S/PV.649 Security Council

At this stage of our deliberations, l feel myself calbd upon to fulfi1 a twofold duty to the Security Council. 72. In the first place, l should like to sum up the case as we see it, and, while doing so, to refer in particular to the three statemen:'a made by the sponsors of the draft resolution [Sj3151] submitted yesterday [648th meeting]. These statements are an element of the dis- cussion, a part of it. They are not by any means to be interpreted as a juridical basls for the explanation of the resolution to be adopted by the Council, except in sa far as the general discussion usually serves as such a basis. They are net going to be the subject of a vote and should not be unduly influential in explaining the resolution t4at may be adopted. Furthermore, these three, statements are at marked variar>.ce, in some respects, wirh one another, and in Gue course we shall try ta refer to sl1ch :ariances or, in fact, discrepancies. 73. While trying to deal with the three statements made before the Council yesterday, l shall also take the opportunity to deal with the statement made by Mr. Eban on 18 No-vember [639th meeting] and the one that he has made today. From what we have heard from him today, he feels himself. it seems, to be, by and large, in agreement with the draft resolution as it has been explained by the three statements made yes- terday. Certainly, here and there he referred to the need for speed and, said that the uinety days allowed for the report of the Chief of Staff was too long a period alld might somehow be reduced. Yet, the way he explained these statements allows us to go along with him to the extent of saying that we are faced with a point of view which is largely in agreement with that of Israel. From now on, it might nl,' '"Je inappropriate to say that we are faced with a view which is that of Israel and also of the three Powers. 74. The second duty l have to perform is to present ta the Council some suggestions which, in our view, might serve as material for a proposaI to be submitted to the Council or. for amendments to the present draft resolution. 75. In looking at the question at, this stage of our deliberations, we see clearly that there are four main factors under cOl:1sideration. . 76. The first factor is· the effect of the works on the rights of Syria in Syria-. whether these rights are the existing established rights for the use of the waters of l'oc~sion pour traiter, en même temps, de la déclaration que M. Eban a faite le 18 novembre [639èmeséance], ainsi que de celle que nous avons entendue aujourd'hui. D'après ce qu'il vient de nous dire, il semble qu'il se considère d'une façon générale d'accord sur le projet de résolution tel qu'il a été précisé par les trois ex]:losés qui ont été faits hier. Bien sûr, il a fait allusiol:1 ici et là à la nécessité d'all:"r vite et il a déclaré que le délai de quatre-vingt-dix jours à l'expiration. duquel le Chef d'état-major doit présenter son rapport est tl'Op long, et que l'on pourrait le réduire quelque peu. Pourtant, la façon dont il a commenté les exposés en question nous permet de dire que ces déclarations concordent en géné- ral avec le point de vue d'Israël. Dorénavant, nous serions peut-être fondés à dire que nous nous tro::vons en face d'un point de vue unique qui est à la fois celui d'Israël et celui des trois Puissances. ' 74. J'ai pour deuxième devoir de présenter au Conseil quelques suggestions qui, à notre avis, pourraient servir de base à une proposition que nous soumettrions au Conseil ou à des amendements que nous apporterions au projet de l'ésolution actuel. 75. En examinant maintenant la question, nous voyons clairement qu'il ya quatre facteurs principaux dont il faut tenir compte. 76. Le premier facteur, c'est l'effet des travaux sur les droits de la Syrie en Syrie - qu'il s'agisse des droits acquis portant sur l'usage des eaux de la Syrie ou des' 79. Lastly, there is a fourth factor with which l should like to deal in particular today, namely, the action of Israel as seen in the light of the general trends of developments in the Near East-an action which, when viewed in conjtmction with many other actions, constitutes a danger ta peace in the area and diminishes greatly the possibilities of any future peaceful develop- ment for the general w~:rre of the Near Eastern region. 80. l shall speak now about the first factor: the rights of Syria in Syria. We have often hearcl Ml'. Eban state that Syria's attit!lde concerning the water project is an (J-Jsttuctive Gne, that Syria has no rights and has no real possibility of utilizing these waters, and that there- fore Syria should allow Israel to use them in their entirety. This is unfounded. If l were to ex.pect from Ml'. Eban the same good spirit which was ex.pressed the other day by Ml'. Charles Malik, that is, a readiness to recant unfounded statements, l should indeed be offering him a great opportunity to recant again and again, this being orny the first point amongmany. 81. Syria already uses the waters of the Jordan in Syria. The existence of the established rights of Syria ta these waters is not contested. These rights date from time immemorial, and did not await the coming of , Zionism. Such projects were made in the past and are no' serving a large area of the southern part of Syria. Ta take the waters away from Syria and ta prejudice or control the rights of Syria without Syria's agreement and over Syria's objections, amounts indeed ta a clear act of aggression against Syria itself. Armistice' or no armistice, these rights should be upheld. They ex.isted long before the armistice, and the armistice has merely affirmed that they should be safegua:rded. 82. Secondly, we come ta a situation in which one party to the Armistice Agreement, Israel, asks another party, Syria, to try torelinquish its rights or ta have them placed under the control of Israel- in other words, ta have those rights prejudiced in one way or another - without the consent of Syria, even though that party, .. Israel, has no existing rights whatsoever with regard ta the Jordan at the present time. Not a single drop of the waters of the Jordan has ever been used to the west of the Jordan in Israel-held territory. These waters have been used in Syria an(~ continue ta be used there. That is why the international agree- ments which were entered into between the United 84. There is no doubt whatever that in this case a mutual prior agreement for the use of the waters is necessary before any project can be started in connexion with them. 85. But we are not at this time apportioning the waters. The representative of France and the represen- tative of Israel have referred 1.0 the partition of the waters. The quantity of the waters now used is im- material. What is important is that these rights do exist and that they are not contested. The Israel project, if realized, would result in two consequences. First, as has been stated by General Bennike, little or no water would be left to flow in the Jordan rivC'!r-bed after the completion of that project. Whether or not water is left, certainly the intake canals which now carry the waters to Syria would not then be at a level, in relation to that of the river, that would allow the flow of thp waters to the canals. But supposing that the amoullt of water that is to be used by Israel leaves the river flow Ilot substantially diminished, and that it would produce onlya minor decrease in the amount of tbe water, still the intake canals are at a level which would not allow the waters to flow into them even if the decrease were less. 'T'his has been proved by the trial that ')ok place in connexion with the flood-gates. The use of the flood- gates of the drainage project resulted in a decrease of about 70 pel' cent in the flow of the waters of the canal, as stated by the reports of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. 86. l conclude on this point, that the Israel project in and of itself is incompatible with the safeguarding of the established rights of Syria. Even if it reany want.ed to, Israel could not at one and the same time carry out its projects and still keep Syria's tights to the use of the waters as they were previously. This consideration i5 one which needs ta be retained. So much for the existing and established rights. 87. But ther~ is something much more important than these established rights, which exist in the case of Syria and which do not exist at aIl in the case of Israel. There is the possibility of the potential use of these waters of the Jordan to the eo. i: of the Jordan as well as to the ,,:est. Syria,.as well as Israel! can physically; at least, d~vert the RIver Jordan from ItS present bed. Syria can divert it ta the east and Israel can divert it to the west. Syria can use all the waters of the Jordan in Syria for purposes beneficial t9 Syria, and it 1S oùr intention to make these purposes benefichl, in particular to the Arab refugees who are the victims of Israel and who are now in other Arab countries. . 8~. Concerning the possibility of the diversion of the l'lver, both Syria and Israel have equal possibilities. What one party can do the other can do also. Legally, 89. Looking' at the situation from the practical point of view, allow me to say that if - and perhaps the possibility is not far away - one party tu the agree- ment, Israel, goes into the demilitarized zone to divert the river or resumes its work with the intention of diverting th~ river, th.:n the other party, Syria, in a11 probability, will seek to do the same unless the first party, Israel, h ordered to abide by the Armistice Agreement and refrain from unilateral action and unti1 the first party complies with an order to that effect and a mutual, prior agreement is reached through the Mixed Armistice Commission between the two sides. The action of one party to divert the river necessarily invites the same action from the second party to the agreement. If Israel refrains, we will refrain. If it does not, we will then be justified in seeking and carrying out a diversioa of the river to Syria. . 90. Both Syria and Israel are obligated ta refrain from unilateral action so as te.' avoid trouble and main- tain peace. Our complaint was indeed brought to the Security Council in a.t'l. effort to maintain peace and to maintain it through eliminating unilateral action that would disturb peace by undermining the Armistice Agreement, that bulwark of peace. 91. Mr. Eban, in his statement of 18 November [639th meeting]; made a mistake, to say the least. And if it was a mistake, this is another opportunity for him to recant. Ii it was not merely a mistake but a conscious one, we do not expect him to recant because such a mist:ake would have been deliberate1y made. He said that what was meant was that Syria could not avail itself of the potentialities of the Jordan, beyond its existing established rights. This statement needs to "be corrected. He cited· what he called two facts, which were only half.-truths, l may sa}', used to conceal the truth. He said that the River Jordan flows southwards and not northwards and therefore it could not be used in Syria. That it flows southward is a weIl known geo- graphicai îact, but that is only half the truth. He con- clt\ded that Syria could not use the Jordan on that account. The fact is that Syria ext€I1ds in a southeTly direction to the east of the Jordan, far further to the snuth than the present place in the demilitarized zone ô..."ld eve!1 to the south of Lake Tiberias, into which the River Jordan flows. In that case, there is Syrian terri- tory in which the waters of the Jordan can be used. 92. Then Mr. Eban rèverted to anothet argument. He said, and l am going to quote him in this case [639th meeting, para. 71] : "As one stands on thebanks of the Jordan on its Israel side and· tooks into Syria, one sees a steep incline rising into mountainous territory. It would take a far m.ore athletic current than the River Jordan to flow upwards .along thase hills." faih~; ce ne sont en réalité que des demi-vérités, utili- sées, si j'ose di:i'e, pour !llieux déguiser la vérité. Il a déc1aré que le Jourdain coulait vers le sud et non vers le nord et que, par conséquent, la Syrie ne pouvait pas s'en servir. Que le Jourdain coule vers le sud, c'est un fait géographique bien connu, mais ce n'est qu'une demi-vérité. Il a conclu que c'était pour cela que la Syrie ne pouvait pas se servir du Jourdain. La vérité> c'est que la Syrie s'étend vers le sud à l'est du Jourdain; elle s'étend vers le sud bien au-delà de l'emplacement actuel de la zone démilitarisée et elle va même jusqu'au sud du lac de Tibériade, où se jette le Jourdain. Il y a donc une partie du territoire syrien où l'on peut se servir des eaux du Jourdain. 92. .M. ?ban s'est alors prévalu d'un autre argument. Je ctteral exactement "ses paroles [639ème séance, par. 71]: . "Si, depuis. la .rive i~raélienne du Jourdain, on regarde en dlrection de la Syrie, on aperç9it une pente abrupte qui remonte vers· un territoire monta- . gne~x. Le fl;uve .qui remonterait le long de ces coUmes devralt aV01r un courant beaucoup plus puis- sant (l'le celui du Jourdain." 93. As regards the possibilities of exploiting the hydro-electric power, they are practicaIly the same both to the east and to the west. If we were to consider, therefore, whether a project is beneficial to one coun- try, we should at the same time consider whether the diversion could be beneficial to another country, since both countries are under the same restrictions and the same limitations as regards the use of stich possibilities at the present time under the Armistice Agreement. Let us keep this basic differe..t1ç~ b mind, that whereas Israel has no existing' right~ whatsoever on the Jorel.an at thê p...esent time, Syr.ia has. We are not discussing the question whether a project is beneficial or not. On that point I can agree fully with what the United King- dom representative said yesterday. The gist of his argu- ment was that what we are trying to see is whether a given project is admissible under the terms of the Armistice Agreement as it now stands. I only men- tioned the facts concerning the possible use of the waters in Syria in order to correct Ml'. Eban's erroneous conception: he implied that Syria had no potential use for· the river and that its stand was merely one of obstruction. 94. Israel is fully aware of all the facts to which I have referred. Therefore, in order to substantiate its argu- ment, it turned to an allegatinn that it had sovereignty over the Jordan and the ~rea through which the Jordan flows. Such a conception of Isra~l sovereignty, I should like topoint out to the Council, negates Syria's ,estab- lished rights, the rights of the inhabitants of the demili- tarized zone, and it also negates the possibility of· any regional arrangenlent concerning the Jordan for the benefit of aIl the parties concerned. From the engineering point of view, a variety of regional arrange- ments is conceivable. But what is the use of considering regional arrangements when Israel's claim to sover- eignty over the Jordan makes all regional arrangements subject to Israel's agreement and renders them academic and futile, since Israel maintains that it should use the river solely in its own interests? 95. If the idea of Israel's absolute sovereignty over that area were to be admitted, there would still remain the fact that, as long as the Armistice Agreement is in existence, such sovereignty could not be exercised in the present circumstances. %. Speaking in the 542nd meeting of the Council, Mr. Eban said [para. 15] : "It is true, however,that the Armistice Agreement prevails over all previous con~eptions of jurisdiction." This is correct. There, i ~ 95. Même si l'on admettait l'idée qu'Israël puisse exercer une souveraineté absolue sur cette région, il re:5terait encore que cette souveraineté ne pourrait être exercée dans les conditions actuelles, tant que la Con- vention d'armistice demeurera en vigueur. 96. A la 542ème séance du Conseil, M. Eban a déclaré [pa,-. 15] : "Il est vrai néanmoins que les dispo- sitions de la Convèntion d'armietice l'emportent Sur toute législation ou juridiction antérieure." C'est exact. 98. We a11 know that this idea of Israel's sovereignty over the Jordan and the demilitarized zone is mere imagination on the part of Israel. The Armistice Agree- ment was not a final peace settlement. It did not fix international frontiers, and the Agreement mentions this specifica11y. Nor did it dispose of Palestine terri- tory. The Palestine question is not a settled question. The resolutions of the United Nations regarding the Palestine question did not settle that question because those resolutions have all been fionted by Israel, wJIether they concern the partition scheme, the Armistice Agree- ment, the internationalization of Jerusalem, or the return and compensation of Arab rèfugees. 99. The question ~f sovereignty in the demilitarized zone is now in·abeyance. It does not belong to Israel, nor does it, at the present moment, belong to Syria. No international frontiers were fixed, and Israel's authority is exercised behind armistke Hnes and not behind frontiers: Without the Armistice Agreement, Isra~ authorities would have no text whatever to justify their action within the demarcation Hnes set up by the armistice. Furthermore, in· the whole Middle Easfern area there is not a single country which recognizes Israel, with or without frontiers. There is no country in the world, east or west, which has •ecognized any fixed frontiers for Israel. Israel itself realizes that it has no frontiers. What it has is only an armistice demarcation line. That is the reason why it strives somehow. although in vain, to transform the present demarcation lines into definite frontiers. , 100. But even if the present demarcation lines estab- lished by.the armistice were to be considered as fron- tiers, Israel's actions with regard tothe division e.'l:tend beyond these demarcation lines. Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever to claim the existence of Israel's sovereignty or its exercise of the attributes of public powers. 101. The so-called sovereignty of Israel is not only a fallacious assertion, but.a very reckless and dangerous one because it does not. ascribe any real value to the demarcation lines indicated in the Armistice Agreement, on which the peace in that area is based. Since Israel ?ases .~ts ,actions on ~uch a conception of sovereignty, !ts actIons are, l must state, at the present moment a -repudiation of the Armistice Agreement and constitute n:en~ u~e assertion fallacieuse, c'est aussi une allégation temeralre et dangereuse, parce qu'elle ne reconnaît au- cune valeur réelle aux lignes de démarcation prévues dans la Convention d'armistice, sur laquelle repose la paix dans cette région. Puisque Israël fonde ses actions sur une telle 'conception de la souveraineté, je dois dire qu'elles constituent, pour l'instant, une répudiation de 104. Sa much for the e.'(isting rights and potential uses of the Jordan to the east as weIl as to the west of its present bed. 105. l should like to turn now ta the military aspects of the situation. l should like to prove that the unilateral actions resulting from the work do alter the very objects of the Armistice Agreement and the value of the demili- tarized zone. The military considerations in the Armis- tice Agreement obviouS'ly surpass in importance the non-military considerations. The cease-fire and the armistice in Palestine brought hestilities ta an end. They did not, however, fix any frolltiers and they left numerous outstanding questions without a solution. Such outstanding questions do not come within the purview of the armistice except ta the extent that the armistice safeguards them until a final settlement has been reached. 106. Therefore, the present Chief of Staff and his predecessor have bath had to look attentively to the military aspects in implementing the Armistice Agree- ment. General Riley did so and General Bennike is also doing sa. In looking into this aspect of the present question of the diversion of the·Jordan, General Bennike dwelt upon. article V of the Armistice Agreement dealing with military questions and with the value and function of the demilitarized zone in the armistice sys- tem. Using his authorityunder article V the Chief of Staff established in his report some findings resulting from careful study and discussion with both parties to the Agreement. He asked himself the question which he has formulated i11 annex l of his report of 23 October 1953 in the following terms [S/3122, anne% l, para. 5] : "Whether the first object of the definitlon of the demilitarized zone according to article V, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement, viz., 'separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such manner as ta minimize the possibility of friction and incident', would be affected by work aiming at diverting a con- 106. Par conséquent, l'actuel Chef d'état-major, tout comme son prédécesseur, a été anlené, dans l'application de la Convention d'armistice, à envisager soigneusement les aspects militaires de la question. Le général Riley a agi de la· sorte, tout comme le fait actuellenlent le général Bennike. En envisageant cet aspect de cette question du dét.ournement des eaux du Jourdain, le général Bennike~a insisté sur l'article V de la Conven- tion d'armistice, qui traite des questions militaires, ainsi que de la valeur et de la fonction de la zone dénlilitarisée dans le cadre de l'armistice. Usant de l'autorité que lui confère l'article V, le Chef d'état-major est parvenu, dans son rapport, à établir quelques conclusions, à la suite d'une étude attentive et d'entretiens avec les deux parties à la Convention d'armistice. Il s'est lui-même posé la question qu'il a formulée dans l'annexe I~ de son rapport du 23 octobre 1953, dans les termes suivants [S/3122, anne~·e l, par. 5] : . "... je me suis efforcé de déterminer... si le premier objet de la délimitation de la zone démili- tarisée, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'article V de la Convention d'annistice général: "séparer les forces armées des deux parties de manière à réduire au minimum les possibilités d'incidents et de froisse.. 25 109. Secondly, the Jordan, in its deep valley, is a serious obstacle for any troops - and l calI to the attention of the representative of France in particular tins finding of General Bennike - particuiarly motor- ized troops, which might attempt to cross it. 110. Thirdly, looking to the projected canal and its miIitary factors, General Bennike said (S/3122) annex III, para. 7 (e)] : "1 agree that respect for the demilitarization provisions relating to the zone îs essential so long as they exist. However, the value of the demilitarized zone as a buffer zone would be different if one party controI1ed the flow of the Jordan in the zone by meaqs of a canal. l have only considered the question of the altered military value of the flow of the Jordan in the demiIitarized zone, resulting from the con- struction of such a canaI." And General Bennike continues, m answering the Foreign Minister of Israel: "You have considered another question, that of the militarv value of the canal in which the water derived from the river would flow. The canal, in your opinion, wouId only constitute an obstacle for a party bent upon aggression. You add that 'for its part, the Government of Israel has consistentIy abjured aggres- sion. Were it nursing aggressive designs, it wouId be thwarting its own purpose' by digging the canal. From a purely technical point of view, it is not quite c1ear to me how the Govemment of Israel 'were it nUI;sing aggressive designs, ... would be.thwarting its own purpose' by digging, in an area not affected by the demilitarization provisions of article V, a canal running paraI1el to the Jordan river-bed. From a pure1y military point of view, the existence of such a canal would permit the party controlling_it to economize its forces in the area and increase them . elsewhere." " 111. AlI through his findings he was basing himself on article V of the Armistice Agreement. He based himself on that same article in·reaching his authoritative conclusions and decisions, which may be stImmed- up as follows: first, that the work would, from the military point of view, alter the object, value and function of the demilitarized zone and would remove the obstacles, separating the two sides and minimizing-the possibility of friction and incident; secondly, that a canal in Israel- held territory, outside the demilitarized zone, is no substitute for the river flowing within the zone; thirdly, that such a canal, held by Israel, would not thwart Israel's aggressive designs, if and when Israel nursed . them, and in the event of military action such a canal would be of service to Israel, allowing it to alter the water course at will a'ld thus to reduce its forces in that 112. If the action of one side was, as is the case with the action in question, of such a nature as to alter the objects of the Armistice Agreement and the very value of the demilitarized zone to both sides, that action would represent a substantial modification of the Armistice Agreement. l cal1 the attention of the representative of the United Kingdom to the fact that it would be a modification of the agreement and not an implemen- tation thereof, and for a modification we need the mutual consent of both parties. 113. Yet today, inparticular, MI'. Eban has tried to base his argument on another provision of the Armistice Agreement - paragraph 1 of a,rticle II. He did this also at a previous meeting. In a previous statement he embarked upon an attempt to minimize the importance of the Joriai. in that area. He said that, most of us, in our younger days, could have jumped over the River Jordan at many points in the zone. No matter how athletic MI'. Eban's mind or his feet may be we would notwish him to try that jump for it would plunge him 'into the Jordan's current. It is preferable that we should correct him before he undertakes such a jump. The Jordan is not a very big river, but it is not possible to jm;np over it. MI'. Hoppenot told us yesterday that that river of rivers, in view of the development of military art and military science, would not now offer a serious obstacle to a modern trained army. But everything is relative. Sorne armies which are better equipped could probably cross the Jordan with far greater ease than the armies which exist in the Near East and which are not yet as wel1 equipped as those of other countries. To cross this river is a big military action. To say the least, it has, in its present bed, served as an effective hindrance to infiltration and other happenings of the kind whiCh go on in other areas of Palestine where no such river exists to form a' separation between the two sides. No matter how much attention' we are bound to give to the observations which have been made by the representative of France, there remains the c1eai observation and decision of General Bennike in which he has appreciated the factors and concluded bysaying that the Jordan does in fact constitute a serious obstacle. This is an authoritative and. objective view. 114. With regard particularly to article II, para- graph 1, and its interpretatiofl and possible implications, we have the fol1owing to state. To begin with, that article was not the one on which General Bennike based his findings. Therefore claiming' authority uuder article II does not in the least diminish the ,,-alue of those findings, which are based on article V. 115. MI'. Eban, however, would have us be1ieve that the truce established by the Security Coundl decision of 15 July 1948 [S/902] was abrogated. Let us examine that matter; it deserves particular attention. What does article II, paragraph 1, of the Armistice Agreement say? It states: "The'principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce 113. Cependant, M. Eban s'est tout particulièrement attaché aujourd'hui à invoquer une autre disposition de la Convention d'armistice, le paragraphe 1 de l'artide II. n l'avait déjà fait lors d'une séance précédente. Au cours d'une intervention antérieure, il a tenté de mini- miser l'importance que présente le Jourdain pour cette région. Il a déclaré que la plupart, d'entre nous, dans notre enfance, aurions pu sauter par-dessus le Jourdain en bien des points de la zone. Quelle que soit l'agilité de , l'esprit ou des jambes de M. Eban, nous ne lui sou- haiterions pas de tenter ce saut, car il tombetait dans le fleuve. Mieux vaut l'arrêter à temps. Le Jourdain n'est pas très large, mais on ne peut le franchir d'UD 'saut. M. Hoppenot nous a dit hier que, par suite des progrès de l'art et de la science militaires, ce fleuve entre tous les fleuves n'offrirait plus de nos jours un bien grand obstacle à une armée moderne. Mais tout est relatif. Certaines armées, mieux équipées, pourraient peut-être franchir le Jourdain beaucoup plus facilement que celles qui existent dans le Proche-Orient et qui ne sont pas encore aussi bien équipées que les armées d'autres pays. Le franchissement de ce fleuve constitue une action militaire d'importance. Le moins qu'on puisse dire, c'est que le Jourdain, tel qu'il est, a effectivement entravé les infiltrations et autres actions du même ordre qui se poursuivent dans d'autres régions de la Palestine où aucun fleuve ne sépare les deux parties. Quelle que soit l'attention que nous devions accorder aux remar- ques du représentant de la France, il nous reste les remarques et les décisions nettes du général Bennike qui a conclu que le Jourdain constitue bien un sérieu~ obstacle. C'est là une opinion autorisée et objective. 114. Pour ce qui est plus particulièrement du para- graphe 1 de l'article II, de son interprétation et des conséquences qu'il peut entraîner, nous· avons ceci à dire. En premier lieu, l'article II n'est pas le seul sur lequel le général Bennike fonde ses conclusions. Par conséquent, lorsque l'on invoque cet article on ne diminue en rien la valeur des conclusions en question qui sont fondées sur l'article V. ' 11.5. M. Eban, cependant, voudrait nous faire croire que la trêve instituée par la décision du Conseil de sécurité en date du l5 juillet 1948 [S/902] a été abrogée. Examinons cette question, qui mérite une attention toute particulière. Que dit le paragraphe 1 de l'article II de la Convention d'armistice? Il est dit ceci: "Le principe qu'aucun avantage militaire ou poli- 27 "Confirme, jusqu'au règlement pacifique définitif, l'ordre donné ... par [sa] résolution du 15 juillet 1948, aux gouvernements et autorités intéressés ..." Il s'ensuit que, bien loin d'abroger la trêve, la résolution du Il août 1949 à laquelle M. Eban a fait allusion aujourd'hui et M. Lodge hier confirme et maintient cette trêve; elle ne dit pas que la trêve est caduque ou qu'elle n'est plus en vigueur, 118. En outre, quel effet la résolution du Il août 1949 pouvait-elle avoir sur un armistice conclu avant son adoption? L'armistice a été conclu le 20 juillet 1949; la résolution n'a été adoptée que le Il août 1949. Elle ne peut donc servir à expliquer les mobiles ou les inten- tions qui ont amené les parties à raire figurer dans la Convention d'armistice des dispositions reconnaissant le principe selon lequel il ne devrait y avoir aucun avan- tage militaire ou politique, principe institué en vertu de la trêve. 119, Pour conclure sur ce point, je voudrais appeler l'attention des membres du Cons,;:,il de sécurité sur les considérations suivantes: Premièrement,il ne peut faire de doute que le principe contenu dans la résolution dt! 15 juillet 1948 reste en vigueur, que les parties l'aici-.t ou non incor- poré dans la Convention d'armistice. Deuxièmement, il ne peut faire de doute qne les parties ont en fait incorporé ce principe dans la Con- vention d'armistice avant le mois d'août 1949. Troisièmement, il ne peut faire de doute que la résolution du Il août 1949 confirme ce principe de la résolution du 15 jumet 1948, d'après lequel il ne devrait y avoir aueun avantage militaire ou politique. Quatrièmement, il ne peut faire de doute que les conclusions formulées par le général Bennike dans son rapport étaient - il l'a déclaré très nettement dans le rapport même - fondées sur l'article V de la 121. The present situation with regard tci the demili- tarized zone and the military aspects of the matter is such that one cou1d safely say that the demilitarized zone is to a large extent occupied by Israel forces and is under Israel control. That situation was recently referred ta by the Chief of Staff. In ;,1s report of 20 October 1953 [5/3122, anne:t" III], he said that Israel police guarding the site had used an old mill as a bivouac. Rence, Isr?êl poiice were in the demilitarized zone. In his state.œènt of 27 October [630th meeting], also, General B(;nnike stated that Israel police were in the zone. He referred, too, tn previous reports by General Riley in which there was reference to the presence of Israel police and other Israel para-military formations in the demilitarized zone. General Bennike concluded that the situation had not changed since his predecessor had reported to the Council on 30 October 1952. 122. A further observation must be made in this resoect. The United Nations authorities in the zone 'JOhght to implement that provision of article V of the Armistice Agreement which empowers the Chief of Staff to employ locally recruited police in the demili- tarized zone. The United Nations authorities established regulations for the recruitment and functioIÙ!1g of such local police. Syria accepted the regulations suggested by the United Nations authorities; Israel refused. Again, in a:nother instance, Syria, faithful to the Armis- tice Agreement, a:ccepted such a proposaI and Israel again refused it, wartting to COnf~ll1e to control the zone by the Israel police and by the so-called "agricultural comruand" which is attached to the army of Israel and which is, in all probability, responsible for the incidents that have taken place at Qibya and at other places on the Israel de.marcation lines. 123. When the United Nations observers come to the demilitarized zone and try to fulfil their mission of observation, the reports also indicate that they are constantly hampered by the Israel authorities. In one instance back in 1951, such observers were turned out at gun-point from certain localities. Today, they are 124.. The second. mission of the forces of Israel in that zone is to establish a de fa,cto control by Israel of the zone so as to prejudice the final settlement. Indeed, the continuation of sucb actions would tend to create a fait accompli and make a final settlement on the basis of right and justice a forlorn hope. 125. The third mission that these forces are trying to fulfil and the purpose of the action to control the demili- tarized zone are to apply to that zone Israel's inter- pretation of the restoration of normal civilian life to it. The intelpretation of Israel with respect to normal civiliah life in that zone is one which we shaIl see in a moment. 126. Ml". Eban has contested our statement that over 99 pel" cent of the demilitarized zone to the south of Qasr'Atra is Arab.We have here an official Govern- ment of Palestine map, which we are ready to present to the Council, which substantiates our statement beyond doubt. General Bennike, in a recent report, in answer to the questions of the representative of Pakistan, affirmed that about half of the land in the demilitarized zone W,.:lS owned by Syrian nationals. The remaining half, however, is owned by Palestinians of the zone, of whom more than 99 pel" cent are Arabs. 127. 1 shouldlike to take a few minutes to discuss the ~tatus of the demilitarized zone asit Is at present. When the Armistice Agreement· was being negotiated in 1949, it was made clear by the two sides in the minutes of the negotiations that an armistice was being negotiated and not a final peace settlement. This situation was described by General Riley, who attended these nego- ;tiations, when he said before the Security Council [542nd meeting, para. 97] : . ".. , it was a1ways kept uppermost in mind that it was an armistice agreement and not a peace treaty or other final settlement that was being negotiated. The question of territorial sovereignty, therefore, was scrupulouslyavoided." 128. Presenting further information on the same matter, General Bennike also said [542nd meeting, para. 96]: ".. ; what mustbe made emphaticaIly clear is that the Armistice Agreement did not in any way deal with the question of territorial sovereignty artd that this question, generally and particularly in so far as the demilitarized zone is concerned, must rest in abeyance while the Armistice Agreement is1n effect p!~s: qu'un vain espoir. 125. La troisième mission que ces forces essaient d'accomplir et l'objet des tentatives de mainmise sur la zone démilitarisée, c'est de rétablir la vie civile normale dans cette région selon Israël. Nous verrons bientôt ce qu'Israël entend par rétablissement de la vie civile. 126." M. Eban a contesté notre déclaration selon la'luelle plus de 99 pour 100 de la partie de la zone démilitarisée située au sud de Qasr'Atra sont arabes. Nous avons ici une carte officielle du Gouvernement de la Palestine que nous sommes prêts à présenter au Conseil et qui appuie notre déclaration sans qu'aucun doute puisse subsister. Dans un récent rapport qu'il a établi pour répondre aux questions posées par le repré- sentant du Pakistan, le général Bennike a affirmé qu'environ la moitié des terrains situés dans la zone démilitarisée appartiennent à des ressortissants syriens. En revanche, l'autre moitié appartient à des Palesti- niens qui vivent dans la zone et dont plus de 99 pour 100 sont Arabes. 127. Je voudrais; pendant quelques instants examiner le statut de la zone d6militarisée à l'heure actuelle. En 1949, lors des négodations qui devaient aboutir à la Convention d'armistice, les deux parties ont bien spé- cifié, ainsi qu'il ressort des comptes rendus des séances, qu'il s'agissait de négocier un armistice et non de pro- céder à un règlement de paix définitif. Le générai Riley qui assistait à ces négociations a exposé la situation de façon très nette lorsqu'il a déclaré devant le Conseil de sécurité [542ènte séance, par. 97] : "... on a toujours accordé la plus grande impor- tance au fait qu'il s'agissait de négocier une conven- tion d'armistice, et non pas un traité de paix oU un autre instrument de règlement définitif. Par consé- quent, la question de la souveraineté territoriale a été soigneusement éludée." 128. En fournissant des renseignements complémen- taires sur le même suJet, le général Dennike' a déclaré [542ème séance) par. 96] : u • •• il convient de préciser et de souligner que la Convention d'armistice ne traite nullement de la ques- tion d,~ la souveraineté territoriale; cette question, qu'il s'agisse du cas général ou du cas particulier de la zone démilitarisée, doit rester en instance aussi longtemps que la Convention d'armistice demeurera "The provision for the demilitarized zone in the light of all circumstances is the most that can be reasonably expected in an armistice agreement by either party. Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be dealt witn in the ultimate peace settlement ..." 130. That answers very fully the statement made today by Ml". Eban thaï the withdrawal of ,Syria from the demilitarized zone was unconditional. On the contrary, it was conditional upon the establishment of a S'tatus in the zone whereby it would be kept separate from the two sicles' and notbe under the influence or control of either one of them. That status of the zone, which places the administration of the zone on a local basis, does not allow the intervention of Syria or of Israel in matters within the internaI jurisdiction of that zone or in its administration. Within the zone as an entity, the ad- ministration will be of a local pattern from village to village and settlement to settlement. Whenever there are questions of general intetest, they will be solved with the guidance of the Chief of Staff. 131. That administration on a local basis continued from the armistice until the beginning of 1951. Then came the Israel projects andwith these projects came a series of incidents which have continually disturbed the peace of the demilitarized zone:· raids on villages, usurpation of lands, dispersion of the people from their homes and refusaI of those people that had been dis- persed to return. They have cotne to the demilitarized zone in order to create a different status in that zone from the one which it had with its Arab population.. 132. In the et',rly months and up to 1951, the Mixed Armistice Commission used to meet whenever a diffi- culty arase concerning the interpretation of the provi- sions relating to the return of normal civilian life. At those meetings, many difficulties were solved. The precedents esta:blished by the decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission do form a good basis for a cor- rect interpret<. ,:'m of the status of the zone. In tbis case, such an intelJetation would not at all permit the United Kingdom delegation, for example, to say that the present conditions in the demilitarized zone were a matter 'of interpretation of the Armistice Agreement. They are rather a matter of modifièation of the status of the zone in· its most fundamental aspects. 133. l haveh~re an example.oi' the attitudetaken by the Israel authorities towardsthe exeJ;cise by Arab owners of their rights in the demilitarized zone. It is in the form of a letter addressed by the Israel authnrities te the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. It is.dated 25 December 1952. The Israel representative said: 134. In other words, Israel would consider the return of an ..<\rab owner to his own land, the exercise of his right of ,t>roperty, as being opposed to t..lte security of Israel in the demilitarized zone, in a zone where Israel has no jurisdiction and no right of control whatsoever and where Israel police should never have been allowed to enter. 135. Sv.ch are the actions of Israel in the demilitarized zone, actions which are substantiaIly moilifying its status and making it incumbent upon us aIl to try to look ioto a situation which is being aggravated from month to monh~ and which may bring about serious dh4iculties and troubles. AlI those actions of control, of policing, of para-military occupation are concomitant and intertwined with the Israel prajects which, in t.tUs case, are aIl directed towards prejudicing the final settlement and realizb:g a mainmise of Israel in that area. 136. l should like to take a few minutes to refer to an important matter to which Mr. Eban has referred today and 011 which he placed sorne importance: the question of the so-caUed private rights of Israelis in the demiIi- tarized zone und~r a so-ealled concession to do the work. The facts are the following. 13ï. The authority which is undertaking the work in the demilitarized zone is not a private one, but an Israel agency working under the Israel Department of Works for the purposes and advantage of Israel and not for any private advantage or purpose. 135. Telles sont les actions d'Israël dans la zone démi- litarisée; ces actions modifient gravement le statut de cette zone et nous font à tous l'obligation d'étudier une situation qui devient plus grave de mois en mois et qui peut amener des difficultés et des troubles dangereux. Toutes ies initiatives prises par Israël pour exercer un i:ontrôle, pour faire la police ou pour occuper la zone avec des formations paramilitaires, sont étroitement associées avec les projets d'Isr-oël qui tendent, en l'es- pèce, à empiéter sur le règlement final et à permettre la mainmise d'Israël sur cette zone. 136. Je dois consacrer quelques minutes à un point important que M. Eban a soulevé aujourd'hui, en y insistant; il s'agit des prétendus droits privés apparte- nant à des Israéliens, dans la zone démilitarisée, en vertu d'une prétendue concession de travaux. Les faits sont les suivants. 137. Premièrement, l'autorité qui a entrepris les tra- vaux -dans la zone démilitarisée n'est pas une autorité privée, mais un établissement public israélien placé sous les ordres du Département des travaux publics d'Israël et travaillant pour les fins et au profit d'Israël et non pour des intérêts privés. 138. En second lieu, le Gouvernement palestinien n'a jamais donné, à aucune époque, de concession à une compagnie en vue de détourner les eaux du Jo'lrdain. L'allégation touchant une prétendue concession des travaux destinés à détourner le cours du Jourdain est une allégation fausse, émise par Israël pour établir des droits privés qui en fait n'existent pas. 139. Troisièmement, si le Gouvernement de la Pales- tine avait donné une concession pour ces travaux, cet acte aurait constitué un acte intérieur de ce gouverne- ment et n'aurait pas pu être opposé à la Syrie en droit international. Le Gouvernement de la Palestine n'a jamais dccordé une telle concession, et il· n'aurait pu le faire, car il était lié par les traités internationaux de 1923 et 192(. qui ne lui permettaient que de construire des uarrages à la sortie du lac de Houlé et du lac de Tibériade, au profit d'usines d'électricité. Le Gouverne- ment de la Paiestine avait été autorisé, par un acte inter- national, à construire ces.barrages et c'est ce qu'il a fait: le lac de Tibériade a été doté d'un barrage pour la pro- duction d'énergie électrique. La concession ainsi accor- dée par le Gouvernement palestinien a donc déjà été exploii:ée. De plus, la raison pour laquelle le Gouverne- 138. Secondly, the Palestine Government at no time gave any concession to any company to divert the River Jordan. The assumption that there is sorne kind of ':on- cession todivert the River Jordan is a false assumption pütforwardby Israel in order to create an actually non-existent private daim. 1 139. Thirdly, if the Palestine Government had given a concession to divert the river, that act would have been an internaI act of the Government of Palestine andcould not be opposed ta Syria internàtionally. The Palestine Government did no1 give any such concessbn and could nothave given it, because that Government was hound byinternational treaties of 1923 and 1926, which pro- vided that the Palestine Government could only author- iz~ thedamming of Lakes Huleh and Tiberias in order to have e1ectric power generated in that manner. The Palestïne Government was internationallv authoriz~d to -dû Sv ""id, in fact,it did: Tiberias waS dammed and electric power was generated. That concession which the Gov~rnment of Palestine gave has already been ex- ploited.• Moreover, the reasoil why the Palestine Gov- ernment acted, and was bound to act, in tha.t manner 141. Fifthly, supposirig that ,Israel were sovereign over the zone, it could not exercise its sovereignty over that zone in the present citcumstances - and, if the Israel authorities had given such authority to a so-called company in order to undertake worl\ in the demilitarized zone, the action of Israel would he unfounded in the same way in which the action of the Palestine Govern- ment would have been unfounded. 142. Tt is therefore evident that no private right exists at aIl, that the right to divert the Jordan under a con- cession was not given by the Palestine administration. No concession was given by the Palestine administra- , tian to divert the River Jordan. Israel, if it ·gives such authority, would be acknowledging that right for itself, based on so-called sovereignty and disregarding inter- national agreements as weIl as established rights. 143. But supposing, for the sake of argument, that there were private rights, such an internal right in !srael could not be made ta prevail- and this is very Important- over the status of the zone, which was established by an international agreement made with the consent of Israel. Israel cannot use a private right ta prevail over an international agreement to which Israel ltself was a party and to which it has given its consent. 144. In .view of tboe limited time at our disposal, l should hke ta pass on to the last f~ctor ta be consid- ered, a factor to which l have referred, namely, the ge~eral tren~ o~ deve!op~ent of the Palestine question. :rhis should mdl~ate our Idea as to what roight be done m the present crrcumstances in order to ensure peace and tranquillity and peaceful deve10pment ifi û'ï.at area. 145. No matter how we look at the Palestine question, no matter how controversial the issues concerning it ma! be,. th~re remains ?ne fundamental and basic point which IS mcontrovertible. Tt was Israel - Zionism, rather - which created the Palestine question. The Arabs of Palestine, living in their homes fur century after century, were subjected to Zionist intru$ion, whicb grew with time ·and in the last few years grew to such dimensions that it turned out of Palestine about one million Arab refugees. In order to pursue this policy of replacing the Arabs in ·Palestine by Jewish immigra- tion: for the purpose of establishing a Jewish State, Syria was dismembered and a Palestine Mandate was created. The philosophy and strategy of Zionism, which has; worked up to the present time, continues to affect anq influence the pn~sent situation to a great extent. That philosophy is based upon a distinction as to reli- gion and race~ It considers the Jews in various coun- tries as exiles, as a Dia~pora, which should be ingath- ered into Palestine. And there lurks the possibility of future expansion, because immigration would neces- sarily cause J:srael eventu-ally to burst at the seams or expand. 14~. II est évident, dès lors, qu'il n'y a pas <le droits pnvés du tout et que l'administration de la Palestine n'a jamais accordé le droit de détourner les eaux du Jourdain en vertu d'une concession. Les autorités de la Palestine n'ont accordé aucune concession à cet effet. Si Isra~l accord~t une concessio~ de 'Ce genre, elle s'arro- geraIt un drOlt nouveau en l~ fondant sur une prétention de souveraineté, et elle violerait des traités internatio- naux aussi bien que des droits acquis. 143. Mais à supposer un instant qu'il y ait des droits privés, il n'en r\~sterait pas moins que les droits inté- rieurs d'Israël ne saurarent l'emporter-le point est capital- sur le statut de la zone, établi par un accord international condu avec le consentement d'Israël. Israël ne peut invoquer un droit privé à l'encontre d'un accord international signé et accepté par Israël. 144. Comme notre temps est limité, je passe au der- nier des facteurs que j'ai mentionnés: l'évolution géné- rale de la qaestion de Palestine. Ceci doit nous amener à voir ce qui pourrait être fait, dans la situation ac- tuelle, pour assurer la paix et !e calme dans cette région et pour contribuer à son évolution pacifique. 145. De quelque façon que l'on envisage la question de Palestine, si divergentes que soient les thèses en présence, un fait demeure, un fait capital qui ne com- porte aucune discussion. C'est Israël-ou plutôt le sionisme-qui acréé,la Qttestion de Palestine. '. Les Arabes de Palestine, qui vivroenCdèpùisdes slèdes dans leurs foyers, ont été les victimes d'intrusions sionistes de plus en plus étendues qui,' ces dernières années, ont abouti à chasser de Palestine près d'un million de réfu- giés arabes. En application d'Une politique destinée à remplacer les Arabes de Palestine par· des immigrés juifs, afin d'établir un Etat juif, la Syrie a été démem- brée et on a créé une Palestine sous maondat. La philo- sophie et la stratégie du sionisme, qui ont été actives jusqu'à l'heure actuelle, continuent d'influer dans une grande mesure sUr la situation·présente. Cette philoso- phie repose sur une distinction de religion-et de ra'Ce.' Elle tient les JuHs <les divers pays pour exilés; perdus dans la Diaspora, et qui doivent être rassemblés en Palestine. Et c'est ici que surgit la menace d'une ex- pansion futare car l'immigration amènera nécessaire- ment Israël à éclater ou à poursuivre son expansion. 149~ We have witnessed another manifestation of the same policy, in the case of reparations to he paid by Germany to Israel. There are sorne countries which now support Israel and which have supported Israel 1n th~ past that have helped Israel to obtain such reparations from Germany and to delay the reparations to others to whom they were due in order that Israel might re- ,ceive more and more help. And we are witnessing some- ~tning more. We are witnessing the levying of taxes by Israel in foreign couotries, even in this very city of New York. 150. The PRESIDENT: MayI interrupt the speaker for just one minute. 1 must say that one of the happiest recollections of my service at the United Nations will be the friendly collaboration that 1 have always had with Ambassador Zeineddine. 1 know that there has never been an appeal made to him which, in his spirit of co- operation, he has failed to heed. That is why 1 am quite sure that he will '110W heed my appeal to keep to th, item before the Council.

. 1 intend to keep ta the item before the. CounciI. 1 certainly shall give the fullest consideration to the kind appeal just made by the President. However, I do not at all feel that 1 have digressed from the stihject before us. Mystatement bears directIy on the present situatjon. 150. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Puis-je interrompre l'orateur pour un instant? Je dois dire que l'un des souvenirs les plus agréables que je garde de ma présence à l'Organisation des Nations Unies tient aux excellents rapports que j'ai toujours eus avec M. l'Am- bassadeur Zeineddine. Je sais qu'avec l'esprit de coopé- ration qui l'anime, il n'est jamàis resté sourd à un appel t qui lui était adressé. C'est pourquoi je suis sûr qu'il m'entendra si je lui demande maintenant de ne pas s'écarter du point de l'ordre du jour. 151. M. ZEINEDDINE (Syrie) (traduit de l'an- glais) : Je n'ai pas l'intention de m'écarter de la ques- tion. Je prendrai certainement encofisidération l'appel cordial que vient de m'adresser le Président. D'ailleurs je n'ai nullement le sentiment de m'être écarté du sU!jet. Ma déclaration touche directement à la situation qui nous occupe. 152. Nous voyons également, à la suite de ces démar- ches dt: çOtl-1iti(m~ q'int-érêts et grâce à l'influence 153. Then we come to another position. We are told that the Armistice Agreements, the purpose of which is ta maintain peace, should not result in prevention of the development of so-called beneficial projects. Israel states that it is impatient with the Armistice Agree- ments and that it seeks their modification. Th~ ques- tion arises: why does Israel not try to utilize the machinery set out in the Armistice Agreements for their modification? Israel states that the Syrians and the . other Arabs are not willing to sit down with Israel to discuss this matter. But we have the Mixed Armistice Commission, where a Syrian and an Israel de1egate sit and talk together. It is precisely there, in that Commis- sion, where the two sides sit, that Israel refuses to par- ticipate and co-operate with the Commission. The only place where something practical might be done is the very place where Israel attempts, hy lack of co- operation, to destroy t,he machinery which has been set up to hring the two parties together. 154. There is something even more c1ear. Israel pretends that it would like to have an dgreeme.n.t with Syria. Then it states that on the question :.efore us Syria does not have the right <to agree or to object. What would he the purpose of these negotiations be- tWt:.en .Israel and Syria when, according to the Israel thesis, Syria has no rights except to agree to what the other party wants? Such negotiations would be of no value at aIl. They would just be a propaganda act in which one party would state that it wanted to negotiate but first would like definitely to prejudice the final rest!lts of the negotiations. 155. From that position, Israel goes on to unilateral interpretations and aets. In his statement, Mr. Charles Malik mentioned the boldness of Israel in that direc- tion. We heard today from Mr. Eban that hé daes not not consider that such boundless amhition exists. How- ever, the facts are there. They have been moving, during the past thirty years,-from one stage to another. There has heen continuaI Zionist expansion. Now when we are faced with the application of the Armistice Agreements, we are presented with statements about the so-called immobility of these agreements. By·this . pœtext, an attempt is made to facilitate the develop- ment hy Israel of projects which would ensure its mai,.mise in a zone that has been demilitarized. 156. Such boldness is due in particular to the con- 156. Cette audace est due, en particulier.? au fait que doning of Israel's actions in the pasto This has only l'on a toléré les actes d'Israël dans le passé. Cette tolé- encoul'aged Israel ta take further actions and to fiout rance n'a fait que l'encourager'à àller plus loin età the decisions of the United Nations. faire fi des décisions des ~ .-;OHS Unies. 157. Coming to the draft resolution [S/3151] before 157. C'est dans la ligne de cette évolution générale que II,S, we view it in the light of these general developments. nous devons examiner le projet de résolution [S/3151] 35 15S. It was possible for the Armistice Agreement to remain without any substantial violations for over a year and a half after its coming into force. But with the Israel projects came the violations of the armistice and the theory of immobility. VVe are not opposed to mobility and development, but we' should like ta see it carried out in an orderly manner, in a manner which would ensure that the r:èsources of the region are used for the henefit of its \}>eople, and the people of that region are primarily Arab refugees. . 159. It is the intention of my Government ta try to do everything possible in order to ensure that the waters of the Jordan shall he used in an area where the Arab refugees cano find relief, and that these waters will not be used by Israel ta the exclusion of the Arab refugees. Israel should not use these waters in addition to what it has already acquired by confiscath:m of the land of Arab refugees, land which in Palestine constitutes about g\) pel' cent of the total area of Israel. Sorne thought was certainly given, especia1ly by the French delegation, to the possibility of the partition of the water. l do not think in the least that the Security Council, with its authority under the Cl:arter, is em- powered or equipped to try to partition waters. It can conciliate, it can mediate; it cannot act for the parties nor take decisions of such a nature. 160. As to the possible guarantees that may be given by the Security Council to the parties, that guarantee also, as far as we can see, has no foundation in tJ'le authority of the Security Council under the Charter. 161. In conclusion, thereiore, 1 should like to men- tion some suggestions which may serve as a basis for a proposaI that may be submitted and which, at the same .time, may serve as obs~rvations concerning the draft resolution before us. ~ 162. First, the Armistice Agreement concluded at the request of the Security Council is an agreement between two sides and cannot be modified or altered except with the consent of both sides, a consent freely given. The Armistice Agreern~t was not endorsed by the Security GOÜî1dl The-Security .Council has always· 8'tated that the··Armistice Agreement had full effect whether it was endorsed by the Security Council or not, and that that authotitycoutci. not he diminished through an attempt in the Security Council to alter the provisions or the rights and obligations which exist under the Armistice Agreement. . 159. Mon gouvernement se propose de faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour assurer l'utilisation des eaux du Jourdain dans une région où les réfugiés arabes puissent en tirer profit, et non pas d'une manière qui servirait uniquement Israël, à l'exclusion des ré- .,fugiés arabes. Il ne faut pas qu'Israël puisse, pa'r l'utili- sation de ces eaux, ajouter aux avantages qu'il s'est acquis en confisquant les terres des réfugiés arabes en Palestine, lesquelles représentent approximativement 90 pour 100 de la superficie totale d'Israël. Certains, particulièren1ent la délégation française, ont même songé à la possibilité de partager les eaux du Jourdain. Je ne crois absolument pas que le Conseil de sécurité, avec les pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés par la Charte, soit qualifié pour répartir les eaux. Il peut faire œuvre de concilia- tion ou de médiation; il ne peut pas agir au lieu et place des parties intéressées, ni prendre une decision de ce genre. 160. Quant aux garanties éventuelles que le Conseil de sécurité pourrait donner aux pa'rties, il ne nous semble pas non plus que l'on trcowe dans la Charte des dispositions qui lui permettent d'exercer de telles fonc- tions. 161. Pour conclure, je voudi"ais donc présenter quel- ques suggestions qui pourront servir de base à une proposition à présenter et qui, en même temps, peuvent être considérées comme un résumé des observations que ma délégation désire formuler sur le projet de résolu- tion soumis à l'examen du Conseil. 162. Premièrement, la Convention d'armistice conclue à la demande du Conseil de sécurité est un accord entre deux parties; elle ne peut être modifiée ni transformée sans le consentement mutuel et librement accordé des deux parties. La Convention d'armistice n'a pas été 'Officiellement approuvée par le Conseil de séCUrité. Le Conseil de sé~urité a touj{)urs déclaré que les clauses de la Convention d'armistice avaient leur plein effet, avec ou sans l'approbation officielle du Conseil de sécu- rité; 'On ne saurait réduire cet effet en essayant d'amener le Conseil de sécurité à modifier les dispositions de la Convention d'armistice, ou les droits et obligations qui en découlent. 163. Deuxièmemerit, les prétentions d'Israël à la sou- veraineté sur la zone démilitarisée ou à l'exercice de droits puhlics de souveraineté sur la zone située entre les lignes de démarcation israéliennes sont une négation même de la Convention d'armistice et une répudiation de cette Convention par Israël. Les actes perpétrés par Israël ont eu les conséquences suivantes - consé- quences d'ailleurs inévitables: ils ont tout d'abord porté 164. We think that the draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council should be one that would up- hold General Bennike's au~hority in full, nothing more or less. The draft resolution before the Council does not uphold that authority; on the contrary, we be1ieve that it alters it substantially. Further, we should like to see the draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council provide for definite prohibition of unilateral action on the part of Israel, so as to create confidence and ensure peaceful development. We should also like the draft resolution to take into account a matter of primary importance in the present circumstances: the strengthening of United Nations observation machinery in the area by the addition of observers as weIl as other personnel, so that the Armistice Agreement could not be defied without having that defiance of the agrèement known at once and reported to the Chief of St:-ff and, perhaps through him, to the Stc1lrity Council. Th~ addition of observers te e..'1SUTe implementation of the Armistice Agreement is far more important than the addition of hydraulic engineers, espe:cially in view of ,the fad ,that the Security Council is primarily respon- sible for dealing with security matters and that its primary duty, l thïnk we aIl agree, is to try to ensure that the implementation of the Armistice Agreemènt is carried out. 115. In our opinion, the resolution should state spe- cifically that the continuation of the work, whether in the zone or beyond the zone, should not influence the deci- sions of the Council because the meaning of the words "in the zone and beyond it" is the same, whether a part of the work is carried out within the zone or outside of it, the purpose being the diversion of the River Jordan, with aIl the civil and military consequences that result with regard to Syria and with regard to the con- travention of the Armistice Agreement. 166. Our purpose would be to try to create sorne kind of international co-operation sa as ta develop the waters of the Jordan basin with a view to ensuring that the Arab refugees would find relief. We will try to do sa in co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 167. We shall in due course try to formulate further remarks on the text of the draft resolution that has been submitted to the Council, and we may in due course also submit some amendments to that draft resolution. 168. .Finally,allow me to say that we seek pea,ce and peaceful development and are ready to co-operate ina way that can lead to that end on the basis of ,the strict appliance of the Armistice Agreement, appliance of the Armistice Agreement as it really is, and not as Israel would like it to become through the various tendentious 37 indépend~.lUts de la Convention d'armistice et seront touché,'j de quelque manière que les travaux soient con- duits; enfin, ils n'ont pas tenu compte de la possibilité, qui e..'<:iste pour la Syrie autant que pour Israël, d'es- sayer de tirer parti des ressources potentielles des eaux du Jourdain. 164. Nous estimons que le projet de résolution qu'adoptera le Conseil de sécurité doit maintenir pleine- ment l'autorité du général Bennike, et s'en tenir là. Sous sa forme actuelle, le projet de résolution, d'une part, ne consacre pas cette autorité et, d'autre part, nous estimons qu'il dénature gravement cette autorité. Nous voudrions en outre que le projet de résolution qui sera adopté par le Conseil interdise définitivement toute me- sure unilatérale d'Israël, de manière à rétablir la con- fiance et à assurer le développement pacifique.de la région. Il faudrait aussi, à notre avis, que le projet tienne 'Compte d'un élément qui est d'importance pri- mordiale dans la situation actuelle: la nécessité de ren- forcer l'organe d'observation des Nations Unies dans la région en augmentant le nombre des observateurs et en envoyant du per$onnel supplémentaire, de -sorte que la Convention d'armistice ne puisse pas être violée sans que cette violation soit connue immédiatement, et si- gnalée au Chef d'état-major et, si besoin est, au Conseil de sécurité, par l'intermédiaire du Chef d'état-major. Il est beaucoup plus important d'augmenter le nombre des observateurs chargés d'assurer l'execution de la Convention d'armistice que d'augmenter le nombre des ~'Perts en hydraulique, surtout si l'on tient compte du fait que le Conseil de sécurité est chargé avant tout de traiter des questions de sécurité et que son premier devoir est - tout le monde· en conviendra -'- d'assurer .l'application de la Convention d'armistice. 165. A notre avis, la résolution devrait aussi préciser que la poursuite des travaux, dans la zone ou hors d~ la zone, n'influencera pas les décisions du Conseil; en effet, la portée de ces termes "dans la zone et hors de la zone" est la même, qu'une partie de ces travaux soit faite à l'intérieur ou en dehors de la zone, le but en étant de détourner les eaux du Jourdain. avec toutes les conséquences civi~es et militaires que ces travaux peu- vent avoir, soit pour la Syrie, soit en ce qui concerne la violation de la Convention d'armistice. 166. Notre intention serait d'essayer d'obtenir une sorte de coopération internationale, qui permettrait de . mettre en valeur ies eaux du bassin du Jouràaùn~t-de venir ainsi en aide aux réfugiés arabes. Nous tenterons d'obtenir ce résultat en coopération avec l'Office de se- cours et de travaux des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés' de Palestine dans le Proche-Orient. 167. Le moment. ye!lU, nous essaierons de présenter d'autres observations sùr le texte du projet de résolu- ' tion qui nous est soumis, et nous pourrons peut-être même présenter' certains amendements à ce texte. . 168. Enfin, qu'il me soit permis ,de dire que nous sou- haitons la paix et une évolution pacifique et que nous sommes prêts à coopérer aux efforts entrepris dans cette voie, sur la base de l'application stricte de la Con- vention d'armistice, telle qu'elle existe et non telle qu'Is- raël voudrait la transformer, grâce aux diverses inter-

There are three more speakers on the list, of whom the representative of Co- lombia is the first. However, due to the lateness of the hour, 1 think it would he better if they did not speak today. 170. 13efore adjourning the meeting yesterday, 1 an- nounced my intention - within the limits of possibility -' of completing co.nsideration of this question this week. It seems ,that 1 was a little too optimistic. On the other hand, when 1 made that statement 1 had in mind inter alia the members of the Secretariat who, after the strenuous work of the last three months, have every right to a little more time during the next week for ' themselves and their familles. With this in mind, 1 should like to ask representatives whether they would accept my suggestion to make a falr try - that is to say, to have two meetings tomorrow, one in the mom- ing and one in the afternoon. Of course, if there is the slightest objection ta my suggestion, we shan meet only in the afternoon. 171. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Au nom de ma délégation, je suis heu- reux de pouvoir dire que j'accepterais que nous nous réùnissions à la fois demain matin et demain après- midi et, le cas échéant, samedi afin d'en finir avec cette question et de montrer au Président que, comme lui, nous tenons à achever notre programme.

Speaking for t...'J.t: United States delegation, 1 am glad to say that 1 would he willing to meet bath tomorrow morning and tomorrow afternoon and, if necessary, on Saturday, in order to expedite this bu~iness and to show the President every co-operation in his desire to complete the programme. 172. M. HOP.PENOT (France): Je suis entièrement d'accord pour siéger demain matin et demain après- midi, sous la seule l"éserve que nous puissions en finir demain, au besoin en prolongeant la séance jusqu'à 7 ou 8 heures. Si c'était nécessaire, je ne verrais même aucun inconvénient à ce que le Conseil se réunh:se samedi. Mais il me paraît extrêmement désirable, aussi bien pour nous tous que pour le per-sonne1 du Secréta- riat, auquel vous avez fait allusion, Monsieur le Pré- sident, que le débat ne se prolonge pas la semaine pro- chaine et que, malgré la proximité du Jourdain et de Bethléem, nous ne soyons pas obligés de siéger le jour de Noël.

1 am quite in agreement with the idea of meeting tomorrow morning and afternoon, provided. only.tuat we can finish the business tomorrow, if neces- sary by continuing the meeting until 7 or 8 in the evening. If necessary 1 should not even object to the Council's meeting on Saturday. It seems to me ex- tremely desirable, however, both for us all and for the staff of the Secretariat, to whom you referred, Mr. President, that the discussion should not continue into next week and that, despite the proximity of the Jordan to Bethlehem, we should not be obliged ta meet on ~ .chri~tm~s pal'. 173. Mr~ Charles MALIK (Lebanon): Th(( sponsors of the draft resolution [S/3151] before us have every right, of course, to express ,their views rega1"ding speed in this matter, but 1 should like to point out - with all respect, but also fran..ldy - to the Council and to the sponsors that the text was put in our hands only yester- day, twenty-four hours ago:We have communicated with our governments in regard to the draft resolu- tian, but l have not the vagul:'st idea what my Govern- ment's views are. If l find myself in the same position tomorrow when the three Powers are going to press for a vote - if they do - l do not know what 1 shan do. 173. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais) : Les auteurs du projet de résolution dont nous sommes saisis [S/3151] ont absolument le droit, bien entendu, d'exprimer leur point dé vue sur l'urgence de cette affaire; toutefois, je tiens à leur faire remarquer respel' 1Ci1Sement, ainsi qu'aux autres membres du Conseil, que le texte ne nous a été commul1iqné qu'hier, donc il y a vingt-quatre heures seulement. Nous avons consulté nos gouvernements au suJet de ce projet de résolution, mais, quant à moi, je n'ai pas la moindre idée de ce que mon gouvernement en pense. Si.je me trouve dans la même situation demain quand les trois Puis- sances insisteront peut-être pour que l'on vote rapide- ment, je ne sais pas ce que je ferai. ' 175. It is obvious that the three western Powers which have. taken the initiative in this matter have every right to carry it through as they please, hut they are not so intimately af!ected in this situation, and therefore l would request them. very earnestly ta re- consider their pressing request ta finish the matter be- . fore we have had sufficient time to think it over and to receive full instructions trom our governments. l do hope that thissimple procedural request will not be refused. l have much to say about the substance of the matter, and once l have said it l think it will be c1ear why we ought to consider the matter il1 a somewhat less hurried manner than in the pasto Therefore, l re- quest, and plead with, the l"~presentatives of the United States and France, and you, Mr. President -"since you did say that you had hoped t:) finish the matter but had been a Httle over-optimistic and l was grateful for your sensitivity concerning the situation - ta allow sorne further time. l do hope that the sponsors of the dra# resolution will understand that it is an extremely delicate matter and that it is obvious that if they are going to press for an immediate decision it will produce bad feeling all round. Let us give it at least another day of-careful, thoughtful consideration. The initiative is in the hands of the three sponsoring Powers and they need have rro fear of losing it, but please give us this pro- ceduralleeway for another day or two. 176. The PRBSI'DENT: Before calling upon the representative of the USSR .l would assure my Lebanese colleague that, as President, l shall never put the draft resolution to the vote uutil aIl members of the Council are readyfor me to do so.

î for -my part quite understand your humane feelings, Mr. President, towards the staff servicing the Secul"ity Council and towardsall the other members of the Council, who are of course anxious ta rest, and l quite as "much as any 'of them. When a serious matter is being discussed, however, rest 1S the last thingto be thought of. That is quite plain. eiaHst~~uvi#itiüesj-~~t~it~u~~u.c~}-;.-,.M~~u~.J~~ __-: Président, -je comprends parfaitement, quant à mQi, -le sentiment d'humanité que vous éprouvez à l'égard de ceux qui travaillent pour le COliseil de _sécurité et à l'égard detous les autres membres du Conseil qui, bien sûr, ont besoin de repos - et moi comme les autres. Mais lorsque l'on examine une question importante, le repos est chose secondaire.C'cgt parfaitement compré':' hensible. f78. The situation is this. Today Mr. E1;>an made som~ 178. La situation est la suivante: M. Eban, par remarks on the substance of the matter whichseem to exemple, a formulé, me semble-t-il, des considérations meworthyof attention. For example, teferringto the dignes d'attention touchant le fond de la Qttestion. C'est draft resolution [S/3151] he observed that paragraph 9 ainsi qu'à propos du proJet de résolution 1S/3151], il a of the operative part shou1d be more precisely worded souligné que le paragraphe 9 doit être rédigé sous une 39 179. l must say that in these circumstances the dele- gation of the Soviet Union is of the 'Opinion that theo question with which we are now dealing should be given additional study, and l hope that it will be possible to do this within a reasonable space of time - if not per- haps as quicldy as might be desired by the optimists, whose viewpoint l am always ready ta share. 180. Tt seems to me that it will he necessary to devote further study to this question for the purpose of reaching agreement between the two sides. For we now see that hetween Israel and Syria there is a serious disagreement which can he merely prushed aside or ignored only if we approach. t>~e mattèr from the purely formaI point of view, without really providing any basis for the normal, good-neighbourly relations which each of us individually and the Security Council as a whole must strive to promote. 181. l submit that it is necessary ta make every effort to obtain a resolution which would form a hasis for .agreement between the two parties on the disputed points. Otherwise, it~eems to me, the relations hetween the parties may become still further embittered. That would be in the highest degree undesirable and would obviously prejudice the maintenance of peace in this region, and he in complete éonflict with the aims which the Security Council ought to pursue. In arder to eliminate and exclude undesirable consequences of that kind and instead to produce positive results, l think that we should not rush our discussion of this matter and arrive at a formaI decision such as could be reached 'Ooly by failing ta go deeply into the matter and by con- fining our attention to the material- which'has not yet been sufficiently analysed -now available on the subject. 182. For that reason l support most earnestly the posi- __ tion setout by Mr.Malik, the representative of Lebanon, and Tsubmit Hiat tliiSecurity-COundî oughf not to he in a hurry in this matter. That is not to say tb_'tt l objc.:t to meeting two or three times tomorrow. If necessary, let us have two or four meetings, if we have time.for them. l am sure that this would be within our powers, but l am against imposing any kind of limit at this early stage or imposing any term for the purpose ofpassing a resolution at any cost and dispersing for the Christmas holiday. A had resolution will not give us a good Christmas. For that reason, l repeat, l am againstrushing 'Our discussion of this question. ~tre moins vite que ne le voudraient les optimistes, parmi lesquels j'aime pourtant à me ranger, d'une façon générale. 180. Il seranécessalre, me semble-t-il, d'étudier plus à fond cette question en vue d'aboutir à un accord entre les deux parties intéressées. Or nous constatons actuel- lement qu'entre Israël, d'une part, et la Syrie, d'autre part, il existe une grave divergence de vues, que l'on ne pourrait faire disparaître ou laisser de côté que si l'on envisageait la question d'une façon purement for- melle, sans vouloir réellement jeter les bases de ces rela- tions normales et de bon voisinage que chacun d'entre nous, en particulier, et le Conseil de sécurité, dans son ensemble, s'appliquent à créer. 181. A mon avis, il est nécessaire que nous fassions tous nos efforts pour adopter une résolution qui puisse servir de base à un accord entre les deux parties inté- ressées, sur les points en litige; sans cet accord, me semble-t-il, les relations entre les parties intéressées peuvent encore s'aggraver, ce qui serait au plus haut point indésirable, compromettrait le maintien de la paix dans cette région et ne répondrait aucunement aux intentions du Conseil de sécurité. Lorsqu'il s'agit de mettre fin à cette tension, d'écarter ces conséquences fâcheuses et d'arriver à des résultats positifs, nous ne devons pas songer à traiter cette question à marches forcées; en effleurant·seulement le sujet, en nous limi- tant à la documentation encore insuffisamment examinée dont nous disposons actuellement, nous n'aboutirions qu'à une ~écision purement formelie. 182. C'est pourquoi j'appuie avec vigueur lerepré- sentant du Liban, M. Malik, et je pense que ie Conseil .de--s'écuriténe-doit-pas;se-ffG\.""er-dans--1'examen de cette question. Ccfa ne 'signifie pas que je m'oppose à ce que nous tenions demain deux ou trois séances. S'il le faut, tenons demain deux séances ou même quatre, ~i le. temps y suffit. Je suis sûr que nous aurons la force de le faire, mais je m'oppose à ce que l'on formule dès maintenant une "limite" quelconque ou à ce que l'on nous fixe un délai pour adopter une résolution coûte que coûte et nous séparer pOttr les vacances de Noël. L'adoption d'une mauvaise résolution ne nous aSSttrera pas un bon Noël. C'est pourquoi - je le répète - je m'oppose à ce que nous étudiions cette question à mar- ches forcées. 186. l agree with what the President has just said. The Security Council could hold a meeting tomorrow afternoon, on the understanding - and l want to assure Mr. Lodge and Mr. Hoppenot that there is no con- sideration of politics involved in what l am now saying -that we may not be able to vote tomorrow. l may not he in a position to vote tomorrow. Of course, sorne representatives may wish to vote without me. They are perf.ectly free ta do sa. In fad, they can do quite a number of things with or without my will. It does seem to me, however, that it would certainly be conducive to a tolerably good ending of this matter - at least pro- ceduraIly 'speaking - if there was no insistence on a vote tomorrow. As l have said, I may not be in a posi- tion to vote tomorrow. 187. l think we should meet tomorrow' afternoon on the c1ear understanding - arrived at now, sa that we may makearrangements now - that it may he neces- sary to ho1d another meeting on Monday afternoon. l do not think that it is unreasonable to suggest that, in connexion with EO important an item, the Council should meet tomorrow aHemoon and, again, on Monday after- noon, in the hope that we may aIl be in a position to complete consideration of the matier on Monday after- noon. Ida not think it is asking too much of the mem- bers of the Council to suggest that they should put up with two days of further deliberation on this matter. 188. The PRESI>DENT:. l recognize the representa- ·tive of the United States on a point of arder.

l think I unG;,;rstand some of the motivations for the re- marks made by the representative of the Soviet UniOn. While l do not shan: them aIl, l can certainly agree that there should be no foiced- march. l am not in favour of a forced march. In fad, l am always willing to extend the courtesy of a delay when avalid reason is given.

May l interrupt you? That is not a.point of arder. 185. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais): Dans mon intervention précédente, j'ai oublié de dire que j'étais pleinement averti de l'état des excel- lents 'Collaborateurs, hommes et femmes, qui nous prê- tent leur concours ici et derrière les coulisses. Je leur sais gré de se montrer si patients à notre égard et je serais le dernier à vouloir abuser de cette patience. Je suis sûr cependant qu'ils penseront comme nous - et comme tous les membres du Conseil- que la question dont nous sommes saisis est si importante qu'un jour de plus ou de moins ne les fatiguera pas au point de les rendre incapables de travailler à nos côtés. Nous sommes tous logés à la même enseigne. Je suis sûr que l:s membres du Secrétariat feront preuve de coopéra- tion. 186. Je souscris entièrement à -ce que vient de dire le Président. Le Conseil de sécurité pourrait siéger de- main après-midi, étant entendu - et je prie M. Lodge et M. Hoppenot de croire qu'il n'y a là aùcnne consi- dération politique - qu'il est possible que nous ne puissions pas passer au vote demain. Moi-même je puis ne pas être en mesure de voter demain. Peut-être ce,,- tains représentants tiennent-ils à voter alors que le Liban doit s'abstenir. Ils sont parfaitement libres de le faire. Il ya d'ailleurs bien d'autres choses qu'ils peuvent faire, que je le veuille ou non. Mais il me semble néan- moins que ce débat se terminerait plus·correctement _ tout au moins sur le plan de la procédure - si l'on n'in- sistait pas pour qu'un 'Vote· ait lieu demain. En effet, je le répète, je pourrais ne pas être en mesure de voter demain. . 187. Il me semble donc que nous devrions nous réunir demain après-midi et qu'il devrait être bien entendu- dès maintenant, pour que nous puissions prendre les dispositions voulues - qu'il pourrait être nécessaire de tenir une autre séance lundi après-midi. Pour une 'ques- tian aussi importante, il ne me semble point déFaison- nable de proposer que le Conseil se réunisse demain après-midi et à nouveau lundi, ni d'espérer que nous serons tous en mesure de terminer ce débat lundi après- midi. Je ne pense pas que ce serait trop demander aux membres du Conseil que de les prier de consacrer encore deux jours à l'examen de cette question. 188. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le re- présentant des Etats-Unis a la parl,'e, sul' uri. point d'ordre. 189. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de'l'anglais) : Je crois comprendre certains des motifs qui ont inspiré les observations du représentant de l'Union soviétique. Sans souscrire àtous ces motifs je conviens qu'il ne doit pis y avoir de màrches forcées.' Je ne· suis nullement en faveur des marches forcées: Je suis même tout disposé à obliger tout le monde en accordant un délai s'il est justifié. 190. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : Puis..lje vous interrompre? Ceci ne concerne pas l'ordre des débats.

l was saying that l'agree with the representative of the Soviet Union that we do not want to have a forced march. l think that would be very unfortunate. l am always willing to extend the courtesy of a delay whenever a valid reason is given for delay. 197. l will say to the representative of Lebanon that l do not care whether ît is politics or not. That.,is bis business. If he has a political motive, that is up· ta mm. But l have listened very carefully to bis argument in favour of delay. The only argument he made is that the text has only been available since yesterday morning. l think that is a very technical argument. Not only has thesubject been before us since 27 Octoberbut the text in essence became available to the parties last Friday night. A few little words may have been changed here and there but the essence of the text, which we as reasonable men and not as quibblers or as pettifoggers should realize, ,became available last Fridaynight. Very few changes·were made•.and those were made available to the parties the night before last, that is, Tuesday night. 198. In viewof the length oCtime that this has been in his possession, it is hard to believe that a gentleman as distinguished and as erudite as the representative.of Lebanon reaHy needs much more. time. Now, l have no desire to preclude him from speakingas. long as he wants ta, However, l do agree with the representanve of the.Soyiet Union in my willingness ta hold con- tinUOtlS sessions - even four times a day, as l think he said. -It would be setting an example to the world of expedition and efficient action. if we were to meet to- 42 parle~ ensuite. 195. M. HOPPENOT (France) : Je tiens simplement à faire remarquer que s'il est un Mhat pour lequel on ne peut pas être accusé, ainsi que paraissaient l'insinuer certains membres du Conseil, de précipitation, c'est bien celui-là. Nous en -sommes à la neuvième ou à la dixième séance pour examiner la même question, et nous enten- dons toujours la répétition de ce qui s'est dit à la séance précédente. Aujourd'hui, par exemple, nous avons entendu deux interventions longues et intéressantes certes, mais qui ne nous ont apporté.aucun élément nouveau. Si cette procédure doit se poursuivre indéfi-' niment, je n'y vois, pour ma part, aucune objection; mais, dans ce cas, il ne vaut pas la peine de précipiter la discussion en tenant, par exemple, deux séances demain et une samedi, si nous deyons quand même nous réunir dans la semaine de N0~i. Dans ce cas, je serais d'avis de ne tenir demain après-midi -qu'une séance au terme de laquelle nous fixerions la date de la prochaine réunion; 196. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (tradu-it de l'anglais) : Je disais que je pense, comme le repré- 'sentant de l'Union soviétique, qu'il ne faut pas étudier la question à marches forcées. Je pense que ce serait regrettable. Je suis toujours prêt à accorder un délai lorsqu'il ya, ,'our cela, des raisons valables. 197. Je dira.: au représentant du Liban que je ne me souciepoint de savoirsi c'est là ou non de la politique. C'est là son affaire. S'il a en vue un motif politique, cela le regarde. Mais j'ai écouté avec attention ce qu'il a oit en faveur d'un délai. Son -seul.argument valable, c'est que le texte ne nous a été comn;:lUniqué qu'hier matin. A mon avis, il s'agit d'un argument tout à fait tech- nique. D'abord, nous 'sommes saisis de la question depuis le 27 octobre, et de plus l'essentiel du texte a été remis aux parties vendredi dernier, dans la soirée. Il sè peut que, çà et là, quelques mots aient été changés, mais l'essentiel du texte ~ nous devons le reconnaître si nous nous conduisons en gens raisonn,ables etsi nous ne coupons pas les cheveux en quatre-nous a été com- muniqué vendredi soir. Les rares changements appor~és ont été communiqués aux parties'avant-hier soir, c'est- à-dire mardi soir. . 198. Etant donné tout le temps dontil a·déjà disposé, j'ai de la peine à croire qu'un collègue aussi distingué et aussi érudit que le représentant du Liban ait en.core besoin de beaucoup de temps. Je n'ai certes nul désir de l'empêcher de parler aussi 'longtemps qu'il le veut. Mais, comme le représentant de l'Union soviétique, je suis prêt à accepter des séances continuelles - quatre fois par jour auhesoin, comme il l'a .dit, si je ne me trompe. Nous donnerions a:: monde un exemple de rapidité et de diligence si nous nous réunissions demain 204. On the other hand, it is not true that we were told then that that text was like the law of the Medes and Persians and that it could not he altered in any essential sense. On the contrary, we were told that the whole idea of putting this text into our hands in time for us to consider it was that we might be able to confer with the sponsors about it, which we took the liberty and the pleasure of doing over the week-end and during the first two days of this week - and l am very sure that Mr. Eban a.,d his friends did the same thing. 205. Therefore, it cannot be said that either we or our governments had the slightest inkling, until the night before last, at exactly 6.17 p.m., when a gentleman now seated at this table rang me up and toId me 50, that the text was to be substantially as we had seen it on Friday last. That was the first time l knew about the finality of the tex:t. As l have said, thaï was the night before last. Will the Government of the United States, which hat! given this matter days and weeks of consideration before making up its mind about it, begrudge us at least .two or three days to consider it before we reallycome ta a decision as ta whether we accept it or not? 206. It is not true that, if we were given ·fuis text last week - and it is quite true thaï we were given it at that time - our governments had thè final word abGut it before yesterday. Our goverrnrents knew nothing until yesterday about the final text to he voted on. Therefore, my request tS perfectly reasonable, and l am very sure that the reasonable representative of the United States will admit - politics or no politics- that my motives are 'luite weIl founded and will grant me the possibility of not üeing able to act on the matter before Monday. 207. l had made sorne kind of suggestion berore that we meet tomorrow afternoon. l will· be very frank with . i Al&EHTIlIA-Al&EHllNE . Editorial Sudamericana S.it... Alsina 500. 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Univ...ldeci. ilar.elon•• Les <::omll'lalldllS litdemandes de renseisnamenls émana,nt de pays cô il n'existe pas encor. d'Of dé~sttalres ,zeuvent être adress~s il ICI Section deG vellf.es ai de la di$i!)lj- tian, QrganlsGtion des Nations Unies, New-York (Etats- Unis d'Amérique) ou à IQI Section des Ve~~9S, OllJanlsa. Jion des NatlOl'lS Unlet, Palais· des Nations, Genêvet (Suisse). (1312) Q-9480-Ma-y 1954--1,600