S/PV.5080 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the decision taken on 26 October 2004 by resolution 1569 (2004). At the outset, let me say what I think should be obvious: that this is a highly unusual meeting of the Security Council. Since 1952, when the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole were housed in New York, the Council has met outside of New York City only three times. This is a demonstration of the very strong interest of the Security Council in the situation in the Sudan and its commitment to the future of that country, as well as an expression by the Council of the fact that we are there not only today but on into the future to do what we can to ensure that the Sudan has a strong and viable future. On behalf of the members of the Council, I am pleased to acknowledge the presence of His Excellency The Honourable Mwai Kibaki, President of the Republic of Kenya, where the Security Council is meeting. I wish to thank his Government for the generous support and assistance in making our meetings a success. I now have the honour to give the floor to President Kibaki. President Kibaki: I should like at the outset to welcome all of you to Nairobi. You are welcome; please make yourselves at home, and, perhaps most importantly, although we assume that you are very busy people, do not rush home after this meeting. Take a little time at least to see a little bit of Kenya and to see a little bit outside of Nairobi. You will be very welcome and warmly received in those places. We hope that you will stay. Secondly, it is very important for this very important institution to meet in a Member country. You chose to meet here in Nairobi, which is suitable because we have a United Nations presence here — the Secretariat and so on — and for that reason we very warmly welcome you. Thirdly, I hope that the meeting will be successful. I hope also that you will be able to complete work on the agenda you have set yourselves, and that we will arrive at positive conclusions, because none of the problems we face, issues which affect Member countries, is insurmountable. We in this country want to join in the consideration of the matters before the Council. Allow me, therefore, to make a brief statement. I warmly welcome the Security Council to Kenya for this meeting of the Council, which is dedicated to questions of peace and security in the Sudan and in Somalia. The issues the Council is going to discuss are of crucial significance to Kenya and to the region. I am particularly encouraged that the Council has chosen to meet here in Nairobi. That decision, by itself, has sent out strong signals as to the importance that the Council attaches to peace and security in the Horn of Africa. The conflicts in the Sudan and Somalia have adversely affected Kenya, which has hosted many refugees from the two countries. This has been compounded by the problem of the illegal movement of illicit firearms, which has heightened insecurity in our towns and cities, as well as in the countryside. Over the last decade, the Government has been involved in the peace processes both for the Sudan and for Somalia. It has been a rugged road for all of us, but today we are full of hope. For the Sudan, in spite of the sad situation in the Darfur region, the Naivasha peace process is on course, and we remain hopeful that, within the coming months, the final peace agreement will be signed here in Kenya. We appeal to the international community not to turn their backs on the people of the Sudan at this crucial time. The international community should remain seized of the process to the very end. That is the only way to demonstrate our commitment to the realization of enduring peace for the people of the Sudan. With regard to Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government is now in place. Members of the Somali Parliament have been elected, and the President was sworn in on 14 October 2004. A Prime Minister has also been appointed. The road to lasting peace in Somalia has been mapped out, but we have not reached our destination — the establishment of a fully functional government in Somalia. What Kenya expects today from the Security Council is for it to collectively rally behind the Somali Government and help it to relocate to Somalia. The presence of the Somali Government in Mogadishu will strengthen and consolidate the reconciliation process that is still going on in that country. I appeal to the international community to continue to work tirelessly to assist the people of Somalia achieve lasting peace. The international community should continue to work closely with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union to ensure that the peace negotiations in Naivasha are sustained. In the case of Somalia, the support of the international community is needed now more than ever before. The newly elected Somali Government requires both diplomatic and material support to start the process of peace-building and reconstruction in that country. It must be appreciated that the establishment of a Government in Somalia is not only good for the people of Somalia, but also good for us in the region and for the entire world. There is no denying that, without a central authority, Somalia poses a risk to its neighbours. There is no way of monitoring the movement of the illicit arms that have infiltrated our borders and are the cause of the rise in the incidence of violent crimes in our cities. More important, however, Somalia, without a Government, is likely to be a haven for dangerous criminals with terrorist intentions. It is in the interest of global peace that the new Somali Government be helped to restore law and order in that country. Since it is within the Council’s means, we hope that Somalia will be assisted to move quickly to peace.

It is always an honour to welcome the Secretary-General to the Security Council, and especially to this extraordinary meeting in Nairobi. I now give him the floor.

Allow me to start by thanking the Council’s wise President, Mr. Danforth, for bringing us here to Nairobi. It was his initiative that brought us here. It is fitting that the Council should have taken the rare and highly symbolic step of meeting here in Africa. The Council has come to Nairobi primarily to discuss the situation in Africa’s largest country, the Sudan, which, unhappily, is also one of the countries most affected by conflict. The Sudan is a country with very deep-rooted and complex divisions. In large parts of the Sudan, particularly in the south, the people have lived for decades in fear, hunger and misery, both natural and man-made. Now, at last, the Naivasha peace process, so skilfully and patiently led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), offers real hope: real hope of an escape from that long nightmare and a chance to transform the Sudan’s political landscape and system of governance. The Sudan’s people have waited far too long for such a transformation. It is high time to conclude the negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) and start implementing what has been agreed. The effects of delay are felt not only in the south, but elsewhere too, as conflict spreads to more parts of the country. The devastating conflict in Darfur is glaring evidence of this. That is why the time for decision is now. There is no time to waste. The speedy conclusion of the north-south talks would not only help curb the further spread of conflict to other parts of the country; it would also serve as a basis and a catalyst for the resolution of existing conflicts. Indeed, as I have indicated to the Council on earlier occasions, the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A have already agreed to use the relevant principles of the Machakos Protocol as a basis for resolving conflicts in other regions, including Darfur. Those principles were the basis for settling the conflicts in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei. Another reason to conclude the Naivasha process speedily is that this would lead to the formation of a new coalition Government in Khartoum with a new army, one that would include the SPLM. I cannot help feeling that the formation of a north-south Government in the Sudan would add weight and impetus to the search for a settlement in Darfur and elsewhere and that it would have an important confidence-building effect. That is why, today, I re-emphasize to the members of the Council the importance of an early conclusion of the Naivasha process. I am confident that the Council will, in its collective and private discussions with Vice-President Ali Othman Taha and Mr. John Garang, as well as in the draft resolution that it will be adopting on the Sudan, encourage the parties to sign a comprehensive peace agreement before the end of the year. I particularly welcome the Council’s promise of full support for the implementation of such an agreement and its offer of incentives to encourage the parties to do what is right for their people and the country. Both the Government and the SPLM should be urged to work together to resolve other conflicts besetting the Sudan immediately after signing their agreement, as indeed they should, as members of the new Sudan Government. This kind of approach is needed because there is a general issue of governance in the Sudan. It is not just a problem of north and south, Darfur or Beja. Such conflicts cannot be dealt with in a piecemeal way. A comprehensive approach is required. Naivasha offers a good basis on which to build. The Sudanese from around the country and across the spectrum, including political parties, civil society and exiles, are going to have to come together to discuss the future of the Sudan and how the country should be governed. While it is proper that the Council should place its primary focus, in these particular meetings, on the conclusion of the north-south talks, the conflict in Darfur also demands its attention. The terrible situation in Darfur has been brought about mainly by deliberate acts of violence against civilians, including widespread killing and rape. Because of the magnitude and intensity of the human suffering in that region, the conflict remains a burning concern. The Council’s draft resolution rightly reflects that concern. It is encouraging that, in Abuja, the parties to the Darfur conflict have signed protocols on the humanitarian situation and on security. They must be urged to abide strictly by those agreements. The parties should also be pressed to maintain the momentum towards reaching agreement on political and other outstanding issues. The Council should send an urgent message to that effect to both the Government and the rebel parties, and to all States that have particular influence on them. Meanwhile, I regret to report that the security situation in Darfur continues to deteriorate, despite the ceasefire agreements signed earlier in N’Djamena and now reinforced in Abuja. Both the Government and its militias, as well as the rebel groups, have breached these agreements. This has made humanitarian work by the United Nations and our partners precarious and difficult, if not impossible. Many innocent civilians continue to suffer as a result. This cannot be allowed to continue. The strongest warning to all the parties that are causing this suffering is essential. We cannot allow impunity. When crimes on such a scale are being committed, and when a sovereign State appears unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens, a grave responsibility falls on the international community, and specifically on the Security Council. So far, the Council has chosen to exercise that responsibility by demanding compliance with its mandatory resolutions, while giving its full support to the efforts of the African Union (AU) mediation and monitoring mission. The African Union mission has begun to deploy and has already achieved some successes. It now needs to move rapidly into the areas of Darfur where people are most in danger; and for that, it urgently requires means of transport, as well as financial and logistical support. All Member States with the capacity to do so must give the maximum possible support, so that the AU force, including the essential police contingent, can deploy swiftly and mount an effective operation on the ground. I have spoken of the need for a comprehensive approach. Only a comprehensive political solution for the Sudan as a whole offers any longer-term hope of stability in the country. It is therefore time to convince the Government and its future partner, the SPLM, to conclude the Naivasha process and quickly involve all Sudanese stakeholders — the Government and armed and non-armed opposition groups — in a national conference to discuss the future governance of the country. We — the United Nations, the African Union and the whole international community — should join our efforts to help plan and support that process. The United Nations, through my Special Representative and other technical staff, in partnership with members of the IGAD Partners Forum and the Troika, will continue to do everything we can to assist the IGAD mediation and the parties to bring about a quick and successful completion of the Naivasha negotiations. For far too long, war has inflicted misery and untold human suffering on the Sudan, distorting the allocation of scarce resources, discouraging foreign aid and scaring away both Sudanese and foreign investors. Peace can turn this situation around. Already, we in the United Nations are preparing a major, multidimensional operation to help build a lasting peace, and many donor countries have indicated their readiness to help the Sudanese realize a tangible peace dividend. But first, agreements must be finalized and signed. The engagement of the Council must impart a new sense of urgency to all the Sudanese parties. By meeting here in the region, the Council has made an important gesture of solidarity and support for the peoples and institutions of the new Africa. It is good that the Council has chosen to work through African institutions, provided that members do not forget that the Council itself retains primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as laid down in the Charter. What is happening in the Sudan — and in other African countries on the Council’s agenda, such as Côte d’Ivoire — is a grave challenge not only to Africa but to all humanity. The United Nations must be fully engaged in helping to meet it.

I thank the Secretary-General for his very important statement. I invite the First Vice-President of the Sudan, Mr. Ali Othman Taha, to take the floor.

It gives me great pleasure to begin by welcoming you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council, to Africa for these important extraordinary meetings. This is only the second time that such extraordinary meetings of the Council have been held in Africa. The first was at Addis Ababa, at a time when the Sudan held the presidency of the Security Council — perhaps that is a propitious sign. These meetings send an important message that reflects the interest of the international community, represented by the Council, in the peace process in the Sudan and in African issues in general. There can be no doubt that the international community as a whole, in particular the African peoples, including the people of the Sudan, have been looking forward to this historic event, which we hope will bring a new era of peace and stability to Africa, and thence to the world, so that we can begin a new chapter of history that opens up horizons for prosperity and peace. It also gives me great pleasure to extend to Council members the best wishes and greetings of the people of the Sudan. We recall the committed and sincere efforts that the United Nations has made so far by sending a Special Representative to the Sudan to oversee the peace process there. We greatly value the importance accorded by the Council and its members to the issues currently before it regarding the Sudan. We hope that the Council will play the role of a genuine partner in achieving peace and stability in the Sudan. The Council must recognize all the genuine efforts that the Government of the Sudan has made so far in search of peace. We believe that peaceful negotiations are the only means to that end, and we have embarked on the path towards peace with full, national determination, with the support of our partners and brothers. We have taken part in serious negotiations without any preconditions. We have agreed to discuss all the important issues through the mediation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in proof of our good intentions and sincere willingness to achieve peace and national harmony. The Naivasha agreement on six peace protocols was a clear demonstration of our belief in the seriousness and validity of that process and we reiterate again today our full commitment to finalizing those negotiations as soon as possible in order to achieve comprehensive peace in the southern Sudan and throughout the country. We have been negotiating for a long time, perhaps because there have been serious concerns among the partners and the brothers. However, the arduous process of negotiation has been successful and productive, enabling us, together with our brothers in the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), to reach finely-detailed agreements on all the various issues and to agree on means of implementation and guarantees leading to lasting peace. The extended process of negotiation has definitely been productive and fruitful and has acquired special importance because of our agreement with our SPLM brothers on the absolute necessity of implementing all that has been agreed for the transitional period. We look forward to a genuine partnership with the international community in the implementation of those agreements. We believe that the pending issues can be resolved, particularly since they relate merely to procedural aspects of the implementation of the agreements concluded. I should like once again to reiterate our firm commitment to concluding the negotiations as soon as possible, and I am pleased to say that we have reached an understanding with our brothers in the SPLM and the IGAD secretariat, as reflected in the common memorandum of understanding to be signed in the presence of Council members and committed to by both parties for the conclusion of the negotiations within the agreed framework contained in the memorandum. Since peace is an integral whole, the Government of the Sudan has not limited its efforts to reaching a peaceful settlement, but has complemented them by launching a serious and constructive dialogue with all political forces with a view to laying a solid foundation for peace. Here, I concur with the Secretary-General’s statement that the peace agreement opens the door to conducting a national dialogue to form a popular, broad-based Government that includes other parties that were not party to the Naivasha negotiations. Such a dialogue would provide the basis for a broader popular consensus on the peace agreements to be reached. On the other hand, the Government of the Sudan has conducted sincere negotiations; without preconditions, in N’Djamena, Addis Ababa and Abuja with those who have borne arms in Darfur. I reiterate our commitment to all agreements reached in Abuja. My only reservation concerns the Secretary-General’s statement regarding the Government of the Sudan’s violation of the agreements signed in Abuja. The fact is that violations have been recorded as having been committed by the other parties. We call for the implementation of a common mechanism with the United Nations to investigate such alleged violations and for the deployment of African Union observers. We commend the efforts of all parties that have participated in and contributed to the efforts to reach the agreements in Naivasha and N’Djamena. We also salute IGAD and its partners, as well as the international community for its sincere efforts to date. We welcome the efforts of the African Union and of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in particular. In the context of the situation in Darfur, our clear policy is based on addressing the humanitarian situation. Alongside the international community, we have come a long way in that regard and remain committed to improving the humanitarian situation there, in cooperation with the international community. The signing of the last security agreement in Abuja will enhance the joint efforts of the Sudanese Government and the international community to alleviate the impact of the disputes and conflicts on the civilian population. The second important pillar of our efforts to solve the Darfur problem would be ending the fighting and all forms of hostility. We therefore reiterate yet again that the security agreement to be signed in Abuja is extremely important to us and we shall be fully committed to its implementation. A third important point in addressing the Darfur problem is highlighted by our political dialogue with the armed groups, with the cooperation and support of the African Union, Chad and the Federal Republic of Nigeria. We are determined to conclude that political dialogue, with a view to reaching a comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur. We believe the important issues of a nation can be resolved only through peaceful negotiations, not through confrontation and hostility. Our vision of a peaceful political resolution in Darfur — in particular in the case of the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile region — is based on the provisions of the Naivasha Agreements and on the establishment of a foundation for decentralized government within a federal framework that provides the citizens of Darfur and the other peoples of Sudan’s governorates the ability to participate and to have additional authority in managing their own affairs. We also envision that a resolution of this matter would include an agreement on the sharing of national resources and wealth in a manner that provides every governorate, state and region in the Sudan with a proportionate share so that the aspirations of the people can be met. With regard to development, I would like to inform the Security Council that the fourth pillar of our policy for dealing with the Darfur problem aims at normalizing the situation after a political agreement has been reached and at bringing about sustainable development in the region. The Government of the Sudan has prepared a development plan to be implemented after the signing of a peace agreement on Darfur that will promote the Government’s other current efforts. That development plan consists of two parts. First, we would address the issue of providing urgent assistance to displaced persons in order to facilitate their return to their villages, as well as the return of refugees from neighbouring countries. That will require a disarmament programme that includes the rehabilitation of those currently bearing arms so that they may once again be integrated into civilian life. It will also require giving special attention to the rehabilitation of the areas destroyed during the fighting, particularly with regard to infrastructure, education and drinking water. We have prepared specific estimates of the costs of those urgent programmes and would be pleased to share those estimates with the international community so that a common effort to cover the costs can be deployed as soon as a peace agreement is signed. The second part of that plan, which will cover a medium-term period of three years, is based on a policy of carrying out studies and projects to develop the agricultural and other income-generating sectors in the region, including animal husbandry and small- and medium-size industries. The plan will also focus on providing clean water for industry and for people in both cities and villages. Feasibility studies and estimates have been prepared for this three-year plan. Preliminary estimates indicate that we will need $1.8 billion to implement projects such as the ones I have described. Once again, we are pleased to say that we look forward to the participation of the international community in planning, financing and implementing further studies. Improving services and attaining development will complement the political efforts being made to resolve this issue and help to promote peaceful coexistence and social harmony among the various groups in Darfur. The Government of the Sudan, which has made great efforts to establish peace in the south of the country through the Naivasha Agreements, cannot be seen as willing to allow fighting to break out once again in other regions of the country. The war in Darfur is political in nature and was instigated by local groups with the support of foreign parties. Those foreign elements benefited from the historic tension and conflict among the various tribes living in Darfur. That situation was exacerbated by the severe drought that has afflicted that part of Africa. The outbreak of the war in Darfur was supposed to be a hurdle to the peace agreements in Naivasha. We would like to stress again before the Council that the Government’s political determination to solve all conflicts in the south and establish peace through the Naivasha Protocols will remain steadfast. We are equally committed to deploying the political efforts necessary to end the problems in Darfur. The Government of the Sudan is determined to change the situation in our country and to establish peace and stability based on justice, political participation and cooperation with the international community, regionally and internationally. Once again, I would like to renew our sincere thanks to those who have participated and have contributed to the peace process, particularly the Government of Kenya through the sincere efforts of President Kibaki. We highly value their patience and cooperation during all those years of negotiation on the Naivasha Agreements, and we would like to reiterate before President Kibaki and the Council that the time has come to provide you with the gift of peace in the Sudan for its peoples and for the international community.

I now give the floor to the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Aminu Bashir Wali, representing the current Chair of the African Union.

First of all, I wish to thank the President of Kenya, President Mwai Kibaki, for hosting the Security Council in Nairobi. I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the current month. In the same vein, I would like to compliment Ambassador Sir Emyr Jones Parry of the United Kingdom for a successful presidency of the Council in October. We also express our appreciation to Secretary-General Kofi Annan for his initiatives and efforts at conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building in Africa. We welcome the decision of the Security Council to hold this meeting in Nairobi. We recall that the last meeting of the Council in Africa was about 30 years ago, when it met in Addis Ababa, when its agenda was largely on decolonization. The conflict situation in Africa continues to be disturbing because the promises and the hope of prosperity still remain unfulfilled when most African countries have attained political independence. A greater part of the continent is characterized by conflict, poverty, decaying infrastructure and the scourge of HIV/AIDS. In the face of these challenges, African leaders have embarked on serious efforts to find a lasting and sustainable solution to key problems of socio-economic development. In this regard, we welcome the efforts of the leaders of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in seeking peaceful solutions to the conflicts in the Sudan and Somalia. We commend the United Nations and the international community for their response to the humanitarian situation in the Darfur region and urge that they remain engaged in the situation. I recall that one President — Olusegun Obasanjo, the current Chairman of the African Union — addressed the Security Council in September 2004 in New York on the state of the peace talks in Abuja between the Government of the Sudan, the Liberation Army/ Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. The parties have since reached an agreement on both security and humanitarian issues. For instance, they agreed to maintain the civilian character of internally displaced persons and reiterated the right of internally displaced persons and refugees to voluntarily return to their homes. They also agreed to protect the human rights of internally displaced persons and refugees. Finally, they agreed to ensure that all forces and individuals involved or reported to be involved in violations of rights of internally displaced persons, vulnerable groups and civilians would be impartially investigated and held accountable to the appropriate authorities. We welcome Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), which condemns all acts of violence and violations of international humanitarian law by all the parties to the crisis. In particular, we welcome the call on the Sudanese Government to fulfil its commitment to disarm the Janjaweed militia and bring them and their associates to justice for any violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. We call on the parties to comply with the request to disarm the Janjaweed and ensure that civilians are no longer attacked, and that those who attack them should be prosecuted. We support the recommendation that those who violate the ceasefire agreement and international humanitarian law, on both sides, should be subject to military or civilian prosecution. In this regard, we welcome the fact that the Government of the Sudan has continued to fulfil its commitment under the joint communiqué regarding humanitarian access, which has made possible an increase in humanitarian operations serving internally displaced persons and refugees. This has enabled 40 international non-governmental organizations, the Red Cross mission and United Nations agencies to operate in Darfur. The international humanitarian operation in Darfur is a significant testimony to the benefits of effective cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. In this connection, we commend the efforts of the Security Council in building the necessary synergy for the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the continent and the subregions. We urge the Security Council to further intensify its support for the various regional initiatives for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Nigeria reiterates its support for the commitment of the African Union to increase its mission in Darfur to 3,320 persons, including 2,341 military personnel, 450 observers and up to 815 civilian police. We welcome the African Union’s expanded mandate, beyond the terms of the N’Djamena agreement, to include the monitoring and verification of the provision of security for returning internally displaced persons, of Government-controlled militias and of the protection of civilians. The engagement of the Security Council and the international community in the peace process in the Sudan should be total and comprehensive. We are encouraged by the Secretary-General’s report that the political process for addressing the north-south conflict in the Sudan has resumed and is making progress. We note that the parties were able to resolve most of the outstanding issues, including the agreement on the permanent ceasefire, the deployment of joint integrated units in eastern Sudan and collaboration in negotiations with other armed groups. We urge the parties to resolve their differences on funding the armed forces of the Sudan, as well as the integration of other armed groups into the respective structures of the Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA/M during the transition period. We support the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the outstanding issues should not be allowed to prevent the successful completion of the peace talks. We recognize that any delay in resolving them would adversely affect the United Nations pre- deployment arrangements in southern Sudan and other conflict areas. In conclusion, we note that the Security Council has adopted many resolutions on the situation in the Sudan and has consolidated its special political mission in the area. We urge the parties to continue to cooperate with the Security Council and the international community to facilitate effective implementation of the resolutions. By so doing, we will succeed in ushering in an era of sustainable peace in the Sudan. I pledge the continued support of Nigeria, and indeed of the African Union, for those efforts.

I now invite Mr. John Garang, Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army, to take the floor in accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

First and foremost, I would like to thank the Council wholeheartedly for having invited the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to this significant and historic Security Council meeting on the Sudan, Somalia and other African affairs, so that we can share our perspective on the peace process and on the situation in our country in general. I understand that this is the fourth time in its history that the Security Council has met outside its New York Headquarters. We appreciate this significant gesture and concern. Indeed, this is another momentous occasion in the history of our country. I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the peaceful resolution of all conflicts in the Sudan. It is our hope that the meeting of this body in Nairobi will expedite the swift closure to the peace process in the Sudan of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) so that we can also reach a comprehensive peace agreement for the whole country. The core of the peace agreement, in the form of six protocols, is already in place. The task that remains to finalize the agreement on a comprehensive ceasefire and the modalities for implementing what we have agreed. These will form annexes to the peace agreement. The parties — the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A — signed the six protocols with a view to implementing the agreement and with the primary aim of ending the war. Obviously, therefore, the two annexes that remain — on a comprehensive ceasefire and on implementation modalities — should not be stumbling blocks to closing the deal. One makes agreements in order to implement them, and we made the agreement in order to end the war. I want to assure the Council that the SPLM/A is willing and prepared to work with the other party to move swiftly to complete and sign the framework comprehensive peace agreement in the shortest time possible. We in the SPLM/A have absolutely no reason to cause any delays. On the contrary, and in the interests of our country, we have every reason to expedite the process and to sign the final agreement today rather than tomorrow. Under the ceasefire negotiations of the first annex, there are two outstanding issues, the cardinal one being the funding of the armed forces — both the SPLM/A and the Government army. According to section 1 (b) of the security arrangements protocol, which we have signed, it has been agreed that the two armed forces — the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLM/A — are to be “considered and treated equally as Sudan’s National Armed Forces during the Interim Period”. That entails funding from the national treasury in all their aspects the two armed forces and the joint integrated units that will be constituted from them. It was precisely for that reason that the SPLM/A settled for only 50 per cent of revenues from oil extracted from the southern Sudan and only 50 per cent of non-oil revenues collected by the central Government in the southern Sudan, so as to enable the national Government to retain sufficient financial resources to meet national obligations, including expenditure on the National Armed Forces. The other party’s position on this issue is both untenable and inconsistent with the meaning and the spirit of the security arrangements framework agreement during the interim period, because it limits funding from national coffers to the Government army component of the National Armed Forces, completely ignoring the funding of the other component of the Sudan National Armed Forces — that is, the SPLM/A — leaving it to be funded by the government of the southern Sudan, which is a subnational-level government and therefore is not responsible for funding national institutions, including the SPLM/A. However, I believe this is an issue that we, the parties, with the assistance of the mediators and the international community, should be able to resolve, because obviously the SPLM/A must be funded during the interim period. The second outstanding issue in the ceasefire agreement — although relatively less problematic than that of funding the armed forces — is the time frame for incorporating other armed groups into SAF or SPLM/A structures, depending on their individual choice, as stipulated in the security arrangements agreement signed by the parties in September 2003, which states in paragraph 7 (a) that the process of the integration of other armed groups should be accomplished before the comprehensive peace agreement comes into effect so that by then there will be only two armed forces — the SAF and the SPLM/A — as agreed upon. That is also an issue that we can resolve. Regarding the second annex, on implementation modalities for the agreement, sufficient progress has been generally achieved with respect to the two areas of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei. Further good work needs to be done to bridge the gaps in relation to power-sharing. However, one obstacle in the implementation modalities is that there are two main outstanding issues that must be resolved in the wealth-sharing protocol. First, the Government of the Sudan proposes a system for the transfer of funds that seeks to pay in local currency the share of the government of the southern Sudan of its oil revenues. That is also a problem that can, I believe, easily be solved. The other issue is the sharing of information on existing oil contracts. That is also something that we have agreed on in the wealth- sharing agreement. That also should not be a problem. It’s a problem that we can, I believe, also easily solve. In summarizing this part of my presentation, I want to state the SPLM position in unequivocal terms. The Government of Sudan and the SPLM have a core agreement already in place in the form of the six protocols and, as is stated in the Nairobi Declaration of 5 June 2004, we consider the Sudan peace agreement essentially already completed. The two outstanding issues in each of the two annexes of the ceasefire agreement and implementation modalities should not take time to resolve, especially in view of the very precarious situation our country is in, and the fact that peace has a price and we prepared to pay that price. That is why we have negotiated in Naivasha with our counterparts, our compatriots in Naivasha, over the last one plus years. Once more, I want to assure you that the SPLM is willing and ready to work with the other party to resolve the outstanding issues in the two annexes and bring the process to a speedy closure. We will work in partnership with the National Congress Party in establishing a new coalition Government of national unity in accordance with the six protocols. The SPLM views the agreement as a prelude to the beginning of the process of the democratic transformation of the country, a paradigm shift in the politics of the country, so that Sudan accepts all its citizens equally — whether they are Christians or Muslims, whether they of Arab origin or indigenous Africans, they are all Sudanese. This is also a paradigm shift in Sudan’s economic development, so that we will address the issue of rural development as the majority of our people — 98 per cent of the people in southern Sudan, for example — live in rural areas. We will have a paradigm shift in the observance of human rights and freedoms as endorsed by the parties in the comprehensive bill of rights in the power-sharing agreement. The SPLM will seek to participate effectively in the coalition Government of national unity and other levels of government to ensure the realization of a new political dispensation in the Sudan. In this context, the SPLM will work energetically in partnership with the National Congress Party and all other political forces in the Sudan to ensure timely, free and fair legislative and presidential elections, as shall be agreed in the remaining implementation modalities. In this context, we are committed to the preservation of peace, stability and the territorial integrity of the Sudan during the interim period, and to ensure the holding of a free, internationally-monitored referendum on the right of self-determination for southern Sudan towards the end of the six-year interim period. We remain fully committed to the implementation of all aspects of the peace agreement and will make full use of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission throughout the interim period to assess and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement. This is necessary to rectify any shortcomings without renegotiating the agreement. Through international guarantees and assistance, the international community will play a significant role in the implementation of the Sudan peace agreement, and the present meeting of the Security Council in Nairobi is a positive signal that we very much welcome and appreciate. We appeal to the international community to assist us in the faithful implementation of the peace agreement. Even if one of the parties to the agreement feels that there are too many risks associated with the agreement, in the final analysis, the cost of non-implementation of the agreement would be much higher than the cost of implementation for the whole country. Both parties are therefore best advised in the interest of our country to desist from anything that might undermine implementation of the peace agreement. Before I close, I come to an issue of grave concern to the Sudan and to you in the Security Council. You are undoubtedly aware of the fact that our country is in dire straits. This situation in Darfur is rapidly degenerating into chaos and anarchy, as the government counter-insurgency policy and campaigns in that region have seriously boomeranged and continue to spiral out of control. Furthermore, the Government has recently foiled a coup attempt, and the prospects for fresh insurgencies emerging in other parts of the Sudan are increasing. This overall situation, if left unchecked, can eventually cause the Sudan to implode and degenerate into statelessness and serious insecurity, the consequences of which for the whole region are obvious. The only way to avert this looming tragedy is to expedite the Naivasha process and speedily conclude the comprehensive peace agreement on the Sudan, and then to install a broad-based coalition Government of national unity that can best deal with such threats. It is imperative that the international community do its utmost to consolidate the Sudan peace process. We therefore call upon the Security Council — and we have agreed on this with Vice-President Ali Othman Mohamed Taha and General Sumbeiywo — to pass a resolution in this city of Nairobi, that, inter alia, recognizes, endorses and declares the six protocols signed thus far by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM as binding and irrevocable commitments that the parties may not under any circumstances renegotiate and that they must implement. This is in addition to the Council’s urging of the parties to expeditiously complete negotiations on the two annexes and sign the comprehensive peace agreement by a specified date. As I have already said earlier, I see no serious obstacles that would prevent us from signing the final peace agreement by the end of this year, 2004. The four main remaining issues outstanding in the two annexes can be resolved in a matter of days. The situation in the Sudan is sufficiently serious for the two parties to appreciate the urgency of a quick conclusion of the Naivasha process and signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in the shortest time possible. Furthermore, the parties could use this comprehensive peace agreement as a basis for making a fair and lasting peace for the country as a whole, including Darfur and eastern Sudan, applying and adapting the agreements to the particular situation, as well as using the new political dispensation to maintain peace and stability and the territorial integrity of our country during the interim period. We firmly believe that this is the way out of the current Sudanese crisis and debacle, and the SPLM assures the Council as well as assuring the Government of Sudan that the movement would play a positive role and work in partnership with the National Congress Party and other political forces in the country to bring comprehensive peace to all parts of the Sudan. Allow me, on behalf of the suffering people of the Sudan, to conclude by thanking you most sincerely for having organized and held this historic and rare meeting in our neighbourhood, in Nairobi, in Kenya. This signifies your recognition and awareness of the gravity of the internal Sudanese conflicts and the dangers that they pose to the region and to international peace and security. The Sudanese people eagerly await the outcome of the Security Council’s deliberations and hope that members will not leave Nairobi without sending them a message of hope for Christmas and the New Year. For our part, we pledge — as did my brother, First Vice- President Ali Othman Taha — that we hope to give Christmas and New Year’s presents to the Sudanese people, to the region and to the world by concluding and signing the Sudan peace agreement before the end of this year. We would also like to pay tribute to the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); to Ambassador Sumbeiywo and his envoys; to the IGAD member States; to the IGAD Partners Forum quartet, composed of Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States; to the Government of the Netherlands; and to the African Union for their unrelenting efforts in search of a just and lasting peace in the Sudan. Finally, I salute President Kibaki for taking the time to attend this important meeting.

Our programme includes a presentation by President Museveni, who is the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. His plane has been delayed; therefore, I am going to suggest that we suspend our proceedings until 12.15 p.m.

I now give the floor to the President of Uganda, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, His Excellency Mr. Yoweri Museveni. President Museveni: I greet the Security Council on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Before I talk about IGAD issues, I would like to point out that, in my opinion, wherever there is chaos in the world, one will most likely find a confluence of four factors. And what are those four factors? Factor one is parasitic, vested interests. Factor two is superficiality and obscurantism in identifying and dealing with those parasitic interests and their effects on a particular country or group of countries. Factor three is weak or disoriented local leadership. Factor four is the pre-industrial character of many of the affected areas, especially in Africa, where societies are backward and pre-industrial. In my opinion, as someone who has been observing the scene for the last 40 years, those factors are always present when there is chaos in any part of the world. If I had time, I would elaborate on each of those four factors. But I do not have the time now. It is enough, however, that I have stated them today. Without correcting them, especially the first three factors, we cannot reach a solution, in my opinion. Some of the chronic problems, such as that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are due to a combination of some of those factors. Some nationalist legitimate local leadership emerged in 1960, and the first and only elections in the history of the Congo were held. I am referring to the leadership of Patrice Lumumba and his party, the Mouvement National Congolais. Since there was no strong Congolese independent State, trouble broke out soon after independence. The United Nations troops came in. Instead of assisting the only legitimate leadership to emerge in the Congo up to then, and indeed since then, the United Nations took the side of illegal elements, including the famous General Mobutu. It has now been almost 45 years since the Congolese tragedy of 1961. The United Nations is back in the Congo. How can it be that a country cannot develop a capable State in 45 years? What is the problem? Who is responsible for that problem? We are now witnessing the tragedy of Côte d’Ivoire. How can it be that a country, 47 years after independence, does not have the minimum pillars of State, such as an army capable of defending the territorial integrity of the country, political problems notwithstanding? Is the international involvement in such situations part of the solution or part of the problem? Is the analysis of those situations correct or defective? What about the incredible suffering visited on the people in those situations? I would like the Council to seriously evaluate all those factors. As the Council knows, Uganda has had a lot of problems. Nevertheless, Uganda has never sought, nor would we ever accept, international involvement in our internal affairs, other than our collaboration with our Tanzanian brothers in getting rid of Idi Amin in 1978 and 1979. That is because we do not like to add to our own copious confusion the international supplies of the same commodity of confusion. It is not wise to add international confusion, to what is already an oversupply of local confusion. Therefore, in my view, and following our long experience in this part of the world, our actions should be guided by the following steps. First and foremost, any political problem should be solved by the citizens of the country in question, following democratic principles and guided by belief in the equality of all persons before the law. That should be step number one. Secondly, if the citizens of that country, for some reason, cannot solve the problem, then the region should come in. In the case of our area, the regional organizations concerned are the following: the East African Community (EAC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is here; the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and others. Thirdly, ultimately the African Union should bless the process. Fourthly, it is only then that the international bodies, such as the United Nations, should come into the process, to provide solidarity and back-up support. The advantages are the following. First, there is the question of knowledge of the problem. Because part of the problem is the fact that the players do not know the problem. I have been Chairperson of the Burundi peace process for a very long time. In 1994-1995, when we were first coming into the process once the citizens of Burundi had failed to provide their own solution, there were many suggestions. Some people suggested that the respected former President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, should head that process. I said no. I was Chairperson of the process, and President Jimmy Carter is my very good friend, but I said no. By the time President Carter learned to pronounce Barundi names — and Barundi names are so long: Ntibantunganya, for instance — it would be 10 years later. And he would be unable to help. So I insisted that the retired President of Tanzania, the late Mwalimu Nyerere, should head that process. Then, unfortunately Mwalimu Nyerere died, then we brought in Mr. Mandela. Although South Africa is rather far away, he was supported by all of us and he has done a very good job. That is how the Burundi process is moving steadily and surely. Thus, again, the first advantage I see in this arrangement is the question of knowledge: the ability to know the problem so that one is able to provide a correct solution. One should not complicate an already difficult problem with a lack of knowledge and with superficiality. Secondly, there is the question of stakeholders. Normally, when there is a problem in a country, the first victims are the people in that country. But the next victims are the neighbours, who are affected next by refugees and all the other problems. The neighbours are therefore stakeholders, next to the citizens of the country. Although sometimes there may be some rivalries which may complicate the issue, those can be specifically isolated and dealt with. Thirdly, there is the question of international solidarity, especially concerning the question of resources. So once you have the knowledge and you have all the stakeholders brought in, then the next level is international solidarity, especially with respect to resources and maybe some technical contributions. The four issues of this area are the Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I am reversing the order, because I would have started with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but I put it last, because the region is now out of the Congo. The region is the one which shepherded the Congo process, through the Lusaka process, stopped the war and brought about a ceasefire and the disengagement plan. But then, when the United Nations came in, it said the region is out. So the region is now out of the Congo. That is why I am putting it last: because I do not know what is happening. I cannot speak about what I do not know about. Regarding those four issues, I would like to give the following summarized comments. The leaders of the Sudan, who are sitting next to me here, for a long time refused to listen to the advice of the region in handling the diverse character of that great African country — that country where different African peoples meet. Many in the world may not know who the Africans are. Africans fall into four major linguistic groups. Africans in all of Central Africa, Southern Africa, much of East Africa and quite a bit of West Africa are part of the Niger-Congo group of languages. It includes the Bantu languages, and also the Kwa languages, the languages spoken in some parts of West Africa. The second group are the Nilo-Saharan people, like John Garang, and all the people in southern Ethiopia, Chad and so on. Their languages are the Nilo-Saharan group of languages. The third group are the Afro-Asiatic group of languages, of which those are three in Africa: Arabic, Amharic in one part of Ethiopia, and Tigray in Eritrea and in part of Ethiopia. The fourth group of languages is the Khoisan, a very small group in South Africa. Those people have somewhat Asiatic facial features, but they live in South Africa, and a few in Botswana and Namibia. Those are the four linguistic groups of Africa. We have now added the new European languages — I do not know whether we can also call them African: English, French, Portuguese — and even Spanish in some places. Those are the additional new languages of Africa. Now the Sudan is aware that some of those language groups meet; the Arabic-speaking people meet Garang’s people. Those are very different people; they all are African, but they are very different. As you can see, Mr. Garang’s people are not only black; they are actually blue, when you look at them very carefully. Now when you have Arabs and blue men living together under one sovereignty, that is a very serious project, and it should be taken seriously. But that was not taken into account. We are talking to our brothers; fortunately, I have been dealing with them for a long time, and they know my views. At one time, I went to Khartoum — I was invited to the university, and I gave my views there. As a consequence of not dealing with the issue over the past 50 years, this is where we are today on the question of the Sudan. The six protocols, in my opinion — given what has gone on, given the loss of time in solving this problem — are a reasonable package that should give this region a chance to see peace in the Sudan and then make a fresh start. When you want to jump, you do not stand in one position and jump. No; you go back first. English is a poor language; it does not have enough vocabulary, like my language. In my language, we have a verb for going backwards in order to jump better: we call it okusinga. Okusinga is when you go back in order to gather enough momentum to jump far. I think there is a word in English, but I do not remember it, even though I did English at an advanced level. In the Sudan, because of lost time and lost opportunities, because of mistakes in defining the problem, we need to go backwards. We need to okusinga, to borrow my language. I think that is what the Sudan needs. That sense of okusinga is captured in these six protocols. I hope we can implement these protocols, so that we can see what happens next. Therefore I appeal to the parties to the Sudan problem to resolve the remaining issues without delay. When I spoke with Mr. Garang on the telephone the other day, he mentioned the issue of paying the army, and a few other issues. I hope that these can be resolved quickly, so that we can get moving. I saw a television interview last night when I was in Arusha — we were in Arusha for the meeting on AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis — in which a Sudanese person was saying that the Khartoum Government was busy with the problem in Darfur and that therefore it was not attending to this problem. But, in my opinion, dealing with southern Sudan is part of dealing with the question of Darfur. If you deal with southern Sudan correctly, then you will be able to deal with Darfur more easily. Turning to Somalia, that country now has an agreed Transitional Government. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, the Arab League and the United Nations should materially and technically back that Government so that it can establish its authority in Somalia within the shortest possible time. We should not lose any time, because this package in Somalia is very, very important. I must thank President Kibaki and his Government for helping IGAD to negotiate this agreement here in Nairobi, and I would appeal to everyone to support this process. What they need is troops to assist the Transitional Government to establish its authority inside Somalia. I would propose here the use of African troops. There are troops from very far away — from Uruguay, from the North Pole, from the South Pole; there are quite a variety of them — but I think that African troops could do this work much better. First of all, they are cheaper; we pay our soldiers much less than those people are paid. And they can stand and fight; there is no problem at all. Where African troops have been involved, we have found solutions quickly. We solved the problem of Amin almost alone, we the Africans — Tanzania, ourselves and a few other countries. We solved the problem of Mobutu. We are the ones who dealt with the problem of genocide in Rwanda. Genocide would never have stopped if we had not taken a stand. Getting rid of the regime and enabling people to survive was done by Africans. We are the ones who fought apartheid; the Africans are the ones who fought apartheid. I do not know why, therefore, we do not have a system whereby we have international resources and use African troops to solve these problems. If there is money, we can raise soldiers to deal with this problem of Somalia, or any problem, for that matter. The youth in Africa are doing nothing, they are not employed, they are looking for jobs. It would be very easy for me to raise any number of brigades — two, three, four, five. Now once, when we were working with the former President Bush on the question of Somalia in 1991, I wanted to make a contribution, but I was told that I could send only one company. I said, “No, I am not going to send one company. I am not here for decoration. If you want me to make a contribution, I must send a brigade, so that you can see what Ugandan soldiers can do in order to make a contribution. But just one company from me — that would be like a jamboree, or something like that.” Let us use Somalia as an example. I am the Chairperson of IGAD, and I have consulted the new President, President Abdullah Yusuf. We can have several brigades of African soldiers go into Somalia and assist the Transitional Government to establish its authority on the ground, if we have the money. Money is the only problem. After all, these soldiers are being paid; even when they are at home they are being paid. The money we may be looking for could be money for transportation, food and so on. We are already paying those soldiers, but if we need to raise new battalions, we may need more money, including for salaries. That is what Somalia needs now. It needs a number of brigades to escort that Government into Somalia so that they can start preparing for elections, so that they can have a legitimate Government. The situation in Burundi is progressing quite well, mainly because the region, the internal parties of Burundi and the international community are coordinating well. Things are moving along quite well in Burundi, because all of us are there all the time. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Carolyn McAskie, is working with all the stakeholders. We encounter all sorts of complications, but nobody can deceive us, because we know the situation. By putting our heads together, we always reach a good solution. The only problem in Burundi is money. What is it the French word for money? “Argent.” I keep saying that argent is what is needed now, first of all for the elections, for printing the ballots. I think some money has been raised for the ballot boxes and so forth, but we also need money to assemble the combatants, put them in one place, disarm them and disband them. If we do not do this, free elections cannot be held, because the parties that have armed groups will use them to intimidate rival parties. It is therefore very important that we get the argent for the purpose of demobilizing the combatants. As regards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I have expressed my worries to both President Kabila and the Secretary-General. I hope that those worries are taken into account. One of the problems I had with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is that it has delayed the integration of the combatants. For one and a half years, rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have been appealing to the Government to integrate them. The Government has been saying, “No, we cannot integrate you”. When I inquired further, I was told that Western ambassadors in Kinshasa are the ones advising the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo not to integrate the rebels. Why? Because the rebels committed atrocities, so they must be investigated first. This must be a new theory of conflict resolution. The little I know about conflict resolution is that you first establish peace. If all the troublemakers come peacefully, you accept them with open arms. We should not say, “No, I do not want to allow you in, because I think you may have committed crimes and I want to investigate you first”. If people want to come, we should welcome them with open arms. That is why in the case of Burundi we used the method of “immunité provisoire”, provisional immunity. We assume that these people are not all criminals. They bring their guns, they all come, and we put them in the army temporarily. We then use technical standards to reduce their number to the number we want. We take out those who are over age and those who are sick. We may have a standard regarding education as well. Thus, in the end, we have a smaller number than the original number. Then we give a package to those who are not absorbed. That is where the World Bank comes in: we give them a package, and they go home with a good heart. Now when we do that, we are solving two or three problems at once. First, people with guns come and hand in their guns. Secondly, we are helping the faction leaders. A faction leader has real problems. He has his followers, and he cannot join the transitional Government and leave his followers out. His followers would kill him and say, “You have betrayed us; you only care about yourself and you forgot about us”. That is why some of the faction leaders are very reluctant to come: because they cannot join the process without first having a solution for their followers. When you integrate combatants, you also help the faction leaders. The faction leader is then able to tell his followers, “Look here, my friends, the transitional process has catered for you, so do not harass me”. I truly hope that this issue is dealt with. Only the other day, I sent a special envoy to see President Kabila to tell him about my worries, because I have heard stories of these thousands of people who are out there in that part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with guns, unaccounted for, and whom the Government wants to investigate first. If we had followed that logic of justice before peace and legitimacy, we would have had no peace process in Burundi, because I cannot vouch for most of the people in Burundi’s army. Many among the rebels may have committed crimes. But, by using the technique of “immunité provisoire”, however, we gathered all of them and we can proceed to establishing a transitional Government. From a transitional Government, we will proceed to elections, and thus to legitimacy. Then we can come back to the question of justice. That is how that issue was handled in South Africa, if the Council remembers: first negotiations, then the transitional process, elections and then the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to establish questions of justice. I am taking a lot of your time, members of the Council, but I imagine you came a long way to listen to us, so do not complain. You voluntarily came to listen to us. In my opinion and according to my experience, the magic formula when internal forces have failed to apply in dealing with the issue is the following: the internal parties, the regional players, and the international players. That is how the problem of Amin was solved, how the problem of apartheid was solved and how the problem of Mobutu was solved, to some extent, although not wholly. In my opinion, if there is an intractable problem, that package of players should shepherd the solution through all the stages: negotiations, agreement, implementation, and guaranteeing the agreement in the post-implementation period. Because, if it is not guaranteed, the internal forces will guarantee it through war — through fighting — asserting their rights themselves in the absence of anybody else to guarantee their interests.

I thank President Museveni very much for his very informative statement. In accordance with the understanding reached in our prior consultations, I will now adjourn the meeting. I invite Council members and participants to return to this room for a private meeting, which will take place promptly at 2.30 p.m.