S/PV.634 Security Council

My first and very pleasant duty is to express to Mr. Borberg, our appreciation for the way in 'which he has discharged the duties of President during the past month. He has led and inspireo our discussions, which were sometirnes \:omplex, with a tact" a smiling efficiency and an impartiality to which we are glad to pay a tribute, and - he has guided tlS with authority, cheerfulness and good humour through the maze of our cherished procedure towards the paths of conciliation. For my part,.l shall try ta follow his example as best l cano 1. Le PRESIDENT: Mon premier et très agréable devoir est maintenant d'exprimer à notre collègue, M. Borberg, toute notre appréciation pour la manière dont il s'est acquitté, pendant le mois écoulé, des devoirs de la présid~..nce. Il a -dirigé et dominé des débats, qui furent parfois complexes, avec un tact, une maîtrise souriante ct une impartialité auxquels nous sommes- heureux de rendre hommage. Avec autorité, avec bon- homie et avec humour, il nous a guidés, à travers tous les maquis d'une procédure qui nous est chère, vers les voies de la conciliation. Je m'efforcerai, pour ma part, de suivre de mon mieux son exemple. 2. M. BORBERG (Danemark) (traduit de l'anglais): Permettez-moi, tout d'abord, Monsieur le Président, de vous féliciter de posséder, bien plus que moi, l'expé- rience, les connaissances etJes qualités nécessaires p6ur exercer les fonctions de Président. Qu'il me soit permis aussi de vous remercier très sincèrement des paroles si aimables que vous avez prononcées au sujet de la modeste contribution que j'ai apportée aux travaux du Conseil de sécurité au cours du mois d'octobre. 3. Il m'aurait été impossible de m'acquitter de cette tâche sans la collaboration'si efficace du Secrétariat, du Secrétaire général adjoint et de tout son personnel. Je· tiens à mentionner tout particulièrement M. Protitch, qui m'a dirigé au cours du mois dernier avec tant de tact et d'intelligence que je ne l'oublierai jamais. Mes remerciements vont également -aux traducteurs et aux interprètes qui-ont toujours traduit mes observations de façon si intelligente, et j'éprouve une reconnaissance toute particulière pour les sténographes parlementaires, parce que chaque fois que paraissait le compte rendu sténographique de nos séances, ils avaient trouvé les mots que je n'avais.pas pu trouver lorsque je parlais. 4. L'impression que me laisse cette première expé- - rience- en tant que Président du Conseil de sécurité est

Mr. President, may I, first of all, congratulate you on having ail the experience, knowledge and qualities necessary to do this job of president much better than l have been able ta. May l also thank you very much for your all- too-kind words for my modest contribution to the work of the Security Council during the month of October. . l' j,ft would have been impossible for me to do that job without the very efficient co-operation of the Secre- tariat and of -the Assistant Secretary-General and his entire staff. In particular, l might mention the amazing Dr. Protitch, who really managedme during the last month in such a tactful and intelligent way that l shall never forget it. My thanks alsogo to the translators and interpreters who always translated my remarks in such a very intelligent manner and, certainly, êven more to the verbatim reporters because, when the vèrbatim records of_our meetings'were issued, they really had Succeeded in. finding the words which l could not find when I was speaking. 4. ~Iy impression of this, my first experience as PreSident of the.'Security Council, -was a very sym- Hommage au Président sortant Adoption of the agenda Appointment of a governor of the Free Territory of Trieste (continued) ", 5. The PRESIDENT. (translated from French): 1 call upon the representative of Greece on a point of order. "6. :Mr. KYROU (Greece): The President and the other members of the Council will remember that at our previous meeting on the question of the appointment of a govemor ~f the Free Terr:"ory of Trieste [928th fneeting] a motion for the post~Joneme~t of the d1Scu~­ sion was submitted by the representative of Colombla and, after careful consideration, adopted by an over- whe1rning majority. 'J. The intention of the representati;èof Colombia, as well as of aU the delegations, including my'9'''"0, wmch supported bis proposal, was to avoid any .debate that could prejudice the chances of an early and satisfactory sett1ement of the Trieste problem. This difficult problem has occupied the minds of a1rnost every government represented at this table, as well as of many other governments. There is one alone among us who wishes to sponsor a course of action that would, in spite of everything and against anything, adhere to the uncon- strnctive letter of the law. On the other hand, there are those who invite us to take stock of the situation as it has developed since the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Italy. 8. Those subscribing to this latter school of thought argue that it is essential to take as a basis the solid foundation of sincere understanding and mutual consent - a consent given without mental reservations by those primari1y concemed. We definitely share this opinion and are, therefore, anxious to base our attitude on an accurate, impartial view of the situation as it has deve1bped since 1947, bearing in mind the essential aim of the signatories of the Treaty with Italy, Î1~mely, the establishment and maintenance of stable peace in that extremely sensitive area. . . . 9. 1 respectfully sùggest that we mustbe guidedby these criteria when we' weigh the metits of the draft resolution [Sj3105]confronting us. 1 do not think that '1 am wrong in stating that thegeneral view of members of the Counci1, with one or, maybe, two exceptions, was on 20 October and remains todaythat the con- sideration at this juncture of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union would not he in the best interests of either the question itself or of the purposes assigned to this Couneil by the Charter. 10. It is indeed a matter of public record that the parties mainly concemed in this question are at the present time conducting consultations through normal diplomatic channe1s, either directly 'or indirectly, with a view to working out a solution which would dtl1y take Adoption de l'ordre du jour Désignation d'un gonverneur pour le Territoire libre de Trieste (suite) 5. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole au représen- tant de la Grèce, sur une motion d'ordre. 6. M. KYROU (Grèce) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Président et les autres membres du Conseil de sécurité se rappelle.l:"ont qu'à notre dernière séance consacrée à la question de la. désignation d'un gouverneur pour le Territoire libre de Trieste [628ème séance], le repré- sentant de la Colombie avait proposé d'ajourner la discussion; après un examen approfondi, cette propo- sition a été adoptée à tine grande majoritê. 7. Le représentant de la Colombie et toutes les autres délégations qui, comme la mienne, ont appuyé cette pro- position, avaient pour but d'éviter un débat qui pût compromettre le règlement rapide et satisfaisant du problème de Trieste. Ce problème difficile ne cesse de préoccuper la plupart des gouvernements représentés à cette tahle, ainsi que de nombreux autres gouverne- ments. Seul un représentant parmi nous tient à pré- coniser une ligne de conduite qtli, envers et contre tous, et de la façon la moins constructive qui soit, s'en tient à la lettre du droit. Pendant ce temps, d'autres repré- sentants nous invitent à examiner l'évoluti0n de la situation depuis la date de la- signature du Traité de paix avec l'Italie. 8. Ceux qui appuient cette dernière manière de voir estiment qu'il est essentiel de se fonder dans cette affaire sur le principe solide de la compréhension sincère et du consentement mutuel, c'est-à-dire sur un consente- ment donné sans aucune réserve par les parties directe- ment intéressées. Nous partageons sans hésiter ce point de vue ê(nous tenon~par conséquent à fonder notre attitude sur un examen exact et impartial de l'évolution de la situation depuis 1947,'·en tenant compte du but essentiel que s'étaient fixé les signataires du Traité de paix avec l'Italie, à savoir l'établissement et le maintien d'une paix solide en une région particulièrement névralgique. . 9. Il me semble.que nous devons nous inspirer de ces critères en examinant le projet de résolution dont nous sommes saisis [Sj3105]. Je ne crois pas me tromper en déclarant que-les membres du Conseil, à une ou peut- être deux' exceptions près.,ol1t estimé, le 20 octobre comme aujourd'hui, qu'en examinant tout de suite le projet de résolution de l'Union soviétique, le Conseil ne servirait ni la cau·.,e de Trieste ni les :fins que la Charte a assignées à ses travaux. 10. Tout le monde sait, en effet, que les principales parties intéressées à cette question mènent actuellement des négociations par les voies diplomatiques.normales, directement ou indirectement, en vue de parvenir à une solution qui tiendraitdùment compte des thèses op!,o- pea~eful settlement which is desired- I am quite sure- by all the members of this body. 13. The time which has elapsed since our meeting of 20 October has undoubtedly served to c1ear the aîmo- sphere - something which was very much neeckd. It has not, however, proved to be a sufficient interval for the main1y interested parties to bting their efforts ta full fruition. A further allowance of time should there- fore he wade for the parties' politica1 sagacity and tested attachment to the cause of peâce to have their effects. 13. Le temps qui s'est écoulé depuis notre réurtion du 20 octobre a certainement permis d'éclaircir l'atmo- sphère, ce qui était indispensable. Cet intervalle n'a toutefois pas été suffisant pour que les parties prin- cipalement intéressées voient l'aboutissement de leurs efforts. Ii faudrait donc laisser s'écouler un peu plus de temps afin que la sagesse politique et l'attachement sincère à la cause de la paix dont font preuve les parties produisent leurs fruits. 14. Pour ces raisons, et aussi parce que ma proposttion est une conséquence logique de la décision qü'e k{;onseil de sécurité a pri~,: le 20 octobre, .je demande formelle- ment, conformén-"nt au paragraphe 5 de l'article 33 de notre règlement intérieur, que l'examen de la question dont nous sommes saisis soit renvoyé pour trois semaines, c'est-à-dire jusqu'au lundi 23 novembre. 15. Le PRESIDENT: La discussion est ouverte sm' la motion d'ajoumenlent :présentée par le représentant de la Grèce. 14. It is in the light of these considerations, and as a lltural consequence of the Security Council's decision (lf 20 October, thatr 1 formally move, under rule 33, paragraph 5, of OUI! rules of procedure, that the dis- cussion of the ques.qon before us should again be post- poned for three "1eeks; that is, until Monday, 23 November. 1 15. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): 1 open discussion Ion the proposaI for adjournment submitted by the lrejPresentative of Greece. 16. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques socia- lIstes soviétiques) (traduit du russe) : Je tiens, une fois de plus, à protester énergiquement contre la propo- sition tendant à ajourner l'examen de la question de la désignation d'un gouverneur pour le Territoire libre de Trieste. Je n'ai nullement été surpris d'entendre la proposition de M. Kyrou.En effet, le bruit a couru pendant bien longtemps dans les couloirs que la présente séance du Conseil de sécurité serait ajournée elle aussi -je dis bien que la séance serait ajournée, et non qu'une proposition d'ajournement y serait présentée; or c'est dans les couloirs que, de touteévidence,s'ébau- che la politique que certains de nos collègues entendent suivre tant au Conseil de sécurité que dans les autres organes des Nations Unies. Voilà en quoi consiste la

1 must, once again, strenuously object to the proposaI that the consideration of 'the question of the appointment of a gbvernor for the :Jrree Territory of Trieste should be postponed. 1 Wa$~in th.e least surprised when, today, Mr. Kyrou mad such a proposal, for long before today's meeting ours have been circulating in the lobbies, where th line which. certain members intend totake in the Security Coundl and other United Nations bodies is obviously decide,d, that there would be yet another postponement. 1 do not mean that a proposaI for postponement would be submitted, but that the Council's meeting would be postponed. Such is the strength of those who can obviously count on a firm majoritywhich is always prepared to withhold support from any proposaI made by Soviet representatives whatever the circwnstances. f~rce ~e ceux quU:~m~tents~r. une ~ajorité toujours disposee, dans toutes Ies'conditiens,=a ne pas apj)uyer les propositions du .représentant de l'Union soviétique. 17. Rien n'a changé depuis notre dernière séance du 20 octobre, au cours de laquelle il a ~té décidé d'ajour- ner à aujourd'hui la séance que le Conseil de sécurité devait consacrer à Trieste. Dans la mesure où on peut la juger exactement d'après' les communiqués de presse la situation n'a guère changé depuis le 20 octobre. ' 18. Les raisons qu'on invoqH<;pour ajoul,'11er la pré- sente séance sont les mêmes que celles que 1:'on a mises en avant quand nous avons examiné cette question le 20 octobre. Elles se résument C0111llle suit : des pour- parlers se poursuivent actuellement, principalement entre trois Puissances-les Etats-Unis, le Royatune-Uni et la France - et aussi entre .deux autres Puissances- l'Italie et la Yougoslavie "-c-en vue de parvenir· à ce que .J'9n appelle un règlement pacifique de la question de Tneste., Or, comment les représentants de ces cinq 3 17. Nothing has changed since we met here on 20 Oct.ober.and it was decided to postpone the next meeting ?ntil today. Asfar as one cau judge from what is said In the Press,it would seem that the' situation had remained approximately the same· as it· was on -20 October. . 18. Thearguments in favour of postponing our meeting today are the same as those which were put ,forward whe~ the matter was discussed on 20 October. They are, III brief that certain negotiations are in progress, ijal.nly among three Powers - the United States, the , nlted Kingdom and France - and also two other , PQwers, Italy and Yugoslavia, concerning a so-called peacefulsettlement of the situation in Trieste. But how do the,representatives of.these five Powers propose tosettle the question? How do they propose ta acquit 20. Reference is constantly being made to the Charter and to the rules of procedure. Today, for instance, Mr. Kyrou found paragraph 5 of rule 33 of the rules of procedure to providehim with formaI and legal grounds ~or raising the question. But what are the pC'litica1 arguments for postponing the consideration of this item today? The arguments given are designed to conceaI the true motive. The true motive is not the peaceful settlement· of this unfortunate question of Trieste, but,· to put it frankly, to consolidate the breach of the Treaty of Peace with ltaly of 1947, to do away with it for good and aIl and to secure complet,e freedom from the obligations which it imposes on the twenty-one signatory.êountries. . 21. It might perhaps be as well ta indicate what thè objectives are in the present instance. l shal1 do sa verybriefly, to avoid entering into the substance of the question, which l do not propose ta do at present. l might Just mention the statement made quite recently at a Press conference on 27 October by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles. vVhat Mr. Dulles said at that conference showedhis hand, and there can no longer be· the slightest doti.bt regarding the real reasons foi today's proposaI, of which l would say that Mr. Kyrou was the vicrim. This is a real case of "tata 7lo1entem ducunt, nolentem trahunt". l am sure Mr. Kyrou had no desire to infringe the Treaty of Peace but the futes have, willy-nil1y, compelled· him ta do so. 22. \Vhat Mr. Dulles said was that the rime had come when Trieste was beginning ta affect plans for' . the establishment of a solid defence against·communism in southern Europe. d~s devoirs·etdes obligations qui lui incombent. Si,par contre, î1 a l'intention d'agir, non pas· au nom des Nations Ur..ies, mais pour le compte d'un groupe d'Etats ou de quelques Etats déterminés, doués d'une puissance magique - ne connaissant pas la source de cette puis- sance, je m'abstiendrai d'en parler pour ne pas com- pliquer la question - qui leur permet d'entraîner un certain nombre de délégations et de les faire voter eu faveur de l'une ou de l'autre proposition, cette attitude n'est pas justifiée, si l'on tient compte de l'exécution des devoirs et obligations que la Charte impose au Conseil. 20. .Les membres du Conseil ne cessent d'invoquer la Charte et le règlement intérieur. Aujourd'hui, par exempl~, M. Kyrou a cité le paragraphe 5 dé l'article 33 du règlement intérieur afin de faire reposer la question sur des bases juridiques. Mais quelles sont alors les raisons, s'ils}agit de raisons d'ordre politique, qui pourraient nous amener à ajourner l'examen de cette question? Les motifs qu'on invoque visent à camoufler les raisons véritables. Mais la raison véritable n'est nullement le règlement pacifique de cette malheureuse question de Trieste, mais - je le dirai sans ambages- la consolidation de la violation du Traité de pline ge 1947 avec l'Italie, l'enterrement définitif de ce traité de paix; on cherche, en effet, li. reprendre sa liherté d'action pour être dégagé une fois pour toutes des obligations que le Traité de paix a imposées aux vingt etun pays qui y ont apposé leurs signatures. 21. Quant à savoir quels sont les objectifs que l'on vise dans le présent cas, il serait peut-être indiqué de les expo&er très brièvement,pour éviter l'examen de la question de fond, ce que je ne voudrais pas faire en ce moment. Il suffirait peut-être de se reporter au discours que M: Dulles, Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis,a prononcé le 27 octobre à sa conférence de presse. Dans lesdéc1arations qu'il a faites à cette conférence, il a découvert toutes ::les cartes; ainsi, il ne peut rester aucun doute quant au motif véritable de la proposition qui a été présentée aujourd'hui et dont M. Kyrou est devènu en quelque sorte la victime. En l'occurrence, cn pourrait appliquer le dicton: "fata volentem ducunt, nolente1n trahunt". Je ne pense pas que M. Kyrou désire violer le Traité de paix; mais le sort l'oblige de le faire, car il ne pourrait agir autrement. 22. Or, qu'a dit M. Dulles? Il a dit que le moment était venu où Trieste allait gêner les plans de défense anticommuniste en Europe méridionale. 24. To argue that such defence is necessary savaurs, as we know, of demagogy. Such arguments are specially intended to divert world public opinion from the facts on which it actually shouJd he focused. We shall revert to this again at a later stage. There is no doubt, however, that the present arguments about defence are just as weil founded as they have been in all the other cases, as for instance when t.i.e agreement between the United States and Greece, was concluded. Then, too, there was talk of defence. But who is threatening Greece today? Can it be the Soviet Union that is threatening Gree.::e? Or is there some·other threat, and has poor Greece no other exnedient that to arm itself ta the teeth out of the com~on arsenal wbich is available to .countries which, under the pretext of defence, are hclping t.::l put into e.l!ect the aggressive policy of the United States? AlI this is pure demagogy, ofwhich l think VITe are aU of us weary and fed to the teeth, to use' a popular expression. Its sole purpose is to camouflage the arma- ments race at all costs by arguing the need for. defence against a nonexistent and imagïnary danger. 25. Here, however, is the crux of the matter. As Mr. Dulles pointed out, the conclusion must inevitably be drawn that there can be no stable "defence" - he again used the word "defence", though what he really meant was a stable plan of aggressive acts to becarried out against the Soviet Union and the peoples' demo- crac!es- until. the dispute between Italy and Yuga- ~laV1a over Tneste hadbeen settled. In the meantime, lU ac~rdan~e with this plan, a vast netw'-lrk.of military bases IS bemg constructed round my country with, of course, definiteaggressive intentions. The dispute, how- ever, still .contirtues. It already existed on 20 October and it is perfectly obvious now. Let us consider,fo: example, thé communiqué dated 1 November from Bel~ade which we have before us. It states that Yugo- slavla refuses to give up its zone B even in exchange for the part of zone A whichthe United States and the Uni~ed Kingdom had decided to transfer to Italy. Italy, !Ol" 1tS part,says that it has no intention of renouncing lts~lan to hring the whole of Trieste under its adminis- tration - and this includ{ ~ both zone B which is occupied byYugoslavia, and zone A, atpre;ent he1d by the occupation forces of the United States and the United Kiugdom. ?6" As l pointed out in my last statement,. tbis is meyltably leading to a definite deterioration in inter- natIonal relations and to tension in this region. r l mustsaythat today too Mr. Kyrou undoubtedly elped me by saying that this was, to use his words, an "extremely sensitive area". Sensitive to what? l would say, sensitive in the sense of inflammable, sensi- 26. J'avais déjà signalé, dans ma dernière intervention, que cette situation nous amène inévitablement à. une aggravation de la situation internationale, à une tension dans cette région. 27. Je dois constater qu'aujourd'hui encore M, Kyrou m'a rendu un signalé service endéc1arant qu'il s'agit d'une "région particulièrement névralgique". Névral- gique dans quel sens? Inflammahle, Monsieur Kyrou, à 28. Thus, the real aim is to make use of the Trieste • area as one of the links in the chain of aggressive measures of the North Atlantic bloc. There can be no doubt of this. There is a greaf deal of evidence to prove it. But l am afraid that the President will interrupt me and tell me that T am speaking on the substance of the question, and Ishall therefore say no more on this point. . 29. The real~im ie not to promote peace, or the interests of the loc.al population, of Yugoslavia or of ltaly. If that were the aim, the best instrument would undoubtedly he, as we have already indicated, the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy, in which all disagreements areduly dealt with, better than ever before and as well as they ever can he, in present circumstances, at least. 30. That treaty was signed by Yugoslavia and by Italy. If it is argued that the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste must be settJed, as Mr. Dulles stated on 27 October, then may l remind the Council and Mr. Dulles that that was tried exactly six years aga, in the Treaty of Peace with Italy. Did Italy sub- scribe ta the decision contained in the Treaty of Peace concerning the constitution of the Free Territory of Trieste? It did. Are you now refusing ta constitute the Free Territory of Trieste? Have you abandone:{ even the name of the "Free Territory of Trieste" given ta this territory? So far as l know, that is not the case. The Free Territory of TrÏf,:ste, as envisaged in the Treaty of Peace, exists .in southern Europf:. But every- thi.llg that should really and truly characterize the Free Territory of Trieste has been removed. 31. Thus l say that, according to Mr. Dulles - who directs the foreign policy of the United States as Secre- tary of State, and whose instructions are undoubtedly followed by Mr. Lodge and the other United States representatives, and perhaps also by their friends and sympathizers - what has to be done is ta settle·the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia. We already have an instrument for this, however. That instrument exists in writing and bears t:.le signatures of twenty-one States: it is the Treaty of Peace with Italy, with its two annexes providing for a permanent statute and an instrument for the provisional régime of the Free Terri- tory of Trieste. The Treaty also provides for the appoint- ment of a governor, the institution of a provisional council of government, the establishment of a permanent council •of government and the election ofa constituent assembly; it further provides for the introduction of a large num:oer of other measures; the most important of which is the drafting of a constitution. It also refers to the withdrawal of a11 foreign troops. An excellent pro- gramme, in fact, with the true ring of peace, calling for co-operation and removing aIl danger of an explosion. 32. Why are you unwiIIing ta proceed in this way- in accordance with the Tre~ty of Peace? Why do' the 32. ,Pourquoi ne voulez-vous pas vous engager sur I~ voie qui vqus est tracée par le Traité de paix? Pourqu01,' 33. And now it is proposed that, for these te.asons, we should once again postpone the examination of this question. IncidentaUy, the authors of this proposaI are proceeding somewhat c1umsily. It is perfectly clear that when you use the word "postpone", Ml'. K:'rou, you do not mean to postpone the consideration of the question, . but to have clone with h, toremove it from the agenda, ta postpone it to the Greek calends. Tt maybe your national feeling that prompts you to propose this post- ponement ad calendas graecas. It is not a question of postponing the consideration of. the item. Allow me ta help you in this instance to clarify your ideas. What you have in mind is to remove the item from the agenda sa as to let itdie of neglect. The question of Trieste l11ay appear on the agenda, bui it must not he taken up and dealt with, since, if it is, you will have to renounce your plans for converting this whole region of southern, the whole Free Territory of Trieste, jnto one of the links in the chain of aggression which is the underly~ng purpose of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. That is a fact. 33. Et voil~ qu'on nous propose d'accepter, pour ces rait,;)ns, de renvoyer une fois encore à plus tard f f'''xanien de la question. Du reste, les auteurs de cette proposition agissent assez maladroitement. En effet, il est clair pour tout le monde que lorsqu'on parle de "renvoyer la ques- tion", cela signifie, Monsieur Kyrou, non pas reprendre plus tard l'examen de cette question, mais en finir avec la question, la f, ire disparaître de l'Drdre du jour, la renvoyer aux calendes grecques. C'est probablement par sentiment national que vous proposez ce renvoi aux calendes grecques. Ce n'est pas .l'une remise à plus tard qu'il s'agit; permettez-moi, dans le cas présent, de vous aider à' déchiffrer votre pensée. Il s'agit bel et bien de faire disparaître cette question de l'ordre du jour et de l'abandonner à: son triste sort. La question de Trieste figure à l'ordre du jour, soit, mais il ne faut pas l'abor- der,n ne :faut pas s'en occuper. Parce que, si vous vous en occupez, vous serez obligés de renoncer aux plans que vous avez élaborés pour transformer toute cette région de l'Europe méridionale, tout le Territoire libre de Trieste, en l'un des mamons de cette chaîne d'agres- sion qui constitue la raison d'être du bloc agressif de l'Atlantique nord. C'est là un fait. 34. If you really desire to achieve a: settlement of the dispute between ltaly and Yugoslavia over Trieste, there is an excellent method we canuse: we can proceed in accordance with the Treaty of Peace which has alreàdy settled this matter and whichhas been signed by both parties. 34. Si vous désjrez vraiment aboutir attrèglement du différend qui oppose l'Italie à la Yougoslavie au'sujet de la question' de TrÎéste, vous avez à votre disposition un moyen idéal: suivre la voie tracée par le Traité de paix, qui a d'ores ~t déjà réglé la question, et porte la signature de l'une et l'autre des parties. 35. Perhaps you will say: "That wasin 1947. At that time they were in agreement, whereas now they are not." If l may say so, however, they are not in agree- ment with the new plans either. 35. Vous pouvez dire : "Cela, c'était en 1947. Ces deux pays se sont mis d'at:Cord à l'époque, mais aujourd'hui ils ne sont plus d'accord." Permettez-moi de vous dire dès à présent qu'ils n'accepteront pas davantage le nou- veau plan que vous leur proposerez. 36. On 20 March 1948, you decided to transfer. the whole territory of Trieste to Italy. That was a gross violation of the Treaty of Peace. The reasoh. you gave was that'the circumstances required it, since it was impossible in theexisting circumstances to expect that the Treaty of Peace should be implemented. In the event, however, you yourselves, the representatives of thé United States, discarded that declaration, sirtcein the space of five years yoû have failed ta put it into effect. 36. Le 20 mars 1948, vous avez décidé de transférer à l'Italie la totalité du Territoire de Trieste. Ceci consti- tuait une violation flagrante du Traité de paix. Vous avez invoqué la pression des circonstances, et prétendu que la situation ne permettait pas d'e:Kécuter le Traité de paix. Mais il s'est trouvé que cette déclaration a été enterrée par vous-mêmes, Messieurs les représentajlts des Etats-Unis. Si je dis cela, c'est que, depuis lors, il s'est écoulé cinq ans sans que ,,, déclaration reçoive un commencement d'exécution. 37. On 8 October 1953, you put forward a new plan, under which the whole territory of Trieste would nût he given to Italy, as you promised on 20 March 1948; Far be it from me to defend your dec1aration of 1948, which was a gross violation of the Treaty of Peace. .In making your 1948declaration, youstated that the Treaty of 1947 was not suited to the conditions of 1948. In actual fact, howevr:'1", your declaration acbieved n?thing. It was still-born and you yourselves had to glve it a hasty and surreptitious burial, which naturaVy 37. Aujourd'hui, vous présentez un nouveau plan; qui date du 8 octobre 1953, et qui consiste à ne plus donner à l'Italie, comme vous l'aviez pllOmis le 20 mars 1948, la totalité du Territoire de Trieste. Ce n'est pas que je dt:f~ndele moins du monde votre déclaration de 1948, qui constituait une violation flagrante du Traité de paix. J'indique simplement qu'en faisant votre déclaration de 1.948 vous aviez .souligné que le Traité de 1947 ne convenait pas à la situation de 1948. En réalité, votre 39. If your governments have chosen this course- l am addressing the representatives of h. ~ United States, the United Kingdom and France - you have no right henceforth ta say that "pacta sunt servanda". You have no right ta urge others ta disregard theirsacred duty - the fu1filment. of their obligations. Consequently, you have no right to !~ct as you are doing now. 40. The Securib-· Couneil is the Security Couneil; it cannot postpone its meetings for a reason such as Mr. Kyrou gave in propûsing the postponement of our meeting on the question of Trieste. He proposed that the con~ideration·of this question should be postponed untU the threePowers came to an understanding. Even if their negotiations were leading to a pe.aceful settle- ment of the question, that could not be a reasQn for postponing the consideration of this question in the Security Couneil, since the Couneil is not a suhsidiary or a department of any group of States or of any single State, no matter how influentiaI. The fact that someone, somewhere, is coming to an understanding about some- thing, cannot influence us in our work and in the eXecution of our duty. l am firmly convinced of that. No self-respecting memLer of the Security Council can agree to such a treatment of the matter, and if any mem~r should so agree, that would mean the end of the Security Couneil as an independent organ carrying out the polieies of the United Nations and not of separate groups. 41. We expect sometbing different: we expect the Security Couneil and the whole United Nations - which is a1ready being transformed into an organ and a tool of1:1::te foreign policy of certain groups of States - to reverf to·îts roie of a truly international organization carrying out its own "policy, a policyof joint partici- pation in this responsible and important work. 42. Article 34 of the Charter caIls on the Security Couneil to take the necessary measures, inc1uding the investigaûon of any question or dispute or situation, to promote a greater respect for peace and internatiçmal 43. Thus, Mr. 'Kyrou said that the most important thing was for the parties concerned to consult with each other. That is true, and 1 wholly agree that the parties concerned should consult each other on questions of international politics. 44. But do you not think that the Security Council is the proper place for such consultation? For what ohi.er purpose do the Security Council and the Charter, which governs its actions, exist? Is not the United Nations the place for consultations? We are told that we are right, büt that the chief parties concerned can consult each other outside the Security Council as well. Of course they can, but that should not prevent us from working. Let them consult each other, but we cau go on with our consultations here, and the division into the chief parties concerned and those whose concern is secondary is altogether incorrect and inacceptable, since we are dealing with a peace treaty signed by twenty-one States. . 45. In my opImon, every State which signed that treaty, no matter how small it is and how little weight it cames in international relations, has become one of the chief parties concerned through the act of signature, dnce there are two parties to any peace treaty: the vîctorsand the vanquished. Those who have signed with the victors are the chief parties. Those parties are .equal and have equal rights, and it is a great error to attempt todivide them, as Mr. Kyrou has been doing, into those chiefly concerned and those concerned in less degree. But certain of the principal parties, behind the back of the Security Council and of other interested States which signed the Treaty of Peace, have concocted a plan which finds its expression in the statement of 8 October and in the present understanding of the three great Powers with two others - Italy and Yugo- slavia - on the most effective ways of violating the Treaty. 46. The Soviet Union is profoundly convinced that, if we reach agreement here in the Security Council on the question, say, of the appointment of a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste, we shall have made a good start towards a peaceful settlement of the disputes which have arisen between Italy and Yugoslavia and the discords now raging in certain States, and towards ensuring, by the further adoption of reasonable, practical and necessary measures in respect of the Free Territory of Trieste, the strengthening of peace and international security in the south of Europe and consequently in Europe as a whole. And peace in Europe means world peace. 47. That is why 1 consider that this question mustnot he postponed. What is being attempted is not the post- ponement of this question for twoor thl"ee weeks, but Itspostponement until others have agreed behind our hacks on how to consign the Treaty of Peace with Italy ta final oblivion. Then, when the Council meets again after the three weeks' postponement proposed by Mr. Kyrou, we shaH be told: "Sînce we have come to 1 48. 1'0 sum up: 1 protest categorically against any postponement of the consideration of this question and against any attempt to consign'the Treaty of Peace to oblivion under the guise of furthering the negotiations which are being conducted behind the back of the Security Conncil and of other parties to the Treaty of Peace with Haly. It is more than two weeks since we submitted fuis item and nominated a distinguished and highly respected Swiss officer for the office of governor of the Free Territory of Trieste. That was enough to show our real purposes and intentions. Why are you opposed to dealing with the matter now? It is your duty to deal with it. 1 ask you not to postpone the consideration cf this question. .

l am deeply gratefnl to the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement, and that for two reasons. The first is that he has spoken in a quiet and dispassionate manuer, and l shall do my best to follow his example in th~s way. My second reason for being grateful to him is that he has indeed given, with 11is interventions, infinitely more arguments in favour of my procedural proposa!' than l could have done with rny poor oratory. . 50. \Vhen l o.skeà. for the postponement of the dis- cussion in my previous intervention at this meeting, 1 stated as follows: "1 do not think that l am wrong in stating that the general view of members of the Couneil, with one or, maybe, two exceptions, was on 20 October and remains today that the consideration at this juncture of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union would not be in the best interests of either the question itself or of the purposes assigned to this Council by the Charter." 51.. Mr. Vyshinsky has eloquently stressed how sensitive the region of Trieste is and what possibilities exist there for an explosion; Mr. Vyshinsky has spoken of an anti-eommunist campaign of propagandaslogans and of propaganda fights. He has even refe1""ed to the· recent signing of a treaty between Greece and the United States to which, with the President's permission, l shall refer later. 52. l think that the other members of this Council share my fear that the discussion of the Soviet draft resolution would stan in this body an East-West conflict- to quote one of those Latin phrases 50 dear to the hearrt of Mr. Vyshinsky - de omni re scibüi et qu.ibusdamt aliis. What would he the result of such a protracted discussion? What e~se.but the worsening of the situation? Even more, we wonld perhaps, un- wiHingly, contribute ta bringing about in this sensitive region of Trieste the explosion which Mr. Vyshinsky and all of us with him fear sa much. 50. Lorsque j'ai demandé l'ajournement des débats, au cours de ma précédente intervention, j'ai dit: "Je ne crois pas me tromper en d~clarant que les membres du Conseil, à une ou peut-être deux excep- tions près, ont estimé, le 20 octobre comme 'aujour- d'hui, qu'en examinant tout de suit~ le projet de résolution de l'Union soviétique, le Conseil ne servirait ni la cause de Trieste ni les fins que la Charte a assignées à ses travaux." 51. M. Vychinsky. nous a montré éloquemment à quel point la situation dans la région de Trieste était grosse de -1"ngers et quels étaient les risques d'explosion; M. Vychinsky a parlé d'une campagne anticommuniste menée à coups de slogans et de propagande. Il a même fait allusion à la signature récente d'un traité entre la Grèce et les Etats-Unis, auquel je me propose de revenir plus tard, avec la permission du Président. 52. Je pense que les autres membres du Conseil pensent comme moi que la discussion du projet de résolution de l'Union soviétique ferait naître dans le Conseil une opposition entre l'Est et l'Ouest ~e omni re scibili et qu,ibusdœm aliis, s'il m'est permtS d'employer une de ces citations latines qu'affectionne particulièrement M. Vychinsky. Quel serait le résultat d'une discussion prolongée de ce genre sinon .une aggravation de la situation? Bien plus, nouS poumons involontairement contribuer à déterminer, dans cette région de· Trieste si sensible, l'explosion <J.ue .,M. Vychinsky et nous tous redoutons tout parbcuhere- ment. proposa~. 54. 1 should like to say just a few words more, with the Council's permissiç>n, on the subject of the treaty signed, if 1 am correct, on 20 Octoher hetween my country and the United States. 55. That treaty was signed within the framework and spirit of Article 52 of the Charter. It is not at all anti-Soviet in character. Quite the contrary - and 1 should he grateful to Mr. Vyshinsky if he would believe me - the signature of the treaty is a friendly gesture towards the Soviet Union. My Government has tried and will continue to try to bring about better understanding between our small country and the Soviet Union. It has, however, found itself confronted bya stumbling b10ck in the shape of the feelings of the Greek people resulting from the hard ordeals through which that people has passed in recent years, from its e..'X:tremely bitter experiences and from the undeniable faet that its Cominform neighbours really are armed to the teeth, in flagrant violation of tlte peace treaties and, therefore, in flagrant violation of the formula so dear to Mr. Vyshinsky: «pacta su,nt servandd'. 1 am confident th8Jt, with the signature of this Greco-United States Treaty, our people will regain the feeling of security which will help my Government to bring about better understanding with the Soviet Union. 56. With the help of ~he arguments which Mr. Vyshinsky has been kind-enough to provide for me, l am again moving fOrnIally the postponement of .the discussion on the Soviet Union proposaI until Monday, 23 November.

r think it would he useful if 1 replied briefly to Mr. Kyrou, to make it even more clear why we object to a post- ponement of today's meeting. 58. We are again tqld by Mr. Kyrou that the sole argunientis· that it woùld he· inadvisable for the ~ecurity Council to discuss the item at the present tune. 59. Is it considered, 1 wonder, that 23 November will be a more suitable date? vVhat are :the grounds for suell an assumption? What is meant by a suitable date? Let us consider this and try to find an answer. What is the situation likely to he on 23 Novemher? The first possibility, it seems to me, is that the five Powers may reach agreement on how they consider the Free Territory of Trieste should best he partioned ~nd what course of action is best calculated to carry lUto effect the. plan 1 have already mentioned and ~vhich was made public by the United States Press lU reporting Mr. Dulles' statement of 27 October. This, 1 think, is the tirst possibility, namely, that the me~t conflicts with the obligattions laid down in the Treaty of Peace with Italy, they will commit a breach of t1lat treaty. In our view, that would be wrong. The Treaty of Peace must he observed. and not infringed. 62. Thus ,the first possibility on which Mr. Kyrou's proposaI for postponing the discussion of the question here is based- a discussion which would mean the drafting of measures for the implementation of the Treaty of Peace with Italy-is unsound. Mr. Kyrou's first assumption is unsound. Mr. Kyrou urges us to postpone the discussion in order not to impede the five Powers from reaching agreement. We would ask him: "On what measures is agreement to he reached? On what measures do you expect them to agree?" The answer is: '.'Measures contrary to the Treaty ofPeace with Italy, that is, 'the violation of that treaty." 63. There are absolutely no grounds for postponing a meeting of the Security Council on' that account, since we cannot be partiesif:o an infringement of the Treaty of Peace. 64. If the five Powers do not reach agreement by then, the situation will he the same as it is today when they have not yet reached agreement. As Mr. Kyrou ml1st he very well aware, the agreement in question will he reached at the cost of infringing the Treaty of Peace with ltaly. That treaty came into force on 15 Septemher 1947 and the section of it relating to the Free Territory of Trieste, the question now hefore us, bas not yet heen carried into effect. Accordingly, to postpene the meeting of the Security Council until the five Powers agree on how to continue to evade the implementation Of the Treaty would be illegal. The argument stated by Mr. Kyrou is thus an enjoinder ~=~~=to commit illegal acts involvingthe infringement of the Treaty of Peace with Italy; and in my view the Securïty Council cannot countenance such a course. That will he the situation of 23 Novemher, if the five Powers reach agreement among themselves on the . question. 65. If, however, they do not reach agreement - the secon.dpossibility - the situation will he the same as it is today. Why then should we postpone discussing the question today when we may find oUl'selves in precisely the same position on 23 November? . 66. A third poInt. Ï amconvinced that on 23 Novem- ber, if the five Powers have not reached agreement, 154. Si les cinq Puissances n'arrivent pas à un accord .d'ici là, la situation ne sera pas différente dè celle que nous connaissons actuellement, alors qu'il n'existe pas d'accord. En fait, M. Kyrou doit bien s'en rendre compte, l'a<::cord va à l'encontre du Traité de paix avec l'Italie, qui est entré en vigueur le. 15 septembre 1947 et qui, jusqu'ici, n'a pas été suivi d'exécution en ce qui concerne le Territoire libre de Trieste. Par conséquent, il est illégal d'ajourner la seance du Conseil de sécurité jusqu'à ce que les cinq puissances se soient entendues sur la façon de ne plus exécuter ce traité. Le motif qu'a invoqué M. Kyrou est donc un appel à des mesures illégales liées à la violation .du Traité de paix avec l'Italie; le Conseil de sécurité, à mon avis, ne peut aucunement approuver ces mesures. Voilà quelle 'sera la situation l,e 23 novembre, si les cinq Puissances aboutissent à un accord sur cette question. 65. Deuxième hypothèse. Si l'accord ne se fait pas, la situation sera semblable à celle dans laquelle nous n011S trouvons aujourd'hui. Dans ce cas, à quoi bon ajourner aujourd'hui la discussion de la question, alors que le·23 novenlDre nous pourrons nous trouver dans la même' situation? 66. Troisième considération..Je suis intimement per- sualié que,lorsque arrivera le 23 novembre, si les cinq 67. l consider therefore that there is no justification for postponing the question. It is of course possible to postpone it; at any rate, we have postponed many questions from one day to the next. We recently postponed for sorne time the question of :the dispute between Israel and the Arab counmes. But l ask ~ can it be that in that case also there was no justifi- cation for postponing the question? Did we want a certain party to come to an agreement with another party? Of course not. Nor, in spite of the fact that it would he very desirable and very imporotant for the French Government to come to an agreement with the authorities in Morocco and Tunisia and to settle the Moroccan and Tunisian questions peace- fully, without detriment to the interests of peace, did we post-pone those questions, but considered them here. 68. In my opinion, the reasons given by Mr. Kyrou are. quite invalid. But what is to De donj:? There is a saying: "When there is no qested paper to he had, ordinary paper will have to do." Nothing can come of ,such an approach. We' insist on the observance of the Treaty of Peace. We are told to wait until the live Powers come to an agreement. What are they to agree about? On how best to violate the Treaty of Peace, for the objective, Mr. Kyrou, is the partition of the Free Territory of Trieste, a territory which, under the Treaty, should be united and organized in a manner quite different from that now heing proposed in the negotiations in progress in that area. 69. At first it was proposed to violate the Treaty of Peace by giving the whole of the Free Territory of Trieste to ltaly. That would be a flagrant violation of the Treaty, and l should like to hearsome objections from you on that 'score. Perhaps you consider that sucb a course_ would be in perfeot conformity with the Treaty? In that case, your attitude would be more intelligible to me. But you said nothing to the effect that that would not be a violation; that is a point on.which all my colleagues are silent. If you ,wish to take .that line and demonstrate that such a course would not be a violation of the Trea,.ty, then let us discuss the matter at that leveI. But you do not say that. Yet the fact remains that such a course would he a flagrant violation of the Treaty. Your statement of 20 March· 1948 was a flagrant breach of the Treaty. No one can deny that. . 70. Furthermore, the declaration of 8 October 1953 says that Zone A is to he given to Italy. That also would he a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Peace, ~hich provided for a quite different arrangement 1ll the matter of the Free Territory of Trieste; it provided that a governorwas to be appointed, that there was to be a.council of government, tha,.t the Territory was to have its oWli constitution and that there was to be a constituent assembly. So far, how- .ever, nothing has come of those provisions. Under the Treaty of Peace, Italian sovereignty over Trieste Was to be terminated .upon the coming into force 68. A mon avis, les motifs qu'a invoqués M. Kyrou ont un caractèl.~ parfaitement artificiel. Qr.e va-t-on faire? Comme on dit: "A défaut de grives, on mange des merles." Une telle façon de procéder n'aboutira à rien. Nous insistons pour que le Traité de paix soit respecté. On nous dit d'attendre que les cinq Puissances s'entendent. S'entendre 'Sur quoi? Sur la meilleure façon de violer le Traité de paix, parce que, Monsieur Kyrou, il s'agit du partage du Terri- toire libre de Trieste, qui, aux termes du Traité de paix, doit être unifié et organisé d'une manière toute différente de celle que l'on se propose d'adopter, d'après les négociations qui y ont lieu actuellement. 69. Dès le début, on a 'Songé à violer le Traité de paix pour donner à l'Italie tout le Territoire libre de Trieste. C'est là une violation flagrânte du Traité de paix, et je voudrai's vous entendre protester àce sujet. Peut-être pensez-vous que cela est conforme au Traité de paix?' Dans ce cas, je comprendrais votre attitude. Mais vous n'avez pas dit que ce n'f.:tait pas uneviolation; d'ailleurs, tous mes collègues passent cette question sous silence. Si vous persistez dans cette voie et si vous dites que ce n'est pas une vio- lation, nous envisagerons la question sous cet angle-là. Mais vous ne le dites pas. Et pourtant, il s'agit là d'une violation flagrante. Votre déc1ara,.tion du 20 mars 1948 était en contradiction absolue avec lé Traité de paix. Personne ne saurait le nier. 70. Ensuite, il est dit dans la déclaration du 8 octobre 1953 que la zone A sera attribuée à l'Italie. Cela est également une violation flagrante du: Traité de paix, qui envisage la situation d'un point de vue é"'térent: suivant ce texte, un gouverneur sera nommé; lA. aura un conseil de gouvernement, une constitu- tion, une .assemblée· constituante. Mais, jusqu'ici, aucune de ces institutions n'existe. Suivant le Traité de paix, l'Italie perd son autorité sur Trieste dès l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de paix. Naturellement, c'est désagréable pour l'Italie. Je le comprends. Mais ce n'est pas pour ne pas exécuter le Traité qu'elle 72. May l also refer to my observation regarding the agreement between the United States and Greece. 73. Mr. Kyrou referred to Article 52 of the Charter. Article 52, however, speaks of regional arrangements. What ldnd of regional arrangement can there he between the United States and Greece, which are severa! thousand miles away from each other? What actually is a regional arrangement? It is an arrange- ment between countries be10nging to a particular area. As we know, however, even the North Atlantic Treaty is represented as a regional arrangement, although it inc1udes areas bordering on L'le Pacifie. And now it is proposed to bring in a.r->..as bordering on the Mediterranean. We know that this is not the first time such attempts have been made. The first niistake, therefore, is a legal one: such an agreement can in no way he considered to correspond to .the concept of a regional arrangement. Article 52 of the Charter bas nothing to do with the case. That is the first point. 74. In the second place, we know that the real purpose of the arrangement is to give the United States, under the agreement in question, an absolutely unliroited right to use Greek territory for the establish- ment of United States military bases. Thus, the United States is acquiring control over a certain part of the territory of Greece with a view to organizing military bases in that territory. On the eve of the signature of the agreement between Greece and the United States, the New· York H erald Tribune wrote that Britain's fifty years of active political influence in Greece were coming to an end. We have to go further and say if the era of ;British i.11fluence has com..e.to an end, the agreement between the United States and Greece marks the beginning of the era of United States influence. What ldnd of influence? Well, to avoid using phrases which cause annoyance in some quarters, l shall siroply say that it is an influence the purpose of which hàs nothing whatever to do with the purposes of the Charter, to which, incidentally, Ml". Kyrou referred. 75. And that brings me back to Article 52 of the Charter. Ml". Kyrou says that Article 52 is applicable to this case. But in the context to which he related it, Article 52 is quite inapplicable, because it makes the reservation that regional arrangements must also satisfy the requirements, Purposes and Principles of the Charter; But the Charter nowhere proclaims the principle that one State may receive .. the territory of another State for the purpose of organizing its military bases in that territory. You will not deny, Ml". Kyrou, that the agreement gives that right· to the United States ? The rererence to Article 52 of the Charter, therefore, is incorrect. The agreement is not in accordance with the principles and purposes which, under our Charter, agreements should satisfy. 74. D'autre part, nous savons qu'en réalité il s'agit, dans cet accord, de donner àux Etats-Unis le droit illimité d'utiliser le territoire grec pour y établir des bases militaires. Ainsi, une certaine partie du terri- toire de la Grèce est soumise à l'autorité des Etats- Unis en vue de l'organisation de bases militaires dans ce territoire. A la veille de la signature de l'accord gréco-américain, le New York Herald Tribune a déclaré que la période d'influence politique du Royau- me-Uni en Grèce, qui avait duré cinquante ans, était terminée. Il faut aller plus loin et dire: si cette période d'influence britannique est terminée, que mar- que cet accord entre les Etats-Unis et la Grèce, si ce n'est le début de l'ère d'influence des Etats-Unis? Et de quelle influence s'agit-il? Eh bien, pour éviter d'employer une formule qui pourrait irriter certains, je dirai simplement: une influence qui vise des fins qui n'ont absolument rien de commun avec les buts de la Charte, auxquels, d'ailleurs, s'est référé M. Kyrou. 75. A ce propos, permettez-moi de revenir à l'Arti- cle 52 de la Charte. M. Kyrou dit que l'Article 52 est applicable à la présente situation. Mais cet Arti- cle ne s'applique nullement à ce qu'il vient de dire, car il prévoit que les accords régionaux doivent égale- ment .être compatibles avec les buts et les principes de la Charte. La Charte ne proclame nulle part le principe selon lequel un Etat pourrait recevoir des territoirès d'un autre Etat pour y établir ses bases militaires. Vous ne contesterez certainement pas, Mon- sieur Kyrou, que l'accord en question donne ce droit aux Etats-Unis? Aussi est-ce à tort que vous vous référez à l'Article 52. Cet accord n'est pas compatible avec les. principes et les huts de notre Charte. 78. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Répuhliques socialistes soviétiques) (tnuJuit dû russe): Monsieur le Président, je dois évidemment prendre note de votre injonction et m'y conformer. Lorsque je serai Président, j'exigerai moi-même que: DUS les membres du Conseil de sécurité se conforment à mes injonc- tions, sur la base de la réciprocité. Je n'aborderai pas la question des bases américaines, puisqut cette question vous semble hors de propos, bien qu'à mon avis elle soit au contraire très à propos..Mais il n'y a rien à faire. J'obéis. J'espère cependant avoir le droit de parler de l'accord entre la Grèce et les Etats-Unis, de cet accord dont j'ai parlé plus d'une fois déjà sans que vous m'ayez interrompu, et dont M. Kyrou également a parlé sans que vous lui ayez coupé la parole. J'espère que vous ne m'interromprez pas non plus aujourd'hui. 79. Je comprends, certes, qu'il est impossible de traiter cette question en détail, que c'est même inutile. Telle n'est pas mon intention. Je n'ai nullement l'in- tention d'attaquer, pour ainsi dire, la Grèce à ce sujet; Je veux seulement la citer en exemple, en critiquant la façon incorrecte dont M. Kyrou a présenté le problème ici, au Conseil de sécurité, en· proposant l'ajournement de la question. 80. J'ai fait état de l'accord avec les Etats-Unis, alors que lui a fait état de l'Article 52 de la Charte. Puis-je en parler? Si je ne peux pas exprimer toute ma pensée, ce ·sera votre faute, Monsieur le Pré- sident; mais je m'efforcerai tout de même de le faire. 81. Je veux dire que l'accord entre les Etats-Unis et la Grèce ne correspond pas à l'Article 52; en consé- quence, ceux qui militent en faveur de l'application de la Charte, en particulier M. Kyrou - et j'ai beau- coup de respect et de sympathie pour cette attitude - ont tort lorsqu'ils mentionnent l'Article 52. L'accord intervenu entre la Grèce et les Etats-Unis prouve que le Gouvernement grec a commencé à appliquer des mesures ayant directement pour but la préparation d'une ,nouvelle guerre, lorsque, à cet effet, il a mis le territoire de la Grèce à la disposition des forces armées des Etats-Unis. 81.. '1 want to say that the agreement between the Ul1lted States and Greece has nothing. to do with Article 52, and that consequently those who urge us ta abide by the Charter - in particular Mr. Kyrou, whose attitude in that respect l share entirely - are wrong in invoking Article 52. The agreement concluded hetween Greece and the United States shows that the Greek Government has begun to put into effect measures directly aimed at preparing for another war, .in that it has placed the territory of Greece at the disposaI of the armed forces 6f'the United States, to he used f~r that very purpose. 83. Any further delay in the consideration of the Trieste question by the Seeurity Council will mean that the Secunty Council is washing its hands of the matter. l warn it against taking that course because such a decision - in the same way as agreements like the one recently concluded between the United States and certainother Powers - is likely to lead to a violation of the peace, and would be prejudicial to the maintenance of international peace and secunty. l therefore repeat: l categorically object to any post- ponement of the consideration of the question of Trieste, or rather, of the question of the appoint- ment of a governor of Trieste, which would he a fust step in the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Italy. We must go back to a policy of executing the Treaty of Peace with Italy, and l call upon the Seeunty Council to take that course.

l callon the representative of Greece and would ask him to be as brief and as uncontroversial as possible. 8S. MI". KYROU (Greece): l shall abide by the President's request. l have scrupulously retained from speaking on the substance of the question. My onty point - which has been proven completely correct by this protracted, although preliminary, debate - . has been that a discussion of the merits of the Soviet draft resolution before us would adversely affect any chances of a peaceful seulement. Wihen we disctiss the substance of the question, l shall speak to MI". Vyshinsky's hem's· content on the Greco-United States Treaty and on Article S2 of the Charter; l repeat- de omn.i re scibili et quibusdam aliis.

l caU on the representative of the Soviet Union and ma1œ the same request to him as l did to the Greek representative. l hope he too will accede to it. 87. MI". VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (tran.slated from Russiatn): l trust that the President will not be.disappointed. l shouldmerely like to point out that MI". Kyrou gave no explanation, and thaï l therefore have no alternative but to wait until the next meeting for his "omn.ibus"• 83. Si le Conseil de sécurité diffère à nouveau l'exa- men de la question de .Trieste, cela voudra dire qu'il se lave les mains de cette affaire. Je mets le Conseil en garde contre une telle décision, car cette mesure, de même que divers accords tels que celui qui vient d'être signé par les Etats-Unis et certaines Puissances, comportent l~ risque d'une violation de la paix et desservent la cause de la paix et de la sécurité inter- nationales. C'est pourquoi, je le répète, je m'élève résolumem contre tout ajournement de l'examen de la question de Trieste, ou plutôt de la question de la désignation d'un gouverneur pour Trieste, qui est le premier pas dans l'exécution du Traité de paix avec l'Italie. Il faut en revenir à l'exécution du Traité de paix avec l'Italie, et c'est à cela que je convie le Conseil de sécurité. 84. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole au repré- sentant de la Grèce pour une intervention que je le prie instamment dé rendre aussi· courte et aussi peu controversable que possible. 8S. M. KYROU (Grèce) (traduit de l'œnglais): Je me conformerai à la del11and.e du Président. Jerne suis scrupuleusement abstenu de parler du fond de la question. Mon seul propos - dont ce débat pro- longé, bien que préliminaire, a prouvé le bien-fondé- était de montrer qu'un· examen du projet de résolution soviétique quant au fond réduirait les chances de règlement pacifique. Lorsque nous examinerons le fond de la question, je parlerai longuement, pour 'Satisfaire M. Vychinsky, du traité conclu entre la Grèce et les Etats-Unis, de l'Article S2 de la Charte, et de omni re scibili et quibusdam aliis. 86. Le PRESIDENT: Je donne la parole au repré- sentant de l'Union 'soviétique en lui adressant le même appel qu'à son collègue grec, avec l'espoir qu'il voudra bien en tenir le même compte. 87. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiq~es socialistes soviétiques) (traduit du russe): J'espere que le Président ne sera. pas déçu. Jetiens seuleme~t à constater que M. Kyrou n'a donné aucune exph- cation; il ne me reste. donc qu'à attendre son discours de o'11U~ibus rebus à la prochaine séance. Abstaining: Lebanon. The proposal was adopted by 9 votes ta 1, with 1 abste'lItion. The meeting rose at 1.25 p.'1'1l-. FUIIeE Editions A. Pedone. 13. rue soumot, Paris V.. AlGMIIIA - AlGEIlUIIE Edilorial Sudamericana S.A.. Aisina 500. Buenos Aires. 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