S/PV.630 Security Council

As the menibers of the Security Cauncil will recall, it wasdecided on 190ctober 1953, at the Council's 626th meeting, that Président: M. W. BORBERG (Danemark). Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/630) Adoption de l'ordre du jour La question de Palestine 5. l consider it my dutY to recall to the p,:rties conœrned that, as has been stated in different Security Council resolutions, the General Armistice Agreements ,signed, pending the final peace. settlement, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, inc1ude firm pledges againstany acts of hostility between the parties. They also provide for· supervision of the armistice by the parties themselves and by the Mùœd Armistice Commissions under the chairmanship of thè Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. 6. lwish also to express a firm hope that the parties willgive full consideration to their obligations under the terms of the Armistice Agreements and that they will refrain from any action, contrary to those Agree- ments,' which wduld prejudice the attainment of permanent peace in Palestine,. which is the ultimate aim of the United Nations in the Middle East. 7. In conclusion, may .l make a strong appeal to the parties concerned to refrain.frem spreading rumours and from provocative acts which would contribute to a widening of tensions in. the area, and especially to avoid any premature actions which could jeopardize the Council's present endeavours. 8. And now, Mr. President, l take plea:sure in introducing to you and to the other members of the Security Council, Major General Vagn Bennike, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. 9. The PRESIDENT: The Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Orgal1Îzation, General Bennike, will' now present his report. 10: Major General BENNlKE (Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization): The Security Council, at its 626th meeting, on 19 October, requested me to proceed to New York and report in person. l am grateful for fhis opportunity to .give the Security Council the information at my disposaI. The three Governments which, on 17 October [Sj3109, Sj3110, Sj3111] , submitted the question 'stated that in their opinion its consideration was "necessary to prevent a possible threat to the security of thearea". l am also of the opinion that a threat toi the seeurity of the area is possible and that the situation deserves the attention of the Security Council. 11. l sha1l deal, in the first place, with the situation along the annistice demarcation line fixed by the 9. Le PRESIDENT (trOJduit de l'anglcds): Le Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme chargé de la surveillance de la trêve va maintenant présenter son rapport. 10. Le général BENNIKE (Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies chargé de la surveil- lance de la trêve en Palestine) (traduit de l'anglœis): Lors de sa 626èmeséance, tenue le 19 octobre, le Conseil de séCl1ri~6 m'a invité à me rendre à New-York pour y présenter personnellement mon rapport. Je me félicite de l'occasion qui m'est ainsi offerte de donner au Conseil de sécurité les renseignements que je possède. Les trois gouvernements.qui ont soulevé la question le 17 octobre [Sj3109, Sj3110, Sj3111] ont déclaré qu'à leur avis un débat était "nécessaire pour prévenir la possibilité d'Une atteinte à la sécurité dans cette région". Je crois également, pour ma part, qu'une atteinte à la sécurité est ,possible dans cette région et que cette situation mérite l'attention du Conseil die sécurité. Il. Je traiterai en premier lieu de là situation qui existe le long de la ligne de démarcation que la Con- 12. Before dea1ing particular1y with the Qibya incident, 1 should like to make a brief reference to previous incidents which, since the beginning of this year, have also constituted grave violations of the cease-fire between Jordan and Israel. 13. On 28-29 January 1953 Israeli military forces estimated at 120 to 150 men, using 2-inch mortars, 3-inch mortars, P.LA.T. (projectors, infantry, anti- tank) weapons, bangalore torpedoes (long metal tubes containing an explosive charge), machine-guns, gre- nades and ·small arms, crossed the demarcation line and attacked the Arab villages of Falameh and Rantis. At Falameh the mukhtar was killed, seven other villagers were wounded, and three houses were demolishe.d. The attack lasted four and a half hours. Israel was condemned for this act by the Mixed Armistice Commission. 14. On 22 April 1953, firing broke out at sunset within Jerusalem along the demarcation line on a length of about 4 kilometres. It lasted two hours, until the cease-fire arranged by United Nations observers came into effect. On the following day, there were isolated shots in the early moming and in the aftemoon. There were twenty Jordanian casualties- ten killed and ten wounded. Six Israelis were wounded. The Jerusalem incident was investigated by United Nations observers. After studying the evidence thU6~ collected, my predecessor, General Riley, in a report to the· Security Council 011 the violation of the cease- !ire [S/3007] , stated that it appeared impossible to determine who fired the first shot. 15. On 25, 26 and 27 May, the two parties submitted complaints a1leging violation of the General Ai'lnistice Agreement by civilians and military personnel in the Dawayima area. In an emergency meeting of :l'.he . Mixed Armistice Commission, both parties agreed to a mixed investigation. United Nations obseryers accompanied the representatives to the demarcation line to estahlish the facts. Despite the cease··fire which had been previously arranged, heavy firing broke out during the investigation. The origin of the incident was the illegal cultivation by Jordanians of land in Israel territory. Armed Jordanians had penetrated Israel territory to harvest crops, and. other Jordaüians had fired aeross the demarcation line to protect the harV'esters. On the other hand, Israel troops had fired across the demarcation line at Jordanians in Jordan territory, and Israeli soldiers had bumed crops in Jordan territory. 16. During the latter part of May 1953, incidents took place which coS',~ the lives of three persons and in which six others were wounded. There seemed to he no motive for these crimes other than killing for 1 Voir Procès-verbau:J: officiels du Conseil de sécurité, quatrième année, Supplément. spécial Nol. 17. On the night of 11 August 1953, Israel military iorces using demolition mines,bangalore torpedoes, 2-inch mortars, machine-guns and small arms attacked the villages of Idna, Surif and Wadi Fukin, inflicting casualties among tlle inhabitants and destroying dwellings. The Mixed Armistice Commission con- demned Israel for these attacks. 18. The information l am going to submit on the Qibya incident is based on reports receiv-ed from United Nations observers; in particu1ar from the senior officer who is the acting Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 19. Following the receipt of a Jordan complaint that a raid on the village of Qibya had been carried out by Israel military forces during the night of 14-15 October, between 9.30 p.m. and 4.30 a.m., a United Nations investigation team departed from Jerusalem for Qibya -at about 6.3Q a.m. on 15 Oetober. The acting chairman also left for Qibya on the ;,ame morning. On reaching the village, hè found that between thirty and forty buildings had been completely demolished, including the school, the water-pumping station, the police station and the tel~phoneoffice. 20. Near the police station one lorry had been completely destroyed by fire. The necks and trigger attachments of incendia..ry hombs were found nearby. 21.. Bullet-ridd1ed bodies near the doorways and multiple bullet bits on the doors of thedemolished houses indicated that· the inhabitants had been forced to remain inside nntil their homes were blown up over them. 22. There wereseveral small craters along the western rerimeter of the village, and the tai1s of 2-inch mortar shells were found. Four gaps, approximately 3 metres in width; had been blasted in the barbed-wire protective fenœ surrounding the village. Fragments, easily identifiable as parts of bangalore torpedoes, were found near these gaps. 23. By the time the acting chairman left Qihya, twenty-sevenbodies had been dug from. the rubble. The villagers were digging for others who they clairned were still- buried QeIleath the building stones. They believed that the number of deadmight reach sixt)'. Sixwounded persons were seen in the village, and l'intéri~r jusqu'à ce que l'on fasse sauter leurs maisons. 22. Il y avait plusieurs petits cratères sur la lisière occidentale du village et l'on a trouvé les ailettes de deux obus de mortiers de 50 mm. Quatre brè.ches, d'environ 3 mètl,'es de large, avaient été pratiquées par déflagration dans le réseau de barbelés qui protégeait le village. On a trouvé près de ces brèches des éclats dans lesquels il était aisé de reconnaître des fragments de bengalores. 23. Lorsque le Président ,par intérim a quitté Qibya, on avait retiré des décombres vingt-sept cadavres. Les villageois continuaient de déblayer pour trouver d'autres corps qui, à leurs dires, étaient encore ensevelis sous les ruines des bâtiments. Ils pensaient que. le nombre des victimes atteindrait peut-être soixante. 25. An emerge.ncy meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission was held in the afternoon of 15 October. The following resolution, moved by the Jordan dele- gation, was adopted by a majority vote, with the Israel delegation voting against it: "Part one "(œ) The erossing of the demarcation line by a force approximating one half of a battalion from the Israel regular arro)', fully equipped, into Qibya vill~o-e on the night of 14-15 October 1953 to attack the inhabitants by firing from automatic weapons and throwing grenades and using bangalore torpedoes together with TNT explosive, by which forty-one dwelling houses ànd a school building were completely blown up, resulting in the cold-blooded murder of forty-two lives, including men, women [and] children, and the wounding of fifteen persons and the damage of a police car, [and] at the 'SaIlle time, the crossing of a part of the same group into Shuqba village, [are] a breach of article III, para~ graph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement. "(b) The shelling by a supporting unit to that force by 3-inch mortar guns from across the demar- cation line on Budrus village, which rèsulted in the damage of some houses and a bus and the wounding of an NCO in charge of the National Guards, is a bieach of article III, paragraph 3 of the General Armistice Agreement. "Parttwo "The Mixed Armistice Commission decides that it 1S extremeiy important that the Israel authorities should take immediately the most vigorous measures to prevent the recurrence of such aggressions against Jordan and its citizens;' 26. l discussed with the acting èhairman of the Mixed Annistice Commission the reasons why hè had .sup- porteâ the' resolution condemning the Israel army for having carried out this attack and, after listening to bis explanations, l a:sked him to state them in writing. l shall now read out his memorandum. "The following evidence led to my conviction that Israel miHtary forces planned and carried out this attack: "1. Witnesses to the attack described the attackers as Israelis in military unîf9ml with full equip- mem. . . "3. The use of bangalore torpedoes to blast openings in the barbed wire Mees, concertina type, surrounding the village of Qibya. The bangalore torpedo is normally used by military forces during an offensive action to blast a pathway thrQugh barbed wire entanglements and mine fields. On 28-29 January 1953, Israel military forœs raided. the village of Falameh inside Jordan. In this instance ôl-fiÏIu mortaiS, P.I.A.T. al1d. hangà10re torpedoes were among the weapons ü5ed. Israel'\vas condemned foa- this action and it was brought out, not only in the discussion of the Falameh incident but in the discussion of the Israel counter-complaints, that Israel military forces had carried out this raid. In Augu~t 1953, Isrnel was C'ôndemned for attacking the vdlages of Wadi Fukin, Idna and Surif in Jordan territory on the night of 11-12 August. In Wadi .~ukin the attackers used bangalore torpedoes, demoh!i0n bombs and automatic weapons. The resolution passed by the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israel regular forces for having carried out this raid. Substantiating the contention that regular military forces took part in these raids is the fad that the body of an Israel soldier in full uniform with identification tag was found in the v~llage of Idna after the attack. Again, we have dlscussed no complaint that would indicate that the bangalore' torpedo is used by other than military forces. "4. The use of TNT demoIition bombs in such quantity and with snch expert results. One United Nations observer, a demolition expert, present at the investigation pointed out the heavy construction of the eut stone buildings and the fact that mmlY of them had overheads reinforced bv steel rails. He estiinated that at least seventy demolition botnbs were used to accomplish the complete destruction noted. "5. The use of 2-inch mortars against t1).e village of Qibya. This weapon is aIso standard military equipment, and we have discussed no case that would indicate that this weapon is used by other than military forces. "6. The use of specially manufacturE:d' incendiary bombs to destroy a lorry inside the village of Qibya. The necks and trigger attachments of these bombs were found near the burned vehicle. This tyt>'e of bomb was used by Israel military forces to hum a field of grain inside Jordan on 28 May 1953 in the Dawayima area. This incident was discussed af the 122nd Mixed Armistice Commission meeting, and the following resolution. W.;\S passed: "8. The approach ):') these villages from inside Israel is through an area protected by Israel military forces. No group the size of that employed in the Qibya-Budrus-Shuqba attack could move into this area or withdraw from this area und'etected. "In my estimation between 250 and 300 we1i- trained Israel soldiers carried out this operation. As a break-down of this figure, 1 wO'.lld say that at least 225 men took part in the l1,ct~al raid inside Qibya. This figure would account for the men used to bring the demolition bombs into the area, the unit handling the 2-inch mortars, the infantry units used to protect the demolition groups and' the units engaging the guards at different po;nts throughout this village of approxirnately 1,500 inhabitants. The figure of 225 is considered an absolute minimum, as, it must be noted, the statement of the witnesses and the evidence found pointed out that the village was simultaneously attacked from three sides. In addition to the force used at Qibya, at least one section of eight or nine men WàS used to c-auf out the raid against Shuqba village, and it is also estimated that at least one platoon from a heavy weapons company was engaged in the operation against Bodrus. U(Signed) E. H. HUTCHISON uCommamaer, United States N{1IlJY" 27. The technical arguments given by Commander Hutchison in this memorandum appear to me con- vincing. 28. The Qibya incident and the other incidents ta which 1 have referred should be considered fiat as isolated incidents, but as culminating points or high fever marks. They indicated that tension had increased to the breaking point, either locally in a particular area, or perhaps. generally between the two countries. When the breaking point is reached, either, according to the French phrase, "les f1t;sils pœrtent tout se-ûls", or temptation to resort to force rnay prevail over wise counsels and restraint. 1 11 U(Signé) E. H. H UTCHISON "Capitaine de frégate, Armée de tner des Etats-Unis" 27. Les arguments techniqnes· présentés par le COlIlt- mandant Hutchison dans son mémoire me paraissent convaincants. 28. L'incident de Qibya et les autres incident", dont je viens de parler doivent être considérés, non pas comme des incidents isolés, mais comme les manifestations d'une fièvre parvenue à 'son paroxysme. Ils ~ndiquaient que la tension avait atteint un degré tel, qu'une, oon- ftagration risquait de se produire à tout 'moment, -soit sur le plan local, dans une région particulière, soit sur un plan général, entre les deux pays. Lorsqùe la situation est si tendue, ou bien, selon la formule fran- çaise, "les fusils partent tout seuls", ou bien la tentation de recourir à la force ,peut l'emporter sur ks sages conseils et la modération. 29. Si l'on considère les incidents que j'ai mel1tionnés, on voit que ch.acun d'eux a été précédé par une période de tension croissante. L'incident de Falamé, qui s'est produit à la fin du mois de janvier 1953, a marqué le paroxysme d'une tension qui n'avait cessé de s'accroître pendant trois semaines. A la fin du mois de décembre 1952, la situation était calme. Le 29 décembre a été signé un "accord en vue de réduire les incidents de frontière", valable pour tm mois. La conclusion de cet accord pouvait ~rmC?ttn~ de ~n?~r q.tte l'Qn désirait 29. A review of the incidents 1 have mentioned shows that each of them was preceded by a period of growing tension. The Fala:meh incident, at the end of Ja..'1.uary 1953, marked the culmination of three weeks of rapidly developing tension. At the end of December 1952 the situation was quiet. On 29 Decem- ber, an "agreement to reduce border incidents", valid for one month, was signed. The conclusion of that agreement could be inte11)reted as indicating a desire to settle current problem,\l in !! m9re cQ"9perative ·spirit. 30. The new agreement stipulated that instructions would be given to alllocal authorities and commanders to strengthen measures to ensure the prevention of all illegal crossing,!? of the demarcation line. It was aIso provided that :firing would he reduced to a strict minimum; that it would be prohibited during the day- time on people who had crossed the demarcation line, unless they resisted arrest. Stolen property was to he returned as soon as found, without waiting for any- thing to be handed over by the other side in return; flocks found grazing on the-wrong side of the demar- _cation line would he returned immediately subject to payment, according to fixed rates, for their keep and aIso for the damage they might have caused. It was, moreovt'r, agreed that compÎa.ints would~be kept at a minimum by attempting·to settle minor incidents at the local. commander's le~1. 31. A few days after that new agreement had come into force, the Jordanians captured an Israel driving- school vehic1e which had made an apparent1y strange mistake in leaving the JerosaIem'-Tel Oviv highway and crossing the demarcation line in very difficult terrain inthe Latron area. There were in the vehicle a civilian and three soldiers. The new agreement provided that memhers of the -g-- :urity forces of either Party who crossed the demarcation line "by mistake" should be returned after interrogation. The Jordanians having delayed the return of the three soldiers, Israel announced on 8 January that the new agreement ta reduce and solve incidents was null and void. The agreement provided that, if it came to expiration, the old "agreement on measures ta curb infiltration", signed on 13 May 1952, would automatically re-enter into force. On 8 January, Israel also gaveJormal notice of its desire to terminate the old agreement to two weeks' time, as pennitted by the text of that agree- ment. 32._ Thus, on 22 January, the local commander's agreement for the prevention and sett1ement of minor incidents, particularly the crossing of the line by infiltrators or by flocks, came to an end. On that day an Israeli soldier W!lS killed when an Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation line and exchanged fire with the· inhabitants of Falameh village. 33. On 24 January, Israeli representatives had a conversation with Mr. Vigier (General Riley, Chief of .Staff, was then in New York). The Israel represen- tatives suggested a meeting betwèen Israel and Jor- danian military commanders of high rank to discuss means of solving problems caused by infiltration. They quoted in this connexion _detailed figures relating to criminal acts alleged to have been committed during the year 1952 by infiltrators from Jordan. They stated ,that the ..main areas affected by marauders were 1 1 34. After this flare-up in the Rantis-Falameh-Qalqi1iya area, the situation calmed down to some extent. The talks between high-ranking military coll'.manders proposed by Israel at the end of January did not take place. There were insi:ead, during the month of Marc.1}, talks on the problem of infiltration between the senior delegates to the Mixed Armistice Commission. These talks led'to no result. ~ertain point. Les conversations entre chefs militaires de grade éîevé, proposées par Israël à la fin de janvier, n'eurent pas lieu. Ett revanche, des conversa- tions sur le problème de l'infiltration furent engagées en mars par les chefs de délégations à la O:nnmission mixte d'armistice. Ces conversations n'aboutirent pas. 35. La situation devint de nouveau tendue en avril; des combats éclatèrent à Jérusalem le 22 avril. Je citerai particulièrement, parmi les incidents qui ont révélé ou provoqué un accroissement de la tension, l'incident de Tel Mond du 5 avril où deux Israéliens furent tués (la responsabilité de cet incident n'a jamais été établie, la plainte ayant été rayée de l'ordre du jour de la Commis- sion mixte d'armistice, sans discussion ni vote), l'inci- dent de Wadi Fukin, le 18 avril, lorsque la Jordanie a accust. les Israéliens d'avoir traversé la frontière et attaqué des Jordaniens, tandis qu'Israël accusait les Jor- daniens d'avoir v.!é une sentinelle israélienne et d'avoir blessé une autre sentinelle. Dans cet incident, le Pré- sident de la Commission mixte d'armistice a estimé que le caractère contradictoire des tétnoignagesl'obligeait à s'abstenir lors du vote. La délégation israélienne a alors refusé de voter, et le chef de cette délégation à la Com- mission mixte d'armistiœ a dédaréqu'il ne VOyd.t1: aucune utilité aux travclUX de la Commission mixte d'ar- mistice. - 36. A Jérusalem, l'incident le plus grave, qui a eu lieu le 22 av·ril, avait été précédé par le meurtre, le 20 avril, de deux personnes dans la partie occidentale de la ville - meurtre que les Israéliens ont attribué à des terro- ristes venus par infiltration de la Jordanie. Les Jorda- niens ont prétendu qu'il s'agissait d'un crime intérieur perpétré par des Israéliens. Par la suite, cet incident a été rayé de l'ordre du jour de la Commission mixte d'armistice, sans qu'il y ait eu débat ni condamnation. 37. Tai -déjà parlé des actes de violence qui ont eu lieu à Jérusalem le 22 avril; ils ont fait l'objet d'un i"apport adressé par-mon prédécesseur au Conseil de sécurité, et je hieéoritênterai .d~y ajouter ceci: "lorsque la tension s'accroît entre Israël et la Jordanie, Jérusalem devient un véritable ba:ril·de poudre. Les autorités israéliennes m'ont informé à titre privé que, si des éléments, venus par infiltration dans la partie israélienne de .Jérusalem, s'y livraient à des activités criminelles, cela pourrait créer une situation extrêmement grave. Afin d'empê- cher pareille situation, nous devons pouvoir compter que les autorités des deux parties monteront une garde vigi!ante le long- de la frontière et s'opposeront à l'infil- tration d'individus ou de groupes venus pour piller, faire de la contrebande ou se livrer à des représailles. Nous 35. The situation again became tense in April until it reached its breaking point in the flare-up in Jerusalem on 22 April. Among the incidents which indicated and/ or provoked an increase in tension, l shall mention- particular1y the Tel Mond incident on 5 April when two Israelis were·killed (the responsibility for this crime was never fixed as the complaint was written off the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission with- out discussion or vote); the Wadi Fukin incident on 18 April, when Jordan alleged that Israelis had {:rossed the demarcation line fu,d attacked Jordanians, while Israel complained that Jordanians had killed an Israeli watchman and wounded another. In the Wadi Fukin incident, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Com- mission considered that the conflicting evidence obliged him to abstain from voting. The Israeli delegation then refused to vote and the officer in charge of the Israeli de1egation to the Mixed Armistice Commission stated that he saw no useful purpose in the working of the Mixed Armistice Commission. 36. The major Jerusalem incident on 22 Apd1 was immediately -preceded by the murder on 20 April of two persons in the western parlai the city, a murder which wàs attributed by the Israelis to infiltrators from Jordan. The Jordanians claimed that it wa:s an internaI crime carried out by Israeli criminals. This incident was 1ater written off the agenda of the Mixed Armistice Commission without discussion or condemnation. 37. Ihave alrea:dy referred to the flare-up in Jeru- salem on 22 April. My predecessor hâs reported to the Securii:y Council a:bout it, and l shaH only a"dd this comment: Jerusalem,when tension increases between Israel and Jordan, is a dangerous powder keg.· l have been told in particular by the Israeli authorities that criminal activities by infiltrators in the Israel part of Jerusalem would create a very grave situation. To prevent such a situation from developing, we must depend on the govemments of both parties to maintain a vigilant watch alorig the demarcation line and to stop individuals or groups bent on marauding, smuggling, or retaliation, from carrying out their intent. We must a1so depend on the co-operation of the two armies and police fQ1"ces at the local commanders' level. The Truce 38. Since 22 January, when the agreement on meas- ures to curb infiltration was cancelled, the number of complaints reaching the Mixed Armistice Commission had steadily increased. Ninety-one complaints were handed into the Mixed Armistice Commission during the month of May. Efforts were made to persuade the parties to accept again the procedure of local com- manders' meetings which, in the past, had proved of great assistance in dealing rapidly with local incidents, including minor cases of infiltration. These efforts suc- ceededat t.~e beginning of June and a new local com- manders' agreement '''''as signed on 8 June (S/3030]. Afterwal"ds, local commanders' meetings were held al- most daily in various places along the demarcation line and the situation improved to some extent. 1 11 39. The efforts to revive the idea of high-Ievel talks between senior military eommanders were also success- fuI. A meeting was held on 29 June. In my report to the Security Council (Sj3047], l summed up the results of the meeting as foUows: "Jordan is taking measures against infiltration and will continue to do so. Israel will co-operate by sup- plying information to Jordan on infiltration. Israel will seek to. improve methods of transmitting such information quickly 50 that Jordan can make effective use of it. Detailed arrangements will be worked out in a meeting of high-ranking police officers of both sides which has beenconvened for 8 JuIy. No fumer mèetingbetween the two senior military COnl- manders has been scheduled. However with an Ïtn- provement of the situation another meeting between them might be arranged with a view to aehieving further progress." 40. However, no detailed arrangements were agreed upon by the high ranking police officers in the two meetings which they held in July. Existing arrange- ments for implementing the local commanders' agree- ment re..ll1ained unaltered. Neither has the further meet- ing between senior military commanders, which had been contemplated with a view to achieving further progress, taken place to date. 41. On 31 AUgUst 1953, the local commanders' agree- ment of 8 June was renewed for a further period of three months. From a practical point of view, local commanders' meetings have continued to be more use- fuI than formaI meetings of the Mi.xed Armistice Com- mission. My predecessor, in his report on the Jerusalem incidentihas indicated (S/3007, para. 12] that the machinery of the Mixed Armistice Commission "did not function properly, since delegates tended ta act as lawers defending a case in a court ...". Meetings of local commanders and pol:ice officel's are freer from polities and can be more efficient. 1 43. The latest news received from the United Nations ..~ observers indicates the persistence of tension, par- ticularly in Jerusalem. Each party has accused the other of concentrating more troops than allowed under the General Armistice Agreement in the so-called defensive areas, on both sides of the city. At an emergency meet- ing held on 24 October, the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion decided that there should be an immediate inves- tigation on both sides by United Nations observers. The investigation has disclosed no evidence of excessive troops in the two defensive areas. The situation is, however, dangerous and should be watched closely. .44. The main difficulties respecting the implementa- tion of the Israel-Egyptian General Armistice Agree- ment 2 have arisen along the demar~ation line of the Gaza Strip and also, durîng the last few months, in connexion with the El Anja demilitarlzed zone. 45. l'he Egyptian controlled area known as the "G~7a Strip" 1S about 4 kilometres wide and 50 kilometres long. Ii has a population of approximately 250,000 of which 200,000 are Palestine refugees. The ma:jority of Israel complaints in connexion with that area refer to infiltration into Israel. Water pipes, pumps, cattle and crops have been stolen from the Israel settlements in the Negeb. The Israelis have retaliated by shooting at Arabs seen crossing the demarcation line. They have also sent motor patrols along the line, and shot at Arabs working on their lands in Egyptian controlled territory. This has, however, ·decreased somewhat in recent months. There have been also night raids against Arab villages, during which people have been shot and houses blown up. After every serions shooting incident, Arabs have usually retaliated by laying mines on roads and tracks in Israel territory. The hlowing up of an Israel vehic1e by a mine results in retaliatory action and the cycle of reprisaIs repeats itself. 1 1 46. One of the latest and gravest incidents in the Gaza Strip has been the attack upon several houses and huts in the Arab refugee camp of Bureij on the night of 28 August. That camp, organized and administered by United Nations Relief and Works Agency, is situated about 2 kilometres west of the demarcation line. Bombs were thrown through the windows of huts in which refugees were sleeping and, as they fled, they were 47. The Egyptian- aumorities have taken measures to cope with the problem of infiltration. The presence of 200,000 Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip, however, renders their task paTticularly difficult. 48. South of the Gaza Strip, after a long period of quiet on the Egypt-Palestine froutier, the Israelis started in the early summer intensified. action against the few bedouin who lived in the empty .wastelands of the desert on both sides of the frontier, and north of the El Auja demilitarized zone. Israeli aeroplanes attacked Arabs and their herds of came1s and goats. At the same rime, incidents. of increasing gravity occurred in the demilitarized zone itself. Israel arnrcd groups patrolled t..~e zone; they shot at bedouin at the two main wells; Arabs and their herds were killed. by air and ground attacks; armed Ismel forces, up to ap- proximately thirty men, shot the herds and burned the tents of bedouin. 1 111 49. This appears to have been in preparation for the establishment in September of an. Israel settlement at Abu Ruth, Just east of the ,demilitarized. zone, at about 8 kilometre~ from the road junction at El Auja. Three weeks later a new and smaller settlement, Rahel, was established in the demilitarized' zone, at 2 kilometres from the road junction at El Auja. 50. The Egyptian de1egation sent acomplaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission concerning these dévelop- ments. In an emergency meeting held on 2 October, the followingdraft resolutîon moved by the Egyptian representative was adopted by a majority vote, Israel voting against : "The Mixed Armistice Commission, having dis- cussed the Egyptian complaint No. 336,decides : "That an Israeli armed force has entered several "times the demilitarizec1 zone and attacked the bedouin inhalbitants in the area, kiIling .them and . their livestock andpreventing them from having water -from the wells" in the 'area, thus constituting a flagrant viplationof article VIII, paragraphs 1 and S, of the General Armistice Agreement; "That the existence of an Israeli armed force and r~gular IsraeIi police in the newqibbutz established in the demilitarized zone is a violation of article IV, paragraph 1, and article VIII of the General Ar- mistice Agreement; "That the chairman of the Mixed Armistice Com- mission is called upon to take such measures as he deems necessary to avoid future violations of the demiIitarized l;one," 1 1 "La Commission mixte d'armistice, ayant examiné la plainte No 3·36 de l'Egypte, décide: "Le nouveau kibboutz créé dans la zone démilita- risée près du croisement voisin du village d'El Auja constitue une violation des dispositions du paragra- phe 1 de l'article IV et de l'article VIn de la Con- vention d'armistice général. "La Commission mixte d'armistice invite le repré- sentant d'Israël à demander aux autorités israéliennes -d'évacuer aussitôt que possibl~ le nouveau kibboutz établi dans la zone démilitarisée." 53. Le Président de la Commission mixte d'armistice a expliqué qu'il s'était abstenu parce que la question des activités civiles dans la zone démilitarisée ne rele- vait pas expressément de la Convention d'armistice général. Il a rappelé qu'au moment où la_CO!lyentinn avait été é~aborée il n'existait pas d"actîvités civiles dans la zone démilitarisée et qu'elle ne contenait donc aucune disposition semblable à celles qui figurent dans la Con- vention d'armistice syro-israélienne. Dans ces condi- tions, et comme le Chef d'état-major des Nations Unies n'avait donné aucune. autorisation spéciale à cet égard, le Président de la Commission mixte d'armistice a estimé qu'il devait s'abstenir. Toutefois, il a attiré l'at- tention des parties sur le paragraphe 3 de l'article XII de la Convention qui établit une procédure pour la revision de cette Convention ou la suspension de son application. Il a estimé qu'aux termes de cette disposi- tion les parties pouvaient parvenir à un accord sur les questions qui s'étaient présentées après la conclusion de la Convention et qui n'étaient pas prévues expressé- ment par aucune de ses dispositions. 54. Je partage l'opinion du Président en ce qui con- cerne son abstention. 55. L'application de la Convention d'armistice général entre Israël· et le Liban S a donné lieu à des difficultés relativement peu importantes et peu nombreuses. Ceci est dû en grande partie au fait que la ligne de démar- -cation coïncide avec la frontière !ibano-palestinienne. Il existe des cas d'infiltration, presque toujours du Liban vers Israël, il arrive aussi que des troupeaux franchis- sent la 'ligne de démarcation, etc. Ces incidents sont réglés selon la procédure normale par le sous-comité chargé de r~gler les incidents de frontière. 56. La situation a été tendue entre ces deux pays en juin et juillet à la suite de plusieurs attaques à main armée qui se sont produites en Galilée du Nord; Israël a prétendu que ces attaques avaient·été menées par des bandes organisées au Liban. Le Liban, tout en opposant un démenti aux allégations israéliennes, a renforcé les mesures de surveillanœ sur sa frontière. 57. J'examinerai maintenant très rapidement la ques- tion de la mise en œuvre de la Convention d'armistice général entre Israël et la Syrie 4. Les difficultés qui ont surgi sont liées à la mise en œuvre des dispositions rela- agreement was drawn up, no organized ciman activ- ities existed in the demilitarized zone, and nQ provision \Vas inserted in the agreement similar to the provisions 1ll the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement. In these circumstances and in the absence of spedfic authority from the United Nations Chief of Staff in tbis respect, he fe1t 'he should abstain. However, he drew the atten- tion of the parties to article XII, paragraph 3, of the agreement which lays down a procedure for the revi- sion or the suspension of its application. He thought that under this provision the parties could reach a settlement on such qhestions which have arisen after the conclusion of the agreement and which have not been c1early covered by any of its provisions. 54. l share the point of view of the Chairman con- cerning bis decision to abstain from voting. 55, The application of the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement 3 has given rise to relatively few and minor difficulties. This is due ta a great extetlt to the fact' that the demarcation line co- incides with the Lebanese~Pa1estinian frontier. There are cases of infiltration, almost entirely from Lebanon into Israel, of fl'Ocks crossing the demarcation line. Such cases are normally settled by the sub-commit.:ee on border incidents. 56. There was tension bet...·"een the two countries in June and July, following anumb~r of armed atiacks in northern Galilee,. which Israel alleged were made by bands 'Organized in Lebanon. Lebanon, while rejecting the Israel allegation, has strengthened the surveillance on its border. ·57. l shaU now 'consider very briefly the question of the implementation of the General Armistice Agree- ment between Israel and Syria.4 The difficulties which have arisen are connected with the application of the 3 Ibid., Special Supplement No. 4. 4Ibid., Special Supplement No. 2. 3 Ibid., Supplément spécial No 4. 4 Ibid., Supplement spécial No 2. 59. Ta sum up, the pr~sent situation on the Israel- Jordan demarcation line îs due ta a large extent to the prablem of infiltration. This problem is particularly difficult because the demarcation line is long- about 620 kilometres - and because it divides the former mandated territory of Palestine haphazardly separating, for instance, many Arab villages from their lands. p(). ..To solve the problem of infiltration, there are two methods available ta the parties. The first method was ~>' agreed- to at the high level talks between senior military commanders on 29 June. In my report ta the Security Council [Sj3047] to which I"referred previously, 1 sumnied up the results of the talks as follows: "Jordan is taking measures against infiltration and will continue ta do so. Israel will co-operate by supplying information ta Jordan on infiltration. Israel will seek.ta i l11prove methods· of '. transmitting su<:n information quickly so that Jordan can make effective' use of it." Ta carry out this agreement the parties have at their disposaI the procedure of local commanders' meetings, which have been revive<! since thebeginning of June. The results achieved by this first method may not be spectacular; they may be slow. The method )S, how- ever, effective ta the extent actually possible: if it does not suppreS's, it diminishes lllfiltration and its dangers. 61. The second method is resort ta force. It refiects impatience with the slow results of peaceful means and a preference, instinctive or deliberate, for the oldlaw of talion: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. In such a frame of mind, respect for the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement forbidding the croS'sing of the demarcation !ine appears absurd, when the line is being crossed by thieves in the night. The old frontier spirit teaches belief in the efficiency of punitive raids, shooting and killing. The application of such methods by civilians creates the chain reaction. of retaliatory measures and blood feuds. It increases tension. If military forces carry out punitive raids al~ïOSS the demarcation line, the Ar- mistice Agreement must be considered as having been deliberately. broken in full knowledge of possible con- sequences, incltlding the possibility of a clash with the military forces of the other party. The dangers implied in snch a resort to force shou.1d persuade the responsible authorities to abstain from it and adhere closely ta peaceful means. . trol~ exerce par la po~~e Israehe~ne s.?r la plus gran~e partie de la zone, la reslstance qu Israel oppose au Pre- sident de la Commission mixte et aux observateurs des Nations Unies lorsqu'ils veulent s'acquitter de leurs obligations concernant l'exécution de l'article V de la Convention d'armistice général. 59. En résumé, la situation actuelle sur la ligne de démarcation israélo-jordanienne est due, dans une grande mesure, au problème de l'infiltration. Ce pro- blème est par-ticulièrement difficHe -du fait de la Ion-'- gneur de cette ligne (620 km environ), qui partage arbitrairement l'ancien territoire sous mandat de la Palestine, séparant par exemple bon nombre de villages arabes des terres qui en dépendent. 60. Deux méthodes s'offrent aux parties pour résoudre le problème de l'infiltration. La première a été adoptée d'un commun accord lors des pourparlers qui ont eu lieu à l'échelon supérieur erttrechefs militaires, le 29 juin. Dans le rapport du Conseil de sécurîté dont j'ai déjà parlé [Sj3047], j'ai résumé comme suit le résultat de ces pcurparlers: "La Jordanie prend actuellement et continuera de prendre des .mesures pour éviter les infiltrations< IsraëL prêtera' son concours en transmettant à la Jordanie des renseignements relatifs aux infiltrations. Israël s'efforcera d'accélérer la transmission de ces renseignements pour que la Jordanie puisse en faire effectivement usage." Pour exécuter cet accord, les parties peuvent recourir à la procédure établie pour les réunions des comman- dants locaux, qui a été remise en vigueur au début de juin. Il est possiblt~ que les résultats obtenus par cette première méthode ne soient pas remarquables et qu'ils soient lents. La méthode est cependant efficace dans la mesure où le permet la situation actuelle: si elle ne sup- prime pas les infiltrations et leurs dangers, elle en di- minue le nombre. 61. La seconde méthode consiste à recourir à la force. Elle reflète l'impatience qu'inspire la lenteur des résul- tats obtenus par des moyens pacifiques en même temps qu;une préférence, instinctive ou délibérée, pour la vieille loi du talion: œil pour œil, dent pour dent. Etant donné cet état d'esprit, il apparaît absurde .de demander que soient respectées les dispositions de la Convention d'armistice général qui interdisent le franchissement de la ligne de démarcation, alors que cette ligne est fran- chie la nuit par des voleurs, Le vieil esprit frontalier enseigne la croyance dans l'efficacité des. raids punitifs, des fusillades et du meurtre. L'emploi de ces méthodes par des civils provoque la réaction en chaîne des repré- sailles et des querelles sanglantes. Il exaspère la ten- sion. Si des forces militaires entreprennent des raids punitifs au.,.delà de la ligne de démarcation, il faut con- sidérer que les violations de la Convention d'armistice sont faites en pleine connaissance des conséquences possibles, y compris la possibilité d'un choc avec les forces militaires de l'autre partie. Les dangers qu'itn- pliquent ces recours à la force devraient persuader les "In the nature of -the case, therefore, under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, neither part'j could validly daim to have a free hand in the demili- tarized zone over civilian activity, while military activity was totally excluded." 63. Total adhesion to these two principles would great1y ea:se the situation. Tt would mean, in particular, recognition of the special powers of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and !:he observers in the demiHtarized zone. 64. In the area of the Egypt-Palestine border,'tension is due in part to the existence of an infiltration problem in connexion with the Egypt-controlled Gaza Strip. The ploblem is sirnilar ta that existing in the area of the armistice demarcation line beLween Jœ.-déltl and Israel. It i5 less acute, at least for the moment. Its solution should also be sought by peaceful means, rather than by retaliatory action. Another cause of tension in that area has arisen recently in connexion with the demili- tarized zone of El Auja. The settlement of a group of Israelis in the zone posed last month the problem of the activities of sett1ers foreign to the area. 65. 1 have deliberately refrained from mentioning problems ather than those which, from the naint of view of the Truce Supervision Organization, a;e immediate problems connected with its daily work. 66. 1 am aware, however, that other problems exist, and greatly contribute to tension. There is in Israel an impatience with the General Armistice Agreements which is due to the fact that they have not yet been replaced by final settlements, This impatience extends to the personnel of the Truce Supervision Organization, especially when it tries to exercise supervisory powers in a demilitarized zone. On the Arab side, the usual criticism is that the General Armistice Agreements have nat given them security and that the Truce.Supervision Organization is too v/eak to prevent what they consider ta be Israel breaches of the armistice agreements. ?7. These opposite criticisms should not, in my opin- lOn, lea:d to the conclusion thaï the General ATmistice Agreements should be discardèd before they can be . replaced by peace settlements. The armistice agreements have lasted too long not to pave lost _part of their Appendix 1 STATISTICS TAKEN FROM THE OFFI~IAL RECORI:lS OF THE l!ASHE- MITE JORDAN KI~lGDO:M-ISRAEL MxXED ARMISTICE COMMIS- SION-PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY 1953 .THROUGH 15 OcrOBER 1953 Complaints from Israel: 178. Complair/its from Jordan: 167; BreaidotIm 1. Crossing of the demarcation iine by D1Üi~ U[Üts , 28 51} 2. Crossing of the demarcation line by al'tIled individuah or groups . 71 12 3. Crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed individuals cr groups . 26 2 31 57 4. Firing across thedemarcation line S. Overflights ~ . 6. Expulsions . 7. AIl others, inc1uding armoured cars in forbidden area, threats and illegai entry into the demilitarized zone . 19 35 70. 3 4 178 167 a. Forty-one persons. Israel aIleges the follow- ing casualties inside Israel resulted f(om Jordanian at- 37 32 5 25 t~éko, .•.......•.. : . Condemnation of Jordan by the Mixed Armistic~ .... Commission verified the fol- lowing casualties caused by Jllrdanian action . . . . . .. . . . 10 13 lïSee appendices below. li Voir lea appendices ci-dessous. Appendice 1 STATISTIQUES TmÉES DES DOCUMENTS OFFICIELS DE LA COMMIS- sroN MIXTE D'ARMISTICE JORDANO-ISRAÉLIENNE - PÉRIODE DU 1ER JANVIER 1953 AU 15 OCTOBRE 1953 Plai,~tes émanant de la Jordanie: 167. Plaintes PEa:intu. émanant émaOOI"..t delG à'lsraa. .Tordanf6 1. Franchissement de la ligne de dé- marcation par des formations D1Üi- taires . 2. Franchissement de la ligne de dé- marcation p1ir des individus ou groupes armés . 3. Franchissement de la ligne de dé- marcation par des individus ou groupes non armés ; .. 4. Coups de feu par-dessus la ligne 4e démarcation . 5: Survols de la ligne de démarcation 6. Expulsions . 7. Tous autres cas, notamment incur- sions de véhicules blindés dans la zone interdite, t,n~~ce~. ~trées illégalell dans la zone denulitansee . 28 50 71 12 26 2 31 57 19 35 78 4 . 167 a Quarante et une personnes. Israélie'lUJ Israélie'IUI Jorda'llier.s ;rordamem tuu b1Je8sû mû ble8sél Israël prétend que les pertes énumérées ci-contre, survenues en territoire is- raélien, sont le résultat d'attaques jordaniennes.... En condamnant la Jor- danie, la Commission mixte d'armistice a constaté que les pertes ci-contre avaient bien été causées par les activités des Jordaniens ... 13 10 Condemnation of Israel by the Mixed Armistice Commission verified the fol- lowing casualties caused by Israe1i action .. ~té ~usées par les activités Israéllennes .. Of the 178 Israe1i complaints, 27 were discussed at emergency Mixed Armistice Commission meetings, 144 were handled during regular Mixed Armistice Commission meetings, 4 were withdrawn before they were discussed, and 3 are still out- standing. Of the 167 Jordanian complaints, 19 were discussed at emergency Mixed Armistice Commission meetings, 142 were handIed during regular Mixed Armistice Commission meetiugs, 4 were withdrawn prior to discussion, and 2 are still held for discussion. The discussion of the 171 Israeli complaints by the Mixed Armistice Commission resulted in Jordan being condemned for 20 violations of the General Armistice Agreement. Sur les 178 plaintes émanant d'Israël, 27 ont été examinées au cours de réunions de la Commission mixte d'armistice con- voquées d'urgence, 144 ont été examinées au cours des réUIÜons ordinaires de la Commission mixte d'armistice, 4 ont été reti- rées avant leur examen et 3 doivent encore être eJI.--a.minées. Sur 167 plaintes émanant de la Jordanie, 19 ont été examinées au cours de réUIÜons de la Commission mixte d'armistice con- voquées d'urgence, 142 ont été examinées au cours des réUIÜons ordinaires de la Commission mixte d'armistice, 4 ont été retirées avant leur examen et 3 doivent encore être examinées. Les débats relatifs aux 171 plaintes présentées par Israël à la Commission mixte d'armistice ont abouti à la condanmation de la Jordanie pour 20 cas de violations de la Convention d'armis- tice général. . Les débats relatifs aux 161 plaintes présentées par la Jor- danie à la Commission mixte d'armistice ont abouti à la con- damnation d'Israël pour 21 violations de la Convention d'ar- mistice général. Tottes les autres plaintes d~ deux parties ont été, soit reti- rées, soit réglées sans vote, sCJit réglées par· un vote sans résult-".t. The diScussIon of the 161 Jordanian complaints by the Mixed Armistice Commission resulted in Israel being condemned for 21 violations of the General Armistice Agreement. . Ail ather complaints of bath parties were ei.ther withdrawn, settled without vote, or settled by indecisive ~ote. Appendix n Appendice n STATISTICS TAKEN FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE HASHE- MITE JORDAN KINGDOM-ISRAEL MlXED ARMISTICE CoMMIS- SION - PERlOD FROM JUNE 1949 THROUGH DECEMBER 1952 1. Crossing of the demarcation line by mili~ UIÜtS . 1. Franchissement de la ligne de dé- marcation par des formations mili- taires . 30 162 2. Franchissement de la ligne de dé- marcation par des individus ou groupes armés . 3. Franchissement de la ligne de dé- marcation par des individus ou groupes non armés . 2. Crossing of the demarcation line by armed individuals or groups . 99 5 3. Crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed individuals or groups..... 396 13 4. Coups de feu par-dessus la ligne de démar~~tion . 5. Survols de la ligne de démarcation 6.- Expulsions .. 4. Firing across the demarcation line 30 37 5. Over:Bights .. 6. Expulsic,ns .. Z. Tous' autres cas, notamment incur- sions de véhicules blindés dans la zone intel 'ite, menaces, entrées illégales dans la zone démilitarisée . 12 7. Ail others, inc1uding armoured cars in forbiddenarea, threats and iIlegal entry into the demilitarized. zone 638 1 17 86 6 23 55 STATISTIQUES TIRÉES DES DOCUMENTS OFFICIELS DE LA COMMIS- SION MIXTE D'ARMISTICE JORDANO-ISRAÉLIENNE - PÉRIODE DE JUIN 1949 À DÉCEMBRE 1952 PlaWu Plœintea émalUmt é7IWnant de la d'lsrcu!1, JorckJ,nie 30 162 99 5 396 13 70 116 4 30 37 39 12 i38 375 - Jordan aUeges the follow- mg casualties inside Jordan were caused by Isràeli at- tacks . 8 Total casualties claimed by both parties as resulting from border violations, ... 65 65 132 83 Appendix m STATISTICS TAKENFROM THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE HASHE- MITE JORD,AW KmGDOM-ISRAEL MIXED AnnSTICE CoMMIS- SION The discussion of complaints by the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission during the year 1952 resulted in: 1. Jordan being condemned for 19 violations of the General Artnistice Agreement; 2. Israel being condemned for 12 violations of the General Armistice Agreement; 3.. And in addition 191 complaints against Jordan were settled without discussion by a resolution that included the following: "The crossing of the line hy civilians is inconsistent with article IV, paragraph 3 of the General Armistice Agreement.". It must he noted that these cases .were settled without in- vestigation or discussion, merely to clear them from an already overloaded agenda. 4. AlI other compiaints were either withdrawn, settled with- out vote or settled by indecisive vote. Totaux des pertes faisant l'objet de plaintes des deux parties· par suite de viola- tions de frontières . 65 65 132 83 Appendice m STATISTIQUES TIRÉES DES DOCUMENTS OFFICIELS DE LA CoMMIS, SION MIXTE D'ARMISTICE JORDANO-ISRaÉLŒNNE L'examen des plaintes par la Commission mixte d'armistice jordano-israélienne pendant l'année 1952 a donné les résultats suivants: 1. La Jordanie a été reconnue responsable de 19 violations de la Convention d:armistice général. 2•..Israe."l a -. ét.e' rec.-o...nn..:1 .responsabl.e de 1.2 violations de lai Convention d'armistice général. . . 3. Én outre, 191 plaintes formulées contre la Jordanie ont été classées sans discu~;;ion par une résolution qui comportait la disposition sUivante: "Le franchissement de la ligne de démarcation par la popu· lation civile est incompatible avec les disp'ositions du para· graphe 3 de l'article IV de la Convention. d'armistice gé- néral." Il convient de noter que ces cas ont été tranchés sans en· quête ni discussion, à seule fin d'alléger un ordre du jour déjà surchargé. 4. Toutes les autres plamtes ont été soit retirées, soit clas· sées sans vote ou par un vote sans résultat.