S/PV.607 Security Council

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Tsiang, the representative of China, presided over the Security Council during the past month. In expressing our appreciation of the manner in which he carried out his functions, 1 am not merely conforming with our usage. Mr. Tsiang's high inteUectual qualities, his extensive historieal and legal learning, the perfect dignity he has shawn in many different circumstances and his courtesy to aU deserve our esteem and friendship. In succeeding him in this office which has been honoured by his presence, 1 am happy to be able to express this esteem and friendship. 2. 1 call upon the representative of the USSR on a point of order.

1 cannot associate myself With the views which you have just expressed, since the USSR delegation has pointed out at a previous meeting that the representative to whom you have referred attends the Security Council illegally. 4. ~r. TSIANG (China): l wish to thank the PreSIdent for the very kind words he addressed to me at the beginning of this meeting. As to the remarks of the man from the USSR, it is evident that, with hi!> presence in this CounciI, it is almost impossible for this Important body of the United Nations to maintain the usuaI standards of dignity and civilization. Adoption of the agenda Président: M. H. HOPPENOT (France). Présents: Les représentants des pays suivants: Bré~il, Chili, Chine, France, Grèce, Pays-Basl Pakistan, Turquie, Union des Républiques socialistes l10viétiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda 607) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Question Inde-Pakistan ~ lettre en date du 16 septembre 1952 par laquelle M. Frank P. Graham, représentant des Nations Unies auprès de l'Inde et du Pakistan, a transmis au Secrétaire général son quatrième rapport au Conseil de sécurité (S/2783). Hommage au Président sortant 1. Le PRESIDENT: La présidence du Conseil de sécurité a été exercée, pendant le mois qui vient de s'écouler, par notre distingué collègue M. Tsinng, représentant de la Chine. En exprimant à M. Tsiang combien nous apprécions la manière dont il s'est acquitté de ses fonctions, je fais plus que me conformer à l'usage. Les hautes qualités intellectuelles de M. Tsiang, sa vaste culture historique et juridique, la parfaite dignité dont il a fait preuve en tant de circonstances et sa courtoisie à l'égard de tous commandent notre estime et notre amitié. Je suis heureux, en lui succédant à ce fauteuil présidentiel qu'il a honoré, de lui en exprimer le témoignage. 2. La parole est au représentant de l'Union soviétique pour une motion d'ordre. 3. M. ZORINE (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques) (tradtdt du. russe): Je ne puis m'associer aux paroles que vous venez de prononcer. En effet, la délégation de l'Union -soviétique a déjà déc1aré,à la séance précédente, que le représentant dont vous parlez occupe illégalement un siège au Conseil de sécurité. 4.. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je tiens à remercier le Président des paroles très aimabk~ qu'il a prononcées à mon égard au debut de la séance. Quant aux observations de l'homme de l'URSS, îl est évident que sa presence au Conseil rend à peu près impossible à cet important organe des Nations Unies de s'en tenir aux normes habituelles de la dignité et de la civilisation. Adopt~n de l'ordre du jour 6. It seems to me that the principles on which we are trying to proceed to assist the parties to carry out their Charter obligations are these. 7. In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement. 8. Secondly, the Security Council will, we feel, always we1come any agreement which the parties themselves can reach on any basis which will settle the dispute, provided of course that that basis is consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 9. Thirdly, we feel that it is the l'ole of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach· agree- ment. In this case the Security Coullcil has made avail- able the services of Ml'. Frank Graham as the United Nations Representative. 10., Fourthly, we believe that agreement most fre- quently is reached step by step through negotiation and that negotiation involves an e1ement of compromise. Il. Finally, we believe that the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its representative and indicate to him and to the parties its views on the positions he has taken. 12. With the permission oi the President, l should like now to examine the draft resolution [S/2839] before the Council in the light of these principles. 13. The draft resolution recalls the basic agreements which the parties have reached thus far, the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. 1 These resolutions provideû that the question of the accession of Kas1.unir would be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices 1 For the text' of the Commission's resolution of 13 August Sur l'inv-itatioll dt! Président.. Mme Patidit, repré- sentante de l'Inde, et 111. Gralzœm, représentant des Nations Unies auprès de l'Inde et du Pakistan, pret:1wllt place à la table dt! Conseil. 5. M. GROSS (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'anglais): Nous connaissons tous le problème qui fait l'objet de ce débat; mais ce problème n'en est pas moins grave. En leur qualité de membres du Conseil de sécurité, le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis ont cherché, dans leur projet de résolution [S/2839], à présenter les bases d'un accord. Je voudrais brièvement passer en revue le rôle du Conseil de sécurité et celui des parties en cause, tels que mon gouvernement les considère, dans les efforts déployés en vue de résoudre ce problème. Si l'on pense que le Conseil de sécurité en est saisi depuis près de cinq ans, on peut conclure - à moins de ne guère tenir compte des tentatives auxquelles le· Conseil de sécurité s'est livré - que la solution n'en sera pas aisée. 6. Les principes que nous nous efforçons d'appliquer pour apporter une aide aux parties, de manière à leur permettre d'assumer leurs obligations aux termes de la Charte, sont les suivants. 7. Premièrement, pour être durable, un règlement politique doit être accepté d'un commun accord. 8. Deuxièmement, le Conseil de sécurité se montrera toujours satisfait d'un accord que les parties pourront conclure par elles-mêmes sur toute base qui pennettra de régler leur différend, à condition bien entendu que la solution soit compatible avec les principes de la Charte. 9. Troisièmement, c'est à notre sens le rôle du Conseil de sécurité d'aider les parties à rechercher un ac~ord. En l'occurrence, Ie Conseil de sécurité a mis à la dispo- sition des parties, pour représenter l'Organisation des Nations Unies, les services de M. Frank Graham. 10. Quatrièmement, nous estimons que le plus souvent l'accord est obtenu graduellement, par voie de négocia- tions; et qui dit négociations dit compromis. 1.1. Enfiln, le Consel 1 1 de sécurité doit examiner att~- ttvement es vues et es recommandations de son repre- sentant et lui faire connaître, ainsi qu'aux parties, son opinion sur les positions qu'il a prises. 12. Si le Président veut bien m'y autoriser, je voudrais maintenant examiner à la lumière de ces principes le projet de résolution [S/2839] soumis au Conseil. 13. Le projet de résolution rappelle les accords de principe auxquels les parties sont parvenues jusqu'à présent et les résolutions du 13 août 1948 et du 5 janvier 1949 de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan 1. Ces résolutions prévoient que la ques- tion du rattachement du Cachemire sera décidée au moyen d'un plébiscite libre et impartial effectué sous les 1 Pou... le textl' de la résolution du 13 août 1948, voir les Procès-verbau.~ officiels dit Conseil de sécurité, troisième année,' Supplément de novembre 1948, document SlllOO, par. 75~ Pour le texte de la résolution du 5 janvier 1949, voir ibid., quatrième année, Supplément de janvier 1949, dacument 8/1196, par. 15. 14. The draft resoh~tion before the Council goes on to recall the three resolutions of the 5ecurity Council during the period when Mr. Graham has been acting. Then it endorses the general principles which he has formulated and on all but two of which an agreement has now been reached between the parties. The draft resolution goes on to note that a plan of demilitarization is not now in existence because agreement ras not been reached on one issue. As the United Nations Represen- tative has narrowed the difference down to this one issue, we feel that it is quite appropriate for the Security Council to examine the ways in which the United Nations Representative and the parties have approached this issue. As a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, my Government's examination of this process and our reflection on Mr. Graham's views have led us to arrive at and agree with the United Kingdom Govern- ment on the document now before you. 15. After sixteen moni:hs of effort, of' wise effort, Mr. Graham is reporting that he has narrowed the problem down to the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire Hne. He has put before the Security Council two methods, either of which might, in his view, hdp the parties to settle this issue: either the establishment of the number and character of larces to remain on either side of the cease- fire Hne; or the determination of these numbers as a result of studying criteria or principles. This means that the parties would consider why any troops are needed, what they are needed for, and in view of their mission, how many are needed. 16. The draft resolution, inits operative paragraph, urges the parties to negotiate for the purpose of reaching agreement on a specifie number of forces within certain bracketed ranges suggested to. them by the United Nations Representative. The draft resolution also urges tlle parties to negotiate, bearing in mind the principles or crit~ria which would lead to a decision on what the pr:ecise numbers should be. Presumably, we venture to think, the United Nrtions Representative suggested these bracketed ranges .of figures as a result of his own study of these principles or criteria which he later put to the parties. . 17. The United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, reported to f~!e Security Council, on 10 October 1952 [60Sth meeting], that the parties had been able to agree on ten. points of his twelve-point programme and that thr dlfferences between them on the twelve-point programme had been narrowed down to one main point on which the whole plan depended. 18. Mr. Graham describes this - and l use his own words - as "the issue of the number and character of forces" to remain on either side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. In l>Js third report to the Security Council [S/26ll and Carr.l], dated 22 April 1952. Mr. Graham recommended that 16. Le dispositif du projet de résolution invite les parties à entrer en négociations afin d'aboutir à un accord sur les effectifs précis des forces armées, effectifs compris entre certaines limites qui leur ont été suggérées par le représentant des Nations Unies; il les invite e:'l outre à négocier en tenant compte des principes et des critères énoncés en vue d'arriver à une décision sur ces effectifs. Je suppose que le représentant des Nations Unies a suggéré ces limites à la suite d'une étude personnelle des principes ou des critères qu'il a ulté- rieurement présentés aux parties. 17. Le représentant des Nations Unies,. M. Graham, a rendu compte au Conseil de sécurité, le 10 octobre 1952 [60Sème séance], du fait que lt's parties étaient parvenues il un accord au sujet de dix points sUr les douze que comporte le programme, et que les diver- gences qui les séparent quant au progral'1tl1e de douze points ont été ramenées à un seul point principal, dont dépend le sort de l'ensemble du plan. 18. .Il s'agit, selon M. Graham ---' dont je cite les paroles - de "la question des effectifs et de la nature des forces armées" à laisser de part et d'autre de la ligne de suspension d'armes à l'expiration de la période de démilitarisation. Dans son troisième rapport au Conseil de sécurité [S/26l1 et Carr.l], en date du 19. Mr.. Graham ha.s, from time to time, put before the Security Council various proposaIs which he has suggested to the parties during his sixteen months of devoted efforts. Originally Mr. Gl'aham left open, in the form of blank spaces to be inserted by the parties, the number of forces on which thev woul::1 agrce. On unother occasion Mr. Graham suggested that the numbers he arrived at by relating them to the propor- tion of forces as they existed at the tirae of the cease- fire and the cessation of hostilities. Agnin, more recently, he suggesteu on 1.6 July of this year [S/2783, anne:r 3]. certain brad<'eted numbers within which he recom- mended that the parties seek a specifie figure. After that he arrived at the point of suggesting, on 2 September of this year [S/2783, anne.t· 7], that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan si·:le of the cease-fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan troops having been with- dra...m, and large-seale disbanding and disarmament of the Asad Kashmir forces having taken ",lace, while on the Indian side of the cease-fire line ther'~ should be an Indian army force of 18,000, including the 5tate armed forces. Mr. Graham also came forward with the sugges- tion that it might be helpful to the parties to cons1der theprinciples or criteria for arriving at figures, and thi~ he suggested on 4 September 1952 [51/2783, annex 8]. 20. . l think it is fair to conclude that in coming forward with these proposaIs, Mr. Graham had taken the advice ofhis milita!)r adviser, and that the numbers he has suggested a:i:e not guessp.s arising from some sense of politieal expedièncy. Rather, it is fair to view them as carefully considered suggestions of the United Nations Representative, bearing in mind the basic agreement of the parties heretofore reached in the forro· of the resoIu- tian", of " e United Nations CorntJ:lJssion for India and Pakist4.1~. Mr. Graham has emph'asized over and over again the importance of these agreements, the way in which they present problems whi~h will exist for bo~h parties at the· end of the period of demilitarization. In his most recent statement Mr. Graham tells us that there· is an agreement between· the parties.that on the F'aki.c:tèL.l side of the cease-fire Hne, the tribe~men and Pakistan. nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn, and that the Pakistan trvops Will havebeen withdrawn from the state. There is aiso an·ag":'eement that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk: of the Tndian forces in the State will have been withdr3.wn. He has suggested the various methods l have outlined f(~r assisting the parties to agree1)n what fotces shall rema.ln. 2LHaving considered the' United Nations Represeu- ta'tive's~refully formulated suggestions on this ques- tion,. ::tlldrecognfzing th~ considerable thought and .·~tIort tllat ''''ust·have gone into .J.rriving at ihem, the United Kil 1mand 'theTTnitcd. States Ghverrunenf;;, pF,:Ilsées etd'efff)tt. y'u'elles ont dû lui coûter, le . Royaume-Uni ft Ù:1~~ids-TJnisontprésenté leur projet . de résolution, ~<"'K !!(i,f, d'l'w:ter les parties à négocier. 22.. As the United Kingdom representative has pointed out [606th meeting], the Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit Scouts, occupying as they do a special position, would not he computed in arriving at figures within the range on which the parties are urged in our draft resolution to negotiate. 23. The ranges of numbers contained in the draft resolution were taken from the 16 July 1952 proposaIs of the United Nations Representative, on which the parties had agreed to go to Geneva and negotiate. 24. Thus, the co-sponsors, the United States ~.nd the United Kingdom, are relying upon a suggestion of the mediator, and for that reason the draft resolution, document S/2839, reads in part as follows: "... this number to he behveen 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on tL~ Pah~~tan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 ar.cl 18,000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Represen- tative in his proposaIs of 16 July 1952 (annex 3 of S/2783) ..." , 25. The Security Council will notice that the draft resolution urges the parties to negotiate "bearing in mind" the principles or criteria wbich the United Nations Representative suggested on 4 September of this year. The co-sponsors feel they are worthy of careful attention. 26. These principles, as they relate to .the point we are discussing, ~:e contained in annex 8 to the United Nations Representative's fOl.1rth report (S/2783). Paragraph 7 reads as follows: "7. Agree thatthe demilitarization shaH be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will he: "(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line: "(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting ~il1 have been.withdrawn ; "(H) The Pakistan troops will have been with- drawnfrom the State; "(iii) Large-scale disbanding and disarmatrient of the Asad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the enn of the period of demilitarization the..- shaU he the minimum nuniber of forces that <. required for the maintenance of law·andorder ar. ~e telle manière qu'à la fin de la période de démilita- risation il reste des forces arméès dont les .~eeti~s s'élè':ent au minimum nécessaire pour assurer ie Il(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn; CCCii) FUl'ther withdrawals or reductions. as the case may bl~. of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out; sa that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard ta the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite." 27. It will be recalled that the parties had agr~ed that: "... the demilitarization shaH be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire ag ieement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above" (S/2783, annex 8, para. 8). 28. The parties had agreed to a revised version of the ninth principle, wbkh is firmly based on the two United Nations Commission resolutions, that: "... pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations" (S/2783, annex 8, para. 9). 29. 1 have t~ken the liberty of reading these principles or criteria because, in the nature of things, they must be the considerations which have led the United Nations Representative to arrive at the concrete figures he has suggested to the parties, including the range of figures concerning which we are urging the parties to negotiate. It will be noted that Mr. GrahamÏlas suggested as one principle here, as on previous occasions, that the large- scale disbanding and disarmame;lt of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there sha11 be the minimum forces required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due œgard to the freedom of the plebiscite. We haye accepted what we conchide .to be the view of the United Nations Repre- sentative that the forces - and that is what he ca11s them - which remain on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be those Azad Kashmir rorces which would remain after large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. We have also accepted the view of Mt. Graham that on the Indian side of the cease-tire line the forces should be Indian army forces and State armed forces. 30. The resolution of 13 August 1948 of the United ~ations Commission for India èlnd Pakistan provides m part: CCi) Le gros des forces indiennes aura été retiré de l'Etati CCii) Les forces armées de l'Inde et de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire demeurées· dans l'Etat après exécution de l'opération dont il est questirn à l'ali· néa b, i. ci-dessus, auront été l'objet de nouveaux retraits ou de nouvelles réductions, selon le cas; de telle manière qu'à la fin de la période de démilita- risation il reste des forces armées de l'Inde et de l'Etat de Jammu et Cachemire dont les effectifs s'éièvent au minimum nécessaire pour assurer le maintien de l'ordre public et faire respecter l'accord de suspension d'armes, compte dûment tenu des conditi..lUs nécessaires à la sécurité de l'Etat et à la liberté du plébiscite." 27. On se rappellera que les parties étaient convenues que "... l'opération de démilitarisation s'effectuera de manière à n'entraîner aucune violation de l'accord de suspension d'armes, tant au cours de la période dont il est question au paragraphe 6 ci..dessus qu'après son expiration" (S/2783, annexe 8, par. 8). 28. Elles avaient accepté une version modifiée du neuvième principe qui se fonde sur les deux résolutions de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan selon lesquelles: "... en attendant une solution définitive, le terri- toire évacué par les troupes du Pakistan sera admi- nistré par les autorités locales sous la surveillance des Nations Unies" (S/2783, annexe 8, par. 9). 29. Si j'ai donné lecture de ces principes ou critères, c'est parce que, de par la nature même des choses, ils ont dû être pris en considération lorsque le représentant des Nations Unies a fixé les chiffres concrets qu'il a suggérés aux parties, notamment les chiffres limites sur lesquels nous demandons ave',; instance aux parties de négocier. Il convient de noter que M. Graham a suggéré comme principe ici, comme il l'avait fait en des occasi.ons précédentes, que le licenciement et le désarmement massifs des forces du Cachemire Azad auront été effectués de telle manière qu'à la fin de la période de démilitarisation, les effectifs qui resteront s'élèverC'nt au minimum nécessaire pour assurer le maintien de l'ordre public et faire respecter l'a.:cord de suspension d'armes, compte dûme.ît tenu des conditions nécessaires à la liberté du plébiscite. Nous avons accepté ce que nous considérons être le point de vue du repré- sentant des Nations Unies, à savoir que les forces armées - j'emploie ses termes mêmes - qui resteront. du côté pakistanais de la. ligne de suspension d'armes devraient être les forces armées du Cachemire Azad qui resteraient après le licenciement et le désarmement massifs des forces du Cachemire Azad. Nous avons également accepté le point ue vue de M. Graham selon lequel, du côté indien de la ligne de suspension d'armes, les forcés armées qui resteraient devraient être des forces de l'armée indienne et de l'Etat. 30. La résolution de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pakistan du 13 août 1948 prévoit notamment que: 33. He finally suggested that the remaining Asad Kashmir forces should be the minimum number necessary for the maintenance of law and order, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. Thus, it is fair ta say that the United Nations Representative ccinsiders tha'; some Asad Kashmir forces would remain. The co-sponsors agrec with this position. 34. The United Nations Representative has specified what the function of these remaining Asad Kashmir forces would be. He has described it as "the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite". ' 35. As the resolution of the United Nations Commis- sion for India and Pakistan statp.s in the part which I have just read, these forces would be in territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops and administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Considering then what the functions of these remaining Asad Kashmir forces would be - as Mr. Graham has stated them - operating in an area ~vacuated by Pakistan troops, I think it is clear that they would he separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Commando This position was apparently acceptable to the Govern- ment of P~kistan when, it indicated ta MT. Graham that it was prepared to accept, subject tt) certain observations not here relevant, his proposaIs of 16 Ju1y 1952. The draft resolution takes into accoùnf the con- clusion which the United Nations Representative had previously reached. 36. He also indÎcates that the role of the Indiaa army forces on the 11ld1an side of the cease-fire line would l(~ représentant des Nations Unies ait eu à faire face, et r,ont nous cherchons encore la solution, a été d'appliquer ce principe à la situation concrète qui se présenterait à la fin de la période de démilitarisation. M. Graham a proposé au déhut que, du côté pakistanais de la ligne de suspension d'armes, les forces armées devraient être composées de forces armées civiles, mais il' a renoncé à cette proposition après le mois de décembre 1951, les parties ne s'étant pas mises d'accord. Depuis lors, il a constamment suggéré, si nous interprétons bièn ses paroles, que ces forces devraient être celles du Cache- mire Azad. Après avoir renoncé à sa proposition initiale au mois de décembre 1951, il a suggéré que les Nations Unies exercent leur surveillance en retirant les forces du Cachemire Azad du contrôle administratif et tactique du Haut Commandement paldstanais et en leur assi- gnant comme officiers des officiers lleutres et locaux, sous la surveillance des Natiom', Unies, ainsi que je l'ai dit. 33. En dernier lieu, il a proposé que les effectifs des forces armées du Cachemire Asad qui resteraient s'élèvent au minimum nécessaire pour assurer le main- tien de l'ordre public, compte dûment tenu des condi- tions nécessaires à la liberté du plébiscite. On est donc fondé à affirmer que le représentant des Nations Unie:; considère qu'il resterait effectivement certaines forces du Cachemire Asad. Les auteurs du projet de résolution partagent cette manière de voir. 34. Le représentapt des Nations Unies a précisé les fonctions que le reste des forces du Cachemire Asad seraient appelées à remplir, savoir: le maintien de l'ordre public et le respect de l'accord de suspension d'armes, compte dûment tenu des conditions nécessaires à la liberté du plébiscite. 35. Comme le précise la résolution de la Commission des Nations Unies pour l'Inde et le Pa..1dstan dans la partie dont je viens de donner lecture, ces forces resteraient dans le territoire évacué par les troupes du Pakistan et seraient admin\sttées par les autorités locales sous la surveillance 'des Nation'J Unies. Considérons donc ce que seraient les fonctions des troupes restantes du Cachemire Asad, telles que M. Graham les a énoncées; ces troupes exerœraient leurs fonctions dans une région évacuée par les troupes du Pakistan. Il est manifeste à mon avis qu'elles seraient soustraites au contrôk administratif et tactique du Haut Commande- ment pakistanais. Le Gouvernement du Pakistan a apparemment jugé que ce poillt était acceptable lorsqu'il a indiqué à M. Graham qu'il était disposé à accepter ses propositions du 16 juillet ::'952, sous réserve de certaines observations qu'il n'importe pas de. préciser ici. Le projet de résolution tient compte de la conclusion à laquelle le représentant des Nations Unies a:vaitanté- rieurement abouti. 36. M. Graham indique é~alement que le rôle des 37. It may weU be that the United Nations Represen- tative's assis~uce will help the parties in approaching these problems. Therefore, the operative paragraph of this resolution attempts to organize and put before the Security Council and' the parties sorne of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative on the one issue which aU are agreed is at the root of the problem. From what I have said 1 hope it is clear that the co-sponsors, like the United Nations Representative, have attem~ted to build on the United Nations Commission resoluttons and at each stage to narrow rather than to broaden the areas in which agreement is thus far lacking. As the representative of the "C'nited Kingdom has observe,d, we hope that there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two Governments to reopen questions already agreed on under these resoluti0ns. 38. We have attempted to put before the parties sorne oi the wisdom and sorne of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative and ta urge th'*U to negotiate to attempt ta reach a solution. We have asked them to provide the Security Council with their own account, in their own words, of where these negotiations lean them. We have done this because we see in this case an element of urgency-. It is a case which, as M:r. Graham stated to the Security Council on l(} October [60Sth meeting], should not he allowed to drift lest the parties and the organized society of nations should find them- se1·...es in a position of greater dang~r. 39. In the areas of agreel11ent thus far reached, the United Nations Representative, by formulating his proposaIs and by' his negotiations,. has, in the view of my Government, assisted the parties. The draft resolu- tion does not in any way impair or limit Mr. Graham's .authority under the previous Security Council resolu- tions, and we expect and hope that he will continue to exercise his functions under them. Therefore, the draft resolution not only expresses the gratitude of the Security Council to him but requests him to continue to make his services available to the Governments of India and Pakistan. It also endorses the principles on which hehas sought to bring about agreemf'..nt. 40. In conclusion, 1. retutn ta thegeneral principles with which I began my statement. This draft resolution offers to the parties.an opportunity to arrive, by their negotiations, at a settlement of .the final issue now standing in the way oi the demilitarization of the St.ate and the planning for a plebiscite, including the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. 41. The settlement itself, when it cornes, will be the result of ftee.agreement by the parties~hernselves. Tl.le Securi.tY Council a\.:d the United Nations:Representative can simply assist ~he·.parties in reaçhirtg .agreement.• 43. Of course, the numbers of troops which we have urged the parties to negotiate on, and the criteria which we have urged them to bear in mind, are not now agreed on by them. If such agreement had, happily, been reached, there would be no occasion. for this or any other draft resolution except, perhaps, an expression of gratification for a solution reached. Negotiation must, in the nature of things, involve the element of 'give- and-take and the possibility of compromise. VVe have attempted to restate in the draft resolution an appre- ciation of the 'riews of the United Nations Represen- tative about how such compromise might be brought about. 44. The United States. takes seriously the view of Mr. Graham that there is danger to us aU in allowing this case to drift. As the representative of the United Kingdom put it, we cannot leave it to settle itself. 45. AIl Members of the United Nations have an interest in seeing this dispute settled peacefully. The United States, for itG part, feels that it has more than an interest in the matter: it has the most earnest desire to see the two great States of the subcontinent join together to assure their mutual peace and security as well as their mutual prosperity. 46. These two ).lations have much more in common than the fRet that they are neighbours. vVhole areas of understanding between them should and, we believe, will exist once this dispute has been settled. Leadership . and statesmanship by the Governments of India and Pakistan can bring about that result which we devoutly seek. 47. 1 have no words to match the eloquence of Ml'. Graham, and 1 take the liberty of conc1uding with a quotation from the statement he made in the Security Council a year aga [570th 1neeting, paras. 66 and 70] : "The opporttmity in time and place is for the leadership on the subcontinent, tested in the struggles and sufferings for the human liberty of 400 million human beings, to help prevent the destruction of human freedom and the self-destruction of civilization by setting challenging exatnples of demilitarization, 46. Ces deux nations ont beaucoup plus en commun que le simple fait d'être voisins. Une fois cette affaire réglée, de vastes domaines d'entente devraient exister entre elles; nous croyons qu'il en sera ainsi. Par leur sens politique, les Gouvernements de l'Inde et du Pakistan pourront parvenir au résultat que nous recher- chons si ardemment. 47. Je ne saurais rivaliser d'éloquence avec M. Graham; je me permettrai de citer, pour terminer, la déclaration qu'il nous a faite ici voici un an [570ème séance} par. 66 et 70] : . "L'occasion se pt'ésente, pour les hommes d'Etat de la péninsule qui ont fait leurs preuves au milieu des luttes et des souffrances pour la liberté de 400 millions d'êtres humains. d'aidèr à éviter l'anéan- tissement de la liberté humaine et l'autodestructidn de la civilisation en donnant l'exemple éclatant de.ia ··The subcontinent is the place for a timely example of demilital'Îzation and of self·determinatian. Naw is the time far the dedicated leadershi~ af two great peoples to rise to the caU of their splritt.ml heritaç:e, the responsibility of their power and the appartumty for their greatness ta give in Il dark world challenging examples and fresh hapes ta the peoples in the unresting adventure af the human spirit, through the United Nations, in the long pilgrimage tawards a freer and fairer world, in answer to the prayers of the people for peace and freedom on God's good earth." SALIS AGINTS fOR UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS DIPOSI1'AfRiS DIS PUBUCArlONS DIS NA':"ONS UNflS UIIIl1lIlA- AlttIImlII Edlf<:lrl.1 SucI.me.tçen. SA, "lllnt 600, BuenOi "tfll. AUmAllA-AUJOoUIl H. A Eioddercl, 255. e,orQt St~ Svc/n.y. anill/M- an.1 "gençe et M.nellerle. d. le 1'rttI. SA. 1~2 rut d~ ~rsll. 8n1XtHtt. W. H, Smith le Son. 71.75 Bour.val'd Adolph••Mli. Bruull... lIOlIVIA-IIOl.IYlI L1bttrl. S.leççlon", Colme Vn, la Pe:, 1IA!l1-1IIISl& L1v••rle Açlr. ItUe Motço 98.8. Rio dt oIenell'o. 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