A/37/PV.72 General Assembly

Friday, June 12, 1981 — Session 37, Meeting 72 — UN Document ↗

14.  Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Allow me first, sir, to express my delegation's appreciation and congratula- tions to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of lAEA, for his presentation of the annual report [71st meeting]. The annual report of the Agency for the year 198P contains reference to one of the most serious chal- lenges to the Agency, with far-reaching implications for the Agency and the whole future ofthe development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, namely, the Israeli armed attack against the Iraqi nuclear instal- lations in June 1981. . 2. Mr. Sigvard Eklund, the former Director G~neral of IAEA, in his statement at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, declared that IAEA, since its establishment, had not, in his opinion, been faced with a more serious matter than that of the implica- tions of this event. He went on to say: "The assurance provided by the safeguards activi- ties of the Agency as an independent and objective international trustee should lead to increased con- fidence among States and help to diminish the sense of national insecurity, which could be one of the main motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons. In this context, an aggressive military act against a nuclear facility under the Agency's safeguards on the ground of alleged weaknesses in those safe- guards cannot but undermine the credibility not only ofthe Agency's activities but also of the Treaty itself. Thus, the Israeli attack on 7 June was in essence an attack simultaneously also against IAEA, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the very climate of trust generated by the Treaty and its verification mechanism." [56th meeting, para. 50.] 3. The Board of Governors of IAEA, on 12 June 1981, adopted a resolution2 which stated, in para- graph (g), that the Board was: "Conscious that this military action.... has shown clear disregard for the Agency's safeguards regime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and could do great harm to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." In paragraph (h), the Board of Governors also said that it was:"Gravely concerned by the far-reaching implications of such a military attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities in a member State". The Board recommended, inter alia, in paragraph 2, that the ... ew YORK General Conference "consider all the implications.of this attack, including suspending the exercise by Israel of the privileges and rights of membership" . 4. The General Conference of IAEA, in resolution GC/XXV/RES/381, adopted on 26 September 1981,3 considered the Israeli act of aggression against the safeguarded Iraqi installation as constituting an attack against the Agency and its safeguards regime, which is the foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- tion of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. The Conference also decided to consider at its twenty-sixth session the suspension of Israel from the exercise ofthe privileges ane! rights of membership if by that time it had not complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 487 (1981), of 19 June 1981. 5. The Iraqi delegation to the twenty-sixth regular session of the General Conference, held at Vienna last September, pointed out that Israel, by its attack and its refusal to comply with Security Council reso- lution 487 (1981), had violated the statute of IAEA. Iraq, and the great majority of the non-aligned mem- bers of IAEA, were not engaging in politicizing the Agency, as Israel and the United States alleged. Para- graph B of article IV of the statute stipulates that: "In recommending and approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors and the General Conference shall determine that the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in the Agency, giving due consid~"'ation to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the purposes and principle3 of the Charter of the United Nations." 6. Now, Israel and the United States might as well denounce the statute for this article, as also politicizing the Agency, for what are these criteria for mem- bership in the Agency if not political? Furthermore, paragraph C of article IV states that: "The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, and all mem- bers, in order to ensure to aI! of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute." And paragraph B of article XIX of the statute, on suspension of privileges, states the following: (,A member which has persistently violated the provisions ofthis Statuteorofany agreemententered into by it pursuant to this Statute may be sl;spenrled from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors." A/37/PV.72 sti:~.:!ated in the Agency's statutt-:. It was L~ly because On the occasion of the ~wenty-fifth anniversary of the oftl'e tactics ofpressure and open blackmail practi".ed foundation of the Internationa! Atomic Energy by the United States delegCJ.tion to the Conference Agen;y, the Chairman of the Cau~ci~ of State of the that the draft resolution concerning the suspension of German Democratic Republic, l:..rich Honccker, Israel's membership privileges was prevented from addreli§ed a message to that organization in Wilich acquiring the necessr:y two-thirds majority vote. he s:'\id: 9. What concerns us here and now, however, is the "The IntemationaJ Atomic EnerCi:' Agenc.f plays fact that Israel has openly threatened to repeat its a respee;teJ ro~e in the ~:ffarts for strengthening armed attack against nuclear installations. In spite of inteinational security and co-operation. It::, C('lr.- Security Council resolution 487 (1981), <.'fhich, inter mitment t') the objectives of no,-proEf/~ratio!1 of alia, called upon Israel to refr~in in the future from nuclear Wfapons arLd it3 activiltes safeguarding the any such attack or threat thereof, Israel has not peaceful uses of nu"le~',r ~nerg~ d~3erVf..~ high ap- withdrawn its threat; the threat still stands. My de!e- preciatjt)n." gation would therefore propose an amendment [A/37i 15. The report of !AEA pre~ents ~ dear pictUf!; of L.34] todraftresolutionA/J7/L.29,toadd thefoUowing the broad scope of th\:; Agency's ar.tiv:ties " 1921. paragraphs as operative J., '.ragraphs 3 and 4: I take this opportuntfLy to r~('Ingratu!ate the Djrec~or "Considers that Israel's threat to repeat its Genemij, Mr. Hans Blix, and the .A,~l,;ncy's secretariat armed attack against nuclear facilities constitutes, on pre'par~ng this document. inter alia, a serious threat to the role and activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 16. The German Democratic Repubik strongly development and further promotion of nuclear supports the Agency's safegllads programme because of its important role in the strengthening of intema- energy for peaceful purposes; tional security. Th~refore my d~~~g••t:nn welcomes the "Affirms its confidence in the role o(the Int:er- conclusion of th~ .r'rectOj~ Gen . =;t; I ~ontained in para- national Atomic Energy Agency in the application graph 228 of the report: of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." "In 1981, as in previous years, the Secretariat, 10. The Zionist aggression against the safeguarded in carrying out the safeguards programme of the Iraqi nuclear installation was a total renunciation of Agency, did not detect any anomaly which would any confidence on the part of Israel in the Agency indicate the diversion of a significant amount and its safeguards system. Begin's message of con- of safeguarded nuclear material-or the misuse of gratulati0ns to IAEA on the occasion of its twenty- facilities or equipment subject to safegu'l;rds under fifth anniversarv , which was referred to this morning certain agreements-for the manufacture of any by the representative of Israel, only serves to demon- nuclear weapon, or to further any other military strate the monstrous hypocrisy and cynicism of the purpose, or for the manufacture of any other Israeli leadership. nuclear explosive device, or for purpo~es un- 11. As for the decision by the United States to with- known." draw from the Agency and to withhold its contribu- That conclusion is even more important when one tions to the Agency's budget and safeguards costs: considers that 98 per cent of the nuclear installations one questions not only the logic of ~uch a decision, located in non-nuclear-weapon States are subject to the but also its very sanity. It only goes to show that, in Agency's safeguards system. order to protect the arch-aggressor's piesence in the Agency J the United States is ready and willing to 17. The safeguards system has become an impor- wreck so vital a body as IAEA. What is even more tant factor in the striving for disarmamellt and inter- disturbing and incomprehensible is that the aggressor, national co-operation. We share the view that the being thus protected, has itself done irreparable existing s~/stem should be further improved, for damage to the Agency and its safeguards system and instance, by appointing a sufficient number of fnspec- b~..)adeslt peaceful use of nuc:lear energy. It will this principle has been proved by this yec..r's report' of serve peace and also ~he goals o:f IAEA if decisive the Director General, in which he states that there were ~..easurer arc taken to safeguard the peaceful use of no u::ll~sed funds left in non-convertible c~jrrencies. nuclear energy We consider such measures to be very 27. The German Democratic Republic will continue urgently required because of the expected increase in to take part in the Agency's safety programme, in the peac,eful use of nuclear energy to satisfy man- which substantial progfess has been made towards kind's gr0wirtg needs in r,nergy. comp!etion of the codes and guides ef the Nuclear Safety Standards programme and the "cvision of the 20. Trough the ~.J"on-Pl01iferationTreaty obliges onlY Basic Safety Standards for Radiation ProtecHon. ine fiQn-n.!c1chi-wea?o 1 St~te') to place their nuclear facilitie~· Ulider ~AEA safeguards, the Soviet Union has 28. We also regard the International Nuclear 1n- submntted part ofits tWClear facilities used for civil pur- formation System as a valuable element of the inter- pm:es to the safeguards system of IAEA. My delega- national co-operation with developing countries. tion considers that this step promotes good will and IAEA rightly attaches great importance to the physical confidence-building. It is designed to strengthen the protection of nuclear material. In support of these non-proliferation regime. endeavours, the German Democra:;c Republic has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of 21. My delegation would like to take this opportunity Nuclear Material. We expect that this important to make a few remarks in this context on the United instrument for strengthening the regime of the non- Nations Conference for the Promotion oflntemational proliferation of nuclear weapons will come into force Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, in the near future. which is the subject of agenda item 27. 29. The 25 years of the organization's activities have 22. The German Democratic Republic, ~ttaching been marked by outstanding achievements in pro- great importance to mutually advantageous intema- moting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its tional co:operation in this field, has always supported control. The continuation of this development, how- the convening of a United Nations conference de- ever, depends on the ability to overcome the imperialist dicated to this particular purpose. It goes without course of confrontation and super-armament and a saying that the experience and capabilities of lAEA return to a policy of ff'lJitful dialogue, effective dis- should be fully used for such a conference. armament negotiations and equal international (0- 23. The Ge:man Democratic Republic holds the view operation in all fields. that, in the long run, the concerted actions of States 30. Mr. BUSTANI (Brazil): I should like to express can be successful only if, at the same time, mea- my delegation's appreciation of the report of IAEA sures are taken with "the object of banning the danger introduced by Mr. Blix, the Director General of the of nuclear war. In view of this, the German Demo- Agency. His statement forms a neeoed ~ 'Ipplement to cratic Republic would like to emphasize that it is that report, as it covers relevant additional information imperative to appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to on development~in the Agency's activities in 1982 and commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear takes note of some of the major problems which have weapons. That would be an important step to avoid continued to engage our closest attention. any use ofnuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is impera- tive to prohibit all nuclear tests, to come to an agree- 31. Since 1982 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of ment on freezing the production and deployment of IAEA, it is only natural that we should take this nuclear-weapon systems and to prohibit any attack on opportunity to appraise our successes and setbacks, peaceful nuclear installations. These measures should as well as to explore and suggest new &pproaches, also include the ensuring of the non-proliferation of so that the Agency's future tasks may be better nuclear weapons. fulfilled. It is in the context of such a critical analysis 34. Under the pretext of unspecified improvements of a system which the same report recognizes to have been effective up to the present t safeguard allocations have increased in the last decade by a factor four times that ofthe resources of the Technical Assistance Fund. We cannot but feel disheartened when we com- pare the modest costs of the Programme for Technical Assistance and Co-operation-$US 3,422,910-as set forth on page 22 of the programme budget for 1983,4 with the impressive sum of $US 19,861,735 designated for th~ safeguards programme, as proposed on page 258. 35. It is not enough for the Agency to strengthen efforts to assist member States to find additional resources for financing because its own funds are not sufficient. Paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the aforementioned programme budget for 1983 are most revealing in the detailed account of the safeguards programme, in sharp contrast to the recommendations found elsewhere for stringent budgetary limits when technical assistance is at stake. 36. We welcome the recognition in the Agency's annual report of the need to explain and clarify existing misconceptions about the purposes and scope of Agency safeguards. We hope. however, that such clarifications will leave no doubt as to the fun- damental role 'of the Agency and will dispel those disguised attempts to adulterate a mechanism within the United Nations system that has, as its first and foremo:;t objective, the fostering of international co~ operation for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Further, we hope that the adoption of resolu- tion GC(XXVI)/RES/4G2 will lead to the necessary measures ~to allow technical assistance funds to in- crease on a more predictable basis in order to keep pace with the progress in the other main activities of the Agency. 38. Brazil has always defended the inalienable right of all States to have access to all aspects of the peace- ful uses of nuclear energy without commitments other than those required by the Agency's statute or those which have been negotiated, accepted and applied on a universal basis without discrimination. We therefore find it difficult to accept all attempts to control and manipulate the development of nuclear energy in developing countries while nuclear-we.apon States are free to pursue their nuclear programmes, peaceful or military, without let or hindrance. 39. It is regrettable that the report makes use of expressions or references which do not bel~ng in the statute and depart perceptibly from its spirit. The statute does not allow any discrimina~ion between member States, whether or not parties to a particular treaty, nor does it endorse a non-proliferation regime which does not seem to be universally acceptable and applicable. While excess capacity for destruction based on the possession and ever-growing develop- ment of nuclear weapons becomes a doctrine for the mighty few, there are assertions in the report such as the one establishing that the non-proliferation regime was "strengthened" in 1981 by the mere accession of a few developing countries to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that instrument are criticized for having failed to comply with their obligations under paragraph 4 of its arti- cle Ill, while, for some unknown reason, the report is remiss on the non-compliance with article VI, as if vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons were irrel- evant or an esoteric concept foreign te the Agency's and our concerns. 40. It is our intention to stress our commitment to the IAEA safeguards system as embodied in its statute. This commitment has found concrete expression in the past, as the submission ofour international agreements to the IAEA safeguards system testifies. This loyalty towards the word and spirit of the statute of IAEA can only strengthen our opposition, however, to a tendency, which we have been observing with mounting concern, to undermine the Agency's fore- most purpose of fostering the peaceful application of atomic energy among all its members. We cannot but oppose that tendency, which is furthermore inspired by an international document which has been meeting with growing criticism from signatory and non-signatory States alike and the discriminatory character of which has been repeatedly underlined by my delegation. 49. The Brazilian delegation attaches great impor- tance to the participation of developing countries in the Agency's secretariat. In this context, training programmes for young graduates from developing countries are most welcome, inasmuch as trainees will have access to the latest advances in technical fields, will be in a position to compete more effectively for professional posts in the Agency and eventually will contribute to their national rn,grammes the advantages of the experience acquired therein. 50. One of the outstanding results of the Agency's activities seems to be tlJe programme to develop, for nuclear power plantS, internationally agreed safety standards which are valuable not only from the point of view of strict safety considerations but also as a means of standardizing terminology. The dynamic character of such standards points to the need for a constant review exercise. It is therefore important not to phase out the Nuclear Safety Standards Pro- gramme as a result of budgetary restrictions. Activi- ties of the Division of Nuclear Power and the Nuclear Data Section are of immense value for developing countries and for the public acceptance of nuclear energy. One of the Agency's basic functions is to respond to concerns about the possible shortcomings and dangers of this industry, which has the undeniable record of having been able to avoid any identifiable radiation-induced death or serious radiation-induced injury since the first commercial nuclear power reactor went critical. 51. The future of IAEA as an international instru- ment for furthering matters connected with nuclear energy depends on our capacity to agree and solve such complex political problems. The convening in 1983 of the United Nations Conference for the appro~ches for the transfer of technology on the basis of the directives set forth in General Assembly reso- lution 32/50 and the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly [resolution S-10/2] devoted to disarmament. IAEA would then be in a better position to fulfil its tasks and strengthen its role and functions. 52. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation listened carefully to the statement of the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Blix, and has studied the Agency's annual report for this anniversary year. As we all know, 25 years have elapsed since the entry into force of the IAEA statute, which defined the two aspects of the task of that international organization: to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to prevent any more countries from using that energy to build nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapon of mass destruction. 53. The Soviet Union was one of the prime movers in the founding of IAEA, and it has done much to ensure that the entire history of the Agency, whose twenty-fifth anniversary is being celebrated through- out the world, could rightly be considered as a model of successful co-operation among countries with dif- ferent social systems. 54. As emphasized in a message from Mr. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the participants in the twenty- sixth session ofthe General Conference ofthe Agency: "IAEA is doing much to promote the use of nuclear energy for the economic and social develop- ment of States and to raise the living standards of peoples. The Agency's roie in the development of nuclearenergy is growing. IAEA is now the acknowl- edged international body for the co-ordination of States' efforts in the peaceful uses ofnuclearenergy. "At a time when the danger of nuclear war is increasing, the Agency's activities have taken on special significance and meaning. The Soviet people are convinced that the Agency can and must make a weightier contribution to the elimination of the threat ofnuclear catastrophe. We must do ourutmost to see that nuclear energy ser ~es only the interests of peace and never becomes a r'1eans of destroying life on earth." For its part, the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and reverse the nuclear arms race. 55. There is special significance in the adoption last ~ year by" the General Assembly,,, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, of the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe [i·esolution 36/100], which states that the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity. In keeping with the spirit and letter of that document, the Soviet Union unilaterally declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Ifother nuclear Powers took a similar stand, this would 71. I should like to refer to the successful work of the International Tokamak Reactor Workshop, which has provided, on an international basis, a model Tokamak reactor, thus making it possible to develop a conceptual design device. The Soviet Union, which was the initiator of the Tokamak reactor on an inter- national basis, believes that the experience gained by the Workshop will, as intended, make it possible, as early as 1983, to carry out further stages in the development of the future reactor, which would use a controlled thermonuclear synthesis reaction. 72. Over the historically short period of its 25 years of ~xistence, IAEA has achieved substantial results. The reputation of the Ager.cy in the world tpday is considerable, as attested to by its constantly growing membership. We welcome the entry into IAEA ofyet another member, Namibia. 73. We would especially emphasize that the Agency is fulfilling an important role, since it exists not in a political vacuum but in the realities of the present- day world. As was pointed out at the previous meeting by the Director General of IAEA, the Agency's activities are directly connected with issues of inter- national security. In this c;onnection, we approve the decision, of which everybody is aware, by the States members of IAEA with reference to Israel, a country which, in violation of all standards of international law, has pursued a policy of aggression against other ~he nuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular verification, technical assistance to developing coun- tries and scientific and technological programmes on nuclear and radiation security. 75. The Soviet Union is convinced that these areas of IAEA activity will be the focal-point of its concerns. We hope that the Agency will continue in future effectively to serve mankind. 76. Mr. JOHNSTON (United States of America): IAEA today faces its moment of truth. If IAEA is to survive as an institution, if it is effectively to carry out its statutory functions, it is essential that. all member States and the secretariat rededicate them- selves to the goals embodied in the IAEA statute. The extraneous political issues which have been per- mitted in recent years and months to intrude into the deliberations of the Agency jeopardize continued benefits to all Member States from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 77. The two main tasks of IAEA, as defined in its statute, are, first, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, secondly, to apply safeguards to peaceful nuclear programmes in order to detect and deter possible diversion of nuclear materials to non- peaceful applications. The introduction of unrelated political issues has put at grave risk the continued implementation of this vital mandate. 78. There are two fundamental principles on which the effective operation of IAEA and other technical agencies is based and to which the United States remains firmly committed. The first is the integrity of the technical agencies themselves-the necessity for them to carry out their well-established mandates, free from outside interference and the intrusion of extraneous political issues. The second principle is the unifying and guiding principle of the Charter of the United Nations itself: the sovereign equality of all States, large or small. 79. The idea involved is simple but is of overriding significance to the viability of the United Nations system-namely, that although certain actions by some Member States may be viewed with disfavour, the State itself should not for that reason be declared illegitimate and outside the pale of the international order to the extent that it not be permitted to join with other States under the umbrella of the United Nations or its technical agencies. This principle is, above all, vital to an agency such as IAEA, the im- plementation of whose mandate requirer> the participa- tion of all members in its technical work-indeed, requires universality. 80. Over the years, the United States has proudly supported the progress of IAEA in developing an effective safeguards system and in helping to distribute the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy among the maximum number of member States. We L.'e proud parents, for it was President Dwight D. Eisenhower who propo§ed before the Assembly in December 1~53 that an international organization devoted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy be established. A few years later, IAEA was born, and the United States has 82. "['he development of IAEA regulations for the safe transport of irradiated materials, in which my country actively participated, is also an important milestone. In subsequent years, these guidelines have been incorporated into the national regulations ofmany countries. Further progress was made in the establish- ment, in collaboration with WHO, of the world-wide network of secondary dosimetry laboratories. Today, these labs play an important role in ensuring that hospitals and medical centres can monitor proper doses of radiation therapy during cancer treatment. 83. In another field, United States scientists worked closely with the joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture in pioneering the sterile insect technique. In the past year, this new method has succeeded in eradicating the Mediter- ranean fruit-flY from a large area of southern Mexico. Similarly, my country has worked with IAEA in developing a package of computer codes used in fore- casting and planning the expansion of electrical generating systems, including all forms of energy. Today, these codes are in widespread use throughout the world. 84. Nor can we neglect to note the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in March 1970 and assigned a major safe- guarding responsibility to IAEA. Today, there are 119 parties to the Treaty; this attests to the commit- ment of a vast majority of the international community to the proposition that the further spread of nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices would have profoundly negative consequen~es for world peace and stability. Many-but not aH-members of IAEA are party to and share the non-proliferation objectiv~s of the Treaty, which in turn is clearly sup- portive of IAEA goals. 85. I cite these accomplishments and expanded responsibilities, not as an exhaustive list, but as rep- resentative of the progress made by IAEA during its first quarter of a century. The value of the scientific and engineering knowledge that the planet has derived from these and other developments of IAEA is in- calculable. So, too, has been the resulting transfer of technology for use by member States throughout the world. The United States has always supported and sought to create activities and programmes designed to benefit a large number of developing countries, in- cluding many which do not have nuclear facilities, in order that they, too, could participate meaningfully in the important work of IAEA. It was our premise that for the Agency to succeed in its vital mission, motivat~d actions which have intruded into the affairs of the Agency. We are deeply concerned that this trend, if continued, will leave the Agency unable to fulfil the dual purposes for which it was founded. 88. The United States welcomes the objectives out- lined at the General Conference and reaffirmed today by the Director General. He seeks to preserve tIie Agency's reputation as a technical and objective body and to concentrate on areas where the Agency can make the greatest contribution. In the same spirit, we support! as a first step in restoring confidence in IAEA, the appeal contained in the draft resolution before us that it strictly implement the mandate of its statute. As Secretary of State George Shultz said on 16 October, it is ess~ntial that IAEA and other tech- nical agencies not be undermined or destroyed by political attacks on the rights of member States. To allow this would be the ultimate disservice to all member States and to the people whom nuclear energy can so richly benefit. And that, of course, would be the greatest tragedy of all. 89. Mr. GARVALOV (Bulgaria): I should like to ey.pr~ss the satisfaction of the Bulgarian delegation at the report of IAEA for 1981. We are grateful to the ,Director General for his introductory statement, 95. We are also confident that the vital interests of all peoples in broad and fruitful international ~o­ operation in the fi~ld :of the, peaceful applications of nuclear energy require strict observance ofthe nuclear non-proliferation regime, a cornerstone ofwhich is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A positive fact confIrming this conclusion is the growing number of States parties to the Treaty. 96. At the same time, however, a matter of concern is certainly the continuing unwillingness of some States with substantial mlclear potential to accede to the Non-Proiiferation Treaty and to place their nuclear installations under the international safeguards of the Agency. Israel and South Mrica, whose aggressive policies pose a danger to world peace, continue to operate their nuclear installations outside the intema- tionallJ~EA safeguards. The raid on the Iraqi nuclear installation was an attack not only against Iraq but Tr~aty, and their acceptance of the. international safe- guards of the Agency art:' the basis for turning the principle ofnuclear non-proliferation into an inviolable norm of international relations. 98. The Bulgarian delegation greatly values the efforts of the Agency further to enhance the effective- ness of the safeguards machinery established by it, which has proved to be a reliable instrument. Of C0urse, the further increase in the number of nuclear installations and nuclear materials, as well as the variety of nuclear technologies under international control, will continue to pose certain problems well into the future. However, they can and must be over- come through the drawing up without delay of perti- nent methods and procedures for safeguards and also through further strengthening their material tech- nical basis. In this respect, the full co-operation of the members of IAEA will be of great importance. 99. While a number of countries have started to build their own nuclear energy industries, the contribu- tion of the Agency in the development ofworld atomic "energetics" as a whole, and also in providing tech- nical assistance to the developing countries in this field, is constantly growing. The Technical Assistance Fund of IAEA, made up chiefly of voluntary contributions by Agency members, has been increasing every year. 100. The report of the Agency reflects the impor- tance which it attaches to the principles on export of nuclear h1aterials and to the activities of the Com- mittee on Assurances of Supply. 101. We should like also to voice our gratitude to the Agency t0r its efforts in the field of nuclear safety and environment protection and in the fields of food and agriculture, health care, scientific re- search,.personnel training and exchange of scientific information. The Agency's Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, held in Vienna last September, provided an opportunity for a broad exchange ofuseful information in this respect. 102. I should like to point out that the People's Republic of Bulgaria, on the basis of its beneficial co-operation with other countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, as well as within the lAEA system, is successfully implementing a broad national programme in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The nuclear station called "Kozlodui" supplies 26 per cent of the total output of electricity produced in Bulgaria. My cOllntry now ranks as the world's sixth nation in relative share of electricity generated by nuclear plants. Furthermore, I note with satisfaction that throughout the. eight years of its exploitation that particular power-station has been functioniQg s(J!eIy and steadily within the projected parameters, with a high degree of utilization. On the basis of the experience in this field, my country plans to continue to develop further and expand the produc- tion of electricity-generating nuclear power facilities. 103. In conclusion, I express my delegation's con- fidence that IAEA, under the skilful guidance of ~ts Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, will continue to make its valuable contribution in fostering international co-
We welcome the Director General's remarks this morning both for their candour and for their clear commitment to IAEA and its work. The Director General and the secretariat are to be congratulated for the most useful annual report we are considering today. 105. The Agency has been given a central role, under its statute, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclearenergy, and the wide range ofactivities covered in the annual report underscore the importance of its many responsibilities. My Government is pleased that, despite stringent budgetary limits, the Agency con- tinues to give appropriate priority to technical assis- tance, safeguards and nuclear safety. We believe that the effectiveness of those programmes will directly enhance the acceptability of nuclear power as an energy alternative. 106. The Agency is charged with the difficult task of accelerating and enlarging the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'. Canada is pleased to note that IAEA is improving its ability to select and evaluate projects designed to have significant social and economic impact. We have also noted with satisfaction that the Agency's technkal assistance to dr.veloping coun- tries has again increased substantially. 107. Canada considers the Agency's safeguards operations essential for the promotion ofany effective, internationally agreed non-proliferation regime, and my Government will continue strongly to support these efforts. We are nevertheless concerned that, this year, the Agency has had to qualify its conclusion that nuclear material under Agency safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was other- wise adequately accounted for., If confidence is to be maintained, the Agency must continue to upgrade the effectiveness of its safeguards, taking into account the latest technological advances. 108. The Canadian Government has always made 4bundantly clear before the organs of all specialized agencies that it does not accept the insertion of po- litical considerations extraneous to their mandate in their deliberations and decisions. 109. In particular, we hold the view that, given the importance of the international safeguards regime to all States without distinction and the central role which IAEA plays in administering the safeguards system, , all Governments have a clear and shared interest in . assuring that the environment in which the Agency operates is as co-operative and fruitful as possible. We therefore strongly support the call for all Stated to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency and to implement strictly the mandate of its statute. 110. In conclusion, I should like to join those other delegations in congratulating the Agency on this' its twenty-fifth anniversary, as well as Mr. Blix who, on ach~eve the objectives enshrined in its statute, em- phasis and priority must be given "t~ accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". It is necessary for all of us to address 5eriously the ques- tion of how the Agency should develop its activities in order to achieve this objective. 114. The universal concern at the escalation in the nuclear arms race is now being articulated more force- fully than ever before. Nevertheless, progress t:owards the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament has been dismally slow. The second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament this summer aroused great expecta- tions but ended in most frustrating failure. We con- tinue to hope that the impact of world opinion will still be able to persuade the nuclear-w~apon Powers and that the day will soon come when all nuclear weapons have been finally eliminated from this pianet. 115. The Prime Minister ofIndia, Mrs. IndiraGandhi, in her message to the second special session on disar- mament, enunciated a five-point concrete programme of ac~ion.The second point ofthis programme ofaction has special relevance to all of us, especially to the Agency: "as a first step towards the eventual cutting of existing stockpiles, there must be a freeze on nuclear weapons, providing for the total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons, combined with a cut-off in the production of fissionable mate- rial for weapons purposes."6 116. A freeze on nuclear weapons must necessarily consist of two inseparable elements, namely, a com- plete cessation ofmanufacture ofnuclear weapons and a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. Such a combined step would mean that all nuclear facilities in all countries of the world would become peaceful and, in that event, nuclear- weapon States would have no excuse or pretext for refus~ng to accept international safeguards on all their own nuclear establishments, which they are at 131. The value of the Treaty can be expected to increase as the years roll on and more and more countries are required to look to nuclear power for domestic energy requirements. It is a fundamental necessity that in the years ahead the international regime devised to forestall nuclear-weapons prolifera- tion remain visibly viable. I would add that the Treaty's viability will be much improved if those parties that export nuclear materials and equipment fulfil actively their responsibility to encourage positively adherence to the Treaty and to comply whole-heartedly with its terms and purpose. As the Director General said at the preceding meeting, it is necessary to demonstrate that there are real advantages in acceding to the Treaty and thereby gaining access to nuclear materials and technology under properly safeguarded arrangements. 132. We are glad that the Treaty on the Non-Pro- liferation of Nuclear Weapons continues to attnict new adherents. In the past year, Antigua and Bar- buda, Cape Verde, Uganda and Viet Nam have adhered to the Treaty. We also note with pleasure that Ban- gladesh, Egypt, Guatemala and Venezuela have moved, under the Treaty, to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency. We would urge all non- nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty but which have not yet concluded such agreements to do so at an early date. Likewise, we welcome the recent offer by the Soviet Union to open its facilities to IAEA safeguards. Four of the nUclear-weapon States will thus now be covered by the Agency's safeguards system. Looking further down the road, we look forward t:> the time when the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will attract uni- versal adherence. 127. My country believes that it has particular responsibilities in this field. We are a major producer and exporter of nuclear fuel. We already account for some 20 per cent of the world's uranium reserves outside -of the Soviet Union and China, with the prospect that this percentage '., iP be substantially increased whe::. newly discovered deposits are fully tested and analysed. It is thus natural that Australia should give the highest priority to IAEA. The Agency and its Director General can count on our full sup- port in the discharge of their heavy responsibilities. 128. Foremost among these responsibilities is the Agency's role in non-proliferation. The establishment of the Agency and the acceptance by member States ofits statute and systems ofsafeguards were milestones in the global effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapons while at the same time promoting peaceful nuclear co-operation. 133. I prefaced this statement with a reference to the significance of Australia as a producer of nuclear fuel. I should add, in regard to the commercial exploitation of our uranium resources, that Australia has been assiduous in requiring the negotiation of 'watertight bilateral safeguards agreements. Those with 'EURATOM and Japan, which entered into force this year, are of particular significance, given the size and importance of their nuclear programmes and the role they play in international nuclear relations. The Australian network of bilateral nuclear safeguards and co-operation agreements now covers the major part of the international nuclear fuel cycle, providing as- surances ofsupply within an effective non-proliferation regime. 129. Australia accepts and attaches great impor- tance to the Agency's role in the fields of technical assistance and co-op~ration. We are pleased that such assistance and co-operation continue to expand. We recognize full well the value and importance ofnuclear energy and the application of nuclear energy for the economic development of developing countries. We shall continue to give full support to IAEA in this area. It is nevertheless the non-proliferation dimen- sion of the Agency that is all important. This impor- tance relates to the basic argument that a world 137. In the circumstances, it is necessary to con- firm the special nature of the Agency and to reduce the level of political controversy within it, so that full attention and priority can be given to the specialized matters for which it is responsible. Therefore, Austra- lia wishes to join with others in a call to support and strength~n the substantive work ofIAEA by upholding its technical character, as set out in its statute. Aus- tralia also urges all States to. refrain from actions both outside and inside IAEA which, by one means or another, could affect the Agency's capacity to perform its responsibilities. 138. We cannot afford to lose sight of .the unique and important contribution made by the Agency to international security over the past 25 years. This role has been augmented and made the mure vital for more than a decade now, since the General Assembly in 1968 called overwhelmingly for the Agency to support and verify the commitments made by parties to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There are now well over 100 such parties, and the number continues to grow. It is evident, therefore, that there is the widest global interest, shared by countries ofall groups, not only in preserving but in actively promoting the ability of the Agency to do its job without interference or disruption. 139. Finally, with regard to the draft resolution before us, I would note that the text was negotiated in close consultation with all interested delegations. Therefore, I can say that Australia will have no difficulty in supporting it as it stands. However, it follows from what I have just said about the risks of 143. As a means ofaverting that danger, we welcome the further strengthening of the non-proliferaHon regime by the accession of additional countries to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Thus, the Treaty is making steady progress towards universal adherence, which we believe is an indispensable element in the larger scheme of the maintenance ofinternationalpeace and security, which is the main role of the Organization. 144. We also noted the positive fact that a number of supplying States have indicated their willingness to simplify some ofthe conditions oftheir nuclearexports while continuing to apply adequate non-proliferation restraints. My delegation hopes that this encouraging trend will continue in the future. 145. The Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, held at Vienna in September of this year, proved successful and useful for the member States of the Agency. The projections in the IAEA report predict that nuclear technology will provide an important source of energy in the future as well. As far as Finland is concerned, we are one of those countries- in which nuclear power is a major source of energy. It provides more than a third of the total electricity production. We therefore have a vested interest in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 146. Whil~ we can all agree on the importance of international co-operation in the peacefuluse ofnnclear energy, the fear ofthe proliferation ofnuclear wellpons aggravates the problems experienced in this field of international co-operation. That fear persists because some non-nuclear-weapon States have not given the international community the non-proliferation commit- 157. The difficulty in licensing and public resistance to nuclear energy stem from the same sourc·e, namely, concern about safety, including the question ofnuclear waste, in its dual aspect of the preservation of health and of the environment and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In both fields, IAEA has been accomplishing comm~ndable work through its efforts at standardization and at physical safety through the safeguards regime. None the less, my delegation is convinced that it is possible for the Agency to expand and intensify its action if it tackles more forcefully :the problem of the doubtful image that nuclear energy understandably has and if there is no further delay in the development of nuclear energy on the pretext of non-proliferation. 158. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons does not depend on control or verification measures. It is true that those verification measures dispel apprehen- sion, but we know that it is technically impossible to prevent proliferation, at least through use for peaceful 171. My country firmly believes in the significance of the technical and scientific work accomplished by IAEA. It is precisely for that reason that we are following its activities very closely and that we shall continue to afford it our fullest and most determined co-operation. In this same spirit, we support draft resolution A/37/L.29.
I should like to begin by congratulating Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA, on having presented a comprehensive and important report on the activities of the Agency for 1981. We have full confidence in his devotion to the cause of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear guard~ system, we are assured in the comments in already been installed by the Agency at the Karachi paragraph 228 of the report that: plant and are working satisfactorily. Pakistan's in- "In 1981, as in previous years, the secretariat, ' sistence on negotiating the additional safeguards in carrying out the safeguards programme of the measures proposed by the Agency outside the existing Agency, did not detect any anomaly which would agreements reflected its concern for the principle indicate the diversion of a signifir,;ant amount that it could not accept any unilateral proposals with- of safeguarded nuclear material-or the misuse of out discussion. The misleading criticism by certain facilities or equipment ... to further any other mili- quarters of the position taken by Pakistan is wholly ~ k unwarranted and is refuted by the positive outcome tary purpose ... or J.or purposes un nown." of the negotiations between the Agency and Pakistan 176. The report makes reference to a number of and by the appreciation expressed by the Agenc~y of technical measures which the Board of Governors had Pakistan's co-operative attitude. --------~~~~~.,'--,~_~ The meeting rose at 6 p.m. NOTES J international Atomic Energy Agency, The Annual Report for /98/, (Austria, July 1982); transmitted to the members ofthe General Assembly by a note ofthe Secretary-General (A/37/382 and Corr.l). 3 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Twenty·fifth Regular Session. 4 Ibid., The Agency's Programme for 1983-/988 and Budget for 1983 (GC(XXVI)/666). 6 Ibid., 9th me~ting. 7 Ibid., 11th meeting.