A/67/PV.30 General Assembly

Due to the extreme weather conditions experienced last week, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency was unable to travel to New York to introduce the report of the Agency for the year 2011. His prepared statement will subsequently be issued as a note by the Secretary- General. Copies of the prepared statement are also available here in the Hall. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada to introduce draft resolution A/67/L.3.

On behalf of the Canadian delegation, acting on behalf of the Chair of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it is my pleasure to introduce the draft resolution entitled “Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency”. As colleagues are aware, the General Assembly considers this draft resolution annually. It derives from a requirement pursuant to the IAEA statute and the 1957 Agreement governing the relationship between the IAEA and the United Nations. The draft resolution is the means by which the General Assembly takes note of the statement of the IAEA Director General and of the resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Conference, and recognizes the work of the Agency. The draft text before the General Assembly was discussed in Vienna among IAEA member States, as well as during informal consultations here in New York. It is a simple factual update of last year’s text (resolution 66/7) that merely changes the relevant dates and lists the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Conference at its fifty-sixth plenary meeting. It is my pleasure to commend this text for consideration by the General Assembly. We sincerely hope that it will attract consensus again this year.

I now give the floor to the observer of the European Union.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The acceding country Croatia; the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Serbia; the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Area countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this statement. We are pleased to support the draft resolution entitled “Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency” (IAEA), a report that again reaffirms the indispensable role of the Agency with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, as well as in technology transfer and in nuclear verification, safety and security. The European Union remains committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and emphasizes the importance of universalizing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We call on States that have not done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The EU welcomed the consensus reached on the Action Plan at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Action Plan, as well as the agreement on a process for the implementation of the 1995 NPТ resolution on the Middle East, including a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to be convened in 2012, demonstrated our common resolve not only to uphold but also to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In that respect, the EU commends the Facilitator, His Excellency Mr. Jaakko Laajava, for the professional work and consultations carried out, as well as for his report on the preparation of a 2012 conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East presented during the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting held earlier this year in Vienna. The European Union recalls the IAEA forum held in November 2011 on that issue and welcomes the Agency’s support for the implementation of the 1995 resolution, including through the preparation of background documentation for the 2012 conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as requested by the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. In that regard, with a view to contributing to those international efforts, the European Union is pleased to reaffirm its support for a process leading to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as demonstrated by the recent adoption, on 23 July, of a new EU Council decision. As announced at this year’s NPT Preparatory Committee, the EU is pleased to announce that a track 2 seminar by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is taking place in Brussels today and tomorrow and is expected to allow for an open exchange of views on all aspects related to the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying and ensuring compliance by States with their safeguards obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses. The European Union remains deeply concerned by the protracted and serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic, concerns reinforced by the recent reports of the Director General of the IAEA to the Board of Governors. Once again, the Board felt it necessary to adopt a resolution on Iran reaffirming the requirements of its 2011 resolution and urging Iran to comply fully and without delay with all its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, as well as to meet the requirements of the Board of Governors, including the application of modified Code 3.1 and the implementation and prompt entry into force of the Additional Protocol, The European Union fully supported the adoption of that resolution. The European Union would like to stress again that the Security Council, as the final arbiter of international peace and security, has the mandate to take appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations, including safeguards agreements. The Agency’s system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. In that respect, the European Union would like to express its satisfaction that the IAEA General Conference adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution entitled “Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and the application of the Model Additional Protocol”. The European Union is grateful for the wide support received from the IAEA member States for what is traditionally an EU-sponsored resolution. The EU reiterates its view that the measures contained in the model additional protocol form an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, and that comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, constitute the current IAEA verification standard. The European Union calls for the universalization of those two essential instruments of the IAEA safeguards system without delay. With regard to nuclear safety, in particular with regard to the EU responses to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, I would like to mention that, on 25 March 2011, the European Council called for comprehensive risk and safety assessments — stress tests — to be conducted at European nuclear power plants. The 17 national reports — from 15 EU countries, Switzerland and Ukraine — covering all nuclear power plants of the EU and of participating countries have been assessed by 80 reviewers from Europe. Many observers from third countries also took part in that unprecedented initiative. The peer-reviewed report was transmitted to the June 2012 European Council meeting. In July, an action plan was agreed upon in order to follow the implementation of the recommendations of the report. As requested by the European Council in March 2011, the European Commission will now examine possible evolutions of European legislation, notably of the nuclear safety directive, and submit them to Member States. The EU attaches the utmost importance to the implementation of the highest standards of nuclear safety worldwide. International cooperation is crucial to promoting the global nuclear safety framework. In that context, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Joint Convention are instruments of major importance. The European Union calls on all Member States that have not yet done so to become contracting parties to the relevant safety Conventions without delay. The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety is also an important instrument that should be implemented by Member States and the Secretariat. We face a new era of threats from non-State actors, particularly terrorists, who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related technology and materials and present one of the potentially most destructive risks to global security. In the light of such ongoing threats, the EU actively supports Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009), as well as a number of other international initiatives, such as the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Security Summits and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The EU looks forward to the Agency’s July 2013 lnternational Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, which is open to all States, and welcomes the role that international processes and initiatives can play in facilitating synergy and cooperation in the area of nuclear security. The EU supports IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security in the framework of the implementation of the EU’s strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU, together with individual member States, is one of the main contributors to the Nuclear Security Fund, having provided around €30 million to date. So far, more than 50 countries have benefited from assistance funded through EU joint actions and Council decisions. That number continues to grow. During the period 2007-2013, under the EU Instrument for Stability, nearly €260 million has been dedicated to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation worldwide. Of that amount, more than €100 million has been allocated to the EU’s regional CBRN centres of excellence initiative. The objective of the centres of excellence is to invest in strengthening the institutional capacity of stakeholders in partner countries to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear risks, irrespective of their origin. At the same time, the European Union has stepped up its outreach and coordination efforts to key partners and international organizations. On 19 April, the Security Council welcomed the establishment of the CBRN centres of excellence (see S/PV.6752); a major conference on the centres was held at the United Nations in New York on 22 June; and EU services are about to finalize a broad understanding on coordination with the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security that will include regular work on a strategic and technical level on the radiological and nuclear aspects of the CBRN centres of excellence initiative. Effective physical protection is of the utmost importance in order to prevent nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists or being accidentally misused, as well as to protect nuclear facilities against unauthorized use and malicious acts. The EU therefore urges all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment. Finally, the European Union uses several of its financial instruments to support both the IAEA and cooperation with third countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, amounting to a total of some €150 million per year. Where the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are concerned, the Agency plays an important role in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources, the environment and nuclear energy, as well as in nuclear and radiation safety, in participating Member States. Part of the EU’s funding through its financial instruments is implemented in third countries through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund, to which the EU and its member States are among the largest contributors. We also make substantial contributions to the Agency’s Peaceful Uses Initiative. On 4 May, on the margins of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the EU organized a side event on the topic of peaceful uses, with the participation of the Agency.

Australia commends Director General Amano for his report (A/67/152) on the achievements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and on the challenges it will face over the coming years. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia takes very seriously the responsibilities that entails. We attach great importance to the central role played by the IAEA in improving the safety and security of nuclear activities, enlarging the humanitarian contribution made by nuclear technology and verifying States’ non-proliferation commitments. In the post-Fukushima accident era, Director General Amano’s ongoing actions and initiatives have improved international nuclear safety, particularly through the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. The Action Plan is a strong and practical demonstration of the priority the international community attaches to achieving the highest possible standards in nuclear safety. We encourage States to be proactive in undertaking the actions outlined in the Plan, and any additional actions that are relevant to their own circumstances. Australia welcomes the positive outcomes of the second Extraordinary Meeting of Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in August, especially the upgrading of the rules and guidelines that will strengthen nuclear safety through more comprehensive national reporting and robust peer-review processes. While important, safety measures are not the only elements required to properly protect people and the environment. The IAEA’s nuclear security programme and its role in international nuclear security initiatives and activities are equally important. The IAEA safeguards system is one of the central pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. To be completely effective, the IAEA’s safeguards system must have universal coverage. The universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is indispensable to the system. We continue to call on those States that have not signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible, and to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. We continue to call on all those States party to the NPT that have yet to fulfil their relevant obligations under the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and to adhere to the Additional Protocols without delay. States must comply with their safeguards obligations. IAEA safeguards obligations are not voluntary. It is therefore a matter of deep concern that certain States continue to be in breach of their obligations. We call on those countries to engage with the Agency to resolve all issues, demonstrate conclusively the peaceful intent of their nuclear activities, and comply fully with all of their international obligations, including addressing the concerns of the international community. Australia commends the Agency for its continuing efforts to resolve those issues. Australia continues to support the Agency in developing safeguards techniques and approaches. Recently, the University of Western Australia became the newest member of the Agency’s network of analytical laboratories. In that role, it will analyse environmental samples with the ability to detect illicit nuclear activities. Australia is committed to working closely with the Agency and our neighbours in the Asia Pacific region on peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Australia shares its skilled scientific research base, equipment and personnel with regional neighbours and other Member States, and we provide strong support to the Agency’s technical cooperation programme. The Agency plays a vital role in enhancing States’ capacities to prevent, diagnose and treat health problems through the use of nuclear techniques. We should never lose sight of such humanitarian benefits, to which the IAEA is uniquely able to provide worldwide support. Australia has recently announced an expansion of its nuclear medicine production capability, which in coming years will be able to supply a large part of global need for medical radioisotopes. It is crucial that we advance both health outcomes from nuclear medicine and global nuclear non-proliferation efforts by minimizing the civilian use of highly enriched uranium. Our new facility is based solely on the use of low-enriched uranium. Australia is also further developing its specialized nuclear waste management technology, Synroc, to encapsulate and store safely the waste from its expanded nuclear medicine production. Finally, the external environment in which the Agency operates is highly fluid, and we must ensure that the Agency has the capability to respond quickly and effectively to external developments, be they related to nuclear safety, physical protection, nuclear proliferation or sustainable development. Australia will continue to provide the technical, financial and political support to ensure that the Agency can help States meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. Australia is pleased to sponsor draft resolution A/67/L.3 on the report of the IAEA.

My delegation thanks the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for preparing the annual report for the year 2011, as transmitted in the note by the Secretary- General (A/67/152). The increasing global demand for energy, as well as concerns about climate change, volatile fossil fuel prices and the security of energy supplies, remain essential factors in deciding an energy mix for any country. This is aptly reflected by the observation in the report that, despite the nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011, nuclear power remains an important option not only for countries with existing nuclear programmes, but also for developing countries with growing energy requirements. We note that the IAEA’s post-accident projections of global nuclear power capacity in 2030 are slightly lower than previously projected, as some countries have deferred their decisions to introduce nuclear programmes. The Fukushima accident elicited a global response to the issue of enhancing nuclear safety, with Member States reassessing the safety of existing nuclear power plants. While the results of these reassessments will be further refined as necessary in the light of new information that might emerge in the future, it is a matter of satisfaction that the data collected by the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators shows that in 2011 the level of nuclear safety among the 435 operating nuclear power plants in operation around the world remained high. However, as Fukushima has demonstrated, there is no room for complacency. The IAEA should also take all necessary measures to allay misapprehension among the public and member States about the safety of nuclear power plants, taking into account the current advances in relevant design and technology areas. Therefore, we would like to call on all stakeholders to work collectively to continue to enhance nuclear safety. In this context, we would like to encourage the IAEA to make concerted efforts to enable the free flow of the latest information, technology and equipment pertaining to nuclear safety among member States. Nuclear energy has a crucial role to play in achieving the objectives of India’s sustainable economic growth. At the same time, India is extensively engaged in the development of nuclear technologies in diverse fields extending beyond nuclear power. These include applications for improved crop varieties, crop protection and radiation-based post-harvest technologies, radiodiagnosis and radiotherapy for diseases, and technologies for safe drinking water, among others. The nuclear power programme in India is oriented towards maximizing the energy potential of available uranium resources and the utilization of its large thorium reserves. We believe that available global uranium resources cannot sustain the projected expansion of nuclear power without adopting a closed fuel cycle approach and subsequently adopting a thorium fuel cycle. In this context, we would like to mention the IAEA technical meeting held in India in October 2011, where over 50 experts from 20 member States deliberated on diverse subjects related to thorium. The participants noted thorium’s promise in extending the global deployment of nuclear power, and concluded that the technology is sufficiently mature for an initial commercial deployment. We encourage the IAEA to further engage in the thorium fuel cycle. With its excellent physical and nuclear properties, thorium is widely and rightly viewed as the fuel of the future. Currently, India has 20 operating reactors with an installed capacity of 4,780 megawatts, and seven reactors under construction with an installed capacity of 5,300 megawatts. The first unit of the 1,000-megawatt electrical pressurized heavy-water reactor at Kudankulam is due to attain first criticality very shortly. The second unit is to follow soon after. Work is proceeding on four nuclear power plants of indigenous design of 700-megawatt electrical pressurized heavy-water reactor type, two each at Rawatbhata, in Rajasthan, and Kakrapar, in Gujarat. The prototype fast breeder reactor of 500 megawatts is also in an advanced stage of construction. A number of other reactor projects are under negotiation with prospective foreign vendors for the setting up of nuclear power plants at different sites. We were happy to welcome three new members into the fold of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) in 2011. India has been associated with INPRO since its inception, and has contributed to its progress. We believe that this programme has great potential for making nuclear energy accessible in a safe and sustainable manner, particularly to new entrants embarking on this path. The IAEA, through INPRO, should continue to play a central role in developing innovative technology for the safe utilization of nuclear power. My delegation fully supports other activities of the IAEA undertaken to stimulate innovation in nuclear power through technical working groups for different reactor technologies, small and medium-sized reactors, and non-electrical applications. The coordinated research projects organized by the IAEA provide an excellent forum for understanding and developing technology. India attaches great importance to the IAEA’s work in the field of nuclear science. We contribute to these activities through participation in the technical meetings and coordinated research projects and support the IAEA’s programme in nuclear fusion. My delegation believes that the IAEA’s programmes and achievements in nuclear applications in food and agriculture, human health and nutrition, water resources management, protection of the environment and industry go a long way towards meeting the needs of developing countries. We will continue to provide our support to these IAEA programmes, including by offering experts’ services and seats in reputed institutions for training fellows from member States. With these comments, we take note of the IAEA’s annual report for 2011. India supports the work of the IAEA and has sponsored draft resolution A/67/L.3 on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Belarus, allow me to express our appreciation for the report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Yukiya Amano, on the activities of the Agency over the past year (see A/67/152). The Belarusian delegation reiterates its support for the Agency as the leading international organization contributing to the safe, reliable and peaceful use of nuclear energy for the purposes of sustainable development. The past year has been difficult for the entire international nuclear community, in particular the IAEA, in the light of the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. A quarter of a century after the Chernobyl disaster, the world was again confronted by a nuclear accident. That has forced us to reassess the issue of nuclear safety and of how to ensure it. We note the great amount of work undertaken by the Agency’s secretariat, in cooperation with member States, to adapt current approaches to ensuring a global nuclear safety regime. Belarus has taken an active part in that process and intends to make its own contribution towards implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, endorsed at the fifty-fifth regular session of the General Conference in September 2011. Belarus attaches the utmost importance to ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in the implementation of its national nuclear power programme. The safety of such future programmes is a State priority and our country undertakes all the necessary phases of developing nuclear energy in close cooperation with the Agency and in strict compliance with its norms and standards. That was reaffirmed by the successful hosting of the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review mission in Belarus in June. The efforts of Belarus were highly commended during visits to that country by the Agency’s Director General, Yukiya Amano, in April and by its Deputy Director General, Alexander Bychkov, in October. We note the fruitful cooperation with the Agency’s Secretariat on strengthening nuclear security. With IAEA assistance, Belarus is implementing a relevant and coordinated plan of action. We believe such activities to be a significant contribution of Belarus towards bolstering nuclear security not only nationally but also regionally. Belarus is firmly convinced of the importance of the IAEA’s coordinating role in the global efforts to strengthen nuclear security and to prevent nuclear terrorism. Only the agreed and joint actions of the international community in that area can produce tangible results. In that regard, we attach great significance to the implementation of and broader participation by States in the international legal instruments adopted under the auspices of the Agency, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Belarus actively participates in the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme, through which provision is made for considerable assistance in applying nuclear knowledge and technology. The main national priorities are the development of the nuclear power infrastructure, environmental protection, the rehabilitation of territories that suffered as a result of the Chernobyl disaster and health issues. We believe that maintaining and bolstering the Technical Cooperation Programme, as well as ensuring its robust financial support, must remain a priority among the IAEA activities. As a firm and steadfast champion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Belarus strictly complies with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement. We deem it very important to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including the additional protocol, as the standard for verification activity. In conclusion, we would like to reiterate our support for the Agency’s work. We note that Belarus is a sponsor of draft resolution A/67/L.3, which has been submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly.

The Chinese delegation welcomes the report of Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the work of the Agency (see A/67/152). Over the past year, the IAEA has conscientiously performed its duties in accordance with its statutory mandate by maintaining a balanced development of its two major mandates of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and has achieved fruitful results in various areas of its work. In the field of nuclear safety in particular, the Agency has taken a series of measures to ensure the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety since its adoption at the fifty-fifth regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA. China believes that such efforts by the Agency are of great importance to restoring public confidence in nuclear energy, to improving international nuclear safety and emergency response and to ensuring the safe and sustainable development of global nuclear energy. At the same time, through its Technical Cooperation Programme, the Agency has promoted the application of nuclear technology in a broad range of areas, such as public health, medical services, agriculture and environmental protection. On the basis of the Programme, the Agency has provided important guidance to developing countries on developing nuclear energy. It has also supported and assisted member States in strengthening their nuclear security and safety capabilities by establishing the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and by drawing up guiding documents, such as the Nuclear Security Fundamentals. The Agency continuously strives to promote the universality of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol, and has resolutely carried out its safeguards functions. The Chinese delegation is glad to see that the Agency’s work has been widely recognized and supported by member States. The Fukushima nuclear accident triggered deep reflection within the international community on the use of nuclear energy, and countries increasingly have a sound understanding of nuclear power development. On the one hand, nuclear power, as a clean and efficient form of energy, still plays an irreplaceable role in safeguarding energy security, in promoting economic development and in combating climate change. The global trend for nuclear power development has essentially remained the same. On the other hand, safety is a priority for and fundamental to developing nuclear energy. China always adheres to the principle of safety first in developing nuclear energy. We have established a comprehensive system of legal standards and a regulatory framework for nuclear safety, and will continue to improve such structures. We have enhanced the management of our nuclear safety and emergency response, stepped up efforts in staff training and technology research and development and have a good track record in nuclear safety. China has endorsed and actively participated in relevant international and regional exchanges and cooperation in order to further improve nuclear safety. To that end, it has also worked tirelessly to develop and to implement advanced nuclear energy technology. China also attaches great importance to nuclear security capacity-building and supports and actively participates in relevant international cooperation. In March 2012, President Hu Jintao attended the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, where he expounded on China’s policy and measures on nuclear security issues in a comprehensive manner. China played a constructive role in ensuring the success of the Summit and made a great contribution to promoting international cooperation on nuclear security. At present, the construction of the centre of excellence on nuclear security in China, in cooperation with relevant countries, is proceeding in an orderly fashion. China will strive to make it a regional centre of excellence, and cooperate and interconnect with other centres to raise the level of nuclear security in the region. In addition, China supports the leading role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the field of nuclear security, and will continue to offer contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund. The Agency is the most authoritative and representative international organization in the nuclear field. Member States have high expectations for it. It is China’s hope that, facing the new situation, the Agency will give priority, first, to further promoting the implementation of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and international exchanges and cooperation on nuclear safety, and to helping member States enhance nuclear safety and emergency response capabilities; secondly, to further improving the standards and guidelines in nuclear security and assisting Member States in upgrading their national nuclear security system with a view to playing a more important role in enhancing nuclear security at the global level; thirdly, to strengthening the safeguards regime and effectively preventing nuclear proliferation; and, fourthly, to maintaining an objective and impartial stand on sensitive and controversial nuclear issues, and playing a constructive role in peacefully resolving those issues through dialogue and cooperation.

Cuba welcomes and supports the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The application of nuclear technologies in such priority areas as health, food security, environmental protection and the management of water resources is an important contribution to improving life on our planet. Cuba attaches particular importance to the technical cooperation activity of the Agency because it is an essential way to promote nuclear technology in developing countries. Among other aspects, that can be seen in the strict fulfilment of our obligations to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. In 2011, Cuba fulfilled on time its financial commitments to the Technical Cooperation Fund and paid 100 per cent of its expenses for its national participation, achieving a 92 per cent implementation rate for national projects, which is a figure higher than average. In the case of Cuba, IAEA technical cooperation projects fit harmoniously with our development programmes, which guarantees their impact and continuity. Cuba continues to increase its contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme through various actions, among which I note the contribution of 44 experts who have participated in 70 missions, and the organization of 20 courses and/or regional training workshops. Cuba also considers it vitally important to continue cooperation between developing countries. That is why we reiterate our support of the Regional Cooperative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America, an essential mechanism for promoting nuclear cooperation among the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We welcome the measures that have been taken to strengthen that programme, both by participating countries and by the IAEA itself. Cuba is playing an active role in that process. The economic trade and financial embargo applied by the United States of America to Cuba for more than 50 years affects the activities of the IAEA in our country and violates the statutes of that body. Because of the blockade, the IAEA has had problems purchasing specialized equipment for projects in Cuba, since North American companies or those that provide training to Cubans are not allowed to sell their equipment for use in Cuba because of the sanctions. Furthermore, it is difficult for Cuban nationals to participate in training courses organized in the United States, which also affects the implementation of projects linked to the fight against cancer, which is an IAEA priority. Once again, I denounce the unjust and criminal blockade. Cuba recognizes, however, the ongoing efforts of the IAEA secretariat to find alternatives or solutions to that problem. My country appreciates the work of the Organization in the area of nuclear safety, and stresses the fundamental responsibility of States in that area. In March, Cuba and the IAEA signed an integrated support plan for physical nuclear safety, the implementation of which is advancing satisfactorily. We welcome the excellent level of cooperation that has been achieved with the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security in the implementation of projects to improve physical nuclear safety in border control and installations with Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. Cuba has also hosted regional training events, an area of IAEA support that we consider to be fundamental. My country also welcomes the preparations being carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency to host the important international conference on nuclear security that will take place in Vienna from 1 to 5 July 2013, with the participation of all member States. In that context, I would like to inform the Assembly that Cuba is at an advanced stage of the constitutional process of ratifying the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We reaffirm the need to strengthen the nuclear security regime at the international level, and stress that this is the primary responsibility of States with nuclear installations. Moreover, we recognize the IAEA’s central role in promoting and coordinating international efforts and cooperation to strengthen nuclear security at the global level. Cuba is part of the small group of countries that have met their commitments in the area of safeguards, as certified by the IAEA, which confirms that we are a country that does not have undeclared nuclear material or engage in undeclared nuclear activities. We attach great importance to the sensitive issue of safeguards and to the impartial and professional conduct of the IAEA secretariat in the activities undertaken in that area. We have repeatedly criticized the manipulation and politicization of the Agency for political purposes, as well as the double standards that unfortunately prevail in its analyses. Activities in that area are the exclusive competence of the IAEA, and we therefore reiterate our rejection of the decisions that have involved the Security Council in their consideration. Cuba reaffirms that verification activities must first and foremost respect the sovereignty and national interests of member States. We call on the IAEA secretariat to continue to work to provide a climate of impartiality, trust, understanding and transparency, based on objectivity and truth, which will help resolve the specific issues of compliance with safeguards agreements being considered by the Board of Governors and/or the General Conference of the IAEA. In that regard, we reaffirm the need to respect the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We once again affirm our support for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and for a negotiated solution to the issue on the part of all those involved. We are firmly convinced that only through diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means will it be possible to achieve a long-term solution to the nuclear issue on the peninsula. We would also reiterate our support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. That would be an important contribution to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament and a major step forward in the peace process in the region. In order to bring that about, Israel should join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay or conditions and submit its nuclear installations to the broad safeguards of the IAEA. Cuba hopes that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East will be held with success in 2012 with the participation of all States of the region. While we support the important role played by the IAEA and its links with the United Nations system, in particular with the disarmament machinery, we would take this opportunity to reiterate that our joint efforts must be to continue to defend nuclear disarmament as the highest priority owing to the serious threat to international peace and security and the survival of the human race posed by the existence of more than 20,000 nuclear warheads and military doctrines and strategies that perpetuate their possession and use. Finally, we wish to emphasize that nuclear disarmament cannot be a goal that is postponed or subject to conditions. Cuba will stand firm in the battle for a better world free of nuclear weapons.

One and a half years after the Great East Japan Earthquake and its resulting tsunamis and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of the Tokyo Electric Power Company, Japan is continuing its efforts, including those directed towards decontaminating and restoring the stricken areas. We once again express our gratitude for the great support and assistance that we have received from the international community to date. I take the opportunity afforded by today’s debate to talk about some of the major steps we have taken to contribute to progress in the Nuclear Safety Action Plan of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the past year. That issue is of particular importance to Japan, as my country is organizing the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety next December, in co-sponsorship with the IAEA. We find it important to urge the international community to implement the Action Plan and to share lessons learned and knowledge derived from the accident. First of all, in order to strengthen international nuclear safety, we have fully imparted information and knowledge about the accident with the international community. Japan has already presented two detailed reports to the IAEA on the course of events. Secondly, Japan decided to strengthen its national nuclear regulatory body. A new regulatory body, the Nuclear Regulation Authority, was established in order to separate the authority to regulate nuclear energy from that of promoting it, and to ensure that the new Authority will enjoy a high degree of independence so that it can assume responsibility for all important nuclear regulatory functions — safety and security, radiation protection and, beginning in April 2013, safeguards issues, that is, each of the three “S” functions. Furthermore, Japan welcomes Director General Amano’s expressed intention to prepare a comprehensive report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, which will be finalized in 2014. Japan will actively cooperate with that effort. In order to strengthen global nuclear security, Japan will continue to endeavour to provide assistance to developing countries through the activities of the Integrated Support Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security, working in concert with other countries and the IAEA. Japan appreciates the IAEA’s efforts aimed at promoting the entry into force of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Japan, recognizing that the amendment will bring important changes to global nuclear security, will make the necessary efforts to that end. The IAEA is the only international organization that has expertise in all aspects of nuclear energy; its expertise is not limited to nuclear safety and security. We should not lessen our efforts aimed at supporting the IAEA as it undertakes all its roles. Japan attaches importance to the steady implementation of the Action Plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in concert with the IAEA and others. In that connection, Japan welcomes the ongoing efforts by the United States and Russia towards the control and disposal of certain weapons-grade plutonium and the implementation of the IAEA verification system. We expect similar efforts from the other nuclear-weapon States. Years of constant effort by the international community to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA safeguards have been indispensable. Thanks to them, the number of States with additional protocols in force increased from 110 to 119 over the past year, which is progress that Japan welcomes. Accordingly, Japan will further contribute to efforts for the universalization of the additional protocol. Specifically, we will do our utmost through the joint efforts of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which is a cross-regional group that aims to promote the implementation of the consensus outcome of the 2010 Review Conference and to contribute to the steady reduction of nuclear risks. Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba co-chaired the most recent ministerial level meeting of the NPDI, which was held on 26 September at the margins of the General Assembly. As expressed in the joint ministerial statement of that meeting, the NPDI is working on the ministerial letters that will urge action on the additional protocol. Regional nuclear issues remain the most pressing challenge for the international community. The IAEA, carrying out its mission to, inter alia, prevent the diversion to military uses of nuclear energy, has been playing important roles on those issues in the light of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The nuclear issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a threat to peace and security in East Asia and for the entire international community. Its uranium enrichment programme constitutes a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Japan supports the critical role that the IAEA continues to play in resolving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear issue. With regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, it is indispensable for Iran to take substantive measures to assuage the concerns of the international community and build its confidence. Japan will continue to act in concert with the international community for a peaceful and diplomatic settlement of the issue. The IAEA, which is pivotal in the nuclear non-proliferation system, has also been working decisively for the resolution of regional nuclear issues. For instance, last November, the IAEA hosted the Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East to contribute to confidence-building efforts by the States concerned. The IAEA’s promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a manner that ensures nuclear safety, security and safeguards is sure to benefit all the States Members of the United Nations. Japan attaches great importance to IAEA technical cooperation and, as part of our action in that regard, will make a contribution to the IAEA in the amount of $3.5 million in this fiscal year, in addition to the contribution made in the 2011 fiscal year, in order to ensure the success of the IAEA’s Peaceful Uses Initiative. In addition, Japan will continue to contribute to the promotion of technical cooperation in areas such as radiological science. In the light of the accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station on 11 March 2011, the Japanese Government, with a view to realizing a society not dependent on nuclear power by the 2030s, and while constantly reviewing and re-examining policies and carefully assessing the future outlook, including the international situation regarding energy, will mobilize all possible policy resources to demonstrate to the world a model that strikes a good balance between economic growth and the shift towards green energy. As a responsible country where this nuclear accident took place, we are taking the lessons from this accident fully into account with a view to enhancing safety in the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide, Japan will continue to cooperate with the international community. Japan is resolved to overcome the challenges posed by this historic accident by benefiting widely from the wisdom of the world. Japan will endeavour, through cooperation with the IAEA and other countries, to ensure the world of the highest level of safety and security in its peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and further secure confidence that there is no cause for concern regarding nuclear proliferation in or by Japan.

The delegation of Singapore would like to thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr Yukiya Amano, and his secretariat for the comprehensive annual report of the Agency (see A/67/152). As the global focal point for nuclear cooperation, the IAEA makes important contributions to international peace and security through its promotion of the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, and nuclear non-proliferation. Its mission of safety and security, safeguards and verification, and science and technology constitutes a comprehensive regime. Singapore strongly supports the IAEA’s important work and is pleased to co-sponsor draft resolution A/67/L.3 on the report of the IAEA. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011 was a wake-up call against complacency with regard to the safe operation of nuclear power plants and the effective regulation of the nuclear industry. It was a painful reminder that safety can never be taken for granted. In the aftermath of the accident, in September 2011 IAEA member States adopted the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which is now being implemented. Progress has been made in many areas, and we commend the efforts of the secretariat to oversee the implementation of the Action Plan in the 12 key areas to enhance the global nuclear safety framework. However, much more work remains to be done. The full and effective implementation of the Action Plan will require the cooperation and commitment of all member States, the secretariat and other relevant stakeholders. In this regard, we look forward to a meaningful and constructive outcome at the upcoming Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, to be held in December 2012. At the same time, while the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States, the far- reaching and potentially devastating transboundary impact of a nuclear accident means that ensuring and strengthening the safety standards of nuclear facilities are of concern to the international community as a whole, and in particular the IAEA. Proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety were also discussed during the Second Extraordinary Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention, held in Vienna in August. We welcome efforts that would strengthen the Convention. We also encourage the IAEA to step up its capacity- building cooperation with regional organizations to promote and uphold the IAEA standards of safety and security in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses. This would help to enhance and strengthen nuclear safety in the world. In this regard, we are pleased to report that good progress has been made on the Network of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies or Relevant Authorities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an initiative of Thailand, to establish a network of nuclear regulatory bodies among South-East Asian countries, and to enhance regional cooperation on nuclear safety, security and safeguards matters, including emergency preparedness and response and environmental radiation monitoring. We look forward to close collaborations between the ASEAN nuclear regulatory network and the IAEA and international partners. Nuclear non-proliferation remains a core aspect of the IAEA’s mission. Singapore firmly believes that all States have the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time, the IAEA has the vital task of ensuring that nuclear material and technology meant for peaceful purposes are not diverted for non-civilian uses that could threaten regional and international peace and stability. The IAEA’s safeguards and verification regimes remain central to multilateral efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is therefore both in the interests and the responsibility of all States to comply with these regimes. In this connection, Singapore strongly urges all States which have not done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Those States that have done so should fully implement these agreements. The IAEA plays a central role as the global platform for strengthening nuclear security. It focuses on helping to minimize the risk of nuclear and other radioactive material falling into the hands of terrorists, or of nuclear facilities being subjected to malicious acts. In this regard, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, which monitors thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials, is the authoritative global source of information on illicit trafficking. Singapore is pleased to announce that we joined the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database in March. The IAEA’s work goes beyond nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear energy. The Agency makes important contributions to tackling fundamental global problems such as food security, water and energy shortages, and climate change, as well as in the area of human health. Member States must continue to support the IAEA’s role in promoting the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology, such as for use in cancer treatment in developing countries. Singapore recently completed its term as a member of the IAEA Board of Governors. We would like to reiterate our continued support for the Agency’s vital role and tasks. Over the past decade, Singapore has hosted 23 scientific visits, 92 fellowship attachments and 25 regional training events with the IAEA. More recently, in June this year we hosted the Asia-Europe Meeting seminar on nuclear safety, with a specific focus on emergency preparedness and response, which is one of the key areas of focus in the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. As part of our continued cooperation with the IAEA, Singapore will jointly host a regional workshop on notification, reporting and requesting assistance in December. In addition, we will continue to support the IAEA in promoting capacity-building, in particular among developing countries, through various technical assistance and cooperation projects.

Once again, the past year has been very important for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The challenges facing the IAEA are no less important. Switzerland would like to underline three. First, Switzerland welcomes the fact that, unlike last year, the IAEA General Conference in September adopted its traditional resolution on safeguards without opposition. However, the debate surrounding the adoption of the resolution highlighted the concerns of some member States as to the direction taken by the secretariat on the conceptual development of safeguards, namely, the “State-level concept”. Switzerland fully supports efforts to enhance the effectiveness of safeguards. In this regard, we believe that increased transparency in the participation not only of the secretariat regarding the progress of its work, but also of the member States with respect to their real concerns, could contribute to overcoming these difficulties. Secondly, Switzerland welcomes the decision of the Second Extraordinary Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in August in Vienna, to establish a working group to address the strengthening of the Convention. Switzerland will actively participate in that working group and in the ministerial conference on nuclear safety to be held in December in Fukushima. Switzerland is indeed convinced that a credible global nuclear safety regime requires the firm commitment of States to conducting periodical peer reviews and to addressing safety issues in a fully transparent manner. Finally, Switzerland welcomes the decision of the IAEA to organize a conference on nuclear security in Vienna in July 2013. This decision will allow us to continue, in a more inclusive way, the discussions already initiated during the three most recent nuclear security summits.

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986 triggered not only the revision of international nuclear safety standards, but the creation of numerous international instruments to ensure both the highest level of nuclear, nuclear waste and radiation safety worldwide and a relevant system of emergency preparedness and response. In 2011, those instruments were put to the test in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. We believe that, given its unique expertise, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a leading role to play in any nuclear-related accident or emergency, and that its on-site involvement is vital in addressing situations such as that at Fukushima. While responsibility for nuclear safety rests with each member State, we believe that the IAEA safety fundamentals and requirements should constitute a minimum obligatory basis for States that have advanced civil nuclear programmes. We believe that activities under both the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management enhance the safety of nuclear energy uses worldwide. We call upon all countries that have not yet done so to join these important instruments. We consider that participation in those conventions is in the best interest of any country that has or is planning its own nuclear power programme. The existing international treaty basis concerning nuclear safety and the reaction to nuclear accidents requires further improvement. The relevant work has already started in Vienna, and we believe that positive results could be achieved. Allow me to take this opportunity to reiterate our gratitude to those countries and international organizations that continue to provide us with support and assistance in overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. I am pleased to report that, in April 2012, we reached an important milestone — the start of work on assembling the new safe confinement construction over the destroyed unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This work, to be completed in 2015, will pave the way for further transformation of the shelter object into an ecologically safe system. Nuclear security is an essential programme of the Agency. Ukraine commends the IAEA for its activities aimed at assisting States in preventing and combating nuclear terrorism. We would like to emphasize the important role of the Agency in fostering international cooperation on nuclear security, in establishing a comprehensive set of nuclear security guidelines, and in assisting member States, upon their request, to enhance their nuclear security. Ukraine reaffirms its view that the responsibility for nuclear security rests with each individual State. All States have the responsibility to establish appropriate systems of accounting and control to take the necessary measures to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts involving nuclear material. Ukraine supports the implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013. We acknowledge the progress achieved by the Agency in improving control over radioactive sources. Providing a contribution to the success of both the Washington, D. C., and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits, Ukraine announced and implemented in full its decision to get rid of all national stocks of highly enriched uranium. The meaning of our voluntary step is crystal clear. Ukraine remains a consistent, predictable and reliable member of the international community and makes an active contribution to combating nuclear terrorism, focusing its efforts on strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials. In this regard, we would like to recall that, during the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the delegations of Ukraine, Mexico and Chile jointly declared themselves to be countries that have voluntarily exerted efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium. We call upon other Member States to follow our example and to take a practical step in support of international non-proliferation efforts. Ukraine reaffirms the Agency’s role in verifying and ensuring compliance by States with their safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine reiterates the paramount importance of IAEA safeguards in providing effective control over sensitive materials and activities. The Agency’s system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol are an integral part of this system. The comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, currently constitute the best verification standard. We would like to say that we strictly fulfil our obligations under our Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Since January 2006, Ukraine has had a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol in force. In 2010, Ukraine received positive broad conclusions from the IAEA regarding our nuclear activities. We continue to work with the Agency to establish the necessary conditions for the effective application of IAEA integrated safeguards in Ukraine. In 2011 and 2012, the Agency continued to make significant contributions to global development objectives. We commend the Agency for its efforts, and call upon the IAEA and member States to increase further the contribution of nuclear technology to health and economic development, and to promote the dissemination of knowledge on the peaceful application of nuclear technologies among States. Ukraine has always been a strong supporter of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, which constitutes an important statutory function of the Agency. Ukraine considers the implementation of the Programme to be the cornerstone of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We acknowledge the work done by the IAEA in planning and implementing technical cooperation activities that reflect the needs of different countries and regions. We believe it is important to ensure fair access to technical cooperation funds and the predictable funding of technical cooperation programmes. The key to effectiveness is to meet the needs of member States. In order to maximize the socioeconomic impact of technical cooperation projects, it is crucial that the IAEA further develop partnerships with other international organizations where appropriate. We recognize the importance of the Agency’s research activities regarding nuclear energy, particularly in the fields of safety, waste management, radiation protection, innovative reactor technologies and fuel cycles. Ukraine will continue to participate actively in the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles. Maintaining competence and know-how across the nuclear sector is fundamental to these activities. In conclusion, we would like to join other delegations in welcoming the IAEA report to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session (see A/67/152), and to express our appreciation for the work of the Agency.

Cognizant of the crucial role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the central multilateral forum for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Philippines welcomes the report of the IAEA (see A/67/152) and lends its full support to achieving the Agency’s goals and objectives. The IAEA and its important role took centre stage last year amid concerns on nuclear safety in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident. More importantly, the nuclear accident provided opportunities for member States to consider ways to strengthen the Agency’s work in nuclear safety. The Philippines welcomes the significant progress achieved in the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, and lauds the combined efforts of the secretariat and member States in pursuing concrete actions. These include conducting stress tests of nuclear power plants, carrying out capacity-building activities, and enhancing emergency preparedness response measures. For our part, the Philippines is working with the IAEA secretariat in looking at the possibility of tapping our former nuclear power plant in Bataan, which we closed in 1986, to serve as a regional and international training facility on nuclear power plants. The Philippines also welcomes the important work done by the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies this past year. We reaffirm our commitment to working with the IAEA to facilitate improvements in nuclear and radiological incident and emergency preparedness and response systems. Following the Fukushima accident, the Philippines conducted environmental radioactivity monitoring in nine provinces and shared the data collected with the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. The Philippines continues these monitoring activities through the regional technical cooperation project on the assessment of the environmental impact of the Fukushima accident in the Asia-Pacific region. The Philippines also welcomes the regional initiative within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, which will serve as a forum for the exchange of information on best practices among the nuclear regulatory bodies of ASEAN member States. The Network is also expected to enhance cooperation and develop national capacities in nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Despite the Fukushima accident, countries keen to use nuclear power as a safe and clean source of energy have turned to the IAEA for technical assistance in the development or expansion of their national nuclear power programmes. In August, the Agency provided technical assistance to the Philippines in organizing a national workshop on the evaluation of alternative energy strategies and establishing a national position on nuclear power. This workshop and future related activities will aid the Philippine Government in crafting its position on nuclear power. The Philippines believes that the IAEA continues to play an important role in helping countries achieve their Millennium Development Goals through its Technical Cooperation Programme and its various activities in nuclear applications. The Philippines especially welcomes the Director General’s focus this year on nuclear applications related to food, which is of particular importance to my country, with its growing population. In June, the Philippines hosted the IAEA regional meeting on supporting climate-proof rice production systems on the basis of nuclear applications. This project not only addresses the impact of climate change on rice production, but provides an opportunity for scientific exchanges as well. In the field of health, the Philippines continues to address the health problems caused by dengue and malaria. In that regard, we commend the work of the Insect Pest Control Laboratory of the Joint IAEA/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in Seibersdorf, Austria, on the development of a sterile insect technique package for disease-transmitting mosquitoes. The Philippines is open to working closely with the Seibersdorf Laboratory in the future to further its work. In the area of nuclear medicine, the IAEA’s assistance allowed the Philippines to establish a technetium-99 generator facility, which makes nuclear procedures using technetium-99 now affordable to the public. Through another regional technical cooperation project, the Philippines looks forward to the establishment of a medical cyclotron facility that will supply affordable positron emission tomography radiopharmaceuticals to local hospitals. On water resources assessment and management, the Philippines undertakes activities to develop sustainable and socially responsible water resource management plans under the IAEA Water Availability Enhancement Project. We encourage the Agency to remain involved in this area in order to assist member States in strengthening their national capacities to conduct comprehensive water resource assessments. The Philippines reaffirms the importance of strengthening the Agency’s activities in addressing the threats posed by nuclear terrorism and the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material. Under the Philippines’ national nuclear security plan, we commit to securing nuclear and radioactive materials used for peaceful purposes. We also commit to preventing the illicit trafficking of such materials. The Philippines will update this plan in coordination with the IAEA. In January 2012, the Philippines hosted the third review meeting of the Radiological Security Partnership, which looked at the developments and challenges in subscribing to and implementing nuclear guidance documents in nuclear and radioactive security. In partnership with the IAEA, we will host in February 2013 the International Forum on Effective Border Controls: Global Status, which will develop recommendations to strengthen border controls in combating the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. With the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons, we underscore the need to strengthen the Agency’s nuclear verification capabilities and establish confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities. Finally, the Philippines shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a way to contribute to international peace and security. We remain hopeful of the convening of the 2012 conference on the Middle East, as laid out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)) before the end of the year.

I am very happy to see you, Vice-President Gaspar Martins, presiding over this plenary meeting of the General Assembly. I take this opportunity to wish you every success in your high-level work in the Assembly’s Bureau. I would also like to express my delegation’s thanks to the Secretariat for the excellent analysis provided in the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 2011 (see A/67/152). The issue of nuclear safety is once again at the heart of our concerns. Indeed, although nuclear energy is indispensable to finding new solutions for our needs through its applications in health, agriculture, the production of electricity and many other areas, its use presents real security and safety risks. That is why the IAEA verification programme remains crucial to the efforts of the international community to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons, as it limits the proliferation of such weapons. The Agency should therefore continue, in cooperation with concerned States, to play its role in following up on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other treaties, such as those establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Indeed, nuclear power cannot be developed unless the optimal conditions for safety and security are in place. Therefore, all necessary measures must be adopted in order to strengthen these elements. I reaffirm my country’s commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in full transparency and in a safe and sustainable manner. With regard to technical cooperation, we are reassured by the fact that the IAEA continues to fulfil its mandate “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”. Indeed, the peaceful applications of nuclear energy offer solutions to a series of socioeconomic and development issues that are essential to meeting the needs of humankind and thus to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. As underlined in the report, technical cooperation projects on issues as varied as nuclear-powered electricity, knowledge management, human health, the improvement of water management, more accurate determination of the sources of pollution and nuclear safety or security enable Member States to find solutions to serious development problems. Senegal therefore recognizes and values the scientific and technical cooperation that it has with the IAEA. This rich and varied cooperation covers many areas. First, it includes support for research in the area of water resource management, agricultural productivity improvement, livestock farming development, protection from radiation and research on solutions to malnutrition. Second is the acquisition of a gamma camera, which represents major progress in the treatment of diabetes, thyroid disease and cancer. Third is support for the fight to eliminate the tsetse fly along the Atlantic coast, north of Dakar. Fourth is cooperation with the IAEA, which has raised research facilities in Senegal to the status of world-class scientific centres. We are grateful for the support provided by the United States State Department since 2010 in the fight against the tsetse fly in West Africa. Further examples of cooperation are management training, technology transfer and exchanges of experts in the context of the various projects on which Senegal is working with the Agency. Fifth is energy production and planning and research to improve nutrition for women. Strengthened by such fruitful experience, Senegal will spare no effort to expand its excellent cooperation with the IAEA, through an aggressive policy to promote socioeconomic development through nuclear science and technology. My delegation therefore calls for increased support for the Agency in implementing its mandate.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his circulated statement on the annual report of the Agency (see A/67/152), for the period 1 January to 31 December 2011. Malaysia also wishes to commend the Director General for his commitment to, and stewardship of, the IAEA. At this juncture, Malaysia wishes to welcome the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of San Marino and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago as new States members of the Agency. The latest addition has resulted in a total of 155 countries becoming States members of the Agency. That in turn has further strengthened and universalized the membership of the Agency, and has helped it to carry out its role and mandate in assisting in the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses, technology transfer to developing countries, and promoting nuclear safety, verification and security. It is indeed pleasing to note that, despite its limited resources, not only has the Agency managed to successfully carry out its work, but in fact its work has expanded in recent years. As with other developing countries, Malaysia fully supports the peaceful use by member States of nuclear power as a source of energy. Currently, the Government of Malaysia is undertaking an in-depth study on developing a nuclear power programme in the country, including on its legal and regulatory frameworks. The overarching objective of the study is to ensure that the highest standards of nuclear safety and security are observed at all times. Malaysia has always attached the utmost importance to nuclear safety. The Fukushima Daiichi incident has therefore weighed heavily on Malaysia’s mind as it embarks on a nuclear power programme. There are certainly valuable lessons to be learned. In that regard, Malaysia welcomes the formulation and implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, following the unprecedented Fukushima accident. Malaysia also welcomes the report entitled “Highlights of the Lessons Learned from the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service in 2006-2010”, which was presented at the third Workshop on Lessons Learned from Integrated Regulatory Review Missions in October 2011. The report addresses areas that need improvement, such as the governmental, legal and regulatory frameworks, certain areas of core regulatory practices, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the missions themselves. It also provides recommendations on how countries can meet the Agency’s safety requirements for national safety infrastructures. Malaysia wishes to extend our support in enhancing nuclear safety, and looks forward to participating in the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, to be held in Fukushima later this year. For our part and in response to the Agency’s request, Malaysia has hosted a number of events related to nuclear radiation, transport and waste safety. In the light of the IAEA’s newly revised International Basic Safety Standards, Malaysia hosted a regional workshop on the IAEA General Safety Requirements in April 2012. We stand ready to assist in hosting similar events in the future. Malaysia has consistently considered the issue of nuclear security to be an inseparable component of nuclear energy. To that end, we have implemented various legal mechanisms and conventions, including the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Protocol, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the various IAEA codes of conduct. Malaysia appreciates the opportunity to share its knowledge on nuclear security, as well as its expertise, with a few selected member States. In that regard, Malaysia will host a regional workshop on radioactive source security for industrial radiography with various donor member States by the end of 2012. Malaysia also looks forward to discussing the possibility of Malaysia being recognized as a centre of excellence for nuclear security training in the region and beyond. Malaysia continues to stress the importance of the Technical Cooperation Programme in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The extension of the Programme should obviously be based upon the needs and requests of member States. We believe that the programme should take into account the evolving requirements of member States, as well as the issue of funding. At the most recent meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, some States parties called for the Technical Cooperation Programme to be supported by the regular budget instead of relying on the Technical Cooperation Fund. My delegation joins in that call, and we look forward to further discussions on the matter under the working group for financing the Agency’s activities. Malaysia has indeed benefited from the Technical Cooperation Programme. At the same time, it has also contributed in-kind to the Programme, as well as provided training and sharing expertise with other member States. As for the new project cycle for the period 2013-2014, my delegation hopes to work closely with the Agency to ensure that the projects under the Programme will be adequately funded. My delegation also appreciates the confidence that the Agency has placed in Malaysia’s continuing to host the Post-Graduate Education Course in Radiation Protection, which we would execute to the best of our abilities. Malaysia accords high importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology in agricultural, biotechnology, industrial, environmental and medical applications. In that context, Malaysia has always believed that research, development and knowledge-sharing are key to the successful and sustainable development of nuclear technology by any member State. Therefore, Malaysia attaches great importance to research and development activities within the framework of coordinated research activities, which are an important avenue for multilateral cooperation and the sharing of knowledge among scientists and engineers across the globe. On the issue of cancer treatment and research, Malaysia is committed to further upgrading its cancer detection, monitoring and treatment systems. Malaysia recognizes and appreciates the role of the IAEA on nuclear techniques in that regard. We therefore decided to join the World Health Organization-IAEA Joint Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy by requesting an Integrated Mission for Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy to Malaysia. We wish to thank the Agency for acceding to our request. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Malaysia will continue to play a constructive role in both bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements in ensuring the security of nuclear materials. Malaysia commends the consensus reached in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)). We believe that efforts to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East should be supported by all. Such a conference would give momentum to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, which would undoubtedly contribute to greater peace and security in the region. Malaysia welcomes the appointment of Mr. Jaako Laajava of Finland as facilitator for the conference and wishes him success in this regard. In conclusion, my delegation wishes to reaffirm Malaysia’s commitment to continuing its long-standing cooperation with the work of the Agency in fulfilling its mandate. Malaysia is confident that the Agency could play a greater role in responding to all the needs of its member States in the future if it were provided with greater resources. Nevertheless, we wish to once again express our appreciation to the Director General of the IAEA, as well as to the IAEA secretariat, for the significant and valuable work that they have carried out thus far. In this regard, Malaysia is pleased to sponsor the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/67/L.3) at the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

Kazakhstan wishes to congratulate Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the outstanding work of the Agency. The annual report (see A/67/152) demonstrates the shift in the nature of the Agency’s functions from pure verification activities to safety and security measures for nuclear power plants, countering potential nuclear terrorism, focusing on nuclear applications and technical cooperation for a better and safer world. As a member of the Agency, Kazakhstan is proud of its record of collaboration in seeking to apply nuclear energy, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the national and Central Asian regional levels. It is clear today more than ever that it is important to bring international legal norms in line with the reality of the existence of de facto nuclear-weapon States, necessitating compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by States parties. This is to ensure improved global mechanisms for managing processes in the development of nuclear power. We therefore propose conducting, under the auspices of the IAEA, regular stress tests of nuclear plants and protection systems, as well as rapid rescue responses. Kazakhstan is a major producer of uranium ore and has the fuel fabrication capability to further expand the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the framework of IAEA safeguards. We collaborate with the Russian Federation in making its uranium available for enrichment at the national centre in Angarsk, Siberia, for use in nuclear power reactors. We are also working on the Kurchatov Nuclear Technologies Park, which is under IAEA surveillance. We support the IAEA initiative to develop a new framework for nuclear energy based on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle that are non-political and non-discriminatory. These should be available to all safeguards-complying member States, so that no State will need to give up its rights under the NPT. Kazakhstan has officially confirmed in writing to the Agency its readiness to host an IAEA nuclear fuel bank on two of its sites for countries unable to acquire a nuclear fuel supply on the market. As soon as the site has been determined, steps will be taken to establish the bank. The national atomic energy company, Kazatomprom, is in the process of creating a vertically integrated establishment with a complete nuclear fuel cycle meeting IAEA standards. The Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone is another contribution of our efforts towards a world free from nuclear weapons, to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and the smuggling of nuclear weapons and radioactive materials in the region, as well as to address environmental concerns regarding ecological radiation. Kazakhstan supports the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a solution for peace in that region. We will work collaboratively with the Facilitator and other Member States towards that goal. We are consistently implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as well as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), to strengthen measures to combat illegal trafficking of nuclear and other materials. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, Kazakhstan maintains the strictest controls over its equipment and installations that enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Last year, Kazakhstan ratified and acceded to four major nuclear security conventions, and is reviewing a draft law to accede to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. We are decommissioning the BN-350 nuclear reactor and, with the support of the United States Department of Energy, implementing a project to convert the second research reactor to produce radioisotopes from low-enriched uranium. My country welcomes the proposal to strengthen the infrastructure of the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre as the global focal point for nuclear and radiological safety or security-related incidents. Despite being a key and responsible member of IAEA, Kazakhstan is denied the opportunity to participate in the work of elective bodies due to the existing rules of procedure. Kazakhstan fully supports the early entry into force of the amendments to article VI of the IAEA statute, and hopes that a solution will be found. Kazakhstan’s technical cooperation with IAEA from 2010 to 2015 includes nuclear education, medicine, agriculture, research reactor safety, and radioisotope and radiation applications for collective global human security. My country contributes regularly to the IAEA budget, as well as to the Technical Cooperation Fund, and stands ready to fulfil its financial obligations. We express our gratitude to IAEA for its support to the International Day against Nuclear Tests, and in the ongoing activities of the Nuclear Discussion Forum, initiated jointly by Kazakhstan and the EastWest Institute. To conclude, we fully support the mandate of the IAEA, and look forward to another cycle of even more productive collaboration on current and future issues in nuclear technology.

I would like at the outset to thank the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General, Mr. Yukiya Amano, for their valuable work over the past year, as reflected in the Agency’s report (see A/67/152). Egypt is eager to join the list of sponsors of the annual draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/67/L.3). I would like first to underline the contribution of nuclear technology to electric power generation. This demonstrates in turn our continued interest in the exercise of the inalienable right to the development, production and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as enshrined in article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For almost half a century, Egypt has devoted attention to nuclear energy and its peaceful applications. Following Egypt’s transition to a new democratic era resulting from the revolution of 25 January 2011, we will pursue the implementation of Egypt’s peaceful nuclear programme by establishing our first nuclear plant for power generation. Egypt looks forward to continued close cooperation with the IAEA in that area, given the Agency’s growing role in support of sustainable development. In commenting on the IAEA’s report on its activities in 2012, I would like to highlight the following points. First, the Agency’s technical cooperation activities are a priority for developing countries in terms of employing nuclear applications, including radioisotope, radiation and other technologies, in the areas of health, agriculture, food and water resources in order to promote progress towards development. Egypt calls for increased funding for technical cooperation activities, as well as equitable funding of all of the other activities of the IAEA. Technical cooperation is a key component of the work of the Agency pursuant to its statute. Second, it is important to enhance international cooperation in strengthening national capacities in nuclear safety and emergency response to radiological and nuclear accidents. That would help to ensure easy access to safety information and equitable transfer of related technology. My delegation takes this opportunity to emphasize that the Agency should intensify efforts to assist member States in emergency preparedness and response to nuclear accidents by promoting technology transfer and capacity-building activities, including education and training in the field of crisis management. Third, we stress that any rules or guidelines on nuclear security and safety must be developed and negotiated within a multilateral framework. Measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear security and safety should not be used as an excuse to restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the statute of the Agency. Fourth, the role of the IAEA in verification and nuclear non-proliferation is closely related to its role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in support of States’ development programmes that fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the statute of the IAEA. Fifth, all countries of the Middle East except Israel have joined the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. Israel remains the only country in the region with ambiguous nuclear activities that are not subject to international control and supervision. Israel continues to ignore the resolutions of the General Assembly and the General Conference of the IAEA urging it to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to subject all of its nuclear facilities to IAEA comprehensive safeguards. There is no doubt that this situation has increased the nuclear proliferation risk in the Middle East and continues to prevent the achievement of the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Sixth, Egypt stresses the importance of holding the 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. Egypt also emphasizes the need for the conference to adopt a concrete and binding outcome with a view to achieving its objectives, as set forth at the 2010 Review Conference. Egypt looks forward to the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the 2012 conference and to receiving as soon as possible the background documentation that the IAEA has been mandated to prepare for the conference. Egypt notes its appreciation for the Agency’s efforts in organizing a forum in November 2011 on the relevance of the experience gained through the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone to the Middle East. Seventh, Egypt stresses that any retraction from the commitment to convene the conference on schedule this year, in accordance with the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), will affect the effectiveness and benefit of verification activities in the Middle East. It will also affect the integrity of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and the credibility of the NPT review process. It could even lead to the failure of the next Review Conference in 2015. Eighth, Egypt reiterates the need to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out verification activities related to disarmament agreements, including those concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, now and in the future. We look forward to the Agency’s active role in that domain in the Middle East, through the implementation of its five-year Medium-Term Strategy for the period 2012-2017. In conclusion, Egypt calls on all Member States to support the three pillars of the International Atomic Energy Agency — verification, nuclear safety and security, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — in an integrated manner in order to contribute to fulfilling the purposes of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and in achieving sustainable development.

We have carefully studied the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the General Assembly (see A/67/152). Russia highly commends the work of the Agency aimed at improving and strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and at guaranteeing the widespread and safe use of nuclear energy. The Agency is making a noteworthy contribution to resolving the issues of a secure energy supply, the fight against the global effects of climate change, and maintaining the health and well-being of people throughout the world. It is important that the Agency continue to formulate its efforts based on broader international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In speaking of the Agency’s activities, we cannot fail to note the unique nature of its verification mechanism, which enables the highly efficient tracking of States’ implementation of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We advocate improvement of the Agency’s verification capacity, including through the adoption of the additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards system as the universally accepted standard for States’ implementation of their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. An unbiased approach to nuclear verification based on objective indicators is the most important element in supporting the legitimacy of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system and the non-proliferation regime in general. Russia is actively participating in the Agency’s activities as a financial donor, including through its voluntary contributions to the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles and the Nuclear Security Fund. We wholeheartedly support the efforts of the Agency in technical cooperation and the provision of appropriate assistance to developing States. In the context of the large-scale development of nuclear energy, the Russian Federation attaches priority to establishing a new architecture for peaceful nuclear cooperation based on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle; the guaranteed provision of services for the nuclear fuel cycle; and resolving problems of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. On the basis of those priorities, Russia has launched an initiative to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure and create an international network of nuclear fuel cycle centres. We note with satisfaction that while our initiative has been sorely needed, it is also truly capable of resolving the tasks necessary to guarantee the unhampered access of all NPT States parties to the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that they faithfully comply with their non-proliferation obligations. In practice, however, it has afforded States the ability to enjoy the advantages of nuclear energy and to guarantee their nuclear fuel needs without introducing elements to the nuclear fuel cycle that are expensive and unsound from the standpoint of nuclear proliferation. In the context of that initiative, together with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Armenia, we have launched on Russian territory an international uranium enrichment centre, to which we invite all States working to develop nuclear power in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. Another important step in establishing the global nuclear energy infrastructure was the creation in Russia of a shared supply of low-enriched uranium administered by IAEA. It has already been fully established, and States members of the Agency that are in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations are eligible to enjoy that resource. We are convinced that lessons must be drawn from the outcome of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in order to prevent such a recurrence in future. The central role in that endeavour must belong to the Agency as the only international organization with the requisite expertise and authority. One of the key lessons of the Fukushima accident is that the international community needs to perfect the international legal framework and the technological and organizational aspects of nuclear safety. Based on that understanding, Russia has proposed important initiatives to fill the existing gaps in relevant international legal documents and instruments. In that context, we note additions to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Moreover, Russia has made proposals to improve the Agency’s safety standards and anticipates that these initiatives will enjoy broad support and come to fruition. An extremely important task remains to establish a due level of protection of all nuclear facilities and materials in order to prevent possible perpetration of acts of nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. In the interest of strengthening nuclear physical security, Russia was a sponsor of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Together with the United States, in 2006 it introduced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Initiative is now supported by 85 States and serves as an effective instrument of cooperation in the sharing of extensive experience and practical measures aimed at countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. Russia has signed and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, as well as its amendment. We call on the States that have not yet done so to expedite completion of their domestic procedures in order to accede to those most important international instruments. We are convinced that the Agency must play the central role in coordinating States’ efforts to guarantee nuclear security. We support the implementation of the Agency’s programme on that issue for 2010-2013 and its proposal to convene an international conference on nuclear security issues in 2013. Russia positively commends the practical contribution of the Agency to the multilateral quest for ways to resolve regional proliferation challenges. We commend the endeavours of the Agency in using its expert potential to ensure the sustainable functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We support draft resolution A/67/L.3 on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a sponsor of the draft resolution, Russia wholeheartedly endorses the work of the Agency in the interest of strengthening and ensuring the nuclear non-proliferation regime and achieving reliable energy supplies.

First of all, my delegation thanks the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and his staff for the comprehensive overview of IAEA activities contained in the Agency’s annual report (see A/67/152). We appreciate the valuable contribution of the Agency in supporting developing countries’ use of nuclear science and technology to address national development needs. The Agency’s support in areas such as food and agriculture, human health, water resource management and the environment is essential to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, my delegation welcomes the publication of training packages for medical physicists in the area of diagnostic radiology and nuclear medicine. South Africa continues to host fellows and scientific visitors to assist capacity- building in nuclear medicine. My country also welcomes the Africa pilot project of the Virtual University and Regional Training Network for Cancer Control, which entered its second year in 2011. The project is both a vehicle and a facilitating mechanism to enhance cancer control, e-learning, education and training in Africa, and South Africa looks forward to participating in the initiative, which will pave the way for subregional cancer control workforce training hubs. Global security of energy supply has become one of the key focus areas worldwide, mainly because of decreasing natural resources, global warming, climate change, pollution and rapid global growth. South Africa’s nuclear energy policy is driven by the imperative of ensuring the security of its energy supply and reducing its carbon footprint, and by the beneficiation of our strategic mineral resources for the economic development of our country. In that regard, my Government approved the Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030, which incorporates a significant expansion of nuclear power by the year 2030. The Cabinet has also established the National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordination Committee, an executive body comprised of ministers who have a direct role to play in the nuclear energy programme. In preparation for its nuclear build programme, South Africa has adopted the IAEA milestones approach, which addresses many critical elements necessary for successful implementation. South Africa is working closely with the Agency, and has requested an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review Mission in the country. In that context, the South African Minister of Energy recently announced South Africa’s intention to invite the IAEA to conduct an external assessment of its readiness and to identify any possible risks that may need attention in order to ensure a successful nuclear build programme. Regarding nuclear safety, South Africa is pleased to note that the level of nuclear safety among the 435 nuclear power plants in operation around the world remains high. My delegation takes note of the activities undertaken by the Agency to increase nuclear safety as detailed in the Director General’s report on the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. In conclusion, South Africa attaches great importance to the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme. We welcome the support rendered through a range of regional and national projects to address socioeconomic development needs of Member States, especially African countries. In that regard, we also value the continuous support of the Agency through the activities of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology — in Africa and in the region.

Nuclear science is among the greatest achievements of humankind and should therefore be used to serve its well-being. Given the numerous peaceful applications of nuclear technology as a cost-effective, environmentally friendly and climatically benign source of energy, it has gained a prominent position in the economic life and advancement of nations. Without a doubt, demand for the development and use of nuclear energy and technology will continue to grow in future. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination — including the right of every State party to develop for peaceful purposes a full national nuclear fuel cycle — to be the very foundation and one of the most important pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While attaching great importance to the full, effective, balanced, simultaneous, non-selective and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the NPT, we strongly stress that the exercise of the inalienable right to pursue nuclear science, energy and technology for peaceful purposes, which is an inherent part of the sovereignty of States parties, can never be suspended or restricted by any organ, under any circumstances or pretexts whatsoever. According to article IV of the NPT, not only shall nothing in the Treaty be interpreted as affecting that inalienable right, but all parties have a firm legal obligation “to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. Furthermore, in that context, we underline the importance of article III of the NPT, according to which even the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”. My delegation also would like to emphasize that, according to articles II and III of the IAEA statute, “[t]he Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world...; [t]o encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for another...; to perform any operation or service useful in research on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes; [and t]o foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic energy”. Accordingly, we underline the Agency’s primary responsibility to assist member States and the importance of its other statutory functions. In that connection, we stress the need for strict observance by the IAEA of the principles of impartiality and professionalism; along with the States members of the Non-Aligned Movement, “strongly reject attempts by any State to politicize the work of the IAEA, including its Technical Cooperation Programme”; and call for an end to any interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, as such acts could jeopardize the authority, efficiency and credibility of the IAEA and endanger the credibility of the NPT and the inalienable right of its parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Unfortunately, the application of a discriminatory, selective, highly restrictive and politically motivated approach to nuclear cooperation by developed States parties to the NPT, the main suppliers of nuclear high technology, has given rise to the impression that being a party to the NPT is not a privilege, because rather than facilitating nuclear cooperation, it impedes it. In that connection, it is a source of grave concern that those who have chosen not to accede to the NPT not only are not subject to any pressure to do so, but are also encouraged and generously rewarded in different ways. A living example is the well-documented assistance and cooperation provided by certain Western countries — in particular, the United States and the two nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union, the United Kingdom and France — to the Israeli regime, which, in addition to having an unsafeguarded nuclear programme, possesses one of the world’s largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Such measures, of course, run counter to the letter and spirit of the NPT and, accordingly, are clear cases of non-compliance with the explicit legal obligations under the Treaty. Undoubtedly, those policies severely undermine the universality, relevance, integrity and credibility of the NPT. We did not see any reference to that point by the Director General of the IAEA in his statement distributed today. The Islamic Republic of Iran, while being extremely proud that it is exercising its inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, is also fully committed to its legal obligations, and its nuclear activities are and have always been exclusively for peaceful purposes. Despite all external political pressures on the IAEA, it has repeatedly concluded that “declared nuclear material in Iran remain[s] in peaceful activities”. In that regard, it is worth noting that that is exactly the same conclusion that the IAEA secretariat has come to for 51 States with additional protocols in force, as well as for 61 States without additional protocols in force. Finally, with regard to the so-called alleged studies on Iran’s nuclear programme referred to in the IAEA report, I would like to point out that they are forged reports and include graphs that are not credible, which is why the Agency is not allowed to make them available to the Islamic Republic of Iran. As always, most of that information has been provided by the Israeli regime and its big ally. One may easily conclude that such information is as credible as the childish cartoon that was drawn here in this Hall in September by the Zionist regime’s Prime Minister.

First of all, I would like to thank Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his annual report on the work of the Agency (see A/67/152). I also wish to express our support for the draft resolution before us (A/67/L.3). Ethiopia firmly believes that the work of the IAEA in general, and specifically its annual activities as described in the report, are of paramount importance to ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security. We also acknowledge the Agency’s growing role in ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used only for peaceful purposes, as well as its technical cooperation in bringing about tangible progress in national efforts to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Ethiopia is one of the beneficiary States of the IAEA’s activities under the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme. The Agency’s support has been instrumental in helping us develop modest capabilities in the control of tsetse flies, the treatment of cancer, diagnostic nuclear medicine services, isotope hydrological analysis and non-destructive quality testing. Despite that encouraging cooperation, I would like to underline that we are still far from the optimal use of the transferred technologies or from sustaining the services initiated through the various technical cooperation projects that have been implemented in the past several years. Our major technical cooperation project with the Agency is aimed at eradicating the tsetse fly from the southern Rift Valley region of Ethiopia through an integrated pest-management approach. The project is currently being implemented, and, so far, remarkable achievements have been registered and quite a substantial number of communities have benefited by regaining their farmland and seeing the return of health to their livestock. The project has been and will continue to be the top priority in our technical cooperation with the IAEA. In that regard, we wish to request that the Agency continue to accord high priority to agricultural and livestock development in Africa, including in Ethiopia. My country reaffirms its strong commitment to peaceful nuclear applications as an important component of the effort to tackle the challenges of development. In that regard, the support of the IAEA in ensuring food safety and security, as well as energy, through nuclear technology should be maintained and strengthened. The other important area of partnership where Ethiopia continues to benefit from the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme is the application of nuclear technology and techniques in the area of human health. In response to the rise in the number of cases of cancer in developing countries, Ethiopia has come increasingly to rely on the IAEA’s comprehensive Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. In that respect, while expressing appreciation to the Agency for its technical assistance and for the impact assessment made, Ethiopia hopes to see a further strengthening of our partnership with the Agency. The annual incidence of cancer is estimated to be about 150,000 cases, of which 80 per cent will require radiotherapy. It is for that compelling reason that we call upon the Agency to further strengthen its support to Ethiopia and other developing countries in the fight against cancer through sustainable cancer therapy programmes by carrying out more integrated national and regional programmes. In conclusion, as one of the founding States members of the Agency, Ethiopia reiterates its strong commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and to respecting and implementing global and regional instruments designed to control radioactive and other nuclear materials. However, we are also fully aware that the threats of nuclear weapons to international peace and security are real and need to be confronted with collective and concerted efforts. Ethiopia will continue to support the IAEA’s activities to effectively execute its global mandate of ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology for the benefit of humankind.

We thank Director General Amano for presenting the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and congratulate Fiji, San Marino and Trinidad and Tobago on becoming the newest members of the Agency. For over five decades, the IAEA has worked successfully as a catalyst for promoting nuclear science and related technologies. It has helped member States advance their development priorities, while ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used in a safe, secure and sustainable manner. For that, the Agency deserves the deep appreciation of us all. We share the Agency’s assessment that nuclear energy should continue to be a preferred source of viable, safe and sustainable alternative energy in the future, despite the justifiable public anxiety that arose in the wake of the Fukushima accident. Pakistan recognizes the important role played by IAEA verification regime. We have fully complied with our obligations pursuant to our Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. The unanimous approval last year by the IAEA Board of our C.3 and C.4 Safeguards Agreements reflected the international community’s recognition of Pakistan’s expertise in the safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants. Pakistan believes that all States should fully comply with their safeguards obligations and international commitments in order to maintain the credibility of the safeguards regime. Maintaining a balance between the regulatory, promotional and safety functions of the Agency is essential. The Agency must be seen by all member States as an impartial, efficient and professional body. It is important to correct the public perception of the IAEA as being only a watchdog. Its primary role in the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology needs to be re-emphasized. Pakistan is a strong advocate of utilizing nuclear technology for peace, progress and prosperity for all. As Pakistan is the sixth most populous nation in the world, socioeconomic development is a priority for our Government. For over 55 years now, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has been actively engaged in harnessing nuclear technology for our development priorities. In the past five decades, Pakistan has sought to enhance the application of nuclear technology for our people in a variety of ways and in collaboration with the Agency. Even as we utilize nuclear technology for diverse purposes, the harnessing of nuclear science for power generation remains a priority. At present, the share of nuclear power in Pakistan’s electricity mix is modest. However, in view of our large population, the deficit in fossil fuels and rising energy demand, we plan to increase the current level of 750 megawatts of nuclear power-generation capacity to at least 8,800 megawatts by the year 2030. That is a challenging task, but we are determined to pursue it as an important development imperative. Three nuclear power plants are already on line and have been performing very well. The oldest of these was commissioned way back in 1972. Besides those three, two more nuclear power plants, generating 340 megawatts each, are under construction and are expected to be commissioned by 2016. All nuclear power plants in Pakistan operate under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan has also been actively engaged in drawing lessons from the events at Fukushima. As a result of stress tests and extensive studies, a response action plan has been developed in collaboration with the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA). The plan is at various stages of implementation under PNRA oversight. Pakistan has always attached great importance to ensuring that all its work in the nuclear power domain is conducted within secure and transparent institutional structures. At the national level, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which is an independent regulatory and licensing body, has been performing professionally and efficiently for 11 years now. At the international level, we have had a long-standing engagement with IAEA forums. We have invited and supported World Association of Nuclear Operators peer review missions. We have also welcomed individual experts under the aegis of the IAEA. It is a matter of growing concern that even the supply of safety-related equipment has fallen victim to the restrictive and discriminatory export-control policies of some States. That does not augur well for the IAEA’s goal of encouraging worldwide enhancement of safety standards. Nuclear security is both a global challenge and a national responsibility. Pakistan accords the highest priority to ensuring the establishment of robust security mechanisms. Over the years, we have put in place extensive physical protection measures, robust command-and-control structures, comprehensive export controls and wide-ranging regulatory regimes. In cooperation with the IAEA, Pakistan is implementing a nuclear security action plan that has been called a model for other States. We have gained considerable experience in the field of nuclear security. A national training academy runs multi-tier training modules for comprehensive nuclear security solutions, and is being opened for international training courses as well. A nuclear emergency management system is being put in place. Pakistan subscribes to the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and to its Illicit Trafficking Database. Where the security of radioactive sources is concerned, Pakistan is implementing a cradle-to-grave concept, in accordance with IAEA nuclear security series documents. Finally, the IAEA can make a significant contribution to increasing the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The Agency is uniquely placed to meet the needs and challenges of the twenty-first century in a balanced manner. Pakistan believes in an equitable, non-discriminatory and criteria-based approach to advance the universally shared goals of non-proliferation and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We hope that safety and security considerations will facilitate, not hinder, the pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for promoting the development agenda and offsetting environmental degradation.

At the outset, my delegation would like to thank Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for transmitting the IAEA’s annual report for 2011 (see A/67/152) and for providing additional information on the Agency’s more recent developments and activities in his prepared statement (see A/67/152/Add.1). We appreciate the competent and professional manner in which the Director General and the Secretariat have steered the Agency through its extensive activities with a view to accelerating and expanding the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. We note with particular appreciation that, in carrying out its mandate, the Agency has risen to meet an array of challenges, ranging from the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, to nuclear safety in the wake of the Fukushima accident last year. In that context, my delegation would like to commend the Agency for its achievements in the field of nuclear safety. As outlined in the report, the Agency has been successful in implementing the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted at the fifty- fifth session of the IAEA’s General Conference, held last year. Through implementation of the Action Plan with the full cooperation and participation of member States, the Agency is successfully incorporating the lessons learned from Fukushima, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of both the regulatory framework and the operating organizations in IAEA member States. We also note with satisfaction that the Agency has taken steps to upgrade its emergency preparedness and response capabilities as a whole, which we anticipate will result in tangible improvements to national emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The work of the IAEA in the field of nuclear security, particularly its efforts to coordinate and enhance cooperation among various initiatives and activities, is also worthy of note. We welcome the progress that the Agency has made in implementing the goals and priorities set out in its Nuclear Security Report 2011. We are also pleased to note the successful establishment of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee as a standing body of experts on nuclear security. The Republic of Korea hosted the second Nuclear Security Summit last March in Seoul. The Seoul Summit resulted in comprehensive agreed measures for action to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism, including eliminating and reducing nuclear materials; encouraging wider adherence to international instruments; and combating the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. In addition, the Seoul Summit emphasized the central role that the IAEA plays in strengthening the international nuclear security framework. In that regard, we welcome and support the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, to be held in Vienna in July 2013. My delegation is convinced that the Conference will provide a timely global forum to discuss future directions and priorities for nuclear security, as well as generate valuable input for the preparation of the 2014-2017 Nuclear Security Plan. In early September, the Director General released an updated report on the application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As the Director General stated in his report, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme is a matter of serious concern, and its statements about uranium enrichment activities and the construction of a light- water reactor continue to be deeply troubling. Sharing as we do the Director General’s serious concern, my delegation would like to point out that those activities are a clear breach of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). My delegation therefore urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Council. Furthermore, we would like to recall the resolution on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, adopted by consensus at the fifty-sixth session of the General Conference, held this year. We also reiterate the international community’s call for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to come into full compliance with the NPT and to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of comprehensive safeguards. The resolution voices the international community’s serious concern about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme, including its construction of a light-water reactor and its uranium enrichment activities. The resolution also reaffirms the consensus that exists in the international community that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should not have nuclear-weapon-State status. It also underlines concern about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s statement in August announcing its intention to totally re-examine its nuclear policy. As the resolution clearly states, whatever that review may consist of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must reaffirm its commitment to denuclearization and to the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. With regard to the Agency’s activities in the field of safeguards, we welcome the continuing increase in the number of countries for which both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol are in force. With a total of 114 States now having additional protocols in force — an increase of 10 since the last report — the additional protocol is well on its way to becoming the universal international safeguards standard. We strongly believe that the additional protocol constitutes a crucial verification instrument that not only enhances the Agency’s ability to verify the peaceful nature of all nuclear material in a State but also ensures international confidence in a State’s nuclear programme. In that regard, we call for other member States to conclude and bring into force the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol if they have not yet done so. In the light of the full support for the IAEA’s work to achieve our common goal of harnessing nuclear energy in the service of peace and development for humankind, the Republic of Korea is pleased to co-sponsor draft resolution A/67/L.3 on the report of the IAEA.

At the outset, we would like to congratulate Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for the valuable and comprehensive report on the activities of the Agency (see A/67/152). The report reflects the sincere efforts made to achieve the international goals set by the international community, foremost of which are non-proliferation, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear energy for sustainable development and the advancement of scientific knowledge for the good of all humankind in all areas. We would like to stress the following points. First, we emphasize the importance and central role of the IAEA in the areas of inspection and verification, as well as in providing technical assistance to developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Secondly, we stress the inalienable right of all States to acquire and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as the need to avoid a monopoly on nuclear technology by some States while depriving others from acquiring it. Thirdly, we underline the need for all member States to commit without exception to opening their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection and verification. Fourthly, the international community should bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to open its nuclear facilities to the international inspection and verification regime of the Agency. In closing, we would like to stress that Libya is eager to promote and support a cooperative partnership with the IAEA in a transparent manner. We are willing to provide all assistance necessary to IAEA inspectors to fulfil their functions in Libya as appropriate.

We have heard the last speaker in the debate on this item. We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/67/L.3. Before giving the floor to speakers in explanation of vote or position, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Regarding the report under discussion (see A/67/152) and the related draft resolution (A/67/L.3), my country’s delegation considers the report to be far from correct or true and believes that it fails to cover the fundamental reality of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. With regard to that matter, my country’s delegation would like to clarify its position. First of all, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is without justification and has no power to intervene on the nuclear issue of the Korea peninsula. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or a member of the IAEA. As far as our relationship with the IAEA is concerned, already in the early 1990s the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cut off its official relations with the Agency and severed all contacts of any kind with it. We made that decision when the Agency lost the impartiality expected of an international organization by adopting the wrongful and biased attitude implicit in siding with the politically motivated conspiracy of the United States against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. However, at a later stage, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States entered into bilateral talks and the Six-Party Talks were opened, at which point the United States requested that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea allow the IAEA to offer technical consultation on the sidelines of the Six-Party Talks. We reluctantly honoured that request. The condition for that allowance was that the consultation would take place only while the Six-Party Talks were in progress. Nevertheless, considering the current situation and developments on the Korean peninsula, the United States has not hesitated to escalate, aggravate and ramp up its threats and attempts at blackmail through increased hostilities towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The situation on the peninsula is on the brink of explosion. Nobody knows when war may break out. In those circumstances, the Six-Party Talks have come nearly to the point of being a dead letter. In that state of affairs, the IAEA has no role to play. Furthermore, the IAEA has sided with the hostile United States against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, blindly following the United States policy against my country. It has complicated the way towards a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. We can therefore say that the IAEA has no justifiable role to play. Despite all of the foregoing, we now have this year’s annual report before us. The IAEA has come out and produced such language as “deeply troubling” with regard to the new enrichment facilities and light- water reactor construction, while also expressing the Agency’s so-called readiness to resume its involvement in verification activities. All of that is absurd and makes no sense in the context of what I have just said. On this occasion, the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would like to draw the attention of all participants here to the different status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as everybody knows, has emerged as a full-fledged and justifiable nuclear-weapon State. It is clear that the IAEA cannot and should not use the same standard it was using when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear activities were limited to peaceful purposes. The function of the IAEA is to deal mainly with non-nuclear-weapon States and the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is different, as clearly observed in the IAEA’s previous approach. The Agency has never raised an issue or expressed concern about the nuclear activities of the other nuclear-weapon States; it has done so only with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That does not make sense; it is absurd and yet another instance of the Agency’s diminishing impartiality in its activities. Secondly, the IAEA cannot and is not in a position to offer a helping hand in the settlement of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula. The resolution of all such issues should be based on an objective analysis of the fundamental current reality behind those issues. With regard to the fundamental essence of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula, it is absolutely the product of the hostile, deeply rooted and long-standing policy of the United States against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Moreover, the United States did not hesitate to list the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as part of the axis of evil and as a first nuclear pre-emptive strike target by the United States. Furthermore, when one considers the United States military activities in South Korea this year, its holding of one large-scale exercise after another, involving up to 500,000 troops, is unprecedented. The United States is more than ready to attack the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at any time. Another joint military exercise is now under way, involving over 200,000 troops of the United States and South Korea. As representatives can imagine, they are using live ammunition. In an exercise this summer, they used the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s flag as a target on the ground for an air strike exercise involving live ammunition. It is clear that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a target to be eliminated by the United States. In the face of that threat and in response to such blackmail from the largest nuclear-weapon State, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had no option but to go nuclear to defend itself, to safeguard its security and sovereignty and to safeguard the right to existence of the entire Korean nation. Therefore, the nuclear deterrent of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea represents the deterrence of war and it is an almighty and most treasured sword that can guarantee peace, stability and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region. It is therefore in the interests of the regional countries to move towards peace, development, détente and stability. Concerning the withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the NPT and the IAEA, our objective is to make the United States abandon its strong-arm policy and move towards reconciliation and coexistence with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As long as that hostile policy continues, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will increase, strengthen and expand its nuclear capability and its arsenal of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would like to kindly recommend that the International Atomic Energy Agency not repeat its issuance of this kind of annual report, with its absurd content and language. It will result only in tarnishing and destroying its own image.

We have heard the only speaker in explanation of position. The Assembly will now take action on draft resolution A/67/L.3, entitled “Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency”. I give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.

I should like to announce that, since the submission of the draft resolution, in addition to those delegations listed in document A/67/L.3, the following countries have become sponsors of the draft resolution: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay and Zambia.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/67/L.3. May I take it that the Assembly decides to adopt the draft resolution?

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention, and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Concerning the remarks made by the representatives of Japan and South Korea, the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would like to exercise its right of reply. First, concerning the statement made by the representative of Japan that the nuclear weapons of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are a threat to East Asia, we totally reject this allegation, as it makes no sense at all in the context of the fundamental reality of the Korean peninsula for the reasons I have just elaborated upon. But one thing is clear. When we consider who is the source of the threat in the region, it is none other than Japan. Japan has nuclear capabilities. It has over 40 tons of plutonium. It is a plutonium world champion. It is acknowledged that Japan can assemble nuclear weapons at short notice, even within only a few hours’ time. Japan has a secret nuclear agreement with the United States, adopted in 1960, under which it allows nuclear-weapon-capable American warships to enter its territorial waters at any time. Japan continues to tell the world that it has three non-nuclear principles, which are not legalized but are only oral. In reality, it is doing something quite different; it is moving towards militarism without expressing any apology for its past crimes, including crimes against humanity, of which we are all aware. Concerning the remarks made by the representative of South Korea, again, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cannot have the status of nuclear- weapon State. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has never requested such status. It is up to us whether we do so or not; it is our right in response to the threat. And South Korea has allowed American nuclear weapons into South Korea since 1957, blackmailing the entire Korean nation. They cannot hide or cast aside this fact. Moreover, South Korea is still under the nuclear umbrella of the United States.

I would like to exercise my right of reply in response to the statement just made by the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. First, the Government of Japan’s adherence to the three non-nuclear principles — not possessing, manufacturing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into our territory — remains unchanged, and Japan’s determination in pursuit of the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a view to achieving a world without nuclear weapons is unshakable. Secondly, Japan maintains an exclusively defence-oriented policy, and therefore exercises conducted by the Self-Defence Forces of Japan do not target any particular country or area. Moreover, the ballistic missile defence system that Japan has decided to introduce is purely defensive and does not threaten any country or area surrounding Japan. Thirdly, it is not a fact that the Government of Japan has ever allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States onto Japanese territory. Based on the United States nuclear policy expressed to date, including the 1991 announcement, it is the judgement of the Japanese Government that there is currently no introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States, including via vessels and/or aircraft calling at port in, landing on or transiting Japanese territories. I reiterate that the Japan continues to maintain the policy of adhering to the three non-nuclear principles. Lastly, Japan has acted in strict compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations as an NPT State party. Japan’s peaceful uses of nuclear energy have been confirmed by the IAEA in its annual conclusions that all nuclear materials remain in peaceful activities. Moreover, beyond legal obligations, as a measure of international transparency Japan has regularly reported the amount of its plutonium holdings in accordance with the guidelines for the management of plutonium, most recently on 17 September.

Concerning the remarks made by the representative of Japan, once again the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea totally rejects this allegation. All that has been said is simply political cover-up. It is a fact that in 1960 Japan concluded a secret nuclear agreement with the United States that goes against the three non-nuclear principles, which are themselves contained in no legal or legitimate document. If Japan is serious about its non-nuclear position, then why should it hesitate to adopt a legitimate document? Lastly, Japan is pursuing militarization, seeking to become a military Power. It is creating territorial disputes with all neighbouring countries, including on the Korean peninsula, China and Russia. Japan is making territorial claims that are utterly unfounded and aimed purely at promoting the expansionist and militaristic interests of Japan.

I have no intention of repeating the statement I made earlier to refute the allegations made by the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. With respect to other groundless allegations made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea delegation against Japan, I would rather my delegation reserve its right of reply until an appropriate opportunity arrives in due course.

May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 85?