S/PV.6142 Security Council

This is the tenth 90-day report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 18 (h) of resolution 1737 (2006). The report covers the period from 11 March 2009 to 15 June 2009, during which time the Committee held no meetings but conducted its work using the silence procedure. In the previous report, I informed the Council that the Committee had sent letters to concerned Member States inviting them to provide within 10 working days any additional relevant information regarding the transfer of materiel that constituted a violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006). That paragraph sets out a ban on the export of arms and related materiel to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Committee subsequently received a response from one of the two States, which, however, did not provide any information relevant to such transfers. The Committee therefore sent a second letter to both States on 1 May 2009, reiterating its request. The Committee also received on 27 March and 26 May, respectively, additional details on materiel from States that had first brought the matter to the Committee’s attention. This information is currently under review by the Committee. During the reporting period, the Committee received a notification from a Member State making reference to paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006) and concerning the delivery of items for use in the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran. The Committee also received notification pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) in connection with the unfreezing of funds to make payment for contracts entered into prior to the listing of the entity. The Committee also responded to written queries from Member States concerning certain aspects of the sanctions regime. Finally, with regard to reporting by States on the implementation of all relevant measures set out in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008), the updated figures are as follows: 91 reports under resolution 1737 (2006), 78 reports under resolution 1747 (2007) and 66 reports under resolution 1803 (2008).

I shall now give the floor to members of the Security Council.

I thank Ambassador Takasu for his report as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). First, let me reiterate that the E3+3 countries have been seeking a meeting with Iran to discuss the way forward on its nuclear programme, but have not yet received a reply. The United States will be a full participant in those discussions, and we continue to urge Iran to accept this invitation. Today’s session is the first one since Iran held elections on 12 June. We share the international community’s concern over events in the aftermath of the elections. As Iran seeks to resolve disputes related to the election results, it is important to respect the rights of Iranian citizens to express themselves peacefully. Today’s session is also our first session since the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released his latest report on the status of Iran’s compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements and Security Council obligations. While the IAEA Board of Governors is starting its meetings today, we too should focus on the report and its detailed findings as appropriate to the work of our Committee. The IAEA report on Iran, once again, contains troubling findings that deserve the Council’s serious attention. The Director General underscored Iran’s continued defiance of its international obligations, including its refusal to comply with the Council’s demand to suspend Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. The report finds that Iran continues to make significant progress towards a nuclear weapons capability, increasing its enrichment activities and producing more than 1,300 kilograms of low- enriched uranium hexafluoride, enough materiel for one nuclear weapon, were Iran to enrich it further to make it weapons-grade. Iran has also not accepted the full implementation of safeguards, including access to the Arak reactor, which, the Director General stresses, could harm the Agency’s ability to carry out effective safeguards at that facility. At the same time, Iran continues to refuse to address the IAEA’s remaining questions about its past efforts to develop a nuclear warhead, or even to meet to discuss those issues. Let me offer a few examples. Iran refuses to addresses the IAEA’s request for substantive explanations regarding Iran’s past work to develop nuclear weapons, and there has been no progress on this issue since August 2008. Iran continues to rebuff the IAEA’s inquiries related to the acquisition of the uranium metal document, which contains instructions for casting enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which, the IAEA’s January 2006 report noted, are related to the function of nuclear weapons. Iran declines to clarify the procurement and research and development activities of military-related institutes and companies that could be nuclear-related. And Iran rejects the IAEA’s request for access to information, documentation and individuals necessary to support Iran’s claims. The Director General has once again asked Iran to cooperate with the IAEA without further delay. In the light of Iran’s continued non-compliance with its Security Council and IAEA obligations, we must continue to strongly support the Iran Sanctions Committee’s efforts. In particular, the United States welcomes the Committee’s continued efforts to obtain additional information from Iran and Syria about the recent violation of resolution 1747 (2007) involving the M/V Monchegorsk. We remain concerned that the Committee’s requests continue to go unanswered. The United States thanks the Republic of Cyprus for its recent letter informing the Committee that it has completed inspecting the ship’s cargo and placed it in safe storage. We also appreciate Cyprus’ providing the Committee with the additional details of the cargo that the Committee requested. We would take particular note of the information suggesting that some of the ship’s cargo belong to an organization within Iran’s defence industry, a designated entity under resolution 1737 (2006). We support the Committee’s critically important efforts to examine these additional details and take appropriate action. The United States remains committed to direct diplomacy with Iran to resolve issues of concern to the international community and will engage on the basis of mutual respect. We want Iran to be a respected member of the international community, but we recognize that such status confers not only rights but also responsibilities. Even as we offer Iran a new opportunity to restore international confidence and trust, this Committee continues to have an essential role to play. We urge the Committee to redouble its efforts to ensure fully and robust implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008).

I too would like to thank Ambassador Takasu for his report. We are grateful for his leadership in ensuring the full implementation of the vital measures needed to counter the threat of proliferation. We particularly appreciate the efforts of Ambassador Takasu and the Committee to address the issues raised by the transfer of materiel on M/V Monchegorsk, which constituted a violation of resolution 1747 (2007). We appreciate the cooperation of a Member State in providing further information about the cargo. But, as the report notes, the response received from the States in violation was not adequate. We note that the matter remains under the Committee’s consideration and hope the Committee can draw some useful lessons to ensure full implementation and compliance. The most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran makes clear yet again the seriousness of the threat of Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities. Iran has still not suspended its enrichment-related activities nor its work on heavy- water related projects. This is in clear defiance of several Security Council resolutions. Moreover, it is continuing its non-cooperation with the IAEA. Iran now has over 7,000 centrifuges installed, of which about 5,000 are enriching UF6. Iran has now produced 1,339 kilograms of low-enriched uranium. Iran has denied the IAEA access to the heavy-water reactor at Arak for nearly a year. A reactor of this design could potentially be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. The IAEA has said that this has made it difficult for it to report further on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the Security Council. The report also emphasizes that Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities that has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but that is not implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information. Moreover, the report states that the IAEA has still not received preliminary design information, as requested in December 2007, for the nuclear power plant at Darkhovin. The report also shows no change in the lack of cooperation by Iran in responding to questions about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without this, it is impossible to be confident of Iran’s professed peaceful intentions. We do not wish to deny Iran its right to civil nuclear power. The generous E3+3 offer contains everything Iran needs to pursue a modern civil nuclear power programme, which it claims is its aim. It is difficult to see how Iran’s current actions are in pursuit of this goal. Iran’s continued stalling simply undermines confidence in their intentions. Instead, it is continuing to expand its enrichment programme with no apparent civilian purpose. Iran must suspend its enrichment-related activities, as required by five Security Council resolutions and act to reassure the international community that its intentions are exclusively peaceful. Our message to Iran is clear and simple. It is now time to get down to serious business. The international community has made clear its desire for a mature partnership with Iran. We hope that we will see a genuine response from the Iranian Government in the weeks and months ahead, but this opportunity is not a blank check. We need to make real and urgent progress. It is now essential that Iran makes the choice to move the process forward. The E3+3 has made clear that it wants to engage with Iran. We hope that Iran will quickly decide to do so and move quickly to take forward the offers of engagement by both the United States and the international community. It is essential that we make progress on this front. The offer will not be there forever.

I would like first to thank Ambassador Takasu for his briefing. This presentation comes at a good time to remind us of the reality of the Iranian nuclear dossier. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has just given us a shocking overview of that reality in the report he submitted to the Agency’s Board of Governors on 5 June 2009. Iran is continuing with enrichment and installing new centrifuges despite the bans issued by the Security Council. Iran has refused the repeated requests by the Agency for access to the reactor at Arak that is being built. Iran is refusing to implement certain transparency measures that derive from its safeguards agreement, or Code 3.1, and the Director General has pointed out that Iran is the only country that has significant nuclear activities that does not apply those measures. Iran continues to refuse to apply the Additional Protocol. Finally, with regard to the investigation into the possible military dimensions of the programme, which is of course a key point, Iran has not cooperated. It has not provided access to the information, documents, sites or individuals concerned. The Agency must therefore conclude that it is not in a position to give credible assurances with regard to the absence of non-declared nuclear activity in Iran. Given this behaviour, it is up to us, the Member States, to fully apply the sanctions that were adopted following Iran’s repeated violations of its obligations. Ambassador Takasu alluded to the Monchegorsk issue, the ship chartered by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines that was implicated in illicit trafficking on Iran’s behalf and in violation of Security Council resolutions. The Republic of Cyprus took the right decision in inspecting the vessel and impounding its cargo, but the investigation is not finished. We have to determine whether, in addition to the arms banned under resolution 1747 (2007), the cargo of the vessel has any link with the persons or entities listed in the resolutions dealing with the Iranian nuclear programme. We must insist on the seriousness of this kind of contraband, which threatens our collective security, and on the need for very strict vigilance on our part. In conclusion, I would like to stress, as the previous speaker did, that France supports a twofold approach to the issue of Iran. The political directors of the E3+3 have proposed now for a long time that Iran meet with them, including in the presence of the American political director, and Iran has still not replied. We hope that Iran will re-evaluate its behaviour and will stop obstructing the work of the Agency. We also hope that Iran will accept the hand again extended to it and do what is required of it to restore confidence. Iran has a truly singular opportunity to do this, and France sincerely hopes that it will take this opportunity quickly.

We are grateful to the Permanent Representative of Japan, Ambassador Takasu, for the regular quarterly briefing on the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and for the work that he has carried out at the head of that Committee. We note that in the reporting period, the Committee has operated in full accordance with resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008). Our view is that the Committee will continue to be guided in its work by the spirit and letter of these resolutions and by the primary goal of effectively monitoring the Iranian programme through diplomatic means and negotiations, on the basis of the proposals put forward by the six. Currently, the Russian Federation, with other members of the six, is working towards ensuring that dialogue with Iran would be resumed as quickly as possible. In this context, it is important that all six States maintain their commitment to the primary goal, which is to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in establishing the fact that there are no military aspects to Iran’s nuclear programme.

My delegation would also like to thank Ambassador Takasu for the detailed briefing that he presented to us on the activities of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), and we eagerly await the follow-up of the matters referred to. My delegation is concerned about the points raised in the most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 5 June 2009, which states that Iran is continuing to not comply with Security Council resolutions, to enrich uranium and to build plants that are linked to heavy-water reactors. As we pointed out previously, Mexico is in favour of nuclear disarmament through effective and progressive measures that will ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the international system as it pertains to nuclear non-proliferation. This is what we continue to plan to do with determination. The positive disarmament initiatives that we have witnessed recently on the part of some nuclear weapon States contrast with the attitudes of other States that continue to carry out activities that seem to be aimed at using nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes. We are concerned about possible delays on the path towards a world free from nuclear weapons. The potential for nuclear arms to proliferate will therefore continue to exist until such weapons are totally eliminated. What does not exist cannot proliferate. In that regard, we reiterate the importance of continuing to address the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue, as well as the fact that it is important that Iran continue to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency to clarify the relevant questions concerning its nuclear programme in accordance with the resolutions that have been adopted by the Security Council.

I would, first of all, like to thank Ambassador Takasu, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), for his briefing on the Committee’s work over the past three months. We would also like to express our gratitude to him for the work he has done since taking office as Chairman of the Committee. The Iranian nuclear issue has to do with the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, has a direct bearing on the situation in the Middle East and affects international energy security. It has therefore attracted widespread attention in the international community. China has always supported maintaining the international non-proliferation regime. We oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons and do not want to see a new wave of turbulence in the Middle East. We have always called for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means and in a peaceful way. China has always believed that resolving that issue through diplomatic means is in the interest of peace and security in the Middle East region. It is also in the common interest of the international community. China is therefore ready to continue to play a constructive role in that regard. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, the United States and the Russian Federation are maintaining close contact and cooperation with regard to restarting negotiations on this issue. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also continued its cooperation with Iran on various issues pertaining to Iran’s nuclear programme. Rare opportunities exist in connection with restarting negotiations on the matter. China has taken note of the fact that IAEA Director General ElBaradei has submitted his latest report on the Iranian issue. We appreciate the efforts made by the IAEA and its Director General. We hope that Iran will continue its cooperation with the IAEA and resolve outstanding issues at an early date, so as to allay the misgivings of the international community about its nuclear programme. At the same time, we also hope that the international community will seize this opportunity to intensify its diplomatic efforts on this matter and maintain and promote dialogue with Iran, so as to achieve an early start to negotiations in the search for a long-term comprehensive and appropriate resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.