S/PV.619 Security Council

Today we welcome ta the Security Council the new representative of Colombia, Mr. Francisco Urrutia. Mr. Urrutia is known ta many of us because of his long connexion with the work of the United Nations. Therefore, 1 welcome him on two accounts: first, because he represents Colombia and, secondly, because he is the friendly and distinguished Mr. Francisco Urrutia.

1 should like ta thank the President for his kind words of welcome. It is always pleasant ta meet old friends again, and 1 hope that 1 shall be able ta l1I:lke a useful contribution ta the Council's work. Adoption of the agenda

The first item on the provi- sional agenda of this meeting is the adoption of the agenda. The representative of France wishes ta speak on this point. 4. ~Ir. HOPPENOT (France) (trans/ated jrolll French): For the second time in less than eighteen l110nths the French delegation finds ibelf obliged ta take a stand in the Security Council against an attempt by a group of African and Asian delegations ta induce this body ta take up a matter concerning the French Republic's relati0lb with the r\ürth African pro- tectorates. In April 1952 the matter concerned French- Tunisian relations, and the Council quite righth' rejected the applicants' claim [576tll ,,,..t'ting. para. ](3). Toda)' the relations between France and Morocco are at i'Sue. In a letter signed by the representatives of fifteen States [SI3085]. the President of the Seeurit)' Council was Président: ;-'1. T. F. TSL-\XG (Chine). Présents: Les représentants des pays suivants: Chili. Chine, Colombie, Danemark, France. Grèce. Liban, Pakistan, Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, Royaume-L'ni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Xord, Etats-Cnis d'.-\mérique. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/619) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Lettre adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité, le 21 août 1953, par les représentants de l'Afgha- nistan, de l'.-\rabie saoudite, de la Birmanie, de l'Egypte, de l'Inde, de l'Indonésie, de l'Irak, de l'Iran, du Liban, du Libéria, du Pakistan, des Philippines, de la Syrie, de la Thaïlande et du y émen, concernant les é\·énements du Maroc. Souhaits de bienvenue au représentant de la Colombie 1. Le PRESIDE:\T (traduit de l'ang/ais): Nous accueillons aujourd'hui au sein du Conseil de sécurité le nouveau représentant de la Colombie, M. Francisco Urrutia. ;-'L Urrutia est connu de beaucoup d'entre nous pour avoir depuis longtemps participé aux tra- vaux des Xations Unies. Je lui souhaite donc la bien- venue à un double titre, d'abord en sa qualité de repré- sentant de la Colombie et, ensuite, en raison de l'amitié que nous avons pour une personnalité aussi éminente. 2 ;-'1. CRRl.:TIA (Colombie): Je tiens à remercier le Président pour ses aimables paroles de bienvenue. Il est toujours très agréable de retrouver de vieux amis et j'espère pouvoir étre de quelque utilité à l'occasion de mon travail ici. Adoption de l'ordre du jour 3. Le PRESIDE:\T (trad"it de l'ang/ais): Le pre- mier point à l'ordre du jour provisoire de la présente séance est l'adoption de l'ordre du jour. Le représen- tant de la France désire prendre la parole sur ce point. 4. ~L HOPPE:\OT (France): Pour la seconde fois en moins de dix-huit mois, la délégation française se voit appelée à prendre position, au Conseil de sécurité, devant une initiative prise par un groupe de délégations africaines et asiatiques t'n vue de s.'u:'lÎr cdte instance d'une question concernant les rapports de la Républi- 'lue française avec le; protectorats nord-africains. En avril ] l)~2. il s'agissait des rapports franc( I-tunisiens et le Conseil s'est légitimement refusé à faIre droit à la prétention des requérants [576"1",' St:"t1CC, par. 103J. Aujourd'hui, ce sont le,; rapports de la France et du ~Iarûc qui se truuvent mis en cause. Par une It,ttre signée des représentant> de quinze Etats [SI3085], le 5. The very terms of that request prove, in our view, that it is inadmissible, that the Council is not competent to consider it, and that its object is futile. The French delegation will therefore vote against its inclusion in the agenda and is convinced that the majority of the members of the Council, loyal to the spirit and the letter of the Charter, will take the same.position. 6. The French Government, as ail members know, has refused and refuses on legal grounds definitively explained to the General Assembly by Mr. Robert Schuman on 10 November 1952,' to allow the United Nations to interfere in any way in its relations with the Protected States of Tunisia and Morocco. 7. In order to be completely loyal to that position of principle, l ought to do no more than point out how those grounds apply in the present case. However, in deference to the members of the Council, l think l may refer briefly to the facts which gave rise to the situation mentioned, and misrepresented, in the letter of the fifteen delegations submitting the request. The Council should know these facts although it cannot pass on them. l shall say nothing which might turn a procedural debate into a debate on substance or one of propaganda. l shall suppress every reaction of a Frenchman who, every day, sees the work done by his country in Morocco for over forty years misunderstood and its intentions travestied. l am not here to argue a case, but merely to submit very briefly the facts of a case in so far only as they may clarify the law. 8. The first fact is that for a number of years a large segment of the Moroccan people have become in- creasingly dissatisfied with their sovereign. We are not concerned at ail with the reasons for that dissatisfaction or with the merits of the grievances upon which it is based. We need merely note the undeniable fact that an ever increasing number of the natural leaders - the traditional religious and political leaders - of the Moroccan people accused the Sultan of departing from the position which he should have retained, that of supreme arbiter above ail factions, of favouring one faction to the prejudice of others, and of jeopardizing the integrity of the Moslem faith, of which he was tmstee. Again, it is not for us to say whether or not those charges are justified, any more than it is for us to pass on the merits of the charges which have been levelled in other countries against other sovereigns and have led to the downfall or weakening of other mIes. . 9. The first public demonstration of that feeling occurred on 29 May 1953, when 270 out of the 350 Moroccan caids and pashas submitted a petition to the French Resident-General requesting the French Gov- ernment to depose the sovereign. The caids and pashas are executive and judicial officers appointed by the sultan, but their appointment is in most cases merely d'~sprit se fit jour le 29 '!lai 1953, lorsque 270 des 350 calds et pachas marocams adressèrent au Résident général de France une requête sollicitant du Gouverne- ment français la déposition du souverain. Caïds et pachas sont des fonctionnaires d'autorité et de judica- ture, nommés par le Sultan, mais dont celui-ci, en les """: - 1 Voir Documents officiels de l'Assemblée générale septième session) séances plénières, 392ème séance. ' 2 10. At that time - that is to sayon 3 August- Michael Clark, New York Times correspondent at Marrakesh, said in a cable to his newspaper that if the French abandoned the Sultan he would have the greatest difficu1ty in finding forces prepared to take up arms in his defence. That, too, was a mere statement of fact, the fact of the increasing isolation of the sovereign within his Empire. Il. Faced with this danger to his throne, the Sultan turned to France and to France only. Although there was no material obstacle to prevent him from appealing to the United Nations to intervene, he did not do so. Nor did he appeal to those Governments whose repre- sentatives have called for this meeting of the Council. He appealed to the French Republic, the protecting Power, and in his representations to the Chief of State and his two manifestos of 6 and 17 August 1953 he requested its aid and protection against the revoit of his subjects. France was bound to give him that aid and protection, and did 50 to the fullest extent possible. 12. Throughout the weeks that preceded the final crisis, the French Government, through its represen- tatives in Morocco, continually acted as mediator be- tween the two opposing parties. It urged the Sultan to grant the reforms demanded by his people, which would lead to the democratization of the local municipal and provincial assemblies and to the modernization of the administrative and judicial institutions of the Empire. It constantly advised the Pasha of Marrakesh and his supporters to remain calm and patient, and pointed out that they should place their trust in France as mediator and pacifier. 13. Not until 13 August did the Sultan agree in principle to the reforms which France had proposed and ",hich his people had demanded i"r years. On 15 August the Sovereign and the Resident-General issued a joint proclamation in which, after observing that the prnblems to which the development of the Sherifian Empire gave rise were essentiall)' ,vithin the jurisdiction of France and :-Iorocco and that an)' out- side interference wouId merel)' delay or jeopardize their solution, they announced the iorthcoming promulgation of imperial dahirs relating to municipal refornl through elections, the organization of justice, the status of magistral<'s and the setting up of regional assemblies. ]2. Tout au cours des semaines qui ont pn~'cl'dé la crise finale, le Gouvernement français, par l'organe de ses représentants au :\laroc, n'a pas cessé de jouer, entre les deux parties en présence, son rôle de média- teur. Du Sultan, il s'e,t efforcé d'obtenir qu'il consente, enfin, aux réformes réclamées par ~UIl l't'upie et qui tendent à la démocratisation des asscml,\ées munici- pales et provinciales locales, à la modernisation des institutions administratives et judiciairc:.. de l'empire; au Pacha de :-farrakech et à ses partisans, il ne cessa de recommander le calme, la patience, et de démontrer la nécessité de faire confiance à l'action médiatrice et pacificatrice de la France. 13. Ce n'est que le 13 août que le Sultan con,entit à donner son accord de princil1e aux r~if)rmes pr0I'0Sl"eS depuis des années par la France et rédamées par son peuple. Le 15 anùt, une proclamation commune du souverain et du Résident génc'·ral. apri"s avoir rappelé que les pr"blémes que po,ait l'évolution de l'empire chérifien étaient l'affaire exclusi"e de la France l'l du )'Iaroc et que toute ingl'renct: extérieure ne pourrait qu'en retarder ou en compromettre la solutk'l1. annol1- çait la promulgation prochaine de dahirs impériaux concernant la réforme du régime des municipalités sur les bases de l'élection. l'Ilrgalli""ltil1n de la justi,,'l'. le statut Je;, magi=:itrats. la création d·a~';:'>l"m!Jlees rëgio- 14. In the meantime over 4,000 chiefs and notables opposing the Sultan rallied around El Glaoui at Marrakesh. The Resident-General personally went to see the Pasha in another attempt at mediation and pacification. A personal representative of the Foreign Minister was sent from Paris to strengthen his authority. 15. General Guillaume and Mr. Vimont conferred with the Pasha of Marrakesh and the principal Moroccan leaders on the morning of 15 August 1953 for more than five hours. The Resident-General and Mr. Vimont managed to dissuade the Pasha and his followers from immediately deposing the Sultan as temporal leader of the country. However, El Glaoui and his followers persisted in their refusaI to recoguize the Sultan any longer as the religious leader and Imam of Morocco. That evening, in accordance with tradition, they pro- claimed as Imam Sidi Mohammed Ben Moulay Arafa, uncle and cousin of the last three Alaouite sultans. Ail the Arab and Berber peoples represented at the Marrakesh meeting thus recognized the new Imam as the spiritual leader of the Moslem community in Morocco. That was a decision of a purely religious nature concerning only the Moroccans and it was not incumbent upon the French Government to take sides in the matter. 16. The events which followed are known. While the Resident-General was returning to Paris to report to the government on bis mission, the pashas and caids returned to their respective territories from Marrakesh. In the larger cities the Sultan's supporters, members of the Istiqlal Party, staged demonstrations in his favour, but only a very small minority of the population joined them. In the rural areas and among the tribes, Arab and Berber alike, of the valleys and the mountains, the Moroccans and their leaders rallied almost unanim- ously within the next few days around the new Imam. 17. Under the present theocratic regmle of Morocco the separation of the spiritual and the temporal powers traditionally united in the person of the Sultan, the standard-bearer of Islam, could not have endured how- ever much the French Government might have desired it. The Sultan himself refused to àgree to that separation of his religious and civil authority, and, while through- out the Empire an irresistible movement was being launched among the tribes to deprive him by force of a power which the faithful considered to be illegal because it was not religious, the Sovereign addressed a final appeal to France and to France alone. That appeal was heeded. On the night of 19 to 20 August the Resident-General returned to Morocco with instruc- tions from the French Government to save the Sultan by every peaceable means at his disposaI. Upon his 16. La suite des événements est connue. Tandis que le Résident général rentrait à Paris pour rendre compte au gouvernement de sa mission, les pacl1as et les caïds rassemblés à Marrakech regagnaient leurs territoires respectifs et si, dans quelques grandes villes, les partIsans du Sultan, membres du parti de l'Istiqlal, se livrèrent à des manifestations en sa faveur ils n'entrainèrent à leur suite qu'une très faible min~rité de l~ P?pulation. Dans les campagnes, parmi les tribus, ausSI bIen arabes que berbères, de la plaine ou de la montagne, la quasi-unanimité des Marocains et de leurs chefs se rallia, au cours des journées suivantes, à la personne du nouvel Iman. 17. Sous!e régime théocratique qui est aujourd'hui encore celtll du Mar?c, la division des pouvoirs spiri- t,;els. et des pOUV01rs temporels, traditionnellement r,eums dans la personne du Sultan, porte-drapeau de 1 I~lam, ?e pouvaIt se perpétuer, quel que fût le désir qu. en eut le ~o~vernement français. Le Sultan lui- n;eme se refusaIt a accepter cette division de son auto. nté . religieu~e et civile et, tandis que, de toutes les partIes de 1empIre, un mouvement vraiment irrésis. tible. se faisait jour parmi les tribus pour retirer, au besom par la forc;, au ?,;ltan, un pouvoir que son absence de caractere relIgIeux frappait d'illégitimité aux yeux des croyants, le souverain adressa à la France, et à la France seule encore, un dernier appel. Cet appel fut entendu. Dans la nuit du 19 au 20 août le Résident général rentrait au Maroc, instruit par l~ 18. At that juncture it became apparent that the Sultan couId be saved only at the price of a bloody and ruinous conflict of uncertain issue, which would have brought the French forces into conflict, from the doors of the Imperial Palace to the utmost limits of the Empire, with the peoples and tribes revolting against the Sultan's authority. As France's attempt at mediation unfortunately failed, it was inconceivable that the Gov- ernment of the Republic should resort to force to impose on an entire people the domination of a sovereign whom it had rejected. The only remaining duty of the French authorities was to ensure the personal security of the Sultan and his family and the continuation of the Alaouite dynasty. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the Resident-General visited the Sultan and explained that his departure from Morocco was absolutely necessary for his safety. An hour later, unprotesting and un- resisting, the Sultan and his two sons took a plane to Corsica. ' 19. The Resident-General immediately informed the head of the Moroccan Government of the Sovereign's departure. The Grand Vizier AI Muqrri is an old man of nearly a hundred who has held this high post con- tinuously from a time well before the establishment of the Protectorate and who enjoys great personal prestige throughout the Empire. The Grand Vizier thanked the Resident-General for taking a step without which the public peace and the institutions of the State would both have been in danger. The same evening he con- vened the Makhzen, that is the entire Sherifian Govern- ment, and published a statement in which, after noting that the cxtremely grave tension between the represen- tatives of the people and the reigning sovereign had led the Makhzen to conclude that the Sultan could no longer assume the obligations of power, he solemnly proclaimed Sidi Mohammed Ben ;\[uula)" Arafa as the only Icgitimate s<l\'l'reign of the Sheritian Empire. 20. Thl' very next day the ceremonies of allegiance III the new soverign were heId throughout the territory, in an atmosphert.' of spont::lOeity. unanimity and calm which impressed and surpri:--t'cl all ohservers. 21. In Fez, al",a)", an independent and turbulent cit)", the Ulema, exeept for one absentee, unanimousl)" granted the ne'" Sultan the investiture b)" which his PO"'t'C is traditionally con,ecratl'tl. Ali the members oi the Imperial Family united in recognizing his auth"ritl', One after an"tht'r all the leaders and notables of the tll\\'l1:-- sent wurd of their allegiance tn him. By 22 August, os reported by the .\" <"lI' }'or!.- H crald Tribune corrt':-pondent at Rabat, nillrteen put of twent)··three pashas and 317 out of 323 tribal chiefs had signed an instrument of allegiance to the Sultan, who was thus ill\'l',ll'd bv a far greater majoril)" than that by which his prt'dl'C~':'o:,nr had been fl'Co}..'llizell forty years earlier. Even in Tangier, a city whose international status kept 11 ~Iohammed hen ;\loulay Arala comme seul "JlIverain légitime de l'Empire chérifien. 20. Dès le lendemain, [(', formalité, d'allégeanct' au nouveau spu\'erain se dérl )ubient sur toU1l." l'étendue du territc)irt" d;lll' de:-- conditions de ",pollt:lIléité, d'unanimité et de calme qui ont frapp~ ('1 ~lIrpri..; t(Jus les ténwin .... 21. .\ Fez, \'ille traditi"nndlement in,lt'pentlante et frondeuse, les oulémas. à l'unanimité meJins la voix d'tm ah:--ent. ac(()n1:l.il'nt au nou\'(-au Sultan l'in\'csti- tUTe dont il tire traditionnt·llemellt la CI )Ibécr:ltion dt' son pnu\"oir. Tous le:-- membres de la famillt' impériale se ralliaient égalemt'llt à Sf.n autorité. Les chd:,> ct tous les nütables des villes lui envo\ aient succc.....ivement leur adhé,ion. Dès le 22 aoùt, comme le rapporte le corrt"I"mdant du .\'",' Vo-r!.- firrold Tribu"" il Rabat, dix-neui pachas sur vingt-trois et 317 chefs de tribus sur 323 avaient ..Igné un acte d'allégeance au Sultan. Ce dernier se voyait ainsi ifl\ (,·..,ti par une majorité healKoup ph" .:rendue que celle qui avait, quarante ans plus tt'Il, rl'Ct .nnu s(Jn prédéces~t"ur. :\ Tangt:r mërne, 22. Article 3 of the Treaty between France and the Government of His Sherifian Majesty, signed at Fez on 30 March 1912, obliges the Government of the Republic ta protect the Sovereign against any danger ta his persan or throne or ta the peace of his estates. The Government of the Republic can claim ta have fulfilled this threefold obligation. It has preserved the personal safety of the Sultan, menaced at the gates of his capital and his palace by the growing revoit of the tribes; it has safeguarded the continuity of the throne and of the Alaouite dynasty; and it has saved the peace and tranquillity of the Sherifian Empire from the evils and wounds of an armed internecine conflict. 23. The authorities representing the Republic in Morocco did not dethrone the Sultan, nor did they appoint his successor. Their raie in the conflict between Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef and his people was one of mediation and protection. Despite ail their efforts, mediation failed. Their dutY of protection - of the Sultan's persan, of the dynasty, and of public arder and peace - was carried out. It remained only for their authorities ta take note of the nomination of the new Sultan by the Makhzen and the traditional religious and civil authorities and, once the validity of his election had been recognized and confirmed, ta collaborate with him and with his government in mutual confidence and in respect for their reciprocal undertakings and obligations. 24. That is as objective a report as possible of the facts on which the fifteen delegations of the African and Asian group have felt justified in trying once again ta arraign France belore a United Nations organ. In stating these facts l have not sought ta defend or ta apologize for my country; it is not my task to argue its case before a tribunal which, once again, my delegation does not admit ta be either competent or entitled to intervene in the relationship between France and the countries under its protection. It has nevertheless been worth while to put the facts belore you, sa as to enable the Council to arrive at a better appreciation of the reasons why the French Government considers the request brought before the Council ta be inadmissible and otiose. 25. Indeed, as l said at the outset, the French Govern- ment denies that either the General Assembly or the Security Council is in any way competent ta intervene in its relations with either the Regency of Tunisia or the Empire of Morocco. It finds support for its views in the very terms of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter, which specifies that "nothing contained in the present Charfer shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen- tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State". Now, though Morocco has remained legally a sovereign State, it has by the Treaty of Fez transferred ta France the exercise of its external sovereignty. It cannot have direct relations with any Power other than France. It cannat have direct relations with the international community. The relationship binding it ta France is internaI in character, therefore, from the viewpoint of 26. In other words, any matter covered by the treaty of protectorate falls in essence, and by the very terms of the treaty, within the national jurisdiction of France. In virtue of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter the United Nations cannot deal with such a matter; and in the present case the Security Council can only acknowledge its own lack of competence by refusing ta place on its agenda discussion of the item submitted by the fifteen delegations of the African and Asian group. 27. l would add that the situation brought about in Morocco by the l'vents leading up ta the departure of the ex-Sultan and the advent of his successor is, from the viewpoint of any other Power and from that of the United Nations, what l may cali internaI in a twofold sense. 28. Il is internaI because of the relations between France and Morocco, and equally internaI in respect of Morocco alone. Morocco has never ceased ta be a sovereign State, and hence ail matters relating to its political institutions fall solely within the competence of its Government. France itself can intervene in such matters only where so authorized within the limits laid down in the Treaty of Fez. Before falling essentiall)' within the national competence of France hl' virtue of that treaty, Moroccan internai affairs fall no le" essen- tially within the national competence of Morocco. If, therefore, the United Nations should claim the right ta intervene in such matters. it wouId commit a double violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. 2'). Secondly, the French delegation considers that, in addition to falling h)' its very nature out,ide the juris- diction of the Security Counci!, the request of the fifteen delegations is also inadmissible because the grounds on which it is made do not exist. 30. The complainants base their request on .-\rticle 35 of the Charter. That Article stipulates that "any mem- ber of the Uuited t\'ations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred ta in Article 3~, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General A",'mbly". Article 3~ states that "the Securit)" Council may in\'estigate any dispute, or any situation II"hich might lead ta international frictiun or gi"e rise to a dispute, in arder tn determine whether the con- tinuance of the dispute or ,ituation is likely ta endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" 31. :\UII". is there a di,pute between the French Gov- ernment and the Sherilian Government? The answer is: ;-.;", If such a dispute exi,ted. lI"uul.1 the Security Council be compelt'nt tOI consider it? .\s we have just seen, under Article 2. paragraph ï, of the Charter, the answer again is: No. 33. We also consider this request futile because of its complete Jack of object. If the Council decided to grant the request, what kind of action would it propose to undertake? \Vould it condemn Morocco for deposing its sovereign and rallying peacefully and almost unanim- ously around his successor? Would it condemn France for not changing its mediation into compulsion and sacrificing thousands of innocent lives to maintain on his throne by force of arms a sovereign rejected by his people? ,Vould the Council itself initiate a collective movement by the United Nations to restore the Sultan to power and impose him at the·same time on Morocco as Sultan and on the protecting Power as protégé? Or would the Council not go so far as that but take the responsibility of casting doubt, by retrospective and platonic recrimination, on the legitimacy of the new sovereign and of helping to revive serious dissensions on the soil of Morocco? These questions have only to be asked to be answered in the negative, and to demonstrate in sorne sort by reductio ad absurd1l1n the futility of a motion which could only lead the Counci! into a blind alley. l venture to say that it is an irrespon- sible act to attempt by inconsistent arguments to move a great international body to deal with a matter which does not concern it, and to propose for its decision only measures which would be by their nature directly con- trary to its purpose. The purpose of the United Nations is not to chastise nor to restore - assuming that it were ~ppropriate to chastis~ or restore - hut to strengthen mternatlOnal cG-OperatIOn, repress aggression and main- tain and !!reserve !!eace. Hs pUrJi,0se is not to interfere m the natIOnal affalrs of States, nor to construe treaties which States have concluded with one another, nor to indulge in discussions which can on1y aggravate interna1 dissension and popular feeling and cannot conceivably promote peace or lessen international tension. Hs pur- pose is not, where neither peace nor personal security are threatened, to take irresponsible action which would endanger peace and security in territories for which a sovereign State or protector is solely responsible. so~verainJ de favoriser la renaissance, en pays rnaro- cam, de graves germes de dissension? Il suffit de poser ces questions pour qu'il y soit répondu négativement et pour que soit, en quelque sorte, démontrée par l'absurde l'inanité d'une démarche qui ne pourrait avoir pour résultat que d'engager le Conseil dans une voie s~ns issue. C'est agir à la légère, je crois pouvoir le ?,re! que de tenter de mettre ainsi en action une grande mshtutlOn mternatlOnale pour qu'elle traite d'une affaire qUl ne la concerne pas, en invoquant à cet effet des raisons dépourvues de consistance et pour ne lui proposer, en fait. de décisions à prendre, que des mesur~s qm serment, par leur nature, directement contraIres à sa Illission. Cette ll1ission des Nations Unies n'cst pas de châtier, ni de réparer - en admet- tant qu'il y ait lieu à châtiment ou à réparation - mais de renforcer la coopération internationale, de réprimer l'agression, de maintenir et de préserver la paix. Elle n'est p"s d'intervenir dans les affaires nationales des Etats, ni d'interpréter les traités qu'ils ont conclus en\re eux, ni ~e se \?rêter à des débats qui ne peuvent q~ attIser les dIssenSIOns mte:nes ou les passions popu- laIres, sans que leur Issue pUIsse en aucun cas favoriser 34. l have no doubt that ail these arguments are as fully present ta the mind of members of the Council as they are ta mine. l sincerely hope that the discussion will be conducted without heat or bitterness, and that at its end these arguments will prevail sufficiently with a majority of our members ta constrain the Council ta refuse ta place on its agenda the question submitted by the fifteen delegations of the African and Asian group. 35. ML HA)'IDANI (Pakistan): l regret very much ta announce that because of ill heath, Professor Bokhari has been prevented from taking part in this important meeting of the Security Counci!. 36. 11Y delegation has listened ta the intervention of the representative of France with the care and interest it fully deserved, and reserves the right ta reply ta it after studying it. 37. The delegation of Pakistan, with the delegations of fourteen other Asian and African countries, has been constrained ta bring the question of ),[orocco ta the Security Council because they feel that ta subvert the government of another country by questionable means, ta ride roughshod over the declared will of its people and overthrow its legitimate and rightful sovereign is aggression, just as much as the attempt ta achieve these abjects by the use of force. The recent trend of events in that brave country is interpreted, most certainly in my country and in the whole of Africa and Asia and much of the rest of the world, as instigated and man- (cuvred hy France ta sabotage the )'loroccan national movement. 38. We fully realize the gravity of this widespread feeling of resentment and, in ail seriousness, have brought this matter before the Security Council for immediate investigation and intervention if it should sa decide after a proper hearing. France is a country with honourable traditions and a great and noble people for whom we have a very special respect and regard. Yet its recent behaviour in Morocco has stirred up world opinions. l quote from the editarial of the .VeU' York Times dated 22 August 1953: "Mornccans. like other dependent peoples, have caught the nationalistic fever of our limes, and certain politically conscious elements are demanding inde- pendence and social reforms. The Sultan was re- ,ponding to popular opinion. The pashas and caids are feudal landowners and militarv leaders who oppose social and economic reforms and who there- fore support the French. The Istiqlal party, although extreme in ils nationalistic demands, alway> kept out of Communi,t entanglen",nts and certainl)' has no Communi,t leaders. In the end, the French called upon the foret·, of reaction ta stem the rising nation- alism and u!,,,n the Berber tribesmen ta cow the Arabs of the cities." "Comme les autres peuples qui n'ont 1"15 encore accédé à l'indépendance, les )'Iarocains St mt atteints de la fihre nationaliste qui caractérise notre époque, et certains éléments plus conscient' des réalités poli- tiques réclament l'indépendance et des réformes so· ciales. Le Sultan était sensihle à l'opinion populaire. Ce sont les pachas et les caids. grands propriétaires féodaux et chefs militaires, qui ,'opposent à t'lUtc réforme slIciale et économique et qui, par conséquent, appuient les Français, Le parti de l'IstitJlal, malgré J'intransigeance de se~ revendications nationalistes S'l':-,t toujours gardé de se compromettre avec le~ communi ...tes et n'a certainement aucun dirig-eant com- muni,te. En fin de c,?ml',tl', les Français ont ~it appel aux turet"... de la reactlon pour endiguer la martt ~o.nt~nt(' du natilfn:l!i ...rnt' .et aux trihus berbères pour mtmllJer 'cs Arabes des villes." 40. None of the Articles of the Charter is meant to be a technicality; otherwise, the United Nations would not have been a living organization but a charnel-house of dogma. Yet, very often, it is the great Powers, the sentinels of the ideals of the United Nations, who, both in the Security Council and the General Assembly, after having declared that the United Nations is not a court of law, convert it into one to shield their vested interests from the criticism of the world. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, in our opinion, has been over-taxed in its use. The fact is conveniently ignored that Article 2, paragraph 7, is meant to operate within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations. What is this framework? It starts with: "We the peoples of the United Nations" are "determined" to do certain things and, among others, "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small", and "have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims", with the purpose, among others, "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or seUle- ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". This is a part of the ~i!)'lité et 1,,; valeur de la personne humaine, dans l'éga- Itte de. drOIts des hommes et des femmes, ainsi que des nattons, grandes et petites". Elle poursuit: "Avons décidé d'associer nos efforts pour réaliser ces desseins", entre autres celui de "réaliser, par des moyens paci- fiqu.es,. confor~ément ,a?x principes de la justice et du drOl,t mternatlOnal~ 1a)ustement ou le règlement de dlfferends ou de sltuattons, de caractère international susceptibles de mener à une rupture de la paix", Voili un des buts des Nations Unies, Un autre but consiste à "développer entre les nations des relations amicales fondées sur le respect du principe de l'égalité de droits des peuples et de leur droit à disposer d'eux-mêmes, et prendre toutes autres mesures propres à consolider la paix du monde". fram~work; anothe.r part is "to develop friendly relatIons among natIons based on respect for the prin- ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate means to strengthe~ universal peace". 41: N.ow, Article 2, paragraph 7 states: "Nothing con- tamed m the present Charter shall authorize the United N!,ti?ns to. in~erye~e in matters which are essentially wlthm the JunsdlctlOn of any State ..." This is a broad and general safeguarding pro~ision which does not make the effective provisions of the Charter lose their force but restrains these provisions from being spread so far or taken so much out of their context as to furnish an excuse for intervention in matters that are ~1. La pa.ragr~~he 7 de l'Article 2 est ainsi conçu: Aucune dlsposltton de la présente Charte n'autorise les, Nations U.nies à intervenir dans des affaires qui relevent essentIellement de la compétence nationale d'un Etat ... " Il s'agit là d'une clause de sauvegarde d'un c~ra~tèr~ l~rge et ~éné~a!, dont l'effet n'est pas de red.urre,a ne~nt les dlsposlttons pertinentes de la Charte, maiS d empecher q~e, celles-ci ne soient interprétées trop. largem~nt ou ,tIrees .de leur ~ontexte au point de servir de pretexte a une 1I1terventlOn dans des affaires "esse~tially w!thin the domestic. jurisdiction of any State . The Important words m this Article are: "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State". What is the meaning of "domestic jurisdiction"? Surely the word "domestic" restricts the idea of wider jurisdiction, that is to say, authority in a wide sense. q~i "relèv~nt essentielle!"ent de la compétence nationale ~ un E~at . Les mots Importants de cet Article sont: essen~lel!ement de la compétence nationale d'un Etat". Que ~lg11lfie exactement la "compétence nationale"? Il ne fait pas de doute que le mot "nationale" restreint an~ the territories of that State, and, secondly, one over which that State has powers of direct legislation. 42. So far as the first point is concerned, the subjects and territories of Morocco are not as yet a part of France, and, so far as the second point is concerned, !t bas been judicially determined on the highest author- ~ty that France does not have jurisdiction to legislate ln respect of Morocco. When it tried to do so, it came up against the rights of other States and its jurisdiction was denied by the International Court of Justice in a judgment dated 27 August 1952. 2 It cannot therefore be c1aimed that the internaI affairs of Morocco are "essentially" within the domestic jurisdiction of France, and therefore Article 2, paragraph 7, cannot be invoked to bar an investigation by the Security Council of the serious situation in Morocco. 43; Moreover, the Act of Algeciras of 1906, to which thlrteeh States were party - namely, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States of America, France the 1.!nited Kingdom, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal: Russla, Sweden and Morocco - safeguards the sover- eignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions and economic liberty, and excludes inequality. This is still binding and operative. One of the purposes of the United Nations is to estab- Iish respect for the obligations arising from treaties, and we have always emphasized this purpose enunciated in the United Nations Charter. Under the Act of Algeciras, Morocco is a sovereign State. Moroccans are not French s.ubjec~s. It is true that the Treaty of Fez places certain hmltatlOns on the powers of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco and accords certain authority to the Gov- ernment of France, but these limitations are subject to the Act of Algeciras. 44. There undoubtedly exists a grave crisis in ~[orocco today. Morocco has been held by the French during these forty years by martial law. 1 quote from The Econolllist of London, which has given the following appraisal of the position in Morocco: "If El Glaoui, the Pasha of ~!arrakesh, attempts. as he did last week-end, to depose the Sultan of Morocco, France has serious responsibilities in the matter. It is implicated, first, because the treaty estab- blishing its protectorate over Morocco binds it to lend ail support to the Sultan; secondly, because its perfectionist policy of maintaining a centralized ad- ministration, run by Frenchmen, places it in a posi- tion to check such moves if it has a mind to do so; thirdly, because the Pasha would not have taken the steps he has taken over recent months had he not good reasons to believe that he had French approval." 45. The statement in The Econolllist that the treatv establishing the protectorate over ~[orocco binds Franc'e 2 Cau (o"("nl•.,.g ng1l11 of Mtionals of 'h~ Unittd Statu of Amm<a i• .I(o",uo. Judgm<ol of Augusl 271., 1952: J.CJ. RI;'''/s 1952, p. 176. 11 " ------------------- ~ations L'nies est d'assurer le respect des obligations nées des traités, et nous avons toujours mis l'accent sur ce but énoncé par la Charte des Nations Unies. Aux termes de l'Acte l'Algésiras, le ~[aroc est un Etat souverain. Les ~[arocains ne sont pas sujets français. Il est exact que le Traité de Fez ,oumet les pouvoirs de Sa ~[ajesté le Sultan du ~[aroc à certaines restric- tions et accorde certains pou\,{Jir~ au Gouvernement de la France, mais ces restrictions sont subordonnées aux clauses de l'Acte d'Algésiras. -H. Il est indéniable qu'il existe actuellement une crise grave au ~[aroc. C'est grâce à la loi martiale que les Français ont pu tenir le Maroc pendant les quarante dernières années. Je voudrais citer un passage de l'Eco- "cnnist de Londres, qui contient le jugement suivant sur la situation au ~Iaroc: "Si le Glaoui, Pacha de ~[arrakech, tente de dépo- ser le Sultan du ~laroc, comme il l'a fait à la fin de la semaine dernière, la responsabilité de la France sera gravement engagée. Elle le sera, tout d'abord, parce que le traité établissant son protectorat sur le ~!aroc l'oblige à donner tout son appui au Sultan; elle le ~era: en deuxième. lieu, parce q.u~ sa politique perfectIOnniste qUI mamtlent une admmlstration cen- tralisée, dirigée par des Français, la met en moure de faire êchec à de telles manœUHes si elle en a le désir, et troisièmement, parce que le Pacha n'aurait pas agi comme il l'a fait au cours de ces derniers mois s'il n'avait pas de bonnes rais"ns de croire qu'il béné- ficiait de l'approbation de la France." .\5. En déclarant que le traité établissant le protec- torat de la France sur le ~!aroc engage la France à ~ .-ll!air~ ,.t1atit,~ aux droits dn rt.rsortisson's du Elats·' ."" d'.-lmériqut' au .Uaro(, .-ir"ft du 17 aowt 195.!: C.1J.. Ruwc"1J 1952. p. 176. "After surrounding the palace with troops, in less than a quarter of an hour he .secur~d t~e Sultan:s agreement to delegating both hls leglslatlVe and hls executive powers to committees presided over by his Grand Vizier (who was over 100) but largely com- posed of Frenchmen, and to promising to permit no foreign - that is, United Nations - intervention in Moroccan affairs... "The background to the quarre! is less a difference between the Sultan and the Glaoui than one between the Sultan and Frenchmen. The Glaoui, as will be seen, comes into the picture largely as an appendage of the latter. The difference between the Sultan and the French would seem to be insoluble on one point only, but that point is fundamental. It is disagreement over the role that the French community, now over 450,000 strong, is to play in the elected institutions of the future - municipalities, joint bodies respon- sible for finance, and ultimately a Moroccan assembly... " 'Divide and rule' is an age-old policy, and French die-hards may claim that it has triumphed again. But there are many signs that, this time, it has let division go too far. It has left on France's hands a browbeaten and resentful Sultan, a discomfited Glaoui, an 'Istiqlal' farther from its target than ever before, clashes and murders in the main cities, a religious quarrel in the open, and no Moroccan faction of importance on which to build future policy. Do many Frenchmen seriously believe that they can educate young Moroccans in the ways of democracy and simultaneously stop the march of time in Africa?" 47. Much has been made, as ha. already been indicated, of the differences between the Arabs and the Berbers. In our opinion, this difference has been artificially created. Let me quote a passage from Rom Landau's book, The Sultan of M orocca (p. 80): "When at the beginning of November [1950] the Sultan returned from France, his welcome exceeded in warmth any popular manifestation he had experienced in the twenty-three years of his reign. Casablanca, where he landed, was packed not only with natives who had travelled specially from Rabat, "La politique du divide et impera est très ancienne et les Français réactionnaires peuvent estimer que cette politique a triomphé une fois de plus. Mais, cette fois-ci, il y a tout lieu de croire que la tentative de division est allée trop loin. Elle ne laisse plus à la France qu'un Sultan intimidé et plein de ressentiment un ~laou.i déconfit, un Istiqlal qui est plus éloign~ que jamaIs de son but, des émeutes et des assassinats dans les. villes principales, une querelle religieuse ouvertei Il ne reste plus. aucun groupe important de Maroc~Ins sur lequel pUIsse s'appuyer une politique. y a-t-Il beaucoup de Français pour croire sérieuse- m~nt qu'ils puissent. former de jeunes Marocains aux methodes democratlques et, en même temps, arrêter la marche du progrès en Afrique?" 47. On a fait grand cas des divergences de vues entre les Arabes et les Berbères. A notre avis, ces divergences de v.ues ont été artificiellement créées. Permettez-moi de cIter Un passage du livre de Rom Landau intitulé: The Sultan of M orocco (p. 80) : "Lorsque le Sultan est revenu de France, au début de novembre [1950], le peuple lui a fait un accueil pl,':~ chaleureux .qu'à aucune époque de son règne, deJa long. La VIlle de Casablanca où son avion a atterri, était pleine non seulement d'indigènes spécia- lement venus de Rabat, de Fez et d'autres villes, mais "El Glaoui's attitude \l'as nothing new [I!lis refers 10 1950] but it was only since the request for the revocation of the protectorate treaty that he openly revealed his opposition ta his rightful king's growing authority and popularity. He had, however, revealed his true colours already in 1947 after the monarch's famous visit ta Tangier. He had then called on the new Resident-General, General Juin, and offered him armed help against the Sultan. 'Mon Général', he said on that occasion, 'my men are ready. They await your signal and my orders ta descend upon the plains, and chase out that impostor who has forgotten that it is France that put him on the throne.' Yet, during the Second \'J'orId War, when, after the Sultan's meeting with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, Mohammed V's prestige in native eyes had risen ta sudden heights, while that of defeated France was still pretty low, the Pasha despatched one of his sons ta the Sultan ta assure him that he was 'behind his king'. But even then the Sultan had already taken the full measure of Glaoui; the only message he sent in reply was: 'One must be with me, not behind me.' One feels like adding: 'with a dagger'." 49. The Council is aware that at its seventh session the General Assembly adopted resolution 612 (YII) hy a considerable majority, enjoining France ta take the path of negotiation and conciliation. We consider it a matter of great grief and sorrow that, when the cause of freedom of any people was under discussion, it should have been the French delegation that was ahsent. In the cause of freedom, France has ever been foremost. This is the one cause that is dearest ta the hearts of Frenchmen, and they should be proud ta continue ta lead in the cause of freedom as they have done in the past. 50. The consideration of this matter in the General Assembly establishes the fact that the matter is not within the domestic jurisdiction of France under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. But perhaps the French representative has over-Iooked this because his delegation did not attend that discussion at the seventh session of the General .\ssemhly. 51. What has been the attitude of France since the adoption of that General :\"cmhlv resolution? Did it tr)' ta negotiate with the propcr ~!oroccan authorities? "'e regret ta say that it did not. On the contra!')', it intrnsificà il...; coerci"t' measures, reinforced its armed strength in ~!"rocco and used nen' effort to stage a revoit. \\'hat is it that has angered the French against the Sultan whom they themselves sn IMing!v installed on the throne of ~lorocco t\\'t'nty-~ix ,"car ... ag-n and on whom, in recognition of his' suppOrt duri'ng the Second \\'orld \\'ar, th<'\' bestowed the title ai "Cham- pion of Liberation"? . 52 ls it !>('cau'e the Sultan culti""tcd l'nited States friendship after its troops landed in Xorth Africa in ~2. E,t-ce parce que le Sultan" cultivé l'amiti.' des Etats-L"ob après le déklrilutlllcllt des tr,)uI>es améri· 53. ls it because the Sultan responded to popular opinion demanding independence and social reform? 54. Is it because the Sultan allowed himself to be influenced by the national consciousness all around him in his own people, in the peoples in countries near and far, or is it because he looked beyond the limited horizon of French protection and cast his eyes towards the United Nations? 55. Did he threaten to break off relations with the French Government or dispossess French nationals settled in Morocco who constitute 5 per cent of the population and possess most of the best properties and civil appointments? No. All he asked of the French was that they should reinstate in Morocco the measure of self-government which existed before the French decided to protect the Sultan and Morocco from all evils. 56. In concrete terms the Sultan has declared: "Our proposais aim at the attainment of the ideal objective of enabling the Moroccan people to admi- nister the affairs of the country through a represen- tative parliament and a constitutional government, in accordance with modern democratic processes, it being recognized that the institution of such a régime is not incompatible with the continuation of co- operation between France and Morocco".· 57. Could anyone - at least anyone sitting round this table - object to that at an aim? Yet the French Government has done so most forcefully, and ever since the Assembly resolution [612 (VII)] of December 1952 it has tried by threats to foist on the Sultan at least three decrees: that he should abdicate his admin- istrative powers, pronounce that the General Assembly has no right to advise on the grave threat to peace in Morocco and to ratify the so-called reforms giving the French nationals in Morocco undue political righ~s in contravention of the Act of Algeciras, the Treaty of Fez and the Principles of the United Nations Charter. 58. In contrast to the action of the Government of France after General Assembly resolution 612 (VII), His Majesty Mohammed V, the Sultan of Morocco, has, since the adoption of the resolution, addressed three memoranda to the President and the Government of the French Republic on 12 January, 15 January and 4 July 1953. He has tried to put into effect the hopes expressed by the General Assembly by proposing negotiations with France "on an urgent basis towards developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco, with due regard to legitimate rights and interests .under the established norms and practices of the law of nations". 59. Il indeed bodes i1l for the United Nations if nations in a great position of responsibility to uphold its high ideals act in such a manner as to undermine its prestige and its usefulness. 57. Quelqu'un - du moins quelqu'un siégeant à cette table - peut-il s'élever contre un tel but? Et cependant, le Gouvernement français s'y est opposé avec la plus grande vigueur; depuis que l'Assemblée a adopté sa résolution [612 (VII)] de décembre 1952, il a cherché, par des menaces, à imposer trois décisions au Sultan: celle de renoncer à ses pouvoirs administratifs, celle de déclarer que l'Assemblée générale n'a pas le droit d'é- mettre un avis au sujet de la grave menace à la paix qui existe au Maroc et celle de ratifier de prétendues ré- formes, qui, en violation de l'Acte d'Algésiras, du Traité de Fez et des principes de la Charte, accordent à la population française du Maroc des droits politiques abusifs. 58. Par un contraste frappant avec les mesures prises par le Gouvernement de la France après que l'Assemblée générale eut adopté sa résolution 612 (VII), Sa Ma- jesté Mohammed V, Sultan du Maroc, a, depuis l'adop- tion de cette résolution, adressé trois mémoires au Président et au Gouvernement de la République fran- çatse, les 12 janvier, 15 janvier et 4 juillet 1953. Il s'est efforcé de donner effet au vœu émis par l'Assemblée générale en proposant des négociations avec la France "en vue de développer les libres institutions politiques du peuple marocain, en tenant dûment compte des droits et intérêts légitimes, conformément aux normes établies et aux usages du droit des gens" 59. Il serait de mauvaise augure pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies que des Etats qui assument de lourdes responsabilités dans la défense des nobles idéaux de l'Organisation agissent de manière à saper son pres- tige et son efficacité. 3 Yoir Documents ofJicieis de rAfsemblée générale, sep'ièflll seSSIon, Annexes, pomt 6S de lordre du jour document A/2175/Add.2. ' 61. Three years ago, when the Security Council met on a Sunday and took all possible measures ta succour an afflicted people in South Korea, we welcomed the earnestness with which those measures were adopted and sorne nations in Asia, which feel as we do in the matter of Morocco, sacrified the flower of their man- hood for the cause of Korea. We are not so sure that nations which rose so nobly ta the occasion then ta arrest the domination of South Korea will be forth- coming with even their moral support for the 110roccan people who have been strenuously struggling ta throw off the yoke of foreign domination. 62. We fifteen nations, in all sincerity and friendship. have always urged the peaceful settlement of these matters through negotiation with representatives of the Moroccan people. Our repeated appeals have been unheeded by the Government of France; we have tried ta show that even the majority opinion of the General Assembly has not been acted upon by the Government of France. Article 34 of the Charter reads as follows: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead ta international friction or give rise ta a dispute, in arder ta determine" - 1 stress the words "in arder ta determine"- "whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely ta endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." (,3. In our view - that is, in the view of more than half the population of the world - such a danger exists. and we ask that we be allowed ta prove our contention by having the item placed on the agenda. 1>4. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): Before 1 read my prepared statement 1 should like ta make two observations. The first is that 1 listened with the greatest care ta the statement made by the representative of France and was a little taken by surprise because 1 did not expect him ta enter in such detail into the substance of the matter as the representative of France saw fit ta do this afternoon. 1 had supposed, in my innocence, that we were still at the purely procedural point and that. therefore, any tao detailed examinatian of the merits or demerits of this case would not be in arder at this stage. And while, as the Council will see shortly, 1 do advert in some measure ta the substance of this question - 5ince it is not possible ta talk about anything in a complete vacuum - 1 have neverthe- leS5 restrained myself as much as 1 possibly could from so doing. For all these reasons 1 feel that it is only fair for us tl> he given the opportunity ta study this important statement which the repr<·,elllative of 65. The second point is that we have before us the text of a letter lS/ 3088], from the signatories ta the original request, other than those which are members of the Security Council, "sking that they be given an opportu- nity ta participate in our discussion here. I wish ta move this formally at this stage. I do not ask the President at the present juncture ta put it ta the decision of the Council, but if it is agreeable ta him I should like ta have that procedural point settled after I have made my substantive statement. 66. I take it that we are considering at this stage only the question whether the item on Morocco, sub- mitted jointly by fifteen Members of the United Nations [S/3085] for consideration by the Security Council, should be placed on our agenda. The question is whether the Security Council should take up this matter. This is obviously a purely procedural question. In confining my treatment strictly ta this procedural aspect, I wish first ta make four observations of a purely preliminary and genera! character. These observations will help, I trust, ta set the tone and determine the spirit with which l, on behalf of my delegation and my Government, propose to approach this issue. In these matters, as indeed in almost everything in life, the spirit alone justifies and explains and, in the end. it alone creates the necessary conditions for reconciliation and peace. 67. First, everything I shall say must revolve around the procedural question whether this item should in its substance he examined by the Security Council. I shall not therefore.. at this stage, delve into the substance of the matter except ta the extent ta which that is strictly necessary in order ta prove the procedural point. Ta what extent a persan wou!d go into the substance, and how he would do 50, would depend, of course, on ms general spirit; in other words, on ms method of approach. In any event, you, Mr President, or any representative on the Security Council can at any time call a persan ta arder, according ta the Counell's rules or procedure, if he should overstep the proper limits. As I said at the beginning, I have no fear that I shall be called ta order for anything I shall say, after the important statement by the representative of France, who did go into the matter of the question far more deeply, I feel, than is warranted by the present stage of this debate. Even in questions of form alone, however, a certain degree of preliminary material schematism is necessary, and I can point ta every item in the past about the inclusion of which in the agenda of the Security Council a controversy arose ta pr~ve the contention that a minimum degree of elucidation of substance is in- dispensable if one is ta come ta an unprejudiced deelsion upon the procedural question. Thus, my penetration into the matter of this item will be strictly tailored ta the requirements of the elucidation. 68. The second observation is that the group of fifteen Asian and African States have jointly requested the consideration of this item by the Security Council. Lebanon and Pakistan, which are members of the Secur- pel~r. un orateur à ~'ordre, conformément au règlement !?t~neur du ConseIl de sécurité, lorsqu'il dépasse les hmltes voulues. Ainsi que je l'ai dit au début de mon exposé, je ne crains pas d'être rappelé à l'ordre sur ce que j'aurai à dire, après l'importante déclaration faite par le représentant de la France, qui s'est étendu sur le fond beaucoup plus. me semble-t-il, qu'il n'aurait dû le fmre au stade actuel du débat. Mais, même dans les questlOns de pure forme, il faut avoir certaines données de fait préliminaires et je pourrais rappeler tous les P?mts ?ont l'inscription à l'ordre du jour du Conseil de secunte a, ?ans le passé,. s.uscité une controverse, pour prouve.r qu!l faut un m!mmum cl'exposition quant au fond .S! l'on veut, aboutir à une décision impartiale sur le pomt de procedure. Je n'aborderai donc le fond de la question que dans la mesure où il le faudra pour éclairer le problème. ~. En second lieu,. je voudrais faire observer que c est un. groupe de qumze pays d'Asie et d'Afrique qui ont conJomtement demandé l'examen de cette question par le Conseil de sécurité. Le Liban et le Pakistan, qui ~JUt l .think it i~ doubtful whether there is any country 10 WhlCh there lS more love for France than there is in Lebanon. These are not mere words, for the debt we owe to France is immense, and the Government which l have the honour to represent certainly prizes the effort to deepen our friendship with France as second to no other effort. l trust, therefore, that l shan be believed when l affirm that there is not, nor can there be, in any- thing we say or think the slightest shadow of in win towards France. But, just as French opinion is itself not undivided on this matter, so those who hold France without any guile and in the highest esteem mal' have different views on and different interpretations of the recent events in Morocco from those propounded by the official French circles. Far from such differences impairing real friendships, they on the contrary help to test them and thus to confirm their reality. 70. The final observation is simply that Morocco and France have had for forty years. and are certain to continue to have, very close relations with each other. Those of us who are interested in this problem onlv wish that these relations may so develop as to serv'e the interests of both France and Morocco, to remove an possible friction and to lead to complete contentment and peace. Il never enters our mind that anything should he advocated or done that might hurt either France or Morocco. But it is a vision of better. happier and more creative relations both for France and for Morocco that moves us in our present concern. 71. Confining myself. then, as much as possible to the procedural question of pIacing the item on the agenda or not, representing in part the group with whom we are associated in trying to have this item placed on the agenda, affirming the profound and indissoluble ties of friendship that exist between Lebanon and France and stressing the aim of a peaceful and constructive develop- ment of the relationship between !\Iofùccn and France, l proceed now, with yom pernlÎssion, to the development of my argument. ï 2. Il is required to prove that this is a malter that should be taken up hl' the ~l'curit\' Counci!. In order tn prove this, we must show three things: first, that important evenb occurred in }.LIfllÇÇO which are likely tn disturb the pl'acl' in that conntr.". sl'l'''ndly. that these l'vents entail international implic.'tions: and thirdly, that tl!l'se implicati,,"s are of a character likely t,) lead to international friction and ln endanger the maintenance of international peacl' and :--t'L'urity. If wc proye these three things. thl'n \H' ha\'<' l'rovl'<I the major thesis that this i, a situation that ,i,,'uld be examined b,· the Sccurit)' Cuunci!. . 70. L'observation finale est tout simplement que le :'[aroc et la France ont entretenu pendant quarante ans et qu'ils continueront certainement à entretenir d'é- troites relations. Ceux d'entre nous que ce problème intéresse désirent que ces relations se développent de manière à servir les intérêts de la France et du :Maroc, à supprimer toutes les frictions possihles et à mener à la sati~facti()n complt,te ('t à la paix. Nous ne pensons pas qu'il faille précnni:--l'r ou mettre il exécution des mesures qui ri"Cluent de blesser ou la France ou le ~[aroc. ~[ais c'est la perspecti",' de relations meilleures, plus heureuses ct plus constructives, tant pour la France que pour le ~laroc, qui nous inspire dans l'affaire qui nous occupe aujourd'hui. 71. ~!e bornant donc autant que po"ihle à la question de procédure - il ~an)ir s'il y a lieu, ou non, d'inscrire à l'ordre du jour la question du ~[aroc - parlant en partie pour le groupe auquel 1l1J11";; nous sommes asso- ciés en demandant l'inscription de ce point 'L l'ordre du jour, proclamant les liens profonds d indissolubles d'amitié qui uni:-;~t:'nt le Liban et la France et insistant 'ur le but que nous "i"ms, à savoir le développement pacifique et constructif des relations étahlie, entn' le ~Iaroc et la France, je VfJlIdr~li, poursuivre mainten:mt, avec \"lltre permission, l'exposé de ma thèse ï2. 1) convient de montrer que l'affaire marocaine e:-.t une que:-tion dont le COlbeil de sécurité doit "oC sal~ir. Pour Je prouver, nous devons démontrer trois faits, En prt::'mier lieu, nous clt·\·l lIb montrer que des événe- ments important, .:'iont ~t1rVenllS au :\.l:lTflC qui sont de ;tature ~ troubler la paix: cbn:-- ce pa)':--; en 't'("lIlII lit'lI, Il conV}f:nt de ml Int rl·T llUt: ce... én."·Ilements peuvent avoir de:::. rtpercu:-;:-;illns Înternationales et, en troi:-;ième lieu, que ces répercussions SÜIlt rie nature il eng'l'ndn·r t~n dësaccof(~ entrt.: nations et à compre ,mettrc le main· tIen de la paIx et de la :--t'curité internatj( Inales. Si ntlu .. prouvons lT':l troÎ.o:o faits, nllll" aun,n ... prouvé l't'xactitlld(' de la thèse principale. il ~avoir que Il''llS ~ommt'~ en présence d'une situation qui dl lit être examinée par le Const'il de sécurité. "The Government of the Republic pledges itself to lend constant support to His Sherifian Majesty against ail dangers which might threaten his person or throne, or endanger the tranquillity of his states. The same support shall be given the heir to the throne and his successors." 74. Thus, if these two things are true - namely, that Mohammed Ben Youssef is the legitimate sovereign of the Moroccan people and that the movement to remove him was artificial and did not represent the wishes of the people - then the people of Morocco could not have been faced with a graver provocation. And if we keep in mind that events much less grave than these led in the past to violent reactions in Morocco, then it stands to reason that the present situation, however apparently calm it may seem, still might lead to developments of the most serious character. We must then first show that Mohammed Ben Youssef is the legitimate, recognized and respected sovereign, both temporal and spiritual, of the Moroccan people. 75. Now, according to Moroccan law, the learned doctors of Islamic law, the Ulema choose their ruler and not the caids; as the representative of France stated in his address. They do so in a special convocation at the Karaouine Mosque at Fez. Mohammed Ben Youssef was legally chosen in this fashion on 18 November 1927 and reigned over Morocco until he was exiled to Corsica last week. His piety, his good nature, his progressive ideas, his attachment to his people and his genuine desire to corne to a reasonable understanding with France- an.d l am sure the representative of France will not deny thls - are attested to by many people who met him and by many declarations he has made. 76. A good book on this distinguished Moslem king by Rom Landau was pubJi.shed in 1951. In it his char- acter is clearly and objectively portrayed. And 1 am docteur~ de l'Islam, les ulémas, qui choisissent leur souveram, et non les caids, ainsi que le représentant de la France l'a dit dans son exposé. Ils le font au cours d'une réunion spéciale qui se tient à la mosquée Kara- ouine, à Fez. C'est de cette manière que Mohammed ben Youssef a été légalement désigné, le 18 novembre 1927. Il a régné sur le Maroc depuis cette époque, jusqu'à son exil en Corse, la semaine dernière. Sa piété, sa bi~m:,eillance, son goût du progrès, l'affection qu'il portaIt a son peuple et son sincère désir d'arriver à un acco~d raisonnable avec la Fr~nce -:- je suis sûr que le representant de la France n en dIsconviendra pas- sont attestés par de nombreuses personnes qui l'ont rencontré ainsi que par maintes déclarations qu'il a faites. 76. Un excellent livre où l~ ,:"ra~tère de ce distingué monarque musulman est decrIt d une façon claire et objective a été publié, par M. Rom Landau, en 1951. 80. The French publisher and editor of l'Observatellr, Mr. Claude Bourdet, wrote in that newspaper that the Sultan not only had the support of the nationalist party, but was also the focus of the hopes of the Mo- roccan people as a whole. 81. In the Treaty of Fez of 30 1larrh 1912, which established the Protectorate - reference has been made to this Treaty both by the representative of France and hy the representative of Pakistan - the French Govern- ment undertook to safeguard the respect for and the traditional prestige of the Sultan and pledged itself to lend constant support to His Sherifian Majesty against ail dangers which might threaten his person or his throne or might endanger the tranquillity of his states. The French Government undertook to give the same support to the heir to the throne and his successors. 82. Finally, there is the ruling made on 27 August 1952 by the International Court of Justice. According to that ruling, Morocco, under the Treaty of Fez, "remained a sovereign State, but made an arrangement of " contractual character whereby France undertook to exercise certain sovereign powers in the name and on hehalf of ~Iorocco".' 83. It is possible to multiply relevant quotations such as 1 have made ahllost indefinitely, but 1 think enough has been said for our present procedural purposes- and 1 am limiting myself at this stage to those purposes - to prove that Morocco has an integral and original sovereignty of its o\\'n, that Mohammed Ben Youssef • C4S~ (onurnin9 ngit/s of fIO/iona/s 0/ 11t~ Uni/~d Stalu of AM,"ea i" Morouo, J_dgmmt 0/ A_gust Z7th, 1952: I.CJ. R,ports 1952, p. 176 (p. 188). ~1. Schuman a déclaré que la France considérait le Sultan comme le seul chef légitime du Maroc. Il a également souligné les services éminents que le Sul- tan avait rendus pendant la deuxième guerre mon- diale, et il a exprimé l'espoir de voir cesser toutes les attaques contre la personne de Sa Majesté." 80. ~!. Claude Bourdet, publiciste français et rédac- teur en chef de l'Obsen:·atellr. a écrit dans ce périodique que non seulement le Sultan bénéficie de l'appui du parti nationaliste, mais que c'est également vers lui que con- vergent les espérances du peuple marocain tout entier. ~l. :\ux termes du Traité de Fez du 30 mars 1912, qui a établi le protectorat -le représentant de la France et celui du Pakistan ont tuus deux mentionné cet instrument -le Gouvernement français s'est en- gagé à sauvegarder le respect et le prestige traditionnel du Sultan et a pris l'engagement de l,rêter un constant appui à Sa ~!ajesté chérifienne contre tout danger qui menacerait sa personne ou son trône, ou qui compro- mettrait la tranquillité de ses Etats. Le Gouvernement français s'est engagé à préter le méme appui à l'héri- tier du trône et à ses successeurs. 82. :\ous avons. enfin, l'arrêt rendu par la Cour inter- nationale de Justice, le 27 août 1952. d'après lequel le ~Iaroc demeurait, en vertu du Traité de Fez, "un Etat souverain, mais il concluait un accord de caractère con- tractuel par lequel la France s'engageait à exercer cer- tains ~~voirs souverains au nOIl1 et pour le compte du ~[aroc . 83. Il serait possible de multiplier presque à l'infini les citations pertinentes comme celles que je viens de faire, mais je cruis en avoir dit assez pour le pn',ent débat de procédure - auquel je me limite actuellement - pour prouver que le ~laroc jouit d'une souveraineté intégrale, originale el qui lui e,t propre; que ~[ohammed .. .-lD(Jir~ r~/atit,~ aur droits dn rr·SSp"'h.Jsa"ts du EtiJl./- CnÎJ d'Amr:riqu( au .\ftJr,)(, Arr;t du 27 a,o"t 1952: CJJ., Ru_ni 1Y5!. p 176 (p. (88). 86. The General who makes these statements so openly, so frankly, accompanied General Guillaume, the Resident-General, to Paris for a conference last week, two days before Ben Youssef was flown to Corsica. 87. Again, when discussion is opened on the substance of this matter - and it has not as yet been opened- the story of El Glaoui will form a fascinating chapter. It will not be difficult to show how he rose from relative obscurity and who is really behind the so-called movement of Berber revoIt. Also, the political artifi- ciality of dividing the native population of Morocco into Arabs and Berbers can be easily demonstrated, scientifically. Thi,s division was recently fomented for no other reason than to create conditions to justify, 86. Le général qui fait ces déclarations si ouvertes, si franches, a accompagné le général Guillaume, Résident général, lorsque celui-ci s'est rendu en conférence à Paris, la semaine dernière, deux jours avant que Mo- hammed ben Youssef n'ait été exilé en Corse. 87. Lorsque nous traiterons la question quant au fond - ce qui n'est pas encore le cas - on verra que l'histoire du Glaoui constitue un récit passionnant. Il sera. facile de mont~er comment ce personnage a pu sortIr de son obSCUrIté relative et quel est le véritable auteur du prétendu mouvement de révolte berbère. Pareillement, on pourrait démontrer aisément au re. ga~d de la science, à quel point la division de ia flopu. latlOn autochtone du Maroc en Arabes et Berbères est un artifice de la politique. Cette division a été récemment 89. In the letter by :vIr. Julien which was published in Le Monde on 31 January 1953, one linds the following: "Too many Frenchmen in .\lorocco like to repeat that radical repression is necessary in order to ensure peace, which would last for twenty-live, lifty (the hot-headed ones say for three hundred-years). One of them, a man of very high standing, took the trouble to come to see me a few days ago to explain to me his programme: to overthrow the Sultan, send numerous armed contingents to keep order by their mere presence, eliminate the Arabs and bring Morocco back to its Berber origins." And Mr. Julien concludes by saying: "It is unbe- lievable!" 90. The story of the constant pressure exerted by the French authorities on the Sultan and of his constant refusai to yield to their demands is told in Mr. Landau's book. That story can, moreover, easily be gathered from authoritative statements in leading United States and French newspapers and magazines. The irresistible impression will at once be formed that certain French circles - and 1 emphasize the word "circles" - resolved sorne time ago to remove this great patriot from his throne, because he would not yield to their boundless ambitions but stubbornly protected his rights and the rights of his people, to the end. 91. 1 should like once again to quote from l'ObsCT- vateur - this time a statement by a French Deputy for the Hautes Pyrénées, 1\[r. Charles d'Aragon. who had just returned from a trip to Morocco. He said that 26 January 1951 was a day of dire significance in French-Moroccan history; General Juin and the Sultan had had a long interview, and threatening terms had bren used: abdication and deposition. 92. Mr. Landau describe, the crisis of 1<151 between the Sultan and General Juin. According to '\[r. Landau, when the Sultan refused to disavow the Istiqlal- the nationali,t party. which like nationalist parties every- where, stood for the independence of its country- General Juin', feelings ran away with him. He exclaimcd to the Sultan: "Vour reply is unacceptable. You must either openly disavow the Istiqlal Party or abdicate the throne. Othen"ise, 1 will depose you myseli. 1 am about to leave for \Vashington. Vou have lime now to think over what 1 have just demanded of \'ou. Upon my return Wc' shall see what we should do." 93. [n :\pril 1\153. a so-called co"!:r",, was held in Fez attendcd by El Glaoui, together with sorne French 90. Dans le livre de M. Landau on trouvera le récit de la pression incessante exercée sur le Sultan par les autorités françaises et de son refus C(lI1~tallt de céder à leurs demandes. Ce récit peut d'ailleurs être recons- titué d'après des déclarations autorisées qui ont paru dans de grands journaux et revue; des Etats-Unis et de France. Il s'en dégage immédiatement l'impression irrésistible que certains milieux français - et je sou- ligne: "(l'rtains milieux" - ont décidé il y a quelque temps de déposer ce grand patriote parce qu'il ne cédait pas à leurs ambitio", effrénées mais qu'il défendait obstinément se, droits et ceux de son peuple, jusqu'au bout. 91. Je voudrais citer à nouveau l'Observateur. Il s'agit cette fois d'une déclaration faite par M. Charles d'Aragon, député des Hautes-Pyrénées, qui s'était rendu au Maroc et venait de rentrer. Le 26 janvier 1951, a-t-il dit, a été Un jour fatidique dans les rapports franco-marocains; le général Juin et le Sultan ont eu une entrevue prolongée et des termes menaçants ont été employés: abdication et déposition. 92. .\1. Landeau a donné un récit de la crise qui s'e,t produite en 1951 dans les rapports entre le Sultan et le général Juin. Selon lui, lorsque le Sultan a refusé de désavouer l'Istiqlal- parti nationaliste qui, comme tous les partis nationalistes, était en faveur de l'indé- pendance du pays -le général Juin n'a pu ,e retenir. Il s'est exclamé: "\'otre réponse est inacceptable. Ou ,·ous désavouez Ouvertement le parti de l'Istiqlal, ou vous abdiquez le trône. Autrement, je vous déposerai moi-même. Je pars maintenant pour \\'ashington; \'Ous avez main- tenant le temps de méditer sur ce que je viens de vous demander. ~ (jus "t'ffuns à mon rduur ce que nous devon;:; faire." 93. En avril 1953, il ,\·,t tenu à Fez un prétendu congrès auquel ont pris part le Glaoui et cert.,ins fonc- 94. A vigorous, popular reaction at once set in against the congress and its declarations; letters and tele- grammes of protest poured in upon the French Govern- ment from the four corners of Morocco. But the Ad- ministration did not give up. Soon a "petition" was prepared and signed by 270 caids and assistants demanding the dethronement of the Sultan. It was never disc10sed who the pashas, caids and notables who signed this document were, and the French Press, for example L'Observateur of 4 June and Le Mo1U:le of 12 July 1953, commented on this Fact. Only the name of El Glaoui was published. An immediate popular reaction against this act occurred. The High Council or Assembly of Ulema, which is the only body which has the right to judge the political and religious activity of the Sultan and the only body which invests him with authority or dethrones him, addressed a te1egramme of protest to the President of the French Republic and other officiaIs of the French Government on 31 May 1953. In it the Assembly of the Ulema of Fez, the guardians of Islamic orthodoxy, who, by virtue of the Islamic Constitution of Morocco, possessed the right of investiture of the Sultan of Morocco, expressed to the President of the Republic the profound indignation of the Moroccan people at the petition signed by certain pashas and caids and published in the Press. They declared that those pashas and caids were totally ignorant of the most e1ementary principles of Islam. They allowed themselves to be led to commit publicly and with impunity crimes which injured His Majesty and impaired the dignity of the Commander of the Faithful. The Assembly of the Ulema feared that that. act of high treason committed by those simple offiCIaIs of the Moroccan Government would seriously impair French-Moroccan relations. In order to appease the justified furor of the Moroccan people they demanded administrative sanctions against all those who, in violation of the pledge given by the French- Moroccan treaty, organized, protected and financed that deliberate violation of the internaI security of the State. 95. Besides this popular Moroccan reaction, there waf! forme~ in Paris ?~ 10 June 1953 a French organi- zatlOn, entttled ComIte France-Maghreb, with Fran- çois Ma~riac as its president and comprising many outstandmg French personalities - political, intellec- tu.al and military-with. the aim of promoting good- WIll bet~een th.e two natIOns and endeavouring to ease the tensIOn whlch started to develop in their relations. This body requested a juridical consultation from pr?fess?r. Lévi-Proven9al on t.he value of the petition. HIS opmlon was pubhshed wIth all the religious and historical documentation in Le Monde of 30 June 1953. d'!m;t~re un avis juridique ,s~r la valeur de la pétition. L opmlon du professeur LeVI-Provençal a été publiée 22 t~~lre a 1orthodoxie musulmane, et d'exiger la depo- sltlOn du Sultan. Certaines personnalités françaises de religio.n catholique, comme François Mauria~, lauréat du prIX Nobel, et le professeur Louis MasSIgnon, du Collège de France, ont convaincu le Quai d'Orsay qu'une pareille déclaration serait déplacée et risquerait de pro- voquer des troubles. Le congrès en question s'est alors <borné à désavouer le parti de l'Istiqlal. Il est intéressant de noter que la dernière séance du congrès a été présidée par le commandant des troupes françaises de Fez. 94. Le congrès et ses déclarations se sont immédia- tement heurtés à une réaction populaire vigoureuse. Un torrent de lettres et de télégrammes de protestation venus des quatre coins du Maroc s'est abattu sur le Gouvernement français. Mais l'administration n'a pas làché prise. Bientôt, 270 caids et leurs adjoints ont préparé et signé une "pétition" exigeant la déposition du Sultan. Le nom des pachas, caids et notables qui ont signé le document en question n'a jamais été révélé; la presse française, et notamment l'0 bservateur du 4 juin et Le Monde du 12 juillet 1953, ont d'ailleurs commenté ce fait. Seul, le nom du Glaoui a été mis en avant. Le sentiment populaire s'est immédiatement élevé contre cet acte. Le Haut Conseil ou Assemblée des ulémas, seul organe qui a le droit de juger l'activité politique et religieuse du Sultan et seul organe habilité à investir ou à déposer le Sultan, a, le 31 mai 1953, adressé un télégramme de protestation au Président de la Répu- blique française et à d'autres hauts fonctionnaires du Gouvernement français. Dans ce télégramme, l'Assem- blée des ulémas de Fez, gardiens de l'orthodoxie mu- sulmane qui, en vertu de la Constitution islamique du Maroc, détiennent le droit d'investir le Sultan du Maroc, exprimait au Président de la République la profon~e i~dignation qu'inspirait au peuple marocain la pubhcatlOn, par la presse, de la pétition signée par certall1s p~chas et caïds; elle déclarait que ces pachas ,;t. calds. Ignorent totalement les principes les plus elementaIres de l'Islam, qu'ils se laissent entrainer à commettre publiquement et impunément un crime de lèse-majesté qui porte atteinte à la dignité du Com- mandeur des croyants. L'Assemblée des ulémas crai- gnai~ que cet ~cte ~e haute trahison, commis par de SImples fonctionnaIres du Gouvernement marocain ne portât gravement atteinte aux relations franco: marocaines, et, afin d'apaiser la fureur légitime du p~uple. maroc:,in, ell.e exigeait que des sanctions admi- ,:'strahves sOIent prises contre tous ceux qui, en viola- tton de; l'engagement garanti par le traité franco- marocam, ont organisé, protégé et financé cet attentat délibéré contre la sécurité de l'Etat. 9.5. Outr,; cette ,réaction populaire marocaine, on peut citer la ~r;ahon a Paris, le 10 juin 1953, sous le nom de. Com:t~ !"rance-Maghreb, d'une organisation fran- çaIse preSIdee par François Mauriac et comptant parmi ses membres de très nombreuses personnalités françaises de premIer ~l~n,. appartenant au monde politique, intel- lectuel, et mlht~tre. Le but de cette organisation était de creer un chmat de bonne volonté entre les deux natio~s et de; réduire la tension qui avait commencé à se faIre senhr dans leurs relations. Le Comité France- Maghreb a demandé au professeur Lévi-Provençal 99. 1 think 1 have said enough, for our present procedural purposes, to prove my second point under the first part, namely, that the movement against the Sultan was artifically inspired; that, even if it existed naturally, it represented a negligible minorit\': that the presumption is exceedingly strong that its inspirers were the French authorities themselves: and that, in the exile of the lawful sovereign, there is il threefold violation: a "iubtion of the Treaty of Fez of 1912, a violation of the International Act of Algeciras of 99. Je pense en avoir dit assez, aux fins de notre débat actuel qui porte sur la procédure, pour prouver le deuxième point de mon premier argument. à savoir que le mouvement dirigé contre le Sultan a été artifi- ciellement créé; que même si son existence était natu- ~elle, il repré,e!'tait une minorité négligeable; qu'il )' a tarte prl':->llmptlon que ce ~(mt les autontt· ... françaises elles-mêmes qui ont inspiré ce mouvement: et que l'exil du souverain légitime constitue une triple violation: une violation du Traité de Fez de l'JI.?, une violation de l'.-\cte international d'Algésiras de llJ06 et un rcjd 102. It will he said at this point: "What has all this to do with the Security Council? Even assuming that all you have said is true, whatever deve10pments might occur will not extend beyond Morocco. Therefore the matter is purely internaI and the Council need not be seized of it. We all know that the Council concerns itself with international situations, and indeed with situations that threaten or are like1y to threaten inter- national peace and security." 103. It is precisely in order to face this argument that 1 must now proceed to the second and third parts of my argument. 1 must, in the second part, prove that the developments in Morocco have important internati0n:'l i,:,pli~ations, and, in the third part, prove that these ImplIcatIOns are such as to warrant the helief that they are likely to lead to international friction or to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 104. That the events in Morocco are not purely local, that they have distinct international aspects both juridical and political, can be easily seen fr~m the following considerations. 105. First, the Treaty of Fez of 1912 was hetween France and Morocco. This matter has therefore an inter- nat!onal "-'pect at least in that two n~tions are involved. It IS true, as the representative of France said, that, hecaU'se of the character of the Protectorate Morocco cannot directly submit a dispute between 'itself and France to the Security Counci!. But our whole conten- ti~n is that the Treaty of 1912 is here in question, and thls Treaty, as 1 have just said, already eliminates the pure1y local character of this affair. 1 might add at thls POInt that we have information at our disposai to the effect that, when the Sultan was about to board the plane last week to go from his country to Corsica, trois~ème partie, qu'il y a ~out lieu de suppos~r que ces consequences sont susceptIbles de conduire à un désac- corel entre nations ou à une menace au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. 1O~. Les considérations qui vont suivre montreront claIrement que les événements qui ont eu lieu au Maroc n'ont pas un caractère p?~ement local, mais qu'ils ont certall~s a.spects t~nt JundIques que politiques dont le caractere InternatIonal est hors de doute. 105. En premier lieu, le Traité de Fez de 1912 a été conclu entre la France et le Maroc. La situation a donc un aspect international, ne serait-ce que parce que deux Etats s~mt en cause dans cette affaire. Il est vrai - et le repres~ntant de la France l'a dit - que, étant donné le. caractere du prot.ectorat; le. ~aroc ne peut saisir dIrectement le ConseIl de secunte d'un différend entre la Fran~e et le Maroc. ~ais nous soutenons précisément qu~ ,ce,:" P?se la questIon du Traité de 1912; or, ce traIte; Je VIens de le dIre, suffit pour faire sortir cette ~uestIo,:, du plan purement local. Je pourrais ajouter a.ce sUjet que, selon certains renseignements dont nous dIsposons, lorsque le Sultan se préparait la semaine 106. Secondly, the Act of Aigeciras of 1906 concerning Morocco was signed by twelve nations. That Act is still in force. Consequentiy, at least twelve nations, signatory ta that international instrument, are concerned with any fundamental change in ;.forocco. The depo- sition of the Sultan is certain1y a fundamental change. Therefore this event is not of the purely local character that has been alleged but has clear inter- national implications. 107. Thirdly, the ruling of the International Court of Justice to which l referred above also confirms these views since it states the opinion that Morocco is a sovereignty State and confirms the validity of the Fez and Aigeciras instruments. 108. Fourthly, there is the important fact that the General Assembly last year deemed itself competent to deal with the Moroccan issue. The mere fact that this question was placed on the agenda and debated by the highest international body shows that events in Morocco, especially events such as those that occurred last week, cannot be confined either locally or even between France and Morocco. Nothing there- fore is clearer than that the Moroccan affair is of real international interest. 109. l think l have said enough to prove that the question before us is not of a purely domestic charaeter but has definite international implications. 110. It still remains for me ta show, however, that these implications are not of a commercial or cultural character, let us say. that they do not have to do with such things as radio transmission - aIl these matters also having their own international aspects- but that tbey are precisely of a character that might lead to international friction. For not even' inter- national implication is of interest to the Security Council, but only such matters as appertain ta peace and security. 111. It is obvious that disturbances in Morocco will inevitably involve France. In fact, even now France is deeply involved in seeing ta it that such disturbances do not take place. l3ut the Charter does not stipulate that the situation should have developed into an actual outbreak of disturbances or hostilities before it should be con,idcred bv the Secllritv Council. The mere fact of such disturb:ince or hostil;t\·, the finding that there is a likelihood that pC;Lce and security might be distllrbed, is sufficient t" place the matter within the pllrview of the SeCtlrity CUlIncii. :\othing is more ol'\'ious than that the situation is 50 tense today that at Ie,,,t between France and ~Iorocco there is such a likelihood. 112. ,\~ain. who can guarantee that the signatorie, of the Act Ilf Aigecird' will not be im'olved? \\"hen 109, Je Jll'Ibt' en avoir dit assez pour prl1ll\'l'r que le problème dont nous sommes saisis n'e...t pas uniquement un problème d'ordre intérieur <'t que ses répercussions se font sentir de façon très nette sur le plan interna- tional. 110. Il me rote cependant à démontrer que ces réper- ctl:-:-ions n'ont pas. dirais-je, un caractère commercial ou cnlturel. qu'elles n"intér.."ellt nullement des domaines comme celui des émissions radiophoniques par exemple - tfltl .. domaines qui présentent également un aspect international- mais qu'elles 'ont précisément de na- ture à engendrer un désaccord entre nations. En effet, le Cnn:-eil de sécurité ne :-,'intére:-.se pas à toutes les questipns internationales, mais ~l'ulement à celles qui mettent en jeu la paix et la "'curit,,, 111. De tüllte éYÎllence, la France ~e trouverait inévi- tablement engagée ~i des tr')llhles venail'nt à éclater au ~!aroc. Déjà, il l'heure actuelle, la France est profon- dément engagée, du fait qu'elle veille à empêcher que ces trouble, ne ,e produisent. Toutefois, la CharI<' ne di:-pl J~l' pa~ qu'une situation doit avoir abouti à des troubles ou à des ho ....tilités effectives l'our que le Con- seil dL' <'curit~ pui~~e s'y intl'rv ......L'r Tl suffit, pour qu'une situation re1l'\'(' de la compùence du Con"'l..iI de Sl'CU- rité, qu'elle soit marquée par un c1innt dt: tension ou d'ho,tili!,' et 'lu'elle présente, de l'avis du Conseil, le caractère d'une menace contre la paix et la sécuritl', Or, il t":-t ah:-olument clair que la situation l'st si tl ~ldue aujourd'hui au ~Jaroc qu'il y a menace de conflit, t"ut au moilb entn· la France et le ~Ian oC. 112. De même, queUe garantie avons·m,us que les signataires de l'Acte d'Algésira~ ne "t'Cth nt 1':1:-. en· 1 cannot vouch for every word of the New York Times dispatch, but at any rate it says "must" there, and the Spanish High Commissioner in the Spanish part of Morocco apparently is deeply perturbed. Therefore, there is a Iikelihood that international peace and security might be endangered. 114. Moreover, events in Morocco necessarily affect Tangier, and Tangier has an international character. The Sultan himself has a representative in Tangier who joins with representatives of seven other Powers which administer the territory. A tense situation in Morocco cannot fail to spread into nearby Tangier and, thereby, to involve several other Powers. 115. Consider also - and here 1 address myself to the representative of the United States of America- the strategic interests of the United States in Morocco. 1 wish Mr. Lodge were here, but 1 am glad to see that my friend Mr. Wadsworth is present. Consider, 1 say, the strategic interests of the United States in Morocco. A state of disturbance in the Protectorate cannot leave the United States without deep concern about these interests. 1 could quote, if 1 wished, many statements about this matter, but 1 should be labouring the point and 1 do not want to do that. 1 should also be going too deeply into the substance of the question, which 1 also wish to avoid. But it is obvious that the interests of the United States of America and involved, and obvious also that if the disturhances there should threaten the interest~ of the United States of America, international peace and security might be endangered. 116. Furthermore, there are close cultural and poli- tical ties between the people of Morocco and the Arab, Moslem and Eastern peoples in genera!. Marshal Lyautey said - and aIl must know this important statement - "The world of Islam is like a resonance- box: the faintest sound in one corner of the box reverberates through the whole of it." The truth of 116. En outre, le peuple marocain entretient des rap- ports étroits, tant culturels que politiques, avec les peuples arabes, musulmans et orientaux en général. Le maréchal Lyautey a dit - et nul n'ignore, certes, cette importante déclaration - "Le n'londe de l'Islam est comme une caisse de résonnance: le moindre son émis clans un coin de cette caisse se répercute partout." 26 113. D'autre part, le Maroc espagnol et le Maroc français ne constituent qu'une seule nation et un seul peuple. En fait, la juridiction du Sultan du Maroc ne s'étend pas seulement au Maroc français, mais égale- ment à la zone espagnole. ·La déposition du Sultan touche le protectorat espagnol et, par voie de consé- quence, l'Espagne elle-même. Dans l'avion qui m'a con- duit cet après-midi vers le Conseil de sécurité, j'ai lu à ce sujet, dans le New York Times, l'information sui- vante: "Le général Rafael Garcia Valino, Haut-Commis- saire d'Espagne, et le Calife Moulay Hassan ont protesté aujourd'hui contre la décision de la France de détrôner le Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef. Le général Garcia Valino a déclaré que l'Espagne ne pouvait "demeurer indifférente" devant les mesures prises par la France et que des "répercussions natu- relles" ne manqueraient pas de se produire dans sa zone." Je ne puis me porter garant de la véracité de chacune des paroles que cite le New York Times; il n'en reste pas moins que les mots "ne manqueraient pas" figurent dans cet entrefilet, et que le Haut-Commissaire d'Es- pagne dans la zone espagnole du Maroc semble profon- dément ému. Il est donc possible que la paix et la sécurité internationales soient menacées. 114. En outre, les événements qui se déroulent au Maroc affectent nécessairement Tanger, et Tanger est une ville internationale. Le Sultan lui-même y possède un représentant, qui administre le territoire de concert avec les représentants de sept autres Puissances. Toute tension survenue au Maroc ne peut manquer de s'étendre à la ville voisine de Tanger et, de ce fait, d'intéresser plusieurs autres Puissances. 115. Songez également - et ici je m'adresse tout par- ticulièrement au représentant des Etats-Unis d'Amé- rique - aux intérêts stratégiques des Etats-Unis au Maroc. J'aurais aimé que M. Lodge fût présent, mais je suis heureux de constater que mon ami M. Wads- worth le remplace. Songez, dis-je, aux intérêts straté- giques des Etats-Unis au :\broc. Des troubles dans le protectorat ne peuvent laisser d'inquiéter profondément les Etats-Unis en raison de ces intérêts. Je pourrais, si je le voulais, citer maintes déclarations à ce sujet, mais je ne ferais que me répéter et je ne tiens pas à le faire. D'autre part, je risque d'aller trop au fond de la ques- tion, ce que je veux aussi éviter. Mais il est évident que les Etats-Unis d'Amérique ne sont pas hors de cause et que, si des troubles survenus au Maroc ve- naient " menacer leurs intérêts, la paix et la sécurité internationales pourraient être tl1enacées. 117. Despite ail this, it may still be that one is not absolutely certain that there will be a threat to peace and secu~i~. l quite agree that this may he 50, but the posslbihty - l repeat "the possibility" - is dis- tinctly there, and this is ail that the Charter of the United Nations requires us ta ascertain. If one cannot he absolutely certain that there will he friction and a threat to international peace, who, on the other hand in the light of what l have just expounded, ca~ be absolutely certain at this purely procedural stage that no such development will occur? Ali we are asking is to have this item placed on the agenda of the Security Council so as to enable the Council to study the matter in arder ta ascertain beyond the stage of procedure whether, from the point of view of substance ~~ fact and real probability, this danger WIll matenahze. It seems to me that the minimum requirement, then, is ta place this item on the agenda of the Security Council and to give it a fair chance ta be studied by this august body. 118. It is precisely such situations that Article 34 of the Charter was intended to cover. and the repre- sentative of Pakistan - completely independently of me and without any previous consultation on the matter -<Juoted from Article 34 and made the point that l am about to make. For when Article 34 states: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead ta international friction ... ", the word "investigate" there does not refer to investigation on the spot but to deliberation and examination by the Counci!. The Article goes on ta say: "in order ta determine whether ... " . How can the Council determine, how can it announce a finding, without first making adequate investigation? 119. We have many other arguments ta prove that the situation is abnormal and should be taken up by the Securit)" Counci!. We are debarred from making them under our rules of procedure. Surely fifteen nations feeling this and, from their intimate know- ledge of what goes on among their own peoples, having their own rea,ons for considering that the situation falls within the competence of the Security Council, must be believed and must be given a chance to expound their reasons. How can a decision be taken not to include this item in the agenda of the Security Council without fir,t listening to these arguments in full? 120. l belicve that l ha\'e shown that the ,ituation in Morocco is abnornlal, that it has international implications and that these implications are such aS to warrant our studying it here in the Security Counci!. po~~ihilîté de l'étudier. 118. L'Article 34 de la Charte a été précisément conçu pour des,ituations de cc genre, et le représentant du Pakistan - agissant d'une façon complètement indé- pendante et sans que nous ayons procédé à une consul- tation préalable, quelle qu'elle fÎlt- a cité l'Articlc 34 et énoncé l'argument que je m'apprête à donner. En efft'l. lor,~u'il ",t dit, dans l'Article 34 que "le Conseil de sécurité peut enquéter sur tout différend 011 toute ~itll;lt](m qui pourrait entraîner un désaccord entre nations...... le Olilt "enquêter" qui y figure ne vise nullement une enquête sur les lieux. mais hien une discussion et un examen par le Consei!. Il est dit, plus loin, dans cet Article: "afin de déterminer ,i... ". Com- ment le Conseil pourrait-il déterminer quoi que ce ,oit ou arriver à une conclusion sans procéder à une enquête préalable appropriée) II L/. :'\0'1' dispos"n, de beaucoup d'autres argument~ encore !><lur prouver que la sitllatilln est anormale et qu'il appartient au Conseil de sécurité de l'examiner. Le règlement intérieur du Conseil s'oppose à ce que nous présentions ces arguments. }'1.ais il semhie çc·rtt·S normal de faire crédit et de donner une possibilité d'exposer leurs raisons à quinze Etats qui se rendent compte du caractère anormal de la situatir1n et qui. furts de leur Cl InnaÎ~~aIlce intime de ce qui se pa,..se au ~ein de leurs pr~pres !,?pulations, ont t,.,ut lieu d'estimer que cette sltuatlon rele\'e de la comlH"knce du Conseil de sécurité. Comment pourrait-on décider de ne pas inscrire celle question à l'ordre du jour du Conseil de sécurité sans avoir entendu d'abord l'exposé intégral de ces argtllllents? 120. Je Cf( li~ avoir démontré que la situatÎt ,n au ~faroc est anornlale. qu'elle a des rC:j1erClhSions intcrnatinn::t.les et qu~ ~a nature de ces ft percu~slons justifie que nous exanllnIOtls cette SItuation ici. au Conidl de sécurité. 122. The problem is how ta accommodate the awa- kened native forces throughout the world; how ta satisfy them in justice and in truth; how ta give them the sense not only of freedom and belonging, but a1so of participation and responsibility; how ta train them in the creative arts of peace. The strong have obliga- tions towards the weak, and it is impossible today for any corner, at least of the free world, ta be isolated from nwral scrutiny by the whole. 123. The Arab world has awakened. It will not do either to minimize this awakening or ta ignore it. The Arab peoples everywhere want ta stand on their feet and ta contribute once again to the art of civilization. They are entitled to this, not only because they are human beings with essential human rights, but espe- cially by reason of their really great pasto And speaking of Morocco, we should never forget that Ibn Rushid and Ibn Khaldoun, two of the greatest men in history, honoured that land by once living and suffering and thinking there. The Arab awakening can only be understood and helped by leading the Arab peoples along the path of responsibility and construction. With the challenge of Zionism, with the distant rumbling of communism, and with the impact of the West- both positive and negative - upon the Arab mind, the native powers are stirring deeply, questioningly and with unabating hope. The future, therefore, is great with possibility, and the opportunities of helpfulness and undeŒtanding on the part of the outside world are without measure. Surely, l contend, there is enough spiritual resourcefulness abroad ta meet the challenge of the moment. 124. And sa l make an appeal, an urgent and fervent appeal, ta the forces of understanding and reason in France, and in particular to Mr. Robert Schuman, ta Mr. François Mauriac and ta Professor Massignon - great men, to the quality and also ta the substance of whose thinking l personally am deeply indebted- an appeal that they should redouble their efforts at this critical hour ta bring about a healing of the breach, an erasing of the estrangement, by helping ta restore the legitimate sovereign of Morocco, Mohammed Ben Youssef, ta his throne, to the end that a new chap~er - this time a chapter of trust, respect and co-operatlOn - may open up not only between Morocco and France, but between the French and the Arab peoples every- where. 126. :\1r. HOPPENOT (France) (translated tram French): My only objection to postponement of the French interpretation of the Lebanese representative's statement until tomorrow is that then the French text of his statement would only appear in the record of the following meeting, and we should not be able to study it for sorne twenty-four hours. 127. If we could have the French text of Mr. Malik's speech tomorrow moming together with the English text, I should not object to hearing the oral interpret- ation at tomorrow's meeting. However, if there is to he a delay in the publication of the French texl, I must insist upon hearing the interpretation now, even at this late hour. 128. The Secretariat should tell us what the position is in that respect. 129. The PRESIDENT: I have been informed by the Secretary-General that the request of the French representaitve can he met. 130. Mr. KYROU (Greece): I wonder whether it would he possible for the Council to meet at 2.30 p.m. tomorrow. 131. The PRESIDENT: I appreciate that suggestion, but I think we are ail operating on uncertainties, since we are ail uncertain when the First Committee of the General Assembly will adjoum after its morning meeting. For my part, I feel that we are optimistic in hoping that we can meet promptly at 3. p.m., but I hope that we may he able to do so and then try to adjoum not later than 6.15 p.m. ~lais nous ne savons pas à quelle heure la Première Commission de l'Assemblée générale lèvera la séance du matin. Pour ma part, je crains que nous soyons trop optimistes en pensant que nous pouvons nous réunir à 15 heures; j'espère cependant que nous pourrons le faire et nous nous effCJfcernns de lever la séance au plus tard à 18 h. 15. 132. ~l. HA~1DA:\I (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je voudrais prl'lklser au Conseil de se réunir, non pas demain, mais le lundi 31 août, ou, au plus tôt, dans l'après-midi du vendredi 28 août, ce qui donnerait à ma délégation le temps d'étudier la déclaration du repré- sentant de la France et de préparer une réponse. 133. Sir Gladw)"n JEBB (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'allglais): Je me permets très respectuelhement d'insis- ter auprès de mes collègues pour qu'ils n'acceptent pas la proposition du représentant du Paki>lan. Il ne faut pas oublier que le représentant du Pakistan est parmi les représentants qui ont porté la question devant le Con,ei1 en soulignant son caractère urgent. Je ne vu;, pas pourquoi nous ne devrions pas, à notre tour, la considérer (l)mme une question urgente. De toute ma- nière, sa discussion doit s'in~crire dans notre programme général. J'e,père que la majorité des membres du Con- seil préîL-rera sc réunir demain après-midi; s'il m'en souvient, le représentant du Liban lui-même ne s'c;t pas opposé à celte solution. 134. ~1. VYCHI:\SKY (Union des Républiques so- cialistes soviétiques J (traduit du rllsse): Je serais, au contraire. enclin à appu)"er la propo.,llion du représen-

In order to enable my delegation to study the statement of the repre- sentative of France and to prepare a reply, I would suggest that the meeting he called either on Monclay, 31 August, or, at the earliest, on Friday aftemoon, 28 August, instead of tomorrow. 133. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): \Vith great respect, I would urge my colleagues t,J0t to accept the proposai made by the representatlve of Pal<istan. After ail, this matter was brought hefore us by him, among others, as a matter of urgency. I cannot see why it should not he considered by us to he a matter of urgency. In any case, we had to fit it into our general schedule. I should ~ope it woul~ he the wi,h of the majority to proceed ln a way whlch I do not think was objected to even by the representatlve of LebanQn, namely, to meet tomorrow aftemoon. 134. Mr. \'YSHI:--JSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated trmn Russiall): I, on the other hand should have supported the proposai of the repre- sent;tive (li Paki::;tan. cllt1:-oidering what wc have aCl'ompli,hed in the Sel'uril)" Council today. 1 l"nt du Pakistan, étant donné les résultats que nous 1 ayons obtenus aujourd'hui au Conseil de "·nlrit':. 136. 1 therefore feel that the urgency of the question, rightly referred to by the representative of Pakistan and obvious from the statements made by the repre- sentatives of the fifteen States, does not prevent us from deferring the matter for a day or two during which we should carefully consider ail the data which would facilitate our decision. Failure to do so could only delay the Security Council's decision. 137. For those reasons 1 should have joined our Pakistan colleague in requesting that we should not prolong this meeting but hold another meeting to- morrow; that would allow us additional time. 138. That is a matter of interest to the delegation 1 represent, because the question is a very serious one and to act with undue haste would be dangerous.

Before 1 recognize any member of this Council, 1 should like to say that if we do not meet tomorrow aftemoon, we would have to have our meeting on Monday aftemoon because Friday is reserved for the General As,sembly. If we should meet tomorrow aftemoon, 1 anticipate that we shall have enough business without forcing any representatives here to make a reply to any speech. Only three members of the Council have spoken this afternoon. Others may wish to speak tomorrow after- noon, and the replies can come later. 140. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom)': 1 just want to say that 1 entirely agree in this respect. None of us-my Pakistan colleague, Mr. Vyshinsky or anybody else - can be compelled to speak if we are not ready. But other members of the Council, including myself, would like to speak. 1 do not see whyour Pakistan colleague or Mr. Vyshinsky cannot hear what we have to say. 141. ML WADSWORTH (United States of Amer- ica): 1 agree completely with the President and with my colleague from the United Kingdom. Among others who would want to speak tomorrow aftemoon would be the head of my delegation. 1 am quite sure that he is most anxious to do that tomorrow rather than wait until next week. It is entirely possible that his own personal schedule will make it very difficult for him to be here next week. 1 know that he would want to have his remarks recorded no later than to- morrow. 142. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): If you have speakers for tomorrow, it is <:>nly right ~o hear them but with the clear understandmg that thls procedural debate will not be closed tomorrow because some of us will still want to comment on what has happened

With regard ta Sir Gladwyn Jebb's statement, l should like ta add that it is not only a question of listening ta speakers who intend to make statements. A statement cannot be made at ail without preparation. That means that we must familiarize ourselves with the data. Of course, if there are experts who can speak on any subject without preparation, then those members may be right who propose that we should press on with the debate and charge through the problem like a squadron of cavalry. Personally 1 am ail in favour of cavalry, but it would not do for the Security Council ta try to keep up with a cavalry unit. 144. l should like ta remind the members of the Security Council that we shall be busy tomorrow moming in the First Committee of the GeneraI Assembly, and then we shall be busy for a few hours here (we have already been told that the meeting will continue at least until 6.15 p.m.); the day after to- morrow we must attend the General Assembly, and be ready ta speak and not merely listen to what others have to say. When shall we have time to study every- thing that is distributed to us? 1 am certain, by the way, that many do not even bother to read the docu- ments distributed to members of the Security Counci!. But 1 should like to read them, and for that 1 need time. 145. As an experienced colleague and member of the Security Council, Sir Gladwyn Jebb knows, of course, that reading takes a good deal of time, especially when one wishes to read intelligently and not merely idly. 146. Naturally, if you decide otherwise l shall acquiesce, but 1 am not convinced that this would be a useful thing ta do. After all, we have sorne nights and days in reserve which could be used for our work. ln my opinion, however, we ought all to think this over very carefully. After ail, the whole of this question goes back to 1906 and 1912. 147. That is win- 1 think we would do better to go gently and make 'sure of arriving than ta hurry and make ourselves ridiculous. 148. The PRESIDE:\T: :--!y list of speakers on the matter of adjoumment still contains three names. If wc go on with this discussion, 1 am afraid it will he quite S[lme time bciore this meeting is adjoumed. 1·19. ! think it would be preferable if the Council were to indicate by a v,,1t' its desires on the question of the date of our next meeting. 1 shall therefore put t" the vote my proposaI that the ne..'d meeting should be held tomorr"\\' aftemoon, with the understanding that those members who are not ready to speak at that time will be given an opportunity ta do so at a suœequent meeting. t.o~lte .cette.documentation. En effet. celle question a déjà ete dlscutee en 1906 et en 1912. 11 faut donc savoir de quoi il s'agit. 1-+1. Je pense, par con..équent. que nOlts devrinn:-. nous en tenir au dictrln· "Qui veut aller loin ménage s.'l mon:ure." ~ela me,l'arait bien préférabl~ " une préci. Ilitatlûn qUI pourrait nous exposer au ridicull' 1-1:-:. Le PRESlDE:\T (traduit de l'anglais).' Les orateur, qui unt exprimé le dé,ir de prendre la l'.trule sur la qUt':-tion de l'ajournement sont encelTe au nombre de trois. Si nous )Joursui\'ons ceth.:' discussion, n(JlI~ ne pourrons pas, je Je crains, notb ajourner avant long. temps. 149. Il ,erait préiCrable, ~ mon avi,. que le Conseil se prononce par voÎe de 'I.tt- sur la date de notre pro. chaine St':tI1ce. Je mets donc aux voix ma pro{>f..l ...itilln tendant ... fixer la prochaine séance à demain al',i'" midi. étant ~ien entendu que les membres du C"'''<'d qui ne :-.eront pas prêt'i à inten'enir dans Je dd)at auront l'occasion de Je faire à une T~tlnilHl ultérieure. 153. l beg leave to suggest this solution to the officers as a possible means of reconciling the opposing vÎews. 154. The PRESIDENT: l shall make the ruling that the Council will meet tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m., and l promise that, in conducting the meeting tomorrow, l shall keep in mind the suggestion of the representative of Chile. Those representatives who are not ready to speak tomorrow will be given due opport- unity to do so later. The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS DEPOSITAIRfS DES PUBLlCArlONS DES NArlONS UNIES 'R'OTlIlA_Al'ENfIHE Editorial Sudomerlcono S.À.. Aisino 500. Buenos !lires. ~~~f~ns A. Pedono, 13, ,ue Soumot. Poris V. 'IEECE-GlECE "Eleftheroudllkis," Ploco do 10 COMtHu· tion, Athènes. AUSTULIA-AUS1l1LlE H. A. Goddard, 255/1 George St" Sydney, and 90 Queen St., Melbourne. Melbourne University Press, Corlton N.3, Victoria. IELGIUN-IELGIQUE Agence et Messageries de 10 Presse S.A., 14·22 rue du Persil, BruullJes. W. H. Smith & Son. 71·75. boulevard Adolphe.Mu. BruJeiles. lOUVil-JOLIVIE llbrerio Selecciones. Cuillo 972, La Pez. IIAZIL-IIESIL ., livrllrio Agir, Rio de Janeiro, Seo Poulo end Belo Horizonte. JUATEMAU Gouboud & Cio. Ltd§:, 5e. Avenlde sur 28, Guotemole. "AITI l.ibroirie "A III Corovollo," 8ofto postel. Il J·B, Port·ou-Prince. 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Ahumada 57, Sontioqo. (ltlIIA_CHINE Tho World Book Co. ltd., 99 Chung Kin9 Rood, ht Sec;tion, Toipeh, Toiwon. Commorciol Preu. 211 Honlln Rd.. Shang. hoi (OlOMIIA_COLOMilE L.ibrerlo L.otinll, CorrOfa 60., 13·05, Bogot6. Ubrerla Amirica, Medellln. L.ibrerlo Netionel ltde., BorronqlliUo. COSTAIICA-COSU·IICA Treios Hermonos. Aportedo 1311, San JOI'. lUIA LI Cesa aelga, O'Reilly 455. a.. Hobono. Ubr~iritl J. Schumm.r. LUll.mbourlJ. MOICO-MEXIQUE Editorial Hermes S.A" Ignocio Marl.col 41, México, D.F. NnHElUNDS - 'AYUAS N.V. Mortinus Nijhoff, Longe Voorhout 9. 's.Grovenhage. UECHOSLDYAIIA_TCHECDSLDYAQUIE Ceskoslovensky $pisovotel, N6rodnf Trfdo 9,Prohol. DENMAII-DANEMAII Einor Munhgoord, L.td.. NtZlrregede 6, Kebenhovn, K. DDUINIWI IEPUIlIC _ IEPUllIGUE DOMINICAINE librerto Dominiconll. Mercedes 49, Cill' dod TrlliiIJo. ECIIAoet-EQUAtEUR L.ibrerlll CientHiClI, Glloyoqllillind Quito, EliYPT_EGYfTE libroirie "lo Renoiuonce d'Egypte:' 9 Sh. Adly Plisho. Ceiro. NEW ZEJ,WlD - NOUVELlE·IEI.A11IE United Notions Assodotion of Ne.... Z.a. land. C.P.O. 1011. Wellington. KOIW"Y_KOVEGE Johon Grundt Tonum Forlog, Kt. Au. gushg.t. 7A. Oslo. PAKISTAN Thomos & Thom... Fort Menslon, FrI,. Rood, Korochi, 1. Publishers Unltod Ltd.. 176 Anerbll. Lohore. The Pakiston Cooperetiv. 800t Society, Chittogong and Docco 1Eost Poklstan,) lWo. Jos' Menéndoz, Plozo de Arongo, Penoml, ",IUUAY Moreno HermanOI, .....lIncI6n. EL SALVADOI-SAl'AJOI Manuel Nevlls y Cro.. 10. Avenido lur 37. Son Selvador. ETHIO,IA-ElHIOPIE Agence Ethiopienne d. Publiciti. Bo~ 128, Addis·Abebe. FINlnD-FINLANDE Abt.eminen KirjekouPPI, 2, Keskllskotu, Hellinki. Orden and Inqulrte. from countrlel where ,aies agenb have not yet been appofnted may be sent tOI Sales and CIrculation Section, United Nations, New York, U.S.A., or Sales Section, United Nation. Office, Palal. dei ~atl0'l" Geneva, Swltzerland. Printed in Canada Priee: $U.5. 0.30; 2/-stg.; 5w. fr. 1.20 (or equivalent in other currencies) 4682-April 1954-1,600 'ElU-PElOU Librerlo Internadonll dei PerCi, S.A., Lima ond Arequipa. 'HILlPPlMB Alemer's Book Store, 749 Rizal Avanue. Monilo. r(lUUGAL Livreria Rodrigues. 186 Ruo Aurea, Lisboo. SIM,AI'DIE-SIIIGAPOUR The City Book Store, Ltd" Winchestor House. CoUyer Quey, $WREN-SUEDE C. e. Frih:e's Kun91. Hovbokhondel A-B. Fredsgaton 2, Stockholm. ftlnEIUND-SUISSE Libroirie Poyot S.A.. L.usanne, Ganive. Hons Raunhllrdt, Kirchgosse 17, Zurich 1. SYIIA-SYIIE Libroirie Uciverselle. Oamos. THAII.AltD_THAIUKDE Premllon Mit ltd.. 5S Chokrawet Rood, Wet Tu" Bon9~ok. TUIIEY_TUIQUIE librltirie Hochette. 469 Istiklol Coddesi, Beyoglll, Idllnbul. UNION OF SOUTH AFIICA - UNION SUD-lFIICAIIiE Von Schaik's 8ocrhtore (Pty.) , ltd.. BOl 724. Pretoria. UIlITED IIIIGDOII-IOTAUIIE·UNI r~~·on~tS~~~n,e7on~~~eH.~·~:0~j,o;~j· UNITEO STATES OF AMEllCA - nAfS.UNIS D'AMEl. Int'I Documents S.rvke, Columbia Univ. Preu, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N,Y UIUGUAl Representaci6n de Editoriales. Prof. H. D'Ello, Av. t8 do Julio 133), Montevideo, YEllElUELA Distribuic:loro Esc:ollr S.A.. end Distribl,ll· dora Continentel, Ferrenquln a Crut de Candellllria 178, CarICOS. fln·NAiI Papeterie·librairie Nouvalle Allart Por- toil. Boite postole 283, Sargon. YUGOSUVIA - YOUGOSlAVIE Dnllvno Preduzece. J1I90110vens.a Kniiqe, Terozije 27-11. Beograd. Uni," No"oM pulllkotlo... CIlIft 01. •• oLlvin" from fil. following flrmu l.. pu;b1lcatioM fi.. Noflo... Uni.. "'''''Mt "olo",.nt 'rro o.,....... 00 Gd,.... do de."" AUmIA-AUTIIOII B. Wüllerdorff. Wooqplon. 4, S.lzbur9. Gerold & Co., 1. Gr.ben 31, Wien. GEUlAIIY-ALLEllACNE Elwert & Mellr.r, Houphtraue lOI. Berlin W~c:rnS~:~~~ch, G.reonstroue 25.29, Koln (22c). Ale•. Horn. Spi.geh~alle 9. Wie.boden. "'PAN-JA'Of M,ruzen Company, ltd., Il Tori-Nichom•• Nihonboshi, Tokyo. SfAlN·EstA'"E Librerto Bosch. Il Ronda Univerlld.d. Blrulon•. Les commandes et demandes d. renselgnementl 'manant de pays o~ Il n'existe pas encore de d'po'ltalres peuvent itre adreu4e. 4,\ la Sectfon des ventes et d. la distribu- tion, OrganIsatIon d.. Nations Untes, New-York (Etats- Unis d'Amérique) ou il la Section des vlntes, Organisa- tion des Nations Unies, Palais dIS NatIons, Gen6va (Sul...). (5312)