S/PV.636 Security Council

With thePresident's permission, 1 should like to take this opportunity to comment on the s'tatement made by the Israel represen- tative on 30 Octoberl1953 [633rd meeting]. 1 shall try to give the Council I~ome information about the work which h3,s been going on until recent1y in the dewJli- tarized zone and is being continued beyond the zone since the Council's last decision in this matter. 1 would " Président: M. H. HOPPENOT (France). Présents: Les représentants des pays suivants: Chili, Chine, Coiombie, Danemark, France, Grèce, Liban, Pakistan, Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Ordre du jour pr-cvisoire (SIAgenda/636/Rev.l) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. La question de Palestine Plainte formulée par la Syrie contre Israël au sujet des travaux entrepris sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain dans la zone démilitarisée. Adoption de l'ordre du j~ur L~ordre du jour est a-lopté. La question de Palestine "Plainte formulée par la Syri~ contre Isr.rel au su- jet des travallX entrepris sur la rive occiden.. tale du Jomodain dans la zone démilitarisée (S/3108) [suite] Sur l'invitation d1t Président~ M. Eban~ représentant d'Israël, M. Zeineddine, représentant de la Syrie, et le général Bennike, Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies chargé de la surveillance de la trêve en Palestine, prennent place à la table du Conseil. 1. Le PRESIDENT: Je dois, tout d'abord, porter à la connaissance du Conseil la lettre suivante que je viens de recevok du général Bennike, Chef d'état- major de l'Organisme chargé de la surveillance de la trêve, et qui est datée du 10 novembre 1953: "Dans ma lettre du 30 octabre 1953, qui a été lue à la. 633ème séance du Conseil de sécurité, j'ai porté à la connaissance du Conseil que tous travaux se rapportant à la constructian du canal projeté entre le Jourdain et le lac de Tibériade avaient cessé "dans la zone démilitarisée. Seuls quelques ouvriers bouchaient des fentes dans le barrage en béton à rentrée du canal. "rai l'honneur de porter aujourd'hui à la connais- sance du Conseil de sécurité que les observateurs des Nations Unies ont constaté le 1er novembre que ce travail avait également cessé." . 2. M. ZEINEDDINE (Syrie) (traduit de l'anglais): Avec la permission du Président, je voudrais saisir cette occasion pour présenter quelques observations au sujet de la déclaration que le représentant d'Israël a faite le 30 octobre 1953 [633ème séance]. Je m'efforcerai de donner au Conseil quelques renseignements sur les travaux qui se sont poursuivis jusqu'à ces derniers temps dans la zone démilitarisée et qui, depuis la der- 3. Let me begin by presenting sorne general ideas concerning the statement of the Israel representative before l comment on it point by point. 4. The Israel representative's statement was, in essence, a repetition of the contents of the note wbich the Israel a.uthorities addressed to the United Nations Chief of Staff on 24 September [S/3122, annex II], to which General Bennike had already replied in bis note of 20 October [S/3122, annex IIIJ and in his report of 2.3 October [S/3122] which has been transITIltted to the Counci!. We have eagerly awaited some evolution in the position· of the Government of Israel since Mr. Sharett's last move on 24 September; but it bas not materialized. No new· issues have been raised by the Israel representative in ms statement before :le Counci1. Mr. Eban stuck to bis previous position and did not depart from it. It is evident that the Israel authorities have in the meantime, forgotten nothing nor leamed anytbmg. Yet, the Israel representative on the Security Cooocil went on to explain in detail the Israel con- sideranda and conclusions, thus contributing greatly to. ~'Osing the Israel position and rendering the Security Counci1 more able to see the existing contrast between the Israel stand and that of the United Nations Chief cf Staff. 5. In a waYl the present issue is developing into a two-fold one: on the one hand, we have the opposition between the United Nations authority and Israel uni- lateral actions in defiance of that authority; on the other hand, we hfl.ve a dispute between Syria and the Israel authorities as to the rights of Syria under the terms of the General Armistice Agreement-and Sytia's objection to the unwarranted unilateral actions of these authorities in defiance of tha:t Agreement. Ac- cordingto the Israel view, the Agreement should now !Je tottering towards a state of obsolescence and paralysls. Israel wants. to free itself from the Agreement by wa:y of a unilateral interpretation of it. 6. It appears.however, that there are no differences of viewbetween Syria and the competent United Nations authority in the area. We believe that General Bennike's decision,so far as it goes, is right. We holà, however, that it does not go far enough to meet the actual circumstances. 7. The Zionist thesis, shom of its misrepresentations, reduces itself to the following main elements: 8. In the first place, Syrla, a party to the Armistice Agreement, has, according to t4at thesis, no right to interfere, object or consent to the Interpretation of the Arrni.stice Agreement,. its implementation or· non-imple- m.entàtion .or the-carrying out of its provisions and oblig'd.tions. Israel's reason is that the issue 1S extraneous ta the Armistice Agreement. That is, aï least, what it appears to q~~We hold that it isan.issue directIy govemed by the -Agreement. The Israeli try to evade ~. Qu'il me soit permi;; de commencer par quelques observations générales sur la déclaration du représen- tant d'Israël avant de l'examiner point par point. 4. La déclaration du représentant d'Israël est, en réa- lité, une répétition àe la note que les autorités israé- liennes ont adressée au Chef d'état-major des Nations Unies le 24 septembre [S/3122, annexe II] et à la- quelle le général Bennike 11 déjà répondu par sa note en date du 20 octobre [S/3122, annexe III] et par son rapport en date du 230c.tobre [S/3122] qui a été com- muniqué au Conseil. Nous avons impatiemment attendu une évoiution .de l'attitude du Gouvernement d'Is- raël, mais, depuis la dernière déclaration de M. Sharett, aucun fait nouveau n'est intervenu. La décla- ration du représentant d'Israël devant le Conseil n'a soulevé aucun problème nouveau. M. Eban s'en est tenu à sa position antérieure, sans s'en écarte!". Il est clair que, dans l'intervalle, les autorités israéliennes n'Gllt rien oublié et rietl appris. Cependant, leur représentant au Conseil a entrepris d'exposer en détailles considé- rations et les conclusions de la délégation israélienne. Il a .contribué par là à faire la lu..'llière sur la position d'Israël, mettant ainsi· le Conseil de sécurité mieux en mesure de constater les divergences qui existent entre la position d'Israël et celle du Chef d'état':major des Nations Unies. 5. On peut dire que l'affaire dont le Con.seilest actuel- lement saisi se présente maintenant sous un double aspect l nous avons, d'une part, l'opposition entre l'auto- rité des Nations Unies et l'action unilatérale que le Gouvernement israélien entreprend au mépris de cette autorité, et, d'autre part, un différend entre la Syrie et les autorités d'Israël au sujet des droits de la Syrie en vertu de la Convention d'armistice général l ainsi que les objections de la Syrie aux mesures injustifiées que les autorités israéliennes ont prises unilatéralement au mépris de la Convention. Dans l'optique des Israé- liens, il faudrait con~idérer la ConventiQn comme un instrument dont le caractère inopérant ne cesse de s'ac- centuer jusqu'à la désuétude finale. Les autorités d'Israël veulent se libérer de cette convention en l'inter- prétant à leur manière. 6. Cependant, il n'y a pas de divergences d'opinion entre laSvrie .et l'autorité compétente des Nations Unies dans la région. Nous estimons que la décision du général Bennike est fondée. Mais nous pensons qu'elle ne va pas assez loin, vu les circonstances. 7. La thèse sioniste, si l'on iait abstraction des fcits qu'elle déforme, se réduit aux points suivants: R En prem;ex- lieu, la Syrie, qui est··partie· à la .Con- vention d'armistice, n'aurait pas le droit d'intervenir dans l'interprétation de cette convention, de contester ou d'approuver son application, sa non-appliC'd.tion ou la mise en œuvre des dispositions ou des obligations qu'elle renferme. L'argument de la délégation israélienne est - ou du m9ins paraît être - que l'affaire est étrangère à la COI!vention d'armistice. Nous prétendons, nous, qU~ l'affaire est directement liée à la Convention. Le's l Voir Procès-verbau:ç officiels du .Oonseil de sécJlrité, qflfJtrième année, Supplément spécial NiiZ~ 9 The second main element of the Israel thesis, it appears, 5s that th~ resto~ation of civi~an life in the demilitanzed zone IS not mtended for ItS Arab-Israel inhabitants as such, but is rat.h.er intended to bring about gradually the practical annexation of that zone to Israel, so that a concession, said to be given by the Palestine Gover:nment, would become applicable as an administrative measure to that particular demilitarized area. The Israel authorities, through the project, would be able ultiMately to control the waters and the whole civilian life of that area. This would a1low the Israel authorities to exercise acts of sovereignty over the zone. Those activities of Israel hang together and cannot be di' œd from one another, because Israel cannot pro- ceed to work in that Arab area except by exercising sovereignty through its forces there; nor cpuld it throw a legal cloak over its activities except by introducing a so-called company to the scene in order that it may act as an agency behind which the authorities of Israel stand armed. We sha11 have a good deal to say about this aspect of the question in a few moments. 10. The third main element of the Israel thesis, as we see it, is that the decision of the United Nations Chief of Staff is unwarranted; he has no real authority in the matter, or e1se he is abusing his authority. In support of this view, they present two main reasons: fust, that the attitude of General Benn~ke is inconsistent with United Nations jurisprudence on such matters and, secondly, that he can have no authority beyond that which each side to the Agreement wishes to give him. The United Nations Chief of Staff replies to this view by glving his decision and explanation. The gist of his answer is that he has authority and that, if he were to act only as one of the two sides to the Agreement would like mm to ad, there would be anarchy in the area. 11. The fourth main e1ement of the Israel thesis con- sists of a total negation of the international character of the Jordan River. According to this thesis, neither Syria nor Lebanon nor the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordanhas anything to say as to how the waters ofthis typically international river between Lakes Huleh and Tiberias are ta be used.When the international agree- ments of 1922, 1923 and 1926 concerning these waters are thought of, or when other cOl1siderationsare thought of, Israe1simplydiscards them. To Israel, there is only one fundamental facto Mr. Eban expressed it when· he simply called the River Jordan "our river". According to that position, nobody except Israel has a word to say about the use of the waters of the Jordan. If there are established rights concerning the use of the waters, then Israel might make - to use Israel wording - an ex gratia undertaking which may be invoked. Even then, judgillg fromexperience, we feel sure that the same Israel authorities would notcarry out such an undertaltdng to an)' extent Besides, with the existing established rights go the potentialities for futur~ use 12. Finally, the Israel thesis consists of a fifth element which is the . claim that military considerations are irrelevant under the Armistice Agreement, although the armistice is based exc1usively on military considerations. 13. Generally speaking, therefore, the Israel thesis appears to cot'c;ist of the following: no right on the part of Syria to object or consent to Israel actions; no real authe,rity of the United Nations Chief of Staff to make theJ1'. abide by his decisions; no restoration of normal d~,Aian life to the demilitarized zone except to ensure ' :ts control by Israel; no international rights of other countrieson the international river; no relevance of military considerations in an armistice. 14.' This is a set of negations which leads to on!y one positive result: the possibility for Israel ·to act uni- laterally in the whole matter and to proceed in the demilitarized zone to divert the Jordan River. 15. Mr. Eban did not hesitate to give some of his reasons. He did not seek them in the Armistice Agree- ment to which he hardly madr any reference. He a:voided the Agreement because i~ really does not offer him a shadow of a reason. unableltofind reason.s. in the international agreements or· in th decisions of General Bennike, he discarded them an paid lip service to ititernational authonty. trrtimatel , Île discovered .his reasons on an altogethèr different plane; he found them solely in t.\e Israel wish to acquïre the waters of the Jordan., which he called "our river". That project is a fascinating one, although that very project may turn the demilitarized zone and Syrian territory watered by the Jordan into a wasteland, as General Bennike has said, although that project may also deny the poten-' tialities of the Jordan to other countries legitimately interested, and although it destroys the basic character of the demilitarized zone as a buffer zone under inter- national supervision separating the two sides and minimizing friction and incidents. For Mr. Eban, it is now to be considered as a project solely on the merits of its e~onomic. and military benefits to Israel, to the exclusion of many other possible international economic projects which are being or will be contemplated. 16. Harassed by the aforesaid negations, Israel feels it morefitting to cloak its unilateral action, if possible, in sorne semblance of international authority. In seeking to cloak its unilateral.action in international autbority, Israel has already tried one niethod and is now trying another. .17. It sought, but did not obtain, the concurrence of the United Nations Chief of Staff. The most amusing tIrlng is that it held its own letter-the Israelletter- of .4 September to. thy acting Chief of Staff.to .be a f0nfirmatio~~.given by.hîm to Israel actions, even though lt had forwarded this letter to <the United Nations observers on the basis of tendent·ous information previously furnished by Israel about the scope and nature of the project. General B~e referred tQ that i~:h :m, je laisse au Çhefd'état-ma:jor le soin -de se prononcer en la matière~ . ."Ii ne suit pas que le pro'- jet du creusement du canal ait recueilli l'approbation nécessaire 'à. sa mise en œuvre. iLa lettre duChef de la' délégation d'Israël, en date du 4 septembre, qui faisait suite aux conversations du 2 et du 3 septembre, au cours desquelles on avait exposé au Président par in- térim les grandes lignes du N orthern Irrigation Pro:'" ject, ne saurait remplacer une approbation formelle donnée après examen du planet des répercussions qu'il pourrait avoir." . 18. Le second procédé par lequel les autori"ésisraé- liennes cherchent à couvrir leurs actions unilatérales par un semblant d'autorité internationale,; nous le· voyons en. ce moment. mis. en œuvre au Conseil. On ,s'efforce' d'amener le Conseil à prendre une. décision d'un caractère, mal. défini, vagqe et sans cohésion, en vue de laisser à Israël un nombre suffisant d'échappa- toires pour agir surplace de manière unilatérale, par des interventions dites individuelles. Il convient d'étu- dier cette méthode, que M. Eban a commencé à dév~­ 10ppeJ; dans sa déclaration qui en a montré les aspects principaux. 19. Avec sa verve habituelle, il a présentê devant te Conseil un certain 11,Ombre d'opinions contradictoires et d'allégations qui r-rêtent à confusion, ·fout cela. en vue· d'obscurcir la question et d'ouvrir à Israël la voie d'une action injustifiée et unilatiërale tant par la forme que par le fond, mais qui revêtirait une forme extérieure et une apparence inte1.'l1ationales. ' : 20. M. Eban a évité autant que possible le problème actuel et réel de. la mise en: œuvre de la ..Convention d'armistice; au lieu de cela, il a préféré s'occu~r d'autres questions. Il a présenté cette entreprise, mais, même en la présentant, il s'est gardé de jeter.la lumière sur les conséquences que nombre de ses aspeetspour- ra.ient entraîner, tout en éclairant le reste comme il lui a plu. .. . 5 it 18. The second process for cloaking unilateral action in sorne kind of international authority is going on here now. Tt aims at bringing about a Council decision indefinite in character, vague and loosely knit, so that that decision may leave sufficient loopholes for Israel ta 'act unilaterally on the spot through so-called individual actions. Let us look into this process' that Mt. Eban started to develop' in his staterilent, which made'its main features c1ear. . 19..With his nsual brilliance, Ml'. Eban placed before the COUncil a number of what l would calI contradictory opinions and' misleading allegations. That wasall intended, it seems, to blur th{ .vision and to open for Is~ae1'1:he way to an action which is unwarranted and unIlateral·in substancè and content but international in outward form and appearance. . , 20.J\1:r. Eban ayoidedas much as he could the present and re.al questi()n of the impleiT.e1itati6ïî-'Üf-the'Ar~istice Agreèment andwent, iristead, into other fields. He presented th/" project, but even in presenti~git he kept Its consequences and many of its asoects in the shade, while painting the l'est with.the colottrs of his taste. 22. The choice.at present is clear: cither the fuU implementation of the Armistice Agreement and the màintenance of peace, or a.decision which will deform the meaning of that Agreement, leaving little ot no value to its provisions. 23. The second choice, if taken, would be a hard experience indeed. It would meanthat the Armistice Agreement was a thing made to be hroken at will. It would indicate that agreements and international guarantees of any kind were of no real value in stopping Zionist expansion into the demilitarized zone and beyond the demilitarized zone. It would put the same question to. the Arabs around Palestine that was put ta the Arabs within Palestine, the Arabs that are now refugees, the question "to he or not to he". I(the very existence· of a nation is threatened through lack of proper international action, its' right of self-defence wouldhecomeanineluctable force dominating its mind. It would IlO longer bé in doubé. That i5 the moral of the present dispute. 24. In aU earnestness ànd with a sincere endeavour to keep peace, we have come hefore the Security Coun- cil. He1p 'lS to keep .peace. We will try to do our part in order to sustaiu p~ceful efforts. Our pritnary duty at this moment i5 to è6usider the present question pro- perlyand objectively. My first duty is to try to sweep ~'1.Uraient à se poser la même question que les Arabes à l'intérieur des frontières de la.Palestine,. réfugiés à l'heure actuelle, à savoir la question <fl<être ou ne pas être". Si l'existence même d'une nation est mise en danger par l'absence d'une .itttervention internationale adéquate, son droit de défense légitime deviendra une force inéluctable qui dominera sa pensée. Ce droit ne serait m~me plus mis en doute. Telle est la morale du différend'actuel. 24. Animés d'un dêsir actif. et sincère de maintenir la paix, nous sommes venus devant vous. Aidez-nous à la, maintenir. Nous nous efforcerons de jouer notre rôle en vue de poursuivre nos efforts pacifiques. Notre premier devoir en ce-moment est d'étudier le problème actuel comme il se doit et en toute objectivité. Je doiS 25. First, l want to deal with the distinction between the present situation and the situation in 1951. In order to sustain his stand on the question of the diversion of t.he Jordan, the Israel representative had to resort to a subterfuge. l dislike using such terms·as "misrepre- sentations", "subterfuge" and the like, but they .aTe the only terms that can clarify such a mode of thi.iking. Mr. Eban gratuitously affirmed in his statement that the Huleh project discussed by the Security Council in April and May 1951 is practically identièal with the present project in respect to military and other im- plications. He stated [6331'd meeting] : "The project under discussion is just asbeneficial, Just as compatible with the Armistice Agreement, just as legci.l and. just as reconcilable .with every legitimate affected interest as was the protect for the drainage of the Huleh marshes ..." 26. This argument is contrary to fact. Mr. Eban used it, however, as a basié premise froin which he deduced that the present prcject shouldbe dealt with by the Counçil in the same way as it dealt with the questio.n in 1951. Mr. Eban stated: "The armistice system cannot operate honestly or effectively if there is to be no consistency and con- tinuity ~n its jurisprudence." 27. Certainly, consistency and continuity are neces- sary, provided the two situations are really the same or of the samenature. Cûncluding that thenvo projects were practically the same with regard to the issues involved inboth of them, Mr. Eban then went.ahead to caU upon the Security Council to prejudge this present issue, or rather to judge it in the sameway as the previous one, as if the Council were a court of law about to rejudge a case already decided. He devoted a good part of his statement, about haH of it, to developing an .argument based on his own incorrect premise of thesimilarity between the situation in 1951 and the present one. That effort of Mr. Eban's ~ only beexplained by the fact that he could t'nt] no better ground on which to stand. His ground '1 regard to the present project cannot hold him. lV '1an had a hard time building up that ground, and . j it in the following manner. l should like to draw o._tention to the manner in which he tried to· reason. 28. First, Mr.Eban did not explain the so-called precedent. of 1951 by the decision of 18 May 1951 [Sj2157] , as. one might have expected, because that decisio1;1 isnot inhis favour. He avoided mentioning ~hat decision because·Israel did not implement it and, In fact, flouted it. He ther.. sought refuge from the previous decision by selecting, to suit his purposes, "La Convention d'armistice ne peut· être appliquée équitablement ou efficacement si la jurisprudence établie à son sujet manque d'homogénéité et de con- tinuité!' 27. Cert~s, l'homogénéité et la continuité s'impose-11t, mais encore faut-il que les deux situations soient iden- tiques. Après avoir conclu que les deux entreprisegn'en faisaient pratiquement .qu'une en ce qui concerne les points de droit qu'elles soulèvent,M. Eban a poursuivi en demandant âu Conseilc1e prendre d'avance une déci- sion dans le cas présent, ou plutôt .deprendre àtesujet la même décision que dans le cas précédent, comme si le Conseil de sécurité était un tribunal devant lequel reviendrait une affaire qu'il aurait déjà jugée. M. 'Eban a consacré une partïe importante de· sa déclar·ation- près de la moitié - à développer une arg'.:l1'nentation fondée sur la prémisse fausse qu'il avait lui..;.même posée au débpt, et selon laquelle il y attrait similitude entre la situation de 1951 et la situation actuelle: Cette attitude du représentant .d'Israël ne peut s'expliquer que par le fait qu'il n'a pu trouver un terrain plus solide. Pour ce qui est des travaux actuels, ses·arguments ne tiennent pas. ILa eu du mal à fondel" sa prémisse,et il l'a fait de la manière suivante - j'attire l'attention du.Conseil sur la manière dont M. Eban a voulu raisonner. cc 28. Tout d'abord, il n'a pas justifié son prétendu pré- cédent de 1951 par la décision du 18 mai 1951 [SI 21571Rei'.1}, comme on aurait pu s'y attendre, parce que cette décision ne lui est pas favorable. Il a évité de faire mention de cette décision parce que l'Etat d'Israël ne l'a: pas mise en œuvre et, en fait, l'a rejeté~ Puis, il a cherché à esquiver la décision précédente en choisis- 29. Mr. Eban quoted General Riley aImost as an oracle, but when the voice of that orac1.e did not suit Mr. Eban, he just silenced it. He did not mention the very basic point of view expressed by General Riley in his report to the S€cudty Council of 12 March 1951. General Riley's view was [S/2049~ section Iv.., pa:ra. 3 (B)]: "Until such rime as a mutual agreement is reached between the Governments of Syria and Israel, with respect to the work now being conducted in the demilitarîzed zone in connexion with the draining of the Lake Huleh marshes, the Palestine Land Develop- ment Company or any successors are, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, not justified in continuing such work." That is an excerpt from the report made by General Riley when the previous question was under discussion, but Mr. Eban avoided mentioning it. 30. The Secttrity Council, in itE decision of 1951 [S/2157], had incorporated Mr. Bunche's letter, as a part of the consideranda of that decision, in the tenth paragraph of the resolution, and it noted the Council's approval of the principles set forth in Mr. Bunche's note. The members of the Security Council. will observe, however, that this tenth paragraph, in which . Ml'. Bunche's note was mentioned, does no more than restate what the two Governments had already accepted in that interpretative note; but it was included in view of the doubts which had been expressed during the course of the' debate .concerning the restoration of civilian life to the zone and other matters. 31. In concluding on this point, l would like ta state that, although the questio!1 of 1951 was an armistice question, and this one is··too, the efforts of Mr. Eban to explaili the present situation by means of the previous one, compe1s me to try to draw the distinction between the two situations in order to destroy the basic assumption that the two should be treated in the Council in the same manner. 32. The fundamental ·differences between the drainage of the Huleh on the one hand and the diversion of the Jordan on the other, are the following: 33. First, the Huleh drainage of 1951 does hot divert the waters nor dcies it canalize the river into Israel-held territory, away from the demilitarized zone where it separates the two sides. The present projectc1early diverts the water. 34.. Second, the military and other consequences.of the Huleh scheme take place aImost completely outside the demilitarized zone and not inside the demilitarized zone; that is, that· they- take .place in Israel-hdd territory. Neither the lake of Huleh nor the marshes to· the north of it are in the demilitarized zone. The Jordan, south of Huleh down. to Tiberias, flows entirely in the demili- tarized zone and is governed by the specifie provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Taking away the river from the zone creates a change in the milita~.r situation and makes the purpose of.the zone aImost meaningless. General Bennike has explained that aspect in bis report précédente~ mais M. Eban a évité de la mentionner. 30. Dans sa décision de 1951 [S/2157/Rev.1], le Conseil de sécurité a repris la lettre de M. Bunche pour en faire un considérant (dixième paragraphe de la résolution), et il a pris note de l'approbation donnée par le Conseil aux principes posés dans la note de M. Bunche. Les membres du Conseil de sécurité remar- queront, cependant, que ce dixième paragraphe où est mentionnée la note de M. Bunche ne fait guère plus que répéter ce que les deux gouvernements avaient déjà accepté dans cette note explicative; il a été néanmoins inclus dans la résolution en raison des doutes qui avaient été exprimés, au cours du débat, au sujet du rétablisse- ment de la vie civile dans la zone et d'autres questions. 31. Pour conclure sur ce point, je voudrais ajouter ceci: bien que la question qui s'était posée en 1951 ait eu trait à l'armistice, comme la question présente, les efforts déployés par M. Eban pour expliquer la situation actuelle par la situation précédente m'obligent à établir les différences qui existent entre ces deux situations, afin de détruire sa prémisse selon laquelle il faudrait adopter la même attitude dans les deux cas. . 32. Les différences fondamentales entre l'assi;chement du la.:' de Houlé, d'une part, et le d'!'hu"~ pment des eaux <"<1 Jourdain, de l'autre, sont les suiv, cttes : 33. 8:n premier lieu, l'assèchement du lac de Houlé entrepris en 195111e détourne pas les eaux et ne canalise pas le fleuve vers le territoire occupé par Israël en l'éloi- gnant ~e la zone démilitarisée où il constitue la ligne de démarcation. Tel est manifestement, au contraire, l'effet des travaux actuels. 34. En second lieu, les conséquences militaires et au- tres ·du programme de travaux du lac de Houlé se feront sentir presque complètement en dehors de la zone , démilitarisée et non à l'intérieur de cette zone. Autre- ment dit, ell:es s'appliquent au territoi're occupé par Israël. Ni le lac de Houlé ni les marais situés au nord de Ce lac ne se trouvent dans la zone démilitarisée. Au sud du lac de Haulé, le Jourdain coule, jusqu'au lac de Tibériade, entièrement dans la zone démilitarisée, où il est donc régi par les dispositions expresses de la COfrve:ntion d'armistice. Si l'on détourne le fleuve de cette zone, on modifie.1a situation militaire en faveur 35. Third, the Huleh project does not make it pQssible for Israel ta use the waters of the Jordan in Israel for irrigation a"'-l other purpcses. Israel might say: Here is the pre~~.lt project and its purposes as presented by a map. We have many questiQns regarding the map and will offer information· which the Israe\ representative has nQt revealed. . 36. FQurth, the Huleh project ~laS hardly any inter- national implications when compared to the present case of which the implications are exceedingly great. That is the reason which led Mr. Eban tQ discard SQ emphatically the internatiQnal QbligatiQns involved in the present case. 37. Fifth, the Huleh prQject dQes nQt affect, tQ a large degree, the acquired rights Qf irrigatiQn in the demili- tarized zone and in Syrian territQry. To the extent that the flood gates of the Huleh project affected irrigation, Israel was compelled to stop work on them, as General Bennike mentioned in his report, and even General Riley decided to stop them. In fact, the trial of these gates amounted to a decrease, by about 70 per cent, of the waters going into the Buteiha region in Syrian terri- tory. The Jordan, in the case now before the Council, is the life-line of the demilitarized zone and also of the area in southern Syria which is watered by it. !ts diversion to Israel, where no one can really tell what would happen to its waters once they were diverted, would create serious consequences the fust of which would he the control of the waters by Israel. 38. Sixth, the Huleh project, according to Mr. Eban, has not met with any international challenge since 1951. This is untrue. He said that that project is swiftly nearing completion. This also is untrue. But supposing for the sake of argument that Mr. Eban's opinion that the Huleh has not been meeting an international challenge were true, then it stands to reason that the present project is certainly meeting a challenge, both hy Syria and. the United Nations authorities. 39. L~st1y, the importance of the two projects is far from being the same. The present issue and its inter- national implications are of far greater importance. Indeed, it is undoubtedly the most important issue that the Security Council or the United Nations authorities in the field have had to deal with since the Palestine incidents of 1948. 40. The fact that the two projects have one or more points in common and that bath faU under the armistice, does not imply that they are of the same international nature. We have held our views concerning the Huleh project and we continue to hold them. The question of the drainage of Huleh and the present question are, however, on two different planes. This question should not he prejudged by the previous one, nor should one he assimilated to the other. Our attention should there- fore he concentrated upon the present situation so as ~ 9 ~~·~~':"1%'~·=:;::!,':;:è""-"="""=,!':"":f~~,:!"~~i.~~\''''ci>'''.'l'''''::'(!<i'''3~~,'!!i!Illl'è~il 9§# l4 UKAMUR !!M!'itl!ML&li "1 have studied the relevant decisions and state- ments by the competent organs of the United Nations since 1949, when the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria was negotiated, and l think that my position with regard to the present Israeli canal project is consisî:ent with them." 41. There are points of similarity between the two. But even then Israel refuses to accept General Bennike's verdict. 42. Mr. Sharett in his note, and Mr. Eban in his statement, were not satisfied by that consistency where it detracts from the so-called jurisprudence which they have conceived. They would now like to make General Bennike's decisions vary and become lnconsistent where such fits their own purpose. 43. Secondly, l should like to èomment on the Israel project and its moral. We want ta emphasize again that the present project is relevant to our discussion only inasmuch as its military, juridical, economic and other consequences and effects influence the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and the provisions of the Armistice Agreement concerning civilian life in thé demilitarized zone and the rights of Syria. Were the Israel authorities undertalcing such a pl:oject by using the resources of Israel-held territory and net those of the demilitarized zone, we would have no real reason to object. Were they not infringing upon the rights, c1aims and positions of the other party to the Agree- ment, namely, Syria, whose rights, c1aims and positions were safeguarded by the Agreement; were the Israelis not acting in contravention of article V and other articles of the Armistice Agreement, then also we would have no reason to bring the present complaint to the Security Council, nor would bur consent to Israel action he necessary. But this is not the case. Oqr con- cern with the diversion of the Jordan is essentially its diversion from the demilitarized zone. Though our primary concern is not with economic projects, we shall have to look at this Israel project and the TVAbn the Jordan and other projects in so far as they fall within the scope of tb.e present discussion - a scope limited to the application of the Armistice· Agreement. When we come to look at Mr. Eban's project, sorne important facts reveal themse1ves, to the dismay of Mr. Eban. ë!. very small branch which is at the village of Dikka. 45 Maybe Ml'. Eban would say that this is an error of the Israel technica1 services who prepared the map for him. That may be so, yet it was he who presented the map as a document to the Security Council, and, error or no error, it is our duty to caU attention to this inaccuracy. In so doing, he endorsed and assumed full responsibility for the contents of the map including this inaccuracy and sorne others. . 46. Let us look first at this factual mistake, which, it seems to me, is indicative of a real though not :1- legitimate situation. In fact, the west bank of the river is largely occupied and contro11ed by Israel police. military and para-military formations. That whole area is largely contro11ed by the so-ca11ed agricultural com- mand of Israel and other forces attached to the Israel army.- forces which have no business to be there. AlI this is done in contravention of the agreement con- cerning the demilitarized zone. Such forces enter and leave the zone constantly. Very probably, therefore, the technicians reported to Ml'. Eban this factual situation on the matter, but they did so only with respect to a part of the central section of the demilitarized zone. .47. The partial occupation of the western banks of the Jordan, lying in the dernilitarized zone to the north, to the south, and at sorne other points, was being carried out by Israel in flagrant violation of the decision of the Security Council of 18 May 1951, about which Ml'. Eban invoked selective opinions while avoiding the decision itself. We do not want, at this stage, to dwe11 on that aspect of t~e situation of 1951, but we would like to go back to Lie project and to the map. 48. Ml'. Eban put on his mâpa sma11 shaded bit of territory, not exceeding probably 5 pei cent of the area of the demilitarized zone, which he described as pro- perty owned by Arabs. He did so in order toexplain that the Arab property used or affected by the works constituted orily a minor percentage of the area. He may have done so for other l'casons when he presented his map, and when be questioned ourstatement that over 99 pel' cent of the area of the demilitarized zone is owned by Arabs and that Arab property would, therefore, be used or affected by the diversion of the river, either by the work on the land or by controlling its irrigation and life in that area. His map, representing Arab-owned property and his questioning of our state- ment regarding that property, ca11s for sorne attention. 50. For the sake of further explanation, l should also like to add some information. We have a list of land titles which demonstrate the Arab ownership in most of the demilitarized zone. There are, however, many other titles lacldng. There is a story re~rdiîlg these lacking titles, which sliould be told to the Security Council, because it illustrates the realities of the situation. Some of the land titles of Arab owners were burned by the Israel military and police forces in the course of their raids on Arab villages -like that which they made in Oibya recently - in the demilitarized zone, where they -ht.trned houses and destroyed Arab life and property. These attacks were registered by United Nations observers. Other Arab land titles in the demilitarized zone were taken \ll.'ith their owners when Israel forces kidnapped these owners and carried them off to Israel- . held territory. Many of these owners· are today in Istaeli prisons or in the Israel concentration camp of Sha'ab. If we continue to be ïn possession of these titles, it is because a number of Syrian citizens and Palestinian refugees now in Syria have been able to keep their titles. So, when the representative of Israel dec1ares, here in New York, that it is ready to assume what it calls a self-imposed obligation to respect Arab property as to irrigation or otherwise, we look back, rightly, ta the area to ,see, in fact, what such self- imposed readiness really means. 51. Why does Israel bring its para-military forces to the demilitarized zone? General Bennike referred to that when he said: "Israeli worlanen have crossed it to build the dyke in the western branch of the river; their power shovels, placed in the river bed and also on Arab land, have piled up boulders and soil on it (these have been to date removed to a large extent) ; heavy machinery has overturned the ground; trees have been felled." And then he comes to the most important element of that quotation where he says: ' "Israeli police guarding the site have used an old Arab millas a bivouac." 53. Je veux formuler encore une observation au sujet de la carte - c'est une observation de caractère secon- daire - et je passerai c,nsuite aux questions de fond que soulève l'entreprise. Des moulins arabes sont indi- qués sur la carte et présentés comme moulins aban- donnés. On pourrait croire que voici longtemps que ces moulins ont été abandonnés par leurs propriétaires et ont cessé de fonctionner. Il convient àe préciser que ces moulins fonctionnaient encore récemment. Dans sa note du 24 septembre [S/3122~ annexe Il], M. Sharett a parlé de l'un d'entre eux en disant qu'il ne fonction- nait plus depuis longtemps. Ses déclarations s'opposent ainsi à celles du général Bennike. En réalité, ces moulins n'ont été abandonnés que récemment, soit parce que leurs propriétaires ont été expulsés,.soit parce que les Israéliens ont détruit les digues élevées dans le cours du Jourdain qui dérivaient les eaux vers ces moulins et leur fournissaient la force motrice. Ces destructions ont été accomplies en grande partie à cause des travaux israéliens dans la zone démilitarisée et témoignent de la conception particulière qu'ont les Israéliens de ce qui doit permettre le retour du territoire à une vie civile normale. Les observateurs des Nations Unies savent mieux qu'Israel quels sont les faits réels à cet égard, comme d'ai1J.eurs à tous égards. Nous savons, et les observateurs des Nations Unies savent également, que les travaux entrepris par les Israéliens ne sont pas sans conséquences pour les propriétés des Arabes. C'est un fait inévitable, puisque plus de 99 pour 100 des terres de la région appartiennent à des Arabes. Cepen- dant, je veux souligner que toutes les controverses au sujet de la propriété des terres n'ont aucune importance à notre avis, parce que la zone démilitarisée constitue un tout dans le système d'armistice,. quel que soit le propriétaire de telle ou telle parcelle de terrain. La question qui se pose est celle de l'application de la Con- vention d'armistice à la zone démilitarisée, considérée dans son ensemble, et non comme une' mosaïque de petites propriétés. 53. There is one more remark that l should like to make about the map - it is a remark of a minor nature - and then l shall proceed to the more substan- tiaI elements of the project. The map shows some Arab 'mills, which are called abandoned mills. One might be led to beHeve that those mills had been aba.ldoned by their owners and ceased to operate a long time ago. It is fitting, however, to explain that these mills were only recently in operation. In his note of 24 September [5/3122, anne.x Il], Mr. Sharett referred to one of them as not being operative for a long time. Thus, his views on the matter were opposed ta those of General Bennike. The fact is that these miUs were only lately abandoned either because their. owners were driven away or becaus~ the Israe1is had destroyed the dams in the Jordan river which channeled the waters ta these mills and furnished them with motive power. That was done largely on account of the Israel works in the demilitarized zone area and as a result of a. peculiar Israel method of restoring normal civilian life to it. The United Nations observers know better than Israel what the facts reaUy are in regard to this matter, as in regarçl to other matters. We k"1low, and the United Nations observers also know, that Arab property is affected by the words undertaken by the Israelis. When over 99 per cent of the area is Arab-owned, that becomes. unavoidable. However, l should like ta em- phasize that aU controversy about the ownership of the land is immaterial, in our view, because the demili- tarized zone is a unit in the armistice system, irre- spective of who owns which plot of land. The question resides in the implementation of the Armistice Agree- ment with regard to the demilitarized zone as an entity, and not as individual plots oi land. 54. We have brought forth our observations only in order to help explain to the Council the local conditions which prevail in the zone and to throw lights upon the real meaning, in the mind of Israel, ofthe restoration of civilian Hfe to the zone. This aUeged restoration of civilian life consists, in Israel's view, almost solely of providing Israel with an excuse to intervene unlawfuUy in the zone and ta undertake unil2.teral actions therein. Israel acts as though there had been a disposition of that territory in its favour, either by the Armistice Agreement or by some other arrangement, and behaves as ifthe rights, daims and positions safeguarded'by the armistice werein reality not safeguarded at aU. 54. Nous avons présenté ces observations uniquement pour aider le Conseil à comprendre la situation locale et pour jeter quelque lueur sur la signification réelle du retour à la vie civile dans la zone, tel que le com- prend Israël. Ce prétendu retour à la vie civile repré- sente presque uniquement, pour le Gouvernement israé- lien, un prétexte offert à Israël pour intervenir sans aucun droit dans la zone et pour s'y livrer à des entre- prises de caractère unilatéral. Israël se comporte comme si ce territoire lui avait été attribué par la Convention d'armistice ou par quelque autre accord, et comme si les droits, prétentions et position garantis par l'ar- mistice ne Ifétaient pas en réalité. 55. Now we come to the crucial issue explained by Mr. Eban's map and more clearly still by Mr. Eban's statement, that is, the diversion project. We have to ?iscuss first the scope and nature of that project, then, ltsmoralaspect about which Mr. Eban spoke so eloquently, and, finally, its juridical foundation, or rather lack of jur~diçlil foundatiQ!.~. 55. Nous venons maintenant à la question essen- tielle que soulèvent la carte de M. Eban et, plus encore, les déclarations qu'il a faites, je veux dire: les travaux de détournement des eaux. Nous devons traiter d'abord . du caractère de l'entreprise et de sa portée, ensuite de l'aspectmoral du problème, aspect moral dont M. Eban a si éloquemment. parlé, et, enfin, de son fondement juridique, ou plutôt de son absence de fondement à cet égard. 57. Secondly, among many other projects now con- templated on the Jordan in that area there is one called -the TVA on the Jordan, for which Mr. Eric Johnston flew to the Near East recently. This one also seems to be acquiring another name, "unified project" on the Jordan, but perhaps this is for reasons different from those that brought about the change in the name of the first project. 58. The two projects have this in ccmmon: they are both pushed with great haste and bath are carried on largely with American money. Can these two projects, as they now stand, be integrated? They certainly cannot, and for the following evident reasons. The TVA, the whole length of its projected canals from the west of Lake Huleh down to the Jordan Kingdom, is an irrigation scheme. There is some hydro-e1ectric power to be generated to the north of that point. The Israel project, as it now appears, is solely for hydro-electric purposes. So there is a difference of purpose in these two projects, which makes integration practically impossible. - 59. Then the canals of the TVA start north of Lake Huleh at a height of over 200 metres above sea-Ievel. The Israel project starts south of Huleh at an elevation of about 50 metres above sea-Ievel. The starting and the termination points of the canals in the two projects, and the elevation of these canals, are different. Itwould appear physically impossible to make the two canals _m~et at any point or to integrate the two projects in that manner. Yet the two projects use the same waters which flow from north of Huleh, where the TVA starts, to the south of Huleh, where- the ISrael project diverts the river. 60. Thirdly, the TVA as aproject is to be based on some kind of international and multilateral arrangement among all the countries of the Jordan area. The present Israeli project, in that respect, is a unilateral action in that Israel refuses to admit the need for prior inter- national arrangements. The political-juridical bases of thetwo projects mm them at variance. 61. The two projects, differing as they do in scope and purpose, physical set-up and political-juridical basis, cannet he, as they now appear to he, integrated.· Yet Mr..Eban implied in his statement that they can be. Given these differences between the two projects, one of them has to'be metamorphosed into two other new projects if they are ever to be integrated. 63. Mr. Eban said that the Buteiha farms in southern Syria, now irrigated from the Jordan, do not use - and l am. giving this just as an example - more than 1.5 per cent of the waters, even if they are irrigated to the last inch. This statement is unfounded.The 6,000 acres of Buteiha now under irrigation could use about 15 per cent of these waters, which would not be available to Syria were the Israel project executed. Syria has a legal right, a right by usage and a claim both in the demili- tarized zone for Syrian nationals and in Syrian terri- tory, to say nothing of the potential uses of the Jordan waters. But these claims, as weU as those of Israel, should remain at the présent moment under the provi- sions of the Armistice Agreement. 64. There arises a very fundamental question for whichan answer should be sought. What would happen if Israel were allowed to take away the waters of the Jordan river? To what purpose would it use these waters.? That is a question to which no map not even Mr. Eban's map - can provide the answer. The answer should be found in the many possibilities for the use of the Jordan waters in Israel-held territory. Itshould befound in Israel's haste to divert the river before any agreement takes place concerning the TVA or any other .scheme, and to create a fait accompli. These cir- cumstances provide a better answer than a. map or mere oral explanations. Israel seeks, in aIl haste,- to confront the world with such a fait accompli so that no project except its own various projects, declared or unavowed, can be realized. Once Israel has canalized the waters out of the demilitarized zone it can use them . in the way it sees fit - for electricity and for irrigation. Even its present project niay realize that double aim because when the canal gets to the immediate Tiberian watershed it will be at a height of 40 metres above sea level. Lake Tiberias lies 200 metres.below sea level. The difference in altitude between the projected canal 65. In any of these cases - whether water is used for hydro-electric power or for irrigation, or for both - no water, or indeed very little water, would be left toflow to the demilitarized zone or to Syria. If water were used for irrigation very little or none would· remain to flow to the Kingdom of Jordan by way of Tiberias. These possibilities are real, evident and imminent. Sorne of them, if realized, would render other possibilities of present use impossible in the future. Hence the haste of Israel to carry out its project by unilateral action and the unfounâed assumption of Mr. Eban, to facilit~te this, that his project could be, as it now appears, integrated with the TVA or other possihle projects. 66. An these projects are in: themselves, as I have said, irrelevant to t.~e discussion except inasmuch as they fall within the purview of the Armistice Agree- ment. I had to speak about them only to the extent necessary to lay hefore the Council the information which would allow me to proce:.;d therefrom to draw the following conclusions in respect· of our present complaint and deliberations. My conclusions are the follov.ring : .. 67. First, the project as presented to the United Nations observers by the Israelis early in September, or as· represented by the map and the contradictory statements of Mr: Eban, is being misrepresented in two ways: by untrue assertions, and by the withholding of sorne information. 68. Secondly, the. Israel project, as it now appears, is not final. The waters, once channe1ed into Israel-held territory, can be used in various ways, to deve10p Israel irrigation schemes or to integrate their projects with thé TVA bymodifying the TVA in a way to suit the taste of Israel. In this case, more than in the case of the projèct as it now appears, less water would be left in the bed of the Jordan. 69. Thirdly, Syria has a daim both on the potential use of the waters and on existing acquired rights .of irrigation. Mr. Eban said that the Syrian daim has been made in order to deny the waters to Israel. Syria's consent is a necessity to any project, whether that consent is. ,based on the Armistice Agreement or on more general reasons deriving from our rights under the Agreement itself. 70. Fourthly, no arrangement can be discussed or arrived at unless the Armistice Agreement is fully implemented by the Security Council, and unlèss Syria's consent is given to any modifications of its rights, claims and position, as safeguarded by the Armistice Agree- ment. If the Armistice Agreementis not implemented, or if .adecision is taken beyond its scope, then the confidence of the parties, required for arriving at sorne 67. En premier lieu, le plan de travaux, tel qu'il a été présenté aux observateurs des Nations Unies par la délégation israélienne au début de septembre, ou tel qti~ le représentent la carte et les déclarations contra- dictoires de M. Eban, est faux de deux manières: d'une part, parce qu'il contient des affirmations inexactes et, d'autre part, parce qu'il ne renferme pas certains renseignements. '68. En second lieu, le projet israélien, tel qu'il apparaît actuel1ement, n'est pas définitif. Les eaux, une fois détournées vers le territoire occupé par les Israéliens, pourront être utilisées de plusieurs manièïes: soit pour développer l'irrigation en territoire israélien, soit pour s'intégrer dans les plans de TVA modifiés au profit d'Israël. Dans ce cas, il resterait encore moins d'eau dans le lit du Jourdain qu'avec le plan tel qu'il èst présenté actuellement. 69. En troisième lieu, la Syrie a des droits sur l'uti1i~ sation future' des eaux du Jourdain et elle a des droits acquis en matière d'irrigation. M. Eban déclare que la revendication syrienne a été faite pour empêcher Israël de tirer profit des eaux. Eh fait, le consentement de la Syrie est nécessaire à la mise en œuvre de tout projet de travaux, que ce consentement soit accordé au titre de la Convention d'armistice ou pour des raisons d'ordre plus général découlant de nos droits consacrés par la Convention. 70. En quatrième lieu, il est impossible de discuter les termes d'un accord et d'aboutir si le Conseil de sécurité n'applique pas intégralement la Convention d'armistice et si la Syrie n'est pas amenée à donner son consente- ment à toute modification des droits, prétentions et position que la Convention d'armistice lui garantit. Si la Convention d'armistice n'est pas respectée ou si une décision intervient qui en dépasse la portée, la confiance 71. Would the President like me to c<;>ntinue,. or would be prefer to have a recess for a few mmutes smce I shaH still require about forty-five minutes to complete my statement? . 72. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Meetings of the Security Council usually continue until 1 p.m. Thus the representative of Syria still has about an hour at his disposaI. If the remainder of his state- ment does not take more than three quarters of an hour he can perhaps complete it at this meeting. 73. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) (translated from French): l suggested that the Council might take a short recess, but l am at the disposaI of the President and am·prepared to continue my statement. 74. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l submit, with respect, that it might be better to rest for five minutes and to continue afterwards.

I shaH suspend the meeting for a few minutes. The meeting was suspended at 12.00 noon and resumed at 12.10 p.m. 76. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): 1 should now like to speak about the moral aspect of the project. 77. Every time the Israel authorities want to take a unilateral action such as the one they are now taking, they come to the Security Council in the hope of developing here a moral justification for their action. We thus see Mr. Eban elaborating on the moral aspect of the present project.We therefore have to look at the project in its real morallight and not the one portrayed by the Israel authorities. 79. Let Israel therefore not invoke morals. The lessons that Israel has to give· are the ones to be avoided, for they can only be drawn from actions of an immoral nature, unjust actions which do not contribute to peace- fuI and normal development. They indicate an irrespon- sible state of mind in international· issues, which from greed cao lead only to expansion, aggression and trouble. If this Israel state of mind is encouraged, instead of .putting an end to the Palestine question, it will start it all over again. 80. That is the moral that can be deduced. 81. Let me now speak about Syria's right to consent and the so-called Syrian veto mentioned in the Israel statement. Mr. Eban spoke at some length about a so~called Syrian veto, as if Syria were a great Power with a permanent seat.in the Security .Counci1. Here again he resorted to rhetorical and propaganda ef!ects to sustain an untenable thesis. The principle of the unanimity of the Big Five is a provision of the Charter which applies even to cases in which one of them 1S not directly involved. It is a rule of an organized co- operative bod)[. The consent of Syria in the present issue is not a matter of voting; it 1S obviously a matter of the c01J.sent of a party to an agreement when the conduct of.eachof the parties is a consideration fOI." the other. The question is by no means a question of veto. It is a question of the right of consent and agreement of two parties to an international contract, as opposed to a unilateral breach of an agreement and aS opposed also to the cohtention that the. conclusion of new arrangements does not require the consent of the other side to the agreement. In the light of these facts, the Israel assertions about· the Syrian veto appear to be really one-sided and absurdo 82. Israelseeks to modify the military objects of the Agreement, its very raison d'être, admitting no objec- tion from our side and, therefore, recognizing no need for our consent. 83. Israel seeks to alter our rights, claims and posi- tions as safeguarded by the Agreement, which are also its very raison d'être, and it seeks to alter them without our consent. . 84. Israel opposes itsauthority to that of the United Nations Chief. of Staff, whose authority is essentially deri~ed from the Armistice Agreement which is based on the consent of the interested parties and should not therefore be modified except by the consent of the two sides. - - 85~~ -Israel gives its own interpretati0IlJ9Lbe provisions of the Agre~m~llt:ln!'therestora:tionofnormal civilian life, in violation of the text of the Agreement, the 87. Israel discards international agreements and refuses to consider itself as hotmd by the oèligations assumed by the Government of Palestine concerning the Jordan River. Yet Israel reveris to a doubtful adminis- trative act of the Government of Palestine concerning the so-called concession of the Israel company when the status of the demilitarized zone does not put that zone undel' Palestinian administration or legislation, but puts it at present under a special status, a special régime, described in article V of the Armistice Agreement. Israel confronts us w~th an international and internaI administrative act, hut refuses to submit when inter- national agreements are contrary to its wishes. Israel bides behind the company which acts as an Israel agency under the authority of Israel, and then goes i11to the zone to deal with individuals to the exclusion of Syria, the other party to the agreement which created the demilitarized zone and to the whole set-up of juridical international arrangements conceniing the zone, its inhabitants and its status. 88. Byreason of the Armistice Agreement, the situa- tion may not he modified until other arrangements are made..If Israel wants to modify the agreements and their objectives in the proper manner, it should follow the procedure which expressly provides for the revision cf the Agreement under article VIII, instead of trying to modify it by unilateral and unjustified actions. 89. If the Agreement is to be interpreted in any of the issues, the interpretation should take place 110t -uni- laterally, but in accordance with the provisions of article VII, paragraph 8 of the Agreement,which provides for that interpretation. 90. In aIl of these closely inter-related obligations under the Agreement, the consent of Syria, the other party to the Agreement, as weIl as the consent of Israel, are both essential. The question is not one of individual rights but is totally of an international nature, in the sense t~at· no element of the Agreement could he pro- perly dlVorced from the others and none of the .issues involved could he properly separated. 91. This being the case, Israel seeks to deform and denature the authority of the United Nations Chief of Staff with a view to suhstituting for it an authority of its own which it does not possess. 92. Israel, as we have seen, wants td avoid the Armi- stice .Ag~eemen~ in practically aIl its. aspects, which explams !ts denlai of any need for Syrian consent. It has, however, special difficulty with the authority of the Unite4Nations Chief of Staff based on that Agreemellt, and tnerefore seeks to denature it. ... 93. The authority of the United Nations Chief of 93. L'autorité du Chef d'état-major des Nations Uni.es- Staff is clear. We have explained in our previous state- est incontestable. Nolls _axDns,üans-nottë!iif!irvention ment how the United Nations Chief of Staff has a précédeÏlte;-pr~cisél~triple lonction-au Chef d'état- tr~p~e capacity: presiding over and casting a deter~ major:- présider la CommissiOJ,l mixte d'armistice où 94. We have seen that the real authority of the United Nations Chief of Staff is utterly disliked by Israel. Therefore, Israel sought to destroy it by two means: it hoIds that his authority is limited te what each of the sides, at every stage of the implementation of the Agree- ment, concedes to him; it also maintains, as we have seen, that bis·actions are inconsistent. This reasoning has been proved to be absurd 'by the exchange of notes between,General Bennike and Mr. Sharett as weIl as by the discussions in the Couneil. 95. Now Israel tries to denature his authority and to form an aImost new and altogether unfounded concep- tion of it. It is now trying to introduce a theory whereby the real and existing authority of the United Nations Chief of Staff under the Armistice Agreement would be replaced by a theoretical one. He is not to be responsible for the implementation of article V on bis own authorio/, but he would become the custodian of the rights of Syrïa and the Arabs, without becoming the custodian of the rights of the Israel authorities and the Israelis. Tbis notion of his being a custodian has no basis whatsoever in the provisions of the Agree- ment or in Mr. Bunche's letter. 96. Its absurdity becomes more glaring when we look liltothe inherent contradiction in that notion. It seems, from the Israel statements that the United Nations Chief of Staff would be a strange, one-sided custodian, in the sense that he could preserve, exercise or dispose of Arab rights, daims and positions but not those of the Israelis and Israel. Once such an Israel view of the authority of the Chief of Staff was recognized, then he would be supposed to deal with, Israel without the consent of those concerned. He would become a kind of mandatory agent without the consent of those he would represent. 97. This custodial theory is not new ta the Israel way of thinking and acting. That Government apPlies~lt to the Arab. refugees in pa.lest.ine; an Israel custodi n of refugee property is designated and authorized to di pose of thatproperty in favour of Israel authorities, om- panies and individuals. 96. L'absurdité de cette conception apparaît d'autant plus éclatante quand on s'aperçoit qu'elle comporte une inhérente contradiction. D'après les explications four- nies par le représentant d'Israël, il semble que le Chef d'état-major serait un gardien étrange et partial, puis- qu'il pourrait protéger, faire valoir ou abandonner les droits, prétentions et position des Arabes, mais non ceux des Israéliens et d'Israël. Si l'on admettait cette conception israélienne ties fonctions du. Chef d'état- major, il serait censé traiter avec Israël sans l'accord de ceux au nom desquels il traiterait. Il deviendrait une sorte de mandataire officiel sans le consentement de ceux qu'il représenterait. 97. Cette doctrine, qui en ferait Ut:l gardien ou un séquestre, n'a rien de nouveau dans la théorie ni dans la pratique israéliennes. Le Gouvernement d'Israëll'ap- plique aux réfugiés·arabes de Palestine; un séquestre israélien des biens des réfugiés a été désigné, et il est autorisé à disposer de ces biens en faveur des autorités, des sociétés ou des personnes privées israéliennes. 98. l.a tendance actuelle de la théorie israélienne se fonde l>Jr l'hypothèse que ce Qui se fait de .manière illégitime dans le territoire occupé par Israël doit aussi 100. Allow me now to speak about the military implications of the present situation and how these military implications are connected with the so-called restoration of civilian life. 101. In my statement at the 633rd nleeting of the Council, l took the opportunity of presenting the foundation, scope and contents of the Syrian complaint. Ml'. Eban, in his statement, however, attempted to distort this complaint and to bring into the debate extraneous issues. Therefore, we again find it necessary ta refer to and develop some considerations which we put forward in our previous statement about the military aspects of the question. While doing sa, l will also refute the allegations of the Israel representative con- cerning the military aspects and whatever otherallega- tians he made which l have not yet dealt with. 102. The status of the demilitarized zone has been determined by article V and other articles of the Armi- stice Agreement; it consists of the following basic e1ements. i03. First, military or para-military forces of both sides, às weIl as forces controlled by either of the two sides, are excluded from the zone. IG2. Le statut de la zone démilitarisée a été défini par l'article V et par d'autres articles de la Convention d'armistice; il comprend les éléments essentiels suivants. 103. Premièrement, les forces militaires ou parami- litaires des deux parties sont exclues de cette zone, ainsi que les forçes placées sous l'autorité de l'une des deux parties en cause. 104. Deuxièmement, la zone doit être conservée dans son intégrité, en vue de remplir sa fonction principale, qui est de séparer les deux parties et de réduire au minimum les possibilités de friction. Cette disposition de l'article V doit naturellement être envisagée en rapport avec d'autres dispositions de la Convention, telles que celles qui sauvegardent les droits et la position des deux parties et celles qui assurent, en vertu de l'article premier; le respect du droit de chaque partie d'être en sécurité et d'être libérée de la crainte d'une attaque des forces armées de l'autre partie. 105. Troisièmement, étant donné que la question de la souveraineté et les problèmes généraux de juridiction, d'administration, de citoyenneté, etc., ont été laissés en suspens par l~ Convention actuelle, et qu'aucune des deux parties en présence n'a bénéficié d'un avantage territorial, l'administration de la zone a été établie sur un plan purement local. 106. Quatrièmement, l'administration locale devait être confiée aux villages et aux settlements. Aucune autorité israélienne ou syrienne ne devrait donc influer de quelque façon sur l'administ~ationde la zone. Aucune mesure administrative Ott législative prise soit par la Syrie, soit par la Palestine, soit par les autor;ités israé- liennes, n'est applicable à cette zone. Les forces de police ont un caractère local et ne devraient en aucune façon être rattachées à la police israélienne ou syrienne. Le Chef d'état-major des Nations lTniesdispose d'un pouvoir de surveillance, mais il n'a pas de pouvoir direct d'administration sur la région démilitarisée. 104. Second1y, the zone should be kept as an entity, in order to fulfil its main purpose - separating the two sides and reducing friction to a minimum. This provi- sion of article V is naturally construed in relation with other provisions of the Agreement such as thase which safeguard the rights and positions of the two parties and those which ensure under article l, the respect of the right of each paroJ to its security from fear of ~ttack by the armed forces of the other. lOS, Thirdly, owing to the fact that the question of sovereignty and general questions of jurisdiction, administration, citizenship and the 1ike have been held in abeyance under the Armistice, and that no dis- position of territory has taken place in favour of either Qf the two sides, the zone has been administered on a purely local basis. 106. Fourthly, the local administration was. ta be undertaken by the villages and settlements. No Israel or Syrian authority, therefore, should in any wayaffect the administration of the zone. No administrative or legislative measure either of Syria, Palestinè, or the Israel authorities is applicable to the zone. The police are local and should not be, in any way, attached ta the Israel or Syrian police. The United Nations Chief of Staff has a supervisory power but he has no direct power of administration over the demilitarized area. 110. In commenting on the special administrative status of the demilitarized zone, the United States repre- sentative in the Couficil stated his opinion on 16 May 1951 [546th 1I1cel'ing]. Sir Gladwyn Jebb~ on behalf of the United Kingdom, also stated his opinion at that time. 111. The tenth, eleventh and twelfth paragraphs o~ the decision of 18 May 1951, inasmuch as they are relevant to the present situation, seem to have been forgotten by Ml'. Eban. In fact, he tried to avoid the decisions and 1'ecalled only opinions expressed in the discussion, although opinions may vary. 112. It is evident, therefore, that the demilitarized zone has its own administration and does not in any respect whatsoever fall under any national jUfÎsdiction and administration, or administrative and legislative mea- sures coming from beyond the zone. Its civilian life is ta he restored and l'un locally, according to its own status. The United Natioris Chief of Staff has a supervisory power. Both sides have the power to consent or object to any changes made in both the military and civilian status of the zone, a status which they estab- lished by their agreements, and assumed an equal And. mutual obligation to respect. Thus, neither side to the Agreement can in any waY'exercise any of the attributes of administration or sovereignty. Only by respecting the statua of the.demilitarized zone can it be maintained «scû"ubuffl:r betwë:en the two sides white the daims, rights and positions of both sides are safeguarded until an arrangement is arrived at within or beyond the armistice. This naturally exc1udes any unilateral action. On aU these D'latters, the duties and obligations of the two sides are of equal.validit,}' atld value. Israel has no right. in that respect which Syria does not have, nor ean Syria c1aimany right which it denies to Israel. We do not deny the right of Israel to object or consent to uny action we -might see fit ta take with regard ta t11at z~ne. 113. Bath Syria and Israel, as two sides to anagl'ee- m.ent, are guardians of that agreement. Any unUateral change to he undertaken by one side may bring forth an objection of the other side. Indeed it is the duty of the other side to denounce any unilateral action. That duty isbased on the need and will to keep the Agreement and implement·it. 111. Il semble que M. Eban ait oublié les dixième, onzième et douzième paragra)?,hes de la décision du 18 mai 19S1, dans la mesure où 11s s'appliquent à. la situa- tion actuelle. En fait, M. Eban a cherche à éviter cette décision et n'a rappelé <.tue des opinions exprimées au cours de la discussion, bien qu'une opinion puisse varier. 112. Il est donc évident que la zone démilitarisée possède sa propre administration et ne relève en aucune façon d'une juridiction ou d'une administration natio- nales; aucune mesure administrative ou juridique or- donnée de l'extérieur ne s'applique à cette zone. Confor- mément à son statut, il faut que la vie civile y soit réta- blie et administrée par les autorités locales. Le Chef d'état-major dispose d'un droit de surveillance. Les deux parties ont le droit de donner leur accord ou de s'opposer à toute modification apportée au statut mili- tair, rot civil de la zone, statut qu'elles ont établi d'lm COmlH~ll1 acccord et qu'elles ont pris l'engagement mu- tuel de respecter. Ainsi, ni l'une ni l'autre des deux parties à la Con,:ent~ol1 n'a l~ .droit. d'exercer dan~ la zone aucune attnbutiQl1 amn!!'ustl'atrve ou souverame. La zone démilitarisée ne pourra continuel' à. jouer son rôle de tampon entre les deux parties que si son statut est respecté~ et c'est ft cette seule condition que les droits, prétentions et position des deux parties seront garantis tant qu~un arrangement n'aura pas été conclu dans·le cadre de l'armistice ou en dehors de l'armistice. Cela exclut évidemment toute action unilatérale. Sur tous ces points, les devoirs et les obligations des deux parties ont une validité et une valeur éf,JUles. A cet égard, Israël ne possède aucun droit que la Syrie ne possède pas, et la Syrie ne peut revendiqi.il:~ aucun droit qui serait refusé à Israël. Nous ne nions pas qu'Israël ait le droit de s'opposer ou de donner son accord à toute mesure que nous voudrions prendre touchant cette zone. 113. La Syrie et Israël, en tant que pm'ties à la COll- vention, sont tenus d'en assurer l'application. Toute modification unilatérale que voudrait apporter l'une des parties petit soulever une objection de l'autre partie. Vautre partie est même tenue de dénoncer toute action unilatérale. Ce devoir est fondé sur la nécessité et le désir de maintenir la Convention et de la mettre en œuvre. 116. Mr. Eban avoided many of these points. He went ahead to refer ta ~eneral military questions not con- troUed by the Armistice Agreement, such as measures which may allow Israel "ta wage a successful waru • Snch general measures as training more troops, building IIp armaments, establishing industries for increasing the mîlitary potential, and the like, are not under discus- sion. Israel is taking such measures to enable it to wage a successful \Var. We did not bring a complaint on this basis. 117. The main points of the issue are those actions within the demihtarized zone or based on the zone, llnified in their processesand effects, which unilaterally change the military situation esta:blished by the armis- tice and affect rights safeguarded by that armistice. 118. Mr. Eban told us that the armed forces of either side were forbidden ta enter the zone. Bu.t armed forces controUed by Israel are in the zone, forces of the police, agricultural command and other formations. Israel indeed cannot undertake the works in the demilitarized zone without the use of such forces. 119. Mr. Eban then went on to c--.;:plain {urther how the Israel activity was militarily beneficial for the pur- pose of the armistice. He mamtained that instead of having the river as the 0111y obstacle in the den1ilitarized zone, Israel, by digging ,canals, would be increasing the number of obstacles. The real existing obstacle, how- everJ is the water in the bed of the river in the demili- tarized zone, and that is now ta be diverted. 1 erre a·~tournees. 12ü. U11 certain nombre de questions se posent au sujet des canaux. Par qui, où et à quelle fin ces canaux sont-ils creusés, qui les administrera et qui réglera le débit de leurs eaux? M. Eban a éludé toutes ces ques- (20. Son1e questions about the canals arise. By whom, where and for what purpose are these canals being dug, and who would control them and the flow of the waters in them? Ml'. Eban avoided all these questions. It is evident from General Bennike's report and from Our statement that these are questions which must really be dealt witb. 121. The diversion of the waters from the river bed in the demilitarized zone and the control of the waters and canals by Israel, would have from a military point of view, the effects which we mentioned in our previous statement and which may now be briefly recalled so as ti01~S. D~ rapport du général Bennike et de notre décla- rat1(~n, Il 'ressort cependant que ce sont ces questions qu'il faut traiter. . ldl. Si lIon détournait les eaux du fleuve de leur lit dans la zone démilitarisée et si les eaux et les canaux étaient placés sous contrôle israélien, ces faits auraient, du point de vue mHîtaire, les conséquences que nous avons signalées dans notre déclaration pr~éc1ente et 124. The new canal in Israel would remain an obstacle but that, too, wouldbe a military change to the benefit of Israel because Israel would control that canal and could throw over it at wiII bridges for the use of its own forces. No such bridges can now he built in the demilitarized zone ove: the river nor can they be charted and prepared. 125. An equally important element, if the works are completed, would be that Israel could dry the present bed of the river or the bed of the canal at will, and thus he able to raise an obstacle whenever andwherever it wished in case it wanted to proceed to the demilitarized zone for action. Indeed; the works are intended to regulate the flow in theold or the new bed of the river. 126. The control of the course of the river and the possible use of the canal to be made by Israel as a military factor helps it to withdraw sorne of its forces in that area for use elsewhere. The river which now separates the two sides and reduces friction would thus be removerl. AIl these.consequences would necessariiy . ensue were the project executed. But the Israel reJ?re- sentative also told us that the questions of military changes. and advantages were only relevant under the truce and irrelevant under the Armistice Agreement, because, he maintained, if we undershod mm rightly, that the Armistice superseded the truce by virtue of a Security Couneil decision of August 1949, as if the meaning of that decision was to abrogate the truce. The deeisions of the Security Council do not replace the Armistice; they implement it. Whether or not the Ar1lli~tiçe.sYP(;Tsedesthe trrice in the sence ofabrogating U;-as-Mr. Eban thinks, is a matter of no practical importance, because the Armistice Agreement itself is an adequate basisfor the reasoning we have put forward and which was supported to a large extent by Çieneral Bennike. . 127. Its provisions, ti'uce or no truce, trtake un- warranted such trtilitary changeE as those now contem- plated. It unequivocaIiy safeguards the positions of the two· sides, al,1d their .security. Article' I, paragraph 3, .states: ."The right of each party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other 24 "The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Cauncil is recognized." 129. Why is this principle recognized as a part of the Armistice Agreement? Is it recognized only in order to discard it? How could this be conceivable when the whole Armistice Agreement including this principle was made, as stated in article 1, paragraph 1, on the basis that "The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both parties"? , What was that injunction about if it was not about a truce of 1948 preceding the armistice, which the Secu- rity Council called for? 130. The recognition of this principle in that explicit manner was made in the Syria-Israe1 Armistice Agree- ment, in particular. There were special reasons for it in the Syria-Israel Armistice. It would appear from the armistice negotiations, that Syria, - then holding the terrJtory of the demilitarized zone, would not have withdrawn from it were it not for the consideration of the Armistice Agreement; including all its provisions and not excluding any of them. 131. We need not ga any further at this stage in dealing with tms point unless Mr. Eban comes back to it. We are now satisfied to say that the very provi- sions of the armistice itself allow no military changes or advantages in thedemilitarized zone, without the mutual consent of the two sides. We have suggested changes ourse1ves and when Israel objected to them we refrained from taking any unilateral action. Why does not Israel behave in the same manner? !3~. When the question ûf rnilitary advantages arose in 1951 with regard to the defensive area beyond the demilitarized zone, both sides sought and obtained the verdict of the United Nations Chief of Staff, General Riley. He ruled that no military advantage applied in that case to one side which did not equ~lly apply to the other. Whether his ruling on that situation was right or wrong, the fact nevertheless remains that both sides considered the matter relevant to the armistice and hence sought and obtained a ruling. With regard to the present situation, General Bennike in his report dealt sufficiently with this matter and we need not quote him here. 133. Why does not Israel now consider the question of military changes relevant to our consideration, now that its undertakings change and effect the demilitarized zone itself and not a zone beyond the demilitarized zone? ~hé à obtenir et ont obtenu une décision. Pour ce qui est de la situation actuelle, le·général Bertnike en a traité àssez longuement dans son rapport et il est inutile que nous le citions ici. 133. Pourquoi Israël ne considère-t-il pas aujour- d'j.1Ui que la question des changements d'ordre militaire relève dll Conseil desécurité, maintenant que ses ehtre- prises évoluent et touchent à la zone démilitarisée elle- 136. The continuation of the works within the demili- tarized zone and outside it is, indeed, indicative of the Israel state of mind. l bring this matter now for your consideration because the continuation of these works, as they seem to be going on at present beyond the demilitarized zone, calls for quick, real and definite international action. 137. At this stage of the debate, l would like to state in conclusion the following. 138.. First, the Israel action to divert the Jordan River from its bed without any prior arrangement based on the consent of eachof the two sides to the armistice is an unwarranted, unilateral action with grave con- sequences, military and others. Bath the action and the consequences are a breach of the armistice. 139. Secondly, the present project is not the only one that the Israel authorities or other authorities can con- . sider for utilizing the Jordan waters. It is not a ùnique constructive effort. There are many other projects which the present project, were it executed, wouldthwart and render impracticable. AIl. these projects and plans whetherundettaken by Syria, the Israel authorities, the United States of America or any other country, should be kept as tentative plans until such time as suitable international arrangements are arrived at by consent of the authorities legitimately concerned. The present contemplated diversion of the river a1most amounts to a fait accompli. We have no quarrel with projects, as such. Our quarrel is with unilateral <lctions which unjustly affect each and every other project under consideration, as weIl as rights safeguarded under the Armistice Agreement. 140. Third, once the armistice is fully, unhesitatingly and unequivocally implemented, two fundamental results will have been obtained which are a prerequisite to the maintenance of peace in the area : 141. The first result would be that the door to arrogant unilateral actions and accomplished facts will be cIosed. 143. Fourthy, the Israel authorities undoubtedly seek ta free themselves of the armistice by interpreting it or 11lodifying its very objects whenever that armistice d~es not suit Israel purposes. How can such a state of affatrs continue without creating increasingly grave and nefa- rious results? 144. If Israel would like the Ag-reement to be pro- perly interpreted, then it should find remedy in article VII' if it wants the Agreement or its objects properly 11lodified, then it should avail itself of article VIII. Israel does not do this. It takes the course of unilateral interpretations and modifications of the Agreement, a course which should definitely be barred by the Security COImci!. _ 145.Fifthly, the Security Council, with all its high authority, certainly would not alter the Agreement by its decisions or substitute the decisions for the consent of the parties. 1ts decisions would naturally be intended ta implement the Agreement. The various interests which Syria, the Israel authorities, the United States, or any other country may have are not elements of the issue before us, except to the extent that these interests -may affect the Armistice Agreement itself, and the rights, daims and positions safeguarded by the Armi- stice Agreement until other arrangements _are arrived at by the mutual and free consent of the two parties to that Agreement. 146. Syria was compelled to bring this issue ta the Securïty Coündl because it feels so strongly its duty ta preserve peace in the Near East. Peaceful solutions and healthy progress can result only from peaceful conditions and actions. We should not be turned from the course of peace by expansicnist, unlIateral, aggres- sive actions. Help us to preserve peace and to keep the Armistice Agreement, its ,::mly bulwark, real and . effective. The Council, with its high authority, can preserve the sanctity of agreements and the effectiveness of international responsibility and create an atmosphere of confidence. The parties and the Council can thus serve the very purposes of the Charter.

l had intended to fix the next meeting of the Security Council for Friday 13 November, at 3 p.m., but if some members think that that time is too close, and would prefer that the question should not be taken up again ~efore next week, I am prepared to take their opinion lUta consideration. 148. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l think it would be better to have the next meeting early next ~eek. There are so many documents to read and study lU preparing for this question that it would be humanly La séance est levée à 13 heures. ftANCE edition, A. Pedon., U. rul' soumot, Pori. V. UEEeE - GIECE AI'EIl!l1lA - M'lMTln Editeriol .Sudo·mericono S.i"... Ailino 500, Buenos Am . AUSTUlIA - AUSTIAlIE . H. A. eoddord. 2550 eeorgeSt. Sydney, ond 90 Queen St.,. Melbourne•. MelaoQrne University Press, Corlton N.3. Vi"torio. IElGIUIi-IElClQIIE Agence et Messegeries de le Presse S...... '4-:12 IVe du Persil. Bruxelles. W. H~ Smith &. Sori. i'.75.bQ\llevord Adelphe.Mu. Bruxelles. "Elefiheroud~lis," Plo.- d. 1. Consfltu. tion, Athènes. 'UATEllALA Gou\l.ud 8: CIo. lido;, Se. Avenido lur 28. èu.tom.i•• HAITI Libr.irie· "A 1. C.r~volle." Boit. pOlfel. I.II.B, ·Port••u·Prince. NONlum . Librerlo Ponemericano, Colle de 10 Fuont•• Tegucig.lp•• HONGoIOI" The Swindon Book Co.. 25 Nathe,. Ro!!!!. Kowl~on. /(WIiD - ISlAllOE Bobvel2lun Siqfuser ~mondssonor H. F.. Austyrstraeti 18. ReYk,evik. . IMOlA-INDE 'OUVIA- 10UVIE Librerle Selecéionet; Cesille 972. Le pez. IWIL-nBIL .. Livrorie Agir, Rio de Jeneiro. Soo Peulo ond Belo Ho~onte. CAllADA ~erson Prest. 299 Oueen St. West, Toronto. P.riodic•• Inc.. 4234 de 1. Roche: Mon. treol. 34. cmOlt- CEnAII Th. Associ.ted. N....pep.~ of Ceylon ltd.. Lei. Hous.. Golombo O~ford eôok & Stetionery Co.. Sclndi~ House. New Delhi, end 17 Perk Stre", Celcutto. P. V<ired.chory 8: Co.. 8 L1nglll .Ch&tty St•• Medr•• 1. INDONBIA -INOOMESIE Joie.en Pembongun.n, Gununi Seherl 84. Diokert•• DlILE- (l'LI librerle Ivens. Mon.ô. &22. Senti.~o. Edito;i.1 ·d.1 Pedficô, Ahuin.de· &l'. Senti.~o. OUIIA-CHIIIE Tho- W01(.d Bool Co. lId.• 99 O!ung King Rood, l<t S~o",. T.rpeh. T.iw.n. Cômmercl.1 Press. 211 Hon.nRd.. Sh.ng. h.t COlOllllA - C0101111E Libreofe L.tln.. Carr.re 60.. .3.(15. 8oqot6. -LibrerSe ·Amiric•• Medellln. Librerlo Noclol\lll lId... Berr.nquill•• ~UIl Ke;..,b.Kheneh D.nesh, 293 S..di '\V.. nue, 'i~~ran. IUG-IUI M.denzie·s BO(l'-;,~op. Beghdod. ISUEL Blumsteln's eoolltores Ltd.. 35 Allinby Ro.d. Tel·Aviv. ITALY -ITALlE Colibri S.A., Vi. Mercolli 36, Millno. LEUIION - UlAN Ubreirie Univers.lle. Beyrouth. UlElIA J. Momolu K.mere. Monroyl.. lUXEllOll15 L1broirie J. Schummer. Luxembourg. IIEXICO-1IE1IOUE Editori.1 Herme. SA, lanecio Morlseol 41. M6xico. D.F. NETHEILANDS-PAYSoUS N.V. M.rtin~s Niihoff. 'Longe Voorhout 9. ·,.Gr.venh.ge. -II!IJ ~..!Wl: - iïuiiJEtLE-ZELANDE United N.tion•.Association of New Zea. lend. C.P.O. 1011. Wellington. 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Wüllerstorff. Weegpl.tz. 4. Selzburg. eerold Ir Co.. 1. Groben 31. Wien. IEÏIIAHY- ALLEIIAGllE E1wert.& Meurer. H.uptstresSll 101. B.rlin -Schêineb.fg. W. E. S.etb.ch. eereon<tr~Slo 25.29, KSln (22c). . ...10.. Horn. Spi.gelg~sse ~; Wiesbeden. JAPAN-JAPON Moruzen Camp.eny. lId., " Tori·Nichoml, Nlhonb.shi, Tolyo. SPAI"E5I'AGU Librer!o Bosch. Il Rondo Unlversld.d, Bercelono. Les commandes etdemandes de renaelQnements émanant de pays o~ il n'existe pas encore de dépolltair..s peuvent Itre adress6es Il fa Section des venles et d.e la distribu- tion, Organisation des Nations Unies, New-York (Etats- Unis d'Amérique) ou 6 la Section des ventes, Organi.~­ tlon des NatIon. Untes, Palais dIS Nations, Genève (Sulsse)•. (5312) Q-9762- June 1954-1,600