S/PV.5462 Security Council

I now give the floor to Ambassador De La Sablière.

First, I would like to say to our colleague, Ambassador Jones Parry, how greatly I appreciate the way in which he led our mission: intelligently, skilfully and effectively. I was pleased to work with him in jointly leading the mission in Chad. I think it was important that we went to Chad. From their previous discussions with President Konaré at Addis Ababa, members of the Council could already appreciate the risks that the destabilization of Chad would present to the entire region. Moreover, by visiting the Goz Beïda camps not far from Abéché — camps housing refugees from Darfur and camps for persons displaced following attacks by Janjaweed from the Sudan — we were able to see how much the Darfur conflict has affected Chad. The Council must take this link between Darfur and Chad into account. We had a long visit with President Deby. We recalled the statements issued by the Security Council and our condemnation of the 13 April attack against N’Djamena. We raised all the points that we wanted to raise within our terms of reference. All of that will be in the written record. But today I would like to stress three points. First, as regards Darfur, President Deby reaffirmed his steadfast support for the Darfur Peace Agreement and informed us about the contacts that he had had to try to get the non-signatories to sign it. That is important, because so much depends on the Agreement, which is fragile and which must absolutely be strengthened. Secondly, the relationship between the Sudan and Chad has deteriorated greatly. We have heard accusations from both sides, in Khartoum and in N’Djamena. When he gave us a report on the attack of 13 April, President Deby told us that his country had been the victim of aggression by the Sudan and that he would be complaining about it to the Security Council. In accordance with our terms of reference, we stressed the importance of both countries implementing the confidence-building measures of the Tripoli Agreement. I think that the African Union can certainly be of major assistance in that area. Thirdly, with regard to the camps, it seems that the international community is faced with two problems. At the humanitarian level, there are 300,000 refugees in Chad and 50,000 displaced persons in camps there. That is a lot of people in a very poor country, and international assistance is insufficient. Jan Egeland said as much to us. I believe that we need to help mobilize donors with a view to increasing international humanitarian assistance. The second problem relates to the protection of the camps. The camps have been politicized; we saw that for ourselves from the demonstrations that greeted us. It is said that the camp that we visited is opposed to the Peace Agreement. There was obvious manipulation. Politicization is thus a major factor, and the problem of forced recruitment is serious. Lastly, humanitarian workers are being attacked and are very worried. President Deby expressed his concerns about that, as well as telling us that he was unable to deal with the problem — his army must first protect the borders. He would therefore like the international community to take responsibility for protecting the camps and the humanitarian workers who have to move from one camp to another. I believe that if nothing is done in that area, we might see a serious deterioration in the situation in all respects. It would be appropriate for the Secretary- General to consider the question of international protection for the camps and to make recommendations to us. I can see only advantages to Jean-Marie Guéhenno’s visiting Chad, since he is already in the region.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Augustine Mahiga of the United Republic of Tanzania.

On behalf of my African colleagues in the Council and all the members who participated in the recent Council mission to Africa, I would like to thank our team leaders, Ambassador Jones Parry and Ambassador De La Sablière, for their intrepid leadership during the mission. They were firm in conveying the Council’s central objectives while extending the hand of partnership to our hosts. They kept the team focused and united, despite a gruelling timetable and the fact that we were dealing with politically sensitive issues. We should also like to thank the representatives of the Secretary-General and their teams in the field for the excellent preparations they made for our visit, as well as the Secretariat staff who accompanied us. The interpreters had to endure unusually long hours, while the security personnel left no detail to chance. On behalf of the Council, I thank all of them. Overall, our mission advanced to new levels the objectives that we set ourselves in the places that we visited. Our challenge is to retain the initiative and accomplish the objectives within very tight time lines. The Sudan in general and Darfur in particular will remain the most difficult areas. The visit took place against the background of an uneasy relationship with the Security Council, as we adopted tougher resolutions to protect civilians, address impunity, facilitate humanitarian assistance in Darfur and push the peace negotiations in Abuja. The unanimous adoption, just before the mission took place, of resolution 1679 (2006), with its necessary but perhaps premature reference to Chapter VII, set a difficult stage for our mission. It provided an excuse for the Sudan Government to take a harder line on the proposed transition from the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur in implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. There is open resistance to the transition, and negative perceptions have been created among the general public regarding the intentions of the Security Council. On the other hand, the Government of the Sudan needs the Darfur Peace Agreement, with a weak implementation mechanism in the form of AMIS, which, following its initial but limited success, is unable to undertake, alone, added responsibilities. The Security Council team conveyed to the Sudanese authorities — and tried to convince them — that transition from AMIS to a United Nations force is not an option, but an obligation. The invocation of Chapter VII is not against the Government of the Sudan and its people, but is a necessary reserve option to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement, especially in the disarmament of entities like the Janjaweed and rebel groups, to ensure the protection of civilians and to maintain unimpeded humanitarian access. We should continue to explain and justify Chapter VII beyond the need to maintain credibility before the international community. The Government of the Sudan maintains that it cannot yield its obligation to disarm the Janjaweed under the Darfur Peace Agreement and should not be treated as a failed State. Given that atmosphere of suspicion, a number of steps should be taken. The talking and consultations at the diplomatic level should continue as the assessment mission continues. The operational necessities of the assessment team will demonstrate the necessity of an additional United Nations presence. The African Union should be making the case for a more robust mandate and predictable funding and the political case for partnership through the Security Council. The operational success of AMIS, with implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, would create incremental confidence in the United Nations presence in the Sudan. The planned visit of President Konaré after the assessment mission and before the African Union summit should be used to push further the case for international burden-sharing in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement. The same message should come out of the Banjul summit. In the days to come, it will be necessary for the Security Council to ensure the continuing implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the south. That is of paramount importance, because as we succeed in deploying and in working with the Sudanese Government and the southern Sudanese government, we are creating an atmosphere of confidence and mutual trust between the Security Council and the United Nations on the one hand, and the authorities in Khartoum and Juba on the other. The implementation of the Abuja Peace Agreement will very much depend on the success of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the south. It should also be taken into account that the implementation of the Agreement is very much behind schedule. That is not because of the problems associated with the United Nations, but because of the internal constraints within the Sudanese Government and the southern Sudanese government. Nonetheless, I should highlight the following areas, which are of critical importance in sustaining the viability of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The first area is the need for expeditious demarcation of the boundaries that define the south. The second is the speedy negotiation and resolution of the controversial status of Abie, where oil resources are the centre of the controversy. The third is the clear demobilization and redeployment of forces, as set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Sudan is a unique case under the Agreement, because it is going to retain three armies: the armed forces of the Sudan, the remnants of the Sudan Liberation Army and the integrated army. I should add that in addition to those three recognized armies, there are still militias in the South whose status remains controversial and needs to be defined if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is to be stabilized. Among the militias that are creating concern is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Although it has crossed borders to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it has only made the problem regional and has in no way helped the people of southern Sudan. We continued to receive reports of civilian atrocities, which are of great concern to the government and the people of southern Sudan. When we were in Juba, we were told that a delegation of the LRA was there and that a delegation from Uganda was being awaited for negotiations under the auspices of the government of southern Sudan. We were curious, wanting to know the status of the five indicted leaders and whether they would be part of the negotiations. The leadership was careful to make a distinction between negotiations for peace with the LRA and the culpability of the five indicted leaders. Although we were unable to obtain definite positions on what would happen, they agreed in principle on the need to apprehend the indictees and to hand them over to the International Criminal Court. Ambassador Jones Parry has outlined our visit to Addis Ababa in great detail. Let me emphasize the following. We had the first meeting ever between the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. That offers an opportunity for continued partnership between the two organs of the organizations under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Secondly, the African Union has gone well beyond endorsing in principle the transition from AMIS to the United Nations; it is actually urging a more expeditious United Nations deployment. President Konaré has even written to NATO to ask for logistical support to strengthen the African Union forces in Darfur without actual ground deployment of NATO, only as an intermediary step while waiting for an expeditious transition to the United Nations peacekeeping force. We were also encouraged by the African Union not only to continue working on the political and operational aspects in the partnership with the United Nations Security Council, but also with regard to the need to stabilize hard-won peace and peacekeeping initiatives and especially the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in subsequent cases in various parts of the continent. As Ambassador Jones Parry pointed out, the issue of Somalia was drawn to our attention as fighting was raging in Mogadishu and beyond. At this stage, the hope for moving the Abuja peace process forward resides with the African Union. We hope that there will be positive outcomes from the assessment mission and that President Konaré’s visit to Khartoum before the summit in Banjul will push the Sudanese forward and convince them of the need for a greater United Nations presence. As Ambassador de La Sablière pointed out, our visit to Darfur and across to Chad was important in three main respects. The first is the presence of Darfur refugees in Chad, whose loyalty is reflected in the kind of leadership that was participating in Abuja. In the camps that we visited, we saw the contradictory position of demonstrating against the Abuja process and the Abuja Peace Agreement because of the compensation component — which was lacking — and, at the same time, demanding a United Nations presence in Darfur. It should be noted that that can come about only if the United Nations is allowed to participate in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The second challenge is related to the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps. It was scarcely 15 years ago that the Security Council faced a similar situation in the Great Lakes region. Although the situation has not reached that level of insecurity, reports of recruitment and of frequent attacks from across the border make a strong case for serious consideration of how to strengthen the civilian and humanitarian character of these refugee camps in a very volatile situation. President Deby himself has admitted that he is unable to provide the necessary security to the humanitarian staff and the refugees in the camps. Third is the tension developing between Chad and the Sudan. President Deby expressed his intention to register his concerns with the Security Council in writing. This is going to be a difficult issue in an already complicated environment, which the Council must continue to follow. Ambassador de La Sablière took us to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This case is probably one of the most difficult United Nations operations, but could also turn out to be one of the most successful. The parties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are united on the date of 30 June for the elections. There are concerns about campaigning and access to the media for small parties, but there was almost unanimous agreement that there should be adequate consultations in the next few weeks before the elections so that the issues of access and intimidation are appropriately addressed. The presence of the 17,000-strong force of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), a European force and the African Union’s panel of wise men will be powerful factors in maintaining stability during the elections and during the interim period between the first and second rounds of elections. There are still concerns about the professionalism and the competence of the newly integrated brigades of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but we were encouraged by the firm commitment of a number of countries and partners in the international community to build a viable national army. There is still a lot to be desired, especially in the management and governance of the military establishment, particularly the payment of salaries, but this was eloquently brought to the attention of the authorities, and it will continue to be an issue on the agenda well beyond the election period. We had fruitful discussions with international monetary institutions, in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, on issues of governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The issue is on the agenda, but we are dealing with a deeply entrenched culture of non-transparency and opaque administration. In our discussions, we were confident that, after the elections, these issues would continue to be addressed. We were gratified by the great confidence shown in the Security Council and by the fact that the support that the Security Council is receiving from neighbouring countries is bringing about a unique opportunity for a peaceful transition and the stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To sum up, I would say that this mission, covering several countries in a very few days, did indeed advance our objectives, and the challenge before us would be to catalyse bilateral diplomatic initiatives in connection with the United Nations and the African Union, to see how the Abuja peace process can be moved forward and also to ensure that the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo goes according to schedule.

I thank Ambassador Mahiga for his statement. There are no more speakers on the list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.