S/PV.6329 Security Council

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Choi Young-Jin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire. It is so decided. I invite Mr. Choi to take a seat at the Council table. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations. I should like to draw the attention of members to document S/2010/245, which contains the twenty- fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Choi Young-Jin. I now give the floor to Mr. Choi. Mr. Choi: During the recent Security Council consultations on Côte d’Ivoire on 17 March, I reported that, for the immediate future, two issues — reunification and elections — were likely to dominate the Ivorian peace process. Indeed, since last March, the pairing of reunification and elections has emerged as the governing dynamic of Ivorian politics. Unfortunately, it has produced a political impasse, which has proved to be as complex as it is delicate. The reason for this impasse is that the three major protagonists of the Ivorian crisis are now dealing with their core interests. The presidential camp wants reunification before elections; the opposition wants elections before reunification; and the Forces nouvelles wants identification before reunification. Moreover, by virtue of their ambiguities, the provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement allow each of the three major protagonists to claim legitimacy in support of their respective position. This political stalemate is hardly encouraging. Indeed, during the eight years since the outbreak of the crisis, perennial delays in implementing the various peace agreements have been a source of deep frustration for the Ivorian people as well as the international community. They are all the more so since the elections appeared to be within our grasp until several months ago. The full ownership of the peace process by the Ivorian parties, as defined in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, comes with an obligation to make it work. The events of February and March 2010 demonstrated that the continuing failure to hold elections in Côte d’Ivoire and to materialize the reunification of the country contributes to heightening tensions and hampers constitutional, political, economic and social normalization. It is against this backdrop that a technical assessment mission visited Côte d’Ivoire in April with a view to formulating options for the future of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The mission considered four options: first, strengthening UNOCI’s mandate to organize elections; secondly, withdrawing the Operation; thirdly, maintaining the status quo; and, fourthly, rationalizing the Operation’s mandate and configuration. The first option, the organization of elections by UNOCI, has been strongly recommended by the opposition. The second option, the withdrawal of UNOCI, has been recommended by some observers who claim that the perennial delays of elections and reunification would no longer justify UNOCI’s presence in Côte d’Ivoire. The third option, the status quo, has been recommended by the Forces nouvelles and the Facilitator on the grounds that, despite the failure to produce elections, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement has made a considerable contribution to the stabilization of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and to significant achievements, such as the mobile courts operation, the identification operation and the production of the provisional list, among others. The fourth option, the rationalization of UNOCI’s mandate and configuration, has been recommended by some informed experts on Côte d’Ivoire. Amid this complex and delicate situation, and after much reflection, it is recommended, as indicated in the twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (S/2010/245), which is before the members of the Council, that UNOCI maintain the current strength of its military and police components until the end of 2010. Should this recommendation meet with the approval of the Security Council, the Secretariat would conduct a review of the Ivorian peace process and submit further recommendations on the future of UNOCI before the end of this year. Meanwhile, UNOCI shall maintain three priority objectives for the immediate future, as reported in my previous briefing (see S/PV.6284). These are, first, maintaining peace and stability in Côte d’Ivoire, including the protection of civilians as mandated by the Security Council in its resolutions 1894 (2009) and 1911 (2010); secondly, safeguarding past achievements in both the elections and reunification domains and continuing to provide support towards the implementation of these two crucial processes; and, thirdly, helping to establish the definitive electoral list as expeditiously as possible. This list constitutes a sine qua non not only for the holding of elections but also for the completion of the identification operation and the subsequent distribution of the national identity cards. In particular, with regard to the first point, UNOCI and the United Nations country team in Côte d’Ivoire will continue their efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians. This strategy, once developed, shall allow UNOCI to fully implement the mandates given by the Security Council.

I thank Mr. Choi for his briefing. There are no further speakers on my list. In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations, I invite the members of the Council to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.