S/PV.5858 Security Council

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, Special Representative of the Secretary- General for Somalia. It is so decided. I invite Mr. Ould Abdallah to take a seat at the Council table. In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. It is so decided. I invite Mr. Mulet to take a seat at the Council table. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. Members of the Council have before them document S/2008/178, containing the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, and Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. I now give the floor to Mr. Ould Abdallah. Mr. Ould Abdallah: Last week, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government announced its reconciliation strategy, which involves local peacemaking within the country and talks with the external opposition. That was widely welcomed. The Government’s plan called for me to lead that process, and I am fully committed to helping the various parties come together for preliminary talks. I hope to determine the timing and location of those discussions soon. In that connection, I would like to congratulate the Somalis themselves, my fellow diplomats in charge of Somalia and the members of the International Contact Group. When I addressed the Security Council last December, I called for an end to the costly 17 years of a business-as-usual policy that has yet to bring peace to the country. Since I made that speech, there has been a new approach to addressing the conflict and some indications of progress both inside and outside the country. In full agreement with President Yusuf, Prime Minister Hussein has chosen a new and leaner Cabinet, half of whose members come from outside the parliament. It was welcomed both nationally and internationally. In another sign of progress, the Government moved to Mogadishu in January. I spent three days in Somalia recently and held joint discussions with the President, the Speaker and the Prime Minister, who assured me of their commitment to reconciliation. I addressed the parliament, which is backing the peace initiative. I also held meetings with the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. I am continuing to engage in regular contacts with all sides. I visited Brussels, Cairo and Addis Ababa for consultations with Governments and international organizations. I will soon go to other countries, including the United Republic of Tanzania, which is chairing the African Union. Up until now, international attention has essentially focused on Somalia’s failings. In order to do justice to the people’s resilience and courage, I broadened the agenda by organizing a conference of Somali and international businesspeople in January, to discuss how the private sector can help move the country from a wartime to a peacetime economy. Building on the success of that conference, I am convening a larger follow-up summit later next week, which will be opened by the Somali Prime Minister and attended by international figures. We need to recognize and encourage the efforts made by Somalis themselves in terms of trade, telecommunications and infrastructure. They are encouraging developments, but they are not enough. While more people are now talking about Somalia, there is little action to stop the violence and opportunism. I believe that Somalia remains a prisoner of the past, never having been forgiven for the violent actions carried out against the international community in the 1990s. There is, it seems, either a reluctance to go back there or a deliberate decision to punish all Somalis, many of whom had not even been born when the last international intervention occurred. What is needed now is engagement by the international community. I am not asking outside countries to become active for moral or altruistic reasons. They have a clearly mandated responsibility to become involved in a country where there are widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The concept of the responsibility to protect was adopted at the 2005 World Summit of leaders and later endorsed by the Security Council. Indeed, today too much time is spent collecting numbers and statistics concerning the suffering of the Somali people. The real battle to be won is the battle to be close to and to protect the victims of armed violence, human rights abuses, drought and famine. In my last speech I called for simultaneous action on the political and security fronts. Those two tracks are undoubtedly closely intertwined. Today we have some progress on the political front with the Government reconciliation plan. As the two tracks should advance together and reinforce each other, there is a need for similar action on the security front. Acting only on one of them — the political front — is like limping along on one leg. The Ugandan and Burundian troops are doing an excellent job, which is clearly the responsibility of the whole international community. They deserve our thanks. Indeed, as indicated in the letter of 20 September 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, the security options should not be limited only to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) or United Nations troops. A strong interim multinational presence could also be an option. This would involve the friends of Somalia contributing political support, funds and troops to stabilize the situation, preferably under a lead country. I will continue my efforts in that direction. More can be done to protect ships carrying humanitarian assistance, as initiated by France last December. Denmark has now taken over the same task of escorting ships, and I understand that the Netherlands has volunteered to continue the work. I believe that such protection should be expanded into a United Nations task force, the mission of which would be to protect United Nations humanitarian supplies, deter human smuggling, reduce piracy and support the arms embargo. I have just engaged the services of a retired general to prepare a paper on piracy off the Somali coast. For our work to be truly credible, we need to deploy many more international staff inside the country. That concerns the whole United Nations country team — and, indeed, my office — and would follow the example of the respected International Committee of the Red Cross in Mogadishu. Being far more visible inside the country would allow all of us to closely engage with Somalis, identify their needs, assist them and restore the reputation of the United Nations. No other institution would benefit more from such a move than the Security Council, which, in my opinion, should visit Somalia this year. To facilitate those efforts to improve stability and encourage increased the numbers of international staff in Somalia, we will need to accelerate security sector reform and the training of the police force. I see all the measures I have just mentioned as a series of peacebuilding steps that can be undertaken in the short term and would help stability. The international community also needs to address the question of impunity. Countless lives have been lost and thousands forced from their homes. Those responsible for the violence continue to profit from the misery of others. We have appeased the warlords, the extremists and the spoilers for too long by wielding the carrot but not the stick. Those who have carried out war crimes and crimes against humanity need to be brought to account through the International Criminal Court or another international or local body. There could be a commission of inquiry to look into the most serious crimes. The independent expert could also be more involved in addressing the issue of human rights. Those solutions cannot all be imposed from outside. Somalis themselves need to change their approach. The “winner-takes-all” attitude, which leaves no room for power-sharing, has destroyed the country and its reputation. Compromise in negotiation, as demonstrated in the Agreement of Al Hudaibiyya — which is very important in Muslim countries — between the Prophet Mohammed and the people of Mecca, would benefit everyone. Reconciliation will profit all, from businessman and farmers to politicians and warlords. Obviously the situation in Somalia is very complex. Our analysis should therefore not be based on partisan or inaccurate news reports, which are particularly popular with computer users. To enable us to make the right decisions, a level-headed analysis should be based on firsthand information and expertise on the issues and in the field. An ideological or dogmatic approach should give way to continued flexibility and due respect for the basic United Nations principles of caring for populations and maintaining peace. In conclusion, Mr. President, in the past, your country has helped Somalia, in particular with building airports, which we still use today for travel to the country. Under your presidency, it would be symbolic if the whole Council could agree on concrete steps to show the same compassion for Somalia and its people as it has demonstrated elsewhere in Africa.

I now give the floor to Mr. Mulet.

Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for having granted me this opportunity to present to Council members the recommendations of the fact-finding mission to Somalia, which was led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The mission was dispatched in response to the presidential statement of 19 December 2007 (S/PRST/2007/49), in which you tasked the Secretariat to consider further support to the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and to update contingency planning for a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM. The mission visited the region from 7 to 25 January 2008 and consulted the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, the African Union and regional and Somali stakeholders. The mission visited Merka, Baidoa and Kismayo and spent three days in Mogadishu, where it met with the Prime Minister and other Government Ministers and assessed the security situation on the ground. It was the first United Nations mission to visit Kismayo since the resumption of armed conflict at the start of the second half of 2006. In Mogadishu, the team visited various districts of the capital to assess the security situation. In assessing possibilities for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the fact-finding mission conducted a comprehensive analysis of the security situation, including threats and risks to the security of United Nations personnel. In that regard, it is important to note that the situation is not the same throughout the country. Security conditions in the north are relatively more stable than those in central and southern Somalia. In those areas, the conflict remains extremely complex, characterized by inextricable alliances between clans, sub-clans and extremist elements, fighting for control of political and economic space, and temporary alliances of some groups, aimed at forcing the withdrawal of the Ethiopian Armed Forces from the country. As the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has limited capacity to regulate economic activity and maintain law and order, criminal and other armed elements are free to control the collection of revenues from customs, the port and commerce, as well as those generated by and water and land distribution. In addition, such groups engage in the trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings. Political tensions within and between clans are driven by control over resources. In many cases such tensions are linked to the activities of criminal and insurgent elements but cannot be separated from them. (spoke in English) The continued threat of abduction, kidnapping and extortion limits the capacity of United Nations and humanitarian agencies to operate in the country. At the same time, the United Nations country team estimates that the size of the population in need of humanitarian aid is now approaching 2 million people. The general security trend in Mogadishu appears proportional to the level of military efforts undertaken by the Ethiopian armed forces and the Transitional Federal Government coalition to defeat the anti- Government elements or conduct forcible disarmament. Between June and September 2007, there was a sharp increase in standoff attacks, improvised explosive device incidents, mine attacks and assassinations, but a marked decrease in armed clashes. Since September, concerted efforts by the Ethiopian armed forces and the actions of the TFG against anti-Government elements within Mogadishu have increased. Of note is the fact that, during the last quarter of 2007, attacks by anti- Government elements became more coordinated and began to be conducted during daylight hours. Security incidents occur almost daily, mostly by insurgents targeting TFG elements, as well as Ethiopian and AMISOM personnel. On 8 and 9 February 2008, the United Nations common compound was targeted by hand grenade and improvised explosive device attacks. Threats against the United Nations have also appeared on Islamist websites. In summary, while the Transitional Federal Government has made some progress in its efforts to start an inclusive and viable peace process by reaching out to opposition groups, the security situation in many parts of Somalia, particularly in the capital of Mogadishu, remains complex, volatile and unpredictable. Due to the complexity of the conflict, shifting alliances and extremist activity, the situation in south and central Somalia can change daily, making any location that is safe one day potentially dangerous the next. I would now like to refer to the contingency plans for a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation. Possible future developments are presented in the annex to the report before the Council under four scenarios, leading up to the possibility of deploying of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Based on those scenarios, the Secretariat has further developed contingency plans on the support that could be provided by the international community to the peace process in Somalia. Scenario 1 generally represents the current situation in Somalia. The TFG, with the support of national and international partners, continues to work on the development of an inclusive and viable political process, including by initiating dialogue. Meanwhile, the security situation remains volatile. Under this scenario, the current security situation does not allow for deployment of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and United Nations country team personnel in Mogadishu and the south and central parts of the country. However, the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), in consultation with the designated official, could develop viable options for security arrangements that would allow a limited number of UNPOS staff and United Nations country team members to relocate from Nairobi to Mogadishu and other parts of south and central Somalia. The relocation would enable the United Nations to effectively facilitate the mediation efforts on the ground and address critical gaps in humanitarian and recovery assistance. The Security Council may also consider the establishment of a maritime task force, formalizing the unilateral initiatives presently being undertaken by individual Member States, either as a United Nations task force or as an international task force under a United Nations mandate. This contingency arrangement would also provide medical, logistic and in extremis support for United Nations personnel in Somalia. Scenario 2 envisages a measured improvement in the political process, with at least a critical mass of the opposition parties supporting political dialogue. Under this scenario, while the security situation would still be volatile, dialogue on security arrangements would have commenced, creating the conditions necessary for strengthening the United Nations presence in Mogadishu and other areas of south and central Somalia. The objective under the contingency plan in this scenario would be for the United Nations to further enhance its political support to the peace process through the relocation of UNPOS headquarters — in addition to the limited number of personnel initially deployed under scenario 1 — to Mogadishu in order to facilitate political dialogue on the ground. Subject to the presence required, security arrangements could take considerable time to put in place and entail a major investment in resources and physical protection measures. This further assessment will be undertaken by DSS during the month of April, in close consultation with the Department of Political Affairs, UNPOS, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Scenario 3 envisages a measured improvement in both the political and security situations and the acceptance and implementation by the major clans and factions, including a critical mass of armed opposition groups, of a code of conduct on the use of arms. While that may be short of a full security agreement — a ceasefire and/or the cessation of hostilities — it would establish a minimum code of behaviour among the armed groups, including a commitment not to attack United Nations and humanitarian personnel. The Ethiopian Government and the TFG would have indicated readiness to consider a phased withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu. Under this scenario it is assumed that the political dialogue between the Government and the opposition would have commenced. But if the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops is to be achieved under this scenario — for example, before political and security agreements have been finalized — an impartial stabilization force formed by a coalition of willing States of about 8,000 highly trained and capable troops, together with police officers, would be required. Under this scenario there would still be clan tensions, extremist elements and the potential for the resumption of conflict. The stabilization force would therefore require timely and accurate intelligence on extremist and other groups. The force would also need strong physical protection at its bases to defeat attacks by mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. Troops would need to apply tactical techniques to minimize their vulnerability to roadside bombs and should possess electronic countermeasures to defeat radio- controlled explosive devices. A United Nations force could not be tasked with this role, as the vast majority of United Nations peacekeeping troops do not possess the those capabilities or training. As a result, the Security Council could consider this option only if offers were forthcoming from capable Member States ready to form a coalition of the willing under a strong lead nation, as proposed by Special Representative Ould Abdallah. The combined coalition stabilization force and AMISOM could allow the withdrawal of the Ethiopian armed forces from Mogadishu. In scenario 4, a viable political process would have taken hold, involving players from southern and central Somalia and “Puntland”, with the majority of the parties agreeing to a political power-sharing agreement and agreeing to renounce violence, lay down arms and commit to support the implementation of a Security Council mandate establishing an integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation. Although spoilers would still remain, they would have been marginalized to the extent possible. Under this scenario, the Ethiopian forces would have withdrawn or would be in the process of doing so. A military agreement would have been signed by the major clans and factions outlining key security arrangements, including a ceasefire. A number of conditions would be required in order to ensure the best chances of success for an integrated United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia under this scenario. The strategic assessment and fact-finding missions further reviewed and refined those conditions with their counterparts on the ground, developing proposals for graduated interlinked political, security and programmatic assistance aimed at achieving an inclusive and stable political and peacebuilding process in Somalia. The conditions include the cessation of hostilities, agreement by all major groups to allow for external monitoring, and an inclusive political dialogue. The United Nations military personnel who would be required for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia under this scenario number up to 27,000, with a possible police component of up to 1,500 police officers. Prior to the deployment of any mission, an integrated mission-planning process should be completed, including a comprehensive technical assessment mission to Somalia. The mission would, among other things, maintain a secure environment for the functioning of a broadly accepted political dispensation and assist in the development of security, judicial and corrections institutions capable of ensuring the rule of law and the administrative and institutional capacity necessary to provide basic and social services to the population. Finally, with regard to support for AMISOM, on 20 February this year we received a letter from Chairperson Konaré of the African Union requesting that the United Nations put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, totalling some $817,500,000. The Secretariat is reviewing that request to see how best the United Nations could respond to it. In the meantime, we encourage Member States to provide additional support to the African Union and to troop-contributing countries of AMISOM. In the meantime, the Secretariat continues to provide 10 planners to the African Union in Addis Ababa, who are supporting the planning for AMISOM.

I thank Mr. Mulet for his briefing. I now call on the representative of Somalia.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for taking the initiative to organize this public debate in the Security Council on the situation in Somalia. We also thank the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for their dedication to and tireless efforts for peace and stability in Somalia. Similarly, we thank the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Assistant Secretary-General has provided the Council with the details of a report that describes a very serious situation. We thank the missions for their report. As mentioned, the Security Council was first seized of the situation in Somalia in early 1992. It devoted much energy to the Somali crisis at that time and adopted many resolutions. Those resolutions have allowed for the deployment of two peacekeeping operations and a multinational force. However, after 16 years now, the Somali people are asking to be given a second chance to resolve the protracted tragedy in the country once and for all. We believe that this moment is no to time to give up. The people of Somalia are tired of civil war and suffering. The leadership of the Transitional Federal Government is committed to peace and national reconciliation, as stated by the Special Representative, and there is now a window of opportunity to be seized with the utmost urgency. The United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, could benefit from valuable lessons learned from previous United Nations missions deployed in zones of civil wars and conflicts. In some cases, the United Nations has been able to send peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions that have made positive contributions to ending conflicts and building peace in affected countries. We hope, therefore, that the concerted action of the United Nations and the international community will contribute to peace, security and stabilization in Somalia after such a long time. The report of the Secretary-General and the inter- agency fact-finding mission to Somalia (S/2008/178) clearly illustrates that the international community has a clear and unambiguous responsibility towards the people of Somalia. That responsibility obliges the Security Council to look beyond the limitations that the current security situation imposes and to reflect on a possible outcome and come up with ideas as to what is possible — within the constraints already mentioned in the paper by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations — to help create circumstances in which the United Nations can become more fully engaged. We are asking for real engagement by the United Nations and the Security Council. The Security Council also has the responsibility to protect and assist the legitimate Government in Somalia as it does in other conflicts. Silence and lack of action are not viable options at this time. The international community in general, and the Security Council in particular, must participate in a serious manner in a peacebuilding process in Somalia. Such a process would send the right message to the Somali people, to subregional and regional organizations and to international donors. It would help strengthen the ongoing process of national reconciliation and thereby help support the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to achieve peace and reconciliation in the country. While the Somali Government is striving to bring peace and stability to the country with limited resources and assistance from the international community, there are still a few elements — so-called spoilers — that are doing the opposite. We have taken note of the various ideas in the report, especially with regard to the proposed contingency plans and scenarios and the relocation of the United Nations agencies inside Somalia, which we welcome. In our view, the most viable, practical and meaningful contingency plan and strategy is to adopt a timely and properly integrated contingency plan containing the four elements detailed in the report with the utmost urgency. We also believe it is time for United Nations agencies to relocate inside Somalia, as was proposed, as soon as possible. There are many major cities in the country that can host and meet the security requirements of the United Nations agencies currently based in Nairobi. We wish also to emphasize the time factor, the need for urgent action and the importance of speeding up the whole process so that we avoid losing momentum and opportunities. In conclusion, we have ample reasons to be positive and optimistic about the future as long as the international community speaks in one voice on the situation in Somalia under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. We very much hope that, this time, something tangible will come out of the deliberations of the Security Council. We wish to reiterate the firm commitment of my Government to do everything possible to move forward an inclusive dialogue and national reconciliation in the country in as timely of a manner as possible, with the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

I now give the floor to the representative of Uganda.

The Ugandan delegation is grateful to you, Mr. President, for affording us this opportunity to take part in this important debate concerning the situation in Somalia. I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his latest report on Somalia, of 14 March 2008 (S/2008/178), which shows his continued interest in the matter and determination to find a solution to the problems plaguing Somalia. The Security Council has been seized with the situation in Somalia for some time now. Indeed, resolution 1801 (2008), in its first preambular paragraph, recalls previous resolutions and presidential statements on this matter. In other words, the Council has long determined that the situation in Somalia constitutes and continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region. It is for that reason that the Council authorized the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to take all necessary measures, as appropriate for the maintenance of international peace and security, in Somalia. That mandate has been extended from time to time, the most recent instance being under resolution 1801 (2008), which extended the mandate for a further period of six months. I want to stress here, however, that the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council may, however, as has been done under Chapter VIII of the Charter, authorize a regional organization to undertake that task on its behalf, and that is what it has done with AMISOM. Allow me to point out, however, that that delegation of authority does not amount to abdication. That is why Uganda and many other countries have persistently called on the Security Council to assume its responsibility in Somalia, because AMISOM has a limited capacity thus far to handle the task. I would like to thank the Security Council for appreciating the important work that Ugandan forces have carried out in Somalia and our sustained commitment to supporting the efforts of AMISOM. I would like to reaffirm the commitment of Uganda in that regard. Allow me to now address two issues. First, only Uganda and Burundi have deployed troops in Somalia to date. Other countries that have pledged troops have not fulfilled their pledges. We have called on the international community to provide the necessary logistical and financial support, and we thank the countries that have helped, such as the United States, but so far not much has been done. The Security Council, in resolution 1801 (2008), has urged Member States to provide financial resources, personnel, equipment and services for the full deployment of AMISOM. It is our belief, however, that the Security Council should take a proactive lead in that exercise by mobilizing the necessary resources, including finances and other logistics. Secondly, we have urged the Security Council to take over from AMISOM. Sadly, nothing has been done. We are now familiar with the phrase “development of contingency plans for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM”. That was set out in resolution 1772 (2007); in the presidential statement of 19 December 2007 (S/PRST/2007/49); and now in paragraph 6 of resolution 1801 (2008). The question is: when shall we move from the realm of possibility to that of actuality? We note that from paragraph 40 of the report of the Secretary-General that, this time around, he is proposing, under one of the various scenarios, the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers, subject to certain conditions first being fulfilled. In fact, we think that all the scenarios should be considered and not be mutually exclusive. It is pertinent to quote paragraph 40: “Under scenario 4, a United Nations peacekeeping operation for Somalia would be deployed, provided that broad-based political and security agreements are in place. Prior to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, political agreements reached and security commitments made should include general provisions on power-sharing, the laying- down of arms, respect for human rights, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the development of governing institutions. A total force of from 15 to 21 infantry battalions would be required. The total number of United Nations military could number up to 27,000, with a possible police component of up to 1,500 police officers.” But it is apparent from that that no peacekeepers will be deployed unless there is peace to keep in Somalia in the first place. The conditions outlined are important and everything should be done to achieve them, but they should not be preconditions, in our view. I have had occasion to tell the Security Council and the General Assembly that in fact there may be instances — and Somalia is one — when the Security Council should engage in peacemaking as well. Indeed, we are not persuaded by the reasoning as contained in the report. If there was no peace to keep, why then did the Security Council authorize AMISOM, which was in fact acting on its behalf. It is not my wish to draw parallels here, but I would like to cite the example of Darfur. No one can say for sure that there is peace to keep in Darfur, and yet the United Nations has authorized the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur. We should avoid giving an impression of double standards. To conclude, therefore, Uganda urges the Security Council to do the following: to move quickly to mobilize the international community, with the United Nations taking the lead, to provide the necessary logistical and financial support to AMISOM to fully deploy in Somalia. In that regard, Uganda calls on the Secretary-General to respond favourably to the proposal by the Chairperson of the African Union, in his letter of 20 February 2008, for a financial, logistical and technical support package. It is our conviction that the full deployment of AMISOM will serve as a stabilization force pending the arrival of United Nations peacekeepers; indeed, it should be the nucleus for the planned United Nations force. Secondly, there is a need to finalize plans and move quickly towards the deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping force to take over from AMISOM without preconditions. Uganda is in Somalia for a good cause and we shall stay the course, for we believe the international community should not abandon Somalia.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. In accordance with the understanding reached in the course of the Council’s prior consultations, I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion of the subject.