S/PV.10070 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, according to the year of adoption of the related Council decisions: Ambassador Sangjin Kim, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), and speaking on behalf of the Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan; Ambassador Amar Bendjama, Permanent Representative of Algeria, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024); Ambassador Michael Imran Kanu, Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and Chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals; Ambassador Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Permanent Representative of Guyana, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea- Bissau and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti; and Ambassador Samuel Žbogar, Permanent Representative of Slovenia and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003). I now give the floor to Ambassador Sangjin Kim. Mr. Sangjin Kim: During our Security Council term, the Republic of Korea had the privilege of chairing three subsidiary bodies, namely the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014); and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. At the outset, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the members of the Security Council and the Secretariat for their advice and cooperation with us for the past two years. Let me first turn to the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan. During our chairship, the Committee has continued to operate under a challenging political and security environment, as well as a complex humanitarian context. Against this backdrop, we have sought to ensure that the Committee’s activities remain fair, transparent and effective, while fully attentive to the views of Committee members and Member States concerned. Over the past two years, there were a total of seven informal consultations, six Chair’s briefings to the Security Council and a total of 96 notes. In November 2024, approximately 10 years after the previous listing was made, the Committee approved the addition to the sanctions list of two individuals who threaten the stability of Darfur and the region and commit violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and other instruments. This brought to five the number of sanctioned individuals. This decision underscores the Committee’s continued commitment to hold those responsible accountable. In September of this year, the Council unanimously renewed the 1591 sanctions regime for another year and aligned the mandate of the Panel of Experts with that of the sanctions regime. We have also worked with all Council members to enhance the efficiency of the Committee’s working methods. Specifically, the periodic Chair’s briefing to the Security Council was adjusted from a 90-day cycle to a 120-day cycle, enabling better alignment with the reporting cycle. The report of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 Committee documented graphic examples of targeted violence against civilians in and around Darfur, providing a stark and tangible picture of the scale and brutality of the violence faced by civilians. We also witnessed the real-time use of advanced weaponry in the Sudan, underscoring the urgent need for the fully operational Panel of Experts to investigate potential arms embargo violations. Despite continued efforts, the full Panel of Experts has still not been appointed, largely owing to a lack of consensus on several proposed candidates throughout this year. We urgently recommend that the remaining experts be appointed as soon as possible, as this directly affects the Committee’s ability to deliver its mandate effectively. A fully constituted Panel is critical to the credibility of its work and to the overall quality of reporting. Furthermore, delays in reaching agreement on the Chairs of subsidiary bodies in 2025 have affected the timely start of the Committee’s work. This challenge is not limited to the Sudan Sanctions Committee, but it nonetheless underscores the need for more predictable and efficient processes moving forward. I turn now to the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, which met seven times over the past two years for informal consultations, in addition to conducting its work through written procedures. Over the past two years, no new entries were added to the sanctions list. In 2024, the Committee removed two individuals from its sanctions list upon a request by a Member State There are currently 10 individuals and one entity subject to the Committee’s sanctions measures. During the same period, we engaged in constructive consultations with Council members, in line with the Panel of Experts’ recommendations to the Sanctions Committee, which ultimately led to the Committee’s approval of eight recommendations from the Panel. Given that all decisions are taken by consensus, it is, in reality, difficult to reach agreement on every recommendation put forward by the Panel. Nevertheless, as Chair, I made every effort to facilitate constructive engagement among Council members. In the end, the Committee’s decision to take action on the basis of the Panel’s recommendations, recognizing the Panel’s crucial role in monitoring the implementation of the sanctions regime, constitutes a meaningful achievement in terms of sanctions regime implementation. The Panel’s most recent report (S/2025/650) mentioned the sanctions regime’s persistent challenges and lamented its ineffective implementation. The report noted that the Houthis’ use of smuggling to generate revenue and circumvent the arms embargo continued. Such challenges identified by the Panel underscore that more consistent and faithful implementation is essential to prevent the deterioration of the Yemen situation. In this regard, I was once again reminded of the vital role of the Committee and the Panel of Experts. Also, I believe that the time has come to move beyond words and to seriously consider ways to promote faithful implementation in practice. We regret that the Committee was unable to convene a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, despite the serious situation regarding the recruitment and use of children in Yemen, simply owing to scheduling issues last year. I believe that it is necessary to consider what additional meetings could be convened within the Committee’s mandate to enable the Committee members to gain a deeper understanding of the situation on the ground in Yemen. There were also delays in the appointment of the Panel of Experts, particularly the arms expert, which affected the Committee’s monitoring capacity. As we have renewed both the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts, we look forward to the Panel’s effective operation at full capacity in the coming period. Turning now to the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, peacekeeping today is increasingly conducted in complex and less permissive environments, in which missions face overlapping security, political and operational challenges. In such contexts, ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers, adapting effectively to evolving threats and sustaining peace gains beyond mission drawdown require continuous reflection on how peacekeeping can be strengthened across the full life cycle of missions. Against this backdrop and following a period during which the Working Group was not convened as actively as intended, the Republic of Korea, upon assuming the chairship in 2024, aimed to reinvigorate the Working Group as a platform for strategic and forward-looking discussions to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and better reflect the perspectives of troop- and police-contributing countries. As a first step, in May 2024, we convened a meeting of the working group on the security of peacekeepers. The discussion addressed a range of interlinked issues, including accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, countering improvised explosive device threats, integrated defence of peacekeeping bases and the use of technology. In August 2024, the Working Group co-chaired, together with Mozambique, a joint meeting with the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, focusing on lessons learned from transitions in United Nations peacekeeping in Africa. The meeting was also attended by major troop-contributing countries and the Peacebuilding Commission bureau, enabling a comprehensive discussion on approaches to ensuring orderly and sustainable transitions. This discussion built on resolution 2594 (2021) on the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and reaffirmed that transitions must be carefully planned, inclusive and host-State-led, with sustained Security Council engagement. Working Group members also highlighted close coordination among missions, the Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations country teams, regional organizations and international partners to consolidate peace gains. This year, we had hoped to convene a further meeting to discuss inputs for the Secretary-General’s ongoing review of the future of all forms of peace operations, undertaken pursuant to the Pact for the Future. Unfortunately, owing to the Council’s crowded programme of work, this meeting could not take place. While we recognize that not all aspects of scheduling are fully within the President’s control, a more proactive effort in coordinating the programme of work as well as continued engagement by Council members are essential for the effective functioning of the Working Group. Next year, the Secretary-General will present a strategic direction for the future of peacekeeping. The Working Group is an appropriate forum for discussing peacekeeping mandates, and we look forward to continued discussions in the Working Group to enhance the effectiveness and adaptability of United Nations peacekeeping. Drawing on our experience, we believe that the most important role of the Chair of subsidiary organs is not to operate in a purely procedural or reactive manner, limited to minimum requirements or manuals, but to exercise proactive leadership. This includes making full use of available expertise, in particular that of the Panel of Experts, as well as encouraging active and substantive engagement among Committee members, in order to read the situation on the ground and steer discussions towards more balanced, reasonable and mature decisions and effective outcomes. I would like to conclude by extending my appreciation to the members of all three subsidiary bodies for their vital contributions, along with the secretariat for its invaluable support. I also wish the incoming Chairs the greatest success in their upcoming roles.

I thank Ambassador Sangjin Kim for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Bendjama. Mr. Bendjama: It is me again. Algeria is concluding its tenure as Chair of three subsidiary bodies: first, the Committee pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024); secondly, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; and thirdly, the Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004) on counter-terrorism. I must begin by highlighting a procedural matter that deeply affected the effectiveness of all the Committees, namely the Chair appointments for 2025, which were only made on 29 May. Operational consequences were significant: the undermining of strategic planning and early engagement with Member States; the hindering of the implementation of resolutions’ mandates; difficult prioritization decisions under severe time constraints; and scheduling conflicts between subsidiary body meetings and Security Council activities. These consequences were not merely procedural; they were substantive. Starting with the 2745 (2024) Committee, the main developments having affected the work of the Committee over these two years can be summarized in three key points. First, on 30 July 2024, after four years of division, the Security Council returned to consensus with the unanimous adoption of resolution 2745 (2024), lifting the arms embargo on the Government of the Central African Republic. This decision drew an important distinction between legitimate State authority and illegal armed actors. The Council also decided to rename the Sanctions Committee from the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic to the Committee pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024). Secondly, in July 2025, two armed groups that had signed peace agreements with the Government earlier this year were dissolved. This momentum continued as a third armed group signed a peace agreement last November. These three developments were achieved with Chad’s mediation. Thirdly, the Committee maintained its oversight responsibilities, including regular formal meetings to review reports of the Panel of Experts, processing exemption requests and coordinating with neighbouring States on border security and prevention of illicit arms flows. Turning now to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, this Committee maintained focus on key areas of its mandate, in a context marked by the evolving global terrorism threat. The Committee — I should say the secretariat — conducted 15 visits to Member States. The Committee and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate maintain close partnerships with United Nations entities and partners. Despite the significant delays in 2025, we held a total of 14 formal Committee meetings and four open briefings. Crucially, we achieved critical milestones. First and foremost, the Algeria Guiding Principles on preventing terrorist financing through new technologies now represent a framework for addressing how terrorists exploit emerging financial technologies. The Algeria Guiding Principles are a testament to the Committee’s collective efforts and consensus-driven cooperation. Regrettably, I must also highlight a significant challenge. Africa now accounts for 59 per cent of global terrorism-related deaths. Yet a troubling pattern persists. Assessment visits by the secretariat and partners do not reflect, at all, the severity of terrorist threats in Africa. We regret that the Committee was unable to adopt the 2025 list of proposed visits. Algeria has advocated for prioritizing the most affected countries, particularly in the Sahel region. If the Committee cannot effectively reach those who need support most, we must ask whether we are fulfilling our mandate. Algeria has also used its tenure to advance procedural reforms benefitting all elected members of the Council. We challenged the non-objection procedure regarding access to documentation as lacking legal basis. These efforts led to the update of presidential note 507, and the successful embodiment of the principle of full access to relevant documents and the guarantee of equal access for all Council members. Looking ahead, I offer some recommendations for the Council’s consideration. First, there should be strict adherence to the 1 January deadline for Chair appointments. Secondly, both Committees should systematically integrate development perspectives in their work. Thirdly, outdated sanctions lists should be addressed as a priority, and Implementation Assistance Notices should be regularly maintained and updated. Fourthly, statistics demand urgent reflection. Africa — our continent — accounts for more than 59 per cent of global terrorism victims, yet Africa receives meagre counter-terrorism resources. This is not just a security crisis, but a crisis of international solidarity. To our successors, I say that chairing these Committees is a marathon, requiring patience, persistence and principled partnership. Listen to those most impacted by terrorism and prioritize substance over process, because behind every statistic there is a human tragedy. Finally, let me extend my sincere gratitude to Assistant Secretary-General Natalia Gherman and the team of the Executive Directorate, the secretariat of the 2745 Committee and, more broadly, to the Security Council Affairs Division, in addition to the Panel of Experts and all Committee members, for their collaboration throughout these two years.

I thank Ambassador Bendjama for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Kanu. Mr. Kanu: I welcome this opportunity to share my reflections, having had the distinct honour over the past two years to chair three Security Council subsidiary bodies: the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan; and the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. As a representative of Sierra Leone, a country that emerged from the crucible of a civil conflict more than two decades ago, with the support of the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States and other partners, we approached these responsibilities with a sense of profound duty. Our national journey from conflict to peace, supported by, inter alia, a successful United Nations sanctions regime and a hybrid tribunal with United Nations support, has instilled in us an unwavering commitment to multilateralism, the rule of law and accountability. These values guided our work throughout. Before turning to the substance — and I am doing this in reverse — I wish to express sincere appreciation to the members of these subsidiary bodies for their engagement and spirit of cooperation. I also thank the dedicated secretariat, the Security Council Affairs Division, in particular the Subsidiary Organs Branch, the Office of Legal Affairs and other relevant offices for their professionalism and steady support, which remain indispensable to the effectiveness of the Council’s subsidiary architecture. I further thank the experts, whose work and insights informed our deliberations. I also take this opportunity to thank my colleagues at the Mission, who supported the Chair in the discharge of these important responsibilities. On the 1533 (2004) Committee, I am pleased to note that the Committee continued to discharge its mandate during the reporting period through informal consultations and written procedures. The Committee engaged closely with the Group of Experts. This included an exchange on the Group’s final report (see S/2025/446) and recommendations; a presentation on the workplan for its mandate ending 1 August 2026; and a discussion on the midterm report and key findings. Consistent with the Council’s commitment to humanitarian carveouts, the Committee also received a briefing by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Committee issued public summaries of selected meetings through press releases and maintained direct communications with Member States and relevant stakeholders to support the implementation of the measures. A notable milestone under the biennium was my briefing to the Council on 27 June 2025 (see S/PV.9948), reflecting the Committee’s regional visit to Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Rwanda, undertaken from 14 to 25 November 2024. That visit, I believe, enriched our understanding of realities on the ground, the range of perspectives across the region and the complexities surrounding sanctions implementation and its linkages to the peace process. On the 2206 (2015) Committee, I am also pleased to note that the Committee continued to discharge its mandate during the reporting period, including through informal consultations, during which we received briefings and exchanged views with relevant briefers, notably the Panel of Experts and OCHA. In particular, the Committee discussed the Panel’s final report (see S/2025/442), including its findings and recommendations; heard the Panel’s workplan following the mandate extension; received OCHA’s briefing; and discussed the Panel’s interim report and emerging trends. The Committee also continued outreach and implementation support, including through the receipt of Member State reporting, communications to Member States and stakeholders and the processing of notifications consistent with the sanctions regime. I regret to note that the proposed visit by the Chair to South Sudan and Uganda could not go ahead as consensus could not be reached, notwithstanding clear calls for the region for the Council’s on-the-ground engagement. On the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, chairing it provided a valuable opportunity to reaffirm Sierra Leone’s enduring commitment to the rule of law and the fight against impunity. I wish to recognize the constructive engagement of the Working Group and express sincere gratitude to all its members for their cooperation and active participation during this tenure, which coincided with the continued transition of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to its truly residual phase. In the reporting period, the Working Group supported the Council’s consideration of the Mechanism’s work and contributed to the preparation of two Council products: the presidential statement S/PRST/2024/1 of 4 March 2024 and resolution 2740 (2024) of 27 June 2024. Notwithstanding these achievements, the Mechanism continued to face persistent challenges, including the relocation of acquitted persons and convicted persons who have served their sentences, particularly those unable to secure legal residency following arrangements involving the Niger, as well as the ongoing need to identify additional enforcement States for the service of sentences. I thank the President and the Prosecutor of the Mechanism for their regular reports and constructive engagement throughout the period. Allow me now to offer some personal reflections. When Sierra Leone was entrusted to lead these subsidiary bodies, it was not on the basis of any illusion that we could resolve these challenges alone. Rather, it was grounded in the conviction that, drawing from our experience of conflict and peacebuilding, we could help the Council and the wider membership to navigate complexity with humility and pursue solutions that are principled but pragmatic, context-specific and anchored in the Council’s responsibilities. On the 1533 (2004) Committee, our work unfolded initially in an environment in which misinformation and disinformation increasingly shaped narratives around the United Nations presence, while the country and the region grappled with deep insecurity, an evolving United Nations presence and regional diplomatic efforts, including the Luanda and Nairobi tracks. In such a climate, it was too easy for sanctions to become either a slogan or a footnote rather than a tool integrated into a broader political strategy. My visit to the region reinforced the daunting nature of the task: a complex web of grievances, governance gaps and the exploitation of mineral resources that fuels armed activity and corrodes trust in institutions. It also underscored that sustainable peace cannot be pursued through isolated measures. Any credible pathway must be able to speak to regional cooperation and shared economic prosperity, establishing and supporting the extension of State presence and governance reforms; the demobilization and disengagement of armed groups, including foreign-supported groups or those with external political objectives; credible security guarantees for vulnerable ethnic minorities; reconciliation; minerals traceability and certification; and accountability, so that violence does not remain cost-free. I also came away with a renewed appreciation of why Chairs’ visits matter. When possible, they remain among the most effective tools to deepen understanding of sanctions measures, engage stakeholders directly, including through public and social media engagement, and encourage national and regional ownership of compliance. On the 2206 (2015) Committee, there remained, through much of this period, hope that the transition could be placed on a firmer footing, including through progress on core benchmarks and preparations that could enable a credible and successful transition. Yet, regrettably, the gap between commitments and implementation remains a central concern, and the file is regrettably being left in a difficult place. I also regret that I was unable to provide first-hand perspectives from the ground, given that my proposed Chair’s visit did not go ahead. I would strongly recommend that the incoming Chair undertake an early visit to hear directly from national authorities, regional guarantors, civil society and humanitarian actors and to ensure that the sanctions tool is calibrated to political realities rather than negotiated from a distance. On a broader reflection, the Council’s subsidiary bodies are essential to the Council’s effectiveness, but they too require revitalization. Too often, a packed programme of work and compressed negotiating calendars mean we do not get to the bottom of issues, discussions become routine and the files drift into business as usual, even as realities on the ground deteriorate. In my experience, effectiveness depends less on the number of meetings held and more on the discipline to set priorities early; plan field engagement in good time; maintain regular, substantive interaction with panels and groups of experts; and preserve a shared understanding that these bodies exist to support outcomes, not merely to produce processes. If I may, in closing, I wish to offer four general recommendations. First, visits should be planned early and used strategically. Chair’s visits should be programmed early in the mandate and undertaken more frequently where conditions permit, including, where appropriate, outreach to neighbouring countries and engagement with local and regional media to improve public understanding of the objectives and scope of sanctions. Secondly, the Council must appoint Chairs of subsidiary bodies quickly. Early appointment enables early prioritization, predictable programming and timely engagement with experts and stakeholders, particularly where mandates are time- bound and reporting cycles are fixed. Thirdly, time must be preserved for substance. The Council should preserve sufficient time and space in the programme of work for subsidiary bodies to address underlying drivers, emerging trends and implementation gaps, rather than limiting engagement to periodic briefings that risk becoming routine. Fourthly and finally, the integration of sanctions measures into political strategies must be continued. Sanctions measures are not an end in themselves. Their credibility and utility depend on being integrated into coherent political strategies tailored to each context, including governance, security sector reform, demobilization, resource governance and accountability. With this I wish my successors the very best.

I thank Ambassador Kanu for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Rodrigues-Birkett. Mrs. Rodrigues-Birkett: During Guyana’s two-year term on the Security Council, I had the privilege of chairing two subsidiary bodies, namely the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti. I also served as Vice-Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2745 (2024). My reflections today will focus on the 2048 and 2653 Sanctions Committees. During my chairmanship of the 2048 Sanctions Committee, there were no formal meetings held. However, we remained attentive to the situation in Guinea- Bissau, including through exchanges with the Permanent Mission of Guinea-Bissau and the Secretariat, ensuring that the core mandate of the sanctions regime was upheld. In the past two years, the Committee received no requests for listing or delisting. Consequently, 10 individuals remain on the Guinea-Bissau sanctions list. Considering the broader political context in Guinea-Bissau, I remain particularly mindful of the events of 26 November. I have taken note of the final communiqué of the recently concluded Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in relation to the situation in Guinea-Bissau and take this opportunity to commend the efforts of the African Union and ECOWAS in supporting a peaceful return to constitutional order and stability in the country. Regarding the 2653 Sanctions Committee on Haiti, the situation was quite the opposite. In 2024, the Committee held five meetings, three informal consultations and two briefings to Member States; while in 2025, the Committee held five meetings, four informal consultations and one briefing to Member States. The Committee received briefings from the Panel of Experts, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on behalf of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. In addition, and as a means of delving deeper into issues affecting the Committee’s work, informal informal meetings were held last year. These discussions provided space for frank and constructive engagement and allowed us to candidly address a range of issues, fostering a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and obstacles associated with specific aspects of the Committee’s work. Much of the Committee’s work was conducted through written procedures. In 2024, 80 notes were circulated, including eight official communications to Member States and other relevant stakeholders, and seven notes verbales to Member States. In 2025, we saw a slight increase in the number of notes issued, with 92 notes circulated overall. This included nine official communications to Member States and other relevant stakeholders, including the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) secretariat, and three notes verbales to Member States. In my capacity as Chair, I delivered two briefings to the Security Council in relation to the work of the Committee. I also delivered opening remarks at the regional meeting on firearms trafficking to Haiti, held in Panama on 25 November 2025. One important aspect of the Committee’s work focused on updating the list of individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022). Security Council resolutions 2700 (2023), 2752 (2024) and 2794 (2025) directed the Committee to consider expeditiously updating the list. In this connection, on 27 September last year, the Committee added two individuals to the list, and on 8 July this year, the Committee added two entities to the list. By its resolution 2794 (2025), the Security Council also designated two individuals this year. Consequently, there are now nine individuals and two entities on the sanctions list of the Committee During the course of the year, the Committee received one exemption request to the arms embargo measures pursuant to paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 2752 (2024), which was approved. The Committee further provided guidance to Member States on the implementation of the arms embargo and its exemption measures. As I conclude my chairmanship and reflect on the work of the 2653 Sanctions Committee over the past two years, I am convinced that sustained engagement with Haiti, the Panel and other relevant stakeholders remains key to making greater progress with respect to the enforcement of the arms embargo and updating the sanctions list, beyond the category of gang leaders and members. Illicit arms and ammunition of various types continue to flow into Haiti, impeding efforts to curb the gang violence and security crisis. We have seen, over the past two years, that armed criminal gangs and their sponsors are using different trafficking routes and means to smuggle arms into Haiti. There is also a growing link between the trafficking of illicit firearms and drugs. Another challenge relates to the activities of private security firms in Haiti and the need for effective management of those stockpiles. I am pleased to note that the efforts of the Panel of Experts and relevant agencies to raise awareness of the provisions of the arms embargo and overall sanctions regime have resulted in some progress being made in terms of increased scrutiny and arrests in some countries. I hope that this will also translate into increased reporting by Member States to the Committee. I urge the Committee to remain actively engaged and to continue to focus on raising awareness and building the capacity of front-line implementers, to remind Member States of their legal obligation to take all necessary measures to ensure domestic enforcement of the embargo and to work with relevant stakeholders to ensure that adequate export controls and transit monitoring systems are put in place. I also encourage the Committee to engage with regional and subregional organizations and entities, such as the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, which has a mandate from the CARICOM Heads of Government to execute the CARICOM crime and security strategy, and which has the expertise and mechanisms to assist Haiti in combating illicit arms trafficking. As I conclude, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to the Secretariat staff, some of whom are in this Chamber here with us today, my own staff and Committee members for the exceptional cooperation and support extended to me over the past two years. I also wish the incoming Chairs every success during their tenure.

I thank Ambassador Rodrigues-Birkett for her briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003), concerning Iraq. During Slovenia’s term in the Security Council, I have had the privilege to Chair two sanctions Committees, namely the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005) on Lebanon and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) on Iraq. I also acted as the Facilitator of resolution 2231 (2015) until 18 October. While the 1636 (2005) Committee has not been active, the 1518 (2003) Committee still has 65 individuals and 10 entities on the 1518 (2003) sanctions list at this moment. Delisting processes have stalled, and only one delisting was approved during our tenure, although four cases remain pending at this time. The Committee has been working predominantly through written procedure. On 8 August, the Committee had one in-person meeting together with representatives of the Iraqi national committee for freezing terrorist assets to exchange information on the delisting procedures and the list of persons and entities on the Iraq sanctions list. Ways to facilitate and expedite delisting processes have been explored, including through better information-sharing, with the aim to reinvigorate delisting requests by listed individuals and entities. I thank the Council members for their cooperation, and I would like to express my gratitude to the Secretariat and my staff for their support. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. On behalf of the Security Council, I take this opportunity to express appreciation to the outgoing Chairs for the manner in which they have discharged their important responsibilities on behalf of the Council.