.

At the outs~t I should like to express my condolences to the berr;etved family and lO the Permanent Mission of Mor.c;olia on the death of Mr. Narkhuu. 171. Mr. President, I should m.e tojoin my colleagues who have welcomed you back to our midst and express my pleas~re at having you to guide our proceedings once agam. 1720 t~1y Government regrets that circumstances again make it necessary to participate in a debate on the question of Cyprus. The hlstoJr}' of the inter- communal conflict that has beset the island for so many years r~qpk~.~ no elaboration before this Assembly. All of us are well awar{~ of the facts. H is the view of my Government that we should now concentrate on the future and make every effort to achieve a permanent solution to the problem that is just and equitable for all Cypriots. 173. Canada's interest in and concern about the Cyprus situation grew out ef our close ties and friend- ship with all the parties involved and our faith and conviction concerning the role ofthe United Nations in preserving peace. We have expressed ourdeep distress at the sufferings of displaced and missing persons of both communities, recognizing the agony and misery that have affected all Cypriots. It was for all these reasons that, when requested by the Secretary- General, the Canadian Government dispatched the first contingent of troops to arrive on the island when UNFICYP was established in March 1964. I would remind this Assembly that our troops have been an essential part of this peace-keeping operation for more than 19 years. Over 25,000 Canadians have 175. My British colleague, in his address to you on 11 May [lJ7th meeting], referred to the uns~tis­ factory financial state of UNFICYP. My Govern- ment fully shares the sentiments of the United King- dom and commends the Secretaiy-General's efforts to improve the situation. ~Ne urge an States Members to contribute financially to this United Nations operation, commensurate with the;ir capabilities. If the present system of vOluntary financing is aJIowed to fail, there are bound to be serio~!s consequences, either for the method of financing or for the Force itself. 176. As members are aware. the last time we met to consider the que:;tion of Cyprus was almost four years ago, at the thirty-fourth session. The statement made then by my predecessor [7/st meeting] could, with only minor adjustments, be repeated today. The lack of progress in this dispute is both disappointing and disheartening. As a charter member of UNFICYP, Canada has, over the years, provided military person- nel and financial and other resources to maintain peace on the island. We therefore believe we have a special interest in a successful solution to this pro~lem. 177. The United Nations can justly be proud of the achievements ofits forces and missions in manypeace- keeping operations, but it may be asked whether, after 19 years, the presence of peace-keeping forces is advancing or delaying a settlement. As my Austrian colleague so correctly pointed out yesterday [//7fh meeting], peace-keeping operations should not be used as a means to perpetuate a particularstatus quo. Canaaa regrets that the collective efforts of peace- making have not met with success-a fact which reflects unhappily on the credibility of the United Nations in its role as catalyst for settling disputes. The willingness of Governments to continue to draw on their resources-which are not, after all, un- limited-in order to participate in such operations is bound to weaken if there is no progress towards a settlement. We call on the parties involved to co- operate in a serious effort towards seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem. 178. In conclusion, when considering its vote on any draft resolution, Canada will be guided by its require- 180. I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the effective manner in which you have conducted the work ofthe thirty-seventh !iession ofthe Assembly. Your personal qualities and diplomatic skill assure us that the deliberations of this resumed session will prove fruitful. 181. The Assembly has gathered once again to con- sider the question of Cyprus, an issue that has attracted the attention not only uf the Assembly, but also of peace-loving humanity at large. We note with regret that efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the problem have been in vain. To date, a large part of the territory of Cyprus remains under foneign occupation. Tens of thousands of people are displaced and are living as refugees in their own country. The two Cypriot communities are kept apart, and efforts are under way to widen the breach between them even further. 182. The continuation of the situation in Cyprus has serious repercussions for the peace and security of the region, which has already become vulnerable as the result of the escalation of tension and conflict stirred by the activities of imperialist circles. 183. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan attaches great importance to the fate of the people and Government of Cyprus. At the Seventh Con- ference of Heads of State or Government of Non- Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March, the Prime Minister and head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan emphasized the position of principle of Afghanistan, as follows: "In Cyprus, in spite of all international efforts, a considerable part of the territory is still being occupied by foreign forces. We demand full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus." 184. My delegation supports the speedy implemen- tation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), of 1 November 1974. We believe that the intercom- munal talks constitute one of the major instruments of ne~otiation. The process of dialogue between the Turk.sh Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can effectively bridge the gap between those two communities, which is further complicated by the occupation of foreign troops. 185. While the intercommunal talks, in ~ur opinion, provide the most approrriate means for the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities to settle their problems, we urge b"oth communities to set aside their mistrust and animosities and to start negotiating with the sole purpose of achieving a just and long- lasting settlement. Such a settlement should take into account the legitimate interests and rights of both communities-the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. For foreign forces to resort to putting pres- sure on Cyprus under any pretext would complicate the issue even further. 192. the question of Cyprus is once again before the General Assembly and this is perfectly under- standable. The question is still un.'esolved. The reso- lutions of the United Nations adopted on the question of Cyprus remain unimplemented to this day. The situation in that country and in the surrounding region continues to be complicated and tense. Such a situation can hardly fail to arouse legitimate anxiety in the world community. The principal reason for this problem re- maining unsolved is seen by us to lie in the con- tinuing attempt by certain circles to convert this island into a military and strategic beach-head for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] in the eastern Mediterranean. These manreuvres are leading to the intensification of tension in that area,creating a threat to the existence of the Cyprus State. 193. As is known, the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions defining the bases for a settle- ment of the CYPflls problem. We need only mention here ABsembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by the Security CouncIl in its resolution 365 (l974)~ 194. A decision on the question- of Cyprus must, in particular, ensure respect for the independence, sover- eignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and of its policy of non-alignment, as well as the immediate withdrawal ofall foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus and non-interference in its internal affairs. 200. Mr. President, as. the Assembly resumes to take up the unfinished business of its thirty-seventh ses- sion, it is appropriate for my delegation to record its appreciation of the efficient manner in which you have so far guided and organized our affairs. On the basis of your performance so far, I am confident that the remaining business of this session will be brought to a successful and speedy conclusion. 201. The fact that the Assembly has had to meet in resumed session is a reflection, in part, of the com- plexity of the current world situation. The question of Cyprus is one aspe~t of that complexity. 202. The delegation of Guyana has always taken a special and keen interest in this question, for more than one reason. We see at stake here a number of basic, time-honoured principles of the United Nations Charter and the Organization, such as res~ct for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, non-intervention and non-interfere,'!ce in the internal affairs ofStates, and the non-use offorce in the tht~ probleJ11 of Cyprus is still before us. While that problem remains unsettled, a part of the territory of Cyprus continues under foreign military occupation and a human tragedy is perpetuated as a refugee problem continues to take its toll of human suffering. 205. Ironically, this lack of forward movement in efforts to' find a solution to the question of Cyprus comes nine years after the unanimous adoption by the Assembly of resolution 3212 (XXIX), which ca1l8, among other things, for a process of dialogue between the two communities on an equal footing. 206. That resolution was followed by the high-level agreements of 12 February 197710 and 19 May 1979.1 Together these instruments constituted the framework, agreed upon by the parties concerned, within which a lasting solution ofall aspects of the problem of Cyprus was to be sought by means of constructive dialogue between the two communities. 207. Unfortunately the expectations aroused by the establishment of that framework have not been ful- filled. My delegation sincerely regrets that the momentum generated in the intercommunal talks has not been sustained. This is neither the place nor the opportunity to seek to apportion blame for the lack of more real progress in those talks. My delegation would merely like to stress that i,t is now more urgent than ever that the talks be renewed in a more positive and determined spirit. Each day that this problem drags on could move us gradually farther away from the kind of solution envisaged in resolution 3212 (XXIX). Attitudes harden with the passage of time. The generation for which the physical contact and coexistence of the two communities of Cyprus was a reality is slowly being succeeded by another generation to which such contact is unknown and for whom the people on the other side of the dividing line are aliens. It is essential that the Assembly exert its moral authority to prevent a hard~ning of positions and to facilitate the resumption of the talks in a spirit and a ,manner consistent with the attainment of the objectives set out in resolution 3212 (XXIX) and in the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. 213. At the New Delhi Conference, the Heads of State or Government also reiterated their full solidarity and support for the peopl~ and Government of the 218. That objective has not been attained. On the contrary, the events now continuing in Cyprus still give rise to concern. In accordance with its powers and functions under the Charter of the United Nations to discuss any matter pertaining to the safeguarding and ..maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly thus decided, as is its right, to conside.r the course ofthose events at this resumed ses- sion. In fact, it is becoming increasingly apparent - that there is an urgent need to find ajust and definitive solution to the disputes between the Cypriot com- munities, whose unity was a determining factor in the struggle for national liberation but which, unfor- tunately, was not consolidated in the wa~e of their independence. 219. There is no doubt that the tensions which shake Cyprus today derive from its division-the divi- sion of a people over problems which should have been solved through a common vision ofthe survival of - the nation an4 the perpetuation ofthe State, a de facto 222. Despite that wise and far-sighted appeal for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus crisis, in conformity with the principles of the Charter, the principles of non-alignment and the rules of international law, the situation in Cyprus remains a source of international tension. The people of Cyprus are still hungering for a solution acceptable to all, a solution which would enable them, in a restored spirit of trust and guaran- teed security, to turn" all their efforts to the building of their nation. 223. The question of Cyprus, because it remains un- resolved and perhaps because it is encumbered by the weight of the troubled history of relations between the two Cypriot communities, Greek and Turkish, there- fore continues to be one of the major.concerns of the United Nations. 224. As we are aware, the United Nations has been seized of this question since 1963. There is no need here to recall the resolutions adopted on this question, both by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In. substance, and as reaffirmed in particular by General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 353 (1974),' the interna- tional Organization, committed to the quest for peace- ful and tinal solutions to the Cypriot crisis, has laid down the guidelines that shov.ld enable such a result to be achieved. 225. In this quest for solutions, the General Assembly first recognized that the persistence of the situation in Cyprus was prejudicial to international security. The United Nations, in taking this view, was thus COil- curring in the view taken by the Movement of Non- Aligned Countries; supported by a solemn warning repeated several times by that Movement, to the effect that peace remains precarious, even ifchallenged only in countries that have no military ambitions. 226. Secondly, the territorial integrity of Cyprus and respect for its sovereignty, its independence and its status as a non-aligned country must be maintained. 227.. In other words, the Republic of Cyprus, estab- lished as such in 1960, must remain the Republic of Cyprus, without any attempt to force upon it a fate contrary to the free choice of its people, who have 232. The voice of the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries apparently was not fully heeded. The General Assembly is holding this session because its resolutions and those of the Security Council on Cyprus have certainly not been imple- mented as they should have been. 233. Still, hope remains that the Cypriots can be helped to continue to pursue the only avenue that can lead to preservation oftheir own identity, which, if changed, would only bring about greater suffering and disturbances in the present international order, which itself gives cause for concern. 234. It is to the credit of the Cypriots that they should have succeeded in concluding the high-level agreements of 12 February 197710 and 19 May 1979,1 defining the framework and the modalities for pursuing intercommunal negotiations. The solution to the Cypriot crisis thus broke through the twilight that seemed to make it so illusory. Solution of the crisis should I}O longer be blocked by the· persistence of certain disputes nor by the persistence of certain fears relating to the partition of the island or to its disappearance as a State. It is difficult for a people to ignore its own history. But the history of the Cypriots is inscribed in Cyprus and all Cypriots should recall their history and join together in order to enrich that history with their own sufferings and hopes. und~,r the go.~d offi£es !If the Secretary-General; ilfthly, the gradual search for solutions to the military status that the Cypriots wish to adopt; sixthly, the ending of the abnormal situation of Cypriots who are refugees in their own homeland; and, seventhly, the gradual establishment of a climate of confidence between the Cypriot communities, with the active and disinterested co-operation of the international com- munity, in particular of the Powers that have estab- lished . specific links with all the parties presently involved in the Cypriot crisis. 236. The delegation of Mali is convinced that these concerns are those of the international community as a whole. We are convinced that they are, in any event, those of Cyprus, which is a member of the Movement ofNon-Aligned Countries, whose first Con- ference of Heads of State or Government, held at Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961, underscored, in particular, "the need for a great sense of respon- sibility and realism when undertaking the solution of various problems resulting from differences ...". 237. We have had opportunities to hear the arguments of representatives of the two Cypriot communities regarding the situation in their country. We have had opportunities to draw, from our direct contacts, instructive lessons regarding their wish to be full citizens in a peaceful republic facing its future with faith injustice and equality for all its.citizens. We have been dealing with great patriots. We have been speaking with men who have a great sense of responsibility and a realistic frame of mind. Such men will find solutions to their differences. It is with that con- viction that the delegation of Mali has come to speak at this rostrum on be,half of the people and Govern- ment of Mali. 238. Mr. KRAVETS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): It was with a feeling of profound sadness that we learned of the untimely death of Mr. Tsogtyn Narkhuu, our comrade and close friend. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist RepUblic would like to express its sincere condolences to the members of the Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations, to the family of the deceased and to his friends. 239. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR shares the profound concern that has been so clearly expressed here by the world community in connection with the ongoing crisis on the island of Cyprus, which is such a serious threat to peace and security in the Mediter- 240. There is no doubt that the United Nations mU'st once again use all its political authority and all its powers under the Charter to get the question of Cyprus and the Cypriot people out of the present impasse. 241. The Ukrainian people, like all peoples of the Soviet, socialist and other countries, sympathize with the people of Cyprus and understand to what severe trials they have been subjected in recent years. We are convinced that a peaceful, just and lasting settlement of the problem of Cyprus is possible. The people of Cyprus, like all other peoples, have a right to live in peace without any interference from outside and without foreign troops or foreign military bases. Of course, much depends on mutual understanding between the two national communities whose home and refuge Cyprus is. Each has its own interests which must be taken into consideration, but they cannot be allowed to obscure the overall interest of the Republic of Cyprus as a whole in maintaining its inte~rity, independence and sovereignty. 242.. We do not doubt that if matters had depended only on the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots the problem would long since have been resolved to the benefit and in the interest of all the people of Cyprus. Unfortunately, there are other rather powerful forces which do not want a settlement in that region and are governed by their own selfish and unworthy interests. They are the United States and its partners in NATO, which attribute the absence of any notable progress in the intercommunal talks to a lack of desire for such progress by the two parties. That, of course, is not the real reason. 243. The NATO leaders attach growing strategic sig- nificance to Cyprus, particularly in conditions of increasing tension in the Near East. It is in NATO's interest to maintain the problem as it is at present and maintain the de facto division of the island. Those in NATO circles. see in this situation twofold benefits for themselves: they can use the existing military bases in the southern part of the island and acquire new bases in the north. 244. The United States is increasingly covetous of that island and is hatching plans for transforming Cyprus into its own strategic stronghold on the approaches to Arabian oil. 245. As President Kyprianou said recently: "the Cyprus problem, which basically is the result offoreign intrigue and interference, could be resolved very quickly if it related only to ensuring the harmonious coexistence of the two communities of the island". Enabling the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live together in peace and friendship in a unified, independent, sovereign State and enabling them tQ enjoy independence,.without any unsolicited advice or instructions from outside-that is what is needed to settle the Cyprus problem. 250. Mr. HOANG BICR SON (Viet Nam) (inter- pretationfrom FrenchJ: At the outset, I wish to convey, on behalf of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, our heartfelt condolences to the dele- gation of the Mongolian People's Republic on the recent death of our comrade, M:r. Tsogtyn Narkhuu, Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Unit~d Nations. 251. Nine years have elapsed without the implemen- tation of the relevant resolutions repeatedly adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council since 1974 that provide the essential basis for a lasting solution of the question of Cyprus. Hence, in this important area of the eastern Mediterranean there . remains a grave threat to the sovereignty and ter- ritorial integrity of Cyprus and to peace and security throughout tne world. 252. Ever since Cyprus became a victim of foreign aggression, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has, on repeated occasions, uneguivocally expressed 263. Having been subjected to the influence of vari- ous civilizations, Cyprus, which·is at the crossroads of three continents-Europe, Asia and Africa-is today seeking its unity. A fruitful dialogue of civilizations has, u.nfortunately, given way to a fratricidal struggle. 264. The blow.struck by the Turkish army in July 1974 brought to an already deplorable situation a tot~lly new dimension, which has been unanimously con- demned. This blow had as its aim a repetition of the policy ofHitler vis-a-vis theSudetan Germans, which, as everyone knows, was one of the causes of the Second World War. 265. Regrettable though it may be, the difficulty experienced by two communities living on the same strip of ground and attempting to forge a common destiny and to benefit from their differences is not and can never be a pretext for reviving the frustrated dreams of an expansionism which has disappeared for . ever. 266. The foreign occupation of more than one third of the country, which contains about 70 per cent of the economic potential of the island, has meant the displacement of thousands of person§, who have ~adly become refugees in their own country, and 267. Peace in that country and in the region is thus jeopardized, and this has had its effect on the States Members of the United Nations, which, in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), of 1 November 1974, not only described the Turkish invasion as a violation of the sovereignty, integrity and indepen- dence of Cyprus but also expressed their support and sympathy for that country. In resolution 34/30, of 20 November 1979, the General Assembly deplored "the continued presence of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the fact that part of its ter- ritory is still occupied by foreign forces". It affirmed "the '!'~Jht of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to fun and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources" . 268. Meeting in Havana in September 1979, the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries reaffirmed its solidarity with the Government of Cyprus; it deplored the occupation by foreign troops of a part of Cyprus; and it expressed its support for the 10-point agreement concluded in Nicosia on 19 May 1979 between the President of Cyprns, Mr. Kyprianou, and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denkta~, 1 under the auspices ofthe Secretary-General. That position was reaffirmed at the SeventhConference ofHeads ofState orGovern- ment of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March, as follows: "The Heads of Stare or Government also expres- sed their deep concern over the fact that part of the Republic of Cyprus continues under foreign occupa- tion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces as an essential basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem." 16 269. The People's Republic of Benin cannot fail to £;e affected by the tragedy of a people which sees ~:::'5 territory occupied in flagrant violation of the prin- ciple of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, in contravention of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which states that: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpo~es of the Unite~ Nations." 270. The continuing presence of foreign troops and the unilateral deciSion of 13 February 1975 to transform the occupied part into a "Federated Turkish State" ,-a decision whic~ was denounced by the Security Council in its resolution 367 (l~75) of 12 March 1975- are serious infringements. of the indepen.dence and sovereignty of Cyprus and a threat to peace and secu- rity nofonly in this region but in the world as a whole. Failure to respect human rights in the occupied part, which is dealt with in General Assembly resolution 3450 (XXX), of9 December 1975, concerning missing persons in Cyprus, is again a cause ofserious concern. 280. The Secretary-General's report [A/37/805 llnd Corr.!], in its references to the various stages of the intercommunal talks, notes that they were held in a constructive and co-operative atmosphere. We con- sider this an encouraging indication and, in the same spirit, we welcome the readiness expressed by the parties to continue the negotiations in a meaningful a~~reciation of the renewed support which has emerged for the high-{evel agreements of 12 February 197710 and 19 May 19791 which, in our view, contain significant elements for a settlement. 284. While assuring the parties of all the assistance they may require, the United Nations has the duty to stress to them the need to proceed along the path of negotiation earnestly, patiently and in a spirit of good faith. 285. Only the Cypriots themselves can eventually find a just and lasting settlement through the harmoni- ous accommodation of the needs of both com- munities. What seems important to us, at this stage, is to keep open the possibility of a dialogue between the parties and to avoid trying to determine from outside a solution which should be rooted in the responsible commitments of the two communities. 286. ~taly hopes that this debate will produce a clear message, focused not on what divides but on what unites the people of Cyprus: support for the sover- eignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus; a call addressed to both parties to ~;Jlve their differences through a meaning- ful di,dogue; and the renewed com~itment of the Secretary-General to assist the parties along this path. This is the only way to contribute effectively to the re-establishment of an atmosphere conducive to con- structive negotiations and, thus, to real progress in the quest for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. 287. Mr. AMEGA t i'ogo) (interpretation from French): At the outset, I should like to expreS3 the sincere condolences of my delegation to the dele- gation of the Mongolian People's Republic and to the bereaved family of our late colleague, Mr. Narkhuu, the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations. 288. The delegation of Togo has been most pleased to see Mr. Hollai presiding over the \JfCi~ ilf this resumed sessiron. The ~kill with which he conduzted the work (if the first part of this session augurs well for the s~~ccess of our present deliberations. 296. That resolution was not complied with despite the promptings and intervention oft.he United Nations and of certain States to induce the part::~s to negoti- ate with a view to restoring peace. It was only on 6 June 1968 that the intercommunal talks began in Beirut, to be continued in Nicosia a week later. Those talks, which were pursued intermittently until 19',3, permitted a glimmer of hope to be seen for an overall settlement of the question, when the events of 1974 occurred, namely, the coup d'etat of July of that year, followed by the intervention and occupation of Turkish forces. Those events] which once ag~in emphasized the roles of Greece and Turkey in the life of the Cypriot State, constitute acts violating the principfes of the Charter of the United Nations. This is why the General Assembly, in resolution 3212 (XXIX), jj~~~ -----~~~:..------ l_~ ' ' 289. My delegation is also pleased to pay special tribute, once again, to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts·to settle the various conflicts that are shaking the world, in particular the question of Cyprus, to which he has always paid special attention. There is hardly any need to recall the role that he played 291. Recognition of the existence of the two commu- nities in the Constitution and in existing treaties is very significant and very clearly expresses the refusal of both sides to constitute a nation. The roots of the Cypriot problem therefore lie in the lack ofthis national conscience which bolsters the will of the people of a State to live together and to seek to protect and defend their common interests. 292. In addition to the political reasons, there are religious differences between the two communities. 293. As a result of this situation, each Cypriot community fec;is itself closer to its nation of origin, either Greece or Turkey, countries which do not remain indifferent to the fate of the populations of Cyprus which are engaged in political and religious struggles agains each oth~r. 294. In December 1963, the Greek and Turkish Governments were thus directly involved in the intercommunal hostilities that led to the adoption of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) and the deploy- ment of a peace-keeping force with headquarters in Nicosia. 295. It should be noted that, in that resolution, the Council requested the Cypriot Government, which is responsible for maintaining and restoring public order, to take all further steps necessary to put an end to the acts of violence and b~oodshed in Cyprus.

First of all, I would like to join those who have expressed deep sympathy at the death of the Permanent Representative of Mon- golia to the United Nations. 304. I listened with care to the speech of the rep- resentative of Turkey. First of all, I would like to point out that his statement was to some extent 312. T"e representative ofTurkey referred a:~~f~ to the so-callea embargo; h,e said that we are stoppmg the Turkish Cypriots from trading, from working, indeed from living. What is this embargo? The Turkish arrr..y has occupieo by force the properties of the Greeks in the northern part cfCyprus. Those properties are now utilized. They try to use (hem, to use the hotels, to steal the fruit, to export the fruit, and we rightfully try to stop it. Every sensible man on this earth would try to stop the stealing of his own property, which was created throughout centurieti,. thll"oughot>t life- times, throughout generations. Everyone would do that; it is a duty. This is what the Greeks are doing in Cyprus, the Greeks who were ousted from their homes to live in deprivation and destitution outside their own land. Is this an embr,rgo? 313. We have heard of anG~her grotesque notion that we have to accept equality between the 82 per cent of the Greeks of Cyprus and the 18 per cent of the Turks. We accept equality for every living person on Cyprus. All persons are equal, but if the 82 per cent become equal to the 18 per ~ent, we are not creating equality. This can be proved. easily by mathematics- 82 per cent can never be equal to 18 per cent. 314. We have also noted that threats were catapulted against this Assembly. This Assembly heard that if it adopts a resolution, the Turkish Cypriots may adopt another attitude in the intercommunal negotiations. Very well veiled threats were heard in this Assembly, and on top of that we heard evidence of a con- temptuous attitude towards this forum. Indeed, it was stated here that Turkey would view with contempt the resolutions of this Organization. We heard that there might be a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops but that Turkey would not respect it. Representatives heard that in this Hall. 315. Cyprus is not against the process ofnegotiations, as the representative of Turkey tried to lead this Assembly to believe. I stated very cle,~iJy in my speech [!l6th meeting] that we are for l~~gotiat.ions, for meaningful negotiations, for result~oriented negotiations. We want to find a solution through these negotiation§. We do not want to subjugate either the Turkish Cypriots or anybody e!~e ~n Cyprus. We are workingfor a balanced and fair solutionfor all Cy.priots. This is· the objective of the Government of Cyprus 318. The Poreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Ro!andis, has just d~c:lit Wiih certain salient points of f.-mt mC'.JUmental :;oee6Jh. I am certain H9.:'lt ~he memc~ randum to be ni&tiibuted by tile defcgation of C~!prus will resto:-e truth. 319. I should like, however, to touch UpG~ onc po:nt of more particuiar in.terest t..~ my Government. Mr. Kirca referrted to part of a staiement made by the President Gf th~ Republic of Gr.;ece: Mr. Kara- manlis, concernio-s enosis, or tihe stmgg~e for un!::m of Cyprus watn Greece. Cor~.3is~.en~ wiH: t v.."eH-k10WI1 habits ~fquoting out of (;onte~t, the Turkish lJ"epr~sen­ tative failed to mention that the Presndent\; SPE"~f;h consisted of (wo rarts. 320. In the first part, the Presi~ent gave a histm·jcal ba.ckground of ihe Cyprus questions of -:jo,hat happened about 25 year:; ago. As everbody in ih~s Assembly knows, that part of history is thi;.' struggle of th~~ 80 per cent of t~e population of Cyprus, namely, the Greek Cypriots, for self-determination. So, why this surprise and why·this fuss? . 321. The President vf ..Jreect:, in t) ~t;-:;ond part of his speech, which dealt with present realities and the future, offered a vision off peace for the Republic of Cyprus, a vision of peaceful co-operation between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, a vision of a State where all the inhabitants will live in peace and love. I will have that text distributed so that all Members of the Assembly will clearly understand that the quotation of this historical reference misinterprets the main politi- cal thrust of the speech of the President of the Hel- lenic Republic. 322. I am indeed flabbergasted and I am tempteo to ask in this context: Why is the Turkish representative so sensitive about the political goals of the Greek Cypriots 25 years ago, whiCh did not materialize? Why does he lend so meticulously to forget that it is his country that, by invading and occupying a great part of the Republic of Cyprus, has, for all practical purposes, annexed the northern sector of the island? Mr. Karamanlis spoke about history, Mr. Kircafailed to refer to the present realities for a simple reason- because the present sad realities are the product of :rurkey's illegal aggression against Cyprus. I ~o cross the border of a sovereign, independer,t State Member of th'~ United Nations against the will nf 80 per cent of its population, what do you ~all such an action? We call it, simply, invasion. If you have a better term to describe the situation, I am ready to accept it. 324. But Mr. Kirca added mockery to insuiL He said te us that in Cyprus everything is going well: "Sine,,, 1974,"-the year of the invasion-"in stark contrast to the preceding i 1 years, Cyprus has known unparalleled tranquillity and been virtually free of violence" . 325. The best tranquilHt",.' is the !ranquiliity of the tomb; this apparently evades Mr. Kirca. He continues: "No blood has been shed and the two communities have live, ~ side by side in security, in their respective z~mes ami. under their own administrations, managing their OWrj alffairs"-a paradise. 326. Some 2,UOO years ",go, an order was established in ~he world by force of arms: it was called the Pax Romllna. Apparently, today the ~IUIJulationof Cyprus enjQYs the benefit of the "Pax 7 urciCll". 327. Mr. KhlCA (riJrk~J') (interpretation from F.'enchj.' I win b~~ very brief, since j am taking the floor to say ihat I do not intenu '0 reply to the previous speakers. Xhay!; rllready saad everything in !ny state- m~nt. They may find th~re everything needed to refute their own allegations" 328. In fact, everythingwe havejust heard is the usual literature oflying propaganda. I do not find it worthy of The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m. NOTES 1 SeeOfficiltl Records ofthe Security CO/mdl, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, MlIJ' and June 1979, document S113369 ~nd Add.l, para. 51. 2 A/38/132, annex. J Ibid., chap. I, para. 131. 4 United Nations, Trellly Series, vol. 382, N<J. 5475. 7 ib'd., Twe,,;:'~ninth Year, Supplementjar Ju!y, August lln] Sep- tembe.~ 1974, dOf1Jmefit 8/11398, para. 5. 8 [bilL, Twenty-ninth Yellr, 1780th meeting, para. 32. 9 Ibid., Thirtieth Y,ellr, Supplement for July, August and Sep.'(!i1!- ber 1975, docum:nt 8/11789, 8nnex. IC Ibid.• Thirt)',second YelIT, Supplement for April, May mId June 1977, document S/l2323, para. 5. 11 Ibid.• Thirty-filth 'YelIT, Supplement for July, August lInd Sep- lemher 1980, document S/14100, annex. 12 Ibid., Thirty-sel'enth Yellr, Supplement for April, May (fIld June 1982, document S/15149 and Add.I, para. 56. 13 Ibid., Supplement for October, NOl'emberand December 1982, document S/l5502 and Add.I, para. 58. 14 Ibid., Twent)'-ninth tear, SupplementforJuly. August and Sep- tember 1974. document S/1I465. l!i See A/~763. 16 A/38/132, annex, chap. I, para. 129.