S/PV.6036 Security Council

This is the eighth 90-day report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 18 (h) of resolution 1737 (2006). The report covers the period from 12 September to 10 December 2008, during which the Committee held one session of informal consultations to hear two briefings. In my previous report, I noted that the members of the Committee were considering a written request for certain specific information from a Member State. I wish to add now that the Committee subsequently responded to the communication from the Member State. On 15 October 2008, the United States provided a briefing on its efforts to implement paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008). Those paragraphs relate to the transfer of goods and technology to the Islamic Republic of Iran that could contribute to enrichment- related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; and to the transfer of any further items that, as determined by the State, could contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed concerns or which the IAEA has identified as outstanding. The general rule established by resolution 1737 (2006) was that, with a few exceptions, such transfers were prohibited. Resolution 1803 (2008) widened the prohibition to include the transfer of dual-use items, with the exception of certain specific items to be used in light water reactors and under the framework of IAEA technical cooperation. Following the briefing, some other members of the Committee also shared with the Committee the steps they had taken to implement the relevant provisions. On the same date, Norway, a non-member of the Security Council, provided a briefing on its plans to strengthen the effectiveness of the regulatory oversight of the safety at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The Norwegian project, to be implemented under the auspices of the IAEA, falls under the scope of the aforementioned exceptions. With respect to those exceptions, I would also like to mention that by notes verbales dated 7 November and 21 November 2008, the Russian Federation, as it has done in the past, notified the Committee of supplies it had delivered for the light water reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Finally, Mr. President, with regard to reporting by States on their implementation of all the relevant measures contained in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008), the updated figures are as follows: 90 reports under resolution 1737 (2006), 77 reports under resolution 1747 (2007) and 63 reports under resolution 1803 (2008). As you are aware, Mr. President, by its resolution 1835 (2008) of 27 September 2008, the Council reaffirmed the three resolutions, as well as resolution 1696 (2006), and also reaffirmed its commitment to an early negotiated solution through a dual-track approach to the Iranian nuclear issue and welcomed the continuing efforts in that regard. The Council also called upon Iran to comply fully and without delay with its obligations under the previously mentioned resolutions of the Security Council and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors. As this is my last 90-day report to the Security Council, I would like to conclude by thanking the members of the 1737 Committee for their cooperation.

I thank Mr. Grauls for his briefing and I now give the floor to members of the Security Council.

The United States welcomes Ambassador Grauls’ briefing on the activities of the Iran sanctions committee. Today, I would like to focus on three points. First, I note that the most recent report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran contains troubling findings that deserve the Council’s attention. The report documents Iran’s continued failure to comply with the Council’s demands to suspend all uranium enrichment- related reprocessing and heavy water activities. The report also elaborates on the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past weaponization-related activities, as well as Iran’s refusal to permit the IAEA to have the access necessary to establish the international community’s confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. Iran’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA has, indeed, gotten worse, in that Iran is once again refusing to permit the IAEA access to conduct a special kind of verification inspection at the Arak reactor, which is essential to monitor the ongoing construction of the facility, which itself is a violation of the Council’s resolutions. The report chillingly notes that Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium has reached 630 kilogrammes, which is over half the amount needed for a nuclear weapon. I hope that the Council will take serious note of those findings and support the IAEA secretariat in continuing its investigation. Secondly, in the light of this evidence of Iran’s non-compliance, the Iran sanctions committee should redouble efforts to ensure full and robust implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008). The Committee’s efforts are essential to our broader two-track approach, which includes both targeted sanctions and generous incentives for Iran. As Ambassador Grauls noted, the Iran sanctions committee has endeavoured to share best practices among Member States and encourage greater transparency in the international community’s nuclear dealings with Iran. We particularly welcome Norway’s decision to brief the Committee on its nuclear training programme in Iran and the safeguards put in place to ensure that those activities do not violate existing Security Council resolutions. We urge the Committee to continue its efforts and to consider new, more effective ways to carry out its mandate. Finally, I would like to thank Ambassador Grauls for his excellent work in leading the 1737 Committee and his dedication to ensuring that the Committee carry out its mandate. He has set a high bar for excellence and professionalism for any successor.

This was the last quarterly report of Ambassador Grauls as chair of the 1737 Committee, and my delegation would like, first of all, to pay tribute to the remarkable skill with which he and his team discharged their difficult duties. The last two reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the situation in Iran are particularly negative. In fact, they indicate that Iran is continuing not to suspend its sensitive activities. Indeed, it is continuing to step them up, unabated. Iran is continuing to fail to implement the transparency measures demanded of it. The IAEA finds of particular concern the presumed studies on the militarization of the Iranian programme. The IAEA also regrets Iran’s persistent refusal to provide it with the necessary information and access to shed light on this question at a time when the Iranian reaction corroborate documents that originally Iran had said were false. The Agency has concluded that, unless there is progress on these points, it will not be in a situation to guarantee the absence of undeclared nuclear materials activity in Iran. I would add that Iran has still not responded to offers for dialogue with the E3+3 Governments, despite the historic involvement of the United States, nor has it responded to the E3+3 Governments’ freeze- for-freeze proposal. If Iran continues on this path, the price will be intensified isolation and regional tension. We are engaged on a dual-track approach reaffirmed unanimously by the Security Council in its resolution 1835 (2008). As long as Iran fails to meet the demands of the international community, we must demonstrate increasing firmness. To do this, we need to begin by a rigorous application of the resolutions the Council has already adopted. I would like to briefly recall here measures adopted by the European Union (EU) for the implementation of resolution 1803 (2008), which include the additional naming of individuals and enterprises contained in resolution 1803 (2008), which has been transferred in its entirety to the EU, an additional complementary list of individuals and enterprises was also adopted by the EU in June and the designating process will continue for the individuals and enterprises who participate in the proliferation activities of Iran, in order to ensure the complete implementation of Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the embargo on dual-use goods is fully in place in the EU. This has been supplemented by an additional list of particularly sensitive goods that are also under embargo. So as not to contribute financially to proliferation activities of Iran, the EU is showing restraint regarding the provision of loans and credits for exports. Regarding financial vigilance toward Iranian banks, the EU has defined enhanced concrete monitoring measures to avoid having financial flows be redirected to proliferation activities. These measures include the identification of clients, a register of the operations in which Iranian banks are participating, the making available by the authorities of all necessary documentation and the declaration of suspicious cases in case of dubious transactions and the publication of lists of branches of Iranian banks. It has also frozen the activities of the Melli Bank, which has shown itself to be heavily implicated. It has also established a monitoring regime for the activities of Bank Saderat Iran. All of these financial measures provide a serious and responsible set of mechanisms that conforms with the recently adopted directives of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Finally, regarding cargo inspections, the EU is implementing the regime established under resolution 1803 (2008) and has established a system of a priori declarations for Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Iran Air Cargo. This vigilance is critical to safeguarding the security of all of us. We therefore urge all of our partners to implement it fully. We will make all information available to delegations that wish to learn more on ways to implement their obligations. We also hope to recall here that the Committee can still do a great deal more to assist Member States in this area, as the Ambassador of Burkina Faso requested a few months ago. We hope that in the next few months we will be working on that.

We are grateful to the Permanent Representative of Belgium, Ambassador Grauls, for his briefing on the work of the 1737 Committee of the Security Council for the last three month period and also for the work he has done in heading this Committee. We take note of the fact that in this reporting period, the Committee was acting in strict compliance with Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008). We believe that, in its further work, the Committee will continue to be guided by the spirit and letter of those resolutions aiming at promoting the achievement of the major goal, which is an effective solution to the Iran nuclear problem solely through political and diplomatic means, that is, through negotiations on the basis of proposals formulated by the group of six. Resolution 1835 (2008) of the Security Council, adopted in September, clearly demonstrated the unity of the group of six around the major unifying goal, namely, to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in fact-finding and in establishing the lack of any military aspects in Iran’s nuclear programme. There may be tactical divergences, but these should not weaken the dedication of the group of six to this most important objective, namely, to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

First of all, I would like to thank Ambassador Grauls for this year’s final report to the Council and, on behalf of my delegation, join others in paying tribute to his outstanding chairmanship of the 1737 Committee. The United Kingdom remains committed to the E3 + 3 Governments dual-track policy. The generous offer made by this group in June 2008 still stands. It is deeply disappointing that we have not had a clear response to date from Iran. The United Kingdom stands ready to build a positive relationship with Iran across a range of issues, but we must first see serious action by Iran to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to comply with its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons responsibilities. The IAEA Director-General’s November report stated that the agency had received no cooperation from Iran in the previous two months and that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme continued. Iran’s continued failure to cooperate with the IAEA, or to answer its questions, only increases our concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme and its intentions. It is vital that Iran urgently and comprehensively provide the IAEA with all the requested information, documentation and access. We share the IAEA’s continued concern about outstanding issues relating to the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programmes. If Iran remains determined to isolate itself, then we in the international community must remain equally determined to stand together both in maintaining pressure on Iran to meet its international obligations and in making clear to Iran that its choices will have a cost. In that context, I would like to highlight the important measures recently taken by the European Union as referred to previously by my French colleague.

I too thank Ambassador Graul for his report. I will not refer to the substance of his report. This is one of the most disturbing issues for the international community as it endangers peace and stability. This issue falls, therefore, within the responsibilities of this Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter. I will also not comment on the report because previous speakers have, quite rightly, spoken about it, as has Ambassador Grauls as Chair of the Committee. However, I simply asked for the floor to thank Ambassador Grauls and the Belgium Mission for the excellent work they have done on such a delicate issue as this is the last report that they are submitting to this Council.

First of all, I would like to thank Ambassador Grauls for his briefing on the work of the Committee over the last 90 days. Since its establishment and under the diligent leadership of Ambassador Grauls and Ambassador Verbeke, the Committee has successfully undertaken various kinds of tasks. I thus take this opportunity to express sincere thanks to Ambassador Grauls and Ambassador Verbeke for their vigorous efforts. The Iran nuclear issue relates to the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and its close connection with the security regime in the Middle East and its impact on international nuclear energy security. This issue is complex and sensitive and has received extensive attention from the international community. China is always of the view that the peaceful solution to the Iran nuclear issue lies in diplomatic negotiations, which is the best option and in the interest of the international community. At the present time, the Iran nuclear issue is at crucial juncture. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, the United States and Russia are currently, through the European Union, maintaining constructive dialogue and contact with Iran regarding the resumption of negotiations. The IAEA and Iran are also cooperating on pending questions with regards to Iran’s nuclear programme. This demonstrates that the international community’s diplomatic efforts to advance the resumption of negotiations are effective and opportune. No side should readily pass up that opportunity. China notes the new report submitted by Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the Iran nuclear issue. China commends the IAEA and its Director General for that effort. In the current circumstances, the international community should further intensify its diplomatic efforts and maintain and promote dialogue with Iran to seek an early resumption of negotiations. At the same time, Iran should be encouraged to strengthen its cooperation with the IAEA to resolve pending issues at an early date, to alleviate the international community’s misgivings about its nuclear programme, and to seek an appropriate, comprehensive and long-term solution to the Iran nuclear issue. China is prepared to continue to play a constructive role in that regard. China consistently supports maintaining the international non-proliferation regime, opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and hopes that there will be no new turbulence in the Middle East region. China supports a peaceful settlement of the Iran nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations. We will continue to participate actively in the work of the Committee, support and cooperate with the Chairman in his efforts, and do our best to help the Committee play a constructive role in appropriately resolving the Iran nuclear issue.

At the outset, I would like to thank Ambassador Grauls for his comprehensive briefing and for his effective leadership of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). Unfortunately, the most recent report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms Iran’s non-compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. Italy remains committed to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through a dual-track approach, based on dialogue and the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008). The French delegation’s intervention just highlighted the initiatives undertaken by the European Union to that end, which Italy firmly supports. At the same time, we wish to reaffirm the importance of the political dimension, which is prominent in the package of incentives offered to Tehran, as an essential means to overcome the current stalemate and to strengthen regional stability by actively involving all actors concerned.

We wish to thank Ambassador Jan Grauls, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and representative of Belgium, for his valuable briefing, in which he reviewed the work accomplished by the Committee over the past 90 days. Libya once again reaffirms the importance of intensifying international efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute over the Iranian nuclear issue, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1803 (2008), on further enhancing diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue and consultations with Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and appropriate solution to this issue that would allow for the development of all- round relations and fruitful cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In this context, we call on all parties to begin direct negotiations as soon as possible in order to achieve that goal. Libya expresses once again its firm belief that all efforts to address non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament should be comprehensive and non-selective and that all countries, without exception, should subject their nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We express our regret that the Security Council has not devoted careful attention to the Israeli nuclear-weapon issue, despite the fact that Israel continues to refuse to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to subject its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime. That makes it impossible to fulfil the aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.