S/PV.582 Security Council

The members of the Couneil have before' them the provisional agenda, consisting of four items, contained in document SIAgenda 581. If there al'e no objections, th!;) agenda will be regarded as adopted. 2. The USSR delegation expressed its views on item 4 of the provisional agenda at the preceding meeting. 3. Mr. GROSS (United States of America): The United States delegation, as it did this morning, reserves exactly the scune right in not opposing the adoption of the agenda. I reserve the right of my dele- gation to request the Securii;r Cauncil to take up the item concerning the investigation of the charges of germ ''''l1'fare immediately following the conclusion of the pending item.

We shall return t'J that question àfter we have con- cluded consideration of item 2 of the agenda. With the reservations made by the USSR and United States delegations, we shall consider the provisional agenda adopted. But we still have to hear the interpretation into English of the statement made by the French repl'esentàtive at this morning's meeting. We shall therefore begin with the interpr<etation, after which l shall calI on the reJ)rèsentative of Pakistan. o •• TJiè 'flg~nda wàs'a4opted. Question of an appeal to S~ates to accede to and , ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of ·t.he, -qse of bacterial weaponl!l (continuetl) , . . ' . . ." . ,. .. The' interpretcidon int~ English ,was givet~ of the statementmade by the representative of France at the end ofihu 581sf1;teeting (paragra.phs (7 tf) 93). ' 5. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan): My delegation wOllld like to make a statement on item 2 of the agenda, "Question of an appeal to States to accede to and ratify Président: M. Y. MALIK (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques). Présents: Les représentants des pays suivantE. Brésil, Chili, Chine, France, Grèc~, Pays"Bas, Pakistan, Turquie, Union des Républiq,ues socialistes soviétiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande"Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. L'ordre du jour est celui dB la 581ème séance. Adoption de l'ordre du jGBr 1. Le PRESIDEN1' (traduit du russe): Les membres àu Conseil de sécurité sont en possession de l'ordre du jour provisoire, qui fait l'objet du document S/Agenda 582 et qui comprend quatre points. S'il n'y a pas d'objections, je considère l'ordre du jour comme adopté. 2. En ce qui concerne le point 4 de l'ordre du jour provisoire.. la délégation de l'URSS a précisé son attitude au cours de la séance précédente. 3. M. GROSS (Etats~Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'anglais): La délégation des Etats-Unis n'élève pas d'objection contre l'adoption de l'ordre du jour, mais elle formule à ce sujet les mêmes réserves que ce matin. Je réserve le droit que ma délégation a de demander au Conseil de sécurité d'aborder, dès qu'il aura fini d'examiner le point 2, la discussion de la question d'une enquête au sujet d'un prétendu recours à la guerre bactérienne. ' 4. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du russe): Nous revien- drons à cette question 101'sque nous aurons terminé l'examen du point 2 de l'ordre du jour. Compte tenu des réserves formulées par la délegation dè l'Union soviétique et par celle des Etats-Unis, je déclare adopté l'ordre du jour du Conseil de sécurité. Cependant, il doit encore être procédé à l'interprétation du discours que le représentant de la France a prononcé ce matin. Nous allons donc commencer par cette interprétation. Proposition tendant à inviter les Etats à adhérer au Protocole de Genève de 1925 concernant la . prohibitio~ de l'arme bactérienne ,et à .ratîfier . ledit protocole (.sùitè) , ':.;";-:' ." " ~. 1 • Il est d,inné' leeturède'l'interprétation en anglaisâe la déclaration p1'ononcée par le représentant de la France à la 581ème séance du Conseil (paragraphes 77 ~ 93). 5. M. BOKHARI (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais): Ma délégation tient à présenter quelques observations au sujet du point 2 de l'ordre du jour, intitulé "Propo- 6. At the very outset will you permit my delegation ta. say that, in spite of the very clear statements made and in spite of our great care in studying them, two points, to us, remain obscure. First, it remains obscure to us why the Soviet Union delegation chose to pro- pose this item nt this time. Secondly, it remains obscure to us why the United States did not ratify this Protocol. l will try to understand, for the sake of our own con- science, whether there is any significance, deliberate or accidentaI, to be attached to these two obscurities. My delegation has no hesitation in believing that the Soviet Umon delegation proposed this item for the best and the most humanitarian purposes. If that was to he believed-and my de1egation, as l said~ could have no hesitation in believing it - it is immaterial whether such a suggestion is made today, ten years aga or ten y~ars hence. N ev~rtheless. it is difficult for the human mind to dissàciate an item like this from the general picture of worldevents as they exist today. Whatever the best intentions of the Soviet Union delegation may have been, it could not have but stnick the ordinary person- the ordinary man in the street, the common man in the world -t- that there is an association, at least outsidethis Councl!, hetween this item and the general talk about germ "tarfare that has been going on for a number of months,. Therefore, we cannot pretend that we should speak Q.lp- this item without taking into con- sideration the con'Fext af the situation. 1. 1 l' 7. That being so, 1N-e must ask ourselves whether there were some sinister' motives hehind the United. States' failure ta.ratify the Geneva Protoê:àl. On that questiôn again, as 1 said, although the actual reasons why this Protocol was n,ot ratified by the United States remain to meobsœr~,l1everthelesswe hàve not the slightest daubt that thejr were in no way sinister. AlsoWe have not theslightest doubt that raising this question at this time withthe best· of intentions could not serve any useful purpose. Therefore, although 1 will give tb.e Soviet. Uni<lŒl de1egation. the fullest credit for briflYJ"ing ~bis ques50n forw?1'd, l would certainly daim the i-ight to ~y that this ie ill-titned. VVhy is it ill-timed? Be- délé~ation de l'Union soviétique a propose au Conseil de se~urité d'inscrire à l'ordre du jour. De1?uis que le Conseil a comm;o:ncé d'examiner cette questIon, il y a quelques jours [577ème séance], les escarmouches de procédure ont été si nombreuses que nous devons faire un certain effort de mémoire pour nous souvenir de toutes les déclarations que nQUS avons entendues à son sujet. Nous nous rappelons très bien, néanmoins, la déclaration que le President a prononcée en sa qualité de représentant de l'Union soviétique, et celle de M. Gross, représentant des Etats-Unis. Nous avons écouté ces deux orateurs avec la plus grande attention, et nO\,lS avons étudié le texte de leurs interventions avec un soia plus grand encore. 6. Vous voudrez bien me permettre de déclarer, dès le début, qu'en dépit de la clarté avec laquelle se sont exprimés les orateurs et du soin que ma délégation a mis à étudier leurs paroles, deux questions nous parai.ssent encore obscures. En premier lieu, nous n'avons toujours pas compris pourquoi la délégation de l'Union soviétique a décidé de soulever cette ques- tion de l'adhésion au Protocole de Genève au moment où elle ra fait. Ensuite, nous ignorons toujours les raisons pour lesquelles les Etats-Unis n'ont pas ratifié ledit protocole. Je veux essayer de discerner, par un souci de probité intellectuelle, s'il convient d'attacher un sens, voulu ou fortuit, au fait que ces deux questions n'ont pas été jusqu'à présent éclaircies. Ma délégation est toute disposée à croire que la délégation de l'Union soviétique était animée par des préoccupations très nobles et hautement humanitaires lorsqu'elle a demandé que la question fût inscrite à l'ordre du jour. S'il en est vraiment ainsi - et, je le répète, ma délégation ne demande pas mieux que de le croire - peu importe le moment chdsi pour faire cette proposition, qu'elle soit présentée aujourd'hui, qu'elle l'ait eté il y a dix ans ou C).u'elle le soit dans .dix ans d'ici. L'esprit humain eprouve néanmoins une certaine difficulté à dissocier une proposition de cette nature de l'ensemble des événe- ments mondiaux actuels. Si généreuses que puissent être les intentions de la délégation de l'Union sovié- tique, l'homme moyen -l'homme de la rue, M. Tout- le..;monde - ne pourra s'empêcher de découvrir un rapport, du moins en dehors du Conseil, entre la propo- sition de l'Union soviétique et la guerre bactérienne dont il a été si souvent question depuis plusieurs mois. C'est pourquoi nous ne pouvons prétetldre que l'on peut traiter de la question de l'adhésiol' au Protocole de Genève sans prendre en co~.•sidératîon l'ensemble de la situation mondiale actuelle. 7. Puisqu'il en est ainsi, nous devons nous demander si les Etats-Unis Otlt 6béi à des motifs sinistres en ne ratifiant pas le Protocole de Genève. Là encore, comme je l'ai déjà dit, bien que les raisons véritables pour lesquelles les Etats-Unisn'ont pas ratifié le protocole demeurent pour moi obscures, il ne fait aucun doute pour nous qu'elles n'ont rien de sinistre. Il ne fait pas non· plu.s le moindre doute pour nous, qu'à soulever cette question maintenant, avec les meilleures des inten- tions, on ne peut faire œuvre utile. C'est pourquoi, tien que je reconnaisse à la délégation de l'Union soviétique tout le mérite d'avoir proposé au Conseil d'examiner cette questioll, Je l1l€l crQiacertainement endroit de dire- 8. l am sure that everybody around this table has read thé Geneva Protocol. l may say that my country is a party to the Geneva Protocol. It has signed and ratified It or, as a successor to British India, is deemed to have signed and ratified it, and we stand by the agreement. Therefore, l am not trying to run down a Protocol to which my country is a party. l think that the Protocol, nt the time when it was signed, was probably the best thing that could be contrived in order to keep certain awful aspects of war in abeyance. 9. Let us study that Protocol a little more. The preamble of the Protocol says that the general opinion of the civilized world has justly condemned the use of poison gas or the use of bacteria hl warfnre. The Pro- tocol starts on a very high moral tone and, States and governments apart, l do not belieVf~ that there is any honest civilized ht1l11an being in the world who can contemplate such a war without extreme repugnance and horror. But does the Protocol itself live up to the high moral tone it adopted in the beginning? III many cases it does not. A large number of States, in agreeing ta it, have alsa entered certain reservations. Those reservations are of two kinds. l will try to paraphrase them. 10. The first reservation is: l agree not to use this if you a!so agree not to use it. Therefore this means: l will be dvilized if you will agree not to use gas or bacteria ;'but, if you do, l have the right to be uncivilized. In other words, this was a compromise between the world'fj conscience and power politics. n.The second reservation is even more curious. It says: If you start using this ldnd of material, l will use it too. In other words, the Geneva Protocol is not a protocol to end bacterial warfare or to end poison- gas warfare. It is a protocol which merely says: Let us beware of each other. It is a protocol in which retaliation and repl'isals are regulated. Will such a protocol be of any use today? This is not a matter of opinion; it is a matter of fact, and 1 think most people will be surprised to learn it, that amongst the States which signed this Protocol without any reservations whatsoever, unconditionally, were Italy and Ethiopia. Have we to remind ourselves what use Italy made of this Protocol during the Ethiopian war? Do we have to ask ourselves if this Protocol restrained Italy? Can anybody pretend that Ethiopia was, or could have been, the first ta do this? The Protocol did not stop Italy from visiting horrors upon the Ethiopian people. Sup- pose today everybody signs this Protocol. Can the world be sure that the situation will be any better than it was between Italy and Ethiopia artel' both of them 'had signed this Protocol unconditionally? Therefore, al- though the United States of America - and indeed certain other States - may not have ratified this Pro- tocol at some time for l'easons best known to them- selves, today it is useless toask thtlll1.tO ratify it. Tt ~aYcsatisfy somepeopîe to ask fhose States which have not ratified the Protocol to ratify it now, but l assure ~ualité de successeur de l'Inde britarmique, il est réputé 1avoir signé et ratifié i nous nous considérons comme liés par cet accord. Je n'essaie donc pas de discréditer un pi\ltocole auquel mon pays est partie. Je crois que, quand il a éte signé, le Protocole de Genève était le meilleur instrument qui pût être conçu pour tenir en échec certains Jes aspects les plus effroyables de la guerre. 9. Etudions donc ce protocole. Le préambule déclare que l'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants ou toxiques, ainsi que de moyens bactériologiques, a été à justf.l titre condamné par l'opinion générale du monde civilisé. Le début du protocole est empreint d'une grande élévation morale, et, Etats et gouvernements mis à part, je ne crois pas qu'il soit au monde un seul être humain, sincère et civilisé, qui envisage une telle guerre sans une répugnance et une horreur extrêmes. Cependant, tout ce qui touche le protocole lui-même reste-t-il toujours empreint de cette élévation morale qui apparaît dans son préambule? Bien souvent, il n'en est rien. Nombreux sont les Etats qui, en le ratifiant, ont aussi formulé certaines réserves. Ces réserves sont de deux sortes. J'essaierai d'en donner une paraphrase. 10. La première réserve est la suivante: j'accepte de ne pas employer ces armes si, VOl.'S aussi, vous l'acceptez. Ce qui revient à dire: je me conduirai comllle un homme civilisé si vous acceptez de ne pas employer les gaz ou les armes bactériennes; sinon, j'ai lt~ droit de ne pas me conduire comme un homme civilisé, En d'autres terme,;, il s'agit d'un compromis entre la c-Qnscience du monde et la politique de force. 11. La deuxième réserve est même plus curieuse. Elle consiste à dire: si vous commencez à employer ce genre d'armes, je les emploierai aussi. En d'autres termes, le Protocole de Genève n'était pas destiné à mettre fin à la guerre bactérienne ou à la guerre des gaz asphyxiants. Ce protocole dit simplement: prenons garde l'un à l'autre. C'était un protocole qui augmen- tait les mesures de représailles. Un protocole de ce genre nous sera-t-il utile aujourd'hui? Ce n'est pas là une question de point de vue; c'est une question de fait, et je pense que la plupart des gens seront surpris d'apprendre que l'Italie et l'Ethiopie sont au nombre des Etats qui ont signé ce protocole sans aucune réserve. Devons-nous 110US rappeler de quelle manière l'Italie a appliqué le protocole pendant la guerre d'Ethiopie? Devons-nous nous demander si ce protocole a arrêté l'Italie? Quelqu'u11 peut-il prétendre que l'Ethiopie a été ou aurait pu être la première à employer les gaz asphyxiants? Le protocole n'a pas sl.ffi à lempêcher l'Italie de faire connaître cette horreur au peuple éthiopien. Supposons qu'aujourd'hui tous les Etats signent ce protocole. Le monde.peut-il être sûr que la situation sera meilleure qu'elle ne l'a été pour l'Italie et l'Ethiopie après que ces pays ont signé le protocole sans formulerdet:éserve? En ~ol1séquël1Ce, bien que les Etats-Unis - et certains autres Etats - n'aient peut-être pas ratifié ce protocole·à une certaine époque pour des raiSOllS qu'ils connaissent mieux que qui- 12. Therefore, those nations, amongst them my own, which for a long time ta come - as far as l can see- cannot physkally be in a position to use bacteria or poison gases on other nations, can only be the victims of such things - it would not satisfy them if this Pro- tocol were signed ten times over, because we have seen it broken, we have seen poison gas being used and we see the possibility of bacteria being used in any major wortd cOllflict in the future, in spite of it. Therefore, there is a difference between 1925 and 1952 worth con- sidering by those like yourself, who would like to put an end to this condition for humanitarian reasons. If the Soviet Union delegation or any other delegation has those motives in mind, they will find ample support all over the world. But if those are our motives, we have to adopt other methods. 13. The smaller nations of the world, the people who are neither in a position to start a world war nor in a position to stop one, will want much greater guarantees from the people concemed. They would not be sati:,fied even if the Soviet Union and the United States Gov- ernment agreed amongst themselves to sign a protocol today forbidding the use of bacterial warfare and the use of poison gas. Even if those Governments were satisfied, the l'est of the world would not be. The l'est of the world will say: You have signed this protocol; we have seen many such protocols signed in the past; there isno telling that you will not breal{ it tomûrrow, and when you break this protocol- eith\lr of you- we shall he always amongst the sufferers and, heing helpless people, will be amongst the greatest sufferers. Therefore, tr'day, we the smaller l"'itions of the world insist that we should get on to a stage where such guarantees can be given in a manner which will ease the tension in the world and dispel anxiety. 14. That beirig the case; we think that bacterial war- fare, poison-gas warfare, the use of atom bombs, the use of unusual methods and the use of heavy arma- ments are all various sectors of one question, that ques- tion being that certain major Powers in the world, be- cause of mutual fears· and suspicions, are arming. l have ho doubt they have their awn reasons for arming; but, whatever their reasons, every time they add· ta their armaments the world trembles beèause itknows very weU that thesearms,afterail; are meant ta be ·tlsed, and God 1010WS how soon they are going to be used. Therefore, it is tiot necessary merely ta sign papers today. It is necessary ta take measures which will stop the arms race, which will stop the maunting tension and which will stop the sfockpiling of instru- gu~rre,car' tout en ne sachant pas à quel moment on les utilisera, le monde n'ignore nullement que ces armes sont faites, après tout, pour servir. Il ne suffit donc plus aujourd'hui qu'un Etat appose sa signature à un 15. We know very weIl that the Disarmament Com- mission has been moving' extremely slowly and extremely unsatisfactorily. It has taken much tao long, and there has been hardly any measure of agreement in the Disarmament Commission which should g'Îve any satisfaction ta people all over the world. Never- theless, Wl?: still think that there is a great deal of hard work that can be done there. If that effort fails, if the l'esolve of the people that the great Powers of the world should come ta a peaceful understanding fails, let that failure take place in the right forum. Let it fail in the Disarmament Commission where the total prob- lem will be studied and handled as the biggest major pl'oblem of the world today. Therefore, we have not the slightest hesitation in supporting any proposaI that may be made that this - and indeed any other matter of this kind - should be referred to the 'Dis- al'mament Commission to be dealt with there. 16. We want to add one more word, and that is that, if we support, as indeed we do, the pr{}posal that this item should be referred to the Disarmament Commis- sion, we do not do sa for procedural ease. We do not do so in' order to shirk our work here. In addition we make a very strong and earnest appeal, an appeal such as you would like to have made yourself and which you proposed to make under this item. We make the &ppeal 1 to .th.e Disarmament Commission to tackle this problem along with several others and come to a settlement whereby three things will be achieved: first, that this terrible arms race will stop; secondly, that the major Powers of the world will act1.!~ l1y begin ta share with the l'est of the world the abhorrence·of using arms of mass destruction; and thirdly, that the agreements arrived at will not be on paper only but will take a shape and form which will assure the major Powets as weU as the l'est of the world that there are practical checks on aU the major Powers, checks not only for their own safety but for the peace and the safety of the l'est of the w()rld. If these three things can be achieved in the Disarmament Commission, we can sit back in the Security Council on this and other matters. 17. Therefore, l repeat, we strongly support referring this question to the Disarmament Commission not, as l said, in arder ta saveourselves work here or to shirk our responsibility here, but because we think that Commission is the forum where this matter should be takèn up,along with other similar matters of equal importance and of grea!: concern to the whole of the ' world.

l d\':l not wish to make a statement at this moment, but, in view ot the reference which the President has made to his intention, as representative of the Soviet Union, ta make a concluding statement, l simp1y want to reserve the right of the United States delegation to reply to any statement which the representative of the Soviet Union may make and to which my delegation may feel it desirable to reply.

Naturally, under the ntles of procedure and in ac- cordance with the Council's practice, that is the right of every delegation. 21. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): l wish to make a similar reservation to that just made by my United States colleagl.1e. l reserve the right to reply, if necessary, to any statement which, on my part, may be held to be slanderous in the speech which the repre- sentative af the Soviet Union is now going ta make.

l shall confine myself to the same remark with regard to the statements af bath the United Kingdom and the United States representatives. l can only add that there 1s a popular saying: "If the cap fits, wear it." 23. In its previous statement [579th meeting], the delegatian of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS pointed out that it was precisely the existence of the Geneva Pratocol, and the fact tnat the United Kingdom had ratified the Protocal, which had imposed upon it the undertaking not ta use chemical or bacterial weapons, which restrained the United Kingdom from using these weapons during the Second WarIdWar, notwithstanding that at thetime it had a large stock of chemical bombs at its disposal, as was officially announced by Churchill and confirmed by the United States representative at a previous meeting. 24. This shows how strong· were the undertakings assumed under the Geneva Protocol. This positive faet demonstrates the usefulness and effectiveness of the Geneva Protocol .in assuring the security of the peoples and in protecting them against the use of this weapon of mass destruction. 25. No allegations by the United States representa- tive that the Geneva Protocol cannat prevent the use of bacterial and chemical weapons Can erase this gen- erally recognized atid widely-known fact from the histary of international relations. 27. These facts ,provide a concrete demonstration and confirmation of the force and effectiveness of this inter- national agreement to the whole wodd. Even fascist Germany, at the very outset of the Second World War it had launched, when it was engaged in single combat with the United Kingdom, and despite aU its plans for aggression and invasion, confirmed that if would observe the provisions of the Geneva Protoco!. 28. These historieal facts are such that they cannot be silenced, nor can they be forgotten or concealed by any of the present-day aggressors who are following in the footsteps of fascist Germany in the policy of aggression. 29. l should like to remind the United States repre"- sentative of another well-known fact. But before doing so, 1 shall put a formaI question to him. Did the state- ments by Germany and the United Kingdom, which 1 mentioned earlier, that they would abide by the provisIons of the Geneva Protocol so long as they were not attacked with any of the weapons prohibited under that Protocol, in any way weaken the politieal, inter- national and moral. force of the obligations assumed by those two States under the Geneva Protocol? They certainly did not. 30. Further, 1 should like to remirid the United States representative of a third fact, in case he has forgotten ·it. l'hope, however, that he remembers that President ,Roosevelt' made not one, but two formaI ~tatements in :this, connexiôn 'on behalf of- the United States Govern- 'ment during,the Seèond World War. 31. ,On 6 June '1942, President Roosevelt issued such a stateinent. That statemerit made it dear that in the event that the Japanese .used poisonous substances in .the wari against China,' the' United Stateswoùld take . reprisaIs; A year 'latêi; , on 9 'June 1943,President '"Roosevelt made a similar statement at a press con- ference regarding reprisaIs by the United States if the 'Axis Powers used poisonous substances. l would ask the United States representative whether these state·, ments by President Roosevelt could in any way weaken the obligations imposed by the Geneva Protocoi pro- hibiting the use of poisonous substances and bacterial . weapons. Etat~-Unis. prendraient les' mesures .'de ·represailles vClttlues,'Uria.n plus tard, le 9 juin 1943, le président RMsevk1t, au cours d'une conférence de ,presse, a fait une déclaration· pratiquement identique au sujet des mesures de représailles que les Etats-Unis adopteraient an cas où les Puissaùcesde l'Axe utiliseraient des substances toxiques. Je demande au représentant dc§ Etats-Unis s'il pense que les déclarations précitées du président Roosevelt auraient pu tant soit peu· diminuer ladorce obligatoire du Protocole de Genève q~i stipule l'interdietion de l'emploi des substances toxiques et de l'arme bactérienne? . 36,.. On the other hand, it is general knowledge that evenat .the very end when Japan was Ott thé btink of mi1itary catastrophe and W3.s faced with imminent capitulation, President Truman used the atomic bomb against the peaceful and unarmed Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That action alone brought untold suffering to many thousands of peaceful Japanef5e, to old people,·women and children. l myself have seen sorne of those vktims·of the American atomic bomb. 38. In the light of these facts, the USSR delegation considers it essential to draw the Security Council's special attention to the widely-known fact that during the past few months, or in fact to date, the United States Government has not said one word against the use of bacterial weapons. 39. The question of hacterial weapons has been par- ticularly engaging worlç1 public' opinion for some months now, in fact since 22 February 1952, when the statement by Pak Hen En, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratie Republie of Korea was first officially published. Soon after, on 24 Feb- ruary, an official statement was published on this ques- tion by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in support of Pak Hen En's state- ment. Then, early in March - l believe on 8 March- there appeared a statement by Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People'g Republic of China, coneerning the use of haeterial weapons against the Chînese people by the United States armed forces in China, on Chinese territory. 40. Thus, many months have passed since then- February, March, April, May - and it is now the end of June. However, the United States Government, has so far said not one word against the use of bacterial weapons. It refuses ta condemn the use of this criminal , method of warfare, regardless of what is happening in China and Korea. Up ta this time it has made no state- ment, with or without qualification, that it wil1not use such weapons. The United States Government is keep- ing the silence of the grave on this question. ' 41. In anumber of recent statements concerning bacterial weapons, Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson have been unwilling to speak against the use of such weapons or to denounce this criminal method of waging warfare - irrespective of Korea and China. Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson are not the only ones to keep silent on , thisquestion. United States Senators and Congressmen ' also keeiJ silent. Not pne' of them' has spoken against ·the use of this weapon. Not 'one 'of th~1h so fai: has uttered one vlord in denunciation of this weapon. 42. AIl the candidates for the Presidency or Vice- Presidency of the United States are also silent 'on the question, even in the heat of the election' campaigns and tl:ie ,quest for vo~es. None of these persons, has said ,a ward, with or without qualification, 'against the uSe of bacterial weapons in general and in principle" regardless of what went on or is going on in Korea. 43. Is the silence of United States politicians and military leaders on this important international ques- tion, which· has a direct and immediate bearing on the problem of maintaining and strengthening'peace and security, not significant, irrespective of events in Korea? 39. L'attention de l'opinion internationale se porte sur la question des armes bactériennes depuis plusieurs mois déjà, et plus précisément depuis le mois de février, c'est-à-dire depuis la publication de la prctestation officielle de la République populaire de Corée signée le 2Z février dernier par M. Pak Hen En, Ministre des affaires étrangères de cette république. Cette protes- tation a été suivie le 24 février d'une déclaration du Ministre des àffaires étrangères de la République popu- laire de Chine qui appuyait la déclaration de M. Pall: Hen En. Plus tard encore, au mois de mars, et plus précisément le 8 mars dernier, M. Chou En-Iaï, Ministre des affaires étrangères de la République populaire de Chine, a publié une déclaration touchant l'emploi des armes bactériennes par les forces armées des Etats-Unis contre la Chine et contre le peuple chinois sur le terri- toire !nême de la Chine. ~ , 40. Ainsi donc, plusieurs mois se sont déjà écoulés - février, mars, avril et mai. Nous sommes actuelle- ment au mois de j!lin. Et cependant, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis n'a rien dit jusqu'ici pour condamner les armes bactériennes, qui sont des armes criminelles. Sans égard à ce qui se produit actuellement en Corée et en Chine, il a évité de condamner cette méthode de guerre criminelle. Il n'a toujours pas déclaré qu'il s'abstiendrait de faire usage de ces armes~ que ce soit avec ou sans réserves. Le Gouvemementdes Etats-Unis . garde à ce sujet le silence le plus absolu. 41. Dans les nombreuses déclarations qu'ils ont faites au sujet des armes bactériennes, le .président Truman et M. Acheson ont évité de se prononcer contre l'emploi de ces armes, ils n'ont pas, condamné cette méthode de guerre criminelle - sans'tenir' compte de la Corée et de la Chine. ' M. Truman et M. Acheson ne, sont.pas les seuls à garder le silence à ce sujet.' Il en-estde"Ûlêtne des sénateurs et des' membres·du '.Congrès' dës' Ètât~­ Unis. At\cund~entre' euxn"a pris'1a parôlepoùr"con- damner ces armes. -Ils n'ont fien fait pour·condamner l'e':llploi des armes bactériennes.__ "<_ 42. Les candidâfs à la présidence et 'à lâvicè--pré'si- dence des Etats-Unis gardent eux aussi le &ilenceà ce sujet, .bièn. que la campagrie,'électorâle Datte,:sohpl~in et qu'ds 'cherchent à s'assurer tous"lê~Î sttfftagèspos- sibles. Aucun d'eux n'a ,tien' ait' poilr s'oPposer à l'emploi des armes bactériennes en général, sans égard aux événements qui se sont produits et qui se produisent encore en Corée. 43. Le silence que les politiciens et les militf',ires américains gardent au sujet de cette importante ques- tion internationale, qui intéresse direétement le maintien de .la paix et ~e la sécurité, n'est-il pas 'édifiant,S3J1!? tentr compte des événements de Cqrée? 46. 1t is obvious from: the historical faets that l have cited, all'of which'occurred during the last quarter of a century, that aIl aggressorsl even the fascist aggres- sors, have feared the indelible shame with which world public opinion and the peoples of the world have branded and will doubtless continueto brand, any ag- . gressorwho takes it upon himself ta use shameful, , ~_.,' crimina1~a!!d-I*'ohibited-bacterialorchemiêaI' weaPons and thereby violates the Geneva Protoco1. The aggres- sors have always been frightened atthe wrath and indigtlàtioti of an thepeace-Ioving peoples of the warId against violators of the ban on batterial and chernical weapons. The peoples of the world remember with angerand indignation the German, imperialists and Kaiser Wilhelm, who first used gas against the French at Ypres in the First World VVar. Onlytoday, the Security Council heard a statement about this from Jh~_Fr_enclt.reFt"e5p.ntative--[58-1st-mee-'dng-]. The French cannot fo~get this historical facto 47.' The fierce anger and indignation which'consumed thepeoplès of the world after this barbarous aet of German imperialism compelled statesmen and govern- ments to conc1ude au' international'agreement for the prohibition of chetnical weapons, to extend that' pro- hibitiônto batterial.,weapOns-a step which was taken at Geneva on 17 .January 1925, i.e., after the First' 1;~ior1d War and afterthe lessons of Ypres ~ and to 'maIre a soletnn international promise. not .only toob- serve the provisions of the Geneva' Protocol, but to exert everyèffort to induce all· other States to accede to andtatify that international agreem~t. ,48.,During the êliscussiori in this Council, the United States_representative at.:emptea to 'poiSon international relations ' and, the ,'international atmosphere ,by dis- seminatingtlie aggressive' theory thatinternational agreèments, and the 'Geneva Protocol' in particular,' were "ineffective" and "obsolete". He declared that "this is the year 1952, not the year 1925",. that the reservations to the Gene:yaJ?crotocol were a "fraud and atrick""thatthe Geneva Protocol wasa"paper pledge", and so on and 50 forth. He tried in 1;hïs way ta poison the ,internationalatmosphere and to sow .doubt about 45. Il ressort clairement de tous ces faits que ceux qui se refusent à ratifier le Protocole de Genève et qui sont prêts à employer les armes bactériennes et chimiques sont seuls à déformer la vérité historique, à obscurcir et à empoisonner l'atmosphère internationale au moyen de ,leur propagande mensongère et agressive, pour essayer d'enlever de sa signification à cet instru~ ment international important' qu'est le Protocole de Genève. C'est cette besogne répugnante et dangereuse pour la cause de la paix et de la sécurité internationales que la délégation des Etats-Unis accomplit au Conseil de sécurité. 46. Il ressort des faits que je vieus de cit~t', faits qui appartiennent à l'his1:oire du dernier quart l1~ siècle, que les agresseurs - y compris les agresseurs fas- cistes-- craignaient la honte indélébile dont l'opinion ,publique mondiale et tous les peuples du monde ont stigmatisé et stigmatiseront sans doute toujours tout .agresseUr quise. permettrait d'employer ies armes baè~ tériennes ou chimiques, ces armes interdites, honteuses et crim~nelles, et qui violuait ainsi le Protocole de Genève. Les agresseurs craignaient et craignent encore la colère ,et· l'indignation qu'inspirent à tous les peuples ,du monde épris de liberté ceux qui osent violer .l'inter- diction frappant l'emploi des armes bactériennes et chimiques. Les peuples du monde 'se rappellent avec colère et indignation les impérialistes allemands et le Kaiser Guillaume II qui ont été les premiers à employer des ,gaz .c()nt.re les Français il. Ypres, pendant 'la cc préfuière guerre mondiale. Le représentant de la France au Conseil de sécurité a d'aiileurs traité de cette ques- tion aujoun'l'hui même [581ème séance]. Les Français ne peuvent oublier ce fait historique. 47., La tolère et i;indignation terribles qu'a inspirées aux peuples du monde cet acte barbare de l'impérialisme allemand ont amené les hommes· d'Etat et les gouverne- ments à conclure un accord international. relatif à, l'interdietion de l'arme chimique et à étendre cette interdiction à l'arme bactérienne - ce qui a été fait à Genève, le 17 janvier ·1925, c'est-à-dire après la pre.. mière guerre, mondiale et après 'les leçons d'Ypres...,.... àinsi qu'à: s'engager solennellement~non seulement à observer:rigoureusement les' dispositions du Protocole de Genève, mais· encore à déployer tous leurs efforts pour amener tous les autres Etats à adhérer:à cet accord, international et àJe ratifier. 48. Au cours défios débats, le représentanfdes Etals.. Unis a' cherché àetivenimer les relations entre Etats et l'atmosphère interna.tionale en' général ellprôpageant une, théorie' agressive d'après .laquelle les accords inter- natIonaux, et notamment le Protocole de Genève, seraient "inefficaces" et "tombés en désuétude". Il a déclaré que "nous ne sommes pas en 1925 mais en 1952", que les réserves au,Protocole de Genêveconsti- tuent "une tromperie et unesuperéherie", que le Proto- cole de Genève·n'est qu' "une déclaration sur le papier" etc. C'est ainsi qu'il a cherché à envenimer l'atmôsphère 49. We can thus see how dangerous is this aggressive propaganda of the Unitl'ld States delegation against the strengthening of peace. It influences the least resolute and the weak and they begin to repeat it as gospel truth, although it is not the truth but the base propa- ganda of an aggressoï endeavouring with phrases of this kind to camouflage his aggressive intention to foment war and ta use prohibited weapons. 50. Not one of the representatives of .the countries "which have ratified the Ge.,,\eva Protocol has denied the universally recognized and accepted fact that the Pro- tocol is an important intl'mational agreement designed to strengthen peace and security and that the pro- hibition it contains against the use of chemical and .bacterial weapons has become part of the sY5tem of international relations as an important and universally recognized rule of international law. They have aU reaffirmed on behalf of their governments that theîr States will observe their obligations under the Geneva ~fr\ltocoL This is an. importan~ restilt of 'the discussion in this Couneil, a result of great significance for tlie canse of peace. It is, if you will, a step forward a1png the path of strengthening international peace and security. ' 51. In his attempt to decry the Geneva Protocol, to defame .it and hring it under suspiciDn, to hring under suspicion the obligations which States have assümed under that Protocol, the United States representative found himself ina ,far from, splendid isolaHon. This is a most significant facto 52.' Allthis goes to show that the United States is playing'an .unpopular and dangerous game. The United States, representative and his Government are making these statements' ,in an attempt ta' poison the international atmosphere and to sow the seeds of doubt not :on1y about the GenevaProtocol," but about inter- national obligations in general. Such attempts and activities on the part of the United States, Government require persistent and severe denunciation. The United St<l:tes not only refuses to. ratify the Geneva Protocol ' because of its aggressive policy,but àt thesame time endeavours to sowdistrust and doubt oHhis instrument "in 'other goyernments. 53., This ,perniciousand aggressive propaganda on the part'ûf the ruling cirdes of the ,United States l'uns diJ:ectly counter to the United Nations Charter. One of.theweighty o~ligations of Member Stàfesundér the 51. Lorsqu'il a essayé de minimiser l'importance du Protocole de Genève, de le dénigrer, de semer le doute au sujet de ce protocole et des engagements qui ont été contractés par les gouvernements signataires, le repré~ sentant des Etats-Unis s'est trouvé dans une solitude qui est lom d'êtr.e brillante: Cela est très significatif. 52. Tout ceci prouve qt1e les Etats-Unis jouent un jeu qui n'est pas pl3pula.ire et qui est danger~uX pour la' paix du monde., En exposant des '~onsidérations dè cet. ordre, le représentant, des Etats~Unis et sQngouverne- ment tentent ,d'envenimer Vatmosphère internationale et de, susciter la méfiance,n,ol,1 se1,1lement à l'égard du Protocole de Genève, mais, d'une façon générale, à l'égard <1esobligations internationales. Ces intentions ~t ,ces agissements du Gouvernement:des' Eta'ts':Unis doiventêtie ,examiilésavec la plus grande. attention et être condamnés avec la plusgrànde sévérité. Les Etats- Unis qui, par suite de leur politique agressive, refusent de ratifier le Protocole de Genève, s'efforcent en même temps d~é:veiller,chez lès autres gouvernements la'mé- fiance et .te doute à l'égar'd de ce protocole. 53. Cette propagande néfaste et .agressive des nùlieux dirigeants des :Etats-Unis'est, el;)..contradiction ilagrante avec la Charte des Nations Unies. .Parmi les engage~ ments auxquels les Etat:tMembres ont souscrit en 55. The discussion on this question in the Security Council has shawn that e'Q'en the miHtary allies of the United States, bourid to it by the aggressive North Atlant;c Treaty which the ruling circles of the United States have foisted upon them; refuse to follow the United States on this question. As l have pointed out, they. or at least the majority of tltem, have officially affirmed through their representatives in the Security Cvuncil that they will be faithful to the obligàtions devolving upon them under the Geneva ProtocoI. 56. The ruling circles nf the UHited States should draw the proper conclusion from this fact and there is only one cdnclusion - that .the peoples of the whole world have learned in our time to judgl",=very inter- .national agreement by whether it contributes to the strengthening of. peace and -.;ecurity, or whether it encourages the preparation .and· outbreak of war. This is the true criterion for dJetermining the value and US( ....:Iness of. international agreements. Every ,agree- ment, oId and new, which'could constitute the sIightest obstacle to the preparation and waging of a new world war and ta the use of weapons of mass n.estruction such asbact~ial weapons, mnst berespected and observed. The oti~igations flowing from such an ..international agree.nient must be fu1fi11ed. Thisis where the value and t.tsefulness of these c:greenients lies, as l would Iike ta point out for the hûormation of the representatives whô for unknowll- and .sometimes "we11 known - reasons tise sfiam arguments to underel"l-itnate the importance of the Protôcol. . . 57. Th'4s, the United States :ruling cireles, having cm- ba.!ked on· a "poliQY· ofstrength. andprepareditessfora rtew world.war, .are trying hot only to detrad from the ,GenevaProtocol ànd ta prevent the Unir,':! Staf-s assuming the. undertakingsincumbent on it as a signa- tory of the ProtocGI, but are inciting other Powers ta disre!fard it. The United States is thereby blatantly. violatmgboth the United Naticns Charter and its itit~rnational obligations. argumen~s fallacieux pour minimiser l'importance de ce protocole, je dirai que c'e3t précisément là 01"; résident la valeur et l'utilité de tels accords. . 57.;: Aussi, non setilement les milieux dirigeants 'des Etats-U~üs ~ qui ont adopté une politique de force èt ql'1 ont· pris le parti de préparer une nouvelle'guetre .mGildiale -'- essaient d~ discréditer le Protocole de Genève et d'esquiver les engagements que les Etats- Unis ont assumés en le signant, mais encore ils incitent les autresE'l:ats à faire fi de ce protocole. Par là même, les Etats-Unis commettent uneviolatioll flagrante de la ~harte .des Nations Unies et de leurs engagements mternattonaux.. 59. It is general knowledge, and is no longer a secret to anyone, that the ruling circles in the United States already .consider the United Natio:.s Charter restrictive and unbearable. They signed it not in 1926, as was the case with the Geneva Protocol, but in 1946, and yet, the U~ited Nations Charter is already considered by United States rl.lling circ1es as <lobsolete", "ineffective" and "unbearable". Long ago, therefore, they embarked on a course of breaking down and violating·the Charter on the excuse of "making it more effective" or "com- p,leting" it. One has only to recall the notoriou.'l1 'Uniting for peace" resolution 1 ta see the practical results of this policy. 6ü. They violate the United Natio~:; Charter on the excuse of "making it more effective". Effective for what? To conceal ând ju&tify a policy of aggression. It is common knowledge that the United Nations Wpc: set up 50 that international agreements could be dra\\ _::tp, signed, ratified and theit observance ensured in United Natio~s bodies and through the co-operation of its Mtmber States. 61. AlI the organs of the United Nationsare_dealing w:th these matters, at least the principal ones. If we were to follow the path along which the United States 64. The United States representative passed over in silence the facts adduced in the USSR representative's statement. Yet these facts fully reveal the inconsistency of his arguments and show that the United States' refusaI in the past to ratify the Geneva Protoc01 has been due primarily to its mistrust of other States and ,peoples, its fu.te~tion to use chemical and bacterial wea- pons and .to the pressure exerted by United States chemkal conèerns manufacturing such weapons. The !ine current1y taken in the United States Press and the official statements by l..Jnited. States generals and politi- cians show that that situation has remained unchanged. 65. It sh6uld be pointed out, in this connexion, that a quarter of a century ago, honest voices were' heard in the United States Congress in favour of ratification of the Geneva Protoco1. For example, in January 1927 as can be seen from the Congressional Record) Mr. Bùr- ton, a. member of the House of Representatives from Ohîo, stated that if the United States did not ratify this agreement cr protocol, it would be lacking. in' con- sistency and even fairness in its relations with other countries bècause the, overwhelming majority of 62. Que les impérialistes américains, qui aspirent au- jourd'hui à la domination mondiale, ne se fassent pas d'illusions. Les peuples du monde ne les suivront jamais dans cette voie. 63. Lors d'une précédente séance [579ème séance], j'ai déjà dit que les efforts faits par le représentant des Etats-Unis pour expliquer le refus de son gouverne- ment de ratifier le Protocole de Genève, en affirmant qu'on n'était plus en 1925, mais en 1952, étaient voués à l'échec. Non seulement ces explications sont dépour- vues de fondement, mais encore elles sont maladroites. Ils ne peuvent ni dissimuler ni voiler leurs visées agres- sives. L'histoire et les archives du Congrès démontrent qu'il n'existe aucune différence entre la position que les Etats-Unis ont adopté à l'égard du Protocole de Genève dans le passé et celle qu'ils, adoptent à l'heure actuelle. .64. Le représentant des Etats-Unis a passé sous silence tous les faits cités dans la déclaration du repré- sentant de l'URSS. Or, ce sont précisément ces faits qui révèlent pleinement l'incohérence des arguments du représentant des Etats-Unis et qui démontrent que la méfiance à l'égard des autres Etats et des aùtres peu- ples, l'intention d'employer l'arme chimique et bacté- rienne et l'opposition des trusts chimiques des Et,ats- Unis, fabricants de cette arme, ont· été. la raison principale pour laquelle les' Etats-Unis ont refusé 'de ratifier le Protocole de Genève dans 'le passé. Les communiqués publiés de nos jours dans la presse amé- ricaine et les déeJaratiQns officielles 'des généraux et·des 'hommes d'Et~t a.rn,éricains· démontrent. qù'au fond'ces .raisons n'ont pas changé aujourd'hui. : 65. Il faut rappeler ici qu'à cette érlOque" c'est-à-dire il y a vingt-cinq ans, certaines voix honnêtes se sont cependant fait entendre au Congrès des Etats-Unis en faveur de la ratification du Protocole de Genève. Ainsi, il ressort des proces-verbaux du Congrès qu'en janvier 1927, M. Burton, membre de la Chambre des repré- sentantspour l'Etat d'Ohio, a déclaré que, si les Etats- Unis ne ratifiaient pas cet accord ou ce protocole, ils feraient preuve d'un manque de logique et d'iniquité dans leurs relations avec les autres pays, car la majo- 66. Referring to the Washington Post of 28 No- vember 1926, in which it was reported that the most active propaganda against ratification of the Geneva Protocol was being conducted by the Amedcan Legion, Congressman Burton quoted a passage from that news- paper to the effect that the propaganda was ~eing con- ducted in the name of the American Legion, but not by the Legion itself. It was being directed by a private advertising firm, which had been hired by an organiza- tion of industrialists and chemists. Liaison b,~tween the American Legion and the industrialists anci. chemists was assured by Colonel Thomas Taylor who conducted much of the propaganda against the Protocol concern- ing poison gas. 67. Colonel Taylor was the director of the National Legislative Committee of the American Legion. He was also Treasurer of the National Association for Chemical Defense, the organization which was financing the pro- paganda campaign. It is clear from this extract from a paper published at the time that chemical and indus- trial concerns in the United States were the main opponents of the Geneva Protocol at that time. To please them, the United States Government refused to ratify the Geneva Protocol. 68., Can we really say that the situation has changed since tL:n? Can we real1y say that the industrial and chemical concerns are not the masters of this country now? They deeide the question of war or peace. Con- sequently, they are still the main opponents of ratifica- tion of the Geneva Protocol, and that explains why the United States Government and Congress are refusing to ratify the Protocol now. Those who opposed ratifica- tion in 1926 quoted the opinion of the military experts of that time and with cynical frankness announced their . intention of using chemical gases and gave this as their "argument" for refusing to ratify the Protocol. For example, we see from the Congressional Record of 9 December 1926 that Senator Tyson, in speaking against ratification of the Geneva Protocol, stated that the United States was continuing to produce gas she11s and preparing to use gas. If it was not allo'wed to use gas, aIl the gas shells would be use1ess and the United State's wouldhave to replace them with other types of shells and would lose much more time producing those shells than it had taken to prepare the gas shells. If the United Statesembarked on a war without gas, it would be at least 20 to 30 per cent more costly, and very much more equipment would be required. 70. Such are the explanations aud. intentions of the head of the United States Chemical Warfare Services. This is why he is preparing for chemical warfare and getting ready to use the chemical weapons banned by the Geneva Protocol. They are cheaper, more effective, and more convenient formurderers and aggressors. It is possible to kill more people with chemical weapons and not only to kill people on the field of battle and at the front, but' also to kill them in air raid shelters and gas shelters. That is to say, to kill the peaceful inhabi- tants, ·old people, women and children. 71. These are the objectives, plans and intentions of the United States politicians and military men of today. 72. Isthère really any difference between Senator Tyson's statement in 1926 or 1927 and General Bul- lene's statement in May 1952? There is no difference; bath of them are dreaming of killing as many people as possible with chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. l ask the United States representa- tive; How have circumstances changed between 1925 and 1952? In the light of the concrete faets l have men- tioned there is no change. The circumstances are exactly the same. The policy of the United States Gov- etnment with regard to the Geneva Protoco1 is the same then and now. 73. There îs therefore no difference between cir- èumstances in 1925 and 1926 and circumstances in 1952. There isbut one difference to he noted; in 1926 the United States Congress inc1uded men like Burton, few though they were. Today only men like Tyson are left. Even the Tysons of that time, however, were more honest. They did not play at hide and seek and did not deceive .the American people and public opinion. They called a spade a spade and openly dec1ared;"We are not ·ratifying the Geneva Protocol because we do not trust other .States and nations, because we are· pre- . paring tottse this prohibited weapon, since more people 73. Ainsi, il n'y a aucune différence entre ce qui se passait en 1925 ou en 1926 et ce qui se passe en 1952, si ce n'est qu'en 1926 le Congrès américain disposait, bien qu'elles fussent rares, de personnes ayant les qua- lités de M. Burton. Aujourd'hui, le Congrès n'a que des Tyson. Mais même les, Tyson de l'époque étaient plus honnêtes qu'aujourd'hui. Ils ne fa~saientpas de . prestidigitation, ils ne trompaient pas le peuple amé- ricain et l'opinion publique. Ils appelaient les choses par leur nom et déclaraient franchement; "Nous ne J;a- tifions pas le Protocole de Genève parce que nous ne faisons pas confiance aux autres Etats et aux autres 74. That is how the Tysons spoke in those days. The United States politicians of the present day think and act the same, but try to conceal their aggressive acti- vities under a stream of lies and slanders against the USSR. 75. Hence, the facts l have quoted show that there is not the slightest difference between the United States attitude to the Geneva Protocol in 1925-1926 and its attitude today. Nothing in this attitude has changed, but the world has changed in this quarter of acentury, and not to the advantage of aggressors. Thus they do not risk making such cynical statements as did the Tysons of that time. They are attempting to bring in darkness at noon and to drag in a series of fabri- cated pretexts and explanations. Not one of these explanations, however, is convineing; on the contrary, each of them c1early reveals its authors and exposes the utter worthlessness of their arguments. 76. AU this provides confirmation that the policy of aggression and the policy which serves the intersts of the great monopolies - those blood-thirsty merchants of death - constituted and still constitute the chief reason for the United States refusaI to ratify the Geneva Protocol. 77. In the heat of the argument the United States representative inadvertently, it would seem, let faU the statement [579th meeting] that the Geneva Protocol \Vas a "weU-motivated document". This reservation of lùs merely confirms the correctness of the USSR delegation's position in urging that the Security Council should appeal to all States to accede tu and ratify this "weU-motivated documet't" which has become a rule of internationallaw, binding alike on the practice and the conscience of nations. 77. Da 'IS le feu de la polémique, le représentant des Etats-Dl lis a laissé. échapper - probablement involon- tairemer.t-une phrase [579ème séance] dans laquelle il adit que le Protocole de Genève est un "document qui s'inspire de bonnes intentions". Cet aveu ne fait que confirmer le bien-fondé de l'attitude de la délégation de l'URSS qui insiste pour que le Conseil de sécurité invite tous les Etats à adhérer à ce "document qui s'ins- pire de bonnes intentions" et à le ratifier, pour en faire une règle du droit international ayant force obligatoire pour tous les peuples, sur le plan pratique comme sur le plan moral. 78. Tout en reconnaissant bon gré mal gré que le Protocole de Genève est un "document qui s'inspire de , bonnes intentions", M. Gross s'efforce néanmoins de minimiser l'importance de· cet instrument, Il a essayé à cette fin de présenter un autre argument qu'il a qualifié de nouveau. Il nous a parlé iei d'un contrôle. Il nous a répété au slljet du contrôle ce que rëpète tous les jours M. Cohen, représentant des Etats-Unis à la Commission du désarmement. M. Cohen a en effet pris l'habitude de répéter à la Commission du désarmement que "le contrôle est indispensable", estimant que tout a été prouvé et que tous les argl1ments ont été avancés. Aujourd'hui, au Conseil de sécurité, M. Gross.emploie la même méthode. Mais cette question n'a nullement été inventée par les hommes volitiques actuels des Etats-Unis. Voyons les documents; il s'agit de docu- ments officiels. 79. On sait, par exemple, qu'au mois de septembre 1921, M. Hughes, Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, a proposé un 'Ûrdre du jour provisoire à la conférence .réunie à Washington pour étudier la réduction des arm'Jments. Dès cette époque, cet ordre du jour, pro- 78. While voluntarily or involuntarily acknowledging the Geneva Protcicol ta be a "well-motivated docu- mene', the United States representative is at the same time making every effort to disparage it. To this end he attempted to advarice yet another argument, present- ing it as something new. He spoke about control and repeated in that connexion the statement which Mr. Cohen, the United States representative in the Dis- armament Commission, has been making day after day. In the Disarmament Commission Mr. Cohen has already acquired the habit of uttering three words- "control is essential" and then considering that every- thing has thereby been proved and demonstrated. Mr. Gross repeats that method in the Security Couneil. However, thlS question is certainly not the invention of contemporary United States politieians. Let us look at certain documents, official documents. 79.· 1t is weIl known, for example, that in September 1921, . the United States Secretary of State, MI'. Hughes, proposed the provisional agenda for tlle Washington Disarmament Conference. In that agenda, proposed by the United States Government, was ment~ agressifs dans un torrent de mensonges et de calomnies dirigés contre l'Union soviétique. 75. Il ressort donc des faits que je viens d'indiquer que !'attitude des Etats-Unis à l'égard du Protocole de Genève n'a nullement changé de 1925-1926 à 1952. Rien n'a c:hangé a'~ cours du dernier quart de siècle, sauf le monde. Or, le monde n'a pas changé à l'avan- tage des agresseurs. C'est pourquoi ces derniers ne veulent plus courir le risque de faire des déclarations aussi cyniques que celles des Tyson de l'époque. Ils essaient de donner le change et inventent l'un après l'autre de nouveaux prétextes et de nouvelles explica- tions. Mais aucune de ces explications n'est convain- cante; au contraire, chacune d'elles dénonce ses auteurs et montre combien elle est injustifiable. 76. Tout ceci confirme que la politique d'agression et le désir de servir les intérêts des trusts - ces marchands de mort assoiffés de sang - étaient et sont encore à l'origine du refus que les Etats-Unis ont opposé à la ratification du Protocole de Genève. 80. At the meeting of the Conference on 23 November 1921, Mr. Htlghes proposed that a sub-committee composed of the representatives of the various States attending the Conference should be set up to stttdy and report on the question of using poison gases. The report submitted by the sub-committee stated that the' only real restriction would be entirely to prohibit the use of gas (above aU against non-combatants). On the basis . of that statement agreement was reached on prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and an appropriate article was inclttded in the Washington Treaty of 1922. 81. In 1923, at the fifth International Conference of American States, an agreement was concluded pro- hibiting the use of chemical weapons; it was adopted by seventeen American States. Then, in 1925, the Geneva Protocol was signed. 82. AU these international agreements and, in par- ticular, of course, the Geneva Protocol, introduced into the systenl of international relationships strict inter- national legal standards ensuring the prohibition of chemical and bacterial weapons, which were binding on aU peoples. Thus the question of control is not a new one. The fact that it had not been settled did not prevent the conclusion of international agreements for prohibition at' that time. 83. In view of this generally accepted international rule the Security Council should caU upon aIl States to adhere te} and ratify the Geneva Protocol. Does this mean that this is the extent of its task? By no means. The arguments used by the United States represen- tative, in an effort to cover up the refusal ta ratify, are false, and his references to the need for control and the need for the preparation of a fuUer international agreement on the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction, irrelevant. . 84.. If the United States really is in favour of such an agreement, then why does it .refuse to ratify the Geneva Protocol? One of the representatives here quite . rightly asked this question today. Would ratification of the Geneva Protocol and compliance with its provisions prevent governments whichare members of the Dis- armament Commission, and the United Nations, from continuing their work on a system of control and on a more complete international agreementf No, it would not prevent them at an; on the contrary, the Security Council's call to aU the nations to accede to and ratify the Geneva Protocol notonly would not prevent, but to a large extent would expedite the drafting of a more perfect intern",~ional instrument for the prohibition of every type of weapon of mass destruction. 85. My statement has unfortunately gone on too long and 1 shall be deprived'of the possibility of replying to the French representative's remarks. 1 merely wish to draw attention to the -fact that the French representa- tive stated [581st 'nwet'ing] that, although'he was the rep~~.utativ~ ur a country which has sigl1ed and ratified the Geneva Protocol, he was not offendedby 84. Si tel est l'objectif que visent les Etats-Unis, pourquoi refusent-ils de ratifier le Protocole de Genève? C'est à juste titre qu'un membre du Conseil a aujour- d'hui posé cette question. La ratification du Protocole de Genève et le respect des obligations qui en découlent empêchent-ils dans quelque mesure que ce soit les Etats membres de la Commission du désarmement et l'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies de continuer à élaborer un système de contrôle et à mettre au point des accords internationaux plus satisfaisants? Non;en invitant tous les Etats à adhérer 'au Protocole de Genève et à ratifier ce protocole, le Conseil de sécurité, loin de retarder l'élaboration d'un instrument international plus satisfaisant qui interdira toutes les armes cle destruction massive, favorisera dans une large mesure cette élabo- ration. 85. Je regrette que mon intervention ait été un peu longue et qu'il ne me soit plus guère pOssible. de .ré- pondre en détail aux observations du représentant de la France. Je voudrais sirnplement faire allusion au fait suivant: le représentant de la France a dit [581ème séance] que les observations du représentant des .Etats- Unis au sujet des réserves formttlées ne l'avaient nulle- 87. The French representative tried to explain that it is difficult for him to support the USSR draft resolu- tion [S/2663] because the authors of this resolution are allegedly also the authors of the accusation that the United States Government is allowing its troops to use bacteria! weapons. l do not wish to dwell on this mat- ter 1.11 detail, but would merely like to say that he is sitnply repeating verbatim the slanderous words of the United Statesrepresentative. The United States repre- sentative's statement, however, is mendacious and pure fiction. One need only consult the Security Council and United. Nations documents to see how false and slanderous those statements, are. 88. It is. universally ~nown that on 22. February last . the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratie Republic of Korea officially protested against the use of bacterial weapons. Following this, on 24 February, Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs cf the People's Republic of China made a state- ment in support of that pro~est. A short time later, on 8 M,!-rch, Chou En-Iaipublished his statement pro- testing against the use (If bacterial weapons against the Chinese. people by United States armed forces in China. F~bruary. Notwithstanding thisdocumentary prl,1of, les Etat3-Unis dès le mois de.février dernier.. Néan- however, the United States representative isdistortl\ng moins, le représentant des Etats-Unis déforme la vérité the facts and 1S trying slanderously ta maintain that et déclare faussement que c'est l'Union soviétique qui a these. accusations were launched .by. the Soviet Union. .formulé ces accusations. Cette.affirmation ne correspond l'his .contèntion.bèars no resemblance. to reality and is pas à .la vér~té, elle est inventée de toutes pièces, et je pure imagination from .beginning .to end. - .. tiens àen convaincre le représentant des Etats....Unis. 92. The representatives of the American bloc, in- cluding the representatives of the United Kingdom and France, rejected that proposaI. They voted against it and refused tü consider it. The most determined ob- jection to considering this USSR proposa! came from the United States representative, who apparentlyacted in accordance with the old saying: "The cat knows whose meat he has eatenJl • 93. Now that the Soviet Union delegation is pro- posing in the Security Council an appeal to States to .unite and ratify the Geneva Protocol, regardless of what is happening in Korea and China or what accusa- tions have been brought against the United States by those countries, the United States representative in the Security Co'Uncil, instead of supporting. a proposaI aimed at strengthening international peace and security, opposes the appeal for ratification of the Geneva Pro- tocol and proposes that the USSR draft resolution should be referred to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. 94. What would that achieve? In the United Nations Disarmament Commission the United States represen- tative .voted against the Commission's considering the prohibition of bacterial weapons or the banning of bac- teria! weapons, regardless of what was happening in Korea and China. Here, in the Security Council he abjects ta considering the Geneva Protocol and tries to throw that question back inta the lap of the Commis- sien. It is because of this that the USSR detegàtion said that the United States representative is handli~g this iinportant interp.ational instrument like a football. 95. The USSR de1egation cannot pass over in sil(mce the. remark of the French representative wha went so far as ta compare the' Security Couneil with a back door thrm1gh which someone is allegedly trying to drag sllmething.. In reply to the French representative's remark, .w;\lich l consider' quite inappropriate, l shaH simply refer< to Article 24 of the United Nations Charter,\'Ilhich entrusts the Security Council, as the principal organ of the United Nations, with the task of maintaining international peace and ·security. ·The. Security. Coun~ilhas been· set up. fora mast important "Examen des questions que soulèvent la violation de l'interdiction de la guerre bactérienne, la pré. vention de l'utilisation des armes bactériennes, la nécessité d'amener à répondre de k::ii'S actes ceux qui violent l'interdiction de la guerre bactérienne." 91. Cette proposition de l'Union soviétique ne men. tionnait aucun pays, et il n'y était .uême pas question des Etats-Unis. La délégation de l'URSS l'a soumise en toute objectivité pour appeler l'atten;ion de la Com. mission du désarmement sur l'interdiction des armes bactériennes, sur la prohibition de l'emploi de ces armes et sur les potlrsuites à engager contre tous ceux qui auraient violé cette interdiction. 92.' Les représentants du bloc américain, y compris les représentants du Royaume-Uni et de la France, ont repoussé cette proposition. Ils ont voté contre elle et ont refusé de l'examiner. C'est le représentant des Etat-Unis qui s'est opposé avec le plus d'obstination à l'examen de cette proposition de l'URSS: le coupable sait toujours bien de quoi il retourne. 93. Or, maintenant que la délégation de l'URSS a proposé au Conseil de sécurité d'inviter tous les Etats à adhérer au Protocole de Genève et à le ratifier, sans rattacher cette proposition aux événements de Corée ou aux accusations que la Corée et la Chine avaient portées contre les Etats-Unis, le représentant de ce pays au Conseil de sécurité s'élève contre la ratification du Protocole de Genève et propose de renvoyer cette ques- . tion à la Commission du désarmement, au lieu d'ap- puyer ia proposition de l'URSS qui ~Tjse à renforcer la paix et la sécurité des nations. 94. Quelle est donc la situation? A la Commission du désarmement, le représentant des Etats-Unis a voté contre une proposition invitant la Commission exa- miner la question de l'interdiction des armes .dé- riennes, et il s'est opposé en outre à ce que cette -:om- mission étudiât le principe même de l'interdiction des armes bactériennes, quels que fussent les événements de Corée et dé Chine. lei même, au Conseil de sécurité, il 's'oppose à l'examen de la question du Protocole de Genève, s'efforçant de faire renvoyer ce problème' une fois de plus à la Commission du désarmement. C'est cela qui a permis à la.délégation de l'URSS de déclarer que le réprésentant des Etats-Unis traitait un important document international comme un ballon de football. 95. La délégation de l'Union· soviétique ne saurait passer.sous silence les' déclarations. du. représentant de la France qui s'est permis de comparer le Conseil de sécurité à une petite porte par laquelle d'aucuns cher- cheraient à introduire subrepticement on ne sait quelle proposition. Pour répondre à ces observations du repré- sentant de la France, qui me paraissent d'ailleurs fort ma!avisées,il suffit de rappeler la Charte des Nations Unies dont l'Article 24 cQnfère aU Conseil de sécurité la responsabilité principale du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. C'est pour accomplir cette 96. In conclusion, 1 should like to discuss briefly the United States proposaI to transmit the USSR draft resolution to the United Nations Disarmament Com- mission. The USSR delegation considers this proposaI ta be quite groundless. The United States representa- tive tried to justify his proposaI by referring to role 33 of the Council's rules of procedure [577th meeting], but he must have done so either because of a misunder- standing, or in a deliberate attempt to distort the mean- ing of the Council's rules of procedure. 97. Paragraph 4 of rule 33 provides that the Security Council may taIce a decision lIto refer any matter to a oommittee, to the Secretary-General or to a rappor- teur", This rule derives directly from role 28, which reads: uThe Security Council may appoint p, commis- sion or committee or a rapporteur for a specified ques- tion". In relation to the Council's activities under rule 28, paragraph 4 of role 33 provides that the Coun- cil may refer any question to any committee'or com- mission it has itself set up. 98. The United States representative's proposaI has nathing to do with the above-mentioned rule. It is entirely extraneous. It proposes transmitting the USSR draft 'resolution to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which is.not a commission or a committee set up by the Security CounciI. Consequently rule 33, as weIl as rule 28, does not apply. The United States proposaI is of substance rather than procedural, since it involves a decision by the Council not ta discuss the question and to entrust it to the Disarmanlent Com- mission. This is not, and has never been, a procedural decision. No reference by the United States represen- tative to the rules of procedure will justify that proposaI. 99. in view of these circumstances, the United States proposaI is incorrect in substance, since there is no justification for invoking the rules of procedure, inasmuch as the proposaI i5 one of substance and can- not be justified or cloaked by any fuIes of procedure. 100. .Ta avoid delaying consideration of this and the other items on the agenda, it would be desirable if the United States representative did not maintain his pro- po,~al and did not continue 'to assert that it is a pro- cedural proposaI. In accordance with its sphere of competence and with· its tasks of maintaining and strengthening peace and security, the Security Council is fully entitled to appeal independently to Member States of the United Nations and to non-member States. ,.'l'here is no need. and no justification in law, under the Charter, or in virtue of the rules of procedure, for the Council to transfer this function to any other body. 102. The adoption of such an appeal by the Security Council will help to improve and expedite the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. and, on the other hand, that until the Disarmament Commis- sion and the United Nations have drafted a new and more perfect and comprehensive international instru- ment, the Geneva Protocol, whièh has become P(lxt of the system of international relations, as an important . and universally recognized international mIe, is a use- fuI and important instrument for the purpose of strengthening peace and security and preventing the use of the ineans of warfarè prohibited by the Geneva Protoco!. After the interpretation into E':1glish of the foregoing statement) t~e President continued as follows: 103. The PRESIDENT (translated from Russi<m): The English interpretation ls finished. It has been suggested that the French interpretation should be postponed to the next meeting, and that the next meet- ing should be held at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow. If there are no commentsor objections from the members of the Security Couneil l shall take it that this is· agreed. 104. Sir GladwYl1 JEBB(United Kingdom): l do not know personally what my colle~O'tJes think, but l prefer to meet in the afternoon and not to have all these morning meetings. l do not see any urgency. l think it is good enough ta meet tomorrow afterhaon.

The·work of the Security Council usually proceeds in a verycourteous manner. Whenever any member of the Couneil says that he would like tobegin at some time other than. that originally proposed, his w!shes are generally taken·into account. In accordance with that rule andpracticce, l assume that there is no objec- , tion tothe United Kingdom representative's suggestion . and that wc should meet. at 3 p.m. tomorrow. 106. As there are no objections, the proposaI is ~gQ~~Ih~1:U~~ti~~}s::l,~jo.:trned and the next meet- mg'iiWtll be at 3 p.m.tomorrow, 26 June. ;.,', The meeting rose (lt 6.35 p.m. 104. Sir Gladwyn jEBB (Royaume-Uni) (tradui: de l'anglais): Je ne sais ~s quelle est l'opinion de mes collègues, mais. pour 1;rjapali:" je préférerais que le Conseil se réunisse dans l'apr~s-midi. sans 'tenir .de séance le matin. A mon avis, la question ne présente p~s un caractère d'urgence, et il n'y a pas lieu que nous nous réunissions avant demain après-midi. 105. Le PRESIDENT (traduit d1t russe): Au nom- bre des éléments qui constituent la tradition du Conseit. de sécurité, figure une excellente règle de politesse:· lorsqu'un des membres du Conseil demande, pour des raisons personnelles, que soit modifiée l'heure à laquelle doit se tenir la séance suivante•.i1est généralement tenu compte de ce désir. Dans ces conditions, f4nagin,e.que nous ne verrons aucune raison de ne pas accepter la proposition du représentant du Royautnè-IJ.nj,.qui vou- drait que le Conseil se réunisse demain à 15 heures. 106.I!:u l'absence d'objections, cette proposition. est adoptée. Le Conseil se réunira· demain 26 juin, à 15 heures. La séance est levée à 18 h. 35.