S/PV.656 Security Council

The Council has before it three clraft resolutions [S/3151/Rev.2, S/3152 and S/3166], submitted by members of this Council in connexion with this item. 2. Je me réfère à nouveau à l'article 20 du règl..-nent intérieur provisoire, et je demande au représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande de bien vouloir me remplacer au fauteuil présidentiel, afin de me permettre de prèndre part aux déba-ts en qualité de membre du Conseil. Aux termes de l'article 20, si le Président du Conseil estime qu'il doit s'abstenir de diriger les débats, il fait part de sa décision au Conseil. Je me conforme donc aux terines . de cet article. M. Munro (N.ouvelle-Zélande) prend place att jau- teuil présidentiel. . Sur lJinvitation. du Président par intérim, M. EbanJ représentant d'Israël, et M. Zeineetdine,·représentant de la Syrie, prennent place à la table du Conseil. 3. Le PRESilDENT PAR INTERIM (traduit de l'anglais): Le Conseil va maintenant reprendre la dis- cussion générale. On se rappellera qu'au cours de cette discussion, le dernier oroteur a été le représenta:nt du Brésil. D'autres membres du Conseil désirent-ils pren- dre la parole au cours de la discussion générale? 2. l wish once again to invoke rule 20 of our pro- visional rules of procedure and to ask the representative of New Zealand to replace me in the Chair, while l ta:ke his place as a member of the Council during the debate on this item. According to rule 20, if the President cleems that he should not preside over the Council, he shall indicate his decision to the Council, :l.11d that l am now doing. 3, The ACTING PRESIDENT: The Council will now resume the general debate. Tt will be recalled that the last speaker in the general debate was the represen- tative of Bra:zil. Is there any other member of the Coun- cil who desires to take part in the ,general debate? 4. Comme il ne semble pas y avoir d'autres membres du Conseil qui désirent prendre part à la discussion gé- 1 4. As there does not appear to he any other member of the Council w.ho wishes to take part in the general Présidmt: M. Charles M:ALIK (Liban). Ordre du jourproVlsOlre (S/Agenda/656) Adoption de l'ordre du jour La question de Palestine 6. W·hat are the drinciple features of the question now before the counci!? Last September. under the spon- sorship of the I rael Water Planning Corporation Limited, work was begun in the de' .lÎlitarized zone on a canal project and arried on for' ,me time without the knowledge of Gert raI Bennike. N'hen he did learn of the project and r .quested that work upon it be sus- pended, that requeet was not complied with, at least until after the matter ·ad been brought before the Security Council by Syria. his, of course, is the reas,}n why the Council was seiz cl of this item. We join with other members who 1 st year expressed satisfaction with Israe1's action in giving assurances that work on the canal project wo d be suspellded pending consideration of the question b the Coun :1. But the opinion has been expressed that, e en from the point of view of Israel's own interests, th fact that the work was not suspended earlier was unwi e and regrettable, for the Council was then faced not , ith the question whether this project was in order. but with the question of failure to comply with a request from the Chairman of the Mixed Armis- tice CommissioI" This is a view with which, after care- fuI examination of the explanations given by Israel, I feel bound to agree. It has also been contended that the Cûuncil is entitled ta expect that work on the scheme will not he resumed without the authorization of Gen- eral Bennike. With that contention also 1 am bound ta agree. It is of cardinal importance that the authority of the United Nations in Palestine be respected by the parties. My delegation feels strongly that any party to an armistice -agreement not only has an obligation to c01;'lply with the decisions of the Chairman of the :M;ixed Armistice Commission, but would be weIl advised ta keep him informed - before and DOt after the event- of any significant activity which it proposed to under- take in, or encroaching on, a demilitarized zone. This Council, for its part, must, where necessary, provide the required backing for the decisions of the Chief of Staff and, where appropriate, offer guidance and direction. I welcome and I support fully those provisions of the three-Power drnft resolution [S/1151/Rev.2] which confirm the action taken by General Bennike last year in calling for a cessation of work and which call on the parties to respect his authority in the future. 7. Although this is our first dutY-- if I may use the words of the representative of France, our very obvious duty - it would, l feel, be an unduly restrictive inter- pretation of the United Nations' special responsibilities in relation to Palestine to argue that this was our only 8. In this case we have a project, the economic value of which has been cogently argued by the delegation of Israel and, indeed, can in itself hardly be cha1lenged. Objections have, however, been raised on other grounds. What is needed i8 to determine whether the project can be recondled with the Armistice Agreement and the rights and interests of the parties. 9. Before this question of principle can he detennined, a numher of practical questions require examination. One important question is wbether existing Syrian rights to Jordan water, principally for the irrigation of tue Buteiha Farm, can be protected. In his letter of 20 Octoher 1953 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel [S/3122, annex III] General Bennike expressed his conviction that "unless definite obligations were entered into to pro'tect existing water rights" the project would leave the present river-bed with very little, if any, water during the dry season. In his intervention in the debate on 30 October [633rd meeting], however, the representative of Israel said that he was empowered to express his Government's readiness ta enter into such obligations and to embody them in a formaI instrument which could, if necessary, be invoked internationally by the parties concerned. Thus, although it was General Bennike's view that there was in this respect a potential 1 Voir Procès-verbmlx officiels dtl Conseil de sécltrité, qua- trième année, Supplément spécial No 2. 3 10. If the three-Pûwer draft resolution [S/3151/Rev. 2] is adopted - and l profoundly hope that it will be- General Bennike will no doubt examine, in accordance with paragraph 10 of that resolution, not only the im- mediate implications of the canal project but also the ultimate effects of Israel plans for the utilization of the diverted water. The results of this examination and the nature of the guarantees and safeguards which may be agreed upon will also be relevant factors in the final determination by General Bennike of the other principal issue raised by him - the difficult question whether the construction of the canal would so alter the military situation as ta infringe the relevant provisions of the Armistice Agreement. 11. 1'0 resolve these problems requires, in our opin- ion, further examination on the spot, with the aid of expert advice on the technical questions involved. The Council, l feel, is not at present in a position to pass judgment on the substance of the item. In these cir- cumstances, l agree with the view that the question should now be referred back to General Bennike, that he should he authorized to take the steps proposed in pan>graph 8 of the three-Power dr:::.ft resolution and that he should be asked to report back to the Ccuncil after an appropriate interval. If we take this action promptly l suggest that there is some ground for optimism that a solution can be found which will satisfy the legitimate interests of both Israel and Syria. 12. A comparison LJ the suc<,essive versions of the three-Power draft resolution, induding the revision now before the Cound1, will show the pains which the sponsors have taken in an effort to meet, within the framewûrk of the essential principles to which l have referred, the varying points of view expressed during the debate. No doubt the revised draft resolution does not fully satis.fy either party. Substantial improvements have nevertheless been made. In my opinion the present tex! is well adapted ta the needs of the situation, and my ·delegarion therefore favours its adoption. 13. I must emphasize, however, that this attitude has been determined on the assumption that the draft reso- lution as a whole would be adopted - and l repeat that l profoundly hope that it will be adopted. Somedelega- tions have expressed eriticism of certain paragraphs and have asked for a vote paragraph by paragraph. It is still iny hope and expectation that the draft resolution as a whole will be adopted. But if one or more vital para- graphs were not to receive the necessary votes a new situation would, of cou:se, arise, and my delegation might have to reconsider its position. 14. As ACTING PRESIDENT I should like to re- mind the members of the Council that the representative of Lebanon asked to be heard further in regard to this matter - not, as l understand it, in the course of the general debate, but on a procedural matter. l therefore calI upon the representative of Lebanon.

1 understand that the representative of Lebanon wishes ta speak on the point of arder raised by the Soviet Union representa- tive. 1 therefore caU on the representative of Lebanon. 17. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : 1 shaU be glad ta yield ta Mr. Vyshinsky, if he wishes ta speak before 1 do. My point of 'Order, however, is this: ta my knowl- edge, no t ne has sa far moved that the general debate should be closed. Furthermore, the Acting President has just made a statement in the general debate. Jbviously, we are quite entitled to comment on that statement, because he introduced very important points of sub- stance. 1 myself jotterl down a number of points that 1 wished ta raise - preeisdy in refutation of some oi his own theories. My intention, therefore, was ta make a substantive, not a procedural, statement. As 1 have sakI, 1 believe that a substantive statement is called for precisely because of what the Acting President has just tc/Id the ·Couneil on behalf of his Government. 18. Thus, as 1 ttnderstand the procedural situation, there has never been a motion ta close the general de- bate ; no one has suggested that the general debate should be closed or that the list of speakers should be closed. Even, however, if there had been such a suggestion, 1 think the situation is now somewhat different. The Acting President has just made a very important state- ment in which he has raised some iplportant questions of substance, and it is only fair that we should be given the opportunity to comment on them in full.

As bath the repre- sentative,of Lebanon and the representative of the Soviet Union wish ta continue ta take part in the general debate, 1 propose, of course, to allow them ta do sa. My understanding of the procedure of the Security Couneil is that it has been the custom for the President or the Acting President to speak last in the debate, but that is, as 1 understand, merely a custom, and, of course, if any member.' desires ta speak substantively in reply to what the President or the Acting President has said, that is not only the privilege but the right of members of the Council. The representativ.e of the Soviet Union prob- ably will not ûbject if 1 calI first upon the representativr, of Lebanon, and then upon him, or, if these two repre- sentatives, so agree, 1 will calI first upon the representa- tive of the Soviet Union. 20. MI'.· VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated front Russian) : In the first place 1 must point out· that lassumed that the statement was made n0t by the President or the Acting President but, as he said himself, by the New Zealand representative. 22. Ml'. ChaFles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 wish to thanl.. the Acting Pl'esident for ailowing ml" to speak in the general debate, and 1 wish to thank Mi. Vyshinsky for aIlowing me to speak first, although, as 1 have said, I would gladly have yielded to him. However, since the Acting President has caUed upon me first, 1 will con- tinue with my ~tatement. 23. As 1 listened to the representative of New Zealand, I jotted clown a few ideas which I think are worthy of stFess at this stag~ in 3. commentary upon some (Jf the points which the Acting President raised. 24. The representative of New Zealand spoke of interim arrangements in the Armistice Agreements which, if persisted in, might then he invested "with a permanence never intended for them". Of course, 1 am quoting roughly from his statement, but I think that was the sense of what he said. This l'aises the thesis which Ml'. Eban and other representatives of Israel have been constantly hammering upon here in the Council and out- side, narnely, that it is time for Israel to pass fronl the present situation in which it finds itself to something of a more permanent settlement hetween itself and the l'est of the Arab world in the midst or which it is situated. 25. This is an interesting point of view. It is certainly a c@rrect reading of the text of the Armistice Agree- ments. These phrases exist there, but 1 say with aIl respect to the representative of Israel, ta you as repre- sentative of New Zealand and to others who have also repeated this thesis time and again, that merely to go on repeating it without putting forward constructive ideas as ta how this passage from a temporary state of afiairs tO a more permanent settlement 'can be effected is not going ta bring about a settlement. Merely ta hope that by some magic the non-permanence of a certain arrangement can be transformed into a more permanent arrangement is not going ta bring about that trans- formation. 26. Dering the last few months, 1 have repeatedly stated what are some of the conditions on which the Arab world might accept a modus vivendi with Israel. I have not heard a single ward in reply to any of the suggestions I put forward either from the representative of Israel, from you, the representative of New Zealand, or from any other representative. If you or others here representing the;r own countries think that Israel can get away with what it has already got, completely un- conditionaIly, and without making costly concessions to its own world with which it wants a permanent settle- ment, then let me tell you in aIl frankness that you are aIl mistaken. This is never going to come about. Con- sequently, it would be very weIl for aIl of us - Israelis, Arabs, non-Israelis and non-Arabs - to ponder these matters and not to go on repeating this formula which Israel has dinned into the ears and minds of sorne 6 110 party was entitled to hold up a development project l1ntil that project had received its assent. That is the ic1ea of the veto. It involves the notion that Syria cannat interfere with what Israel wishes ta do in the demili- tarized zone. But this again repeats a thesis which Israel has put fo!'ward without the necessary balance. If it is not right for either State to veto the Q,.;velopment pro- jects planned by the other State, l suggest - and this has also been stated by practically everybody - that it is equally true that neither State has allY right ta go ahead with any unilateral changes within the demili- tarized zone which affect the treaties with respect ta that demilitarized zone. l suggest, therefore, that the bogey veto is counterbalanced by the ward "unilateral"; that if Syria does not have the right ta veto, Israel by the same token has no right ta unilateral action in the demili- tarized zone. l should have wished everybody to stress these two aspects, that neither State has the right ta veto provided neither State has the right ta any unilateral action which will affect the status of the clemilitarized zone. 28. The third remark l \\-ish to make is with respect ta your statement on hehalf of New Zealand alx.:.tt the preservation of the rights and interests of both parties. You said that that was all that was really involved. l ~OTee. But who is going ta determine the rights and interests of both parties? It is certainly not a third party. They themselves can determine it. It is up ta Israel to determine its own rights and interests, and up ta Syria to do the same. Let them meet together under the machinery that is already in existence and see if they cannot come ta an agreement. If they cannot come to an agreement with the mediation and help of the ct ief of Staff, then the Security Couneil might be seized with the non-agreement that would then result and something might be done about it My point is that, at this stage in the development of this affair, it is not right nor is it fair ta allow any third party, even the Chief of Staff himself, to detennine what are the rights and interests of both parties. He should try to bring them together within the existing machinery and see what can he done about reaching an agr~ement between them. 29. Fourthly, you repeated a phrase that has been repeated many times by the representative of Israel and other speakers, namely, "whether existing Syrian rights ... can be protected". And you said hopefully and optimistically that, from your reading of the statements of the representative of Israei, you saw no reason why these existing Syrian rights could not be protected; or at least you hope that they could give the necessary satisfaction ta General Bennike when they negotiate with him a'bout these rights. This begs a very important question. The point îs that we radically reject the posi- tion that Syria has only rights that may he termed, simply and purely, existing rights in the Jordan. We 30. The fifth point is that the representative of New Zealand has certainly every right ta appeal to the mem- bers of the Council to vote in favour of the various para- graphs of the three-Power draft resolution, and the representative of the United Kingdom has every right ta do so, as he did yesterday when l asked for a vote by division. But thè whole idea of requesting action on a te.,t by dividing it into paragraphs is ta give complet~ freedom to members ta use their own judgmer.t in voting upon each paragraph on its own merits. If, by appealing to members. we tie their hands with respect ta certain paragraphs which otherwise they would c~r­ tainly have turned down, then this is not a genuine voting by division. 'Consequently, as l have said, while the representatives of New Zealand and the United KingdoIl1 have every right to appeal to the members of the Conncil ta vote for every comma of this te.'(:t, l have the same dght ta appeal to the members of the Council to vote a[;.linst thern. In particular, l would be 1710st happy - again following Mr. Munro's own appeal- if paragraphs 3, 8 and 10 were rejected, 'because l think, as l said yesterday, that they are texts that are ob- jectionable from many points of view which l have previously had the honour ta indicate to the Council. 31. FinaUy, l cannot help feeling that there are five points which the representative of New Zealand did not suffiçiently take into account in the formulation of his position. l say that with aU respect and with the sure knowledge that the delegation of New Zealand has studied this matter thoroughly and has come ta its po- sition after the fuUest and most consdentious study of this question. But l still have the feeling that there are five viewpoints that have O'ot been sufficiently taken into account. 32. First, there are rights to these waters that are held neither by Israel nor by Syria. These rights are the rights of the Palestinian Ar~b refugees: they have a greater right to these waters than either Israel or Syria. We would be most grateful to the representative of New Zealand and to other members of the Council if they would keep that point in mind. If you are going ta make it possible by international action for these poor people who have been driven from their homes, whi~h they have occupied for thousands of years, ta lose any rights t.e these waters, which are their waters, then you will have compounded the international injustice that has been committed in that part of the world. 33. The second point is that the whole issue revolves around the question whet~ler signifit:.'ant alterations in the statusof the demilitarized zone will be effected by the project which Israel now haa in mind and which it started to execute. And l suggest that we have done our best to urge - although we regret we have O'ot con- vinced sorne people - that in three é ~ificant respects the status of the demilitarized zone will be altered, and that this is not aUowable under the Armistice Agree- ment. First, it will be altered from the mŒtary point of view, to which the representative of New Zealand and , " . 33. Le deuxième point est le suivant: le problème tout entier évolue autour de la question de savoir si les tra- vaux qu'Israël a l'intention d'exécuter et qu'il a même commencé de réaliser, sont de nature à apporter des mo- difications importantes au statut de la zone démilitarisée. J'estime que nous avons fait tout notre possible pour prouver - bien que nous regrettions de n'avoir pu con- vaincre certains - que, sous trois aspects importants, le statut de la zone déniilitarisée va être modifié en viola- tion de la Convention d'armistice. Tout d'abord, ce statut sera modifié du point de vue militaire, ce à quoi 34. The third point which, 1 suggest with all respect, the representative of New Zealand has not taken stLffi- ciently into account is the fact that this case is en'tirely different from the former case dealing with the Huleh marshes. The representative of New Zealand did not enter into that point at all. But 1 must stress again- and we have tried to prove this at length - that we are dealing with 1\vo entirely different cases, since the present case has to do with the demilitarized zone whereas the Huleh case did not have to do with the clemilitarized zone except in a very unimportant respect. 35. The representative of New Zealand spoke in his statement about co-operative regional development. Those mav not be the exact words that he used, but he said som~thing to the effect that he wanted ta see schemes brought about there that might induce regional co-operation. 36. The representacive of the United States also im- plied that in some of his statements. We all know that the policy of the United States is to ascertain whether such regional co-{)perative schemes are possible. Again, Ml'. Acting President, 1 suggest that it is in the nature of a joke - 1 would not put it higher than that - to say, on the one hand, that you believe in this, and on the other hand, ·to pursue policies or allow policies to be pursued which will unclermine this possibility. Either 37. l say this \Vith 0.11 due respect. But these matters must be stressed and they must be brought out into the open because they are of the utmost importance and touch upon the essence of this whole question. 38. Finally, there in the questi~n of sovereignty. It is all very well to say that Syria should not veto develop~ ment plans that have great economic significante for Israel, if not also for the whole area. It 1s, as l say, 0.11 very well to say that, and it is a commendable thing. But the whole point is that Israel has no more right ta the demilitarized zone than Syria has. If Israel has the right to prosecute plans and schemes in the demilitarized zone, then sa has Syria. Throughout past à~bates of the Security Council it has been affirmed, time and again, that the question of sovereignty over the demilitarized zone is to be left completely in abeyance until a final settlement is reached. It was, l believe, the representa~ tive of Turkey himself who, during his country's pre~ vious term of office as a member of the Council, made that point very clear, and who said, if l remember cor~ rectly, that sa far as concerned sovereignty in the demilitarized zone there was no question at 0.11 of either of the two States claiming more sovereignty than the other. Of course, we 0.11 know - although l do not want ta go into this - that Israel daims complete sovereignty over the zone and. in faet, exercises that sovereignty white we sit around here without saying a word to Israel about that point. But is a point that has already been thoroughly proved by the Council: neither of these two Stgtes has more daim to sovereignty over this piece of land than has the other until a final settlement is reached. 39. l submit, therefore, that account should be taken of these five fundamental principles which' as the Acting President has said, we have been trying for the past three months to expound before the Council. They are, first, that the Palestinian Arab refugees have the prior right to these waters - a right prior to any that either Israel or Syria has; second, that there are fundamental alterations in the status of the demilitarized zone, altera- tions which affect the military situation and Syria's potential rights, and which might prejudice the final settlement when the time ror that settlement cornes; third, that we are dealing with a case cntirely different from that of the Huleh case; fourth, that it is absolutely useless ta hope for any kind of regional co-operative development scheme there while at the same time allow- ing Israel to go ahead \Vith its scheme; and, fifth, that Israel has no sovereignty over the zone which is not also enjoyed by Syria. 40. l have made this rapid review of the situation because l was inspired to do so br what the Acting President said, and because l would dare to hope very sincerely that if these points of view were sufficiently taken into account he would vote against the projeet which he now says he intends to support. 41. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): l have already [ 42. What is the reason underlying the Soviet Union's negative approach to the revised three-Power draft reso- lution? Why do we consistently urge the Security Coun- cil ta agree with our point of view, which may be briefly summec1 up in the assertion that draft resolution sub- mittOO by France, the Uni,tec1 Kingdom and the United States cannat be considered a satisfactory solution ta the question before the Council? 43. In answering this question 1 must point out that, as sorne other members of the Security Council have said already - inchlding if 1 understood correctly, Mr. Munro, who spoke here today - it has not been denied that the three-Power draft resolution does not satisfy any of the parties who are most concerned and most c10sely interestec1 in the solution of the dispute now being discussOO by the Council. 44. 'We insist that this draft resolution is reaUy ab- solutely unsatisfactory if we consider the problems which should he settled. It is unsatisfactory if only be- cause it constitutes an attempt to by-pass the question of the dispute which led the representatives of Israel and, Syria to seek the help of the Security Council. More- over, those who are prepared to support the draft reso- lution, and who even express their certainty that it i5 acceptable to aU members of the Security Council, give to their interpretation and conception of the draft reso- lution a direction contrary, in our opinion, to the funda- mental principles which should guide the Security Council in settling such problems - the principles of international law and the principles laid dOWll in the United Nations Charter. 45. The position of the Soviet Union in this matter is detennined primarily by the principles in issue. We seek a realistic and, as far as possible, a complete settlement of this dispute. We strongly advocate such a settlement, since we feel that it is the only just and true settlement. Any other would he only a paper settlement, adoptOO for the sake of ac10pting a resolution; ÏJt would not help to settle this question, and could not eliminate the fric- tion and subsequent c1ifficulties which will inevitahly arise in the demi1itarized zone in the relations between the two States which that zone is intended to protect from future clashes, misunderstandings and complica- tions. This is true because the resolution fails to elim- inate the root cause of these misunderstandings. That is why we feel that this draft resolution does not provide any firm guarantee which would remove or promote the removal of possible friction and misunderstandings- that is to say, a guarantee of the kind envisaged by the general principles of international law and the United Nations Charter. 48. Secondly, we are confronted in the present case with a situation in which it is impossible without the agreement of bath sides ta maintain normal conditions in the demilitarized zone or to eliminate those mis- understandings which are inevitable if these normal con- ditions are disturbed. 49. In this case we must first turn ta the document ,vhich l would calI the most important, the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt. If we examine that Agreement, we shaH see that it is impos- sible ta reconcile it and the principles which, as we understand - of course, l must emphasize, as we under- stand - are at the basis of the whole General Agree- ment with what has been said here, especlaHy by the representat;,re of New Zealand, to the effect that any work may be undertaken in the demilitarized zone whether the other side agrees ta such work or not. Thus, for instance, any work can be undertaken by Syria whether or not it is acceptable to Israel, whet:her or not Israel agrees that it is necessary and possible, and whether or not Israel has any objections. To take another example, Israel also may undertake any work in the demilitarized zone irrespective of the views of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and so f0rtn regarding that work. 50. .1 consider such an attitude to be incorrect. We do not agree that the Chief of Staff, even as Chairman of the Mixed Commiasion, should be given a free hand ta take any decision which he considers necessary, expe- client or useful without taking into accoun~ the opinion of either party. Hence it is even conceivable that the Chief of 'Staff may, as is proposed in this case, take measures, as is openly stated here, with which neit.her 1 party, neither Israel nor Syria, is in agreement. l think thàt such a wide interpretation of the powers of the Chief of Staff and even of the Chairman of the Mixed Commission does not comply even with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, not to mention the general principles of internationallaw. On the contrary, the General Armistice Agreement is based mainly on the principle of mutual agreement. 51. If we turn ta the agreement itself and, in par- ticular, to article VU, we shaH see that the execution of the provisions of the agreement is ta be supervised, not only by the Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Com- mission, but also, as is stated in paragraph 1 of the article, by the whole Mixed Armistice Commission, which, of course, has been organized in a manner aiso laid down in the Agreement. 53. 1 have dealt with two points connected with article VII. 54. Let us now turn to article VIII. The Armistice Agreement can of course be revised. In what circum- stances? Again, it is specificaHy stated in g,rticle VIII, paragraph J, that the Agreement may be revised "by mutual consent". The Agreement cannat be r'evised without the mutual consent of the parties. If you turn ta article V you will see that the same principle is stated in paragraph 1 and again in paragraph 2. As we know, article V is devoted to the special demarcation line, but it stresses that the mIe which determines the. status of the demilitarized zone, and the arrangements which, for exanlple, determine the armistice demarcation line and also the line in the demiHtarized zone and various other provisions relating ta it, are accepted by agreement "between the Israeli and Syrian armed forces" and are not to he interpreted otherwise. Hence the principle of unanimity lies at the very basis of this provision also. 55. This is. quite understandable, because under the Secur.ity Council resolution of 16 November 1948 [5/1080] .it was decided that the demarcation line should be established for the purpose of separating the armed forces of. the two parties, in such a manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident while providing for the graduaI restoration of normal civilian life in the demilitarized zone. Thus the very process of restoring normal conditions in the demilitarized zone depends on the measures which will he taken - as re- sults directly from article V, paragraph 2 of the Armis- tice Agreement - by agreement between the two parties. 56. Who can deny after aU this that the question of the cutting of a canal against the protests of Syria cannot he dealt with outside the context of these provisions, but must he considered in connexion with the restoration of normal economic, and hence political, conditions in that demilitarized zone? 57. Thus articles V, VH and VIII, or at any rate various paragraphs of these long, important and funda- mental articles (eight in all), provide that the unanimity of the parties is a generally binding and fully acknowl- edged principle' without which the demilitarized zone cannat subsist, withottt which it cannot remain a demili- , 13 otrancher à sa guise les questions qui se posent. Lorsqu'il se révèle impossible d'aboutir à un accord sur la base du principe de l'unanimité qui est reconnu par tous et qu'il faut respecter, les décisions sont prises à la majo- rité. On ne peut s'écarter du principe de l'unanimité qu'au profit de la majorité, mais non au profit du Prési- dent, et on ne peut le faire que lorsqu'une décision una- nime se révèle impossible. 53. Voilà ce qui ressort de deux paragraphes de l'arti- cle VII. 54. Passons maintenant à l'article VIII. La Conven- tion d'armistice peut, bien entendu, faire l'objet d'une revision. Mais quelles en sont les modalités? Le para- graphe 3 de l'article VHI précise que les parties peuvent reviser la Convention "par consentement mutuel". Sans consentement mutuel des parties, il ne saurait y avoir de revision. Si vous passez maintenant à l'article V, vous verrez que ses paragraphes 1 et 2 font une fois de plus état de ce même principe. Comme on le sait, l'arti- cle V ne traite que de la ligne de démarcation. Toute- fois, on y insiste tout particulièrement sur le fait que les clauses relatives au statut de la zone démilitarisée, les dispositions régissant par exemple le tracé de la ligne de démarcation et les limites de la zone démilitarisée, ainsi que toutes mesures intéressant cette zone, doivent être adoptées conformément aux arrangements conclus "entre les forces armées syriennes et israéliennes" et ne sauraient être interprétées autrement. Cet article repose donc lui aussi sur le principe du consentement mutuel. 55. Cela est parfaitement naturel d'ailleurs, car, par la résolution du Conseil de sécurité en date du 16 novembre 1948 [5/1080], il a été décidé de créer la ligne de démarcation précisément pour séparer les forces armées des deux parties et réduire ainsi les possi- bilités d'incidents et de froissements tout en permettant le rétablissenlent graduel de la vie civile normale dans la zone démilitarisée. Par conséquent, le rétablissement de la situation normale dans la zone démilitarisée dépend des mesures qui doi·vent être prises - ainsi que cèla ressort du paragraphe 2 de l'article V de la Convention d'armistice - par consentement mutuel des parties. 56. Qui donc peut soutenir, dans ces conditions, que la question du creusement du canal, malgré la plainte de la Syrie, peut être examinée en dehors du cadre de ces dispositions, et sans que l'on prenne en considéra- Lion le rétabli.,:;ement d'une situation normale sur le plan économique, et par conséquent sur le plan politique, dans cette zone démilitarisée? 57. Ainsi, les différents paragraphes des articles V, VII et VIII en tout cas -trois articles importants et fondamentaux, dans l'ensemble des huit articles- montrent qùe l'accord 'mutuel des parties est un principe universellement reconnu et obligatoire, sans lequel la zone démilitarisée ne peut subsister, ne peut être main- ~greeing.on these possibilities with the parties concern- ing in this matter. The paragraph goes on to say "ta take such steps" - that is, not steps, but measures whkh the Chief of Staff may consider expedient for achievirJg the reconciliation, once again without the agreement of the two parties concerned and without asking their opinion or taking action only after it is ascertained whether the parties concerned agree or disagree with the position taken by the Chief of Staff. 60. Those who defend the draft may, of course, find this fully adequate and satisfactory. But l am now e..'l:- plaining our position, and we cannat agree with this. 61. We consider that the basic task of the Security Council does not consist in, vulgarly speaking (you must pardon me for this turn of phrase), "passing thé buck" ta the Chief of Staff and saying that he can do as he likes and that the Security Council will stand aside. This is tantamount to recommending tactics whereby the Security Council can avoid the decision of the problems which constitute its fundamental task and the settlement of which is its bounden duty, because to accept a resolu- tion containing such a clause as paragraph 8, which lays ail responsibility on the Chief of Staff personally, with- out the participation of the parties concerned, ta study the question and to take any measures without the par- ticipation of those parties and ta irilplement them with- out s\1ch participation, means that the Security Council is evading the settlement of the question and is standing aside, having delegated ev~rything, including the respon- sibility, to the Chief of Staff. 62. Of course, it wauld he incorrect if the l'ole of the Chief of Staff were reduced ta that of a simple executor. Of course it would be incorrect ta assume that the Chief of Staff has no right to take any measures, and sa forth. The Chief of Staff is an important political figure and theCouncil, to which he is responsible should, ror this reason, protect the rights of the Chief of Staff, while remaining mindful of the responsibilities which have been entrusted ta him. ; 65. At this point, however, 1 con-~der that we have just snch a case. "\le have a Mixed Armistice Commis- sion and we have a Chief of Staff. The two parties are represented in the Mixed Armistice Commission. It appears perfectly normal and natural to allow those par- ties to settle the problem by mutual agreement. 66. 1 believe that this would also fully comply with our Charter, because the Charter i,tself states that the parties smuId achieve the settlement of disputes by their own efforts, while the Security Council's dutY is to promote the pacific settlement of disputes and to assist parties which take action in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter It is directly stated in that article that the parties must "first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitra- tion ..." and so on. 67. Surely none of the things 1 have mentioned can take place ,vithout mutual consent. Doès the three- Power draft resolution really express the principle of rnutual consent? 68. 1 understand that in the circumstances outlined by the New Zealand representative today the measures which the Chief of Staff rnight consider appropriate in the demilitarized zone would not necessarily have to be approved by the parties concerned. That is not right. 'vVe, at least, take an entirelydifferent view. We con- sider that every step which the Chief of Staff can and should take must be approved by the parties concerned. 69. Of course à. situation might conceivahly arise in which the Chief of Staff would take a decision without any agreement. "Vhat would be the result of such a move? If the decision were not acceptable to.one or other 'of the parties, that in itself would be a considerable political drawback, since in that case the source of every . oonceivable friction and complication would remain. And if the decision were taken without the agreement of either side, we should be confronted with a triangle with three ullstable angles. That, tao, is an absolutely ab- normal situation. 70. It has been said that paragraph 8 of the draft reso- lution is the most important paragraph; it has been , called the "heart" of the resolution (even if that had not been speci'fically stated, it is clear from the draft resolu- . tion, which except for paragraph 8 contains no serious proposaIs). Paragraph, 8 itself not only fails to meet our point of view op the princip1e of mutual consent to the decisions adopted by the Chief of Staff but is also in- consistent with the circumstance to which 1 drew the 68. Il ne ressort pas obligatoirement de te qu'a dit le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande que le Chef d'état- major doive obtenir l'accord des parties intéressées avant 'de prendte les mesures qu'il peut juger utile d'ap- pliquer dans la zone démilitarisée. C'est là une erreur. Pour notre part, nous avons là-.dessus une opinion dia- métralement opposée. Nous estimons en effet que le Chef d'état-major est précisément tenu d'obtenir l'ac- cord des parties en cause avant de prendre les mesures qu'il peut et doit adopter. 69. Bien entendu, on peut imaginer une situation où le Chef d'état-major prendrait des mesures sans l'assen- timent 'des deux parties. Mais quel en serait le résultat? Si sa décision se trouvait être inacceptable pour l'une des parties intéressées, elle serait entachée d'un très grave défaut politique, car elle serait la source de frois- sements et de complications de toute sorte. Si, d'autre part, il a'doptait sa dédsion sans l'assentiment de l'une ni de l'autre partie, il se créerait un triangle dont les trois sommets seraient extrêmement instables. Une telle situation serait parfaitement anormale. . 70. On a dit ici que le paragraphe 8 du projet de réso- luti'on que nous sommes en train d'examiner en était le point principal, on a même dit le "cœur" du projet. Même si on ne l'avait pas dit, il suffirait de consulter ce texte pour s'en rèndre compte, car, à part le paragraphe 8, le projet de résoluti'on ne contient rien de sérieux. Toutefois, !ce paragraphe 8 ne nous .donne nullement satisfaction. Non seulement il ne prévoit pas que les décisions du Chef d'état-maior· d{)ivent reposer sur le 71. The whole tane of this draft resolution is not in keeping with its purpose, which is to settle this dispute. 72. The matter at issue is Israel's right ta cut a canal. Israel undoubtedly has this right; but it cannot avail itself of the right at the expense of the interests of the other party. The crux of our position is that Israel is carrying out this work in the demilitarized zone and not in its own territory. The Government of Israel is master in its own terl"itory, but there are two masters in the demilitarized zone: the Government of Israel and the Government of Syria. 73. The positions of these two Governments, however, may be so divergent that no common measure can be tak-en. This is the reason for the Mixed Annistice Com- mission; this is the reason for a neutral Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and lastly, this is the reason for the Security Council. 74. l am prepared to admit that they may not have been able to reach any agreement on the spot and that they came to the Security Council. But in any case the Council has no right to send them back whence they came. It has no right to send them away; it must come to sorne decision even if it has to make another attempt to finda solution which would be acceptable to bath parties to the dispute and would not violate the funda- mental principle embodied in the Charter. 75. J'his means that, even leaving aside the present paragraph 8 (formerly paragraph 9), the whole tenor of the draft resolution is such that it cannot be supported by my country. 76. Since mutual consent improves and the lack of it aggr:avates any situation, there can be no objection to the proposaI ta indude in paragraph 8 a dear and brief phrase such as "with the mutual consent of bath parties". ", 77. Let the Chief of Staff explore possibilities and take certain steps in the demilitarized zone, but the words "not only in accordance with the Annistice Agreement, bUit also with the consent of the parties" should be added to the text. " 78. May l say frankly that, were this insertion ac- cepted, we should not oppose the adoption of para- graph 8. But if there is no reference ta mutual conserut: or to tliis important principle, then of course l could never and shall never support any paragraph which would violate Sl1ch an importal1t political prindple. This is also a legal principle, because it ,is a fundamental prin- ciple of internationallaw. 79. l must admit, however, that, precisely because the whole trend of this draft resolution is in the opposite direction, it is generally speaking not in conformity with the position which l have just taken the liberty of defending. That, however, obviously cannot prevent the other members of the SecurityCouncil who share another point of view and who have the, majority re- 76. Si vous estimez que l'accord mutuel facilite les choses alors que l'absence d'un tel accord les complique, vous n'avez pas le droit de vous opposer 'à ce que l'on ajoute au paragraphe 8 la formule nette et claire que voici: "par accord mutuel des parties". 77. Je ne m"oppose pas à ce que le Chef d'état-major prenne des mesures dans la zone démilitarisée, mais je vous demande de faire figurer dans votre texte les mots suivants: "non seulement en conformité de la Conven- tion d'armistice, mais aussi avec l'accord des parties intéressées". 78. Si une telle addition était adoptée, rien dans la po- sition de la délégation de l'URSS ne l'empêcherait de participer à l'adoption du paragraphe 8. Mais, évidem- ment, si ce texte ne prévoit pas l'accord mutuel et s'il néglige de mentionner ce principe fondamental, je ne pourrai jamais appuyer un paragraphe qui viole un prin- cipe politique aussi important et ne l'appuierai pas. Ce principe présente d'ailleurs une très grande importance juridique, car il est à Ja base même du droit inter- national. 79. Je dois dire toutefois que, puisque l'ensemble de ce projet de résolution est orienté dans un sens entière- ment différent de notre façon de voir, il est d'une ma- nière générale incompatible avec la position que je me permets de défendre devant vous. Bien entendu, cela ne devrait pas empêcher les autres membres du Conseil qui pensent différ.emment et qui disposent ici de la majorité 81. Mr. Malik, among others, spoke convincingly on this suhject (1 will not repeat his arguments) when he stressed that even the phrase "full satisfaotion of exist- ing ... rights" was wrong, since, the point at issue being Israel's plans, it referred not to e..xisUing rights but to future rights which Israel would acquire in that zone. It is a question of safeguarding, not rights existing now, . but rather the future rights which Israel would obtain if it carried out its irrigation project. Moreover, Syria would still be left out of the picture, since the draft reso- lution itself makes clear that only "existing rights" must be satisfied. That, of course, is an obvious violation of the principle of the equality of the parties. 82. To everythring that l have just said must be added a further defect, namely that the adoption of a draft resolution like the three-Power draft would fail to eliminate the source of future friction; and this must he tak-en into account by the Security Couneil. There is nothing to guarantee that such friction and other possible ·difficulties will not subsequently arise, since the need for the mutual consent of bath sides to any decision has 'been eliminated and the Security Council has therefore refused to take any dedsion and has tried to shift the task of deosion to the Chief of Staff. 83. AH the considerations which l have just outlined explain my position, as the Soviet representative in the Security Cauneil, towards the three-Power draft reso- lution. 84. l have said on more than one occasion that the hest èourse would be for the authors of this draft resolu- tion not to insist on its being put to the vote but to leave the decision of this question primarily to the joint efforts of the parties directly concerned - Syria and Israel- assisted hy the Chief of Staff. 85. It seems to me in this connexion that the Lebanese dratt resolution [5/3166] conforms more closely to the purposes .and t~sks confronting the Security Council. That delfines my delegation's attitude to the Lebanese draft resolution. 81. C'est un point, parmi d'autres, que M. Malik a démontré de façon suffisamment convaincante (et je ne reprendrai pas ses arguments), lorsqu'il a souligné que la formule même "les droits existants sont sauvegardés" n'était pas correcte: il s'agit, non pas des droits qui existent lorsque les plans actuels d'Israël sont en cause, mais bien des droits futurs que ce dernier obtiendra dans cette zone. Il s'agit, non pas de sauvegarder les droits qui existent actuellement, mais les droits futurs dont Israël bénéficiera lorsqu'il aura exécuté .son plan d'irri- gation. Mais cette possibilité n'existe pas pour la Syrie, car il ressort du texte même du projet de résolution que ce sont seulement les "droits existants" qui doivent être sauvegardés. Il y a là, évidemment, une violation fla- grante du principe de l'égalité des parties. 82. A tous ces défauts s'en ajoute un autre: en adop- tant un projet de résolution tel que celui des trois Puissances, on ne fait pas disparaître la source de nou- veaux désaccords; or, c'est là une question que le Con- seil de sécurité ne peut pas refuser d'examiner. Il n'existe aucune garantie contre l'apparition de tels désaccords et d'éventuelles difficultés, qui, c'est évident, risquent de survenir, car on rejette la nécessité d'un ac- cord des parties intéressées au règlement de cette ques- tion, règlement auquel le Conseil de sécurité, lorsqu~il essaie de con'fier la solution au Chef d'état-major, se refuse par là même à procéder. 83. Toutes les considérations que j'ai exposées expli- quent l'attitude que j'adopte, en tant que représentant de l'Union soviétique au Conseil de sécurité, à l'égard du projet de résolution des trois Puissances. 84. J'ai déclaré plus d'une fois qu'il serait hon que les auteurs de ce projet n'insistent pas pour que l'on vote sur leur texte et laissent avant tout aux parties directe- ment intéressées - la Syrie et Israël- le soin de régler la question grâce à leurs efforts concertés avec le con- cours du Chef d'état-major. 85. A cet égard, nous seni.ble-t-il, le projet de résolu- tion présenté par le Liban [5/3166] répond mieux aux buts et aux fonctions du Conseil de sécurité. Telle est l'attitude de ma délégation touchant le projet de réso- lution du Liban. 88. Furthermore, it is clear, at anyrate it is clear ta us, from article V of the General Armistice Agreement that it is the Chief of Staff who is made responsihle for the general supervision of the demilitarized zone. 89. At this time, of course, l cannot quote the whole of article V, 'but it is sufficient for me to quote para..; graph 5 (c) of that article, which reads : "The Cha"irman of the Mixed Armistice Commis- si0I!' establi~hed in article VII of this Agreement and Umted Nattons observers attached to the Commission shal1 be re3ponsible for ensuring the full implementa- tion of this article." l should have thought that that was as clear as anyt!ling could be. Unrler this article, the Chief of Staff has authority, and even -Mr. Vyshinsky cannot pretend that that authority is vested in somebady else. Tt is not a question of a majority vote or anything like that it is a question, in the last resort, of the Chief of Staff's ~uthor­ ity in the demilitarized zone. 90. Again, Mr. Vyshinsky seemed to make great play with paragraph 4 of article VII, which he read out, and to this paragraph l shall also refer. The paragraph reads: "Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible" - to the extent possible, let it be noted - "shall be obased on the principle of unanimity. .. ." Obviously, those decisions should be unanimous if they can be, but Mr. Vyshinsky did not pay any attention to the sentence which follows in that paragraph, yet it is the very crux of the matter. The pamgraph continues: "In the absence of unanimity. decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Com- mission present and voting." _That means that in the Commission, consisting of repre- sentatives of Israel and Syria and General Bennike, if the representatives of Israel and Syria cannot agree, then the vote of General Bennike is final and definitive. 87. M. Vychinsky s'est étendu longuement sur la posi- tion du Chef d'état-major, telle qu'il la conçoit. Il est évident qu'à cette heure tardive il ne m'est pas possible de traiter longuement de la question juridique qu'il a soulevée et qui est, à mon avis, une très importante ques- tion de principe. Je crois devoir déclarer, en mon nom personnel et aussi au nom de mes col1ègues, et afin que mention en soit faite dans le compte rendu de la séance, qu'il ne nous est pas possible d'approuver l'analyse que M. Vychinsky a bien voulu faire devant le Conseil. Je regrette d'ajouter qu'à mon avis cette analyse n'est pas digne du grand et éminent juriste qu'est M. Vychinsky. En fait, il nous suffit de lire les articles de la Conven- tion d'armistice général que M. Vychinsky a cités pour observer que c'est le Chef d'état-major lui-même qui a voix prépondérante au sein de la Commission mixte d'armistice lorsqu'il s'agit de départager les deux parties. Le fait est là et ne peut être contesté. 88. En otitre, il ressort clairement, tout au moins pour nous, de l'article V de la Convention d'armistice général, que c'est le Chef d'état-major qui est responsable de la surveillance générale de la zone démilitarisée. 89. Bien entendu, je ne peux maintenant citer tout l'article V, mais il me suffira de citer l'alinéa 5, c, de cet article qui est ainsi conçu: "Le président de la Commission mixt-e d'armistice prévue à l'article VII de la présente Convention et les observateurs des Nations Unies attachés à ladite Com- mission sont chargés d'assurer la pleine exécution du présent article." J'aurais cru que ce paragraphe était aussi clair que pos- sible. Aux termes de cet article, le Chef d'état-major est investi d'une autorité, et même M. Vychinsky ne peut prétendre que cette autorité appartient à quelqu'un d'autre. Il ne s'agit pas ici de vote majoritaire ou d'une question du même genre; il s'agit, en dernière analyse, de l'autorité dont le Chef d'état-major est investi dans la zone démilitarisée. 90. En outre, M. Vychinsky semble donner une grande importance au paragraphe 4 de l'article VII dont il a donné lecture; je citerai également ce paragraphe qui est ainsi conçu: "Les décisions de la Commission mixte d'armistice seront prises, dans la mesure du possible" - notons- le bien: "dans la mesure du possible" - "sur la base du principe de l'unanimité." Il est évident que ces décisions doivent être prises à l'unanimité si c'est possible. Mais M. Vychinsky n'a pàs prêté attention à la phrase qui suit dans ce même para- graphe et qui est capitale. Cette phrase est la suivante: "A défaut d'unanimité, elles seront prises à la ma- jorité des voix des membres de la Commission pré- sents et vota.nts." Ceci signifie que, si les représentants d'Israël et de la Syrie ne peuvent se mettre d'accord au sein de la Com- mission, qui est composée des représentants d'Israël et de la Syrie ainsi que du général Bennike, la voix du 91. In other "yords, and in a nutsheIl, l suggest that Mr. Vyshinsky is basing his whole argument on the assumption that the dispute before us is, as it were, a simple dispute between two countries of the type with which the Council has so frequently dealt in the past. Ml'. Vyshinsky states that the disputants are IUë.\el on the one hand and Syria on the other. Syria has brought a complaint, and, therefore, we have to try 'w get an agreement, and that is aIl we have to do. 'B!1l: that simply is not sa. This question in a way is sui generis. I:t is not an ordinary dispute. It is a dispute which arises out of an action which it is proposed to take in the demili- tarized zone, and this in its turn, of course, raises ques- tions directly connected with the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and it i'S with these questions arising out of the General Armistice Agreement that the Council is concerned, and also, consequently, with the position of the Chief of Staff who, under the General Armistice Agreement, has had great authority conferred upon him. It is that matter with which we are principally concerned, and to argue, as Ml'. Vyshinsky appears to argue, that aIl that is necessary in the circumstances is to secure agreement between Israel and Syria, or, in other words, tostate that in order to secure a settlement of the dispute Syrian acquiescence in any work undertaken in the demilita- rized zone is essential, is to disregard aIl the arguments which land my colleagues have expounded at such length in the past, and which we have expouded quite recently in this long-drawn-out discussion. 92. By his action, Ml'. Vyshinsky will render the chances of our achieving any constructive solution of the problem before us, such chances as there are, completely nugatory. l should hesitate to say that this is what Ml'. Vyshinsky wants, but l can certainly say here and now that that is what he seems to want. 93. Ml'. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics) (tra.nsla.ted from Russù:m) : 1 shall try to he as brief as possible, in order not to prolong the debate. 94. First of aIl l should like to reply to Sir Gladwyn ]ebb'sreferences to my legal quali'fications. Of course this is entirely his personal opinion, a matter of taste. But it is notoriously impossible to argue about tastes: de gttStibus non est dispu.tandu.11t. l would repeat, there- fore, that this is entirely Sir Gladwyn's opinion. 95. He still considers, with regard to the substance of the question, that the decisive role is that of the Chief of Staff. In this connexion he referred to article V, paragraph 5, of the Armistice Agreement and especially to sub-paragraph (c), which l mentioned myself. Sub- paragraph (c) states that the Chief of Staff, as Chair- man of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and the Com- mission itself shall be responsible. That is quite under- standable. They are responsible for the full implementa- tion of the Agreement ; but that does not in any Wd.Y mean that the settlement of aIl questions is entrusted to the Chief of Staff. Another article relates to the settle- ment of aIl questions, but article V contains paragraph 5 (e), which determines the specifie questions which the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission may ·decide independently. "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commis- sion shall be empowered ta authorize the return of dvilians to villages and settlements in the demili- tarized zone and the employment of limited num'bers of locally recruited civilian police..." These are the actual powers of the Chairman - ta take independent decisions on the questions stated here. These are the only questions which the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission is ernpowered to decide independently. 97. Sir Gladwyn Jebb chose ta ignore this. 98. 1 must also remind you of my reference ta article VII, paragraph 4, which states that, in the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken, notby the Chief of Staff, but by majority vote, with the participation of the Chief of Staff. 99. I would now ask Sir Gladwyn Jebb - - who is as great a jurist as I am according ta him, for I make no daims at aU - whether this is one and the same. Is the 'Chief of Staff to take decisions by himself, or are three members, including the Chief of Staff, ta take the deci- sions? 1 do not think that this is one and the same. I do not think that it is necessary to 'be a great jurist to' understand this. 100. I therefore maintain that the Chief of Staff may in certain cases play a decisive part, but only among the other members of the Commission. But if those members are not there, what can the Chief of Staff do? If there are i:lifferences which cannot be settled because two members vote in one way, two vote in another and the Chief of Staff votes in yet a third way, who is to decide? Perhaps in such a case the deciding vote is that of the Chief of Staff, as the fifth member of the Commission? This is not sa. The Chief of Staff consequently does not have a deciding vote. \Vhen does he have the deciding vote? When he is joined by two others. Who therefore has the deciding vote? Three members, inc1uding the Chief of Staff. Without two others the Chief of Staff does not have a deciding vote. It is not essential ta be a great jurist to understand this. 101. 1 should like to make yet another remark. Article VIII, paragTaph 3, contains the following provision: "The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement. , . at any time ... " Ho-w can the parties revise any provision of this Agree- ment by mutual consent? From this J assume that the fundamental principle of the Agreement is mutuaÏ consent. But who is the deeisive and ·final arbiter? The decisive and final arbiter is the Security Couneil. This is clear from paragraphs 3 and 4, which say that, if there L are disagreements which cannat be resolved, at the request of one of the parties the Chairman of the . 20 97. Sir Gladwyn Jebb a préféré garder le silence sur ce point. 98. Je dois rappeler en outre qu'en parlant du para- graphe 4 de l'article VII j'ai fait observer que, lorsqu'il est impossible d'aboutir à un accord unanime, la décision doit être prise à la majorité des voix, et non pas par le Président lui-mêlne. 99. Je demande donc à sir Gladwyn ]"bb, qui est aussi grand juriste que moi - selon lui, mais je ne revendique nullement cette qualité - s'il s'agit là d'un· seule et même chose. Les décisions sont-eUes prises ,par- le Chef d'état-major, ou bien doivent-tUes être pri~<::s par trois membres de la Commission y compris le Chef d'état- major? Je crois qu'il y a une grande différence entre les deux méthodes. On n'a pas besoin d'être grand juriste, à mon avis, pour la saisir. 100. J'affirme par conséquent que le Chef d'état-major peut e:x.ercer, le cas échéant, une influence décisive, pourvu qu'il soit d'accord avec d'autres membres de la .commission. Or, si deux de ces membres ne votent pas avec lui, que peut-il faire? Que se produit-il lorsque les divergences de vues sont si graves que toute décisio!1 devient impossible? Qui est-ce qui prend la décision lorsque deux membres de la Commission votent d'une certaine manière, deux autres émettent un vote diffé- rent et le Président défend sa propre manière de voir? Est-ce que, dans ce cas, le Chef d'état-major, en sa qua- lité de cinquième membre de la Commission, dispose d'une voix prépondérante? Non. Ainsi, le Chef d'état- major n'a pas de voix prépondérante. Dans quel cas disopse-t-il donc de ce droit? Lorsque deux autres \l'oix s'ajoutent à la sienne. A qui, par conséquent, appartient cette voix prépondérante? A ces trois ille11lbres, y com- pris le Chef d'état-major. Si deux autres membres de la Commission ne votent pas dans le même sens que lui, il ne dispose pas de ce droit. Nul besoin d'être grand juriste pour le comprendre. . 101. Encore une remarque: le paragraphe 3 de l'article VIII stipule: "Les parties à la présente Convention peuvent, par consentement mutuel, reviser cette convention à n'im- porte quel moment .. ." De quelle façon les parties peuvent-elles reviser une dis- position quelconque de cette convention par consente- ment mutuel? J'en déduis que le principe sur lequel ije fonde la Convention est celui du consentement mutuel. Et quelle est l'instance suprême? L'instance suprême, celle qui tranche la question, c'est le Conseil de sécurité. C'est ce que montrent lès paragraphes 3 et 4: si des liti- ges se produisent et s'il n'est pas possible de les régler1 "If the conferenœ provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute. either Party may bring the matter before the Security COl1neil of the Pllited Nations for the relief sought. U 102. Who then takes the final deeision? The Security CoundI. Not the Chief of Staff, but the Security Coun- dl. The Chief of Staff may take independent deeisions in one case only, as is stated in article V, pamgraph 5 (e). In all other cases he can act effectively only when his decision is supported by two of the five members. This is quite natural and legitimate. 103. Can this lead to the conclusions which have been reached by Sir Gladwyn Jebb? l consider that it cannot. 104. In view of these considerations, a pemsal of para- graph 8 of the joint draft resolution will show that that paragraph does not provide for such contingencies, since, in contravention of the basic principle of the Armistice Agreement, the Chief of Staff as Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission is given the deciding vote. Obviously this is absolutely incorrect and contrary to the Agreement. 105. Sir Gladwyn Jebb said that I was rUlnmg any chance of settling this question. He is absolutely mis- taken and his anxiety is unnecessary. His anxiety is unnecessary because I cannot min the system you have b~l.ilt up in paragraph 8 and in the whole draft resolu- tion, beœuse this draft resolution settles nothing; it does not settle the question which it shoulc1 settle. Your fears that I may min something which is not decided are therefore absolutely unfounded. l am not ruining anything. I am only showing you what you are ruining. You are ruining any possibility of transferring :.he whole question to the level of mutual consent, with the assis- tance of the Chief of Staff and the Security Council. 106. 1 am therefore deeply convinced that the only right course is that which we are proposing - not the course of unilateral decision at the discretion of the Chief of Staff, but the normal course laid down in the Armis- tice Agreement, by which both parties, with the par- ticipation of the Chief of Staff, must try to negotiate and agree 011 a decision ta eliminate the differences which prevail in the situation.

I think the Council is now in a position ta proceed to the vote, and the draft resolution upon which we shall vote nrst is the one contained in doc.:llment S/3l5l/Rev.2. I have been requested by the representative of Lebanon to put this draft resolution to the vote paragraph by paragraph. By virtue of mIe 32 of our mIes of procedure, it is now c'est~à-dire celle qui prévoit, non pas la décision d'une seule personne, le Chef d'état-major, mais la procédure normale, établie par la Convention d'armistice, sa'Voir qu'il faut que les deux parties, avec le concours du Chef d'état-major, s'efforcent de prendre, d'un commun ac- cord, une décision pour régler les litiges dont nous sommes saisis. 107. Le PRESIDENT PAR INTERIM (traduit de l'anglais): Je pense que le Conseil est maintenant en mesure de procéder au vote. Je mettrai d'a:bord aux voix le projet de résolution S/3151/Rev.2. Le repré- sentant du Liban a demandé la division. Conformément à l'article 32 du règlement intérieur, je dois maÏntenant demander formellement 'aux auteurs de ce projet s'ils 109. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) : 1 do not gather from a reading of rule 32 that it is the dutYof the Presi- dent ta caU upon the original mover to e>..-press his opinion. The original mover is at liberty ta express his opinion without being called upon specificaUy by the President to do so. The text of rule 32 does not say that parts of a motion or a draft resolution shaU be voted on separntely at the request of any representative unless the President has already ascertained whether the original mover does or does not object thereto. It says "unless the original mover objects". 1 understand this to mean that it must be left to the initiative of the original movers, who are all here and who can them- selves express objections if they wish to. For the Presi- dent actually to initiate the process by asking them to express their opinions seems ta me ta be unnecessary.

Before 1 comment on the observations of the representative of Lebanon, 1 shaU caU upon the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order.

With reference to the statement just made ·by the representa- tive of Lehanon, 1 may say that, whether or not the Acting President had himse1f rnised the question, it had been my intention - for reasons which 1 shall state - to do so before the vote was taken. Perhaps, there- fore, that particular point can be liquidated in advance. 112. In our debate yesterday, Mr. Malik 'referred to rule 32 of our rules of procedure, which, in part, reads as follows: "Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shaH be voted on separately at the request of any representa- tive, unless the original mover objects." MI'. Malik expressed the hope that the draft resolotion would he put to the vote in parts, and he added [655th meeting] : "It is certainly permissible for the sponsors of this text to cbject to my request, but 1 hope they will not do so." In commenting on Ml'. Malik's request, 1 said the following, among other things: . "... though 1 myself believe, for the reasons already given by the representative of France, there would be a considerable case for the movers in this particular instance to object to any proposaI to vote on the draft resolution before us paragraph by para- gmph or part by part - and 1 think that in this case it would be quite a reasonable thing for us to do- we do not, as 1 understand ît - and here again 1 think that 1 speak also on behalf of the co-sponsors - actually wish formally to put in an objection." 113. Since 1 made those remarks, however, it appears that the situation has changed in at least two important respects.

En ce qui me concerne, il s'agit également d'une motion d'ordre; cependant, je cède volontiers la plac.e au représentant du Liban. 109. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (irad1{,it de l'an- glais) : Il ne m'apparaît pas, à la lecture de l'article 32 du règlement intérieur, que le Président soit tenu d'in- viter l'autèur d'un projet de résolution à exprimer son opinion. Celui-ci est libre d'ex,primer son opinion sans que le Président l'en prie e.xpressément. L'article 32 ne dit pas que la division est de droit si elle est demandée, à moins que le p,résident n'ait déjà demandé à l'auteur de la proposition ou du projet de résolution s'il s'y oppose. L'article 32 porte "à moins que l'auteur de la proposition ou du projet de résolution né s'y oppose". Si je comprends bien, cela signifie que les auteurs d'un projet de résolution sont libres d'intervenir s'il leur plaît; ils sont tous id en ce moment et peuvent eux-, mêmes formuler leurs objections si tel est leur désir. Il me paraît inutile que le Président prenne lui-même l'initiative de solliciter leur avis. 110. Le PRESIDENT PAR INTERIM (traduit de l'angla.is) : Avant de me prononcer sur les observations que le représentant du Liban vient de formuler, je donne la parole au représentant du Royaume-Uni pour une motion d'ordre. 111. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): Je souhaite revenir sur la déclaration que vient de faire le représentant du Liban; pour les raisons que je vais exposer, j'avais l'intention de le faire avant le vote, que le Président par intérim soulève ou non la question. Je pourrai donc régler ce point sans plus attendre. 112. A la séance d'hier. M. Malik a invoqué l'article 32 de notre règlement intérieur, qui stipule notammer.t: "La division est de droit si elle est demandée, à moins que l'auteur de la proposition ou du projet de résolution ne s'y oppose." M. Malik, exprimant l'espoir que le projet de résolution serait mis aux voix par division, a ajouté [655ènte séance] : "Il est certain que les auteurs du texte en questîon peuvent s'opposer ,à ma demande, mais j'espère qu'ils ne le feront pas." Parlant de la demande de M. Malik, j'ai notamment dit ce qui suit: "... Je suis moi-même convaincu, pour les raisons mentionnées par le représentant de la France, que les auteurs du projet commun seraient parfaitement fon- dés, dans le cas présent, à s'opposer à toute proposi- tion de vote par division, et j'estime en l'occurrence que cette attitude serait parfaitement raisonnable; néanmoins - et je pense qu'ici encore, je parle éga- lement au nom des autres auteurs du projet - nous n'avons pas l'intention de nous opposer formellement au vote par division." 113. Depuis que j'ai fait ces remarques, la situation paraît s'être modifiée, au moins à deux points de vue qui ne manquent pas d'importance. 117. Le PRESIDENT PAR INTERIM (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de donner la parole au représentant du Liban, je tiens simplement à dire qu'étant donné le cours de ce débat, j'ai cru qu'il était juste de présenter la ques- tion comme je l'ai fait pour la commodité du Conseil, et je persiste à le croire. Cependant, tout cela parait main- tenant d'un intérêt quelque peu théorique. 118. M. Charles MALIK (tradttit de l'angla.is): Sir Gladwyn Jebb a dit qu'il y avait aujourd'hui deux éléments nouveaux dans la situation; le premier est le fait que j'ai repoussé l'appel qu'il a lancé hier pour nous demander de prendre en considération le projet de réso- lution dans son ensemble. Je ne comprends pas ce que cela veut dire. J'avais dit - et il me parait encore évi- dent que j'avais à le dire - que l'idée même de toute demande de division serait absolument sans valeur si des appels comme celui du représentant du Royawne- Uni, devait signifier que les délégations ne sont pas libres de se prononcer sur le bien-fondé de chaque partie d'une résolution et de voter pour ou contre, ou encore de s'abstenir suivant le cas. Si l'on a envisagé de diviser un texte pour le mettre aux voix, c'est justement pour donner aux membres cette liberté. Si l'on nous la refuse en lançant un appel ou autrement, on n~ peut plus parler d'un vote par division. 119. Je me permettrai donc de faire observer très res- pectueusement que le premier élément nouveau auquel le représentant du Royaume-Uni a fait allusion et qui, a-t-il dit, l'a amené à changer d'avis en ce qui concerne la position excessivement prudente qu'il a prise hier à regret, est - je regrette d'avoir à le dire ~ un argu- ment de pure rhétorique. Je ne m'attendais pas à ce qu'il présentât la question de cette façon, puisqu'il n'existe aucun élément nouveau qui, d'une façon quel- conque, ait pu le faire revenir sur ses déclarations de la veille. Voici le premier point. 119. 1 would therefore submit very respectfully that the +irst new element to which the representative of the United Kingdom refel'red as having caused him to change his mind on the exceedingly cautious and very reluctant position he took yesterday is - and 1 regret to have to say this - entirely rhetorical. I never expected him to put it in that way at 'ail since there is no new element that, in any sense of the term, coulcIl possibly cause him ta change his mind on what he stated yesterday. ·That is the first point. 121. 1 regret, 1 repeat, that the representative of the United Kingdom and the other representatives who sponsored this text should have found it necessary to invoke their right ttnder rule 32. 1 appealed to them very sincerely yesterday and 1 appeal to them again to reconsider their objection. They may persist in that objection, and of course we have to abide by the rules of procedure, but if they do so persist it will, as 1 have said, certainly be the first time in the history of the Security Council, as far as 1 know, that such a request has.'been dbjected to 'by the authors of a draft resolution. 122. It will go on record that this departure, this objection, this exceptional behaviour, has occurred with respect to Palestine. 1 can only say, Ml'. Acting Presi- dent, that if every exception,' every departure from normal procedure, is to take place \Vith respect to Palestine then your hopes for peace in that area - hopes which are, 1 am sure, shared "y Sir Gladwyn Jebb and by the other representatives here - will aIl be dashed. 1 therefore appeal again to the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States not to object to my request that this draft resolution should be voted upon in parts. If they persist in their objection 1 can only hope that the text will fall, either as the result of the voting of the Council or by any method by which it can fall. 1 do not care what the method is because 1 think that this is as a whole a most ~bnormal procedure. 123. Ml'. WADSWORTH (United States of Ame- rica): 1 wish to join the representative of the United Kingdom in objecting to the request made by the repre- sentative of Lebanon that the draft resolution he voted on in parts. 1 do this with the complete belief that this is the best way of handling the question. 124. It is not my intention to attempt to prevent anyone from registering his objections to paragraph 8, or to any other paragraph. 1 feel that during the past several debates on this question, the positions of the various members of the Council have been made 121. Je regrette, il me faut le répéter, que le repré- sentant du Royaume-Uni et les autres auteurs du projét de résolution aient jugé nécessaire d'invoquer le droit qui leur appartient en vertu de l'article 32. Hier, je leur ai adressé un appel très sincère, et je leur demande encore de reconsidérer leur objection. Ils peuvent main- tenir leur objection, et il nous faudra bien entendu nous conformer au règlement intérieur; mais, s'ils persistent dRns leur opposition, ce sera, comme je l'ai dit, certaine- ment la première fois dans l'histoire du Conseil de sécu- rité que les auteurs d'un proJet de résolution se seront opposés à une telle demande. .122. Il sera consigné au procès-verbal que cette déro- gation à la procédure normale, cette objection, cette attitude exceptionnelle, ont été constatées au sujet de la Palestine. Je dois dire, Monsieur le Président par intérim, que, si toutes les exceptions, toutes, les déroga- tions à la procédure normale doivent se produire au sujet de la Palestine, vos espoirs de paix dans cette ré- gion - espoirs qui, j'en suis sûr, sont partagés par sir Gladwyn Jebb et par les autres membres du Conseil de sécurité - seront anéantis. Je fais donc encore une fois appel aux représentants de la France, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Unis, pour qu'ils ne s'opposent pas à ma demande de division. S'ils persistent dans leur objection, il me reste l'espoir de voir le projet ,de résolution rejeté, soit par un vote du Conseil, soit par toute autre mé- thode. Peu m'importe la méthode, car toute cette pro- cédure est bien anormale. 123. M. WADSWORTH (Etats-Unis d'Amérique) (traduit de l'anglais) : Je tiens à m'associer au représen- tant du Royaume-Uni pour m'opposer à la proposition du représentant du Liban, qui demande la division. Si je le fais, c'est parce que je suis intimement convainc'cl que c'est là le meilleur moyen de résoudre le problème. 124. Il n'entre pas dans mes intentions d'essayer d'em- pêcher personne de déclarer son opposition au para- graphe 8, ou à tout autre paragraphe. J'estime qu'au cours des diverses séances qui ont eu lieu dernièrement à propos de cette question, les divers membres du Con- 126. Sir Gladwyn Jebb said that one of~he reasons, why he intended to object and did in fact object to a vote in parts was that the Soviet Union representative apparently intended to avail himself of his privilege during the vote. 1 cannot understand to what privilege Sir Gladwyn was referring. 127. The representative of the Soviet Union does not wish to and will not avail himself of any privilege. He wishes ta, and will, avail himself of the right vested in him by the Charter. So long as the Charter exists, and so long as the Charter lays down a voting procedure, it is not a privilege to support that procedure; it is the right of every member of the Security Council to support the procedure established by the law of the United Nations. the Charter. Hence no talk of privilege in this case has any foundation - unless, of course, it is intended for popular consumption. l do not wish, however, tb try to read Sir Gladwyn's mind, and l shaU therefore refrain from imputing this motive to his statement. 128. Actually, however - and this is the second point which caUs 'for attention - some representa'tives here would like ta avail themselves, 1 would uot say of their privileges, but of a very unusual practice, and to act in a manner completely at variance with the usual practice. 129. Only yesterday Sir Gladwyn Jeb'b - unfortu- nately I. have not the Russian text of his statement- said that he did not intend to abject formally to a vote in parts, and presumed that he was also speaking on 'behalf of his co-sponsors. He went even farther. He said that the~e were precedents: "As 1 understand it, 'there are few precedents in this regard, and we do not wish in any way to depart from precedent uo'less it is absolutely a case of urgent necessity." * Tt is quite dear that, out of respect for precedents in the Security Council's practice, he did not intend to insist on a procedure which \vould conflict with that practice ttnless something unusual occurred or unless he was forced by urgent necessity to do so. What urgent necessity now forces him to object? Apparently it is the stand takeil in this matter by the representative of the Soviet UnÏt.:m. 130. Sir Gladwyn, however, seems to have forgotten that the$oviet Union representative did not take this sta:nd for the' first time today; 1 cannot therefore under- stand why itshould have come as a surprise to him. The USSR representative took exactly the same stand three months 'ago and repeated it yesterday, before Sir Glad- wyn Spoke, 'and earlier in January and on 21 December and in Nôvember. This position has never changed. Why * In English in the original. 25 • • Il •• *En anglais dans le texte. 131. vVhat is the reason for this? l think, if we can speak of privileges, that Sir Gladwyn is using his privilege under rule 32 to prevent us from voting fl'eely on the various paragraphs of this drafit resolution, each of which has particular signi'ficance. For e.'\:ample, para- graph 7, in which the Council calls upon the parties to perform certain obligations, has some significance. Para- graph 5, in which it reminds the parties that where the illterpretation of the meaning of a paI"ticular provision of the Agreement is at issue, the Mixed Armistice Commission's interpretation shaU prevail, and para- graphs 3, 4 and 6, which l consider acceptable, aU doubt- less have some significance. Why do you deprive me of the opportunity of voting in favour of ,these paragraphs? The only explanation seems ta be that you wish to force me ta vote in favour of the one paragraph which r cannat accept. That, however, is a type of pressure which is inconsistent with the most elementary ideas of free voting. Is this what you refer to as my privilege? 132. l am requesting a vote in parts because there are many paragraphs in this draft resolution for which l can vote, although l do not agree with the general tenor of the draft resolution. But you do not want me to vote for those paragraphs because it suits you to depict me as the champion of the veto. That is not something at which you hint; you say so outright. Vou force me to use my right, and then you transform that right into a privilege, and ~Imost transform that privilege into a crime, and you think your stand is legal, particularly because only yesterday you stated that you wouId not try to divert the Council from its normal procedure. Today, however, you have shown that your words have little weight. Yesterday you said, in circumstances which you wished to use to bring pressure to bear on 'those delegations which werebound to agree with us, that ei-ther the)" must agree with you or there would be no resolution. That is the situation. Is that what you call a privilege? l calI that an abuse of your right. In this case l do not intend to abuse my right, but l propose to avail myself of it stricti juris) and not only stri.cti juris but also poli- tically. 133. l therefore consider that -the stand taken by the United States and United Kingdom representatives, Ml'. Wadsworth and Sir Gladwyn Jehb;is not compati- ble with the practice which has become accepted in the Security Council in matters of voting, or with due respect for the principle of freedom of expression of will; the proposaI by the representative of Lebanon, Ml'. Malik, that the vote he taken in parts was not in conflict but rather in agreement with that principle. When such a vote has been taken, it will be quite clear to everyone which paragraphs are acceptable, which paragraphs are unacceptahle and to whom, why they are unacceptable, and what must he done to secure, in the 131. De quoi s'agit-il? A mon avis, si l'on peut parler de privilèges, sir Glaclwyn Jebb use du privilège de l'article 32 pour nous empêcher de voter librement sur les divers paragraphes, qui ont chacun, dans ce projet de résolution, une importance bien définie. Le para- graphe 7 a lui aussi une importance bien définie: il prescrit certaines obligations aux parties. Sans aucun doute, le paragraphe 5 a également une certaine valeur, car il rappelle aux parties que, lorsque le sens d'une disposition particulière de la Convention donne lieu à interprétation, l'interprétation de la Commission pré- vaut; il en est de même des paragraphes 3, 4 et 6 qui, me semble-t-il, sont acceptables. Pourquoi m'ôtez-vous la possibilité de voter sur ces paragraphes? Selon toute vra.isemblance, à seule fin de m'obliger à voter pour un paragraphe que je ne puis accepter. Mais c'est là un moyen de pression étranger à la notion élémentaire de liberté de vote. Est-ce cela que vous appelez mon pri- vilège? 132. Je désire voter paragraphe par paragraphe parce qu'il y a dans ce projet de résolution un certain nombre de paragraphes pour lesquels je peux voter, bien que je n'approuve pas la tendance générale du projet. Mais vous ne voulez pas que je vote sur les paragraphes en question, car il est avantageux pour vous de faire de moi un "chevalier du veto". Vous ne vous contentez pas d'y faire allusion; vous le déclarez ouvertement. Vous me forcez à user de mon droit, puis vous transformez ce droit en un privilège, dont vous faites presque un crime, et vous pensez que votre attitude est réellement légi- time, d'autant plus qu'hier encore vous avez soutenu que vous ne vouliez pas détourner le Conseil de sécurité de la voie qu'il avait suivie jusqu'à maintenant. Or, au- jourd'hui, vous avez prouvé que vos paroles avaient très peu d'importance: en effet, hier, dans un cas que vous vouliez exploiter pour faire pression sur les délégations qui penseraient comme nous, vous posiez le dilemme sui- vant: ou bien vous VOU5 entendrez avec nous, ou bien il n'y aura pas de résolution. Voilà quelle est la situation. Et vous appelez cela un privilège? J'appelle cela un abus de votre droit. Dans le cas présent, je n'ai pas l'intention d'abuser de mon droit, mais je compte y recourir strkti jI/-ris) et non pas seulement slrù:ti jwr.is mais également sur 'le plan politique. 133. C'est pourquoi je pense que l'attitude adoptée par sir Gladwyn Jebb et M. Wadsworth,qui représentent respectivement le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis, s'écarte de la pratique que le Conseil de sécurité suit pour les votes et qui est conforme au principe de la libre expression, principe que le représentant du Liban, M. Malik, ne contrarie pas mais favorise, lorsqu'il demande le vote par division. Chacun verra alors clairement quels sont les paragraphes qu'il peut accepter et ceux pour lesquels il ne peut voter, pourquoi il en est ainsi, et ce qu'il y a lieu de faire pour réaliser, en fin de compte, l'unanimitt'. au Conseil de sécurité. Mais on ne pourra pas atteindre ce but si l'on adopte les méthodes que le

We shaH now proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/3151/Rev.2. A '[.~ote was taken by show of /la1lds. 1tl favour: Colombia, Denmark, France, New Zealand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: Lebanon, Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lies. Abstaining: Brazil, China. The result ,(Jf tire vote was 7 in favot/r, 2 against, with 2 a.bstenti.()fl.S. The draft resolu.tion was not udl1pted, o·ne of the nega#ve votes bel:ng that of a permanent member of the Council. 136. The ACTING PRESIDENT: 1 eaU upon the representative of the United Kingdom for an explana- tion of vote. 137. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom): Yet once more we have witnessed the application by the Soviet Union of a veto in the Security Council- and, what is more, this veto has 1Jeen appHed for the first time in connexion with the affairs of the Middle East. This therefore is both melancholy and a sinister occasion- melancholy because it can hardly be a good augury for the future of international co-operation, sinister perhaps because of its implications in connexion with the cause of peace in the Arab world. 138. What has happened now in this great bod)'i, which is supposed to be charged with the duty of preserving peace and of doing everything possible to prevent the evil effeets of international friction? A constructive proposaI put forward after weeks and even months of negotiations, and indeed embodying some of the very ideas of Mr. Vyshinsky, has failed because of the oppo- sition of Mr. Vyshinsky himself. AlI that remains before us is a draft resolution put forward by one party to the dispute which is principally - indeed, 1 do not think it would he unfair to say, solely-·designed to esta:blish the principle of the necessity of Syrian agreement. 139. It is indeed understandable that Mr. Vyshinsky should be in favour of a veto as such - 1 suppose he has only to hear the word "veto" in order automaticalIy 136. Le PRESIDENT PAR INTERIM (trad.tit de l'angla-ü): Je donne la parole au représentant du Royaume-Uni pour une explication de vote. 137. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'angla.is): Une fois de plus, nous venons de voir l'Union soviétique faire usage du veto au Conseil de sécurité. De plus, ce veto concerne pour la)première fois une question relative au Moyen-Orient. C'est là un fait à la fois affligeant et inquiétant, affligeant, car il n'est guère un bon présage pour l'avenir de la coopéra- tion internationale, et inquiétant, peut-être en raison ne ses répercussions sur la cause de la paix dans le monde arabe. 138.. Que vient-il de se passer au Conseil de sécurité, au Conseil qui est censé avoir pour tâche de préserver la paix et de tout mettre en œuvre pour éviter les effets néfastes de la mésentente internationale? Une proposi- tion constructive, présentée après des semaines et même des mois d'échanges de vues et qui faisait place à cer- taines des idées mêmes de M. Vychinsky, a été rejetée en raison de l'opposition de M. Vychinsky lui-même. Tout ce qui nous reste est un projet de résolution dé- posé par une des parties au différend, projet dont l'objet principal- je ne pense pas qu'i'! serait injuste de dire, le seul objet - est de poser en principe la nécessité de l'assentiment de la Syrie. 139. On comprend que M. Vychinsky soit partisan du veto pour le veto - je pense qu'i.} lui suffit d'entendre le mot "veto" pour lèver automatiquement la main- 140. Mr. Vyshinsky has talked a great deal about agreement between Israel and Syria. The fact is that, having decided ta veto, he is trying desperately ta rationalize his motives. But his arguments will not, l think, convince anybody. They are, ta use a phrase from Shalœspeare, springes ta catch woodcocks. They will not hold any water. AU Mr. Vyshinsky wants ta do, l think, is ta muddy the waters, not ta prevent any leaks. Ta this end, any argument is probably good. But let us who are undeceived recognize Mr. Vyshinsky's veto for what it is. In a language which l know he understands, what he is in effect saying by this gesture is: hoc volo, sic jubeo, si! pro ratione voluntas.

l also must explain my vote, although l should point out that Sir Gladwyn Jebb took some pains to try ta explain my vote for me. In fact he was ~xplaining not his vote, but mine. .. 142. l have already spoken about the purpose of this draft resolution. l said that the purpose of this draft resolution, or its main purpose, was ta avoid answering the question which we are bound ta answer, namely whether the action taken by the party whose activities in the demilitarized zone do not meet with the agreement of the other party is correct or incorrect, and how that party should proceed further - whether it should aet with the consent of the other party or, as before, without that CœH\ent. 143. '!'~,at is the main problem that we' have had to solve. But the motives which prompted the sponsors ta submit their· draft resolution, even in its revised form, wen' aat directed towards a solution of the prablem. That is the whole point of the draft resolution. 144. That is the reason for the outcome, and l am in no way to blame for it. l do not intend to make anY' excuses, for l was exercising my right. l would repeat that l showed solidarity with my three coUeagues in the Security Council who apparently consider the draft resolution to be unsuitable. 145. The Lebanese representative voted against this resolution. He is the representative of an Araob State. l db not think that he will deny that he is the represen- tative of an Arab State. He voted against the draft resolution. According to Sir Gladwyn Jebb's logic it would follow that Mr. Malik voted against the interests of his own .people, against the interests of the Arab States, and that, to use the words of Sir Gladwyn, was melancholy and sinister, because it might result in a breach of the peace in the Middle and· Near East. . 146.' If anyone votes against Sir Gladwyn Jebb, ihat may result in a breach of the peace. Thus, for example, the USSR' representative's vote and the Lebanese 143. Voilà la principale question qu'il s'agissait de trancher. Cependant, les auteurs du projet de résolution et même du texte revisé de ce projet recherchaient tout autre chose qu'une solution de ce problème. Tel était bien .Je sens du projet. 144. Les résultats ne se sont pas fait attendre, et je n'y suis pour rien. Je ne cherche nullement à me jus- tifier, car j'ai tout simplement fait usage de mon droit. Je répète que je n'étais pas seul: trois autres membres du Conseil de sécurité estimaient comme moi, apparem- ment, que ce projet de résolution n'était pas satisfaisa~t. 145. C'est ainsi que le représentant du Liban a vdté contre ce texte. Or, il représeùte un pays arabe. Je pense du moins qu'il ne le niera pas. Il a voté contre ce projet de résolution. Si l'on suivait la logique de sir Gladwyn Jebb, on 'devrait reconnaître que M. Malik a voté contre les intérêts de son peuple, contre les intérêts des pays arabes. Son attitude serait aussi regrettable et inquié- tante, selon les termes de sir Gladwyn Jebb, car dIe' ris- querait de troubler la paix dans le Proche et le Moyeü:' Orient. 146. Dès qu'un représentant vote contre sir Gl~dwyu Jebb, œla risque de troubler la paix. Aussi le vote né- gatif des représentants de l'URtSiS et du Liban'met-il 148. 1 should like to point out to Sir Gladwyn that his attitude to the problem is not serious. 1 cannot appraise his attitude in any other way, when the conclusion reached from the vote which 1 cast here is, first, that this is an unfortunate omen 'because it can adversely affect the cause of peace, and secon(lly, that it is a terrible crime because for the first time the Soviet Union is voting with the Arab States on a question which concerns their interests, on the ground that those inte- rests must be defended with absolute justice by a reso- lution other than that proposed by the represeniatives {Jf the United Kingdom, the United States and France, three permanent members of the Security Counci!. 149. MoreO\.er, not only did two members vote against this draft resolution,· but two other members of the Council abstained apparently because they also considered that the draft resolution failed to elicit either their enthusiasm or their support. When someone wishes ta support a proposaI he votes for it, but his abstention means, to say the least, that the draft is unsatisfactory ta him. 150. Consequently the two who abstained have also committed a crime against peace, the guardian angel of which today is, to the complete surprise of aU, Sir Gladwyn Jebb. 1 never knew until now that Sir Gladwyn, an exponent of the foreign policy of his country, is really a universaUy recognized, patented guardian ange!. 151. When Sir Gladwyn explained his vote by explaining mine, for which 1 am not at aU grateful to him, he said that 1 had tried to convince someone of something but had failed to convince anyone. 1 was not trying ta convince Sir Gladwyn or any of the sponsors of the draft resolution, but 1 was reaUy .trying to con- vince others. 1 was trying and shaU continue to try to convince, not by my vote, but by the arguments which 1 have advanced for three months before the Security Council and - just imagine, Sir Gladwyn - 1 have done so without changing my position, unlike the repre- sentatives of certain other delegations who say one thing one day and something different the next. 1 have really never changed my position. That may be what irritates you especiaUy. 152. In considering the voting, l have drawn a conclusion diametrically opposite to that reached by Sir Gladwyn. My conclusion is that today's voting in the Security Co~ncil has shawn that, unless the prin- ciple of mutual agreement of the parties concerned in this dispute underlies any solution of the dispute between Israel and Syria, no solution of this problem can in fact 'be reached by a majority vote in the Security CounciI. 153. 1 must make yet another point. Today's vote has shown that the time is past when the representatives of 150. Il s'ensuivrait donc que les deux représentants qui se sont -abstenus auraient commis eux aussi un crime contre cette paix dont sir Gladwyn Jebb s'est révélé aujourd'hui, de manière tout à fait inattendue, être l'ange gardien. Je ne savais pas jusqu'ici que sir Glad- wyn Jebb, qui est censé représenter le Ministère des affaires érrangères de son pays, est en réalité l'ange gardien de la paix, un ange breveté et reconnu de tous. 151. En expliquant son vote aussi bien que les motifs du mien - ce dont je ne lui sais nullement gré - il a dit què j'avais essayé de convaincre nos collègues, mais que je n'y avais pas réussi. En réalité, je n'ai pas cher- ché à convaincre sir Gladwyn Jebb ou les autres auteurs du projet de résolution. Il est exact, toutefois, que j'ai essayé de convaincre les ~utres représentants. J'ai essayé de les convaincre et j'essaierai toujours de -le faire, non pas par mon vote, mais par les arrangement,s que j'ai exposés ici à plusieurs reprises au cours des trois der- niers mois, sans toutefois modifier ma position comme l'ont fait certains représentants qui nous disent aujour- d'hui une chose pour en dire une autre demain. En effet, je n'ai jamais changé d'attitude. C'est sans doute ce qui vous irrite le plus. 152. En examinant les résultats du vote, il me faut constater un fait tout différent de celui qu'a observé sir Gladwyn Jebb. Il me faut constater que le vote qui a eu lieu aujourd'hui au Conseil de sécurité a montré ceci: à la base du règlement ëventuel d'une question tou- chant un différend entre Israël et la Syrie, on a posé le principe du consentement mutuel des parties intéressées; de plus, aucune majorité ne peut réellement se dégager au Consei'l de sécurité pour trancher cette question. 155. Je dois constater un autre fait. Le vote auquel nous avons procédé aujourd'hui a montré, semble-t-il, 154. There is no longer any question of gllaking a clenched fist to ensure the vote desired, let us say, by the United States representative or the United Kingdom representative. It would seem that there is now greater freedom of expression of will than there was when the Soviet Union alone protested against the distortion, disfigurement and violation of international law and of our Charter which unfortunate1y we have seen only too often in the United Nations. l now observe with great <>atisfaction that, although the place of the Eastern European Slav countries, in the Security Council, which legitimately belongs to us, is not occupied by rep!'esen- tatives of those countries, as it should he in accordance with the gentleman's agreement reached in London in 1946, we have here in the Security 'Council some repre- sentatives who, although they cannot support the Soviet position whoIly and from every point of view, cannot whoIly and in every respect support the position of the representatives of Powers who have been accustomed to the submissive execution of their will; the attitude of those representatives is explained by reasons to which. l do not now consider it necessary to refer. 155. l think that the reasons for our vote have been sufficiently explained by aIl that l have just said. Today you have infringed the elementary right of every mem- ber of the Council to vote on every draft resolution paragraph 'by paragraph, as you yourself have admitted to be the established practice here; you did not give me an opportunity to vote for several of the paragraphs of this draft resolution, because you wanted to be able to say once again that the Soviet Union had again used the privilege of the veto. 156. Please -bear in mind, Sir Gladwyn, that we are not renouncing and shaIl never renounce the rights conferred on us by the Charter, and that we shaH always defend these rights and the interests requiring our inter- vention and our defence of the principles which certain de1egations here are trying to violate. 157. That is why l voted against this drait resolution; l should have voted against some of its paragraphs while voting for others but you did not give me the opportun- ity of doing so. 158. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l should like to say a few words about the vote that has just taken place. Of course, everybody knows best what he is doing and why he is doing it. Everybody knows the hest inte- rests of his country and how 'best to serve them. 159. The question of peace in the Middle East has been touched upon. l am bound to observe in this connexion that in so far as this matter is affected by the vote of the representative of the Soviet Union, only those can in fairness be held responsible for this situation who aHowed matters to develop to this point. They are wise, they know what they are doing. But there was no end of warnings, of intimations, as to the proba-ble, if not almost certain, course of events. And yet matters were allowed wilfully, consciously, almost, l might add, with spite, 155. Il me semble que les motifs qui nous ont poussé à voter ainsi ressortent avec une clarté suffisante de ce que je viens de dire. Aujourd'hui, violant le droit élé- mentaire de chacun des membres du Conseil- le droit de voter sur chaque projet de résolution paragraphe par paragraphe, conformément à la pratique établie du Con- seil, que vous avez vous-même reconnue - vous ne nous avez pas permis de nous prononcer sur un certain nom- bre des paragraphes en question, parce que vous vouliez avoir une nouvelle occasion de dire: "Une fois de plus, l'Union soviétique use de son privilège en invoquant le droit de veto." 156. Que sir Gladwyn Jebb sache bien que nous ne renonçons ni ne renoncerons aux droits que la Charte nous confère et que nous défendrons ces droits ainsi que les intérêts qui nous font une obligation de défendre les principes que certaines délégations s'efforcent de violer. 157. Voilà pourquoi j'ai voté contre ce projet de réso- lution; j'aurais voté ppur certains de ses paragraphes et contre d'autres si l'on m'en avait laissé la possibilité. 158. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais) : Je voudrais dire quelques mots au sujet du vote qui vient d'avoir lieu. Chacun sait, bien entendu, mieux que personne ce qu'il fait et pourquoi il le fait. Chacun sait où sont les véritables intérêts de son pays et com- ment il peut servir ces intérêts au mieux. 159. On a évoqué la question de la paix dans le Moyen-Orient. Je dois noter à ce sujet que, dans la me- sure où le vote du représentant de l'Union soviétique influe sur la question, ceux qui peuvent être tenus pour justement responsables de la situation actuelle sont ceu..x qui ont permis que l'on en arrive à ce point. O'rtes, ce sont des gens avisés, qui savent ce qu'ils font, mais on leur a prodigué avertissements et conseils pour tenter d'éviter la situation actuelle, qui était à prévoir et qui était presque inévitable. Et pourtant, on a laissé volon- strang~ now to speak of ptace in the Middle East as possihly having been affected, when it was perfectly obvious that according to the best possible calculations the draft resolution could have been adopted only by seven votes. 163. Again, 1 repeat, they are wise, they know what they are doing. When one day 1 shan he able to under- stand that wisdom, 1 shall certainly bow my head in an respect. 164. However, even if it had not been difficult to make sure of the seven votes, was it right, in a situation regarding matters so complex, to have depended only on that amount of agreement? 165. A study of the composition of the voting shows that the representatives of the Soviet Union, Lebanon, Brazil and China were not pleased with this text. But this fact was known in advance by everybody concerned. Apart from the represell'tative of Brazil, with whom we have the best relations, the other three represented Powers on the Asian continent. Why does the Western world, in dealing with the Middle East, allow itself to he so manoeuvred as to appear opposed to the Powers throughout Asia? Is this the 'best possible diplomacy in the circumstanœs? The Western world has been in contact with the Middle East for one hundred and fifty years, and now, from one situation to another they are allowing themselves to app~ar in this unfavourable posi- tion. They think they cannot hdp it, but 1 think they cano 166. Is that to their interest? Is that the best that can be done, when we all know how difficult are the situa- tions in the Middle East? 1 repeat, they know be1:ter than 1 do. There may be deeper wisdom than 1 can penetrate, but,- with my limited comprehension of these matters, 1 simply {'wn, in all humility, that 1 cannot mesur~ où la paix, la concorde, l'harmonie et la bonne entente dans le Moyen-Orient dépendent de ce qui s'est passé ici ce soir - et les orateurs qui m'ont précédé ont fait allusion à ces questions - on aurait pu éviter d'en arrh'er là. On pouvait agir. C'est pourquoi, si -l'on doit blâmer quelqu'un, il faut blâmer ceux qui, en parfaite connaissance de cause, ont permis que l'on en arrive à ce point. 161. D'autre part, même si l'Union soviétique n'avait pas voté contre - et il eût été inconcevable que l'Union soviétique ne s'abstint pas tout au moins -le projet de résolution n'aurait été adopté que par sept voix, c'est- à-dire le minimum de voix prévu par notre règlement intérieur. Dans ce cas, les trois auteurs du projet de ré- solution se seraient-ils félicités de cette victoire? 162. Certainement, personne n'ignore les diffiwltés rencontrées au cours des semaines et des mois passés pour assurer ce minimum de sept voix au projet de résolution. Quand il s'agit d'une situation aussi com- plexe, aussi difficile et aussi grosse de conséquences que celle où se trouve le Moyen-Orient, quand tous les faits sont connus depuis des semaines et des mois, venir dire maintenant que la paix dans le Moyen-Orient peut être menacée, alors qu'il était évident que, même d'après les calculs les plus optimistes, le projet de résolution ne pouvait être adopté que par sept voix, est pour le moins étrange. 163. Je le répète, ce sont des sages, et ils savent ce qu'ils font. Si je parviens un jour à comprendre cette sagesse, je m'inclinerai certainement avec respect devant ces sages. 164. Mais, même s'il n'avait pas été difficile d'assurer sept voix au p\Ojet de résolution, convenait-il, dans une question aussi complexe, de se reposer uniquement sur une majorité aussi restreinte? 165. Si l'on examine les résultats du vote, on constate que les représentants de l'Union soviétique, du Liban, du Brésil et de la Chine n'étaient pas satisfaits de ce texte. Nul ne pouvait l'ignorer. A l'exception du repré- sentant du Brésil, avec qui nous entretenons les meil- leures relations, les trois autres délégations représentent toutes des Puissances du continelJ.t asiatique. Pourquoi le monde occidental, dans ses rapports avec le Moyen- Orient, se laisse-t-il manœuvrer au point de paraître hostile aux Puissances d'Asie? Est-ce là la plus sage diplomatie qu'il soit possible d'adopter dans les circons- tances? Le monde occidental entretient des rapports avec le Moyen-Orient depuis cent cinquante ans, et aujourd'hui, quel que soit le problème, il se laisse en- traîner dans une situation embarrassante. Selon les Puissances occidentales, la chose est inévitable; à mon avis, elle ne l'est pas. 166. Agissent-elles dans leur intérêt? Ne peuvent-elles rien faire de mieux,alors que nous savons tous combien délicats sont les problèmes du Moyen-Orient? Je le répète, elles savent mieux que moi ce qu'elles ont à faire. Peut-être leur sagesse est-elle trop profonde pour moi, mais j'avoue en toute humilité qu'avec ma connaissance 168. The draft resolution on which we have just voted was not against a solution acceptable to the parties. l think that the three sponsors would be very happy if such a solution were possible, but this draft resolution was a half-hearted affair. l felt that in going along that course we might spoil whatever chances we might have of a solution acceptable to the parties. That is why l abstailled on this draft resolutioll. 169. In the last few moments there has been sorne talk about the effect of the action of the Council on th~ pros- pects of peace in the Middle East. l humbly submit that it would be most difficult for any member of this Coun- cil ta try to predict whether the adoption or the rejec- tion of the draft resolution would promote the prospects of peace in the Middle East. How is the effect of the action taken by the Council this afternoon as regards the prospect of peace in the Middle East to be deter- mined? 1 feel that we had better not try to prejudge or ta presume tao much. 170.· In my own opinion, peace in the Middle East must be ba"ed on good relationships ..;,nd friendly feelings between Israel on the one side and the Arab States on ùe other. There is no doubt in regard to this point. The passage of this resolution could not in any way have improved the friendly relations between Israel <uId the Arab States. 1 doubt that the adoption of this particular draft resolution would have 'improved the prospects of peace in the Middle East. l am afraid the effect would have been just the opposit~. 171. 1 think the wisest policy to pursue in the Middle East is the following. We hope to make progress along different fronts. On 1.11 fronts, there are many problems still remaining ta be solved. Progress in any specific sphere at the sacrrfice of general improvement in the relations between the Ara:b States and Israel is dearly hought and might in the lor.~ mn prOVè to be vain. l would put in the forefront of our effort the aim of improving relations between Cie Arab States on the one hand and Israel on th~ other. l give that the highest priority in all considerations. l would not sacrifice that for progress in any specific sphere.

In practical life, there are situations in which governments find extreme difficulties in negotiating. In such situations it is perfect- ly legitimate even obligatory for the Council to take such steps to facilitate conciliation as it deems useful. The idea underlying paragraph 8 of the draft resolution therefore had my sympathy. It was construotive. 1 also considered paragraph 10 with particular favour. l think

The Secretary- General wishes to make a statement to the Council. l caU upon the Secretary-General.

Mr. President, may l thallk you for allowing me to speak at this very late hour. 175. l need not remind the Couneil of the history of this question. This matter was first considered in the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission in Septem- ber 1953. It \Vas the subject of a decision by its Chair- man, General Bennike, on 23 September [Sj3122, an- 1Je.'t· I]. The question was then 'brought to the attention of the Security Council by the representative of Syria on 16 October 1953 [Sj3108jRev.l] and has been dis- cussed here since 27 October [629th meeting]. 176. Time is becoming a ver: {>ressing factor, and further delay m:f;ht introduce . "ther complications. Being àeeply concerned at the devl 'pments, l have the feeling that, at the present stage, it is proper for me to point out that from the viewpoints to he represented by the Secretary-General the whole issue in substance caUs on1y, but caUs urgently, for two things: a confirmation of the initial attitude taken by General Bennike in con- sultation with the Secretariat and the opening of possi- bilities for him to try to work out an agreement by which this question can be prevented from becoming a source of continuaI friction between Israel and Syria. 177. If the matter is referred back to the Mixed Armis- tice Commission for consideration in the light of the discussion which has taken place in the Council, Gene- ral Bennike, assisted by such technical experts as rnight he placed at his disposa!, could proeeed immediately to seek a solution through consultations on the spot with the parties themselves. 178. Again l must, in the present troubling situation, stress the importance of the time factor, which is the main reason for this intervention after months of dis- cussion in the Security Couneil. With this as a back- ground, l must ask the Couneil to consider most seriously the possibility of a speedy, positive decision giving the Chief of Staff, General Bennike, the necessary support and authority. 179. Mr. LUCET (France) (translaied fromFrench): The indecisive vote -l)llhich has just been takm has quite obviously created a new situa:tion. Furthermore, it is very late. We shaU aIl undoubtedly have to make contact with our governments to obtain fresh instructions, and to think over the whole of this question at our leisure, taking into account the important statement just made ,by the Secretary-General. 180. In those circumstances I think that l am justiified in formally moving the adjournment of the meeting under rule 33, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure, leaving it to the' President's discretion to caU another meeting of the Council when he sees fit. The meeting rose at 8.5 p.tn.