S/PV.639 Security Council

No decision ,vas in fact taken- hecause there was no need for one - ta hear the representative of Israel tirst; but hefore the end of the last meeting he did ask ta h<l,ve his name put down as first speaker in reply ta Mr. Zeineddine, and until just now l bad not been informed that'any member of the Couneil wished to make use of his prerogative ta speak before mm. l cannot stop Mr. Malik, as a member of the Couneil, from using what is not in fact a right- because it is nowhere written in the roles - but bas become a custom. NevertheJE'ss l very much hope that he will emp!oy greate- d1~ '..:ction in the future in his use.of the privilege of 'Speaking ,before, after and even dunng the statements of the speakers most directly concemed in the matter. ' 7. Mr. Oiarles MALIK (Lebanon): Before l proceed with my statement, l wish ta state' that when the President spoke about the future, he obviously mu~t have had in llljnd some incid~t in the past wherein l used what he called a custom rather than a right. l do not remelllber ever ha~ng used it in the pasto Consequently, what be said about the future with. respect ta the discussions seems ta me ta be unfounded, at least as fa:' as my past behaviour is concerned. 8. Furthemlo.re, it is a fad; that, in the verbatim record that l have before me, there is nothing to show t.imt the representative of Israell was going to he the first speaker today, m: that he mentioned it ta the Cmmci1. He may have spoken to the President. in private - that is perfectly possible. Therefore, l am grateful to the President for allowing me to speak, and l assure him that there ,vas no need to ask me tQ use discretiou whether in the past, present or future. 9. The report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Troce Supervision Organization [S/3122], Ils well as the statements of the representatives of Syria and Israel, have providedthe Coundl with the facts and the differentviews on the case which was .brought by Syria to its attention. From a thorough and objective examination of the report and the state- ments, the following seven indubitable facts cal1. be established: 10. First, large-scale work was started in the demi- litarized zone created by the Syrian-IsraeH Armistice Agreement. 1 This work was sponsored, supported and defended by one party to that Agreement, and the work was started and pursued not oilly without the approval of the other party but evenwithout prior consultation with it. n. Secondly, the work was started and prosecuted in the demiHtarized mne without a prior authorization 10. Premièrement, des travaux de grande envergure ont été entrepris dans la zone démilitarisée créée par la Convention d'armistice syro-israélienne 1. Ces tra- vaux ont été conçus, appuyés et défendus par l'une des parties à la .Convention, et ils ont été engagés et poursuivis, non seulement sans l'accord de l'autre partie, mais sans même qu'elle ait été préalablement consultée. 11. Il apparaît en second lieu que les travaux: ont été entrepris et poursuivis dans la zone démilitarisée 1 Voir Procès-verbaus officiels dt~ Conseil de sécurité, ql/a- trième allllée, Supplét1lel~t spécial No 2. 13. Fot.rthly, the work which was star~ed in the demi- litarized 2:one will bring about a substantial modifi- cation 'of the geophysical features of the zone. The least .that could be said about this modification is what v,,'as reported on it by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in his report [S/3122, atmex III] . "The construction of the projected canal would ... alter the flow [within the demilitarized zone] of the Jordan permanently and ... it would, in a11 likelihood, adversely affect, particularly during the dry season, the lif~ of the people depel1ding on the waters of the river. '.' The present canal project, the execution of which would rcsult in cOll'siderably lowering the waters of the Jordan, affects many . more Arabs" - the comparison here is to the Huleh project - "and many more acres of lands." In another part of the report rS/3122, anne.'\; I] the Cbief of Staff states that " ... the projected ('.anal and power station would sometimes leave the Jordan with very Httle, if any, water. JJ , 14. Fifthly, the work which was started in the demiHtarized zone has military consequences which are aU, according tû the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization who is our only objective and neutra.1, authority on this question, to the advantage of ore party to '/:he Agreement. 15. ·Sixthly, the work which 'was started ·in the zone will -hring "about, if continued, a ddinite integration of thé zone into the economic and hydro-electric, 'System of 'one bf the twoparties to the Armistice Agreement, an integration which Is neither stipulated in the Agreement nor permitted ,by it._.. 16. Seventhly, the work started in the demilitarized zone will'produce, in the demilitarized zone and else- where, a total change in the flow of the waters of an international river, the Jordan. 17. It is the contention of my delegation that these facts - which l be1ieve to be incontrovertiblc, and which no amount of oratory can possibly refute- constitute in their negative aspect a violation of the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Agreement. They amount in their positive consequences to a radical alteration of the conditions in the demilitarized zone, an alteration which, a,ccording to the Armistice Agreement itself, should not take place without the mutual consent of the two parties'to the Agreement. Whether the party responsib1;e for these seven indubitable facts was 17. De l'avis de ma délégation, ces faits - que j'estime incontestables etqu'auGun artifice oratoire ne saurait réfuter - constitut!nt, iridirectement, une vio- lation de la Convention d'armistice signée par la Syrie et Israël. Ils ont, d'autre part, pour conséqüellce directe de modifier radicalement la situation dans la zone démi- litarisée alors qu'une telle modification, 'aux termes mêmes de la Convention d'armistice, ne peut inter- venir sans le consentement mutuel des deux parties. La partie responsable de ces sept faits irréfutables, que ce soit la Syrie ou Israël, a vi01é et la lettre.et l'esprit 3 ea~, les terres et les propriétés des habitants de la zone; cependant, ces travaux ont été engagés sans qu'un accord préalable ait été conclu avec les habi- tants au sujet de leurs droits sur ces eaux, ces terres et ces propriétés. 13. Quatrièmement, il apparaît que les travaux entre- pris dans la zone démilitarisée modifieront considéra- blement les caractéristiques géophysiques de la zone. Le moins qu'on puisse dire de ces modifications est c.: que le Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme D;argé de la surveillance de la trêve a signalé dans son rapport [S/3122, annexe III] : ct •• • La construction du canal que l'on se propose de creuser modifierait de façon permanente le débit du Jourdaiu [dans la zone démilitarisée] et '" les travaux auraient,· selon toute vraisemblance, de fâ- cheuses conséquences, surtout pendant la' saison sèche, pour les populations dont la vie dépend des eaux du fleuve ... Le projet actuel, qui a trait au creusement d'un canal et dont l'exécution aurait pour effet d'abaisser considérablement le niveau du Jourdain, a.-lfecte les intérêtd d'un nombre beaucoup plus grand d'Arabes et po:i:e sur un bien plus grand nombre d'acres de terrain- que les travaux entre- pris dans la région du lac de Houlé." Dans une autre partie de son rapport [S/3122, annexe I], le Chef d'état-major déclare: " ... Il est probable que ... le ca."la1 et la centrale projetés ôteraient par- fois au Jourdain une grande quantité sinon la totalité de ses eaux. JJ 14. Cinquièmement,' les travaux entrepris dans la zone démilitarisée ont, du point de vue militaire, des conséquences qui, 'Je1I)n.Je Chef d'étaf-maj()r, de l'Or- ganisme chargé de la surveillance de la trêve, qui est notre seule autorité objective et neutJ;e· ~n la matière, sont toutes de nature à profiter exclusivement à l'Wle des deux parties ,il. la Convention. 15. Sixièmement, les tra'r{aux entrepris dans la zone, s'ils étaient poursuivis, auraient· pour résultat d'int~ grer la zone dans le système économique et hydro- électrique de l'une des deux parties à la Convention d'armistice: or, une telle intégration n'est ni préVue ni autorisée par la Convention. 16. Septièmement, les travaux entrepris dans la zone démilitarisée auront pour effet de modifier entière- ment le cours des eaùx d'un fleuve international, le Jourdain, tant dans la zone démilitarisée qu'en dehors de cette zone. cas~ and the canal project case. We think that the Chief of Staff, by po;.nting out these differences, has perfectly 1'JOO his rights and fulfilled his duties in confonnity with articles V and VII of the Armistice Agreement, rights and duties which were confinned in the resolu- tio~ of the Council on the Huleh case. However, it can he 1:oncluc;led from the findings of the Chief of Staff that the case that we are &~aling with goes beyond the mere supervision of the gradual restoration of normal eivilian life to the area of the demilitarized zone - a supervision·that the CHef of Stàff is obliged to assume according to article V, paragraph 5, of the Arnristiœ Agreement - in that the works started aiid contemplatedprejudk\Hhe ultimate settlecrent, .. a pre- judice <:ompletely excluded ·by the ter:ns of artJcle V, paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement itself. It goes also beyond the.mer€ interpretation vf the articles of the Agreement; for it mises the Yery problem· of -the military objective of creating and maintaining the demilitar.zOO zone; it affe<:ts the question of sovereignty in the zone, and, therefore, it amounts toa unilateral alteration of sorne clauses of the Agreement. an rotera- tion totally unpermitted without ·the consent of the two parties. 20.. Our second reason for going beyond the pre- cedent of the Couneil in the Huleh cise, and for asking the .ço~cil now to go along with us~ is that· the decision of the Counci1· in the Huleh case proved ineffective. For l doubt - and 1 state this very conser- vatively - whether an objective inquiry into themanner in which Israel impl~ented that ~ecision wîl1 show that Israel implemented it faithfully. 21. Precedents can he argued for only if they worked; if they did not work, then obvîous1y one is justified in .departing from th~m~ However, whether.or not Israelimplemented the Huleh necision properly, it is clear fro;ffi, our presentexperience ~th the canal proje<:t that the foriner action of the Conncil did not prevent 18. Il pourrait sembler qu'en défendant cette thèse devant le Conseil ma délégation va au-delà du précé- dent que le Conseil a établi dans un. cas analogue l'affaire du lac de Houlé. Dans ses conclusions rela~ tives à cette affaire, le Conseil s'est borné à réaffirmer que le ('''hef d'état-major de l'Organisme chargé de la surveillance de; la trêve a compétence pour arrêter les dispositions nécessaires en vue de la continuation des travaux d'assèchement dans la· zone dénù1itarisée. Le Conseil n'a pas fait du consentement mutuel des deux parties à la Convention d'annistice la condition préalable Je la poursuite des travaux. Voici pourquoi notre conclusion 'Sur l'affaire du creusement du canal va plus loin que la conclusion à laquelle le Conseil est arrivé dans l'affaire du lac de Houlé. 19. Il faut tenir compte d'abord' des différenc.~ qui existent entre l'affaire du lac de Houlé et celle du projet de creusement d'un -canal, différences qui ont été re- connues dans le rapport du Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme chargé de la surveillance de la trêve. Nous pensons .que le Chef d'état-major, en 'signalant ces différences, a exercé ses droits à juste titre et parfai- tement rempli ses devoirs, conformément aux articles V et VII de la Convention d'armistice; ces droits et devoirs ont d'ailleurs été 1~ofifinnés par la résoiution du Conseil sur l'affaire du lac de Houlé. Cependant, d'après les conclusions au.~quelles est arrivé le Chef d'état.-major, on peut affirmer que l'affaire qùe nous examinons maintenant dépasse le cadre d'w1e simple surveillance du rétablissement graduel de la vie civile normale dans la région de la" zone démilitarisée - sur- veillance que le Chef d'état-major a l'obligation ,d'exer- cer en vertu du paragraphe 5 de l'article V de la Convention d'armistice - étant donné·que les travatlX commencés et envisagés pr6jugent le règlement final de la question, cè qui est complètement· e.:~clu par les dispositions du para."uraphe 2 de l'article V de la Convention d'armistice elle-même. Elle dépasse ég:tle- ment le cadre d'une simple interprétation des artides de la Convention; en effet, elle soulève le. problèrr.e même de l'objectif militaire qtoi visait la ~réation et le maintien de la zone démilitarisée; elle toudtela question de la souveraineté dans la zone et, de ce fait. équivaut à une modification unilatérale de certaines clauses de la Convention, modification qu'il n'est abso- lument pas permis d'apporter sans le consentement préalable des deux parties.· . 20. La déuxième raison pour laquelle nous· demandons au Conseil d'aller au-delà du précédent établi dans' le cas du ·lac de Houlé est que sa décision dans ce cas. s'est révélée sans efficacité. Je ne crois pas, en effet-'- et je. suis bien en deçà de la vérité en le disant;.... que, si l'on examinait objectivement la manière dont Israël a appliqué .•cette dédsion, l'enquête··montrerait qu'il l'a appliquée consciencieusement. . . 21. On ne peut invoquer des précédents que lors- ! qu'ils ont été efficaces; dans le cas contraire, on est entièrement justifié à s'en écarter. Néanmoins, qu'l'sraël ait ou .non donné· la. suite voulue.à la. décision. prise dans l'affaire du jac de Houlé, il est clair, dans le cas présent du projetde.:C1"~~5,ementd'un éanâl, que la 2'2. These are the main reasons which led us to the formulation of the contention I have submitted to the attention of the Council. 1 have presented them in their broad outline; now 1 propose to deal '.'Jith t.lJ.em in furtner detail. 23. I sha11 start with the military aspect. The Chief of Staff dealt with it in unequivoca1 tenns in bis report to the Secretary-General (Sj3122, a.nnex 1] 1 beg the members of the Council to notice the language used by the Chief of Staff. He said: armw:~e Il, le Chef d'état-major a traité de cette ques- tion en des tenues qui n'ont rien d'équivoque. Je demande aux membres du Conseil d'examiner attenti- vement le passage que voici du rapport du Chef d'état- major. "En ce quiconceme l'aspect militaire de la ques- tion, le Jourdain, avec sa vallée profonde, constitue un sérieux obstacle pour toutes les' troupes, en particulier .pour les troupes motorisées. qui cher- c11eraient à le traverser. La partie à la COI1vention d'armistice général qu.i, var un canal, pourrait con- trôier le cours du Jpl1rdlin dans la zone démilitarisée et pourrait modifier C'~ cours ou même assécher le fleuve iL sa guise, pourrait modifier à roll. gré la valeur q~e la zone démilitarisée présente pour l'autre partie; cette zone a été "définie en vue de séparer les forces années des deux parties, de manière à réduire au mÎJ1Jmum les possibilités d'incidents et de froissements ... " 24. D'après la déclaration fa\te au nom de M. Bunche à la 542ème.séa.'lce.du Conseil: " ... Le but de la zone dë.~mtarisée est de séparer pendant toutè la durée de l'armistice les "forcCs années des .deux parties, de manière à réduire au minimum les possibilités d'incidents entre elles. En fait, la zone démilitarisée devait être une. il!IOrte de "zone tampon" jusqu'au règlement pacifique et défi- nitif du différend." 25. L'idée de cette zone démilitarisée est due à M. Bunche. Dans sa déclaration, il confinne son impor- tance en tant que partie intégrante du système. établi par la Convention, et son avis fait autorité. Cette zone ne doit exister que "pendant la durée de l'armistice" et jusqu'au "règlement pacifique et définitif" du diffé- rend. Par conséquent, toute mooication de la 1'a1eur- militaire de la zone - et le général Bennikeamontré que le plan envisagé et entrepris unilatéralement par l'Etat. d'Israël aboutirait inévitablement à une telle modifi.œtion - reviendrait, en réalité, à suspendre les dispositions de l'article V de la COnvention ·d'armistice; or, aux tennes du paragraphe 3 de l'article VIII de la Convention d'armistice, ces dispositions ne-.epet1ven.t être suspendues qu'avec le consentem.....Lt. mutuel des deux parties. 26. Nous en venons maintenant à la .question des rapports. entre le projet de canal et le S~t1rtlégai et reConnu de la zone démilitarisée, à la question .des conséquences que le creusement de'· ce canal aUl'ait s "As regards the military aspect of the question, the Jorda.:."1, in its deep valley, i'5 a serious obstacle for any troops, particularly motorized t'roops, which would attempt to cross it. A party to the General Armistice f\greement which, by means of a canal, could control the flow of the Jordan in.the <Îe.-:-lilî- tarlzed zone, changing it or possibly even dryiL,,; 1t up af-will, could alter at will the value ta the other party of the demilitarized zone, whichhasheeu , 'defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner as to . minimize the possib;lity of friction and inci- dent ... '." 24. According ta a statement given on behalf of Ml'. Bunche at the 54~~nd meeting of the Council: "The purpose of the demilitarized 2:one ... was to 'separate and to keep separated for the duration of the armistice the anned forces of the two parties, 'in order to eliminate as fully as possible friction and troublesome inc'idents between them. This was tobe, in effect, a so!'t of 'buffer zone' pending final peaceful settlement of the dispute." 25. Ml'. Bunche was the initiator of the idea of the (}emilitarized zone. His statement g:. ~ an authoritative confirmation of the value of the zone as a principal part of the system created by the Agref'ment. It must la:st for ~'the dumtion of the armistice" and until "a final peaceful settlement" is reached. Therefore, any alteration of themilitary value of the zone - and ~neral .B~nnikf' bas pr<?yed that such an alteration lG the certain resült of the 'Scheme proposed and unila- teraUy begun à'or Israe1- amounts in effect to the • J . ., ., SUspensl011 of article V of the Annistice Agreement. But, under ra.:ticle VIII, paragraph 3, of the Armistice A-greement, tliese terms may not be suspended save by the mutual consent of thetw9 parties. ! 26. W~ come now to the relation of the canal project ro the recognized legal status of t.'le demilitarized zone and ,to its effects upon tltat statUs. The Council is certamly aware of.the developments, which 1~ to the 27. The !srae1is consider the demilitarized zone as a part of Israeli territory. Sovereigntyover it is or ought te he Israeli sovereignty. This was stated tirnes by Israeli officiais (;'Ïther here or .in Isne!. We refer in particular ta the· 'statement of the Acting Foreign Minister of Israel, reported· in the cablegram dated i2 April 1951 from the Acting Olief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a reportcovering the period 11 and 12 April 1951 [SI2088]. The acting Foreign Minister of Israel stated that the Govern- ment of Israel considered that the demilitarized zOne "vas in Israel territory. 28. A repre!:ientative of Isr~el gave, at the 542nd meeting of the Security Council, the legal grounds for suchan I;Sr'aeli daim. Accordil'ig ta him, most of the temtf'Jry· of the demilitarized zone was giveu to Israel in the partition resolutiùn of the. general Assem- bly of 29 November 1947; 2 most of it was within the territory which \VaS proclaimed by the Israelis. on 14 May 1948 as heing Israeli territory; and he said that, latelr on it should be occupied.by Syrian forces during the military operations "... military Occup(l~ion itself Idid] not give rise to legal sovereignty". l have quùted the wQrds of the representative of Israel. 29, Therefore, according to the Israel rep":"~13entative, and l quote him again [542n4 meeting] : . . «.;. The theory t4at Israel's laws, civil juris- diction or fr~om of development in' the demili- tarired zone are inaheyance and may Jegitimately bechaUenged under the Armistice Agreement is contrary- ta- the estabHshed practice of the Agree- ment, just as it is without foundation in ·the text of the Agreement itself." 30. From'thîs reasoning it could he deduced that Israell'.aS been acting within the limits of ifs obliga- tions às à 1ega1 heir to the British mandatoty·author- ities by authorizing 'the Palestine Land Deve10pment Companyto conduct its drainage work in thè demili- tarlzed z6rle~andby authorizing at presènt the Palestine Electric CUlIJOration to -~: on' itswork for the· 2See ·officidz 1?ecords of the Geu"ai As~embij, Second Session, ReSofutions, rêsolûnon 181 (II). - . 6 ..2Voir .I.Jocu~~Ii!s officièls ck· l'As~~mbÙ~ générale, deu.xjJnI~:"· 34. Syria's conception of the demilitarized zone was presented by the Syrian representative at the 545th meeting of the Security Council as follows: "The territory comprising the demilitarized zone had been for the mast part under Syrian occupation, as l have already stated. When a final peace agree- ment has been conc1uded,. Syria will certa.inly insist that this territory should he retumed to its control." 3$. The'Syrian representative went to explaIn the reasons fOl' his statement and what he meant by it. He said: , "This allusion was in conne.."'Cion with the Israel daim i~ one of the agenda items that thé <iefuili- tarized zone wa.s in Israel territory. 1 never said nor intended it to he understood that· Syria has any desite or wish at the present time to occupy any pprtion of the demilitarized zone. .. Syria considers that during the armistice period aIl claims to any sector in the demilitarized zone are held in abeyance, The destiny of this area is to be established in the provisions of the eventual peace treaty." 36. l now cOmeto the United Nations conception. This conception of the legai status of· the demilitarized zone has 'been stated by several officiaIs of the United Nations who have been involved in the neg-:>tiations, the interpretation and the implementation of the Ar- misticè Agreement. 37. Ml'. Bunche's opinion on the matter of sovereign1:'j in the zone was reported to the Security Couneil at its 542nd meeting by the Chief of Staf( of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. General Riley said, qU()i.lng Ml'. Bunche: 38. In another passage of the sarne statement we read: " <The provision for the demilitarized zone in the light of all circumstances is the mpst that can he reasonably expected. in an. armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must he dea1t with in the ultimate peace settIement and not' - 1 repeat not- <in the Armis- tice Agreement.· " • 1 39. In his report of 12 March 1951 [S/2049] General Riley expressed his own view as Cl-Jef of Staff on the qu~stion of sovereignty: « ••• neither party to the Armistice Agreement ... enjoys rights of sovereignty within the demilitarized zone. Any laws, regulations or ordinances in force prior to .the Armistice Agreement which affected any areas included in the demilitarized zone àre null and void". 40. In a fcotnpte in which the last part of the state- ment was amended, the Chief of Staff said: «The United Nations Chief of Staff now helieves that his memorandum should have stated tha.t any laws, regulations or ordinances in' force ,mor to the Armistice Agreement which' affected any areas included .in the demilitarized zone <are held in· abey- ance' instead of <are nu1l and void'." 41. The representative of the United Kingdom ex- pressed the view of his Government on the same question in t.~e.following terms [546th meeting] : « ... until a final peace treatybetween Syria and Israel has been made, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regards the question of sovereignty in the demilitarized zone as being per- fectly dear. The General Ar,dstice Agreement, together with Mr. Bunche's in{.erpretive note· of 26 June 1949, which was formal!y aCt".pted by bath Governments as an authoritatiy~ commentary on the: Agreement, must he interpreted as meaning that, so long as the atmistice continues in 'force, neither Government exerdses sovereignty in the demili- tarized Z .Jne!' 42. The representatives of Turkey, the Netherlands 1 ~__~do:c: ooncurred _rn_the sam< new. The Turkish 8 lr~ surveillance de la trêve estime maintena..'1.t que son mémorandum aurait dû préciser que "l'application" de toutes lois, tous règlements et toutes ordonnances en vigueur avant la signature de la Convention d'armistice et applicables à tnut territoire situé dans la zone démilitarisé.:- "~p':'"dit suspendue", et non pas que ces textes sera.. .•lt «nuls et non avenus." 41. Le repî'ésentant du Royaume-Uni a exposé l'opi- nion de son gouvernement sur cette même question âans les termes suivants [546ème séance] : "Le Got1vernement du Royaume-Uni estime que, l:aJ.ït qu'un traité de paix final n'aura pas été c:mclu entre la Syrie et Israël, la question de la souve- raineté dans la zone démilitarisée est parfaitement claire. La Convention d'aroùstice général, d'une part, et l'interprétation donnée le 26 juin 1949 par M. Bunche et acceptée officiellement par' les deux gouvernements comme faisant autorité en ce qui concerne la Convention, d'autre part, doivent être considérées comme signifiant que tant que l'armis- tice demeurera en vigueur, aucun des deux gouver- nements n'exercera de souveraineté dans la zone démilitarisée." 42. Les représentants de la Turquie, des Pays-Bas et de l'Inde ont exprimé la même opinion. Après avoir 43. It is extremely useful to recaU as a final quotation in this subject the paragraph of the Security Cauncil resolution [S/2157] on the Huleh case, in which it was c1early stated that: "The question of civil administration in villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an armistice agree- ment, in sub-paragraphs 5 Cb) and 5 Cf) of the drait article. Such civil administration, including po- licing" - 1 repeat the ward "policing" , which of course you all know now is done by regular Israel police - "will he on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, iurisdiction, citizenship, and sovereignty" - and l wish ta em- phasize these 1ast words. 44. From aU this, the following four conclusions can he drawn: 45. First, regardless of Israel or Syrian claims ta sovereignty over the demilitarized zone, the interpre- tations given by United Nations officiaIs and by the Caunci! to the Armistice Agreement stipulations con- ceming the zone establisù the fact that until a final settlement in reached between Syria and Israel, no State has sovereignty ove. the zone. 46. Secondly, since no State has sovereignty over the zone, there is no single authority at the present time which is entitled to consider itself heir ta the' British mandatory authority, and which cau use its sovereign right to decide whether under the new con- ditions created in Palestine the concession of the Pales- tine E1ectric Corporation is or is not still applicable in the zone or whether it is in the interest of the inhabi- tants of the zone. 47. Thirdly, the United Nations Truce Supervisioh Organization is not exercising in the demilitarized zone the rights of a sovereign State; it is limiting itself to the task of supervision of the implementation of the clauses of the Armistice Agreement relating to the zone. It is probably for this reason that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Orga- l1ization, in his commenfs on the letter of 24 Septemher 1953 of the Foreign Minister of Israel, limited himse1f to the following observation [S/3122) anne.'t"III] : "As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the rights of the Palestine Electric Corporation or the other private rights within the demilitarized zone to which you have referred are not in question. What is in question is the right to 'Start work in the demi- fin~l ait lieu <::ntre les deux. parties." 43. Il est extrêmement utile de rappeler, comme dernière citation sur cette question, le paragraphe suivant de la résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à propos de l'affaire du lac de Houlé [S/2157/ Reid]: "Les alinéas S, b, et S, f, du projet d'article règlent la question de l'administration civile dans les villages et settlemen~ç de la zone démilitarisée dans le cadre d'une convention d'armistice. Cette administration, .v compris la police" - je répète le mot "police':; vous savez tous, naturellement qu'elle est assuree par la police régulière d'Israël- "se fera sur une base locale, sans que soient soulevées des questions générales d'administration, dt: juridiction, de citoyen- neté ou de souveraineté" - et je tiens à insi"""'r sur ces derniers mots. 44. De tout cela on peut tirer quatre conclusions: 45. Prp.mièrement, quelles que soient les prétentions d'Israël ou de la. Syrie à 1•• souveraineté sur la zone démilitarisée, les interprétations dotUlées par les agents des Nations Unies et par le Conseil aux. clauses de la. Convention d'armistice relatives à la zone démilitarisée établissent très nettement que, jusqu'à ce qu'tm. accord définitif soit conclu entre la Syrie et Israël, aucun de ces deux Etats n'exerce la souveraineté sur cette zone. 46. Deuxièmement, puisqùe aucun Etat n'exerce la souveraineté sur cette zoné, il n'existe aujourd'hui aucune autorité qui puisse, à juste titre, se considérer comme l'héritière de l'autorité détenue par le Royaume- Uni en tan\.' que Puis:>ance mandataire et qui puisse utiliser son droit souverain pour (Mcider si, dans la nouvelle situation créée en Palestine, la con<;ession de la Palestine Electric Corporation est ou n'est pas applicable dans la zone démilitarisée, ou si cette con,,:, cession est confonne aux intérêts des habitants de la zone. 47. Troisièmement, l'Organisme des Nations Unies chargé de la surveillance de la trêve n'exerce pas, dans la zone démilitarisée, les droits d'un Etat sou- verain; il se bom~ à veiller à l'application des dispo- sitions de la Convention d'armistice relatives à la zone. C'est sans doute la raison pour laquelle, dans les observations qu'il a présentées au sujet de la lettre du Ministre des affaires étrangères d'Israël en date du 24 septenlbre 1953, le Chef d'état-major de l'Orga- nisme chargé de la surveillance de la trêve s'en est tenu à la remarque suivante [S/3122, annexe III]: "Ainsi qu'il a été indiqué au paragraphe précé- dent, les droits de la Palestine Electric Corporation ou les droits d'autres intérêts privés à l'intérieur de la zone démilitarisée dont vous· avez parlé ne sont pas contestid. Ce que l'on conteste, c'est le droit on~ way or the other the question of sovereignty over the zone and, therefore, the destiny of the zone, must he stopped at the recognized limits of the zone ttnless agreement i5 reached between Syria and Israel. 50. In addition to this legal approach to the pfoblem, we w~te confronted with an extra-Iegal, apparently dynanllc, economic approach. Wc were told that the whole economic picture Qf aState hangs on the canal project and this consideration, it is argued, 5hould justify anything that the interested State might do in the demilitarized zone. This daim is so daring, so dangerous, so full of consequences, not only to one State in the area but ta aU its States and peoples; that 1 propose to deal with it at length once 1 take up the other issues related to the present case. T would ma.1{e now only two remarks about this allegedly dynamic economic daim, a daim that is supposed to drench and drown and complete1y obliterate the legal arguments. 51. First, l would recall a statement made by the representative of France at the 546th meeting of the Sccurity Council in answer to those who attempted at that time to minimize the importance of the indivi- dual rights which were endangered by the extension of the Huleh project to the demilitarized zone. That remark of the representative of France is perfectly relevant to the present discussion. He said: Urt has been said too often that it was only a question or a few acres of land. Tt is a150 and above aIl a question of a principle and, when aIl is 'Said and done, of the whole status of the demd1itarized zone." crt~e tme situation de fait qui préjuge, en faveur de l'une ou l'autre partie, la question de 1~ souverainetê sur la zone. Ma délégation estime donc que les travaux entrepris pn.r cette société dans la zone démilitarisée devraient être inter.l'ompus, soit jusqu'à la conclusion d'un accord définitif entre IsraN et la Syrie qtli règle la question de la souveraineté sur la zone démilitarisée, soit jusqu'à ce que les autorités des deux Etats s'enten- dent sur la légalité et l'utilité des travau."t. 49. En soutenant cette thèse, nous l'le cherchons pas à donner à l'une des parties à la Convention d'annis- tice le droit d'opposer son veto aux projets de dévelop- pement écono11Ùque de l'autre partie. En effet, rien dans la Convention ne justifierait cette attitude néga- tive de la part de l'une ott l'autre partie. Nous affir- mons seulement que, tant que la question de la souve- raineté sur la zone démi1itarisé~ ne sera pas définiti- vement réglée, tOllt projet entrepris en territoire syrien ou israélien qui, en s'étendant à la zone, pourrait préju- ger effectivement la question de la souveraineté.sur la zone et, par conséquent, l'avenir de cette zone, doit être arrêté aux limites reconnues de la zone, à moins que les autorités syriennes et israéliennes ne s'enten- dent à son sujet. 50. A cette façon juridique d'aborder le problème, on a opposé avec vigueur des arguments d'un caractère extra-juridique, des arguments d'apparence dynamique fondés sur des considérations économiques. On nous a dit q.le toute l'économie d'un Etat dépend de la création du canal projeté, et l'on soutient que cela devrait suffire à justifier tout ce que l'Etat intéressé pourrait être amené à faire dans la zone démilitarisée. Cette assertion est si' audacieuse, si dangereuse,· si lourde de conséquences, non setilementpour l'un des Etats de la région, mais pour tous les Etats et tons les peuples, que je me propose d'en traiter plus longue- ment lorsque j'aurai examiné les autres aspects de l'affaire qui nous occupe. Je me borner~, pour le moment, à présenter deux observations au sujet de cette revendication économique et prétendue dyrla- mique, qui deVTait sans conteste l'emJXlrter sur tOllS les arguments juridiques. 51. Ma première observation consistera à rappeler la déclaration que le représentant de la France a faite à la 546èm.e séance du Conseil, en réponse à ceux qui tentaient alors de minimiser l'importance des droits privés que met en péril l'extension à la zone démilita- risée des travaux entrepris dans la région du lac de Houlé. Cette renlarque du représentant de la France aurait parfaitement sa place dans le présent débat. Le représentant de la France a déclaré: "On a trop dit qu'ilue s'agissait qùe de quelques acres de terre. Il s'agit aussi et surtout d'un prindpe et en définitive même du statut tout entier de la zone dénùlitarisée." 53. 1 \Vish, in conclusion, to state, as a fundamental maxim for peace in the Near East, that peace can never come about, concord and ttnderstanding can never supel'vene so long as one State takes international law into its own hands, trusting that it has enough influence, in high as well as in low places, to do altnost anything and be able to get away with it. Neither violence, nor injustice, nor ttnilateral action, nor pride, nor boumUess ambition can bring peace. Peace - a genuinel real, lasting peace - will not come to our tonnented part of the world tt11til there' is a spirit of understanding, agreement, humility, respect for law, honest deferences ta the decent opinion of manldnd and, ubove all, a spirit of truth and love. 54. Ml'. EBAN (Israel): l vtish to make a final SUlI)1l1ary of Israel's case in refutation of the Syrian complaint against to B'not Yaacov canal project. l may seek the privilege of reply if new considerations are raised in the further course of this discussion. 55. Every day that has passed since this debate began has increased our astonishment that a project sa legitimate and beneficial should have encountered 50 many obstacles at Syria's behest. The absence in Mr. Malik's speech of any arguments not previously refuted, still further augments our perple..'dty. Here are water sources which do not flow through Syria at any single point j which are unavailable for Syrian use by every consideration of geography, history, topography and law j but which do flow through Israel and constitute Israel's sole source of natural power, The United Nations - the symbol and instrument of international co-operation- is requested by Syria to withhold these \Vatel' sources from Israel's peaceful economic develop- ment, merely because they pass for a small part of their course through a demilitarized zone, well out- side Syria's territory, notwithstanding the fact that the Amùstice Agreement contains ne'!: a single word which has been or can be quoted to justify such an arbitrary impediment. And all this happens three yeats after the Security Council, in a sinùlar case affecting the same are,a, rejected the alleged right of Syrian veto and confirmed its policy of facilitating economic development projects depencling upon work in the demilitarized·zone, To make the paradox even mort' startling, this project, which tS so vital fol' Israel's national economy, has now been lblicly declé.1.rfls1. by extV:>l.ts of universal eminence to tit adnù- 56. 1 have had the privilege of hearing many cases and complaints dÎ'scussed. in the organs of the United Nations; but 1 have never encountered one in which the balance of argument \Vas sa overwhelmingly in one direction, or in which a comp1aint was put forward and maintained with such totallack of adequate motive or justification. In smnmarizing the points at issue 1 wish ta appeal most earnestly ta the Security Council that it aet with HU speed ta help the full resumption of this totally beneficial project. The Israel Govern~ ment and the Palestine Eleetric Corporation have already incurred many needless complications and lasses as a result of this unfounded Syrian complaint. The wark has been suspended since 27 October, and the winter rains are close at hand. The deliberations of the Security Council on this question were twice postponed at the request of the représentative of Lebanon. May 1 not hope that the Security Council, having accepted. with satisfaction my Government's ofter fur a temporary suspension of this work, will now desire to make every effort to expedite its early resumption in conditions which will satisfy aIl legiti- mate affected interests? 57. In his address to the Seeurity Council on 10 November 1953 [636th meeting] Mr. Zeineddine pur- ported ta summarize my Government's position under five headings, all of which, except one, he formulated in distorted terms. The sole e."'\:ception is his correct attribution ta Israel of the view that Syria does not gain the right of veto over Israel's national develop- ment projects simply because such projects involve sorne wom: in an area outside Syria called. the 'demi- litarizedzone. That is our view on the Syrian veto- and a correct one. Even here, the Syrian representative is not quite accurate in describing this as an Israel attitude. The absence of a Syrian right of veto is not Israel's assertion, but an established United Nations principle, laid down in the Security Council three years aga on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, EcuadGi and tb~ Netherlands, embadied in a resolution and categorically confirmed by the United Nations Chief of Staff, bath in word and in action: in ward, by his formaI statement in the Security Council that Isareli development projects in the demilitarized zone cannot be legitimately held up .by Syria; and in action, by his ruling infavour of resuming a development projed in the very area now under discussion notwithstanding Syria's opposition. This ruling, in its turn, received full Security Council consent. The doctrine that the existence of a demilitarized zone corners upon Syria a right of intervention in Israel's water development which it would otherwise not possess has already been refuted at the Security Council table. élément~ nouveaux aux observations que j'ai formulées . dans la déclaration que j'ai faite le 30 octobre au Conseil de sécurité [633ème s(~allcC']. 59. Le fait, que la Syrie ne possède aucun droit qui lui permette de porter atteinte à l'e..'\.écution du projet de canal est établi par la géographie, par l'histoire, pal' J'l topographie. par les textes des Conventions d'al'" mistice et documents connexes, par les précédents de 1951, par tous les traités et accords internationaux qui aient jamais porté sur cette région, par les objec- tifs et les principes du développement régional. 60. Je voudrais exanùner l'un après l'autre ces divers aspects. J'ai déjà e..'\.posé en détail l'aspect géographi" ·que. J'ai indiqué qu'à partir de l'endroit où il entre en territoire israélien, au nord du lac de Houlé, jus- qu'à celui où il pénètre dans le Royaume hachémite de Jordanie, à 13 kilomètres au sud du lac de Tibériade, le Jourdain ne traverse qu'un seul Etat souverain: l'Etat d'Israël; au contraire, le territoire de la Répu- blique de Syrie ne touche en aucun point les rives du Jourdain.. 61. Devant les conséquences de cette vérité fonda- mentale, M. Zeineddine est revenu sur sa première déclaration écrite, oÙ il donnait à entendre que le Jourdain est un fleuve commun à l'Etat d'Israël et à la Syrie. Il s'en tient maintenant à cette conclusion assez boiteuse que le Jourdain n'est pas très éloigné du territoire syrien. Cette assertion est bien entendu exacte, mais ne vient nullement limiter les droits d'Israël. Le fait important est que le Jourdain ne coule pas en territoire syrien et que la Syrie ne peut attein" dre ses rives sans commettre un acte d'agression. Au contraire, le Jourdain coule en territoire israélien, et l'Etat d'Israël a seul accès à 'ses eaux en de nombreux points situés hors de la zone démilitarisée, au nord du lac de Houlé et ailleurs. 62. Je passerai brièvement sur ce qui paraît être une autre conclusion, beaucoup plus faible encore, de M. Zeineddine, savoir que le Jourdain "appartiendrait" en quelque 'Sorte à la zone démilitarisée. Cette zone est, elle aussi, extérieure au territoire syrien, puisque la Convention d'armistice demande catégoriquement le retrait des forces syriennes jusqu'aux frontières établies de la République de Syrie. Nous considérons ce retrait comme permanent. Lorsque, à la 541ème séance, le représentant de la Syrie a déclaré que son gouverne- ment avait toujours revendiqué le territoire qui cons- titue actuellement la zone dénùlitarisée, parce que ce territoire était occupé par les forces syriennes jusqu'à la conclusion de la Convention d'armistice, il· n'a fait que reconnaître un acte d'agression et formuler une revendication territoriale illégitime. C'est exactement comme si la Syrie revendiquait le territoire d'un autre pays voisin: par exemple une partie du Liban ou un morceau de la Turquie, ou le territoire de n'importe quel autre Etat limitrophe. En tout cas, quel que soit le statut de la zone démilitarisée, elle n'appartient certainement·pas à la Syrie, puisque la Convention 59. The absence of a Syrian right to affect this canal project is established by ge(lgraphy; by history; by topography; by te..'\.ts of the Arnlistice Agreements nnd related documents; by the precedents of 1951; by 0.11 the international treaties and agreements which have ever affected this area; and by the aims and prin- eiples of regional development. 60. I should like to analyse these aspects one by one. 1 have already spoken fully on the geographical aspect. 1 have e..'\.plained that from the point at wbich it rises in Israel territory north of Lake Huleh, down to the point at which it enters the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan eight miles south of Lake Tiberias, the River Jordan flows through the territory of only one sovereign State, nanlely, the State of Israel; and conversely, that the territory of the Syrian Republic nowhere comes up to the bank of the River Jordan. 61. 'Under the impact of this fundamental truth, Ml'. Zeineddine has now withdrawn from bis previous written implication that the Jordan is a river common to Israel and Syria. He has retired to the somewhat lame conclusion that the River Jordan is not very far from the territory of Syrla. This, of course, is true, but 'Nlthollt any consequence in limitation of Israel's legal rights. The point is that the Jordan daes not touch Syria and that Syria cannot touch the Jordan without cammitting an act of aggression. On the other band the Jordan does flow through Israel and Israel has exclusive access ta its waters at any number of points outside the demilitarized zonenorth of Lake Huleh and eIsewhere. 62. 1 will say only a few words on what appears ta 'he Afr. Zeineddine's alternative and much weaker contention that the Jordan River,' in 'Sorne sense, "belongs" to the· demilitarized zone. This zone, too, is non-Syrian territory since the Armistice Agreement ca.tegoricallyrequired the withdrawal of Syrian forces to the established frontiers of Syrla. We regard that as a permanent withdrawal. The statement of the Syrian representative, at the 541st meeting of the Syrian Government has always daimed the part where the del11ilitarized zone no;v exists to 'be Syrian territory be-· c~use this territory was under aggressive Syrian occupa- tIon until the time of the Armistice Agreement was nothing but a statement of the attitude of aggression, . an ilIegitimate territorial daim. Tt is exactly of the sam" standing as if Syria were to daim the territory of any o!her neighbour, if,it were to say that it would like a plece of Lebanol1 or a slice of Turkey or the territory of any other contiguous State. But at any rate the de111Œlitarized zone, whatever it is or is not, is certainly I1On-Syrian Territory because the Armistice Agree- ment required and secured the withdrawal of Syrian 63. Thus, the Jordan is a river which flows through Israel and never through Syria, passing at some points through the demilitarized zone, which is itself speci- fically non~Syrian, and in which established civilian rights are subject to the dutY of the United Nations Chief of Staff to protect other valid civilian rights. There is thus. no essential connexion between the course of the River Jordan and the demarcation of the demili- tarized zone. There has never been any intention to keep the river hennetically 5ealed within the zone. Indeed, there are various points, even in the course of its flow through the demilitarized zone at which the River Jordan emerges from the zone into non- demilitarized Israel territory. This happens at map reference 208.7-260.0 to map reference 208.5-258.2, apart from the areas north of the Huleh and south of Lake Tiberias where the river flows entirely in Israel outside the demiIitarized zone. 64. l must therefore repeat the emphasis which l laid on 30 October on the paramount importance of these geographieal faets. l doubt if there is any, other instance in the history of internationallitigation i~ which a country through whose territory a river does. flaw has been obstrocted in the use of its water at the behest of a country in whose territory it does not flow for a single inch at any point. 65. Now this fact of geography i5 not accidentaI. It does not merely happen to be the case that the frontier of the Syrian Republic lies beyond the River Jordan without touching that frontier at any point. Facts of history have creatèd these faets of geography. The international frontier of the Syrian Republic, confirmed fi" tue "Ariiûstice Agreement, ,was fuœd with the deli~rate purpose of ensuring that the northem waters of the Jordan, should be unreservedly available for Palestine, and. not subjected to. ?l1'la's control. 66. The discussion which led to this result took place between the Government of Great Britain and France at· the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. The records were preserved in the minutes of·the Peace Conference and in the memoirs of Ml'. David Lloyd George... The discussion was conducted at a hign 'level of tesporrsibility. The participants were Ml'. David Lloyd George, representiilg Great Britain as the prospective mandatory power fox Palestine, and ~ace d'une telle situation géographique. Ce n'est pas par hasard que le Jourdain coule loin des frontières de la, République de Syrie qu'il ne touche en aucun point, ne fût-ce que sur un seul mètre. Les situations géographiques Isont déterminées par l'histoire. Ill. frontière internationale.de la République de Syrie, que la Convention d'amnstice a confirmée,a été établie e~'Cpressément afin d'assurer à la Palestine l'utilisation ex,clusive des ea11X septentrionales du Jourdain et de 'sotlstraire ces ea11X'au contrôle de la Syrie. 66. Les négociations qrii ont conduit à ce résultat ont .eu lieu entre le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bre- tagne et le Gouvernement français à la. Conférence de la paix, à Paris, en 1919. Le déroulement de ces négo- ciations est rapporté dans les documents de la Confé- rence et dans les mémoires de M. David Lloyd George. Les, .discussions ont ,étéme~ées par les. personnalités les plus haut'placées. Les participants étaient M. David Lloyd George, qui représentait la Grfuï.de-Bretagne en "The waters of Palestine were essential to its existence. Without· those waters, Palestine would he a wilderness. .• On the other hand, those same waters were of no use to anyone holding Syria. They cauld in effect only be used far the purpose of bargaining ar for the purpose of obtaining con- cessions from Palestine." 67. The French Government, as might be expected, aceeded to the equity and logic of geography, and the boundary was accordingly drawn in such a way that Syria, already blessed with abundant water, at nu pOint had access to the waters of the River Jordan, which becaIne unreservedly available to Palestine. 68. TUIS the international OOundary of the Syrian Republic, removed from the River Jordan, is embodied in the Fcinco-British Treaty of 1923, all the provi- sions of which the Syrian representatives if l under- stand him arlght. apparently still desires to accept. In any case, that same international boundary is recognized in the General Armistice Agreement he- twe..::n Israel ând Syria and in Dr. Bunche's accom~ panying letter, OOth of which make it clear that the only Syrian interest which has ever existed west of that frontier, an interest which arose from the aggres- sive occu~tion of its armed forces, was to he cancelled by"the withdrawal of Syrian forces back to the esta- blished international boundary. It would therefore now require a violation of the Armistice Agreement for any Syrian citizen, military or CÏ:vilian, ta touch the bank of the River Jordan. 69. Thus the hi'Storical experienœ of thirty years, as embodied in aU the negotiations and agreements affeeting this area, has confirmed the completel)' flOn- Syrian characrer of the River Jordan, and. has also refiected the complete and vital dependence of the arid areas of Palestine upon access to those waters for their' very fertilitv and life. . - 70. .l have said that the lessons of history and geo- graphy are reinforced by tOpOgraphicai faets. Not only does Syria lack legitimate access to the River Jordan because its boundaries faU short of that river; it is a faet that even if Syria had access to the batiks of the River Jordan it could not physicaUy uti1îze more than 1 or 2 per cent of its waters. The River Jordan happens to fiow southwards and not northwards. 71. The Hebrew word "Jordan" is derived from a ~oot signifying the. river "that goes down".. It drops lU a deep descent from its point of rising, '.IÎrst iuto J:.ake Galileeand then into the Dead Sea. As one stands on the batiks of the Jordan on its Israel side and looks into Syria, one sees a steep incline rising 67. Le Gouvernement français, comme on pouvait s'y attendre, 'S'était rendu à l'équité et à la logique de la géographie, et, en conséquence, la frontière avait été délimitée de telle manière que la Syrie, qui dispo- sait déjà d'une quantité d'eau considérable, n'avait en aucun point accès aux eaux du Jourdain, qui étaient laissées sans réserve à la disposition de la Palestine. 68. Ainsi, la frontière internationale de la Républi- que de Syrie, qui ne toucl.epas au Jourdain, est déli- mitée dans lè Traité franço-britannique de 1923, que le représentant de la Syrie, si je le comprends bien, semble toujours vouloir accepter sans reserve. En topt cas, cette même frontière internationale est reconnue dans la Convention d'armistice général syro-israélienne et dans la lettre de M. Bunche qui l'accom~onait; ces deux docurnents établissent c1airenlent que les seuls intérêts syriens qui aient jamais existé à l'ottest de cette frontière - intérêts qui ont POUi" origine l'occu- pation d'une partie de la Palestine par les forces armées syriennes à la suite d'une agression - devaient être annulés par le retrait des forces syriennes sur la frontière internationale établie. Par conséquent, lors- qu'un citoyen syrien, soldat ou civil, touche à la rive du Jourdain, il y a violation, de la Convention d'armis- tice. 69. Ainsi, l'histoire de ces trente dernières années, teUe qu'elle est con~ignée dans toutes les négociations et dans tous les accords rela;tifs à cette région, continne que la Syrie n'a absolumenf aucuri droit sur le Jour- dain et démontre également que les régions arides de la Palestine sont, pour leur vie et leùr fertilité mêmes, absolument tributaires des eaux du Jourdain. .. 70. J'ai dit· qu~la topographie vient coiTflrmerles- leçons de l'histoire et delagéographie.Non 13eulement la Syrie ne peut légitimement prétendre à l'accès au Jourdain parce que ses. frontières ne sont pas conti- guës à ce fleuve, mais il est prouvé que, même si elle possédait une partie des rives de ce cours d'eau,elle ne pourrait matériellement pas utiliser plus de 1 ou 2 pour 100 des eaux du fleuve. Il se trouve que le Jqurdain coule vers le sud et non pas vers le nord. 71. En hébreu, le mot "Jourdain" a une racine qui signifie la rivière "qui descend". Il suit un ·cours rapide qui, depuis ..s~ S91trCe" l~ Il1,~ne. à )a l11eJ."..g(;l Galilée et ensuite à la mer Morte. Si, depuis .la .rive israélienne du Jourdain, on regarde en direction de 72. The General Armistice Agreement .between Israel and Syria enacts no modification whatever in Syrîa's international {rontier and therefore brings about no changes in the historicat or geographical facts which l have mentioned. It goes without saying that the Armistice Agreement cannot change any of the topo- graphical facts which determine the non-availability of Jordan water for Syria. . 73. This brings me to discuss the distinction between the effective interests of Israd and of Syria in the demilitarized zone under the Armistice Agreement. It is true of Israel, as it is not true of Svrla, that certain work in a small area of the demiiitarized zone is neèessary for the execution of projects affecting the c-_~ntj~J1JJ.tionaleconomy outside the zone. It is true of Israel, as ft is not tme of Syria, tùat there exists an established private right, namely, the concession of the Palestine Electric Corporation, which applies, ina small hut vital part of its total applicatiol::, to the area of the deinilitarized zone. It istrue of Israel, as it is not true of Syrîa, that the explanatory note annexed to the Armistice Agreement authorizes Israeli policing and administration in parts of the demilitarized zone, while Syrian policing and administration is aut;horized in no parts thereof at aU. 74. Finally on this point,as l have alreadypointed out, it was established in 1951 in the jurisprudence a See Final Report of the United Nations Economie Survey Mission for. the Mid.dleEasl, United Nations ~~Publications Sales No: 1949.IIB.5., Parts l and II. 3 Voir Rapport fin{ll de la MissiOl~ économique d'étude des NatiOl~s Unies POliT le Moyen-Orient, publication des Nations Unies, .11Uméro de vente: 1949.II.B.5, première et deuxième parties. 75. Now each of the seven characteristics ascribed by Mr. Zeineddine to the a:uleh drainage scheme applies to the project now under discussion. He fails to establish any substantive differences whatever be- tween the two projects of which one has deifinitely been ruled to be legitimate and is in fuII operation. Both. projects have involved work in the demilitarized zone of which the major effects and conseqqences lie outside the demilitarized zone. Both projects are' the subject of concessions resting on valid legislation. Both projects reçognize Israel's rights to utilize the Jordan waters for power and irrigation. Both projects have precisely the same international background and implications. Bath projects have been challenged by Syria on pre- cisely the same grounds; yet on one of these projects the' United Nations has given its clear endo,rsement and specifically rejected the very Syrian ~ssertions 110W invoked' against this project in the same area under the same agreement. There is thus no way of acting consistently with the Security Council's policies of 1951 which would not involve the immediate restlmp- tian of work on tlûs hydro-electric project,' subject only to the 'Satisfaction, which there should be, of other affectecl private rights. /6. Mr. Malik's speech shows thaï' he is acutely embarrassed by this1951 precedent, and he plainly ;Incl TI'ankly invites the Security Coundl to dishonour its own. jurispl'udence and not to be affected 'by it. He does now and again quote the observations of repre- sentathrr:3 Qf delegations made in that debate in 1951, hut if he respects the views exptessed in that debate - by, for. example, the representatives of France and the United Kingd0111 --' why does he not respect the conclusions which they reached? .The main t:onclusion which they reached and which they helped the Security Council to implement was that Syria possessed no right to obstruct or deter the execution of Iegitimate economic development projects, even if such projects required work in the demilitarized zone. l shouldsay rés~rve. tout à.fait l~aitùne,..qu'une. compensation soit a~c?rdée aux particuliers dont les droits se trouveraient leses. 76. Le discours<de M. Malik a montré que ce pré- cédentde 1951 le gênaitconsidérabl.ffi1eî1Î:;- aussica:.,;t.:ii ouvertement invité le Conseil de sécurité à renier sa propre jurisprudence et à ne pas en tenir compte. Il lui arrive, certes, de temps à autre, de citer les paroles de tel ou tel représentant au œufs du débat de 1951, mais, s'il professe du respect pour les opimons expri- mées alurs - pour celle':> du représentant de la France, pa:i' exemple, ou ce11es du représentant du Royaume- Lici-- pourquoi ne respecte-t-il pas les conclusions auxquelles ils sont parvenus? Leur principale conclu- sion, celle qu'ils ont aidé le Conseil de sécurité à mettre en œuvre, était que la Syrie n'avait pas le droit cl'empêcher ou de retarder l'exécution de projets réels de développement économique, même si ces pro- 77. That is the issue here. Thus, even if Mr. Malik cotild prove the complete absence of Israel sovereignty this would not in any measure advancehis cause. The absence or presence of sovereignty does not affect the absence or presence of the right to undertake leg'itimate, nornml eivilian activity in the demilitarized zone, provided that other private interests are ,not prejudiced. 2'8. There is another point of analogy between the 'tWo projects, In the present case, ~. in 1951, the private rights affected are of inftnitesimal scope' in relation tb the total proportion of the ,project itself. It was this which led the representative of Ecuador to declare.on 18 May 1951 [547th meeting] -following similar statements, which l quoted last nionth, on behalf of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the .Netherlands - as another' supporter of the majority which adopted the resolution: t'... My de1egation is confident that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission will shortly ·tind a' formula for a settlement which wiU' enable 'theworK: of drainiiIg the Huleh marshes to proceed without demy and witho~t obstacles, and will com- pensate the landownersaffected for the damage they have incurred, In the view of my delegation, the. project is benefieial ta the entire area and might produce favourable results which would outweigh the'damage done. Moreover, it would not be right for the project to be held up for an indefinite period. Undoubtedly, private rights must he respected; on the. other hand, a balanced and equitable solution bas to he reached which. would secure such rights and allow the work to proceed. Privateinterests should. not become an obstacle ta the general welfare, and the United Nations cannot oppose human pro- gress," 79. That was the consensus of the Security Council at that time. It would be difficult to nnd any more e10quent or incisive words with which todefine a statesmanlike course of thought and action for the SecurityCàuncil ta embody in resolution form for the settlement of the present complaint. 80. The complete legitimacy of.this prnject is esta- blished .not only by history, geography, topography, 78. Les deux projets ont encore un autre élément commnn. Dans le cas présent, comme en 1951, les droits privés qui sont en jeu sont extrêmement mini- mes par rapport à la portée de l'ensemble du projet. C'est ce quia amené le représentant de l'Equateur, le 18,filSl 1951 [547è-me séance] ...:-après des déclara- tIons analogues, que j'ai citées le mois dernier, des représentants de la France, du Royaume-Uni, des Etats-Unis et des Pays-Bas, qui ont tous voté pour la résolution en question - à faire la déclaration sui- va~: . " ... Ma délégation fait confiance au Président de la Commission mixte d'annistice pour trouver rapidement la formule de règlement qui permettra de poursuivre sans délai et sans obstacle les travaux d'assèchement du lac de Houlé et d'indemniser les propriétaires intéressés pour les préjudices subis. Ma délégation esHme en effet que la région tout entière bénéficiera de ces travau..'{, que les résultats heureux que l'on peut en attendre sont plus impor- tants que les dommages qu'ils pourront causer, et qu'il ne serait pas juste qu'ils fussent indéfiniment arrêtés. Il est incontestable que les droits privés sont .respectables' et doivent être respectés. Toutefois; il importe de trouver une formule équilibrée et équi- table qui satisfasse ces droits tout en permettant de poursuivre les travaux, sans que les intérêts privés deviennent une barrière ou un obstacle au bien général. Les Nations Unies ne peuvent s'opposer au progrès humain." 79. Telle était, à l'époque, l'opinion générale du Con- seil de sécurité. Il serait difficile au Conseil de trouver une formule plus éloquente ou plus nette pour définir les conceptions de haute politique dont ieConseil'- devrait s'inspirer dans toute résolution propre à régler le présent différend. 80. Si ce prt>jet est pleinement justifié, ce n'est pas 'Seulement en raison de l'histoire, de la géographie, de 82. l referred on 30 October t () the Franco-British treaty of good neighbourly relations and expressed what I thought were legitimate doubts as to whether Syria wished to condude such a treaty of friendsbip and lieighourly relations with Israel. I invited the Syrian representative to make a contràry indication, but my Govemment has still reteived no invitation to give effect to sucb a treaty of friendship and good- neighbourly relations with the Syrian Republic. 83. vVhile the 1926 treaty of good neighbourly rela- tions .aIso deals with certain matters under discussion in the Security Couneil, more attention should begiven to the Franco--British treaty of 1923, which Mr. Zei- neddine describ~s as a source of international obligations still.incumbent upon Israel and Syria. He is not, in my view, weIl advised to rely· upon that treaty, for it discredits his· entire case. l have a copy of the treaty here. As a matter of juridica1 prineiple, Israel tannot he deemed bound by treaties or agreements which its own Govemment has not signed. The fact that the United Ringdom signed a treaty with France in 1923 does not constitute a mandatory legal obligation on my Government, which has not signed such a treaty. However, if the representative of Syria has an affection for the actual contents of the 1923 treaty, we are prepared to co-operate with him in bis enthusiasm. If he wishes to. give effect to the Franco-British treaty of 1923, replacing the signatures of Britain and France respectively by those of Israel and Syria, we would he prepared to accept his invitation. To be even more helpful, \.\' 3.re willing, even without signing the treaty or contracting it as a legal obligation, to act voluntarily in every respect as though that treaty were still in legal force. 84. Let us assume, for the sake of Mi.-. Zeineddine's argument, that Israel has all the rights and obligations pertaining to Palestine in that treaty, wbile .Syria has the rights and obligations pertaining to France. This is a hypothesis and it is, of course, not a sound Jegalview.But on that hypothesis, whatwouldthe position he? The answer is simple. The hydro-electric project riow tmder discussion could proceed with perfect freedom and without any impediment or challenge whatever from the Syrian side. For the 1923 treai:y deals with two subjects alone. Its main 83. Certes, le traité de bon voisinage de 1926 traite de certaines des questions dont s'occupe actuellement le Conseil de sécurité, mais il convient de s'attacher davantage au traité franco-britannique de 1923 qui, selon M. Zeineddine, constitue une source d'obligations internationales auxquelles Israël et la Syrie sont tOu- jours soullÛ.s. M.· Zeineddine, à mon avis, ne devrait pas invoquer ce traité qui ruine sa cause tout entière. Je dispose' ici d'un exemplaire du traité. Du peint de vue juridique, Israël ne peut pas s'estimer lié par des traités ou conventions que 'Son gouvernement n'a pas signés. Le fait qu'en 1923 le Royaume-Uni a signé un traité avec la France ne constitue pas une obligation juridique à l'égard de mon gouvernement qui n'a pas signé ce traité. Néanmoins, si le représentant de la ,Syrie s'intéresse aü contenu réel du traité de 1923, nous sommes disposés à coopérer avec lui. avec enthou- siasme. S'il désire donner eŒet au traité franco-bri- tannique de 1923 en remplaçant les signatures du Royaume-Uni et de la France par celles d'Israël et de la Syrie, nous sommes prêts à accepter.'Son offre. Pour nous re1'l.dre encore plus utiles, nous consentons . même, sans signer ce traité ou considérer que nous avons contracté une obligation' légale en y adhérant, à agir volontairement dans· tous les cas 'comme si ce traité était encore en vigueur. 84. Supposons, pour suivre l'argument de. M. Zei- neddine, qu'Israël air les droits que ce traité confère à la Palestine ct les obligations qu'il lui impose, alors que la Syrie exercerait les droits que ce traité recon- naît à la France et les obligations qu'il lui impose. Cela est une hypothèse et n'est pas un point de vue juridiquement valable. Mais quel1e serait la position si l'on admet cette hypothèse? La réponse est simple. 0n pourrait, en toute liberté, et sans aucun empêchement ou aucune opposition du côté syrien, poursuivre l'exé- cution du projet de travaux hydro-électriques. En 85. But of more relevance is the second effect of the 1923 treaty, derived from the frontier demarcation, ,vhich, is ta establish the River Jordan as a completely non-Syrian river, ,,,hile imposing upon Palestine- and therefore, according ta his hypothesis, now, upon Israel - the obligation ta maintain unimpaired the "existing rights over the use of the waters of the Jordan by inhabitants of Syria". The righ':s refer to the residents of the Buteiha Farm. At the same time, the Government of Palestine, or persons authorized by the said Govern- ment, were awarded the right ta build a dam, to raise the leve1 of the waters of Lake Huleh and Lake Tiberias above .their nonnal level on condition that they pay fair compensation ta the owners and Jccupiers of the lands which 'will thus be fiooded. 86. The picture under the treaty is therefore clear. The River Jordan is an entire1y Palestinian.river and the two lakes are Palestiman lakes, with Syria speci- fically exdudèd from any access ta or control of the river, and with an explicit reservation in favour of existing water rights, such as are now used by certain inhabitants. The reason for Syrla'g exclusion was the vital relevance of the Jordan to the irrigation of Paléstine and its total irre1evance. to the irrigation of Syiir,L, which, possessed and possesses vast ;water resoutces of its own. 87. .My Government, as l have saîd, strongly doubts its obligation in principle to he bound by the treaty between France and Britain signed at Paris on 7 March 1923, but it is wiiHng, ex gratia, to accept aU the, rights and, obligations which woulel, be incumbent upon it in this resped if the treaty were still valid. 'vVe are ready, both with respect to the frontier and with 'respect to the consequent provisions on water rights, in co-operation with the United Nations, ta express this definite obligation in an appropriate legal instrument which would he binding upon my Govern- ment. 88. l shou1d ,like to add a ward on the regional ,aspects of this problem. The Security Council is not seized with any particular scheme for regional water development. However, the Syrian representative, apparently dissatisfied with bis own arguments b'lsed on internationallaw or the Armistice Agreements, 11• .5 endeavoured at great length ta prove that the hydro- J 91. l explained to the Secl1rity Councîl on 30 Octo- ber that the effect of this project is as foUows: The waters of the Jordan which now flow from Lake' Huleh to Lake Tiberias in a single channel, creating no electric po\ver. on the way, will, at the e.nd of two to three years, flow into Lake Til>erias in two channels, namely the original Jordan l>ed and the tributary canal, which will create e1ectric power. That is what this terrible, alarming project is ,about. That is what Mr. Malik caUs boundless ambition. But when that electric power station is created, aU the water which now flows into Lake Tiberias will continue to flow into it, so that the level of the lake will be unaffected. Indeed, the progress now under way in draining the Huleh marshes will shortly augment the volume of water flowing in the northern reaches of the Jordan and thence into Lake Tiberias. 92. There have been no regional water schemes which envisage the use of Jordan water north of Lake Tiberias for uny area outside Israel, with the exception of a very smal1 percentage which has an effect on irrigation canals leading to Buteiha: and there is no difficulty whatever, as we shall see, in maintaining those needs 93. Dcspite our illtimate acquaintance with these established facts we have endeavoured to ascertain whether the hydro-electric project Ott which. we are now embarked would hinder any prospect, slender as it may he, of eventual Arab-Israel co-operation for the joint utilization of these waters. Vie have 'Sought counsel from tluee of the most eminent authorities on \\'ater problems, who also have the distinction of havll1g been in the Middle East and studied its water prohlems. l refer to Messrs. H. W. Bashore, T. L, Sava",o-e ahd Professor Abel Wolman. • 94. Ml". Bashore is rightly cOmlid~red one of the most experienced water engineers the United States has produced. He is now the presidential representative and Chainnan of the Upper Colorado River Basin compact Commission and has acted as a consultant to the Depal'tment of the Interior on irrigation and rec1a- mation problems. He has worked on most of the major reclamation and irrigation projeds in the United States since 1906. His most recent governmental post in his own country \Vas that of Commissioner of Recla- mation. 95. Ml". Savage had had vast experience in foreign fields, having worked in Mexico, Pakistan, Afgha- nistan, Ceylon, Spain and Puerto Rico. His domestic c:>..-peIience covers engineering services on the TVA, the Hoover and Norris Dams. From 1908 on, Ml". Savage bas been working assiduously on water pro- blerns all over the world, and is now in Japan on a special mission. His latest official post was that of Chief Designing Engineer of the Bureau of Reclama- tion. %. Ml". Wolman is a Professor of Sanitary Engineer- ing at Johns Hopkins University and is a lecturer at Harvard and the University of Chicago, three of the most important educational institutions in the United States. He is at present a consultant for the United States Public Health Service, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the United States Army and is an adviser to the American Red Cross on sanitary engineering. He alsu served as Chairman of the National Water Resources Commission of the United States of America. 97. These three experts represent a total of expe- rience and background in irrigation, hydro-electric and rec1amation fields that may perhaps be without parallel in the world today. In a scientific opinion, bearing their nanles, which they have conveyed to my Govem- ment in writing, these experts, after analyzing the 9~. This opinion, based on expert scientific investi- gation, enables me to add another point to the merit of our project. Apart from being internationally legal, economically progressive, entirely consistent with the l\rmistice Agreement and with the Security CO'lllcil's llwn jurisprudence, this project would also serve admirably as an integral part of any future develop- ment of regional water resources. Does it not become increasingly astonishing to think that a. project which possesses such attributes should, at Syria's behest, be hcld up by international action? 99. Thus the discussion brings us back full circle to the three basic considerations which I discussed in my first address: land, water and demilitarization. The Security Council will recaU that these are descri!-.n?:\i by the United Nations Chief of Staff as the only three considerations which have affected his interest in the màtter. . 100. Let us see what remains of the shattered struc- ture of Mr. Zeineddine's complaint. Geography is against him; for it fixes the whole of the River Jordan outside the Syrian border, and nowhere contiguous to it, while over a great part of the Jordan's course Israel has sole access to the river in its non-denùlita- rized territory. It is not geographically tme that the present project creates for Israel a capacity, which it would not otherwise possess, of deter1lÙning the course of the Jordan. 101.' So much for geography. History does not help IVlr. Zeineddine, for it proves that the separation be- tween the River Jordan and Syria is not a geographical accident but a conscious design based on fundamental concepts of politieal and economïe equity. Nor can he flud comfort in topography; for this decrees that the Jordan is both available and vital to Israel's very existence and unavailable and irre1evant to Syria's life oreconomy. No consolation for him reposes in the Armistice Agreement or the related documents, which pointedly exc1ude any Syrian authority to obstruct ci- viliau projects in the demilitarized zone. ~;Oj:c~:~P=~~~qS~~~:~:~~~~~~~~~~~:~~~~:~~~~=.J 103. Finally, he clutches at his last refuge: the doc- trine that our hydro-electric project conflicts with regional water schemes. Here Mr. Bashore, Dr. Savage and Professor \Volman put him completely ta l'out by proving that the e,.,act opposite is the case and that this project would fit congenially, or in their words "admirablyU, into any regional water scheme that may come to pass. 104. In view of the flimsy character of this Syrian superstructure, I should lïke ta deal ,vith the three 'Substantial matters whieh, according to General Bennike's report of 20 October, are the only con- siderations affecting the resumption of this work. 105. I need add little on the military subject because Ml'. Zeineddine has given us no trouble on it at.aU, and Mr. Malik has added nothing new. The Security Council, in its resolution of 11 August 1949 [S/1376, II], decided that the truce referred ta in article II, paragraph 1, of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agree.;. ment was superseded by the Armistice and was no longer in separate force. There is no contradiction, as Mr. Zeineddine appears to believe, between th~s and the continued titlel the appellation of Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. When the truce, with its military considerations, was abolished on Il August 1949, and many restrictive circumstances deriving from it were set asicle, I drew attention to the obsolete character of the phrase "Chairman of the Truce Super- vision Organization". The Security Council agreed to note the anomaly but to leave the title extant, because it figured in agreements previously concluded, notably the Armistice Agreements signed between February and July 1949, and we would have to meet and modify all those agreements if we were to make a point of changing this obsolete term. This,. however, does not affect the fact stated in the resolution of Il August, 1949, . that the truce reaffirmed on 15 July 1948 had been superseded by the Armistice Agreement; and therefore article II, paragraph 1, with its provision that "... no military . .. advantage should be gained under the truce ...u is not relevant to the present legal situation. The resolution of Il August 1949 which abolished arms and restrictions and repudiated blockades certainly did not seek to perpetuate such lesser vestiges of the truceas the doctrine of military advantage in 'the purely tactica1 local sense. 106. With respect to the general question of demi- litarization, no argument wharever has been invoked against the Chief of Staff's decision, given at the ~;;'th the general question of the demilitarized zone from the point of view of its topography, and here the ruling is dear, definite and of general effect. It confirms that the pr~sence or absence of any topo- 2Taphical feature in the demilitarized zone is of no ~elevance te its demilitarized character. The only attri- bute of the zone which we are pledged to observe is that the armed forces of neither party shaH enter it. On the positive side, we are pledged to encourage normal civilian activity and to recognize, ::lS we freely do .the right and indeed the duty of the Chief of Stur to foster and encourage 'Such nonnal activities. I cau say from my own personal recollection and expe- rieü<:e in negotiating this matter witb. Dr. Bunche that the demilitarized zone was established.without any reference to what Mr. Malik has called "geophysics" and was established Ïn the full knowledge that 01 • agreement to its demilitarization did not affect our deve10pment projects, which were known and discussed freelyat that time. . 107. I would only add here that that view, which was weIl understood at that time by Dr. Bunche, is in any case embodied in General Riley's ruling, which was requested by both parties and which was deemed by him to have legal effect only because both parties requested it. But for that request, the Chief of Staff would have beeti bound by his reservation that it was not legitimate under the Annistice Agreement to invoke 'Such considerations at all, because the Annistice Agree- ment marked the pennanent end of the military phase of the Palestinian conflict. 108. Thus Ml'. Zeineddine's state1nent that the zone is to be "conserved" - if by that he means frozen in its development - is ms own invention. It is utterly refuted by official declarations given in favour of nonnal development within and from the zone. The Syrian representative has not been able to deny that the tangible effect of the present project would be only to increase the number of obstacles to military rnovement in either direction in the zone, and thus render aggression more difficuIt: 109. But we cannot fail to he a little sardonic about this concept of the River Jordan as a "military obs- tacle". I think most of us round this table, in our younger days, could have jumped over the River Jordan at many points in the demilitarized zone; and the riverhas such little effect as a ttulitary obstacle that ~yrian anned forces were able aggressively to cross mto Israel in May 1951, at the season of t'he 110. Mr. Zeineddine's only new point is ta inform us that the River Jordan "as an obstacle for the move- ment of troops" would not be "within the range of the fire of Syrian a-'i:illery and infantry", and that this might not be the case with our newly constructed canal. AIl 1 can say is that the renl0teness of our canal from the "range. of the fire of Syrian artillery and infantry" is an event which aU the United Nations will certainly be able to sustain with equanimity and fûrtitüde. 111. 1 come now to the questions of land and water. In these two matters, Mr. Zeineddine leaves my argu- ment of 30 üctober complete1y intact. 112. His statement that 99 per cent of the land in the demilitarized zone is Arab-owned is simply a direct untruth of such vast and lavish proportions that we find no support for it in three pages of. melodrama about non-existent land titles which are alleged to have been burnt. 'Indeed, the land titles are perfa-tly c1ear. The only Arab-owned land concerned is the area marked in black on the map which 1 have circulated, and this map precisely refiects General Bennike's findings, which Mr. Zeineddine therefore either repu- diates or ignores. Incidentally, we have had the map examined and compared, and it is accurate, in aIl respects. General Bennike's report makes nonsense of Mr. Zeineddine's élaim that 99 per cent of the land 1S Arab-owned, because that report narrows the ques- tion of land down to four small plots which it is our policy to circumvent in the execution of·this work. 1 should add that a great proportion of the land con- cerned is on the slopes of a steep canyon on which a human being could hardly stand, that only a small proportion is on a fiat surface and could be utilized for agriculture, and about 99 per cent of that is in the possession of the Jewish National Fund, a public land- owning utility corporation. The same is true of the water mills. Mr. Zeineddine quite wrongly stated that the facts shown on my map are in contradiction ta those elicited by General Bennike in his preliminary investi- gations. In his letter of 20 October, General Bennike confirms that the only mill in operation is Tahunat Naimat es Stibh. This.mill does appear on our map, and th,~ supply of water to it will be cOlnpletely unaffected by the hydro-electric projet. 114. ,It is perhaps rare for a great public utility n"roiect to adapt itself to such a limited private interest; for' nonnally - the limited private interest would be subordinated to the public welfare. However, in view of the administrative obscurity in the demilitarized zone, and the questions of principle which Mr. Malik in his speech ascribed to a previous observation made by the representative of France, we do not wish to :mise th~ acute question of the normal expropriation rights of a concessioriaire, and prefer instead to under- talœ complete non-en~roacliment upon Arab land, whereyer if may be. 115. The final question is that of water. It is a fact of geography, topography and histoff, as illustrated hj the Franco-British Agreement of 1923, thatthe only Arab Jap.d irrigated by the Jordan in its course between Huleh. and Tiberias lies in the Buteiha Farm area: Thesè. farmlands are not themselves strictly con- tiguous ta the Jordan, because no Syrian farmer can approaeh the Jordan without vio1ating the frontier. But the Buteiha land is irrigated by canal8 whose wate~ level is affected by that of the Jordan close by, although the Jordan furnishes only a part of the waters upou which the Buteiha lands rely for irrigation. 116. But, in any case, .the question is: first, can the satisfaction of these water needs be reconciled with this hydro-e!ectric project? And, second, is Israel ~illing to undertake. a definite obligation to that effect? The answer to both these questions is an unqualified affir- mati~: . 117. With respect to the first question, Mr. Zeineddine shows something less than l:.ndour in his speech of 30 October when he portrays the United Nations Chief of Staff as stating that the hydro-electric project is intrinsically inconsistent with the welfare of these farms andmight indeed reduce them ta a "wasteland". General Bennike says something utterly different, namely, that prejudice to certain local interests will arise, and l quote his words: "unless definite obligations are secured". This is really the whole difference between the Syrian case and our own: behveen the veto on this project and its continuation on the basis of satis- fying affected rights. Indeeci, this is an intrinsic diffe- ~ence between the Syrian approach and that reflected ln the correspondence of the Chief of Staff because the Syrian approach is to apply a total and permanent 118. l would say that the Syrian record in roatters of water is ramer iess nobie mali Mr. Zeineddine asserts it to he. Whereas Syria is not a riparian State on the Jordan, Israel is a riparian State on the Yarmuk. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government bas agreed with the Jordan Govemment on the diversion of the Yarmuk River in a manner depriving Israel villages of water used by them for the past twenty-five years. This has not prevented. the Syrian representative from now declaring [636tlt l1!.eeting] with greart solemnity but, Iam afraid, not with accuracy that "whenever a wateï" course has international implications, we do not proceed to use these \vaters by unilateral action". MOl"eover, SYlia,' despite strong protests from Israei, has deprivcd Israel cultivators of large. quantities of water Rowing in the \iVadi Duffila, north of Lake Huleh, by diverting those waters from Israel ta Syrian territory. 119. Howe"er, we do not consider these as valid e.xamples for our own action. We shouJd certainly not expect the Seeurity Council to draw any conclu- sions from those precedents and, therefore, notwith- standing our lack of legal obligation, we have agreed and hereby undertake to maintain an adequate supply of waterat all seasons for the irrigation of the Buteiha lands, and to contraot a legal obligation to th'at end. J 122. The technical devices for storing the water for the dry season offer many alternative solutions. My Government win undertake to .fll1fil whichever. solution is regarded as most effective when the facts relating to land, area and water volume are ascertained. The problem will not arise at all for two years or more because, as l have explained, the construction would require that period and no change whatever in the water configuration and no flow of' walf:er through the newly-constructed canal would take place before then. So that the problem will not arise at aU for more than two years and will be easily and readily soluble when it does arise. Indeed, it is interesting ta note that even by Syrian contentions, which we think are exaggerated, we achieve a confession from Mr. Zeineddine that the relative objective interest of Israel and Syria in these water sources never falls below a proportion of 85 per cent for Israel as against 15 per cent for non-Israeli interests. This together with Israel's legal, political and geographical access to the Jordan waters is 'Surely a fatal blow to his case for impeding the major interest in deference to the m[nor one, whenthe minor interest too cau easily be recon- ciled with the major one. 123. No interests, international, naJtional, regional or private are prejudiced by the fulfilment of this legiti- mate project which, both in itself and in respect of its underlying principles, touches the very ess';nce of Israel's political freedom and economic inde'"~dence. For no other State does this matter have the same vital interest or concern. AU' parties affected, Syria, Israel and the Chief of Staff have turned to the Security Coullcil for guidance. Can anybody seriously or ho- nourably doubt that the caU of dutY .and justice is clear : ta facilitate, to promote, to encourage this project, while requiring all appropriate obligations to he concluded for safegnarding the private interests of land and water affected by it? 1~4..1 have no hesitatioîl in'antieipatirig fuat the Security Council will repudiate those Syrian utterances which attempt to intimidate it by dark threats of an alleged right of forcible "se1f-defence" against this p~oject. What on earth has this subject got to do Wlth self-defence? Self-defence against e1ectric power; se!f-defen~e against light and etrergy for quickening thts area lUto the peaceful rhythm of serene rural life; 125. The Security Council has here been given sorne insight into the struggle of a small people to defend its basic interests against the iIlicit pressures of a neighbouring siege. There is nothing more challenging in this era of Israel's development than the eruption of .these constructive impulses of peaœful progress out of the very midst of this' sterile neighbouring hostility. 126.. The United Nations has an opportunity here, by dismissing the Syrian complaint, to combine the high concepts of international law with a devotion to the stirring challenge of social and economic progress. 127. Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN {Pakistan): It is not my intention at this stage to hazard any view on the merits of the case. In spite of the great volume of statistics and facts that have been nlaced before the Security· Council- sorne of them unchallenged, some of them agreed upon, and some which are disputed- there are aspects of the case on which we, at least, feel that we need more information if we are to he in a po~ition to express a view on the questions in dispute. I do notpropose to ask for information on those points by addressing questions to General Bennike, as I consider that the greater part of th~ information which we need might either not he available to him or not legifimately within the purview of his functions. I shall state the points on which information is needed and shall leave it to the President to S~ whether, through the normal channe1s of the Secretariat, that information can be made availahle to the Security Council. 128. The first point is a .very easy one to determine, as the information is there, and it may even he available on the maps with which we have been supplied.. If the maps contain that informa.tion, it would only be necessary to draw our attention to the particular map which defines the frontier in that manner. Some refe- rence hasheen made tothe frontier visualized - I advisedly do not use any other ten:n in this respect -in the General Assembly resolution oi November 1947 for the State of Israel, then in view. If this {rontier does appear on any map, it would be enough, as I have said, to draw our attention to it. If it does nôt,weshottld~1îketo~seehoW itfiat {rotitier runs through the demilitarized zone. A reference was made to that frontier by the representative of Israel in the course of bis submission.this afternoon, and he said that the greater part of the demilitarized zone was contained within that frontier on the side of the State of Israel. We should like it made quite clear where that frontier runs. ~2,5. Le Conseil de, sécurité .a maintenant quelque rdee de·la lutte que mene un petit peuple pour defend1'e ses intérêts vih;.t1x contre les pressions illicites des voisins qui l'assiègent. Le seul défi qui. soit lancé dans cette région où· se poursuit le développement d'Israël est celui de l'apparition des forces coO\<;tructives du progrès pacifique, surgies du terrain 'stédle de l'hosti. lité ambiante. 126. En rejetant la plainte de la Sytie, l'Organisa. tion des Nations Unies a aujourd'hui l'occasion de répondre à l'appel émouvant du progrès social et économique tout en respectant les principes élevés du droit international. 127. M. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai pas l'intention, pour le moment, de me risquer à émettre une opinion: sur le fond de la question. Malgré la grande masse des statistiques et des textes qui ont été communiqués au Conseil de sécurité - dont certains ne prêtent à âuctme contro· verse, d'autres sont des faits· sur lesquels il n'y a pas de divergences d'opinion, et certains autres sont contro· versés ---, il y a certains aspects de cette affaire sur lesquels la délégation du Pakistan, au moins, estime qu'elle a besoin de renseignements supplémentaires avant de pouvoir exprimer une opinion sur les ques· tions en litige. Je ne me propose pas d'obtenir des renseignements sut ces points en posant des questions au général Bennike, car je considère que la majeure partie des renseignements que nous désirons obtenir n'est peut-être pas à sa disposition, ou bien qu'il n'entre pas normalement dans le cadre de ses fonctions de les posséder. J'indIquerai donc les points sur lesquels nous désirons des renseignements supplémentaires, et je laisserai au Président le soin de s'enquérir s'il est possible de les faire communiquer normalement au Conseil de sécurité par ·les 'soins du Secrétariat. 128. Le premier point est très facile à déterminer, car le renseignement désiré existe, et on peut même peut-être le trouver dans les cartes que l'on nous a distribuées. Si ces cartes contiennent le renseignement en question, il suffirà de nous indiquer quelle est la carte qui définit la frontière de la manière qui nous intéresse. On a fait état de la frontière envisagée- c'est à dessein que je n'emploie pas d'autre terme- dans la résolution de l'Assemblée générale du mois de novembre 1947 pour l'Etat d'Israël dont on étudiait alors la création. Si cette frontière apparaît sur UXle carte, il suffira, conmle je l'ai déjà dit, de nous indiquer la carte en question. Sinon, nous voudrions qu'on noUS montre le tracé de cette frontière à travers la zpne démilitarisée. Le représentant d'Israël a fait allusion à cette frontière dans sa déclaration de cet après-niidi, et il a dit que la majeure partie de la zone démi1itaris~e était comprise dans l'Etat d'Israël tel qu'il était déli· mité par cette frontière. Nous voudrions que l'on: nous indique de façon très claire le tracé de. cette frontière. 130. It bas been .s~lggested on bebJf ;Jf the State of Israel that the only such advantage or benefit of irrigation enjoyed Is by what is called the Buteiha Faon, part of which, 1 understand, lies within the demilitarized zone, and part of which lies within the State of Syria. 131. The infonnation we desire on .this point is: (1) What is the area of the Buteiha Farm which receives irrigation from the Jordan? (2) What is the total area ,jf the Buteiha Fann, and what part of it could receive irrigation from the Jordan if there were no interference with the flow of the river? (3) Are there any other lands -not merely Arab- owned lands in the demilitarized zone, but any other lands within Syria - which. receive irrigation {rom this part of the FJver Jordan Or derive any other advantage from the river? . 132. The third point on which we require information is as follows: 133. This project has been described. as a hydro- electric project. Assuming that it was developed and put into effect, would it he possible at any later stage to convert it into an irrigation project? The point 1 have particularly in mind is this: in a hydro-electric project, pure and simple, it may he possible ta return to the river at.sorne point almost thè same volume of watet".- not appreciably diminished - whiC!h i5 ;taken out of it at a higher point. The information we desire is whether this project could'- 1 do not mean whether it is today visualized or intended but whether, from the engineering point of view, it could - he convertedinto an irrigation project, so as to utilize the whole or any suhstantial portion of the waters that may he diverted into the project. If it couIdhe developed in sucb a way, what is the maximum quantity of water whichmay at anytime he withd.rawn·from the river for that use·? 134:· A further question in that connexion would he : In that event, would the volume of the watèrs in Lake Tiherias he affected to any degree? And, if they would he wouId the degree·of salinity of tlie waters of Lake Ti l{rias and of the River Jordan helow .Lake Tiherias be lU any manner affected? And, if so, in what manner and ta what degree? If any such change were brought about;·hôw would the present uses based on the River Jordan,or·'any advantages at present derived from .the River Jordàn,· by the State of Jordan~ affected? 135.. 'fheré~ is 'one question that 1 would submit ta General Belihike for his consideration: It has appéared to~e~I~y he ""rong; but this is thè impression 1 have':"'" t4at saine cif the conclusions drawn. by him concemi~t the probable consequences of tlùs project, upo~, whi~ he baséd"his request to the State of I$rael, hâve ,peen conteSi:ed by the 'representative of Israel. If Genenll Bennike should' have any comment on tlmt aspect of the submission ~de by. the représentative 13L A cè sujet, nous aimerions avoir de~ réponses aux questions suivantes: 1) Quelle est la superficie des terres de la fenne du Buteiha qui sont irriguées par les eaux du Jour- dain:? 2) Quelle est la superficie totale de la ferme de Buteiha et quelle est la partie de cette exploitation qui pourrait être irriguée par les ~ux du Jourdain, si rien ne venait entraver le cours du fleuve? 3) y a-t-il d'autres terres-non set11ement les pro- priétés arabes situées dans la zone démilitarisée, mais aussi en Syrie même - qui sont irriguées par des eaux provenant de cette section du Jourdain ou qui tirent quelque autre avantage du fleuve? 132. Le troisième sujet· sur lequel nous aimerions avoir des renseignements est le suivant: 133. Le projet en question a été présenté comme un projet de travaux hydro-électriques. A 'supposer qu'il soit mis en œuvre, serait-il possible plus tard de le transformer eIll projet d'irrigation? Voici à quoi je pense plus particulièrement: lorsqu'il s'agit de travaux uniquement hydro-élect.-riques, on peut envisager. de rendre au il ~uve à l'aval à peu près le même volume .d'eau que ceiui qui lui a été emprunté à l'amont. Nous voudrions donc· savoi.r si le proje.t actuel pourrait du point de vue technique - même sans être dès mainte- nant conçu à cet effet - être .converti en un projet d'irrigation, de manière ~ utilifrero l'intégralité ou une portion notable des eaux ain:si aménagées. Si' cette utilisation est possible, quel serait le volume d'eau maximum qui pourrait être distrait du fleuve, à un momel1t quelconque, pour servir à l'irrigation? 134. Une 'autre qttestion se pose à cet égard: dans cette hypothèse, le v(}lume des eaux du lac de Tibé- riad~ serait-il modifié d'une façon quelconque? Et· dans ce cas, le degré de salinité dès eaux du lac de Tibériade et de celles du Jourdain en aval de ce lac s'en trouverait-il modifié, et, si oui, dans quel sens et. à quel point? Si des modifications devaient être réali- sées, quelles en seraient les conséquences pour les asagesactuels des eaux du Jourdàinou pour les av~n~ tages que la Jo'rdanie retire présentement des eatlX' du Jourdain? 135. Il y.a une question que je voudraissoumefue aux réflexions .du.général Bennike. Il me semble - je puis...~rie tromper, .lJ.1ajs telle! est l'impression: que fai::. formée - que certaines desconclusioll,5.auxqt.1elles il'. a abouti touchant· les conséquences prob~bles dec.e,. projet, et sur lesquelles ·il a fondé la ~emande qu'iF-;i. . adressée à Israël, ont été contestées par' le re~re.~:' sentant d'Israël. Si le général Bennike a des ob..'let- vations à présenter sur cette partie de l'exposé du 140. With regard to the last question which the repre- setlltative of Pakistan put to General Bennike when hé asked if the General would reply ta sorne of the objections raised by the representative of Israel in connexion with the considèrationsand grounds on which the General's decision was based, 1 feel that we can ooly leave il: to General BeDllike's discretion to provide us. with sorne explanation, if he considers it necessary to do so, eithel" because he thinks his reasons have oot been. weIl enough understood or because, in arder ta cllHghten the members of the Cauncil, he desires ta supply infornIation additional ta that which he bas already given in ms report. 141. :Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN· (Pakistan): With reference ta the remarks tl>at the President has made, 1 have only one ccmment and one request. 1 have not taken note of what 1 said concerning the observation which 1 addressed to General Bennike, but 1 helieve 1 said·..... and the President and J ~ in ~ccord~ ,that in case General Bennike mmself should wish to make . any comment, he would in due cou.rse,no doubt, make that comment available to the Council. l' did Îlot suggest in any manner that he must reply ta the questions. Of course, it is left compleœly ta the General's discretÏon. 137. Ces questions m'ont. frappé par leur portée constructive; de plus, elles mettent en lunùère, non 'Seulement les aspects juridiques et historiques, mais aussi les éléments techniques du problème que nous étudions et sur lesquels le Conseil peut difficilement se prononcer à l'heure actuelle. 138. Le représentant du Pakistan a posé un certain: nombre de questions sans dire exactement à qui il les adressait; en même temps, il a demandé si le Secrétariat pourrait répondre, du moins à certaines d'entre elles. Je crois que le Secrétariat pourra lui donner satisfaction quant aux cartes qui existent sans doute dans les archives et qùi pourront, par consé. quent, être communiquées aux membres du ü>nseil. 139. D'autres questions me paraissent extrêmement techniques. Certes, les représentants d'Israël et de la Syrie ont déjà répondu à plusieurs d'entre elles, mais, si je l'ai bien compris, le représentant du Pakistan serait heureux de recevoir une confinnation prove- nant de sources peut-être plus désintéressées; en d'au- tres tennes, il estime que la réponse à un certain nom· bre de questions ne peut être donnée que par le général Bennike lui-même et ses collaborateurs, en raison de la profonde connaissance qu'ils ont de ces problèmes; peut-être encore en'VÎsage-t-il que des experts entre- prennent sur place une nouvelle étude qui fournirait sans doute à M. Zafrulla Khan les. précisions qu'il désire. C'est là une possibilité qui n'a pas été écartée de l'esprit de certains d'entre nous et qui pourrcùt, en cas de nécessité, faire l'objet d'une proposition de la part d'un membre du Conseil. 140. Quant à la dernière question aux tennes de laquelle le représentant du Pakistan a demandé au général Bennike s'il voulait répondre à certaines des objections soulevées par le représentant d'Israël quant aux considérations et aux motifs sur lesquels il a fondé sa décision, il me parait que nous devons laisser à la d~scrétion du général Bennike le soin, s'il le juge utile, de nous apporter certains éclaircissements; en effet, il peut penser que ses raisons n'ont pas été BUffisam- ment comprises; il peut aussi vouloir donner aux membres du Conseil des renseignements supplétnen- taires à ceux qu'il a déjà fournis dans son rapport. 141. M. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) (traduit de l'anglais): Je n'ai qu'une observation ~ qu'une demande à présenter au sujet de l'explicab.·1 que le Président vient de donner. Voici tout d'abord Yobser- vation: je n'ai pas le te~~e écrit de mon disçours, mais! en ce qui concerne les parties de mes observations q~! s'adressaient au général Bennike, je crois que· j'a! dit - et .le Présidnt et moi 'Sommes d'accord sur ce point - que, si le général Bennike désire faire une observation quelconque, il pourra sans doute la com- muniquer au Conseil en temps opportun,.Je n'ai pas du tout suggéré qu'il devrait répondre -auxques~s que j'ai soulevées. Naturellement, je laisse ce point à son entière discrétion. 0.-. ~.

I am entirely in agreement with the representative of Pakistan with regard to the statement he bas just made. 144. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): We listened very attentively indeed to the statement which Mr. Eban made this afternoon and which he called a summary of Israel's case. I have sorne brief and relevant obser- vations to make concerning it., 144. M. ZEINEDDINE (Syrie) (traduit de fan- gluJis): Nous avons accordé la plus grande attention à la déclaration que M. Eban a faite cet après-midi et qu'il a appelée un résumé de la position d'Israël. Je présenterai brièvement quelques observations à ce sujet. 145. Je voudrais tout d'abord remercier M. Eban de sa déclaration qui montre que 'Son point de vue se rapproche du nôtre. Elle nous permettra peut-être d'arriver à une décision rapide. En réalité, il a prati- quement confirmé cet après-midi ce que nous avions déjà dit lors de nos déclarations antérieures ains~ que nos principales thèses et nos principaux arguments. Nous sommes donc actuellement dans l'heureuse situa- tion d'avoir très peu de choses à dire, car il a donné implicitement cette confirmation en; renonçant à réfuter nos argutl,lents et nos thèses. 145. l should like to start by expressing a word of thanks to Mr. Eban for his 'statement because it does show a rapproche1ne1llt of bis views to ours. This might facilitate a swift decision. In fact, ,in his state- ment this afternoon, he practica1ly confirmed what we had aIready said in our previous statements and in the mah thesis and arguments on which we based our case. We are therefore in the fortunate position at this stage of having very little to sayon account of the faet that he has implicitly made this confirmation by no longer trying to refute those arguments and the thesis which we have previously made. 146. In the preliminary statement which we made on this subject [633rd nzeeting], 7' took the liberty of warning the Council that we expected that om:' Zionist opponents were apt and ready to inject into the discussion irrelevant motives of Israel and its wishes to tak~ away the waters of ,the Jordan, under sorne preœ;.t, for ifs purposes and its own use. I then referted to the possibility of Israel's trying to bring confusion into this discussion 50 as to diminish its clarity, and to present general views so as to create a foggy abnosphere in which it could then easily sneak out of its international responsibilities. Today, this has been rendered more clear than in the past by the Israel representative. 147. He seems to say, and he has in faet said, that the stirring challenge. before the Council is that of social ~d ecCinomic progress. The challenge is not ~at. It 15 peace as established by the General Armis- tIce.Agreement. The wishes of Israel and the benefits ~hat it miJ.Y draw from this or that project are not at Issue. There are. many other constructive projects that could be of use to the area and to the other countries provided they are executt::d under law and discipline and according to the .standards of international be- haviour. The issues·are whether international behaviour in 1;his case should or ShbUld not hé subjected·ta inter- national agreements, whether the Armistice Agreement should· be app~ed, whether international treaties.should he respected àrid whether the United Nations authority 146. Dans la déclaration préliminaire que nous avions faite sur cette question [633'ème séance], je m'étais permis d'avertir le Conseil que nous pressentions que nos adversaires sionistes étaient enclins et disposés à introduire dans la discussion les vues d'Iraël, qui n'ont aucun rapport avec la quest.ion, et son désir de s'attribuer les eaux du Jourdain sous un prétexte quelconque, pour servir ses propres fins et pour. so.n propre usage. J'avais aussi laissé entendre qu'Israël s'efforcerait sans doute de créer laoonfusiol1ati.n d'obscurcir la discussion et de présenter des vues générales pennettant de faire régner une atmosphère brumeuse à la faveur de laquelle il pourrait. facile- ment 'Se dégager de ses rèsponsabilités international~s. Aujourd'hui, le représentant d'I;sraë1 a montré, mieux encore que par le passé, que ces prévisions n'étaient pas saris fondement. . 147. Il semble avoir dit- et il a dit effectivement - que la question extrêmement importante .qui est posée au Conseil de 'Sécurité était celle du développe- ment économique et social. Il n'en est rien. La ques- tion est celle du maintien de la paix pa.r le respect de la Convention d'armistice général.· 'Les vœux de l'Etat d~Israël et les avantages qu'il pourrait retirer de. tel ou. tel projet sont tout à fait en dehors <lë la question. Il y a bie~ d'autres projets construcl:I'fsqui pourraient être fort. utiles pour la r~gion !=t pour les autres pays à cond!tion. qu'Us soient il1is en. œuvre dans le respect des lois et de la discipline et confor- mément aux normes du comportement. international. La question qui est devant le Conseil de sécurité est de savoir si, dans le cas pré!>-:nt, le comport.ement 149. On the other hand) Israel caUs fo!' negotiations, but what would he the meauing of negotiations with a Syrian side which according to Israel) cannat object ta what is required of it and has ta consent, with no objection, ta what is required according to the Israeli thesis ?Then, the representative of Israel tried to modify and in faot to alter substantiaUy sorne of the stands which we have taken whenever he bas ventured ta touch upon them. He referred ta the military modi- fications under the truce wbiCh he said do not exist any more. When the truce developed into the armistice the principles of the truce were rt':I.."%'>11ized., in the armistice. These principles were not recognized in arder to he discarded but in arder 'lO he established on a continuing basis. However, even without them, as General Bennikehimself in his report has. remarked) there are other articles of the Armistice Agreement) and particularly article V, wbich do not allow military changes wbich endanger the rights, positions and daims of the other side. 150. Naturally, he sought to explain this by saying that the establishment of canals would create more obstacles. Today he tried ta make us· feel like the great ath1etes of eartier ages who could jump over the River Jordan. I do not know, but it seems ïo me that the flGW of bis oratory was far bigger in his mind than the flow of that River Jordan. The Jordan is not easy to cross and it effects a separation. If we look at the present situation, what do we find? We find that on the Syrian-Israel frontier there are hard1y any incidents of· infiltration or of movement from one side to the other. Why? Because the Jordan is ,there and because the water-line separates the two sicles. Remove that line and you would then have many incidents such as Qibya, and if such incidents took 152. Parlant des droits de la Syrie, M. Eban a offert de les reconnaître par mesure gracieuse. Mais, quels que soient ces droits, qu'ils soient importants ou non, ils existent, et notre consentement est indispensable, qu'il s'agisse de modifier la situation nùlitaire, le statut de la zone ou la portée même des droits syriens. S'il n'en était pas ainsi, la Convention d'annistice devrait dire tout le contraire de ce qu'elle énonce; elle devrait porter que la zone démilitarisée est placée 'Sous l'auto- rité d'Israël, que la situation militaire peut y être changée 'pendant l'armistice et que les droits de la Syrie peuvent être abolis par la seule volonté d'Israël. Dans ce cas, il ne nous resterait plus qu'à reléguer la Convention au musée des antiquités. Le Conseil de sécurité ne saurait adopter une telle attitude, qui ruinerait toute chance de paix dans cette région. 153. M. Eban â tenté d'éviter tous les points que nous avons soulevés, et, ce faisant, i1les a implicitement confirmés, à notre avis du moins. Il a traité ensuite quelques autres questions parfaitement étrangères au sujet qui nous occupe. Il a évoqué l'aspect géogra- phique, les' antécédents m'storiques, la topographie, les droits des particuliers, la possibilité de conclure des arrangements régionaux, etc. Même si, tout à fait théoriquement, je voulais bien lui concéder tout cela, et admettre que tous ces facteurs sont contre nous comme il le dit - bien qu'ils ne le. soient pas -'- il y a une chose qui est incontestablement en notre faveur, . et c'est la Convention d'armistice, que nous devrions nous efforcer de mettre en œuvre. Il y a un autre élément qui est également pour nous, et c'est l'auto- rité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, qui s'est prononcée dans le rapport du Chef d'état-major. ·154. En· quoi tout cela intéresse-t-il la géographie et l'histoire de la région? Rech~rche-t-on un succès . de propagande? C'est bien possible. l'Sraël pourrait avoir intérêt à rechercher des effets de propagande. A vrai dire, il y a une diminution constante dans l'appui que reçoit Israël. A no~,.e avis, cet appui pour- rait bien avoir diminué d'environ 50 pour 100 dans les deux ou trois dernières années, particulièrement dans les pays comme les. Etats-Unis où il était vigou- reux et où il continue à .décroître. Il est donc tout naturel qu'Israël recherche un succès de propagande, mais ce n'est pas au sein du Conseil de sécu.rité qu'il devrait chercher à l'obtenir. 155. D'autre part, il y a l'aspect géographique de la question, et le fait que le Jourdain ne touche pas la Syrie. Dans le 'secteur qui nous intéresse, le Jourdain coule dans la zone démilitarisée, laqudle ne fait pas partie d'Israël·et n'a été cédée par aucun des Etats en présence. Enfin, il y a la topograpme de la région et le fait que le Jourdain "descend" et porte un nom qui signifie, s("'-,1.1 !lne étymologie douteuse, "le fleuve qui descend". iv~. Zhan oublie que 111 frontière syrienne longe également un côté de la vallée du Jourdain et que 153. Ml'. Eban tried to avoid all these issues that we have brought up and, in our view at least, he thus implicitly confirmed them. He tllen turned ta some other .extraneous issues whichwere quite foreign to the subject. He mentioned the geographic aspect, the historical background, the topography, the private rights, the possibility of regional arrangements, et cetera. Even if, for the sake of argument, l tell him that l grant him aIl this, and that aIl these things are again5t us, as he says - though they are not ~ there is one thing tllat is absolutely vdth us, and that 1S the Armistice Agreement, the agreement that we should seek to implement. There is another th.ing that is also definitely on our side in tms case, and that is the United Nations authorityexpressed in the report of the United Nations Chief of Staff. 154. ''''hat has aIl this to do with the geographica1 aspect ar:d the historical background? Is a propaganda effect bemg sought? That may be. Israel might he justified in seeking propaganda effects. In fact there is a steady diminution in the support which Isr~el has been receiving. In our view, that support may have. diminished in the last two or three years hy about 50 pel" cent, especially in countries such as the Œùted State~ .where it was particularly strong and where now It 15 constant1y on the wane. It isvery natural for Israel to seek this propaganda effect but the Security Council is not the place for such p;opaganda. . 155. Then there is the geographiè aspect; and the fact tha~ t~e Jordan ~~es .not touch upon. Syria. The Jordan IS III the dennhtal'lzed zone in that area and the demilitarized zone is not Israel and no on~ has conce~ed the territory. Again, there is the topography of wh1ch he. spoke, and the fact that the Jordan flows down and 1S named by a derivation which is quite dou~tful, a river thatgoes down. Ml'. Eban has forgotten that the Syrian frontier also mns down the valley of the Jordan on one side, and that the R;ver Jordan does t.~at land is within the demilitarized zone and, there- fore, subject to its status. 157. Mr. Eban then spoke about extraneous private rights - the private rights of a so-called company having a concession. At no time in history has any government of Palestine given a concession to divert the Jordan. That project is new and was never con- sidered by the Government of Palestine or any other government. But even supposing it had, the decisions of the Government of Palestine do not apply to the demilitarized zone, any more than the decisions of the Gpvernment of Syria. How co~td they apply? But Mr. Eban himself starts hy saying that Israel is not continuing Palestine. If Israel is not continuing Pales- tine, and if it does not hase itself upon the inter- national treaties, how can he then rely upon an adminis- trative decision in this case? Such an administrative decision, in fact, 11\)t only is not applicable to the zone but, in fact, never existed in the form of a diversion of the River ] ordan. "\That they once o'btaineci from the Government of Palestine was simply the possibility of building dams and of raising the level of the waters of lakes Huleh and Tiberias above their normal levelln order to Qbtain electricity. But l should like to reiterate that in no case can these private rights he considered as an obstacle in the \Vay of the application of an armistice agreement entered into by the two authorities. 158. l would ask the Council to allow me to make one more remark on this particular point concerning private rights. We have said, and we continue to say, that 99 per cent or more of the demilitarized zone is Arab-owned. Vve mention that simply in order to demonstrate the impossibility of a statement which was meant to be misleading, in connexion with the contention that the work could becarried on there without affecting the rights which, the Arabs, had acquired by use or by irrigation. 159. Mr. Eban mentioned the National ]ewish Fund, Probably he was referring to sorne government-owned land in· that area which has been given to the National, Jewish Fund. That may he so. But the factremains t~<lt:beownersof that area are those who have heen d. ;'/,::". away from their lands by Israel and who are now either refngees in Syria or prisoners in Israel prisons and concentration carnps. They are those who were driven away and whose homes were. partly burned in· violation of the Armistice Agreement and, furthermore, in contravention of the decision of 1951 ~ I [ 1 des dispositions de la Convention d'armistice et, en i • i 161. There is another argument which has been often repeated. We paid no attention ta it, thinking that it was superfluous and of no consequence whatsoever, but owing to its repetition, l should like to say a ward concerning it. We have often been reminded that beèause Syria possesses other resourœs, it should therefore he generous with its resou!:'ces to the south. This kind of generosity is 'something that we would not like to participatein, especially with Israel, because of its means of action with regard to the problem of Arab refugees and other problems. Our resources are ours, as the resources of ea.ch country belong lo it. The fact that we have other resources in no argument,' except in the mind of Mr. Eban. .•. ' 162. AIl these arguments of geography, topography, and the like, are in fact immaterial in considering the issue, which is based squarely and completely on the Anndstice Agreement. AIl this rhetoric does not, by any means, cover.up the nakedness of the Israeli policy. 163. Without in. the least giving any anti-Semitic conn;>~ation'.to what l anl going to say, or any anti.:. . Semltic feeltng, for we have none, 1 would like to ~e~ll. the merchant of Vçnice. In that story, one mdlV1duaIhaddebts against another, and the creditor was calIed Shylock. He had debts and he wanted a poun~. of flesh. But tha.t pound of flesh would destroy the hfe of somebody else, and it was refused 'him. Israel has no debts to collect from other countries. ~srael cannot take the River Jordan without having ItS ounce of blood, that is, by destroying the life of the area and disturbingits peace. 164. There are tîmes, such' as ,today, when we are asked to try to. come to iom agreement, of some nature. 165. The best thing to do is to close the door defi- nitely to unilateral action, because when this door is unequivocally closed by Security Council resolutions, then the thinking may tum in a different direction. Then fears would be lessened and confidence established, and then we would have the opportunity which, in time, might lead to some kind of change in the situa- tion. . 166. The Security Council must look tQ its duties . under the Charter, and its primary duty is to implement international agreements and to keep their sanctity. Today we have the Armistice Agreement. If Israel would like to iRterpret it, let it not seek negotiations heyond it or under it or around it. It is possible to interpret the Annistice Agreement. If Israel wants to modify that Agreement, it is possible to do 50. But to try to paralyse it by unilateral action is somethitig that does not serve peace; it serves ooly expansion and aggression, and naturally prompts ,the necessary actions. ., 167. . The PRESIDENT (translated fram French): It is rather difficult for me at this ume, without previous consultation with the office of the Presi<:lent of the Assembly, to fix, for our next meeting on the 'question we have beendiscussing today, a date which is not in danger of clashing with a plenary meeting of the General .A:ssembly. Consequently, if the C01.1ncil agrees, it rriight allow me to' use my discretion in con- vening it 'Some clay. next week for the purpose of continuing the discussion of this question. The meeting ro-seat 6.15 p.m.