S/PV.605 Security Council

It has become a tradition in the Security Council for a new Preside! to pay a tribute ta his predecessor, It is a particularly pleasant task for me to follow that tra~ dition today in complimenting Ml'. Muniz, Ambassador of Brazil, for between the peoples of his country and min~, both members of the Latin-Amcrican community, there has always existed a deep-rooted friendship. Furthermore, Ml'. Muniz and lare linked by bonds of friendship and mutual respect forged by almost six years of work together in the Economie and Social Counci1, in the General A&,.semb1y, and this year in the Security Council. In thîs work we have very often found ourselves in agreement and have had many opportunities ta serve not only the general interests of the Organization, but also, and a1ways in con- formity with those interests, the desire for closer relations and friendship between our two peoples and for unity with their brothers on the A11lerican continent. 2. In thanking Ml'. Muniz on behalf of the Security CouncH for his work as President, l wish to add the thanks of my delegation. 3. Ml'. MUNIZ (Brazil): l am very much touched by the President's generous words which, l am sure, were addressed more ta my country than to me person- ally. ChUe and Brazil are drawn together by so many friend1y ties and associations and the collaboration of our two countries in the United Nations has been sa intimate that l see inhis kind words a reflection of these a:Jsociations. l thank the Presidellt very much. Président: M. H. SANTA CRUZ (Chili). PrJscnts: Les représentants des pays suivants: Brésil, Chili, Chine, France, Grèce, Pays~Bas. Pakistan, Turquie, Union des' Républiques socialistes soviétiques, Royaume-Uni de Grand~Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Ordre du ,jour provisoire (S/Agenda 60S) 1. Adoption Je l'ordre du jour. 2. Question Inde-Pakistan: Lettre en date du 16 sep- tembre J.952 par laquelle M. Frank P. Graham, représentant des Nations Unies auprès de l'Inde et du Pakistan, a transmis au Secrétaire général son quatrième rapport au Conseil de sécurité (5/2783). Hommage au Président sortant 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Il est de tradition, aIl Consf,l1 de sécurité, que le nouveau Président rende Mffi!;.lage à son prédécesseur. Comme il s'agit en l'occurrence du représentant du Brésil, M. Muniz, je cuis particulièrement heureux de me conformer à cette tradition, ca'r il existe depuis tou- jours, entre son pays et le mien, qui sont tous deux membres de la communauté de l'AmériQuè latine, une amitié profondément ancrée dans l'âme des deux peuples; et je suis d'autant plus heureux de le faire qu'entre M. Muniz et moi se sont créés des liens très puissants de camaraderie et de respect .mutuel, au cours de près de six années de travail en .~ommun au Conseil économique et social, à l'Assemblee générale et, cette .mnée, au Conseil de sécurité. Dans l'exercice de nos fonctions, nous nous sommes souvtmt trouvés d'accord et nous avons eu de nombreuses occasions de répondre, tout en défendant toujours l'intérêt gé~ néral de l'Organisation, au désir de nos deux peuples de se rapprocher, de resserrer leurs liens d'amitié, et d'être unis à leurs frères du continent américain.. 2. Au nom du Conseil de sécurité et au nom de ma délégation, je féliçite M. Muniz de la manière dont il a dirigé les débats du Conseil. 3, M. MUNIZ (Brésil) (traduit de l'anglais): Je suis très touchl~ des paroles généreuses du Pré- . sident qui, j'en suis sûr, s'adressaient à mon pays plus qu'à moi~même. Le Chili et le Brésil sont unis par tant de liens d'a~nitié et la collaboration de nos deux pays à l'Organi.!'li!ttion des Natîop.s Unies est si intime que je ne peux voir dans ces paroles aimables que l'expression de ces relations. Je remercie vivement le Président. LETTER. DATED 16 SEl'TE:M:BER. 1952 FROM MR. FRANK P. GRAHA:M:, UNITED NATIONS RE,'>RESENT.ATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAEl'STAN, TC TrŒ SECRETARY-GENE'RAL TRANSMITTING lUS FOURTH REFORT TC TFF'€ SECUR!TY COUNCIL (5/2783 and Corr.1) 4. The PRESIDENT (transltltl'd from Spanis/s): When the Council bas consid red this matter on pre- vious occasions, it has decided, ttnder Article 32 of the Charter and rule 37 of its rules procedure, to invit~ a representative of the Government of India tü be present. 1 do not thiuk a new decision to that effect is necessary, and sa 1 will invite the representative of India ta take a sent at the Council table and loin in the discussion. • At the invitation of the Presidrnt, Mr. Dayal, repre- sentctive of lndia~ mld Mr. Gra"am, United Nations Reprt'sentative for India (lnd Pakista~, took places at the Cowncil bble. 5. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Before calling on Mr. Graham, may 1 remind the Council that, in accordance with earlier decisions, only simultaneous interpretations of his statement will be given. 6. Mr. GRAHAM (United Nations Rep~esentative for India and Pakistan) : As a supplement tCl the report to the Security Council dated 16 September 1952 rS/2783 and Corr.1]. the Uniteù Nations Repre- sentative makes. this personal summary statement. This statement should be considered in connexion with an other pre,,-ïous reports ta the Coundl and debates in the Security Couneil on the Kashmir question. This statement will set forth: (1) The obstacles we have found in the way of the Governments of India and Pakistan h!ndering an agreement on a plan of demilitarization; . (2) The tweive proposaIs made ta overcome these obstacles; (3) The progress made by the parties in the accep- tance of these proposaIs; (4) The revival of the difference over the meaning of "local forces"; (5) The several proposaIs made regarding the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office; (6) The several proposaIs made by the United Nations Representative regarding the number and character of forces ta be left on each side of the cease- fire tine at the end of the period of demilitarization; (7) An agreement on ten and part of another of the twelve proposaIs; and (8) Suggested alternative approaches to the one main remaining difference regarding, the issue of number and character of forces. LETTRE EN DATE DU 16 SEPTEMBRE 1952 PAR LAQUELLB M. FRANK P. GRAHAM, ~E'PRÉSENT \NT· DES NATIONS UNIES A'lJllRÈS DE L'INDE ET DU PAKISTAN, A TRANg~ M:rs AU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL SON QUATRIÈME RAPPORT AU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ (5/2783) 4. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Con~ formément aux dispositions de l'Article 32 de la Charte des Nations Unies et de l'article 37 du règle- ment intêrieur du Conseil de sécurité, notts sommes convenus, lors de séances antérieures où nous avons examiné cette question, d'inviter un représentant du Gouvernement de l'Inde. Je crois qu'il n'est pas né- cessaire que ll0US nous prononcions à nouveau sur ce point et je me permets d'inviter le représentant de l'Inde à prendre place à 1:1. table du Conseil et à parti- ciper au débat. Sur l'invitatiot: du PréS/'dent, M. Dayal, repré- smtant de f Inde) ct M. Graham) représentant des Nations Unies auprès de l'Incie et du Pakistan) pren- nent place à la table du Conseil. 5. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol) : Avant de donner la parole à M. Graham, je voudrais -rappeler que, conformément à nos décisions antérieures, seul le sJ'stème de l'interprétation simultanée sera utilisé pour les interventions de M. Graham. 6. M. GRAHAM (Représentant des Nations Unies auprès de l'Inde et du Pakistan) (tradu# de l'anglais) : POlIr compléter le rapport au Conseil de sécurité en date du 16 septembre 1952 (S/2783), le représentant des Nations Unies tient à présenter, à titre personnel, l'exposé sommaire ci-après. Il y H iieu de se référer, à te propos, à tous les rapports présentés antérieure- ment a'.l Conseil et aux procès-verbaux des débats que le Conseil de sécurité a consacrés à la question du Cachemire. Cet exposé traitera tour à tour: 1) Des obstac~es qui ont empêché le Gouvernement de l'Inde et le (;'f>l wernement du Pakistan d~ se mettre d'accord sur un pla~1 de démilitarisation; 2) Des douze propositions faites en vue de sur- monter ces obstacles; 3) Des progrès accomplis en ce qui concerne l'ac- ceptation de ces propositions; 4) Des nouvelles divergences de vues sur le sens des mots "forces locales"; 5) Des diverses propositions relatives à l'entrée en fonctio~ de l'Administrateur du plébiscite; 6) Des diverses propositions du représentant des Nations Unies au sujet des effectifs et de la nature des forces à laisser de part et d'autre de la ligne de sus- pension d'armes à l'expiration de la périocle de démi- litarisation; 7) De l'accord réalisé sur dix des douze proposi- tions et de l'accord partiel réalisé sur une autre de ces propositions; et 8) Des autres méthodes proposées en vue de ré- soudre le dernier désaccord importah~ sur la question des effectifs et de la nature des forces armées. (1) AHegations about the violations of the cease-fire Hne; (2) HeadHnes about troop mcvements and œunter- troop nIDvements close ta the border of the State Gr Jammu and Kashmir; (3) Discussions and fl'ars concerning the role of the Constituent Assembly ta he convened at Srinagari and (4) Threats of war and rumours of war. 8. In the course of many consultations with the two Governments, the United Nations Representative found additional differences regarding: (5) The timing and amount of the disarming and disbanding of the' A.lTaa Kashmir forces in rela,tion to the withdrawals of the Indian forces; (6) The time reqttired for a programme of demili- tarization; (7) The number and character of forces to he left on cach side of the cense-fire Hne at the end of the period of demilitarization; (8) A possible danger ta the'l cease-fire Hne incident to possible fears which might arise out of a he:avy preponderance of armed forces on either side of the ceasr:'-fin Hne in the process of demilitarization; (9) The timing and co-ordination of appropriate withdrawals, reductions, disal'ming and disbanding of forces, as the case may be, on the two sides of the cease-fire liue; (10) The timing of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office 1 (11) The meaning of the phrase "final disposaI" in the 5 ]anuary 1949 resolutîon 1 of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan Î1l relation ta loca- tion or reduction of forces, and more lately; (12) The nieaning of the phrase "local authorities" in the 5 ]anuary 1949 resolution. II. THE TWELVE Pl<oPOSALS MADE BY THE UNITED NAT!ONS REPRESENTATrvE FOR OVERCO~UNG THE OBSTACLES IN 'l'lIE WAY OF DEMILITARIZATION 9. To overcome thè first four of the twelve obstacles enumerated above, the United Nations Representative directed his first four proposaIs to decreasing the high tension between the two countries. Representatives of the Government of India indicated that no agreement on demiHtarization was possible because of the threats of war. The representatives of the Government of Pakistan said that the dela>,s in demilitarization as a condition fÇ)r a free and lmpartial plebiscite caused unrest and talk of war among the people of Pakistan. Thus we found that delays in demilitarization caus~d 1For the text of theresolution of 5 January 1949, see Official RJ ecords of the Secul'it;y Council, Fom-th Year, Supplement for anflary 1949, document S/1196, para. 15. 7. Quand nous sommes arrivés dans la péninsule indienne, le 30 juin 1951, nous y avons trouvé une situation extrêmement tendue, créée p.'\r les facteurs suivants: 1) Prétendues violations de la ligne de susp."'nsion d'armes; 2) Informations senJSationnelles sur des l11{)uvements et des contre-mouvements de troupes tout près de la frontière de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire; 3) Discussions et craintes relatives au rôle de l'As- semblée constituante qui devait se rénair à Srinagar; et 4) Menaces d~ guerre et rUMeurs de guerre. 8. Au cours des nombreuses consultations avec les deux gouvernements, le représentant des Nations Unies a constaté qu'il existait en outre des diverg"..nces de vues sur les points suivants: 5) Cadence et importance du désarmement et du licenciement des forces du Cachemire Asad parallè- lement s.ux retraits de forces indiennes; 6) Délai d'exécution d1un programme de démilita- risation; 7) Effectifs et caractère des forces à laisser de part et d1au',re de la lig'ue de suspension d'armes à l'expi- ration de la période de démilitarisation ~ 8) Danger que pourraient faire courir " maintien de la liçne de suspension d'armes les craintes que susciteraJt éventuellement la présence de forces armées importantes de part. et d'autre de la ligne de suspen- sion d1arm.es pendant la démilitarisation; 9) Dates et coordination d.es 1i'~trait! de forces, des réduCtions de forces, des opérations de licenciement et de désarmement qui seraient appropr,'és suivant le cas, de part et d'autre de la ligne de sr.spensiotl d':a.rmes; 10) Date d'entrée en fonction de l'Adminis-trateur du plébiscite; 11) Signification des mots "retrait définitif"l qui figurent dans la résolution du 5 janvier 1949 1 de la Commissiell des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pa- kistan, par ~'~iJport aux notions de cantonnement <:lU de réduction deI:! forces et, à une date plus récente, 12) Signification des mots "autorités locales" dans la résolution du 5 janvier 1949. Ir. LES DOUZE PROPOSITIONS FORMULEES PAR LE R~­ . PRESENTANT DES NATIONS UNIES· AFIN DE SUR- MONTER LES OBSTACLES .À LA DEMILITARJ3A'r'!ON 9. Pour surnlonter les quatre premiers des douze obstacles énumérés ci-dessus, le représentant des Na", tions Unies a formulé quatre premières propositions ayant pour objet de réduire la tension extrêmement grave qui existait entre les. deux pays. Les' représen- tants du Gouvernement de l'Inde ont indique qu'en raison des menaces de guerre il était impossible d'aboutir à un accord sur la démilitarisation. Les repré- sentants du Gouvernem~t.dtt.Pakistan .. ont. déclaré que les retards interventls en ce qui concerne la. démi- litarisation, condition d'Un plébiscite .libre et impartial, 1 Pour le texte de la résolution du 5 janvier 1949,voir les Procès-'llerba~ officiels du Conseil de sécurité, quatrième année, Supplément de janvier 1949, document S/1196, par. 15. 10. The United Nations Repre~entative therefore asked the twc Gavernments for the follawing com~ mitments: The G(.lvmunents of Inclia and Pakistan ProposaI 1. Reaffirm their determinatian nat ta resort to force and to adhere ta peaceful procedures and spee:ficallv pledgt' themselves that they will not commIt aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard ta the question of Jammu and Kashmir; Proposai 2. Jo.gree that each Governmen~, on it~ part. will instntct its official spokesmen and will ur~ all its citizens, organizations, publications and radto stations not ta make warlike statements or stat~ments calculated to incite the people of either nation ,to roake ,,,-ar against the other with regard ta the question of Jammu and Kashmir; ProposaI 3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease- fire effeutive from 1 January 1949 and the Kar;:tchi Agreement of 27 July 1949; ProposaI 1-. Reaffirm their acceptmœ of the prin- ciple that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ta India or Pakistan will be de- cided through the democratic method of a free \lnd impartial plehiscite unrler the auspices of the United Nations. Il. The :fifth obRtac1e was the question of t.lte Asad Kashmir forces in relation ta part II of the UNCIP resolution ,of 13 AUgtlbt 1948 2 and principles 4 (a) and (b) or the S J;:;nual'J 1949 r~solution. The resolution of 13 August 1948 made no reference to the "Asad Kasrmir forcesu • Part n of this resolution had the folIr,wing provisions: "A "1. As t.1:te presence of.troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir consti- tutes a material change in the situation sinee it was represented by the Governmeat of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from ,that State. "2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationa1s not nonnally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting. "3. Pending a final solution, .the territory eva- cuated by the Pakistani troops will he administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. 2 For the text of thè resolution of 13 August 1948, see ibid., Third Year, Sltpplement fo,. N ovember 1948, document S/1100, para.7!5. '. , ~acifiquesl et s'engager.: e."::pressément à ne se livrer \ a aucune agression l'un contre l'autre et à ne pas se faire la guerre au sujet de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire; Proposition 2. Conviennent que chacun des deux gouvemements prescrira à ses porte-parole 'officiels et pressera tous ses citoyens, toutes ses organisations, publications et stations de radiodiffusion de s'abstenir de déclarations belliqueuses ou de déclarations qui viseraient à inciter le peuple de l'un ou de l'autre pays 1 à faire la {fuerre à l'autre au sujet de l'Etat de Jammu 1 et CachemIre; 1 Proposition 3. Réaffirment leur volonté (...: respecter 1 la suspension d'armes qui a pris effet le 1er janvier 1949 et l'Accord de Kal"achi du 27 juillet 1949; i Prop,osition 4. Ré-affirment leur acceptation du prin-! cipe que la question du rattachement de l'Etat de; Jammu et. Cachemire à l'Inde ou au Pakistan sera! réglée p2r la voie démooratique d'un plébiscite libre et impartial, organisé sous les auspices de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. ! 11. Le cinquième obstacle résidait danE la ques-qûn des forces du Cachemire Azad envisagée dans ses rap- 'ports avec la deuxième par.tie de la résolution de la Commissibn des Nanons Unies pour l'Inde et le iPa- kistltn en date du 13 a,oût 1948 2 et les principes, d~nis dans les alinéas 4, a et b, de la résolution du 5 Jan- vier 1949. La résol1ution du 13 août 1948 ne mention- nait pas les "forees du Cachemi't"e Azad". La deuxième partie de cette résolution comprend les dispositions suivantes: ' "A "1. Attendu que la présence de troupes du Pa- kistan dans le territoire de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire modifie de façon considérable la situa- tion telle qu'elle avait été exposée au Conseil de sécurité par le Gouvernement du Pakistan, ce der- nier accepte de retirer ses troupes de cet Etat. "2. Le Souvernement du Pakistan fera tout en son pouvoir pour faire évacuer dt. l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire les membres de tribus et les ressor- tissal1ts du Pakistan qui, en temps normal, ne rési- dent pas dans cet Etat et qui y ont 'pénétré afin de combattre. "3.' En attendant une solution définitive, le terri- toire évacué par les troupes du Pakistan sera'adtni- nistré par les autorités locales sous ,la surveillance de la Commission. 2 Pour le texte de l~ résolution du 13 août 1948, voir ibid., troisièmè année, Sttpplémènt de niJVèmb,' 1948, document S/1100, par. 75. th~ hulk of ifS forces from the State in stages to he agreed upon with .the Commission. "2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions'for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are consi- dered necessary ta assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessal'y. "3. The Government of India wilt' undertake to ensure that the Government of che State of Jammu and Ka&hmir will take aIl measttres within its power to make it public1y known that peace, law and order wil! be safeguarded and that aIl human and political rights will be guaranteed." 12.. The 5 January 1949 l'~solution provided, regarding the Azad Kashmir force:~ and the Indian and State armed forces, principles 4 (a) and (b) as follows: "4 (a) After implementation of parts 1 and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful condi- tiC'ns have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the GQvernment of India, the final disposaI of Indian and State almed forces, such tiisposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. " (b) As regards the territory referred ta in A, 2 of part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposaI of the armed forces in that territory will he determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local author- ities." 13. The Government of India maintained that, in accepting the 13 August 1948 resolution on 20 August 1948, they were unaware of the large nttmber and fighting efficiency ûf the Azad Kashmir forces..They maintain that ~f they had been so aware they would have insisted 011 the disarrr.lng and disbanding of these forces provided for in part Il of the 13 August 1948 resolu.tion. 14. In this matter the Govemment of Pakistan main- tained that they stoodon the resolution as written and accepted. ' 17. Regarding this problem, the Commission itself, in its third interim report [Sj1430J, had ohserved (paragraph 250), "The conclusion to he drawn from the experience of the Commission during the past year, and from the attitudes of the two Governments as regards the withdrawal problem, is clear: developments in the State rlt'ring' the past year necessitate a modification in the origina} plan of demilitarization. Such a modi- fication must treat the problem of demiHtarization as a whole, elimil"ating aU distinctions and comprising aU questions concerning the final disposaI of a11 armed forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir." 18. Recognizing that no progress had been made on this issue for.three years, we sought to aid the parties in this matter' by a new approach, conceiving demili- tarization·as a continuous process. The United Nations Representative came to the view, as the basis for an approach to the problem by the parties, that part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and principles 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January J.949 resolution should be considered as interdependent parts of a continuous process of demilitarization. " 19. To this general end and specifical1y in order to break the dead-lock over the timing and amount of the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kaslunir forces, the United Nations Repnsentative made proposaIS as fol1ows: ProposalS The Governnzents of India and Pakistan Agree that subject to the provisî.ons of paragraph Il below, the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP re )lutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shali be effected in a single, continuous process. 20. Ta overcome four more obstacles, and as corol- laries to .a programme of demilitarization as a con- tiouous process, the U:lited N3.tions Representative madeproposa~$ 6, 7, 8 and 9 as follows: 1 Convienl,1ent que l'opération de démilitarisation doit s'effectuer lie telle manière qu'à la date prévue au pa- ragraphe t, ci-dessus, la situation se présente d~ la façon suivante: a) Du côté pakistanais de la ligne de su..f'pfnsion d'arme,,-: 1) Les membres de trihus et les nationaux pakista- nais qui, ne résldan. pas dans l'Etat de ]anlmu (i) The tribesmen and Pakistan l1i:l.tionals not normally resirlent therein whC' had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn; (ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State; and (iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Asad Kashmil' forces will have t~en place. (b) On the 1ndian side of the cease-fire Une: (i) The bulkof the Indian forces in the State will have been catried out, (ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion oi the operation referred ta in (b) (i) above will . have ·been carried out; so that at the end of the period referred to in proposaI 6 above there will remain on the present Paldstan side of the cease~fire Hne a force of ... civii armed forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire Hne a force of ... 21. The United Nations Representative left blank sp1ces in proposaI 7 for the number of forces ta be left Ofl eachside of the cease-fii'e Hne to be fil1~d in by the two Governments as a precise ba!îis for resolving the difference on this crucial issue. • Prop,osal 8 The Governments of Jndia a·nd Pakistan Agree tha:t the demilitariza.fÏon shaH be carried out in snch a way as to involve no thteai: to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above. ProposaI 9 The Governments .of Jndia and lPakistan Agree that representatives of the Jndian.and Pakistan Governments, assisted by theit mi:1itary advisers, will meet, under the auspices of the United Nations, to draw up,a programme of demilitarization in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above. 22. Next ta proposaI 7, proposaI 10 was the most orucial of the twelve proposaIs. ProposallO provided ~or the fiXing ora,definite tim( ~i.~ld manner for the tnduction of the Plebiscite Administrator as' follows: f':1~ (;achemire en temps normal, y avaient pénétré pour combattre auront été retirés; ii) Les troupes du Pakistan auront été retirées de l'Etat; Hi) Il aura été procédé à un licenciement et à un ~ésarmement massifs des forces du Cachemire Azad. b) Du cJté indien de la ligne de suspension d'armes: i) Le gros des forces indiennes aura été retiré de l'Etat; ii) Les forces années de l'Inde et (le l'Etat de Jammu et Cacr.emire demeurées dans l'Etat après exp.cu- tian de l'opération dc.'lt il est question à l'alinéa b, i, ci-des~';t1s auront fait l'objet de nouw' 'lX retraits ou de nouvelles réduction5, ",don le s, de telle manière qU"à la date prévue dans laproposi- tion 6 ci-dessus il reste du côté actuellement pakistanais de la ligne de suspension d'armes une milice de ... hommes et du côté indien de la ligne de sus;?enSiOll d'armes une force de ... hommes. . 21. Le représentant des Natio~s Unies a laissé dans le texte de la proposition 7 des blancs où doivent fi- gurér les effectifs des forces restant de part et d'autre de la..ligne de suspension d'annes; les deux gouverne- ments sont appelés à y inscrire des chiffres précis, une fois résolues leurs divergences de vues sur cette 'lues- tian cruciale. . Proposition 8 Les G.owvernentents de !'Inde et du Pakistan Conviennent que l''Ûpération dedérnilitarisation s'effectuera de manière à n'entraîner aucune violation de l'accord'de suspension d'armes, tant au cours de la période dont il est question au paragraphe 6 ci-dessns, qu'après san expiration; . Proposition 9· Les G.ou.'vernements tie l'Inde et du Pakistan Conviennent que des représentants des Gouverne- ments de l'Inde et du Pakistan, acoompagnés d'experts militaires, se rencontreront, sous les auspices de l'Or- ganisaHon des Nations Unies,pour mettre au point un programme de démilitarisation conforme aux dis- positions'des paragraphes. 5, 6, 7 et 8 ci-dessus. 22. Après la.proposition7, c'est la proposition 10 qui, des douze propositions, revêt le plus d'importance. Cette;lroposition fixe en effet comme suit les condi- tions etiadate d'entrée en fonction de l'Administrateur du plébisCite: 23. To make c1ear that, in connecting part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and "the large-scaie dis- arming and disbanding of the A::ad Kashmir forces" and "the further reduction of the Indian :rorces" to con- stitute part of a continuous process of demilitarizaotion, the funcHons and respons\bilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator re- mained with regard "ta final disposaI" of the remaining forces, proposaI 11 provided as follows: Proposal11 The Govermnents of India and Pakistan Agree t!>.at the completion of the programme of demilitarization referred ,ta in paragraph 9 above will be without prejudice to the functions and responsi- bilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administraotor with regard to the final dis- posaI of forces'as set fortIl in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution. 24. The Government of India contends "that botih under the two United Nations resolutions read to- gether and according to the understandings with the CornT!:~issiQn; the term 'nnal disposaI' in sub-paragraph 4 (a) means only disposition. This is evident from -::he fact that the UNCIP resolution Ol: 13 August 1948 speaks of minimum' forces requirpd to assist the local authorities iit the maintenance of !aw and order, which the Commission itself has interpreted to inc1ude adequate &efence. The Government of India considers that- it can never be contemplated that as a result of any subsequent reduction forces should be reduced to below the minimum. The Commission has never used the term 'reduction' or 'withdrawal' of Indian forces with reference to s,ub-paragmph 4 Ca); it has, on the .otb.er hand, always insisted that sub-paragraph 4(b) contemplated disbandment and disarming of Azad K?shmir forces and other armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-nre line. This distinction was made bythe CotIllnission with reference to a difficulty of its own creation by giving an aSsurance to the Pakistan Government,·without the knowledge of the Government; of India, that it dio. not contemplate the disbandment ?J1d disa.l.'mifig of Azad Kashmir forces at the stage of part II of the 13 August 1948. resolution. Moreover, once it is .accepted in principle that demil~tarization contemplated under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single con- tinuons .process, no interference with the strength of forces in the State 1s possible at the plebiscite stage. Furthermore, if the element of- reduction or withdrawal of .fllrces at the plebisdte stage, according to the Pakistan Government's interpretation of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and Cb) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, is brpught on to .the demilitarization stage, the· process of demilitarization must be deemed to have exuausted itselfand the United Nations Representative and the 25. The Government of Pakistan contends "that the term 'final disposaI of forces' was used by the U~CIP bath in sub-paragraph 4 (a) of its reso1ution of 5 Jan- tl<lry 1949 with respect ta Indian and State armed forces, and in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the same resulu- tian in respect of the Asad Kashmir forces. Tt could only meau the snme thing in both cases. The Vice- Chairman of the Commission informed the Foreign MinÎster of Pakistan on 25 December 1948 that the abject of paragraph 4 of the Commissiou's drait pro- posaIs on 11 December 1948 (which subsequent1y be- came the Commission's resolutton of 5 January 1949) \Vas lita ensure a large-scale reduction and disarma- ment, the exact scope of which will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with t~e authorities concerned". (See me1110randum apper.ded ta annex 5 to the second report of UNCI'P [5/1196].) The term 'final disposaI' there- fore covers reduction by withdrawal or disbandment as weIl as location or stationing of the armed forces concerned. If it il> ~ontended that 'final disposaI' means only the location or stationing of forces, then there is, by the same token, no provision in the UNCIP resolu- tians' for the reduction or disbandment of the Asad Kashmir forces either". 26. To prevent a later dead-Iock over differences re- garding an agreed programme of demilitarization proposaI 12 p1"O'0ded as follows: Pr.oposal 12 The Governments of India and Pakt".stan Agree that any differences regardln~ the programme of demilitarization contemplated in paragraph 9 above will be referred ta the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, ta the United Nations Representative, whose decision shall be final. 27. It is the view of the Government of Pakistan that "paragraph U of the truce proposaIs enables the United Nations Reprl''ientative to determine final points of difference relatin~ to technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed demilitarization programme. This is not enough. Sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the Security Council's resolution of 14 March 1950 (S/146n authorized the United Nations Representa- bve ta mtetpret the agreements reache.d by the parties for demilitarization. There should be a similar provi- min~e5 par la Commission et par l'Administrateur du plébiscite, de concert avec les autorités intéressées". (Voir pièce jointe à l'annexe 5 du deuxième rapport de la Commission des NatioDs Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan [5/1196].) "L'expression "modalités du re- trait définitif" s'applique par conséquent à la réduction par retrait ou licenciement aussi bien qu'à la disposi- tion ou au cantonnement des forces armées en ques- tion. Si l'on prétend que l'expression "les modalités du retrait définitif" ne se rapporte qu'à la disposition ou au stationnement des effectifs, on peut dire tout aussi bien qu,e les résolutions de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan ne prévoient pas la réduction ou le licenciement des forces armées du ,Cachemire Azo.d". 26. Afin d'empêcher que des divergences de vues con- cernant un programme de démilitarisation C'lnvent' ne conduisent plus tard à une impasse, la proposition 12 prévoit ce qui suit: Proposition 12 Les Gouverne-ments de l'Inde et du Paki.stan Conviennent que tout différend relatif au pro- gramme de démilitarisation prévu au paragraphe 9 ci- dessus sera porté devant le conseiller militaire du représentant des Nations Unies et, si le désaccord per- siste, devant le représentant des Nations Unies, dont la décision sera sans appel. 27. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan est d'avis que "le paragraphe 12 des propositions de trêve habilite le représentant des Nations Unies à trancher tout diffé- rend au sujet duquel un désaccord persisterait con- cernant des détails techniques de la mise en œuvre pratique du plan de démilitansation convenu. Cette mesure n'est pas suffisante. L'alinéa 2, a, de la résolu- tion adoptée par le Consei1 de sécurité le 14 mars 1950 [5/1461] charge le représentant des Nations Unies d'interpréter les accords concll.!-s ~ar les parties en vue 28. It ili tue view of the Government of Indin thnt "tht' rt.'ference in pnrngraph 1~ of Mr. Grnham's letter is ll()t to differences arisin~ in the process of drnwing up a programme of demihtarization hut only ta dU- ferences upon technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. On this l.tndcrstanding the answer to the question is in the affirmative"• 29. In line with his policy maintained frCJm the outset of his mission thnt any assurance given to the parties could only be given by the United Natio'.i5 Represen- tative on the written record with thtl eqc,al knowledge of bath Governments) the United Nations Representa- tive gav, the assurance that he was not seeking to arbitrate matters of substance and would confine his decisions to those matters of technical detaiis concern- ing the adual implementation of -the agreed programme. UI. PROGRESS fN THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE TWELVE PROPOSALS 30. At the conclusion of our consultations with the two Governments on the sub-continent we were able) in our report to the Security Council of lS October 1951 [S/.?375]) to report agreement on the first four of the twelve proposaIs. 31. At the conclusion in December of the negotiations in Paris, we reported to the Security Council on 18 Decelllber 1951 [S/2448] additional agreements on proposaIs 8, 9; Il and. 12. 32. The suggestion made by the Uflited Nations Representative that the Plebiscite Administrator desig- nate he now associated with him not for negotiations hut for consultation regnrding the prospective joint responsibilities of the Representative and the AdnlÏnis- • )1' and to mah studies) was not considered advisable the two Govç/nments, This suggestion was there- , fore not carried out. 33. The United Nations Representative considered that it would facilitate the preparation for the plebiscite to have the Plebiscite Administrator designate make studies as soon as possible regarding the conditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure plebiscite. Your representative has the view that these studies by the Plebiscite Administrator are basic to the considera- tion of the whole complex problem of the plebiscite. Since such studies as are necessary could best he made on the ground and since both Governments consider it inadvisabie for him to be consulted in an official capacity before his induction) it is my view that it is important that he be indttctec! as soon as possible and therefore it is important that an agreement on a plan of demilitarization be agreed upon as. soon as possible sp that he can get on with his studies on the ground. ~rogram~e convenu. Si .tel est bien le cas) la réponse a la questton est affirmattve". 29. Conformément à la politique qu'il a adoptée dès le déhut de sa mission de ne donner d)assurnnce aux purties que pur écrit) en ~enant les deux gouverne- ments également informés) le représentant des Nations Unies a confirmé q1.1)il ne cherchait pas à s~rvir d'ar- bitre pour trancher des questions de foud et qu'il se bornerait à se prononcer sur les questions technioues précises que poseront les modalités œexécut~on· du programme ct1nvcntt. fU. PROGRÈS ACCOMPLIS EN CE QUI CONCERNE L)ACCElP~ TATION DES DOUZE PROPOSITIONS 30. A l'issue de nos consultations avec les deux gou- vernements de la péninsule) nous avons été en mesure, dans notre rapport au Conseil de sécurité en date du 15 octobre 1951 rS/2375]) de rendre compte qu'un accord avait été realisé en ce qui concerne les quatre premières des douze propositions. 31. A la fin des négociations de Paris) au mois de décembre) nous avons porté à la connaissance du Con~ seil de sécurité) le 18 décembre 1951 [S/2448]) que les parties étaient en outre parvenues à un accord sur les propositions 8) 9, 11 et 12. 32. Les deux gouvernements n)ont pas jugé bon de donner une suite favorable à la suggestir-" que le représentunt des Nations Unies avait fonnuL_ à l'effet de lui associer) dès à présent, rAdministrateur du plé- biscite désigné) non pas aux fins des négociations) mais en vue de diverses études et notamment de consulta- tions sur les responsabiHtés que le représentant des Nations Unies et r Administrateur devront éventuel1e~ ment assumer en commun. En conséquence) cette sug~ gestion n'a pas été mise en œuvre. 33. Le représentant des Nations Unies avait pensé que la préparation du plébiscite serait facilitée si l'Administrateur désigné entreprenait le plus tôt pos- sible des études concernant les conditions nécessaires à rorganisation d)un plébiscite libre) équitable et don- nant toutes garanties du point de vue de la sécurité. Votre représentant est persuadé que des études de cette nature constituent un des éléments essentiels de l'examen du problème complexe que pose le fllébiscite. Etant donné qu)il serait préférable d)effectuer les études nécessaires sur les lieux et qu,:e les deux gou- vernements jugent inopportUI'l de consulter officielle~ ment l'Administrateur du plébiscite avant son entrée en fonction) il importe, à mon avis) que l'Administra- teur entre en fonction le plus rapidement possible et par conséquent que lIon arrive sans délai à un accord au sujet d)un plan de démilitarisationJ de façon que e~isted nt the time of the ceasc-fire on 1 January 1949. 35. There remained outstamling four of the twelv~ proposais upon which agreement had not been reached l1lc1udin~ the two most basic of a11 the twelve pro- posaIs: tirst, the time of the induction into office of the Plehiscite Administrator; and secondly, the number and character of forces to he left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitnriza- tion. 36. In view of the contînuing dead-lock the United Nations Representative made definite suggestions re- garding the two most basic differences in l'evised pro- posaIs presented on 16 July, 2 September and 4 September 1952. On 2 Septemhcr and 4 September 1952 he trnnsferred the substance of the original proM pmml 9 to the provisional clause at the end of the twetve proposaIs, that clause to read as follows: P,'o'llI'siollal clause. This agreement sha11 enter into effect when the two Governments of India and Pakistan have approved a programme of demilitarization in con- formity with paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above, the draft , of 'snch programme to be drawn up in meetings be- tween the representatives of the Govermnents of India and t'.· Pakistan assisted by their military advisers under the auspices of the United Nations. The first meeting sha11 take place within t'Wo weeks after the signature of the above agreement. 37. In the revised vel'siorts of 2 September and 4 Sep- temher 1952 the new proposaI 9 was made as follows: 2 Septcmber Revlsed proposal 9 The GovemtltetJts of bJdia and ,of Pakistan Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be a'CI:ministered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. The local authorities sha11 undertake the fulfihüent of su~h duties as are necessary for the observance within that territory of the provisions of the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949. (That tS, the cease-fire agreement.) 4 Septcmber F,t1'thel' ·revised proposal 9 The Govcrnments of India attd of Pakistan Agree that, pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by tue Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities ttnder the surveillance of the United Nations. IV. lŒVIVAL OF THE DIFFERENCE OVER THE MEANING OF "LOCAL AU1'HORITIESIJ IV. NOUVELLES DIVERGENCES DE VUES AU SUJET DE LA SIGNIFICATION DES MOTS "AUTQIUTÉs LOC,ALES" 39. The Government of India contends that the State of Jammu is a legal entity, that the sovereignty of India is based on the Insêrument of Accession constitu- tionally executed, and that there can be no de jure or de facto recognition of the A::ad Kashmir Government. 40. The GO\Ternment of India hoIds Clthat the adminis- tration of this area would, under paragraph 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities ta he established or recognized for tlie pur- pose; to these local authorities under the same resolu- tion only local administrative ftmctions have been assigned. In the very nature of things such authorities can he in charge only of 10caUaw and arder whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. Ta give them any armed force equivalent ta troops would net be consistent either with their status or with their func- tions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammtt and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local au- thorities can he entrusted only with civil armed force". 41. The Gavernment of Pakistan 11alds that "Paragraph 3 of section A of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 provided that 'pending a final soiru,tian, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities uhder the surveilla..'1ce of the Commis- sion'. ClIn its letter dated 3 September 1948, the Com- mission defined t}le 'evacuat,~d territory' to mean 'those territories il.. '"te State ot J9.:nmu and Kashmir which are at prese. ~ under the effective control of the pakistan High Command (first report of UNCIP, paragraph 90). As a result of the demarca- tion of the cease-fire line aU terr!tories situated on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be regarded as 'evacuated territory'. "The United Nations Commission told the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that by the term 'local author- ities' it meant the Asad Kashmir Government, though the Commissioncould not accord de jttre recognition to a revolutionary authority such as the Asad Kash- mir Government. The Commission also gave the assurance that no official' of the Government of India, or of the Maharaja's Government, would be permitted ta enter the evacuated territory. (See summary record of the meeting held by UNCIP on 31 August 1948.) . "As regards the term 'surveilla'l'tee', t.he UNCIP said that it meant neither supervision nor control. The Chairman of the Commission explained that ~a11 dér~s comme "territoires évacués". "La Commission des Nations Unies a indiqué au Ministre des affaires étrangères du Paldstan que, par "autorités locales", elle entendait Je Gouverne- ment du Cachemire Asad, bien que la Commission ne puisse accorder une reconnaissance de jure à une autorité révolutionnaire telle que ce gouvernement. La Commission a également donné l'assurance qu'aucun fonctionnaire du Gouvernement de l'Inde ou du Gouvernement du Maharajah ne serait auto- risé à pénétrer .dans le ter.ritoire évacué. (Voir le compte rendu analytique de la séance tenue le 31 août 1948 par la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan.) "En ce qui concerne le terme "surveillance" la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan a déclaré qu'il n'impliquait tU vérification "The Pakistan delegation took note of the United Nations Representative\; statement on 2 Septemher 1952 that he understood the term 'local authorities' ta menn 'the persans there who exercise effective authoriti and that as regards 'surveillance' over the local autharities the United Nations Representative would seek ta exercise it through the appointment of civil and military observers." 42. In Geneva the representatives of the two Govern- ments agr.eed on a revised proposaI 9 ta read as follows : Rcvised ptoposal 9 The Governments of India and of Pakistan Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shall he given to this by the time the process of demilitarization mentioned in para- graph 6 has been completed on bath siâes of th~ cease- nre Hne. v. THE SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE FOR NEGOCIATIONS REGARDING THE INDUCTION OF THE PLEBISCITE ADMINISTRATOR l'NTO OFFICE 43. In the original twelve proposaIs of 11 September 1950 the United Nations representative proposed on the sub-cnntinent that the Plebiscite Administrator he inducted into office not later than the last·day of the ninety-day period of demilitarization. 44. The Governnlent of Pakistan agreed. 45. The Govemment of India then "doubted whethe.r during the period of ninety days the nrm will ta settle the Kashmir questien peacefully would have replaced in Pald:stan the spirit and temper of war prevaiHng at the present time" (that is, at that time). The Government of India considered "that the proposaI concerning the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator should be omitted from the twelve proposaIs and be inc1uded in proposaIs having to do specifically with the holding of the plebiscite". 46. The Unitt:d Nations Representative proposed in Paris in December 1951that the Plebiscite Adminis- trator be inducted into office on 15 JuIy i952. 47. The Govemment.of Pakistan agreed. qu~ ç'est là un terme très modéré qui n'impliquerait pas automatiquement le contrôle ou une intervention auprè~ des autorit(·· locales à moins de violation de la trêve", (Voir le compte rt'ndu analvtique de la séance tenue le 2 septembre 1948 par la'Ctlmmission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan,) La Commission. également convenu que sa surveil- lance ne s'étendrait pas jusqu'à englober Gilgit, ceLa délégation du Pakistan a pris acte de la dé- claration faite par le représentant des Nations DnieR le 2 septembre 1952 et selon laquelle, par "autorités locales", il entendait "les personnes exer- çant effectivement l'autorité dans cette région", et qu'en ce qui concerne "la surveillance" portant sur les autorités locales, le représentant des Nations Unies chercherait à l'exercer en nommant des ob- servateurs civils et militaires," 42. A Genève, les représentants des deux gouverne- ments ont accepté un texte revisé de la proposition 9; ce texte est le suivant: Proposition 9 revisétJ Les GouvernemtJnts de l'Inde et du Pakistan Conviennent qu'en attendant une solution définitive, le territoire évacué par les troupes du Pakistan sera administré par les autorités locales sous la surveillance des Nations Unies. Cette disposition p~endra effet au moment où l'opération de démilitarisation dont il est question au paragraphe 6 aura été achevée des deux côtés de ia iigne de suspension d'armes. V. LF-S DIVERSES PROPOSITIONS AVANCÉES PAR LE REPRÉ- SENTANT DES NATWNS UNIES AU SUJET DE NÉGO- CIATIONS RELATIVES À LA DATE D'ENTRÉE EN FONC- TION DE L'ADMINISTRATEUR DU l'LÉBISCITE 43. Dans les douze propositions initiales que le repré- sentant des Nations Unies avait formulées le 11 sep- tembre 1950. alors qu'il se trouvait dans la péninsule, il avc.it proposé que l'Administrateur du plébiscite e~trât ~1 ~onction !lu plus tard le, 4ernie~ de~ Cl.u!ltr~­ vmgt-dlx Jours prevus pour la perlOde (Ié deml1itarl- sation. 44. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan a accepté cette proposition. 45. Le Gouvernement de l'Inde a déclaré qu'il "dou- tait qu'au cours de cette période de quatre-vingt-dix jours, la' ferme volonté de régler de façon pacifique la question du Cachemire vînt remplacer, au Pakistan, l'esprit belliqueux qui régnait à l'époque". Le Gouver- nement de l'Inde aexprimê l'avis "qu'il faudrait sup- primer, dans les douze propositions, la proposition relative à la nomination de 1'Administrateur du plébis- cite et qu'il serait préférable de la faire figurer parmi celles quO 'nt trait expressément à l'organisation du plébiscite 46.. A Paris, au mois de décembre 1951, le repré- sentant des Nations Unies a proposé que l'Admlnis- trllteurdu plébiscite entre en fonction le 15 juillet 1952. . . -CC",... 47. L~. Gouvernement du Pakistan a accept6··ces proposltions. 49. In New York. the United Nations Representative suggested on 16 July 1952, for consideration in the conference propased t" he held in Geneva, that the Plebiscite Administrator he inducted inta office not Inter than the final day of the demilitarization period (ninety days) referreel ta in proposaI 6. 50. The view of the Government of Intiia is ICthat the Plebiscite Administrator can properly function .on1y after (i) the process of demilitarization is com- pleted and the United Nations representative tS satis- fied that peaceful conditions have been restoJred and (il) the local authorities arl.' recognized and are func- tioning on the Pak~stun side of the cease-fire Hne under the surveillance )f the United Nations Repre- sentative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would he prepared ta agree to rus indt1f~tion on the last day of the period of demilitariza- tian provided that it is completed according ta plan and is exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrator woulel, as regards the forces remaining in the State after demilitarization is fully implemented, be con- cerned only with their disposition". 51. It is the view of the Government of Pakistan "that second in importance only to the question of demilitarization •is the date by which the Plebiscite Administrator will be inducted into office. Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administratol' has ta be jnducted into office as saon as the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and the Pakistan Army and the bulle of the 1ndian Army have been with- drawn. The United Nations Representative's proposal that the Plebiscite Administrator should be a?pointed not later than the last day of the demilitarizatlOn pro- gramme represents a big concession to the Indian point of view. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as a part of the twelve truce proposaIs suggested by the United Nations Representative". VI. THE SE'VERAL ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING THE NUMBER AND CHARACTER OF FORCES TO BE LEFT ON EACH SIDE OF THE CEASE-FIRE UNE AT THE END OF THE PERIOD OF DEMILITARIZATION 52. In the original twelve proposaIs of 11 September 1951 the United Natiotls representative suggested in proposaI 7 "that at the end of the period (90 days) referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire Hne a force of ..'. civil armed forces, and on the Indian sicle of the cease-fire line a force of ... ". 1..- VI. PROPOSITIONS FORMULÉES PAR LE REPRÉSENTANT DES NATIONS UNIES AU SUJET DES EFFECTIFS ET DE LA NATURE DES FORCES ARMÉES QUI SERONT MAl'NTENUES DE PART ET D'AUTRE DE LA LIGNE nE SUSPENSION D'ARMES À LA FIN DE LA PÉRIODE DE DÉMILITARISATION' 52. Le 11 septen1bre 1951, le représentant des Na- tions Unies avait présenté douze propositions de trêve; dans Sa forme originale, la proposition 7 disposait "qu'à la fin de la période (90 jours) dont il est ques- tion au paragraphe 6 ci-dessus, il reste du côté actuelle- ment pakistanais de la ligne de suspension d'armes une milice de... hommes, et, du côté indien de la ligne de suspension d'armes, une force de ... JI. ~ide of the cense-fire Hne nt the end of the period agreed upon in the terms of parngrnphl:i 6 and 9, the Govern- ment of India \Vonld agree to n force of 4,000, I..ll:gan- ized, eqnipl?ed and composed as recol11mended to UNCIP in Item C of the memoranc!um transmitted ta the UNCIP ttnder caver of a letter dated 13 April 1949 hy the Set'retary-General in the Mil1istry of E~ternal Affairs of India; that is, the forces {of 4,000) should consist of persons nomlally resident lU A.aad Kashmir territory, haH of whom shoul<1 he lollowers of Azad Knshmir and the other half persons who are not fol- lowers of Asad Kashmir. This force should be com- manded by United Nations officers :>1' 'loeals' and not by Pakistan officers." 54. The Government of Paldstan felt "that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the neces- snry administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme envisaged in paragrnph 7". The Pakistan Government, however, e~pressed the view "that some slight difference in the strength of description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached, sa long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire Hne were of the order indicated abova". 55. In effect, proposaI 7, as it stood, did not provide the basis for an agreement. 56. In the Paris sessions of December 1951, the Gov- ernment of India emphasized that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization under this plan were over 7,000 less than the minimum stéltted in para- graph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of 11 September. 57. This proposed remainder of 21,000 was estimated by India to be a reduction of over 80 pel' cent of the Indian and State armed forces present in the State at the time of the cease-fire on 1 January 1949. 58. The Govermnent of Pakistan r. aintained its posi- tion that a force of no more than four infantry bat- talions (with the riecessary administrative units) should be left on each side of the cease-fire line. The Pakistan Govermnent was, however, prepared ta agree that "so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire lîne are of the arder indicated above, some slight difference in the strength of description of the two forces should not stand in the way II)f an agreement being reached". 59. The disparity between the number and character of forces proposed by the parties continued to he wide. The United Nations Representative revised the relevant part of proposaI 7 to read as follows: "sb that on the date referred ta in paragraph 6 above there will remain on each side of the cease-fire tine the lowest possible 60. This revised proposaI aiso did not provide the basis for an agreement, 61. In New York the United Nations Reflrt...,entative, in his revised proposaIs of 16 July 1952 [S/2783, an- ne.'!: 3], suggested for t!le consideration of the two Governments, in a conference proposed to he held in Geneva, brackets of numbers in proposaI 7 as follows: (i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn; (H) The Pakistan troops \vill have been withdrawn Irom the State i (iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the'Apad Kashmir forces will have taken place; sa that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shaH be an armed force of ... [the United Nations represen- tative suggests, as a basis for discussion, figures ranging from 3,000 ta 6,000] ; (iv) The remaining Asad Kashmir forces will have been separated from the administrative and operational con~rol of the Pakistan High Command and will be officered by neutral and local offic.ers under the sur- veillance of the United Nations. (i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn; (H) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indiàn and State armed forces remain- ing in the State after the completion of the operation . referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out; sa that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be an Indian Army force of. .. [the United Nations Representative suggests, as a basis iordiscussion, figures ranging from 12,000 ta 18,000]. These numbers did not inc1ude the Jammu and Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit and Northern Scouts. 62. The proposed brackets of numbers (12,000 to 18,000 on. the Indian side and 3,000 to 6,000 ori the .Pakis~an side of the cease-fire.line) not having provided the basis for an agreement, the United Nations Repre- sentative, in the further revisedproposals on 2 Sep- tember 1952, suggested for consideration by the representatives of the two Governments an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side and an Indian and State army of 18,000 on the Indian side of the cease-fire Hne. J Otl the Pakt'stan side nt the end of the period of demilitarizntion there sha11 be the minimum number of forces thnt are required for the maintenance of law and order and the cease-fire agreement, with due regard ta the freedom of the plebiscite; and . On the J.ndian side there shaH be the minimum num- ber of Indian and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and arder and of the cease- nre agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. 64. Since this suggestion did not provide the basis for an agreement, the abO've prindples or oriteria were revised in other draft proposaIs on which agreement was not reached. 65. The position of the Government of India rega'l'd- ing the character an ~ number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line was summarized in Geneva as follows [S/2783, anna.t' 5] : . " (1) The position of the Government of India as . regards its own forces is as follows: . " (a) According to paragraph 4 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, the Govern- ment of India must have the minimum forces required to assist the local authorities, i.e., the Jammu and Kashmir Government, on the India side of .the cease-' fire line in the maintenance of law an"d oroer; this term, a:cC'Ott1ing to the Commission, inc1udes adequate defence. "(b) Under sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the disposaI of India and State armed forces on our side has ta be with due regard to security, whioh in its connotation has a wider significance than law and m"der. " (c) The Government of India is constitutionally responsible for the defence of the Jammu and Kash- mir State, which inc1udes aid to the civil power. . "(d) Having regard ta theJe commitments of lnternl'l,l and exh:rnal security, the responsibilities under. the cease-fire agreement àüd the· faet thllt Pakistan would be rree to locate its forces as it likes within its own borders, which for some length are. common \Vith the borders of the Jammu and Kashmir St~te and f.or a still greater length within practically stnking. distance of thecease...fire lille and·. important areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the Govern- dit~ons indispensables à la liberté du plébiscite; et Dft côté indien) il ne restera que le minimum de forces armées de l'Inde et de l'Etat de Jammu et CacLemire nécessaire pour le maintien de l'ordre et le respect de l'accord de suspension d'armes, compte tenu des conditions indispensables à la liberté du plébiscite. 64. Ces principes n'ont pas recueilli l'n'{rément du deux gouvernements intéressés; en const ~...ence, ils ont été modifiés et ils ont fait l'objet d'autres propositions que les gouvernements ont également rejetées. 65. La position du Gou"'.rernement de l'Inde sur la nature et les effectifs des forces qui seront maintenues de chaque côté de la ligne de suspension d'armes a été résumée à Genève de la façon suivante [S/2783, anne~"e 5] : "1. Nature et effectifs des forces armées qui seront maintenues de chaque côté de la ligne de sus- pension d'armes: '(1) La position du Gouvernement de l'Inde en ce qui concerne ses propres forces est la suivante: "a) Conformément au paragraphe 4 de la deuxième partie de la résolution adoptée par la Commission des Nations Unies pJur l'Inde et le Pa- kistan le 13 août 1948, le Gouvernement de l'Inde doit disposer, du côté indien de la ligne de suspen- sion d'armes, des effectifs minimums nécessaires pour aider les aùtorités locales, c'est-à-dire leGou- vernement de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire, à faire respecter l'ordre public; d'après la Commission, cette expression s'applique à la défense appropriée de l'Etat. "b) D'après l'alinéa 4, a, de la résolution adoptée par la Commission des Nations Un.ies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan le 5 janvier 1949, les modalités du retrait des forces armées de 1'Inde et·de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire du côté indien de la ligne de suspension d'armes doivent tenir dûment. compte des conditions nécessaires à la sécurité, laquelle dans son contexte a une signification plus large que le respect de l'ordre public. "c) Le Gouvernement de l'Inde est constitu- tionnellement responsable de la· .défense de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire) et cette responsabilité 'com- prend l'aide à apporter aux autorités civiles. Hd) Compte tenu de ces obligations rclatives à la sécurité intérieure et extél'Îeure de l'Etat, des res- ponsabilités contractées aux termes de l'accord. de suspensicm d;armeset du fait qu.e le Gnlt"l1erll.el11~nt du Pakistan sera libre.de disposer ses forces. armées comme il l'entendra à l'intérieur de ses frontières nati.(lllales, lesquellès sur. une certamfJdistancesont "COmmunes au Pakistan et à l'Etat de Jammu et Ca-. chemire et se trouvent. sur une distance encr.'e plus H (e) Howeverl on complete disbandment and dis.. armament of the Asad Kashmir forces and as a further gesture towards a settlementl it is prepared' ta effect a further reduction of 710001 but it is im- possible to reduce this absolute minimum figure of 21,000. "(f) The Gov~rnment of India will in no drcum- stances be prepared to include the Militia in these ca1culations. The Militia is a special anned police force which is under. the administration of the Jammu and Kashrnir Government for its normal law and order responsibilities and is only tenl.f)orarily, for the period of emer&"ency, under the operational control of the Indian Army. "(II) The position of the Government of India as regards forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire Hne is as fol1ows : "(a) The Asad Kashmir Forces and the Gilgit and Northern Scouts have been newly raised or greatly augmented during the pedod of Pakistan's aggression. This has been done in violation of the Commission's assurance that Pakistan would not be al10wed to consoHdate its position to the dis- advantage of the State. They are administratively and!or operationally under the control and direction of the Pakistan High Commando For these reasons they are indistinguishable from the Pakistan regular troops and must be disbanded and disarmed. This is necessary not only to honour the assurances given btlt also to restore peaceful and normal conditions in, and to facilitate the return of the refugees to, this area. "(b) The administration of thisarea would, under paragraph 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, ve· t in local authorities to be established or recognizeà for the purpose; to these local authorities, under the same resolution, only local administrative lunctions have been assigned. In the very nature of things such authorities can be in charge only ùf local law and order whether in the atea or with reference to the cease-fire Hne. To give them any armed force equivalent ta troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation ta the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil arn1ed force. . "Cc) The Government of lndia considers that, hjJ.virig regard to ail the circumstances of the case, a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side cOllsidering the' pre-aggression strength of "'Cd) Ha:ving règard t6 the functions these forces are to discharge and the conditions of a fair and im- partial plebiscite, these forces should consist of an equal proportion of Asad Kashmir and other el':;iIlents. The Government of India would be pre- pared to agree to a suitable readjustme.at of the armed and unarmed portion of this force. " (e) The civil armed force should be under neutral and local officers. "2. Principles for the determination of forces to be left on either side of the cease-fi1'e Zine: "The Government of India considers that the principles enumerated in sub-paragraph 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (H) of Mr. Graham's proposaI of 4 Sep- tember 1952, were conceived in the right spirit having regard to the two UNCIP resolutions. As a basis for the evolution of a suitable definitio:~ of func- tions of forces on hoth sides of the cease-fire line they contained the germs of a settlement but despite several efforts to evolve a suitable draft in terms of the language used in the Commission's resolutions no understanding could be reached with the Pakistan Government. Since the evolution of such principles is basic to the question of the character and quantum of :torces, the Government of India would point out that while the Commlssion's resolutions acknowledge its responsibility in tI:!is respect in specifie broad terms, the use of the term 'local authorities', the pro- vision for the surveillance of the United Nations Commission, and the fact that these local authodties have to carry on the mere administration of this area leave no doubt whatsoever that their law and order responsibilities are of a purely local character. The Government of India cannot accept any equation of its responsibilities with the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire Hne or agree ta any- thing more than a local character - the maintenance of public order in that area by the local authorities. It would observe that constitutionallv the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the con- cern of the Government of India and it alone is entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose. This is the only position consistem: with the assurance given and the practice observed hitherto by the United Nations authorities of giving recog- nition to the sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which derived originally from the Instru- ment of Accession and has sinee been embodied in the Constitution of India." . 66. The position of the Government of Pakistan regarcling the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire Hne has been summarized as fo11ows [Sj2783, al1ne.t· 6] : (1) ProposaIs of 16 hl1y 1952 "Pakistan considers that after the processes out- lined in paragraph 7 of the United Nations Repre- sentative's truce proposals of 16 ]uly 1952 have been cartied out, there should remain on each side of the cease-fire line only the minimum forces necessary for tha maintenance of law and order and the preserva- tion of the cease-fire line. "The UNCIP resoiutions contemplated the reten- tian of some armed forces on bath sides of the cease- fire Hne for the purposes specified above. The char- acter of the forces must, Qbviously, be the same on bath sides of the cease-!.ire line. "There tS no warrant in the UNCIP resolutions for the appointment t.,.ç 'neutral' officers in command of the reduced Asad Kashmir fo"ces. This proposal is aIso inherently unworkable. There is no shortage of suitable local officers ta commând the reduced Asad Kashmir forces." . (2) ProposaIs of 2 September 1952 "Pakistafi' considers that the United Nations Representati.ve's proposal thatat the end of the dernilitarization progr<mlme contemplated in para- graph 7 of the proposaIs, there should remain an armed force of 18,000 (exclusive of 6,000 MiHtia) on the Indian side, and an armed force of 6,000 (exclusive of 3,500 Scouts) oil the Pakistan .sicle leaves too many s01diers in the State. Before parti- tio:J, th~ Maharaja's Government managed with less than a quarter of ·the forces suggested by the United Nations Representative (8,000 as aga;nst 33,500). "The ratio on the date· of the cease-fire was 5 to 4 in India's favour according ta the Government of Pakistan, and· 7 .to 5 according to General Jacob Devers, the Military Adviser to the United· Nations' Representative." (3) ProposaIs of 4 September 1952 "Pakistan. ful!y'agreed .with the United Nations Representative .that every· effort should be made at the· Confetence•.itself to agree on. the number. and 'character' of forces whièh shou~d temain on each side o'f 1!he eease"fire Hne at the.end of the demilita'rization programme.. Failing this,. the Conference. should' at least ~gree .on the guiding principles .for determining the num.ber and character of forces. 66. La position du Gouvernement du Pakistan en ce qui concerne les effectifs et la nature des forces armées qui seront maintenues de chaque côté de la ligne de suspension d'armes a été résumée de la façon suivante [S/2783, mmC:l:c 6] : 1) P~oposttions dt(, 16 fuillet 1952 "Le Gouvernement J.u Paldstan estime qu'après l'ex.écution des opérations prévues au paragraphe 7 des propositions de trêve formulées le 16 juillet 1952 par le représentant des Nations Unies, il ne devmit rester, de part et d'autre de la ligne de suspension d'armes, que le minimum de forces nécessaire pour le maintien de l'ordre et la protection de la ligne de suspension d'armes. " "Les résolutions de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan envisageaient que certains effectifs seraient maintenus de chaque côté de la ligne de suspensio:tl d'armes aux. fin~ précisées ci-dessus. La nature de ces forces doit éviden~'TIent être la même des deux côtés de la ligne de suSpeli~Ol1 d'armes. "Il n'existe dans les résolutions de la Com- mission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan rien qui justifie la nomination d'officiers "neutres" au commandement des forces :lrmées réduites du Cachemire A;.:ad. Cette proposition est de plus im- praticable en elle-même. Il ne manque pas d'officiers locaux capables de commander les forces armées réduite' du Cachemire Asad." 2) Propositions du 2 septembre 1952 "Le Gouvernement du Pakistan estime que la proposition du représentant des Nations Unies selon laquelle, à la fin de la période de démilitarisation visée au paragraphe 7 des propositions, il devrait rester du côté indien des forces armées dont les effectifs s'élèvent à 18.000 hommes (non compris les 6.000 hommes de la milice) et, du côté pakis- tanais, des forces armées dont les effectifs s'élèvent à 6.000 hommes (non compris 3.500 éclaireurs), maintient des effectifs trop élevés d'ilns l'Etat. Avant le partage, le Gouvernement .du Maharajah se con- tentait de moins du quart des effectifs proposés par le représentant des Na.tions Unies (8.000 hommes au lieu de 33.500 hommes). , "D'autre part, le rapport des forces proposé est inéquitable à l'égard du Pakistan, car ce rapport n'était favorable à l'Inde, à la date de la: suspension d'armes, que dans la proportion de 5 contre 4 d'après le Gouvernement du Pakistan et de 7 contre 5 d'après le·généml Jacob Devers, conseiller militaire du représentant des Nations Unies." 3) Propositions du 4 septembre 1952 "Le Gouvernement du Pakistan a été entièrement d'accord avec le représentant des Nations Unies pour estimer qu'il fallait, au cours de la Conférence, ne ménager aucun effort pour aboutir à un accord sur l'importance et la nature des effectifs qui seraient maintenus de chaque côté de la ligne de suspension d'armes à l'expiration de la période de démilitari- sation. Si cet effort n'aboutissait pas, la Conférence ClSubject to the above observations, and some drafting changes, the Pakistan delegation was pre- pared to accept the United Nations Representative's draft prr.)posals of 4 September 1952." Vl'I. AGREEMENT ON TEN OF THE TWELVE REVISED PROPOSALS AND PARTIAL AGREEMENT ON ANOTE:ER 67., To quote from our report of 16 September 1952 [S/2783] submitted to the Security Council: "':Dhe revised proposaIs of 4 September were agreed upon by the representatives of India and Pakistan to the fo11owing extent: "(i) Proposals 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 (a) (i) and (ii), 7 (b) (i), 8, 9, 10, 1Z'and the provisiona1 clause; with the redrafting of paragraphs S, 6 and 9 as fo11ows: . "'5. Agree that the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the United Nations resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 sha11 he effected in a single continuous process; "'6. Agree that this process of demilitarization sha11 be completed during a period of ninety days, starUng from the -date on which the progranlme of demilitarization referred to in pax;agraph 7 below 15 approved by the Governments of India and Pakistan, unless another period is decided upon by the two Govermnents ; "'9. Agree thatpending a final solution the terri- tory eva'CuaJI:ed by Pakistan troops wiU be adminis- tered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shaH be given to this by the time the process of demilitarization melltioned in paragraph 6 has been completed on both sides of the cease-fire Hne: "CH) Concerning paragraph 12, the representative of India accepted it with the. understanding that the differences referred to by the United Nations Rèpre- VII. ACCORD SUR DIX DES DOUZE P.ROPOSITIONS REVl'SÉES ET ACCORD PARTIEL SUR UNE AUTR~ DE CE!:> PROPO- SITIONS 67. Dans le rapport "n date du 16 septembre 1952 [S/2783] que j'ai présenté au Conseil de sécurité, on trouvera le passage sUlvant: "L'accord s'est é+abli entre les représentants de l'Inde et du Pakistan sur les points suivants des pro- positions revisées du 4 septembre: "i) Propositions l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, alinéas 7, aJ i et ii, et 7, bJ i, paragraphtls 8, 9, 1O~ 12 et clause provisoire,' les paragraphes 5, 6 et 9 étant modifiés comme suit: "5. Conviennent 'lue la démilitarisation de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire prévue dans les résolutions du 13 août 1948 et du 5 janvie.r 1949 des Nations P!'lies devra constituer une opération unique et mmterrompue; "6. Conviennent que cette Clpération de démili- tarisation devra avoir pris .fin a'~ bout d'une période de quatre-vingt-dix jours, à ccpmpter de la date à la.quelle le progran1l11e de démil'ltarisation dont il est question au paragraphe 7 ci~df~ssous sera approuvé . par les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan, à moins que ces deux gouvernements ne fixent un autre délai; . "9. Conviennent qu'en attendant une solution dé- finitive, le territoire évacué par les troupes du Pakistan sera administré par les autorités loca1es sous la surveillance des Nations Unies. Cette dispo- sition prendra effet au moment où l'opération de démilitarisation dont il est question au paragraphe 6 aura été.aclievée des deux côtés de la ligne de sus- pension d'armes." "ii) En ce qtù concerne le paragraphe 12, le re- présentant de l'Inde l'a accepté à condition que les différend& pDrtés devant le représentant des Nations iC(iv) Paragraph 11 of the proposaIs was deleted, ta be substituted with another one to be agreed upon by the two Representatives, connected with the definite warding of paragraph 7 and with the fune- tions and responsibiHties of the United Nations Representa.tive and the Plebiscite Administrator in accordance with sub-pa:agraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resoll.1tion of 5 January 1949." VUI. SUGGES'l~ ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES Ta THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES ON THE DEMILI- TA~l'IZATION PROPOSALS 69" Towards reaching an agreement on the remaining difference on proposaI 7, the United Nations Represen- tative made his suggestion for alternative approaches either through the establishment of the number and VIII. AUTRES MÉ'l'HODES PROPOSÉES PAR LE REPRÉSEN- TANT DES NATIONS UNIES EN VUE DE RÉSOUDRE LES DIVERGENCES QUI' SUBSISTENT AU SUJET DES PROPOSITIONS RELATIVES À. LA DÉMILITARISATION 68. Afin de mener à bien la tâche que le Conseil de sécurité lui a confiée, c'est-à-dire d'aider les partil::ls à se mettre d'accord sur un plan de démilitarisation, le représentant des Nations Unies a proposé un pro- gramme de démilitarisation en douze points dont l'e..'\.é- cution contribuerait à la solution d'un difficile pro- blème. Il tient à déciarer aux membres <iu Conseil que si les divergences de vues au sujet du programme en douze points ne portent plus que sur une seule ques- tion essentielle, dont dépend le succès du plan tout entier, elles sont néanmoins très profondes. Nous avons supprimé ou contourné des obstacles, nous avons réduit et mieux défini les divergences de vues, mais il reste beaucoup à faire pour combler le fossé qui sépare les parties en ce qui concerne la question de l'importance et de la nature des forces. Ces difficultés procèdent de l'oppositio:: souvent mentionnée - par exemple dans le rapport provisoire de la Commission des Na- tions Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan (Procès- verbat:.''C officiels d~t Conseil de séc~trité, qttatrième année, Supplément spécial n° 7, document S/1430/ Rev.l, paragraphes 200 à 202) et dans le rapport du représentant des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pa- kistan au Conseil de sécurité en date du 15 octobre 1951 (document S/2375 et Corr.2, paragraphe 35) - entre les conceptions des deux gouvernements touchant, premièrement, le statut de l'Etat de Jammu et Cache- mire, deuxièmement, les responsabilités et attributions des autorités compétentes de chaque côté de la ligne de suspension d'armes après la démilitarisation et, troi- sièmement, les obligations des deux gouvernements aux termes des résolutions du 13 août 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949, prévoyant un plébiscite. C'est après l'acceptation de dispositio11s précises concernant un plé- biscite que les hostilités ont cessé. Aux termes des deux résolutions du 13 août 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949, l'exa- men des conditions nécessaires à un plébiscite libre, équi- table et offrant toutes garanties de sécurité se fonde-- rait en partie sur les études de l'Administrateur du plébiscite. 69. En vue de faire disparaître les divergences de vues qui subsistaient au sujet de là proposition 7, le représentant des Nations Unies a proposé comme autres solutions, soit de fixer la nature et les effectifs 71. Ta fail to solve the Kashmir problem rather than to bridge present differences is incanceivable as a prac~ ticnl palicy in the face of a situation heavily charged with long-accumulated high potentials. The peoples of the sub-continent have the opportunity ta challenge the peoples of the world with their own adventurous programmes for bath individunI freedom and the general welfare, for bath national sectirity and world pence. For the peoples of the sub-continent ta fail to solve peacefully the Kashmir problem and ta drift or stumble inta greatly increased danger rather than bridge the chasm whioh divides them would be a tragedy for the two nations and for the people of the world who look with hope ta the humane leadership of two great peoples. Programmes which now proV'ide sustenance,· freedom and hope for hundreds of millions of people m~ght give way to violence. At this important and critical time in the history of the sub-continentl an agreement on Kashmir couId he. a great demonstration for peace hy peace-minded leaders, whose position for peace would he reinforced by an agreement. In case of conflict and destruction, fear and hunger might stalle the villagesl where most of the people live in the hope- fuI lands between the mountains ànd the seas. Violence and then tYl"anny might seek to feed on hunger and hatred while humane programmes were engulfed in the deep catastrophe. 72. The values of an early settlement of this dispute would, in my view, be tremendous for the 4 million people of the State, the 400 million people of the two nations involved, and the people of the world. 73. A settlement of 'this dispute would mer.n that the status of the people of the State would be finally de- termined not by the sovereignty of princes but by the sovereignty of the people, 'not by the might of armies but by the will af the people, not by buliets but by ballots, through the self-determination of peoples by the democratic method of an impartial plebiscite con- , ducted with due regard for the security of the State p~es a d~s1?os.er.~ eux~~emes, pa: !a vote democratique ,d un plebISCIte Impartial orgamse sous les auspices 75. Moreover, the settlement of the Kashmir dispute would contribute much to the relief of the fears and tènsions over canals and river,s from which come the waters for the fields, and the hopes of food and op~ portunity for millions of people. A settled basis for the co~operative development of the natural resources of the rivers and their wide valleys would make more promptly and broadly possible the connecting of the engines of production, transportation and commu- nication with nature's ceaseless cycle of mighty but unharnessed power between the sun and tr.~ seas, be- tween. the mountains, the snOW5, the rains and the rivers, between the douds and the lands of the vast sub-continent. 76. Food and freedom, goods and equal opportunity, health and education, dynamie hope and the libera-cion of the huma!}. spirit fo!' the good life of these great, fre~ societies can thus become the way of life of the peoples of India and Pakistan with all the meaning to the peoples of the 'world therein involved. 77. The co-operation of India and Pakistan in the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in the self-determination of the people of the State, and in the allocation of larger budgets for constructive programmes, might becom~ one of the turning-points in the history of our times tm,vards the co-operation of all nations for the larger self-determination of ail peoples; towards universal disarmament and the harnessing of atomic power for the moral equivalent of war in. the campaigns against poverty, illiteracyand disease; and tovvards the more effective co-ordination of the national programmes, the "Point Four" pro- gramme, the Colombo Plan and the United Nations technical assistance programme for advances in agriculture and industry, health and education, free- dom and peace, for all people. 78. On the sub~continent of Asia there is a iuncture of tb~ forces of strategic geography, historie 'peoples, high traditions, ancient religions, humane leadership, fresh currents of national freedom and democratie power of high· potential for peace or confliet, weal or woe, in the' present world. May the prompt, fair and .peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute by the Goyernments of India and of Pal.cistan set the example, mon~e actuel, sont pleins de possibilités de paix ou de conflit, de bonheur ou de malheur. Puisse un règle- ment .prompt, équitable et pacifique du différend du

Defore giving the flaor to the representative of Pakistan, who has asked ta speak, I should like ta thank the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan for the very clear, complete ::llld objective statement he has just made. 1 think that in doing so l express the feeling of aU members of the Council. In particular, 1 believe that members of the Council will consider that the way in which you have set forth the 1h'lsic points of view of each of the parties ta the dis" putt' throughout the various stages of your mission as rnediator, and the way in which you have described the course of your work as mediator, is of positive use to them in making up their minds on the settlement of this complex question. , 80. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan): At this stage, my delegation is not rn a position to after any comments on the fourth report of the United Nations Repre" sentative for India and Pakistan, which, of course, is ta be read jointly with the very exhaustive statement made by Mr. Gra:ham this afternoon. 1 have no com" ments to make beyond e.'\:pressing the appreciation of my Government for the integrity, the perseverence and the very high sense of Tesponsibility with which Mr. Graham 'bas tackled his task This tribute applies equally to the team of very able and experienced civil and military advisors who assisted hin' 111 his work. 81. The statement we heard from Mr. Graham this afternoon is of fair length, and we should like ta have an opportunity to study it extremely carefulIy, and so I think that a recess of a few days would he in order. 1 therefore request the President, subject ta his convenience and ta the convenience of the other members of the Couneil, -to calI another meeting very shortly. In the meantime, alI of us can apply our minds ta the words and suggestions and observations of Mr. Graham. 82. For the present, for the reasons 1 have given, I propose that this meeting now be adjourned. 83. The PRESIDENT (trattSlated from Spanish) : The representative for Pakbtan has asked for the ad" journment of the meeting under mIe 33 of the rules of procedure, wbich states that a motion of that land shalI be settled without debate. If there is no request for a vote on bis motion, 1 shalI take it that there are no objections and close the meeting. Otherwise 1 will put the Pakistan representative's proposaI to the vote. 84. I hear no objections. 85. The representative of Pakistan has also requested t~at a meeting he convene4 in the near future to con- tinue discussion on this subject. 1 shall consult with the members of the Couneil and in particular with th,e parties coricerned, and the date of the next meeting WIll be communicated to members. 1 see no possibility, of course, of holding a meeting before the opening of the General Assembly. The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m. 80. M. BOKHARI (Pakistan) (traduit de fan" glais): Ma délégation n'est pas, pour le moment, en mesure de présenter des observations sur le quatrième rapport du représentant des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan qu'il faut, naturellement, rapprocher de l'e."posé très complet que M. Graham a fatt cet après" midi. Je tiens seülement à rendre hommage, au nom de mon gouvernement, à la probité, à la persévérance et au sens très élevé des responsabilités avec lesquels M. Graham s'est attaqué à sa tâche. Cet hommage s'adresse également aux conseillers civils et militaires très compétents et très avisés qui l'ont aidé dans ses travaux. 81. L'exposé que M. Graham a fait cet après"midi est assez long et nous aimerions avoir ia possibilité de l'étudier très soigrleusement. C'est pourquoi je pense qu'il conviendrait que le Conseil s'ajourne pour quel" ques jours; je demande donc au Président, s'il n'y voit pas d'inconvénients et si les autres membres du. Con- seil n'en voient pas non plus, de réunir de nouveau le Conseil très prochainement. Dans l'intervalle, nous pourrons tous étudier les déclarations, les suggestions et les observations de M. Graham. 82. Maintenant, pour les raisons que je viens de donner, je propose de lever la séance. 83. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'espagnol): Le représentant du Pakistan a demandé que la séance soit levée. Cette proposition a priorité conformément aux dispositions de l'article 33 du règlement, qui stipule qu'il est statué sans débat sur toute proposition de cette nature. Si personne ne demande qu'elle soit mise aux voix, je considérerai qu'il n'y a pas d'objections et je lèverai la séance. Dans le cas contraire, je mettrai aux voix la proposition du représentant du Pakistan. 84. LI n'y a pas d'objections. 85. Le représentant du Pakistan a demandé aussi que le Conseil se réunisse à une date rapprochée pour continuer l'examen de la question. J.e me mettrai en rapport avec les membres du .consel1, plus particuliè- rement avec les parties intéressées, et je leur commu- niquerai la d~.te de la prochaine réunion du Conseil. Evidemment, je ne vois pas la possibilïté de tenir une séance avant l'ouverture de la session de l'Assemblée l:5énérale. La séance est levée à 16 h. 55. t1WIŒ &lllIons A. 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