S/PV.4223 Security Council

I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Australia, Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa and Thailand in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them document S/2000/1072, which contains the text of a letter dated 6 November 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a paper on decision-making by the Council on mission closure and mission transition. Although there are a number of open Council meetings scheduled for this month, it is today’s meeting which should be seen as the pièce de résistance of the Dutch presidency. The title of our theme has nothing to do with the Netherlands’ imminent exit from the Security Council, but it is a sort of goodbye present and, as presents go, it remains to be seen whether everybody will like it once it has been unwrapped. Before opening the floor to what promises to be a lively discussion, I should like to say a few words to render account of what we have done. The way we have spelled out the theme of today’s debate — in an annex to a letter from me in my national capacity addressed to the Secretary-General — is somewhat unorthodox. The contents of the annex are even more so. The Security Council does not often embark on an open debate on the basis of a document which contains terms such as “miserliness”, “parochial motives” and “double standard”. In our view, however, a debate on the Security Council’s decision-making process with regard to the termination of peace operations can be productive only if we aspire to a degree of openness that is not normally associated with an open Security Council meeting. In order to achieve that degree of openness, it was inevitable that the line between my function as President and the contribution I made in my national capacity would temporarily become somewhat blurred. But I can assure members of the Council that that phase has now passed. The sole purpose of our annex was to focus this debate, and we will soon see to what extent it has been successful. The question we would like to see addressed today is whether the Security Council can improve its performance in the matter of decision-making on the termination or transition of peace operations. The question is not specifically treated in the report (S/2000/809) of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, but it clearly dovetails with what that report has to say about Security Council decision-making. There is an obvious link between greater clarity about the termination of a peace operation and the clear, credible and achievable mandates that the Brahimi exercise demands for those peace operations to begin with. We expect to hear suggestions for improvements in a variety of fields such as analysis and planning, political will, commitment and leadership, and resources and funding. But a realistic discussion should also take into account that there can never be an absolute guarantee that a peace operation, once begun, will be pursued until the conditions are fulfilled for an orderly transition to post-conflict peace-building. A peace that once seemed fit for keeping may suddenly melt away, and we should also study the question of how, in such a situation, the United Nations can limit the damage caused by the inevitable early termination of the peace operation. That is all I wanted to say by way of introduction to the debate. The floor is now open.

Thank you so much, Mr. President, for your creativity in having a discussion on an issue which at first seems abstract, but which in fact goes to the heart of the responsibilities of the Security Council and of the United Nations. Thank you also for calling a meeting on exit strategies at a time when my own nation is looking for one in Florida. I am sure we will find one, but we watch with attention and interest. I want to state at the outset, because it has been raised by so many of my colleagues in the United Nations, that the United States has an Administration until 20 January; our President is currently in Brunei at the summit meeting with leaders of many of the Governments represented here. I believe he just met, or is about to meet, with President Jiang Zemin, and President Putin and he have just concluded their meeting. I just want to underscore for all our friends in the United Nations that, while we have a genuine drama going on as to who the next President of the United States will be, at this point we have an Administration in place; it is functioning; and in no way, shape or form is there any diminution in the strength of the United States or in our ability to conduct foreign relations at this point. I need to underscore that because it has been raised by so many people recently. Your creativity, Sir, in forcing us to address, in a theoretical context, a real and practical problem deserves special commendation. This is a time when United Nations peacekeeping is challenged as it has not been before — and this is an issue on which I have spoken out many times as a private citizen as well — and when the demand for peacekeeping is outpacing capacity and resources, as has been made clear by the report (S/2000/809) of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. Indeed, the very nature of peacekeeping has been transformed. It used to be defined mainly as border patrol efforts between States, and in some cases, such as Ethiopia-Eritrea, it will still be that. But increasingly, it raises questions of bringing peace and stability in conflicts within States. That is the most difficult issue for the United Nations. Many countries represented in this Chamber are legitimately concerned about the issue of sovereignty, and about the limits of infringement upon that sovereignty by the United Nations. The principle of sovereignty is fully enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and I would just state on that delicate point, which is of particular concern to several members of the Security Council, that it is precisely for that reason that, on an issue such as the proposal for the protection of the Palestinian people put forward by Ambassador Al-Kidwa and Chairman Arafat, we say that it cannot be decided without the full consent of Israel. But once a peacekeeping operation is in place, which is what the proper subject of today’s discussion is, deciding what conditions are necessary for scaling it down — in other words, an exit strategy — should be a vital part of any peacekeeping mission. Establishing realistic goals and understandings must be a basic part of every decision we make. To be sure, many of our goals are not easy to meet. In places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, the Congo and Sierra Leone, the international community faces extremely difficult problems. Those societies have been torn apart internally by divisions — ethnic, political, religious and externally fuelled — by corruption and by tragedy. In such places, peacekeeping is a source of stability, and the engagement of the international community offers the best hope for people to rebuild their lives. If we do not deal with the causes of conflict, the United Nations is reduced to dealing with the consequences of conflict, and that means that the United Nations specialized agencies — such as the United Nations Children’s Fund, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme — end up spending much more money — I stress that, much more money – on dealing with the consequences than we would dealing with the causes. I need to underscore that one of the oldest sayings in the English language, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”, applies directly in this case. This means that we must be very careful, when we talk about exit strategies, not to confuse them with exit deadlines. We agree that it is highly preferable that peacekeeping operations have an end state, and not be absolutely open-ended. But an exit strategy must be directed towards a defining overall objective, not an arbitrary, self-imposed, artificial deadline. Artificial deadlines encourage belligerents to out-wait the outside intervention, to delay and to wait until the international community goes away, at which point they can resume what they had been doing before. Artificial deadlines give hope to warlords, to criminals and to corrupt officials that they can outlast the international community. We learned that lesson in Bosnia where, after the Dayton Peace Agreement, five years ago next week, the United States set two arbitrary time limits for its own troop presence: first a 12-month limit right after Dayton, then, secondly, an 18-month time limit in January 1997. Both those time limits were wrong, as I argued at the time. Finally, in December 1997, President Clinton took a brave decision reversing American policy and announcing that United States troops would remain in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadline. As President Clinton said at the time, the mission should be achievable and “tied to concrete benchmarks, not a deadline”. I cannot emphasize too strongly how important that was. It told those people who were trying to out-wait the international community that the United States at least was going to fulfil the mission, not have the mission defined by an arbitrary deadline. To put it differently, our goals must determine the timeline, not the other way around. To take an extreme, but important, example, consider the case of Korea. Nobody in the world thought that international troops would still be in Korea 47 years after the ceasefire there. There was no politician, of any country, in the United Nations command in 1953 who could have envisaged such a thing. But today more than 35,000 American troops are still in Korea, and they are universally accepted as an important part of stability there. They have the support of the American people, and they are no longer an object of criticism by other nations. The reason for that is that the United States moved away from arbitrary withdrawal deadlines, which were erroneously put forward in 1976-1977 by the Carter Administration, and moved forward towards a policy of keeping the forces there until the mission was fulfilled. When we saw the historic summit of the two leaders of North and South Korea last month, we saw an event that could not have taken place had the troops not remained there. So, again, an exit strategy yes, an exit deadline, no. The term “exit strategy” should never be allowed to mean a hasty or arbitrary departure from a strategically stated goal that is supported by the international community as expressed through the United Nations Security Council. Rather, the term should mean the implementation of a comprehensive settlement. For example, crucial interim goals could be the establishment of the rule of law, the arrest of those indicted for war crimes, and the creation of legitimate democratic institutions. In that regard, I want to praise the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bernard Kouchner for the excellent way in which they have conducted and fulfilled part of one of the goals of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), namely, the elections in Kosovo last month. That was a partial step, but it is part of a long-term exit strategy, although there are many more things that must be done. Let me suggest that the ultimate goal — and therefore the ultimate exit strategy — must be accountable governance and stability, and the fact that international forces can leave without their departure triggering a return to the very things that caused the initial intervention. That is the sine qua non of a just and lasting peace. History shows this truth: peace processes in El Salvador, Bosnia, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa and Cambodia have all been successful, or partially successful, because they have steered toward democracy and accountability. But the critical result — apart from the fact that armed violence was de-legitimized and that political competition could continue — was that in those countries the wars were over. Those examples deserve to be registered as peacekeeping successes in a world that continually looks at the most difficult cases and tends prematurely to judge peacekeeping as hopelessly difficult. We reject that; we think peacekeeping is of vital importance to the world. The United Nations has an important role to play in peacekeeping, but not an exclusive one. These are examples of successes. A lack of desire for peace is not what sabotaged the peace processes in Angola and Sierra Leone. What sabotaged the peace in those troubled countries was Jonas Savimbi and Foday Sankoh. Therefore the United Nations role in Sierra Leone needs to be strengthened, not diminished. I think we should take another look at the tragedy in Angola. If we look at the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo we will again see that peace-making and ensuring accountability go hand-in-hand. At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first we are learning that peace and stability are inextricably linked to democracy and questions of tolerance and good governance. You cannot want peace if you are not prepared to accept democracy and accountability. I fully support the views of your Government, Mr. President, and those of our Dutch colleagues, that we should focus on getting the job done right rather than on getting out. Getting the job right is the primary responsibility of the Member States of the United Nations acting through a Secretariat that has the institutional capacity to help shape and implement our resolutions. I welcome our new Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, to the Council this morning. I say to him, and again to my colleagues, that the implementation of the Brahimi report, while not sufficient, is an essential next step in moving forward. I welcome the resolution that was passed earlier this week on that issue, and I hope that the United Nations, and other bodies within the United Nations, will act to give the new Under-Secretary- General the additional resources he needs to carry out his incredibly difficult and vital job. I feel, by the way — and I must say this quite frankly — that troop-contributing countries, some of whom are represented in our audience today, have not, in my view, been adequately consulted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the past. I do not believe they are adequately represented in the staff of the Department. I say here today that, as part of improving peacekeeping, I strongly urge that troop- contributing countries, which carry the burden and, increasingly, the human risks involved, have a stronger role in the consultative process and in the personnel structure of the Department. I cannot understand why major troop-contributing countries do not have any significant representation in the Department. As for my own country, I do not feel that we have much representation either, right now. Of 420 people in the Department, only one is an American. I hope that will also be corrected. I speak here on behalf of my many friends in the audience who have talked to me directly about this. I support them strongly. We are all aware that the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to plan, manage and backstop peacekeeping is severely inadequate. That is why we want the Brahimi report implemented to the maximum extent possible. Unless we move decisively on meaningful peacekeeping reform, those that threaten peacekeepers across the globe may draw the conclusion that the United Nations lacks the will, the cohesion and, even, the capability to perform its essential peacekeeping functions. Absent reform, those people who rely on the United Nations and look to us for hope in places like East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will suffer, as they have in the past. As we have said many times before, we need to make sure the resources the United Nations needs to conduct peacekeeping are in place as rapidly as possible. The military component of peacekeeping, while important, can only bring the stability necessary for the search for political solutions to political problems. Our job in the Council is to create the conditions necessary for that dialogue, to assist it and to remain in place to help build and rebuild shattered societies with more democratic institutions. The United Nations must provide countries and regions a chance for peace. During the Millennium Summit, President de La Rúa of Argentina found a word he thought would describe this doctrine. Speaking about the principle of non- interference, he said that there was an equally valid and countervailing principle, non-indifference. I do not know what the term is in Spanish. What is it? No indiferencia; it sounds much nicer in Spanish. But in either language it is a wonderful concept and I strongly endorse it. Non-indifference commands us to fix United Nations peacekeeping, to save it by giving our Blue Helmets the means they need to succeed. Those include a realistic exit strategy based on sustainable commitments to peace and accountable governance. In conclusion, let me again thank you, Mr. President, for giving us a chance to discuss this issue. I hope and pray that we will continue this discussion in private and that the underlying thoughts that bring us here together will also underlie the ongoing debate about implementation of the Brahimi recommendations so that they will assist our new Under-Secretary- General — who has our prayers, hopes and support — in his difficult task.

Mr. President, you have asked us today to give thought to the topic “No exit without strategy”. Your initiative is very welcome, and I thank you for it. It comes at a timely moment, timely because the United Nations is involved in an unprecedented exercise of introspection and of remaking peace operations in the wake of the very useful Brahimi report, and also because the Security Council has established some important, even decisive, operations — I am thinking of Kosovo and Timor in particular — and it must be able to terminate them without risking the future of the peoples concerned. The document prepared by the Netherlands delegation for our discussion studies three examples of peacekeeping operations. It describes the conditions, more or less successful, conditions for closure of the missions and examines the reasons for these results. In this spirit, I should like to make a few comments about the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). From the standpoint that is of concern to us today, we believe that some interesting lessons can be drawn from this operation. I should like to make five points. First, the management of this case was the most inclusive possible. Apart from the regular consideration by the Security Council, a Group of Friends was established consisting of members of the Security Council that were particularly interested, troop contributors, countries of the region and external donors. This made it possible to ensure that not only was there a good common understanding of the Mission’s objectives and conduct, but also that there was, as much as possible, coherence in the action of the international community beyond MINURCA itself. Secondly, the Group of Friends established a series of criteria, benchmarks to assess the Mission’s performance and, in particular, the effort made by the Central African Republic authorities to match the commitment of the international community. Even if these criteria were imperfectly met, they provided both a road map describing the objectives for durable stabilization of the situation, and a kind of tracking board making it possible to assess the results and adjust the operation’s duration and mandate. Thirdly, on this basis, the Security Council extended MINURCA’s mandate to ensure a safe environment for the holding of the general and presidential elections so that the country could have political institutions that enjoyed democratic legitimacy. Although this political condition was not sufficient, it was essential in order to deal with the other problems of the Central African Republic. Fourthly, the United Nations actions through MINURCA were not the only means by which the international community supported the Central African Republic’s recovery. At the same time, international financial institutions and donors were seeking to deal with the economic and financial aspects of the situation. Finally, when MINURCA ended last February the Secretary-General and the Security Council were careful to maintain a support office in the field to, inter alia, follow the implementation of reforms and to promote an integrated approach to the elaboration and implementation of post-conflict peace-building programmes. The Council continues to be informed of the office’s activities and of developments in the situation. I now wish to make some general comments. Having a strategy means, first, having a good understanding of the problem in all its dimensions and of the required substantive solutions. This is no easy task, particularly for the Security Council, for two reasons. The first is that a proper understanding of the situation requires knowledge of the underlying causes of conflicts and the interests and motives of the protagonists. But the Council is ill-equipped to understand — correctly and quickly enough — this dimension, and the Secretariat often does not have the means if it does not have a presence in the field. The second reason for lack of proper understanding is that usually the Security Council intervenes only when a conflict has begun and deals in particular with the phases of restoring peace and peacekeeping. However, without a clear understanding of the fundamental reasons for the conflict, there is a risk of only dealing with the symptoms and coming up with temporary solutions. The solutions to this shortcoming are not easy to find, but some elements can be pinpointed: developing a preventive approach; strengthening the Secretariat’s capacities for analysis and early warning, in the spirit of the recommendations of the Brahimi report; giving more attention to the underlying causes when the Council is seized with a conflict; and, as far as possible, making sure that the basic problems receive appropriate responses in the peacekeeping phase, and especially in the peace-building phase. My second comment is that a strategy must be based on clearly defined ultimate goals, which essentially must be the establishment of conditions — political, security and economic — for lasting peace. This is possible in many cases, but is not totally possible in others. One good example is the parallel between the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), charged with preparing and accompanying East Timor to independence, and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), charged with providing an interim administration while establishing transitional institutions for democratic self-administration in Kosovo. In each case the Security Council must to have a clear picture of what it can do and adapt its decisions accordingly. Thirdly, much depends on the local actors. If there is clearly broad compliance with the rules of the game, it is possible to define a strategy and to stick to it. This is what happened in Mozambique and in the Central African Republic, as I have just demonstrated. However, Somalia and Rwanda highlight the difficulty, or even the unfeasibility, of this job when there is not even a minimum consensus between the parties to the conflict. In this case, two opposite, and extreme, approaches are available to the Security Council. One is inaction or, if there is commitment on the ground, simple withdrawal. That happened in Somalia and Rwanda, and we know the political price that the United Nations paid in both. The other is enforcement action, which is what took place at a certain point in Haiti, Somalia and East Timor. This last option, however, presupposes maintaining a commitment for the duration. In East Timor, once comprehensive security was restored by the International Force in East Timor, the United Nations deployed a large-scale mission, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, charged with rebuilding the territory. This determination is being demonstrated today in Sierra Leone. This last point brings me to the fourth lesson that can be drawn from past experience. The implementation of a strategy means that the United Nations and its Member States must be prepared to mobilize the necessary means for as long as necessary. I have already said that despite the reservations expressed by various parties, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic was maintained beyond the initial deadline. Persistence is often a key element of success. This means that adequate resources should be available. Apart from the fact that we might be tempted to carry out peacekeeping operations on a very tight budget, post-conflict peace-building operations — I refer to the building of a state of law, economic reconstruction and restoring the social fabric — all depend basically on voluntary contributions. Even if it is not the Council’s job to respond, this question should be raised. Can there be continuity of effort in the context of an exit strategy with such discontinuity in the method of financing? Fifthly, continuity does not, however, mean inertia. To the contrary, the United Nations must be able to adapt to changes on the ground and hand over control at the right time. I will take just one example here: the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). UNTAES successfully carried out the peaceful transfer of state authority in Eastern Slavonia to Croatia. Mindful of the need to continue in a lighter and more specific way, the Security Council decided, upon the expiration of the UNTAES mandate, to establish for nine months a Civilian Police Support Group. The assessments at the end of that period recognized progress made without concealing reasons for dissatisfaction, even of concern. This is why the international community handed over control to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) police-monitoring programme. An OSCE mission is still in Croatia. This is an example of an exit strategy that is very gradual and in keeping with the complexity of the tasks to be carried out. But we should also think about this as an example of a successful transition between international organizations that have managed to establish good coordination between themselves. Sixthly and lastly, an exit strategy must include a set of complementary objectives and instruments seeking the same goal. There is no point in seeking to enforce a peace agreement if thought is not given to the fate of the combatants. Hence, the crucial importance of a demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programme for former combatants, which was one of the keys to the success of the United Nations Observer Mission in Mozambique and one of the reasons for the failure of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola. This brings me back to the first question I asked about the underlying motives of the parties to a conflict. Why do people take up arms? What can be done to prevent them from taking up arms again? Depending on the situation, real alternatives need to be offered in terms of jobs and resources, or effective power sharing should be guaranteed. The effort to restore peace and security could be futile unless we tackle what feeds conflicts: traffic in precious materials, which finances arms trafficking and could well be one of the main reasons for the conflict. The Council recently explored this dimension in several African conflicts and took action accordingly. These efforts should be continued and intensified. An upcoming resolution of the General Assembly will make it possible to deal with this aspect. At the end of this long statement — and I do apologize for its lengthiness — I am not going to draw specific conclusions because, Mr. President, you asked us all to draw conclusions jointly from this debate. But I thank you again for having taken the initiative of bringing us together on this important subject because the very image of the United Nations depends on our capacity to successfully manage exit strategies for peacekeeping operations, which our Council is mandated to lead to success.

It is a particular pleasure for me and my delegation to take part in what you, Mr. President, termed as the pièce de résistance of the Dutch presidency: this open debate on the item “No exit without strategy”. We thank you very much for introducing the debate on issues relating to the conclusion or termination of United Nations peacekeeping operations. When we plan to start anything well, we should also plan so that it ends well. The question of transition from peacekeeping to peace- building did not receive due attention in our deliberations in the context of reform of peace operations. Council resolution 1327 (2000) addresses issues relating to authorizing peacekeeping operations and defining their mandates. It does not cover strategies or parameters for significant change or the closing of an operation. You are right, Mr. President, to point out that the Brahimi report touches upon the matter only marginally. This is possibly because of the overriding consideration of the difficulties in mandating and deploying peacekeeping operations. The use of the term “exit”, which bears a negative connotation, is perhaps not exactly correct in this context. More appropriately, we are concerned here with the conclusion of peacekeeping operations and their transition to the post-conflict peace-building phase. We agree that peacekeeping missions should be supportive of a peace process that has a clear political objective. But the concerns over an exit strategy should not result in an argument of “no entry without strategy” or “no entry without an exit strategy”. The conclusion of a peacekeeping operation must be linked to achievement of the mission’s objectives. The parameters for the conclusion should include an objective assessment of a given situation in the medium- to long-term perspective. Such an assessment should take into consideration the political, military, humanitarian and human rights aspects and the regional dimension. But the achievement of the objectives set out in the initial mandate of a mission cannot be the only criterion for drastic changes, withdrawal or termination of a mission. A situation may seriously deteriorate when parties to a conflict renounce the peace agreement or resume all-out hostilities. In that case, the situation would require withholding deployment or partial or complete withdrawal, as the case may be. But let us focus on the more usual cases of transition from peacekeeping to peace-building. The Council decision on the conclusion of peacekeeping operations in general follows a pattern: assist implementation of the ceasefire agreement through monitoring the ceasefire, assisting in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, assisting humanitarian assistance and supervising the electoral process. The withdrawal is decided, on the basis of the Secretary-General’s report, following elections. Three case studies have been presented in the background paper by the presidency: Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. Mozambique represents a success story, but much of the success is attributed not to the United Nations doing it right, but to a great extent to chances and coincidences. Liberia has emerged as a case of an unaccomplished or half-accomplished mission, although it followed the usual process of termination. Two fundamental weaknesses are pointed out. The first was the failure to provide sufficient assurances to the Liberians to vote freely; the second was the failure to address the regional dimension of the Liberian conflict. The Liberians voted for Charles Taylor, it is argued, out of fear that, if not elected, Taylor would unleash a reign of terror. Given the experience of Sierra Leoneans having their hands chopped off by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) elements, such fear cannot be ruled out. The question remains as to what else or what more — the Council should or could have done. Addressing the regional dimension, questions remain about the possibilities of Council action beyond the imposition of the arms embargo. In the case of Haiti, the United Nations peacekeeping operation appears to have left with a mission half-accomplished. The Council decision, it is implied, was not based on an objective assessment of the situation. We are struck by the conclusion in paragraph 13 of document S/2000/1072 that “some key Council members pursued objectives in their own perceived national interests at the expense of making firmer commitments to resolve the Haitian conflict.” This raises a very interesting area of debate: harmonizing the objective of peacekeeping with the perceived national interests of Security Council members. The contrary situation — that is, compromising national interests for the sake of the objectives of peacekeeping mandates — would be an idealistic proposition. The debate might sound philosophical, but it is worth engaging in if we seriously mean to do peacekeeping right. The maintenance of international peace and security is a continuous process. Peacekeeping is one of the phases in the continuum that may also include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace-building. The continuity must be maintained through appropriate and timely transition. The smooth transition that we are seeking will require closer coordination between the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations — the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council — as well as the relevant funds and programmes. The role of the Bretton Woods institutions, of course, remains critically important. To that end, we propose setting up an institutional mechanism of consultation among all relevant actors for elaborating such a comprehensive transition strategy. There are other extremely important actors that share the peace and security mission of the United Nations. I am speaking of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Both humanitarian and developmental NGOs are there long before United Nations peacekeepers arrive, and they remain there long after peacekeepers leave. They share a significant part of the peacekeeping and peace-building job. The Security Council should recognize their role and contribution. The Council would do justice to its own responsibility by setting up an institutional mechanism for cooperation and coordination with the NGOs. Such a mechanism will help the Council avoid many of the mistakes of the past. In deciding on the conclusion of a peacekeeping operation, it would be extremely useful to keep the experience of past peacekeeping operations in view. It will be difficult to define general parameters for ending peacekeeping operations. Each situation being unique and having specific problems, Council decisions will, of course, have to be based on evolving realities and considerations. However, an objective assessment and some advance planning would certainly be helpful in taking the right decision at the right time. We shall continue to pursue this common objective.

I should like at the outset to express our appreciation to your delegation, Mr. President, for taking this initiative to debate the issue “No exit without strategy”. This reflects the strength of your commitment to a more effective Security Council, an objective for which the Netherlands has worked tirelessly and effectively during the period of its membership in this body. (spoke in English) Our debate is tackling a very important issue — ensuring that the ultimate goal of any peacekeeping mission is to strengthen the prospects for sustainable peace and decrease the likelihood of the resumption of violent conflict. Canada believes that in order to achieve this goal, our focus must encompass the political and socio-economic context of conflict, including aspects of the rule of law and the human rights situation, rather than solely the military and humanitarian aspects. This means building on traditional concepts of peacekeeping and working towards a broader and more integrated view of peace support. In this respect, we encourage the Security Council to include long-term peace-building strategies when planning missions and drafting their mandates. The long-term, peaceful resolution of conflict requires a collaborative and inclusive approach with other United Nations bodies, international organizations, including the international financial institutions, responsible non-governmental organizations and Member States. Canada has always maintained that elements of peace-building should be integrated into the mandate of a peacekeeping or peace mission from the very beginning. We remain fully engaged in international efforts to conduct peacekeeping operations that integrate military peacekeeping, civilian police and human rights components with humanitarian aid and the development aspects of peace-building. In this respect, we will continue to promote an enhanced capacity of the United Nations to respond to crises rapidly, effectively and in an integrated manner. We have also stressed — as does your paper, Mr. President — the need for peacekeeping mandates to be shaped by requirements on the ground, including long- term conflict resolution, and not by short-term, distant, outside political or financial considerations. Mandates must be matched by the necessary resources. Recent experiences of peacekeeping have taught us that an excessive focus on keeping costs down, while cheaper in the short run, is more costly later on if missions fail to achieve their objectives. The Council must have the staying power to ensure that the international community’s investments in peace are not lost because of short-sighted political expediency. That goes to the heart of the title of this subject, “No exit without strategy”. At the same time, the Council must also be judicious in deciding where to make those investments in peace. Put another way, in the words of Ambassador Chowdhury, there should be no entry without strategy, either. A key consideration in this regard, and one which you, Mr. President, pointed out in the very useful paper you prepared to frame today’s discussion, is the attitude of the parties on the ground, in particular their disposition towards peace. If there is no peace agreement, or if military options continue to be pursued in spite of one, the Council should think twice before agreeing to deploy in the first place. Attempts to import solutions from outside will go only so far if the will to pursue peace is not shared within the societies or regions in question. We will need to reflect on this fact as we consider, for example, the renewal next month of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The pursuit of peace in a country torn by internal conflict poses special and complex challenges. One of the lessons we are learning in the pursuit of sustainable and durable peace in countries emerging from conflict is that we need to ensure that there is an indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence. Peacekeeping is a key instrument in building human security, a concept that aims to protect the security of people and puts people first. Against this background, we fully support the Brahimi Panel’s recommendations aimed at enhancing the Council’s ability to address the root causes of conflict as the greatest deterrent to violent conflict. Moreover, in a world where crises evolve quickly, the need for integrated planning of a multidisciplinary core mission is crucial from the very outset. This includes all relevant players such as the military, civilian police, international humanitarian and human rights agencies, and other civilian experts. Like France, in this respect we welcome the Brahimi report’s recommendation to enhance the Secretariat’s early- warning capabilities linked to information gathering and analysis in the establishment of an information and strategic analysis secretariat. We also welcome the recommendation to create integrated mission task forces to improve the United Nations support and planning capacities, which will enable the Council to plan better for the long term. I should like to say a word about troop- contributing countries. This is an area in which, I think, we have come some way, but we still have a considerable distance to travel. I would draw people’s attention, particularly those who are not members of the Council, to resolution 1327 (2000), adopted by the Security Council a few days ago, on the Council’s response to the Brahimi report, and in particular to the fact that part I of its annex underlines “the importance of an improved system of consultations among the troop-contributing countries, the Secretary-General and the Security Council, in order to foster a common understanding of the situation on the ground, of the mission’s mandate and of its implementation”. The resolution also states that the Security Council “Agrees, in this regard, to strengthen significantly the existing system of consultations” and so on. The importance of working with the troop- contributing countries can hardly be exaggerated. Political and military guidance must be given to the forces in the field so that they know what is expected of them and have a common understanding of it; so they know what they are there to do and so that we know what they are doing; and so that the troop- contributing countries are not off in another corner somewhere, in another room, while the Council is trying to make decisions that have such a direct bearing on the well-being of the troops and, ultimately, on the success of the mission. I think that this is an area on which the Security Council will be concentrating in the coming months, and I think also that it is one whose importance can scarcely be exaggerated. We also welcome the Secretary-General’s decision to formulate a plan on strengthening the United Nations capacity for peace-building strategies. We look forward to his report on conflict prevention, due this spring, and trust that it will include practical suggestions, for both States and the United Nations family more generally, to develop practical and pragmatic strategies. Canada has been active in finding ways to strengthen peace-building initiatives. In 1996 we launched our own peace-building initiative and programme, aimed at assisting countries in conflict to deal with their differences and to manage their own conflicts peacefully. This programme also promotes and underwrites our ability to participate in international peace-building initiatives. Such initiatives include activities such as enhancing demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; supporting national and community-based small arms reduction and disposal efforts; addressing the protection, welfare and rights of war-affected children; promoting reconciliation between populations, including displaced populations; and factoring the gender dimension into development assistance, and particularly into conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Canada would be pleased to lend its support to the United Nations in the development of a new framework for the management of contemporary conflict to help build a more peaceful world. We support existing efforts to sustain United Nations peacekeeping interventions, in particular follow-on United Nations peace-building offices and missions in places such as Liberia, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Haiti. These initiatives, while not perfect, help to sustain our investments in peace, and they help to demonstrate the continuing commitment of the international community, and the continuing interest of the international community, in building peace in those countries. (spoke in French) Effective international action to support peace- building requires coordination at the international level between various types of actors, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, peacekeeping forces, civilian experts, and, above all, the affected populations themselves. I should like, finally, to stress that it is vital for external peace-building assistance to support, while endeavouring not to replace, local initiatives designed to bring about lasting peace.

I should like to thank you most particularly, Mr. President, for having chosen the topic of today’s open debate. This shows the importance that you and your country have always attached to matters related to peacekeeping operations throughout the consideration of this issue in the Council. We believe also that this debate is very timely. While the requirements for establishing a peacekeeping operation have undergone analysis in terms of doctrine and have been underwritten by over five decades of practice in this Organization, the exit strategy for any peacekeeping operation has thus far been less explored. We believe, nonetheless, that the exit strategy of an operation is just as important a matter as its establishment, because both of them equally affect the success of the operation. The decision to put an end to an operation is more complex than it appears in principle. We believe that there are two reasons for this. First, the exit strategy must not be necessarily determined by pre-established timetables but rather by the objectives to be attained, and the latter vary according to the nature of the conflict. Secondly, the objectives may have been only partially attained. In that case, the Security Council would have to evaluate carefully the relationship between the human and financial cost of maintaining any operation and the political consequences of the pullout of such a mission for the States directly involved, as well as for the stability of the region concerned. In a conventional armed conflict between States, such as, for instance, one involving a territorial or border dispute, the objectives are better defined: compliance with the ceasefire by the parties or patrolling a border. In those cases, the exit strategy would appear to be more foreseeable and easier to define. In practice, however, it may happen that while no significant ceasefire violations are recorded, the conflict remains latent. Here the rationale for keeping the operation intact would be stabilization or deterrence, to prevent the conflict from breaking out anew. The problem we see with this scenario is that in the long run, the stabilization function could lead to a syndrome in which the parties become dependent on the peacekeeping operation, thereby making it more difficult for the Security Council to take the decision to put an end to it. With respect to the multidimensional peacekeeping operations created after the end of the cold war to deal with conflicts of a fundamentally intra-State nature, the difficulties are greater still. These operations include military, political, human rights, civil police and judiciary components. Their objectives are much broader given their very nature, and as a result it is more difficult to evaluate their performance. They run from truce supervision to the building of institutions and the providing of public services. As a result of the difficulty of determining a priori when these goals have been met, it would be necessary to carry out periodic evaluation with an integrated approach to be able to progressively gauge performance. In this sense, the Secretary-General’s reports, the missions of the Security Council and interaction with other agencies of the United Nations system constitute important tools. In multidimensional operations, even more so than in the conventional ones, the exit strategy is directly related to the entry strategy. While the mandate and plan of operations for a mission are being planned, the objectives must be evaluated realistically and in the light of the political, social and cultural circumstances surrounding the conflict and in the light of the human and financial resources available. There must also be, above all, a political will to attain the objectives set. Keeping that will alive throughout any operation is one of the major challenges with which the Security Council and the Secretariat must grapple. In our opinion, in most of the operations since the end of the cold war, the departure of a peacekeeping operation cannot be separated from peace-building activities. The humanitarian, institutional and economic consequences of most of the current conflicts have taught us that bringing about lasting peace and reconciliation requires far more than a ceasefire. We have to also create the conditions necessary for sustainable development within democracy. That is why it appears to us that any formalistic concept that would give priority to the legal end of a conflict may prejudice the essential goal of peace-building activities. Without prejudice to the factors specific to each conflict, it is appropriate to give thought to peace- building activities before the conflict is formally concluded, so as to achieve a transition from peacekeeping to peace-building activities. The existence of 15 peacekeeping operations — some of whose mandates have been renewed over the decades, others that have only partially attained their goals and yet others that constitute United Nations transitional administrations — shows the magnitude of the challenge facing the Security Council. To meet this challenge successfully, we must have the political will of the parties to overcome the root causes behind any conflict and to identify fully with the objectives of rebuilding. We must also have the political will of the Security Council to support these operations on the path to peace and reconciliation. With this same determination, the Council will have to point out to the parties that peacekeeping operations are an instrument needed to attain these specific goals and must not be turned into an excuse for permanently putting off resolving their own differences. The reasons that I have given, the ones stated by other delegations and those you expressed at the beginning of this meeting, Mr. President, illustrate the importance of thinking about and enacting exit strategies for peacekeeping operations. They also attest to the timeliness and importance of this debate.

At the outset, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your initiative to organize a debate on the thematic agenda item, “No exit without strategy”. We are also grateful to your delegation for the background paper, which provides a sound basis for today’s discussion. The topic of our discussion today relates to some of the most sensitive and difficult aspects of the work of the Security Council and of the United Nations system as a whole. Furthermore, it is important and useful for the Council to hear the views of the larger membership on this issue. When the United Nations was conceived 55 years ago, this Organization was intended to deal with inter- State warfare. Today, the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, are being required to deal with and respond urgently and swiftly to intra- State instability and conflicts. In these armed and bloody conflicts, the destruction is not just of soldiers but also of the innocent and vulnerable populations. Preventing such wars is now a matter of defending humanity itself. The Security Council has, since the last decade of the last century, actively been seized with humanitarian aspects of conflicts, such as the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, and children and armed conflict. It is unfortunate that it still continues to be seized with these complex and difficult intra-State conflicts in this new century. The new dimension of armed conflicts, namely humanitarian catastrophe involving the exodus of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, requires the urgent and ceaseless attention of the Security Council and swift action aimed at resolution. Finding solutions to these armed conflicts is not an easy task for the Council, as the root causes of these brutal conflicts are multidimensional in nature — causes such as political ambition and greed and the continuing and devastating problems of extreme poverty, crippling debt burdens and oppression. Ending and ensuring the end of such military conflicts represents a major challenge in the maintenance of international peace and security today. The complexity and fragility of this process often requires the assistance of the international community. As recognized by the Security Council in its statements relating to this subject (S/PRST/1999/21 and S/PRST/1999/28), an impartial United Nations peacekeeping operation could play an essential role by discharging a number of key tasks and by helping to create an environment for a post-conflict peace- building operation to be carried out. Peacekeeping is one of the instruments available at the disposal of this Council. The number and intensity of armed conflicts require a comprehensive response to the complex and intractable problems of these conflicts. We believe that peacekeeping can maintain peace in the most challenging environment when it is deployed with a clear, credible and achievable mandate and with a deterrent capacity, equipped with the necessary wherewithal. Above all, it has to be backed by a sustained political will by all the parties to the armed conflict, regional actors and the international community. To begin with, it is imperative that the parties to prospective peace agreements, including regional and subregional organizations and arrangements, engage the United Nations from an early stage in negotiations. This is to ensure that any provisions for peacekeeping operations meet minimum conditions, including the need for a clear political objective, the practicability of the designated tasks and timelines and the rules of engagement in accordance with the principles of international law. This Council, for its part, must ensure that the mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations are appropriate to the situation on the ground, including such factors as the prospects for success and the potential need to protect civilians. My delegation firmly believes that beyond the deployment of peacekeeping missions in existing conflict situations, there is a need for the Council and the United Nations as a whole to develop appropriate strategies for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building to consolidate and sustain peace in the conflict area. As many of today’s armed conflicts are multidimensional in nature, peace operations must seek not only to bring stability to areas of conflict, but also to address the root causes of conflict. This means tackling a wide variety of needs, ranging from the political to the social and the economic. In many conflict situations, the processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and national reconciliation are at the heart of these efforts. In this regard, there is the need for more effective coordination of the DDR programmes and for adequate and timely funding for these programmes, which are vital to the success of peace processes. We endorse the efforts by the Secretary-General to formulate a plan to strengthen of the United Nations capacity to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of them. We look forward to the recommendations of the Secretary- General on the basis of this plan. We also welcome the Secretary-General’s intention to spell out more clearly future concepts of operations, including ways to help strengthen local rule of law and human rights institutions. There can be no viable peace in a country if national reconciliation among the parties does not take place and if those responsible for war crimes are not put on trial. This Council has to be actively engaged in all of these efforts and must lend its full support to the promotion of sustainable development and a healthy democratic society based on the rule of law, good governance and democratic institutions. As part of the overall strategy for peace operations, my delegation believes that the current dispatching of Council missions, with the consent of host countries, to the conflict areas is a useful means of reviewing the implementation of Security Council resolutions. At the regional level, the Security Council must acknowledge and support the roles played by regional and subregional organizations in establishing appropriate mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of armed conflicts. The Council must regard these organizations as security partners in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is imperative, therefore, that the Council strengthen its cooperation with these regional and subregional organizations. We believe this is essential to the success of peace operations. The Security Council cannot act alone. Other relevant bodies of this Organization, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations could also play their part so as to allow for a smooth transition from one type of peace operation to another — from peacekeeping to post- conflict peace-building. It is imperative, therefore, that the Council work closely with those bodies to ensure better cooperation and coordination in order to achieve effective results on the ground. There is no paucity of analysis of the sources of armed conflicts and the reasons why they persist. The Secretary-General, various panels of experts and Security Council debates have produced reports that contain clear, candid analyses of the sources of conflicts and recommend actions and goals that are both realistic and achievable — actions and goals to reduce conflict and, in time, to help build a strong and durable peace. Just two days ago, the Council adopted resolution 1327 (2000), which contains the decisions and recommendations of the Council in response to the Brahimi report. We have to ensure that those decisions and recommendations are translated into action. This Council has an important responsibility that it must face. Member States of the United Nations have conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in order to ensure prompt and effective action. It is appropriate that the Council adopt effective strategies to prevent, contain and put an end to armed conflicts, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. The United Nations has had several success stories in peace operations — Namibia and Cambodia, to name a few. We see no reason why they cannot be repeated.

First, I wish to thank you, Sir, for having arranged this open debate. I want to make a few brief points. First, the issue of an exit strategy mainly concerns the connection between a peacekeeping operation and post- conflict reconstruction and the transition from one to the other. An exit strategy has a direct bearing on whether a peacekeeping operation is able to fulfil its mission successfully. In recent years the United Nations has established peace-building support offices in some countries, so as to continue to provide help to the countries concerned in their efforts to consolidate peace and for their post- war reconstruction efforts after the termination of relevant peacekeeping operations. However, on the whole, the formulation of practical and operational exit strategies will require more experience on the part of the United Nations in peacekeeping. Secondly, the formulation of an exit strategy and whether this strategy can be implemented depend to a large degree on whether a realistic and practical plan can be formulated when deciding on a peacekeeping operation. This includes an accurate analysis of the situation in the country or region where the peacekeeping operation is to be deployed, an assessment of various possible factors that might disturb or interrupt the peace process and of the corresponding coping strategies, an explicit goal for the peacekeeping operation and a guarantee that the resources required to achieve this goal are available. Thirdly, United Nations peacekeeping operations should from the beginning be aimed at supporting the peacekeeping capabilities of the countries concerned. Fundamentally speaking, the affairs of a country should ultimately be handled by that country’s own people and Government, and the international community can only play a promoting and facilitating role. In the process of assisting a given country, the United Nations should take care to respect the views and opinions of that country. We cannot envision letting the United Nations reform a given country in accordance with a pre-established model or letting the organization impose a pre-established model on a given country. Such a practice would give rise to a great deal of difficulties and problems and would even harm the credibility and image of the United Nations. It is therefore something that an exit strategy should avoid by all means. Fourthly, the United Nations should enhance its coordination and collaboration with regional organizations and truly allow the regional organizations to play their role. It should also strengthen coordination and cooperation among the relevant United Nations system entities, such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. This is also very important for exit strategies.

In the view of the Russian delegation, the topic for today’s discussion, while in and of itself very important, should be considered in conjunction with other equally important tasks relating to improving the peacekeeping potential of the United Nations. Of particular importance is acting on the understanding achieved at the Millennium Summit to the effect that effective international peacekeeping under the aegis of the United Nations, carried out in keeping with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of the Security Council, is one of the key factors for guaranteeing global strategic stability. It is of crucial importance that the Millennium Summit reaffirmed the commitment of members of the Council to strengthen the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that the Summit took note of the need for strict compliance with its authority in this area. The Charter provision that the Security Council alone is entitled to authorize such an extreme measure as the use of force in a crisis situation remains crucial. Improving United Nations peacekeeping, including the definition of an exit strategy for peacekeeping operations, requires first and foremost the clear formulation and strict fulfilment of Security Council mandates and timetables for the conduct of peacekeeping operations, as well as adherence in practice to the basic principles of peacekeeping. These principles include the necessity that there be a real threat to international security and consent of the parties and that the peacekeepers be neutral and impartial. So that peacekeeping operations conclude successfully, a United Nations rapid-deployment capacity must be developed, and the effectiveness of the planning must be enhanced and the technical and financial resources of operations must be ensured. In this connection it is important to strengthen the relevant Secretariat units, including making full use of the capacity of Military Staff Committee as an important source of military expertise both for preparing for the possible deployment of an operation and for wrapping one up. We support the useful initiatives to enhance the practical results of United Nations peacekeeping activities, in particular the recommendations of the Brahimi report. We think that the outcome of their consideration within the United Nations should be to agree on concrete measures capable of increasing the anti-crisis potential of the Organization on the basis of the consent of Member States. Peacekeeping operations, of course, are not an end in themselves; but they are one very important instrument for bringing about the ultimate goal, which is a political resolution to a conflict, primarily by creating favourable conditions for the successful activities of international mediators and for encouraging dialogue among the parties to the conflict themselves. In this context, there is no doubt that there is a need to design a well-thought-out strategy for the conduct and termination of specific peacekeeping operations. The importance of this is relevant from the standpoint of ensuring the smoothest possible shift from conflict to normality; reducing the likelihood of the eruption of a new wave of violence and ensuring the transition to a long-term and just settlement. We think that a guarantee for attaining these goals should be the main criterion in carrying out the tasks outlined by the Security Council when setting up peacekeeping operations, and should be a condition for exiting from a peacekeeping operation. One important factor for establishing and terminating a peacekeeping operation is the material resources of the United Nations. Unfortunately, the peacekeeping resources of the Organization are not limitless, and they must be apportioned in the best possible way, in a manner commensurate with the real danger posed by a given conflict to regional and global stability. As the Council knows, given the recent surge in demand for United Nations peacekeeping, the United Nations peacekeeping budget has grown increasingly tight. A comprehensive approach to modern-day peacekeeping means that there must be a smooth transition from one phase to the next. Of great importance here is the political support provided by the Security Council to peacemaking efforts, which must be carried out through the appropriate bodies of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. We believe that most of the economic aspects of conflicts should be handled by the competent offices in the United Nations system. Security Council involvement in this process, including through the use of peacekeeping operations, has its limits, and it should take place on an ad hoc basis if there is still a real threat to international or regional peace and security. The peacekeeping efforts of the Security Council have extinguished major regional conflagrations in Cambodia, Mozambique and Central America. The most recent example of such positive efforts was the settlement achieved in Tajikistan. Russia, as a member of the Security Council, continues to make its contribution to the United Nations efforts to prevent and settle crises. We are participating in 10 of the 15 United Nations peacekeeping operations, providing military police, political and civilian personnel and logistical support. We reaffirm our willingness to fully support United Nations peacekeeping activities, which seek to achieve final results and guarantee a dignified exit.

First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having proposed the theme “No exit without strategy” for discussion today. The participation of States non-members of the Council is likely to enhance this debate. The consideration of this issue comes in the context of a major debate unfolding within the United Nations following the issuance of the Brahimi report. That report, based on lessons drawn from past experience, serves as a point of reference in the search for ways to strengthen the capability of the United Nations in the realm of peacekeeping operations. Just two days ago, the Security Council adopted resolution 1327 (2000), annexed to which is an important document that is the product of in-depth consideration within the Council, and it is this body’s contribution to collective efforts in this realm. One of the major issues that arises is that of finding out whether emphasis should be placed on an exit strategy for a peacekeeping operation as an end in itself or whether priority should be given to a long- term solution to any given conflict. Obviously, the Security Council’s major goal must be to achieve peace and stability on solid underpinnings that guarantee the sustainability of that peace and prevent the renewed outbreak of a conflict. This shows just how important it is to have the conditions for a successful operation in place right from the very first planning phases to the implementation phase and to the exit phase. In fact, successful exit must cap a process supported by all the actors concerned, starting from the very conception of an operation. First, we would like to reaffirm the importance we attach to rigorous respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter on the part of peacekeeping operations, for the sake of the legitimacy of such operations. In our view, the following elements might constitute the parameters for an approach designed to ensure the success of a United Nations commitment. First of all, in cases where the parties envisage calling on the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping operation, it would be appropriate for the United Nations to give its assistance to the parties during peace negotiations. The point is certainly to help the parties to work out the best possible peace agreement and to prepare for the operation being envisaged. It is also important for the Security Council to persevere in its commitment to a mission until its end. Such a commitment should not be affected by the complexity of a given conflict or difficulties that crop up along the way, so long as the parties show that they are committed to peace. They must prove this through deeds and keep intact their commitment to a peaceful settlement. Moreover, it is important to endow peacekeeping operations with a clear-cut and realistic mandate and objective, while ensuring that they have the resources they need for their swift and effective deployment. The Council must have information that is as complete and precise as possible in order to allow it to evaluate the situation and to take the appropriate decisions regarding the evolution of a given operation, including possible adjustments to the mandate if necessary. The troop-contributing countries play an essential role in the implementation on the ground of peacekeeping operation mandates decided upon by the Security Council. Close and meaningful consultations are likely to raise the chances for success of these operations. The Council has already agreed to strengthen the machinery in place for consultations between the Council and the troop-contributing countries. We welcome that decision; it is a step in the right direction. Before disengaging from a mission, the United Nations must see to it that the objective it has set has been attained. If we are talking about a conflict between States, the Organization must make sure that the causes of the conflict and the tensions it fuels have disappeared, and that the conditions for peace and stability, and thus for the foundations of normal relations among the States involved, have been established. To consolidate these gains, the Council could encourage confidence-building measures. In the case of a domestic conflict, it would be appropriate to adopt an across-the-board strategy designed to consolidate the underpinnings of peace and stability and to make them last. To sum up, we must deal with the root causes of a conflict to prevent its resurgence. We feel that a sustained commitment must be brought to bear in dealing with the root causes of conflicts in the light of the specificity of each situation. This requires a comprehensive and coordinated approach to which the United Nations bodies will contribute, in accordance with their own competencies and it must be supported by the parties concerned. Populations should have the opportunity to enjoy the dividends of peace and to experience their tangible benefits in their daily lives. It is true that post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building cannot succeed without the support of society, to the full development of which contribute such important and varied factors as the building of a State of law and the promotion of human rights in their broadest sense, including political, economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development. We are convinced that peace and development are intimately linked. Thus, a more sustained commitment of the international community to reducing poverty throughout the world and to promoting sustainable development is both a step towards conflict prevention and a contribution to peace-building. In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm that the success of United Nations involvement requires the adoption of a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated strategy whose guidelines and objectives are clear and which ensures an orderly and harmonious management of the various phases of a peacekeeping operation, from its conception to the completion of its implementation.

You hail, Sir, from a country with a long and outstanding record of contribution to United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building activities. It is therefore no surprise to my delegation that your presidency saw fit to arrange a public meeting on a theme of such importance. Let me also thank you for the background paper prepared by your delegation on the theme “No exit without strategy”. This debate comes at a time when we in the United Nations are deliberating on the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The Brahimi report, among others, though not explicitly, addresses aspects of the theme we are discussing today. The paper you have distributed as background to today’s discussion not only deals with real situations by way of drawing conclusions from case studies, but, in a very courageous manner, actually touches upon core issues which the Security Council, either through individual members or collectively as an organ of the United Nations, needs to consider. It is some of these issues that my delegation will seek to address briefly. At the outset, I wish to emphasize that the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security is indispensable. An exit with a strategy is not tantamount to an easy way out, nor should it be an abdication of the Council’s primary responsibility. We view the objective of this theme as a way of establishing a continuum of peacekeeping to peace-building — two sides of the same coin. We are therefore convinced that this theme is not about getting out, but about getting it right. Post-cold-war United Nations peacekeeping is characterized by successes and failures on the part of the United Nations. In some instances, the United Nations has either withdrawn prematurely or reduced its presence, only to have the situation revert to violence and descend into subsequent human tragedy. Thus, in the view of my delegation, the imbalanced handling and management of present conflicts is indeed a concern. Some conflicts are left to drag on, breaking down state institutions, destroying physical infrastructure and resulting in population displacements, while other conflict situations are addressed rapidly and with massive resources. The case studies provided enable us to draw lessons from our past undertakings. In our view, it is the Charter obligation of collective security, not national interests, that should dictate and guide United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates. It has been argued that, in setting out mandates for peacekeeping, we must plan for worst-case scenarios, and we agree. In other words, this is a recognition of inherent difficulties in peace operations. We also concur, therefore, that when appropriate resources accompany every peacekeeping operation, irrespective of its geographical location, then the eventual difficulties are minimized and the foundation, from peacekeeping to peace-building, is assured. Major conflicts today, especially in Africa, are economically driven. Conflict diamonds and other natural resources are cases in point. What is needed, therefore, is adherence by the international community to the diamond embargoes in place with regard to Sierra Leone and Angola, to cite just two examples. Furthermore, the awaited report by the Secretary- General on the illegal exploitation of the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be an added progressive step. I mentioned at the beginning of my statement that today’s discussions should not lay ground for the selective termination of mandates and the abandonment of missions because of a lack of progress, fatigue or even fear. In the view of my delegation, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) should continue. The problems being experienced with regard to MONUC’s full deployment can be overcome if the Security Council examines them in the context of its Charter responsibility and not in terms of individual Council members’ national interests. Objectivity, and not selectivity, is a real challenge which the Security Council has to overcome, especially in terms of conflict situations in Africa. With regard to case studies, in the case study of Mozambique, for example — whose findings my delegation fully agrees with — it should be emphasized that, in addition to what is entailed in the background paper which you, Mr. President, made available to us, the regional context of the conflict situation at the time needed to be taken into account. In 1992, there were countries surrounding Mozambique which themselves were fairly politically stable. The same cannot be said today about the Democratic Republic of the Congo or even Sierra Leone. It therefore follows that a successful United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone or MONUC also depends on peace and stability in the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the case of Namibia, my country, while there was political will among the parties, the events of 1 April 1989 could have derailed the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). It was a fatal and dangerous situation, but the Security Council took the right decision by deploying the United Nations Transition Assistance Group fully. That deployment was crucial, for it meant either independence for Namibia or the continuation of apartheid rule. The poorest countries cannot emerge from conflict without generous aid from the international community, especially from donor countries, in laying the foundations for durable peace and recovery and in avoiding a relapse into conflict. Past experience has shown that peace-building is an important, integral part of peace operations. It is essential that institution-building be a part of peace- building operations. Each peacekeeping operation or mandate should take into account the level of socio- economic development of the country in question. Recent experience has shown also that Security Council missions to conflict areas have enabled Council members to see first-hand the nature and the extent of problems. We strongly recommend that the Security Council continue to carry out such visits to assess the situation on the ground and to establish whether conditions are ripe for peacekeeping and peace-building. United Nations peacekeeping has had some failures and many successes. It is on those successes that we must build.

It is important for the Security Council to be examining this issue at this time, just two days after adopting a comprehensive new approach to peacekeeping operations. The decisions and recommendations approved by the Council in resolution 1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000, were an important first step in improving the capacity of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council’s approach to peacekeeping operations must now be guided by those concepts, and must be evaluated in terms of how well we implement them. We must ask ourselves why it is necessary to discuss this issue. Why should the Council be concerned about an exit strategy when considering the establishment of peacekeeping operations? The answer clearly lies in the lessons of the past. Had the record of the Security Council, and the United Nations as a whole, been irreproachable, then there might not have been a need for the Brahimi Panel. Among the conclusions reached by the Brahimi Panel was that “In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peace-builders work to make that environment self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peace-builders inseparable partners.” (S/2000/809, pp. viii-ix) That conclusion was reached by a Panel described by the Secretary-General as composed of individuals experienced in the fields of peacekeeping, peace- building, development and human assistance. Their conclusions should be taken seriously. The paper you provided, Mr. President, on the theme “No exit without strategy”, points to a number of cases in which the Security Council has terminated a peacekeeping operation prematurely. The result has often been a return to conflict situations worse than those that triggered Council action in the first place. The evidence abounds in support of this conclusion, and need not be repeated here. We must now, therefore, turn our attention to solutions, which will avoid a repeat of our past mistakes. Our exit strategy must be guided by a number of considerations, including the following: the stability of the region as a whole; the effect of the conflict on neighbouring States, as well as the effect other external factors could have on the particular situation following the termination of a United Nations peacekeeping operation; the dangers posed to a sustainable and lasting peace by internal factors, such as debilitating poverty and underdevelopment; and other root causes of conflict that could foster a recurrence of the conflict situation. I now turn to some of the elements for developing an exit strategy that my delegation believes may serve as a way forward. Many are found in the decisions and recommendations annexed to resolution 1327 (2000), which provide a new set of principles to guide the Security Council in the way in which it creates new peacekeeping mandates to secure lasting peace. First, the Security Council must seek to ensure that peace agreements that require United Nations involvement in peacekeeping provide for a clear political objective; that they meet minimum conditions for United Nations peacekeeping operations; and that such agreements incorporate practical designated tasks and timelines for implementation and criteria for final disengagement. Secondly, the Security Council must clearly define each peacekeeping mandate, whether new or renewed, by ensuring that it is credible in relation to the conditions on the ground and that it is achievable, taking into account the lessons of the past. For this to be achieved, the Security Council must be guided by the best available accurate, timely and comprehensive information and analysis. Thirdly, the Security Council must incorporate at the very outset, or as soon as practicable, on the basis of the exigencies of the situation, peace-building measures as an integral part of the planning in the conceptual stages of peace operations. This requires a partnership with the Secretariat in developing a doctrine of peace-building strategies and programmes in an integrated and comprehensive approach to conflict situations. These important steps in the process of developing an exit strategy are aimed at significantly reducing, if not eliminating, the possibility of a peacekeeping operation leaving behind a situation that threatens to revert to serious conflict. If we exercise the political will to implement our own decisions, we will begin to achieve in the next decade what we have failed to achieve in the last one: ensuring peace and security for the generations to come.

Allow me, first, to express my delegation’s thanks to you, Mr. President, for your initiative in organizing this substantive debate on a crucial question of the organization of peacekeeping operations and Council decisions regarding the scaling back or ending of a mission. My delegation welcomes this opportunity to recall that it is to the Security Council that Member States have entrusted the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We know that the Council has often done a good job. We know the success stories which give us reason to have hope in the United Nations. However, let us not forget the failures, with their human, political and economic costs. My delegation welcomes the Brahimi report on peace operations, and this discussion on ways to strengthen the capacity of our common institution to organize and carry out operations effectively and successfully. We support the recommendations in the report, because they will make it possible to respond better to current and future threats. My delegation shares the concerns forcefully stressed by your delegation in your working paper, Mr. President. In many ways, the paper is a useful continuation of the fundamental debate on reform begun by the Brahimi report. We agree that we need to find the right strategy, but we believe that such a strategy should never result in major risks for the future of the peoples concerned. The conditions for exit must be part of any decision we make from the start. That said, we do not favour exit deadlines, and we call for strengthening the role of the United Nations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, rather than reducing or simply withdrawing the operations there. Like some previous speakers, we believe that any exit strategy should be based on well-defined objectives, to achieve which we must develop a preventive approach, strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity for analysis and early warning, give greater attention to the real causes of conflict, and ensure that the root problems are appropriately addressed, particularly during the peacekeeping and peace- building stages. A critical examination of the conditions that have led the Council to decide on a gradual or immediate end to a mission teaches some useful lessons about the forward-looking management of ongoing operations as well as the conception and execution of operational plans for future operations. A brief evaluation of experience over the last few years shows that the progressive or final shutting down of an operation is influenced by many factors, including the accomplishment of a mission’s mandate to the satisfaction of the various parties, in which case it is natural for the Council to decide to gradually withdraw and shut down a mission. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia and the United Nations mission in Mozambique are good examples. A second factor has to do with security. Lack of confidence by parties to a conflict and rejection of the United Nations presence by a party to a conflict — often accompanied by attacks on mission staff and mission interests — are both reasons which in the past have led the members of the Council and troop contributors to raise questions about continuing a United Nations mission. Under these conditions, the withdrawal of troops and United Nations personnel was a solution, but one which had the disadvantage of letting the country plunge into chaos and causing a setback to all prospects for a solution to the conflict. The vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the United Nations is filled quickly by the enemies of peace. Such withdrawal have resulted in enormous losses for the Organization, both in prestige and in material terms. The third factor stems from the multidimensional nature of missions, and the fourth factor is financial. The definition of clear mandate for a mission will make it possible to translate into operational terms the conditions necessary for the realization of a just and lasting peace. This approach has the advantage of leaving no doubt about the intention of the United Nations. It also has the advantage of avoiding different interpretations of the mandate by the various parties to a conflict. It cannot be overemphasized that an operation must begin in a timely manner. A lack of timeliness at this stage would have a bad impact on the whole implementation process and would reinforce doubts about the real capacity of the United Nations to act and respond effectively to possible problems. Cooperation by troop-contributing countries and their involvement in the initial phase of the process should be encouraged. The process of dialogue between the troop contributors and the Council should be continued and strengthened. Special attention should be given to training and capacity-building for troops, the participation of development agencies in peace- building, the rehabilitation of infrastructures and economic and social reconstruction and development are all very important for the success of a United Nations peace operation. In the view of my delegation, these elements make it possible to respond to the various criticisms and questions raised by the final or gradual withdrawal of the United Nations from areas where its presence is expected to lead peace and security with a view to harmonious development. Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): I wanted to speak late in the debate because I wanted to hear what other people said and to pick up the tenor of our discussion, so I am going to speak quite informally. I am grateful to the Permanent Representative of Tunisia for remaining this long. Mr. President, you asked a question at the beginning of the meeting, a question that has been answered obliquely. That question was, can the Security Council improve its performance in the termination of peacekeeping operations? I think the general answer around the table has been that it can, and that it has to, improve its performance. The question is, how? Having listened to 13 other members of the Council, I think that we are remarkably united in the prescription that we have put forward, and that is a good thing. But we have not actually answered the question, “how?”, and we need to decide how to answer it. There were some nuances in the debate. One or two old hobby horses came out, and some things that were not entirely relevant to the question came out. I think that Namibia’s remark that the responsibility of the Security Council must not abrogated, the question of whether we are too selective in the termination of peacekeeping operations are questions that the Security Council has to look at politically. But, actually, in talking about exit strategies, we are talking about strategy. The United Nations, in the area of peacekeeping and in some other areas, is to a large extent, a minimalist Organization. We do not have many resources, and we try to get away with the minimum possible to deal with a certain situation. It is otherwise too expensive or too difficult for our national decision- makers to agree to commit themselves to a collective operation. So it is strategy that we are talking about. This debate is taking place only two days after we adopted resolution 1327 (2000), so we have done a lot of the work that we are talking about, and it is absolutely clear that we must have at the front three things in particular. One is a much deeper and broader analysis of what we are doing, and we need to have the equipment for that analysis. There is no point in just asking for it. It has to be the Council’s analysis because the Council is responsible, but we obviously need the professional work of the Secretariat to do much of that analysis for us. I think we all think that Brahimi is quite right in asking for a specific, strategic analysis capability to be present in the Secretariat. But it has to be an analysis not just of the swamp into which we are sending our peacekeeping operation but of the causes of the problem. All members have said that. And it is not just the causes; it is the context. Some have pointed to the regional context, and some have pointed to the political, economic and social context into which we are sending a peacekeeping operation. The mandate has to pick that up, and the mandate, as has been stated here, is very often dependent - and should very often be dependent - on the peace agreement that the parties have come to. We are not free. We are not starting from scratch in authorizing a mandate. That is a problem because we are not in charge of the peace agreement. I think we should insert our interests into the agreement at a much earlier stage, as Jamaica and others have said. Then there would be a criterion in the mandate for the exit. In other words, we have to direct the peacekeeping operation with a clear objective which can be judged as having been finished. As Ambassador Holbrooke said, at the very least the original problem has to be dealt with, and Ambassador Ward set out a number of other considerations which establish how we can define that the objective has been met. That is extremely important, and we do not always do it; we have to do it. Once we set the mandate, there is then a second item beyond the initial analysis, and that is that everybody understands the mandate: the wider membership, particularly the troop contributors, or potential troop contributors which means that they must be consulted before we finalize the mandate. In among that broad understanding there has to be an assessment of the capability and will of the international community to perform the mandate. Namibia pointed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a clear example, in Namibia’s view, of potential or actual selectivity. But I think that in making that remark they were not subscribing to what is a much broader understanding that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) cannot actually start the operation until certain conditions have been met because the United Nations does not have an endless capability or an endless will. It has very severe limits, and the Secretary-General is now clearly aware of those limits and is going to tell us what those limits are. So we, too, have to have an understanding of what we are capable of as the United Nations. Then, the third area is implementation. Absolutely crucial — and this is in the lap of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, at least in the first instance — is that there needs to be better planning, higher speed, better coordination and all the things that fall under Brahimi. Mr. President, you used one word in your introduction, when throwing questions at us, that not one member of the Council then picked up. That word was “leadership”. Nobody has talked about it. This Organization as a whole is seriously deficient in leadership. We pass the buck endlessly. Look at the shape of this table. Between the Secretary-General, the Council, the membership and the troop-contributors, we pass the buck around endlessly. I am not saying that the United Kingdom has solved that problem in the Sierra Leone context, but we have national reasons for wanting to show a very great determination to end it. The Australians did in East Timor. NATO did in the Balkans. But that leadership does not extend into all the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations or the Security Council. I think we need to talk a bit more about leadership and the limits of the United Nations in carrying out complicated operations when the leadership function is dissipated among parts of the international community. Then there is a stage which we have not really got to grips with, the stage when something happens to a peacekeeping operation that changes its basis. Lomé breaks down; the Revolutionary United Front go back to war. That is a difficult one, because the original mandates have not taken account of that and have not really given us flexibility from the original objective to deal with it. Therefore, we need to build into our thinking an awareness of the possible need for change. We do it as we go along. We are flexible as a Council. We ordain on the day what we have to do. But we do not necessarily understand each other on that. Canada talks about conflict management and training up the international community and particular countries that are relevant to manage conflict as we go along. That is management. We have not learned how to do it in the Council. I think France also pointed to the fact that clear objectives for a peacekeeping operation are not always possible. That again I think has been a lesson in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere. I will not go on about other things that Brahimi brings to us: the broader coordination that is necessary, from conflict prevention all the way through to post- conflict peace-building, and, as China has rightly said, including the ownership of the country itself of the programme that it is involved in, of the peacekeeping operation, because it is the ultimate authority to which we have to return authority when we exit. That is extremely important. It brings in economic questions, arms flow questions, mineral resource questions, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) questions, regional questions and the very function of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. All that has to be looked at again. I do not think we are broad enough in our approach. But what did come out of this morning, I think, is a very clear lesson that the decision on exit has to be related to a transitional mechanism. We do not just get out. We hand over to a mechanism that deals with the next stage. The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium was an example. Civilian police and civilian experts are needed for this; a DDR process is needed for this; and an understanding with the host country is needed for this. Bangladesh pointed also to the role of non-governmental organizations and civil society. There is also the question of resources, both money and troops. We need another discussion about why it is that developed high-tech armies do not want to do low-tech United Nations peacekeeping. We talked about it in the retreat. We need to talk about it again. It is not a matter of double standards. It is a matter of the nature of different organizations, different armies, different requirements and different experiences. This week we had in town the Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) from NATO. We had a very interesting small dinner party, talking about the differences in approach between NATO, on the one hand, and United Nations peacekeeping, on the other, which brought those of us who were listening some lessons that will have to be gone into in greater detail. Mr. President, you would be disappointed, I think, if we left this room — and we need to hear what non-members of the Council have to say this afternoon — without agreeing on some action that we need to take to follow up the thoughts that your paper has inspired. I think the Brahimi report covers a lot of what we want. I am not sure that we do not need a special subcommittee of the Council on peacekeeping operations to take up some of these professional and detailed points. I think we need, as Namibia has said, small missions occasionally, perhaps two or three people going out to an area and bringing back some firsthand experience, before we pass the mandate. We have to talk as the Security Council to other parts of the system, to the economic and social parts and to the General Assembly and its committees on some aspects of what we are doing, and we have to explore further with the Secretary-General his responsibility, and with the Under-Secretary-General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations their responsibilities, for putting into the pot what is not there and what your paper and your debate are asking for. We must follow this up. There have been some suggestions as to what we should do. We must not put resolution 1327 (2000) on the shelf. We have an enormous amount to do before your question is answered, Mr. President, and we have improved the performance of the Security Council. Thank you for this debate. I think it has been extremely useful.

There are still 17 speakers on my list. With the concurrence of the members of the Council, I intend to suspend the meeting now.