S/PV.658 Security Council

We shall now proceed ta the discussion of item (a), "Complaint by Israel against Egypt concerning (i) enforcement by Egypt of restric- tions on the passage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal and (ii) interference by Egypt with shipping proceeding ta the Israeli port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba". 2. Ml'. EBAN (Israel): .The Government of Israel now returns ta the Security Couneil ta seek the im- medi1!-te cessation,by Egypt of hostile practices which violate the prineiples of internationallaw, the purposes of the United Nations Charter, the specifie provisions Président: M. L. K. MUNRO (Nouvelle-Zélande). Présents: Les représentants des pays suivants: Brésil, Chine, Colombie, Danemark, France, Liban, Nouvelle-Zélande, Turquie, Union des Républiques soch listes soviétiques, Royaume-Uni de Grande- Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Ordre du jour provisoire (8/Agenda/658) 1. Adoptior.. de l'Qrdrl» du jùur. 2. La question de Palestine: , a) Plainte d'Israël contre 'l'Egypt.e, au sujet de.: i) L'imposition par l'Egypte de restrictions au passage par le canal de Suez des navires faisant commerce avec Israël; ii) L'application par l'Egypte d'entraves à la navigation des navires se rendant au port israélien d'Elath, dans le golfe d'Akaba; b) Plainte de l'Egypte contre Israël, pour viola- tions par Israël de la Convention d'armistice gé- néral égypto-israélienne dans la zone démilita- risée d'El Anja. Adoptiom de l'ordre du jour La question de Palestine a) Plainte d'Israël contre l'Egypte, au sujet de~ i) l'imposition par l'Egypte de restrictions au passage par le canal de 8uez des navires faisant commer~e avec Israël; ü) l'application par l'Egypte d'entraves à la navigation des navires se rendant au port israélien d'Elath, dans le golfe d'Akaba (8/3168 et Add.l) 1. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Nous allons maintenant examiner le point a de l'ordre du jour, intitulé: "Plainte d'Israël contre l'Egypte, au sujet de: i) l'imposition par l'Egypte de restrictions au passage par le canal de Suez des navires faisant commerce avec Israël; ii) l'application par l'Egypte d'entraves à la navigation des naviTes se rendant au port israélien d'Elath, dans le golfe d'Akaba". 2. M. RBAN (Israël) (traduit de l'anglais): Le Gouvernenent d'Israël. s'adresse de nouveau au Con- seil de sécurité pour demander que l'Egypte cesse immédiatement des pratiques hostiles' qui sont eon~ traires aux principes du' droit international, aux buts 5. Above aIl. the Sec...rity :Council faces a decisive test of its autharity. Never bef<':-<': has one of its decisions. overwhelmingly sustained by the world community, come back to its table after the passage of years without any progress having been made, either towards cam- pliance or towards an efforé at enforcement. 6. The s: '.1ation before us is therefore more acute than that which engaged the Security Coundl's anxious concern in the summer of 1951. An a.rmistice violation which had then been in force for two and one-haH years has now remained without redress for five years sinee the signature of the Armistice Agreement. The restric- tions denounced by the Security Council in 1951 have not only been maintained, but defiantlyextended. The losses and dangers inflicted without justice or law upon my country and others have grown to the propor- tions of a major international outrage. The rebellion is now not only agai!:':;t the Armistice Agreement and the earnest requests of the Chief of Staff of the United Na- . tions Truce Supervision Organization, bt1t also against the Security Council itself. Since my Government, after an unusual exercise of patience, has decided no longer to acquiesce in the arbitrary violation of itl3 rights. we have c1early reached a turning point in the security of our region. 7. The conflict on this subject of free navi~tion at Suez is between Egypt on the one hand and the opinion of mankind on the other. The issue is drawn between progress towards peace, and the frank exercise of alleged rights of war. The debates and decisions of the Securit) Council in these coming days cannot.therefore 1 See Official. Records of th\e Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3. 2 Ibid., Sisilh y car, 558th meeting, para. 5. 2 , 1 Voir Pt';}cès-verbau~ officiels du Conseil de sécurité, qua- trième année, SuppUment spécial No 3. 2 Ibid., si~ième amlée, 558ème séance, par. 5. 8. Seven of the present members of the Security Council participnted in the discussions held on this sub- ject in 1951. Three of the other four members of the Security Council have a specialIy intimate concern in their n:, ;or.al capacity for the maintenance of free navigation in international waterways. l shall say nothing to add to Mr. Malik's dilemma, except to con- fess a frank curiosity about how he intends to res-.>lve it, and to recall his frequent advocacy of the Security Council's duty to require the meticulous observal~ce of the Armistice Agreements and of the Security CotlIleil decisions referring to those ~greements. 9. With such a wealth of varied experience assembled around this table, '.lpon which there lies a resolution which the Spcurity Councii has already adopted, it might seem unnecessary to summarize the previous phases of this question or to argue points which the Security Council has decisively resolved. 1 understand, however, that it is the desire of many representatives- as it is the right of world opinion - to have their memory refreshed concerniug the history of this most impurtant international question. 10. The Security Council will recall that when the Mandate for Palestine ended on 14 May 1948, Egypt, together with other Arab governments, openly under- took armed intervention against the new~ established State of Israel. In the course of this intervention, launched and maintained in defiance of repeated Secur- ity Council resolutions for a cease fire, Egypt estab- lished a general blockade against Israel and began to visit and search ships of aH nationalities passing through the Suez Canal, thus violating the freedom of the seas and contravening the convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Canal, signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1888 8, under which the Power con- tiguous to the Suez Canal is bound ta keep the Canal "always ... free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag". The avowed objective of this blockade instituted by Egypt in 1948 was to prevent the passage of ships carrying cargoes to Israel. Il. On 24 February 1949, a General Armistice Agree- ment between Israel and Egypt was signed at Rhodes in the presence of United Nations representatives, Mr. Ralph Bunche and General Riley. The United Nations Chief of Staff reported 4 the following to the 8 Georg Friedrich von Martens, N ouvea11 recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs aus rapports de droit international, Gœttingue, Librairie Dieterich, 1891, 2e sér., t. XV, p. 557. 4 Voir Procès-verbaus officiels du C01fseil de' sécurité, sixième am~ée, S"pplément de la période du 1er avril a11 30 juin 1951, document S/2194. 13. Thus the blockade operated mainly through the deterrent et!ects arising f::om the existence of the regu- lations themselves, and only secondarily through specific acts of interference with certain vessels in cases where the deterrent influence of the regulations had not been sufficient to prevent trade with Israel. 14. ·In. seekin~ to justify these regulations the Egyptian Government has irankly admitted that these are hostile aets dependent upon a "state of war". Indeed, the whole practice has been based on the as- sumption that Egypt possesses an internationaHy recog- nized right of war against Israel which aIl other Pawers and the United Nations are bound 1'0 respect. 15. On 11 August 1949 [437th meeting], the Security Council took note of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel which had been concluded pursuant to its own resolution of 16 November 1948 [381st meeting]. On 3 March 1949 [413rd meeting], the representative of Egypt had stated in the Security Council that the agreement had been animated by his country's spirit of peaceful co-operation and by its- and 1 quote the Egyptian representative's VI-"Ords- "respect for the Seeurity Couneil and its unfailing' com- pliance with the Council's resolutions". 16. In its resolution of 11 August 1949,5 the Security Couneil decided that the Armistice Agreements super- seded the truee. 1t was, therefore, the sense of the Security Council that the restrictions imposoo by the truce should no longer be applied by one party against the other, or by the United Nations against bath. Incidentally, the blockade had been held illegal ~ven during the truce as established by the Security Council, as is clear from decisions of the Chief of Staff under the truce. The Armistice Agreement, however, was far 5 Ibid., Fourth Year, 435th meeting. 5 Ibid., quatri~me année, 435ème séance. 18, Mr. Bunche, who had represented the United Nations in the negotiation of the Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement, and who must therefore be re~rded as the chief United Nations authority on the int ~rpretation of that agreement, reported to the Secur- ity Council, on 26 July 1949, that Ewrptian restrictions on shipping were contrary to the agreement which had now been signed and which the Security Couneil was about ta endorse. He said [433rd -meetingJ: "The Armistice Agreements are not the final peace settlement but the only possible interpretatio'1 of their very specifie provisions is that they signal the end of the military phase of the Palestine situatio' '- l repeat "the end of the mHitary phase of the Palestine situation" - "The objective now clearly should be to restore normal conditions of peace ta the fullest possible extent ... The entire heritage of restrictions which developed out of the undeclared war should be done away with ... There shouldbe free movement for legitimate shipping, and no vestiges of the war- time blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with bath the letter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreements." 19. Ac,:ordingly, the Security Couneil, on 11 August 1949, requested the signatory governments to observe the Armistice Agreements, and reminded them that those agreements ":nclude firm pledges against any further acts of hostility between the parties". That is a quotati~:m from the Security CouncH's resolution of Il August 1949. 20. That theblockade practices at Suez are "acts of hostility" is a matter on which Egypt and Israel have always agreed. Indeed, it has been a rare feature of this case that the two parties and the United Nations authorities concerned have not, differed on the basic facts and definitions involved. It is agreed by bath parties that Egypt does practise thesè acts of hostility, and that it does so on the assumption hy Egypt of a state of war. The conflict has been, therefore, not about fads; the conflict has been between the Egyptian view that such acts of hostility are legitimate, and on the other hand the doctrine, supported by Israel, by all the maritime pc.wers, by the United Nations Chief of Staff and by the Security Council, that ,such acts are not legitimate and that there is no justification for them in an alleged "state of war". ' "I submit that these pledges of non-aggression are , a reaHy solid basis for a permanent and lasting peace in Palestine ... "These restraints" - the blockade and the restraint on arms shipments - "... are no longer appropriate or neœssary now that we have firm commitments from the parties in the Armistice Agreements to refrain from aIl hostile activity and to adjust their differences, if any, peaceably." 22. It is ironical to record that this Interpretation of the agreement as a permanent and final end to hostil- ities, and therefore as the annulment of any state of war, was enthusiastic~lly uphetrl by the representative of Egypt in the Security Couneil in August 1949. The Egyptian Government was anxious at that time to restore its ireed(lm to import arms and war material- a freedom which had been suspended by the truce. It was, therefore, the urgent interest and concern of Egypt to hold that the General Armistice Agreement by its specifie provisions put an end to the truce, with aIl its considerations of military advantage. Mr. Mah- moud Fawzi, now Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, quoted with approval [433rd meeting] the statements of Mr. Bunche and others that restrictions arising from the state of hostiHties must end, and that the world community should cease to deal with Egypt or the other countries in the area as if they were stiU subject to speeial restrictions arising from their belli- getent status. The Egyptian representative even referred approvingly to my own statement that the agreement at Rhodes should be regarded as a provi- sional peace settlement, which could only be supple- mented by a final peace settlement, that this agreement had no time Hmit, and that restrictions arising from a state of hostilities should now be abandoned. 23. It is obvious, of course, even without these instructive records, that the Security Council's very deeision to restore legal freedom in the sale and purchase of arms to governments in the area cannot possibly be reconciled with any view that a state of war continued to exist. 24. Despite the clear sentiment of the Security Cauneil and its representatives in favour of abandoning aIl acts of hostHity and, espeeially and specific~lly, acts of blockade, the Egyptian practices continued in full force. On 29 August 1949 the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Ar- 'mistice Commission made the following decision; "J.~ suis convaincu que ces pactes de non-agression cons'tituent véritablement le fondement solide d'une paix durable en Palestine... "... Ces interdictions" - c'est-à-dire ie blocus et l'interdiction des envois d'armements - H ••• ne sont plus né,"essaires ni opportunes, puisque les parties aux cunventions d'armistice ont pris l'engagement formel de renoncer à tout acte hostile et de régler de façon pacifique les différends qui pourraient surgir." 22. Je constate avec ironie qu'en août 1949 le repré- sentant de l'Egypte au Conseil de sécurité a appuyé avec enthousiasme cette interprétation, qui considéraIt que la Convention d'armistice a-lait mis fin à jamais aux hostilités et supprimé, par conséquent, tout état de guerre. Le Gouvernement égyptien tenait, à l'époque, à recouvrer son droit d'importer des armements et du matériel de guerre, droit que la trêve lui avait retiré provisoirement. L'Egypte avait donc un intérêt direct à soutenir que, par ses dispositions expresses, la Con- vention d'armistice général mettait fin à la trêve et aux considérations d'avantages militaires qu'elle impliquait. M. Mahmoud Fawzi, qui est actuellement Ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Egypte, a approuvé [433èMe séance] les déclarations de M. Bunche et d'autres repré- se11tants qui estilTIaient que les restrictions découlant de l'état d'hostilite devaient prendre fin et que la collecti- vité mondiale devait cesser de traiter l'Egypte et les autres pays de Ja région comme s'ils étaient encore soumis aux rest! ictions spéciales découlant de leur statut de Puissances belligérantes. Le représentant de l'Egypte a même approuvé la déclaration dans laquelle j'avais précisé que la Convention de Rhodes devait être considérée C(lmme un règlement de paix provisoire, qui ne pouvait être suivi que d'un règlement définitif, que cette convention' ne comportait aucun terme et que les restrictions découlant des hostilités devaient donc être levées. 23. Il va sans dire, même en laissant de côté ces docu- ments instructifs, que la décision du Conseil de sécurité tendant à rendre aux Etats de la région le droit d'ache- ter et de vendre des armements est absolument incom- patible avec la thèse selon laquelle l'état de guerre aurait continué d'exister. 24. Bien que le Conseil de sécurité et ses représentants se soient clairement prononcés en faveur de la cessation de tout a'Cte d'hostilité, et tout particulièrement des actes de blocus, l'Egypte a continué ses pratiques sans changem(;ut. Le 29 août 1949, la Commission mixte d'armistice égypto-is.""élienne a pris la décision sui- vante: '~ 27. In January and then again in June 1951, the Israel-Egypt Special Committee met under the chair- manship of General Riley to hear the appeai by the Egyptian Government against the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 29 August 1949. 28. The Chief of Staff duly reported on the work of this Committee in a letter to the Security Cauncil on 12 June 1951 (S/2194). His observations on behalf of the Special Committee dealt with two points. The first was a matter of jurisdiction, of competence. Did the Mixed Armistice Commission have sufficiently wide terms of reference to deal with such a broad inter- national question as the Egyptian blockade? In the second place, the Chief of Staff dea!lt with the ques- tion of substance: whether Egypt had a right to main- tain these practices under the Armistice Agreement. On the jurisdictional point the Special Committee held, with Egypt, that the Mixed Armistice Commission lacked the competence to deal with the matter because of its restricted and specifie terms of reference. The reason given for this· ruling, however, was not that the blockade was consistent with the Armistice Agreement, but, on the contrary, that it was such a grave and gen- 02ral breach that a higher organ must render the final decision. The Chief of Staff said [S/2194] , and 1 quote his report for the Special Committee: f 6 Ibid., cinquième année, Supplément de septembre d décembr, 1950,· document 5/1907. 6 Ibid., Fifth Year, Supplement for Septefffher through De- cember 195(), document 5/1907. . ttIn my opinion", he said, (lthis interference is an aggressive and hostile action ..." He stated further: Ct: .. 1 must also say that the action of the Egyptian authorities in this instance is, in my view, entir~ly contrary ta the spirit of the General Armistice Agree- ment and does, in fact, jeopardize its effective func- tioning. It was certainly never contemplated at Rhodes that what is, in effect, an act of bloclcade or at least an act undertaken in the spirit of E. blockade and having the parti~l effect of or.e, would he con- tinued by one of the parties ta the General Armistice Agreement more than two yéars after it had been signed." 29. The Chief of Staff's report on the work of the Special Committee went on to make it clear that the matter should he referred ta the Security Council. He said: (1••• it must he clear, and it certainly is ta me, that the question cannat rest here. Either the Egyptian Government must, in the spirit of the General Ar- mistice Agreement, relax the practice of interference with the passage of goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal, or the question must be referred to some higher competent authority... the General Armistice Agreement was never intended ta provide a cloak for the commission of acts by either party which in their intent and effects are indeed hostile." 30. This, then, was the conclusion of the United Nations Chief of Staff, and he went on to make what he called a Ctstrong request" to Egypt - a strong re- quest to Ctdesist from the present praetice of interfering with goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal, since such aets can only be construed as inconsistent with the-spirit of the Armistice Agreement". This, then, concluded the discussion of this subjeet in the organs of the Armistice Agreement. 31. In accordance with the Chief of Staff's opinion that the question "must he referred to some higher competent authority", the Government of Israel brotight a complaint to the Security Coundl on Il July 1951 [S/2241]. 32. The Security Coundl devoted its close and earnest attention to this problem for seven weeks, at the end of which it a:dopted the resolution of 1 Septemher 1951. This resolution is the basic document for the Security Council's present consideration. The issues discussed and resolved in the 1951 discussion are of great im- portance today beèause nothing has happened sinee that time to change the basic legal principles at issue. 33. In opposing the blockade restrictions, Israel, sup- ported by a ma:jori~l of the Secul-:ty Council, argued ~s follows: that the application of the regalations was a "hostile aet", as indeed Egypt had confessed; that as such; 'it was inconsistent withthe Armistice Agr~etl:t tt... Il est évident- j'en suis du moins persuadé -" disait le Chef d'état-major, "que la question ne peut pas en rester là. Il faut, ou bien que le Gouver- nement égyptien se conforme à l'esprit de la Conven- tion d'armistice général et desserre les entraves qu'il a mises au transport à travers le canal de Suez des marchandises destinées à Israël, ou bien que la ques- tion soit renvoyée à une autorité compétente supé- rieure... la Convention d'armistice général n'a jamais été destinée à servir de prétexte à l'une ou l'autre des parties pour se livrer à des actes qui, par l'esprit qui les a inspirés comme par leurs consé- quences, sont véritablement des actes d'hostilité." 30. Tel1~ était donc la conclusion à laquelle aboutis- sait le Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme chargé de la surveillance de la trêve, qui, ajoutait-il, se voyait con- traint de "demander instamment" à l'Egypte de cesser "d'entraver le transport à travers le canal de Suez des marchandises destinées à Israël, car ces entraves ne peuvent être interprétées que comme contraires à l'esprit de la Convention d'armistice". Ainsi se termi- nait, dans les organes créés par la Convention d'armis- tice, la discussion sur cette question. 31. Conformément à l'avis exprimé par le Chef d'état-major, selon lequel la question devait être ttrenvoyée à une autorité .compétente supérieure", le Gouvernement israélien a saisi le Conseil de sécurité d'une plainte, le 11 juillet 195'1 [S/2241]. 32. Le Conseil de sécurité a examiné cette question avec l'attention la r".ts minutieuse pendant sept semaines, à l'issue desquelles il a adopté sa résolution du 1er septembre 1951. Cette résolution constitue le document de base des délibérations actuelles du Con- seil de sécurité. Les problèmes examinés et résolus en 1951 revêtent"1a plus haute importance aujourd'hui, car rien· ne s'est produit entre-temps qui ait modifié les principes juridiques fondamentaux en cause. 33. La thèse soutenue par Israël pour s'opposer aux restrictions imposées par le blocus - thèse que la majo- rité des membres du Conseil de sécurité ont appuyée- était la suivante: l'institution du blocus constitue ttun acte d'nostilité"~- airisi que l'Egypte elle-même l'a ad- 34. Members of the Security Couneil, with varying degrees of emphasis, spoke strongly in favour of each of these the:mes. Outside the Council nearly aIl the maritime Powers found due occasion to express their interest bath in unconditional freedom of navigation and in the immediate and total abolition of these illieit Egyptian restrictions. For here was an attempt by Egypt to apply its legislative authority, under the sanc- tion of force, not only to its ,.:itizens and territory, but also to ships, the maritime dghts and the commercial polieies of other sovereign States. 35. These then were the main arguments against the restrictions. A study of the resolution adopted by the Council on 1 September 1951 reveals how fully and comprehensively the Security Couneil put its high authority behind the case for the complete termination of these practices. The resolution of the Security Coun- cil of 1 September 1951 is upon this table, and it has been attached as an appendix to the press release of these observations. 36. In thefirst two paragraphs of its resolution the Security Couneil recalled its previous resolutiolls of Il August 1949 and 17 November 1950, which interpretoo the Armistice Agreement as including "firm pleages against any further act of hostUity between the parties". As 1 have said, blockade practices are by universal consent "acts of hostility". 37. In paragraph 3 the Security Couneil drew atten- tion to the report of the Chief of Staff of 12 June 1951 [5/2194] which expressed the grave opinion that the Egyptian interference with shipping jeopardized the effective functioning of the Armistice Agreement. It will he remembered that in the same report the Chief of Staff had referred to this Egyptian practice as an "aggressive and hostile action" and as a policy the con-- tinuation of which had definitely not been envisaged by the parties when ,they had set their hands to that agree- ment at Rhodes. 38. In paragraph 4 the Security Couneil noted that Egypt had not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff that it "desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel". 39. In paragraph 5, which is of decisive importance in relation both to this practice in the Suez Canal and to any other similar praotice, and which constitutes what the representative of France was later ta describe as the legal foundation of the Security Counei'l's action, the Security Council determined that "since the armis<tice regime ... is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a bel1~gerent or 40. In paragraph 6 of its resolution, the Security Council determined that the maintenance of the Egyptîan restrictions is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Armistice Agreement. 41. In paragraph 7, the Security Council disqualified the Egyptian practice on general grounds of inter- national maritime law by defining that practice as "an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and . " selzure . 42. In paragraph 8, the Security Council categorically dismissed the Egyptian contention that the Egyptian practice could be justified on the grounds of "self- defence". 43. In paragraph 9, the Secudty Council condemned the attempt of the Egyptian Government ta impose its legislation and its policy of hostility to Israel upon other countries, noting that -those restrictions repre- sented "unjustified interierence with the rights of na- tions to navigate the seas and to trade freely with each other, including the Arab States and Israel". 44. Finally, in paragraph 10, the Security Couneil called upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease ail interference with such shipping beyond that required for technical considerations of safety or for the ob- servance of international conventions. 45. The Security Council may weil observe with sorne pride that its resolution of 1 September 1951 is a document of high character, in the political, legal and moral sense. "Vith deliberate clarity it recorded a specific statement of United Nations policy on every single one of the issues involved in the case before it. It analysed the Egyptian restrictions from the view- points of general internationallaw, of maritime practice, of the United Nations Charter, of the Security Coun- cil's previous resolutions, and of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreen:J.ent. The Egyptian restric- tions were examined, judged and found invalid on each and every one of these grounds. Formulated in these categorical terms, the resolution left Egypt with a clear choice: either to respect its agreement with Israel, its obligations under the Charter, its duty towards the Security Couneil and the rights and interests of other States; or to repudiate the Agreement, to defy the Security Couneil, to violate the Charter and to impose piratical practices upon other countries desiring to navigate and to trade peaceful1y along the maritime channels of the world. 46. It is profoundly regrettable that Egypt should so far have rejected the former course and chosen the latter - the more so since many countries, large and small, have' made earnest and sincere efforts to bring Egypt's policy and, doctrine in the question into con- formity with international law and the Security Council's decisions. . 47. 1 now come to recount what has happened since the Security Council adopted that resolutim on 1 September 1951. Egypt's defiance has been compre- hensive and complete. Not the slightest notice has been taken of the Security Council's findings and decisions. 42. Au paragraphe 8, le Conseil de sécurité rejette catégoriquement la thèse égyptienne selon laquelle ces pratiques se justifiaient par des raisons de "légitime défense". 43. Au paragraphe 9, le Conseil de sécurité condamne les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement égyptien en vue d'imposer à d'autres pays sa législation et sa poli- tique d'hostilité à l'égard d'Israël, et note que ces res- trictions "constituent une ingérence injustifiée dans le droit que possèdent les nations de naviguer sur les mers et de commercer librement les unes avec les autres, y compris les Etats arabes et Israël". 44. Enfin; au paragraphe 10, le Conseil de sécurité invite l'Egypte à lever les restrictions mises au passage des navires marchands et marchandises de tous les pays par le canal de Suez, quelle que soit leur destinClition, et à ne plus mettre d'entraves à ce passage, si ce n'est dans la mesure indispensable pour assurer la sécurité de la navigation ou faire observer les conventions inter- nationales en vigueur. 45. Le Conseil de sécurité peut constater avec quelque fi~rté que sa résolution du 1er septembre 1951 est un document de haute tenue, au regard de la politique du droit et de la morale. Avec une clarté voulue, il expose la position des Nations Unies sur chacun des aspects de la question dont le Conseil était saisi. Il analyse les restrictions imposées par l'Egypte, sous l'angle du droit international, de la pratique des Puissances maritimes, des dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies, des résolutions antérieures du Conseil de sécurité et de la Convention d'armistice général égypto-israélienne. Le Conseil a examiné les restrictions imposées par l'Egypte, les a appréciées et leb a jugées illégales à chacun de ces titres. Formulée en termes aussi catégoriques, la résolution n'offrait à l'Egypte que l'alternative suivante: ou respecter la Convention qui la liait à Israël, les obli- gations que lui imposait la Charte, le respect qu'elle devait au Conseil de sécurité et les droits et intérêts d'autres Etats; ou dénoncer la Convention, lancer un défi au Conseil de sécurité, violer la Charte et imposer des pratiques de piraterie aux pays désireux de navi·, guer sur les mers et de commercer paisiblement sur les voies maritimes du monde. 46. Il est profondément regrettable que l'Egypte ait, jusqu'ici, choisi la deuxième voie. Nous le regrettons d'autant plus que de nombreux pays, grands et petits, se sont efforcés en toute sincérité de l'amener à adopter une politique et un~ doctrine plus conformes au droit international et aux décisions du Conseil de sécurité. 47. J'en viens maintenant aux événements qui ont suivi l'adoption de cette résolution par .le Conseille 1er septembre 1951. L'Egypte n'a tenu aucun compte de cette résolution. L'Egypte n'a pas prêté la moindre attention aux conclusions et 'aux décisions du Conseil 48. In the first place, the offensive regulations de- nounced by the Security Council have remained in full force..Wher~ they have been amended at all, the change has been 1esigned ta aggravate the offence. 49. l should again make it clear that this blockade works principally through the very e..'\:istence of the regulations and their consequent deterrent effects, and only secondarily through actual assaults and con- fiscations. Having no means to overcome the force at the disposaI of the Egyptian authorities i:. the Suez Canal area, maritime nations have been compelled reluctantIy to respect the very restrictions to which they and the United Nations are totally opposed. They have had to agree, against their own will and interest, to avoid bringing certain cargoes to Israel as the priee of passage through the Suez Canal-a canal in which their rights of navigation should be regarded as absolute and unconditional. The very knowledge that inter- ference is either certain or possible carries out the pur- poses of the blockade. Thus, in a ~~nse, the fewer are the actual incidents of detention and confiscation, the WOl ~è is the position and the graver the proof of trans- gression by the very existence of the regulations. 50. Let me give two illustrations of this point. 51. First, scarcely a single one of the hundreds of tankers passing each year through the Suez Canal has recentIy tried to sell part of its cargo at tlle Israel port of Haifa. This simply proves, however, that the blockade in this respect has been complete and watertight, and that the Egyptian Government has extorted from other governments an unwilling and implicit surrender to its own illegitimate regulations. For it had been pro- claimed and practised that whenever a tanker exercised its undoubted right of delivering its crude oil to an Israel port, as to any other Mediterranean port, it would be subject to penalties and sanctions effectively preventing its future operations in the Suez Canal. Indeed, seventy tankers which had exercised this right had been put on the Egyptian "black list". Tens of millions of dollars have been lost to Israel and even larger sums to other countries through the need to' purchase thousands of miles away the oil which would be available locally if Egypt were to stop its piracy. This is merely a single item in the great balance of loss inflicted by this illegal blockade. 52. Secondly, the same is true of Israel flag ships. The right of ships of all nationalities to free navigation through the Suez Canal justly pertains to Israel ships as weIl as to aIl others. Although we possess this undoubted right, we have so far refrained from using it, knowing full weIl that the Egyptian regulations, although condemned by the Security Council, are never- theless being exercised and would be applied against such ships. For the same reason, many plans and prospects of legitimate trade between Israel and coun- tries on the African and Asian continents have had to be renounced, for no other reason than that the position 53. Thus, when it is argued for Egypt that the traffic through the Canal for destinations other than Israel is constant and that the actual confiscations are relatively few, the argument is itself an index of Egypt's success- fuI and flagrant transgression. It is like an armed highway robber saying that few people pass along his route these days in any direction which he does not approve, a:ld that he therefore seldom has ta use his gun. The more traffic passing through the canal for destinations other than Israel and the fewer the con- fiscations, the more drastic and effective does this prove the blockade ta he. 54. Nevertheless there has been active intervention by the Egyptian authorities in dozens of cases where sovereign countries have righteously declined to be intimidated by the existence of the re1:i~rictive regulations themselves. The Egyptian authorities have drawn up a "black list" of ships bearing certain materials to Israel, and penalties are imposed upon these vessels when they serk again to pass through the canal. The disem- barkation of their crews on Egyptian soil is forbidden and - what is more important - water and fuel are withheld. By the middle of 1950, the number of ships on this "black list" had already reached 88, of which 70 were oil tankers - and this for the crime of attempting to trade peacefully with Israel through an international waterway. This fully explains why such vessels have found it hard to exercise their free choice in respect of visiting Israel ports. 55. From time to time my Government has informed the Security Council of specific acts which illustrate the general incidence of the blockade. l will recount some of the most recent episodes. 56. On 31 October 1952, a cargo of meat on the Norwegian vessel Rimfrost, proceeding from Massawa ta Haïfa through the Suez Canal, was confiscated. 57. On 24 January 1953, the Danish ship Andreas Baye was detained in the Gulf of Elàth on its joumey from Elath to Mombasa. It was escorted by an armed corvette to an Egyptian command post and held for 24 hours. On its way back from Mombasa to Elath, this Danish vessel was again held up at the entrance to the Gulf on 10 March 1953 and held against its will for 33 hours. 58. On 2 September 1953, the Greek ship Pa: 'on was detained at Port Said on its voyage from I-_ 'a with a cargo of building materials for Elath';nd of Israel-manufactured motor cars destined for Mombasa. The ship was detained by the Egyptian authorities for Il days and its cargo forcibly held. 59. On 4 November 1953, the Norwegian vessel Rintfrost was again detained in the canal on its way from Elath to Haïfa and twofishing boats on board destined for Italy were confiscated. 62. On 20 December 1953, a cargo of clothing and bicycles en route from Melbourne in Australia to Genoa was confiscated from the Norwegian ship Lantan on the grounds that the ship had an Israel port as its destination. 63. On 1 January 1954, Egyptian gunfire was directed at the entry of the Gulf of Aqaba against the Italian ship Maria Antonia on the way from Massawa ta Elath. The ship was forcibly compelled to return to its port of origin. 64. Other maritime Powers are in possession of in- formation about many more incidents than these, which have come to my Government's specific notice by reason of the destination ta which the ships were proceeding. 65. On some of these and other occasions, confiscated cargoes were released after protests by the Govern- ments of Norway, Greece, Italy and Ethiopia, or after representations in Cairo by other governments, or pellhaps because it was deemed that sufficient damage had beên done to the trade concerned through the deterrent effect, through the damage of perishable cargoes, or the enormously inflated costs imposed by such delays. Such acts of presumed condescension, however, are entirely irrelevant except in so far as they imply an Egyptian admission of the illegality of these seizures, or in so far as they prove that really vigorous concerted action by the United Nations, supported particularly by the maritime Powers, might well have the effect of bringing about the total annul- ment of these regulati01l's. This - the total annulment of these regulations - is our minimal objective. For the release of any isolated ship or cargo is not of the slightest substantive interest te my Government and does not constitute any degree whatever of compliance by Egypt with the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951. Indeed, there has been no change whaœver in this pattern of regular confiscation and occasional release, no change whatever in that pattern as between the periods preceding and succeeding the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951. For these specifie interferences are merely a subsidiary part of a blockade poliey which works mainly by the very existence and general application of the illicit regula- tions. Most shipping which wishes to trade with Israel has been effectively driven off the route by the existence of tl-te regulations; and the restrictions and humiliations of the kind which 1 have described and of which 50 many maritime countries have been the victims are merely destined to render an almost total blockade completely watertight. 67. There is, of course, no legal or generic difference between the character of these two acts, between restrictions at Suez and those in the Gulf of Aqaba, and both are covered by the Security Coundl resolution of 1 September 1951, a:s weIl as by the General Armistice Agreement. Either Egypt may exercise the rights of \Var at sea against Israel, or it may not. If it may, then it could conceivably practise its blockade policy bath in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba if in the former ca'se it were prepared as it seems to be, to ignore the Constantinople Convention. If, however, the situation of law under the Armistice Agreement is that Egypt may not justifiably exercise the rights of war at sea, then such exereise is equally illegal whether practised at Port Said in the Suez Canal or in an international waterway leading into the Gulf of Aqaba. 68. 'While the Security Coundl resolution of 1 September 1951 inc1udes a specifie ban on restrictions against shipping in the Suez Canal, since at that time the hlockade was practised there alone, the same resolu- ~ion destroys the legal basis for all similar practices ln an other waters. In this connexion, special importance attach~s, to parag~aphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Security Councll s resolutlOn of 1 September 19511., which constitute a general denial by the Security Council of the Egyptian doctrine of belli~rent rights and there~ore of any actions' anywhere based upon that doctrme. Paragraph 5 determined, without specific reference to any particular waterway, that: 67. Il va sans dire que ces deux actes ne diffèrent ni en droit, ni en fait; rien ne différencie ces restrictions, qu'elles soient appliquées à Suez ou dans le golfe d'Akaba. Elles sont toutes vilSées tant par la résolution que le Conseil de sécurité a adoptée le 1er septembre 1951 que par la Convention d'armistice général. De deux choses l'une: l'Egypte peut exercer contre Israël des droits de belligérance en mer, ou elle ne le peut pas. Dans l'ar."firmative, il seraît concevable que l'Egypte po~rsttive sa politique de blocus, aussi bien dans le canal de Suez que dans le golfe d'Akaba, étant entendu que, dans le cas du canal de Suez, l'Egypteseraît disposée, ainsi qu'elle semble l'être, à méconnaître la Conven- tion de Constantinople. Si, en revanche, la Convention d'armistice constitue pour l'Egypte une interdiction juridique d'exercer valablement des droÏ'is de belli- gérance en mer, l'exercice de ces droits est de ce fait également illégal à Port-Saïd, dans le canal de Suez, et lSur toute voie maritime internationale ahoutissant dans le golfe d'Akaba. 68. S'il est vrai que la résolution du Conseil de sécurité adoptée le 1er septembre 1951 interdit expres- sément toutes restrictionlS au mouvement des navires de commerce dans le canal de Suez - car le blocus n'était à l'époque appliqué que dans cette région- cette même résolution enlève tout fondement juridique à des agissements analogues sur toute autre voie mari- time. Il y a lieu à ce sujet d'attacher une. importance particulière aux paragraphes 5, 6, 7 et 8 de la résolution du 1er septembre 1951, par laquelle le Conseil de: sécurité a rejeté dans son ensemble la doctrine égyp- tienne des droits de belligérance et, partant, tout act/e, où qu'il soit commis, fondé sur cette doctrine~ En efff~t, le paragraphe 5 dispose .ce qui suit, sal.s préciser aUc~ne voie JUaritime donnée: This same injunction is repeated in general language in the ensuing three paragraphs. 69. Thus, the Security Couneil's denial of the concept of belligerency wa:s not restricted to any particular area Of the high seas. 70. In a memorandum which 1 addressed on my Government's hehalf to the Security Council on 11 July 1951 [S/2241J,' 1 e..'Cpressed the apprehension that unless the blockade practice at Suez was checked "there is disquieting evidence that... it will become increasingly extended to other waters." Unhappily, this has proved to he the case. 1 have no doubt what- ev€r that since the Security Couneil has denounced the original blockade practice, it will, with increased vigour, condemn a defiant extension of that practice. There can he no question that if the soverign Govem- ment of Ethiopia, or any other govemment in Asia or Africa, desires to trade with the 'sovereign Govern-' ment of Israel, whether through the Suez Canal water- way or through the Gulf of Aqaba, and if the sovereign Government of Italy, or of Greece, or of Denmark, wishes to make its shipping availa:ble for sucb trade, then it is an encroachment by Egypt upon the sover.: eignty of aIl those countries when it attempts to impose upon them its policy of boycott and blockade. Whether other countries seU oil or food or clothing or any article whatsoever, to Israel, and whether they import any article whatsoever from Israel, is a matter.falling within their exclusive diseretion, and one over which Egypt has not the slightest right to impose its own wiU against their consent. These countries are not colonies of Egypt, and are not called upon to subject their commercial or economic policies or relations with Israel to Egypt's condescension or agreement. 71. Any claim by Egypt that in the Gulf of Elath it is merely exercising the rights of sovereignty in territorial waters w01.lld of course be totally frivolous since it is a physical geographical fact that there is no way for a ship to approach any place on the northern shore of that narrow gulf without passing through the territorial waters of any or aU of four countries---: Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 72. We should thus arrive at the absurdity that any one of those four governments could, at any time use its armed force in the straits of Aqaba to prevent a ship from reaching any other of the three littoral States. It is not difficult to conceive what a maritime jungle would he created by such a ludierous theory. Inter- national law and practice on such questions is quite clear and explicit. 1 shaH also be able, if necessary, to offer documentary proof in my Govemment's possession that the Egyptian Government knows and has stated in writing to another friendly government that inter- ference .with free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba is contrary to international law. In any case, however, the blockade practice at Elath is 'specifically ruled out, first by article II, paragraph 2, of the Armistice Agreement, forbidding any war-like or hostile acts; second, by the interpretation of .Ml". Bunche and General Riley that aU acts of blocka.de' are rul~ out 73. I therefore summarize the sombre course of events since the adoption of the Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951. The regulations originally denounced by the Security Council have been retained in full force, with the result that the deterrent blockade has become increa:singly tightened. There have been many active interventions against the ships of many countries. These numbers have increased, with adverse immediate effects and with the purpose of closing any loopholes through which legitimate naviga- tion and commerce may still take place. The restrictions have been extended to the Gulf of Aqaba in violation of the Armistice Agreement and of the Security Council resolutions of 11 August 1949, 17 November 1950, and 1 September 1951. In the Suez Canal itself new restrictions have been introduced, in addition to those already defined as illegal, and wider categories of goods are brought under the abusive practice of visit., search and 'Seizure. Although even without tilis exten- sion, the maintenance of the existing categories would be a sufficient offeuce. Special regulations are report'ed to have been instituted to interfere with shipping passing through th ~ Suez Canal to Elath. And what is more important than whether there is a new regulation or not, ships passing between Haifa and Elath are inter- fered with, whether it be under an old decree or a newone. 74. Another development in this period, 'equally grave, is the publication of a memorandum, ascribed by the Egyptian press to the Govemment of Egypt, setting out the reasons for these new restrictions. The operative part of this memorandum reads as follows: "The Anti-Israel Boycott Committee" - that includes aU the members of the Arab League- "asked for the passing of legislation designed to tighten the siege against Israel bath by confiscating ail Israeli goods of all kinds and by seizing aU ships carrying goods to or from Israel, as is being practised .in all other Arab countries. The Arab governments also asked Egypt to take appropriate measures in order to confiscate food shipments going to Israel through Egyptian territorial waters in a manner similar to the measures undertaken by the Governments of Iraq, Syria and Jordan. These governments have not made any distinction between war contraband and food. They are confiscating all shipments going to or coming from Israel as they consider them to be enemy property. "In view of the fact that modem wars are characterized by the total mobiJization of an economic resources in 'Support of the war potential, as weIl as by the direct or indirect participation of the peoples in the heIligerent states, it has hecome difficu1t to distinguish between the fighting forces and the civilian population, and hetween the supplies destined for one or the other of them. 1t has there- fore hecome customary in international relations to regard aIl imports of a belligerent state as war contraband. Consequently, Egypt has to take sterner measures to attain the desired end." That is the text of a memorandum published in the Egyptian Press and ascribed to the Government of Egypt. 75. The Security Couneil will note that this memo- randum is a document of rare insolence, for it adduces in support of the Egyptian practice a series of arguments, every single one of which has been cate- gorically rejected by the Security Couneil in its resolution of 1 September 1951. 76.. Now the Security Couneil cannot fail to ask itself in astonishment on what grounds these illegal acts cano possibly he justified by Egypt against this accumulated weight of international CenSU:fê. On no single occasion have the Egyptian authorities been able to find such justification except in terms of arguments already heard and rejected by the Security Couneil itself in 1951. 77. Let me therefore analyze briefly what these arguments have been. First, Egypt has contended that there exists a state of war between Egypt and Israel, . and that Egypt consequently has an alleged "right" to perform hostile acts against Israel. The fact is, however, that no sncb legitimate "state of war" exi'sts. Egypt has never declared war against Israel or requested international recognition of such a decJaration. l leave aside whether, under the regime of the Charter, a declaration of war would entitle a country to belligerent rights. The Egyptian assau1t upon Israel was confessed by the Egyptian represen- tative in the Security Coundl 10 have arisen on Egyptian initiative witllout a declaration of war. On that occasion, the United States representative in the Security Couneil, on 22 May 1948 [302nd meeting], referred to this assault as an aggression of international character, and other representatives endorsed that definition. 50, far from according recognition to this attack, the Security Couneil urgently requested Egypt not to launch it at aIl, and to bring it '10 an end as soon as it had been launched.. 75. Le Conseil de sécurité notera sans doute qu'il s'agit là d'un document d'une rare insolence, car il cite, à l'appui des pratiques égyptiennes, une série d'arguments dont chacun a été catégoriquement re- jeté par le Conseil de sécurité, dans sa résolution du 1er septembre 1951. 76. Le Conseil de sécurité ne peut manquer de 'Se demander avec étonnement quelles raisons l'Egypte peut invoquer pour justifier des actes illicites con- damnés sans cesse par l'opinion internati'Ûnale. Les autorités égyptiennes n'ont jamais pu trouver de raison valable et elles n'ont pu que recourir à des arguments que le Conseil a déjà entendus et rejetés en 1951. 77. Permettez-moi d'analyser ces arguments de façon très brève. Tout d'abord, l'Egypte prétend que l'état de guerre existe entre elle et Israël et que, par con- séquent, elle a le "droit" de se livrer à des actes hostiles contre Israël. En vérité, il n'y a pas, en droi1t, d'état de guerre entre les deux pays. L'Egypte n'a jamais déclaré la guerre à Israël ni demandé à la communauté internationale de reconnaître une telle déclaration de guerre. Je n'ai pas l'intention d'examiner si, sous l'empire de la Charte, un pays qui déclare la guerre acquiert de ce fait les droits d'une Puissance belligérante: Le représentant de l'Egypte au Conseil de sécurité a admis que l'initiative de l'attaque contre Israël venait de l'Egypte et qu'elle ~'avait été précédée d'aucune déclaration de guerre. A cette occasion, le 22 mai 1948 [302ème séamce] , le représentant des Etats-Unis au Conseil de sécurité a qualifié cette action d'agression de "caractère international", et d'autres représentants ont approuvé cette définition. Loin donc de reconnaître la légitimité de cette attaque, le Conseil de sécurité a demandé instamment à l'Egypte de ne pas l'entreprendre, puis, lorsqu'elle fut déclenchée, d'y mettre fin. 79. Even earlier, in April 1949,· it had been reported from the headguarters of the United Nations Con- ciliation Commission for Palestine then at Lausanne that: "Arab representative~have informed the Palestine Conciliation Commission that as there had never bet:n a formaI state of war with Israel, no formaI peace treaty with Israel can he signed." 80. The Security Council can now draw its own conclusions about this selective theo~y of a state of war. When Egypt wishes to import arms, or dec1ines to sign a peace treaty, it claims virtuously that no state of war ever existed. When it cornes to searching desperately for legal grounds on which to justify a blockade, a full-grown "state of war" springs into miraculous existence for the first time, long after the signature of an agreement signifying the end of hostil- ities. 81. This must be the first time in international history that a state of war has originated from hostilities long after their official aIlld permanent termination. 82. Final1y, this Egyptian argumenil: based on a "state of war" is refuted in paragraph 5 of the Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951. It was also dismissed in the discussion bythe representatives of France (552nd meeting, paras. 19, 20 and 30), the United Kingdom (552nd meeting, paras. 7 and 10), the Netherlands (553rd meeting, para. 15) and Brazil (552nd meeting, paras. 54-57). 1 shaH quote only one of these statements, that of the Brazilian r{';presentative, who correctly pointed out: "... 1 must say that the Council should not allow the thesis of the existence of a state of war between Israel and the other signatories of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 to justify the resort to hostile acts by any of the· parties. .. Should we accept. the Egyptian thesis, we would he bound to recognize any measures of reprisaI adopted by the Isra:el Government. It i'S obvious that in the exchange of hostile acts that would follow, we could hardly expect to lay the foundations of il definite solution to the Palestine question." 84. The Security Council naturally had no difficulty in dismissing this argument in 1951. It is quite itn/l11aterial to ask what other 'l.rmistice treaties have contained or have not contained. The content of any other armistice agreement in the history of the world is entirely irrelevant to the Security Council's decision. Sorne armistice agreements have been similar to peace treaties, and others have been little more than military truces, but it matters nothing. The on~~T issue is what is allowed or what is not allowed under this Armistice Agreement signed between Israel and Egypt at Rhodes on 24 Feb:ruary 1949. This agreement utterly and categorically forbids the continuation or resumption of any hostile acts. The United Nations Chief of Staff cogently made this point when he addressed the repre- sentatives of Egypt and Israel at a meeting of the Special Committee. Referring ta the Egyptian doctrine of a state of war, he said: "Certainly there was no declaration of war ; it was a question ofacceptance or non-acceptance of the Security Council resolution of 1948" - calling for a cease-fire - "... certainly in their spirit and letter the Armistice Agreements had no thought of a resumption of hostilities . .. You may. quote all the international authorities in the world on armistice agreements, but when you check your own Armistice Agreement" - he said to the representatives of Egypt and Israel- "you will find that it is almost unique in history. The parties them6e1ves have evolved in this Armistice Agreement certain prin- ciples on which international jurists have yet to write books, and certairJy this Armistice Agreement does not in any way, shape or form justify either party talking about the resumption of war," From this he drew his conclusion againsts belligerent rights and the right of blockade. 85. .The same view, as we have seen, was taken by the Security Council in its resolutions of Il August 1949, 17 November 1950 and 1 September 1951, stat' Ig that this Armistice Agreement of 24 February 19+9 forbids all hostile acts. Many members of the Security Council supported this view by rejecting the Egyptian thesis tha:t this pllrticular: Armistice Agreement allowed the signatories to continue acts of hostility. don~ compatibles avec l'exercice continu des droits de belligérance. Or, comme la Convention égypto-israé- lienne porte également dans son titre le mot "armistice", elle doit être absolument identique à tous les autres traités dont le titre comprend ce mot et doit donc coexister avec des actes d'hostilité. Le représentant de l'Egypte part donc du principe que, du simple fait qu'elles contiennent ce mot magique d' "armistice", toutes les conventions d'armistice ne possèdent qu'un seul attribut et qu'une 'Seule qualité essentielle. 84. En 1951, le Conseil de sécurité n'a, bien entendu, éprouvé aucune difficulté à réfuter cet argument. Il importe peu, en effet, de savoir ce qu'il y avait et ce qu'il n'y avait pas dans d'autres traités d'armistice. Le contenu de n'importe quelle autre convention d'ar- mistice conclue dans le passé n'a absolument rien à voir avec la décision du Conseil. Certaines conventions d'armistice ressemblaient à des t.raités de paix, d'autres n'étaient guère quP. des accords de suspension d'armes; mais cela n'a aucune importance. La seule question qui se pose est de 'Savoir quels sont le, actes que la Convention d'armistice signée pa, Ismél et l'Egypte à Rhodes, le 24 février 1949, autorise et quels sont ceux qu'elle interdit. Or cette convention interdit explicitement et catégoriquement la continua.tion ou la reprise d'actes d'hostilité. Le Chef d'état-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies chargé de la su~'­ veillance de la trêve a fait ressortir ce point très clai- rement lorsqu'il s'est adressé aux représentants de l'Egypte et d'Israël au cours d'une séance du Comité spécial. Parlant de la doctrine égyptienne relative à l'état de guerre, il a dit: "Bien entendu, il n'y a pas eu de dédaratiC''' de guerre; il s'agissàit uniquement de l'acceptation ou de la non-acceptation de la résolution que le Conseil de sécurité avait adoptée en 1948" [pour inviter les parties à cesser le feu] "... Il ne fait pas de doute que ni l'esprit ni la lettre des conventions d'armistice ne prévoyaient une reprise des hostilités... Vous pouvez citer tous les experts internationaux qui font autorité en matière d'accords d'armistice, mais si vous consultez votre propre convention d'armistice - a-t-il dit aux représentants de l'Egypte et d'Israël - vous verrez qu'elle est presque unique dans l'his- toire. Dans cette convention d'armistice, les parties elles-mêmes ont défini certains principes sur les- quels les juristes internationaux n'ont pas encore écrit d'ouvrages, et il est certain que cette convention d'armistice n'autorise aucune des parties à parler d'une reprise de la guerre." C'est de cette déclaration qu'il a tiré ensuite ses con- clusions réfutant l'existence des droits de belligérance et du droit de blocus. 85. Comme nous l'avons déjà vu, le Conseil de sécu- rité a fait sienne cette manière de voir, déclarant, dans ses résolutions du Il août 1949, du 17 novembre 1950 et du 1er septembre 1951, que la Convention d'armistice du 24 février 1949 interdisait tous actes d'hostilité. De nombreux membres du Conseil de sécu- rité ont appuyé cette interprétation, en rejetant la thèse égyptienne selon laquelle la 'Convention d'armistice en H... the armistice reglme which bas been in existence hetween Egypt and Israel for nearly two and a half years differs from the classical type of armistice in 50 far as it is of an expressly permanent character and cannot therefore he annulled by a resttmption of hostilities; it can only reach its son~ sttnunation by endorsing the peace it has a1ready brottght about. Since neither State is actively a belligerent, there can be no justification for exercising the right of visit, search and seizure." 86. A third Eg}rptian argument, apart from the state of war and the quality of armistice agreements, bas stated that these restrictions are necessary for purposes of Hself-defence" or "self-preservation". 87. The Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951, in paragraph 8, determined on the contrary that the blockade p,ractice "cannot in the prevailing cir- cumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence". The doctrine of "self- defence" was specifically discussed and rejected by the representatives of the United Kingdom (550th meeting, paras. 93-94), Brazil (552nd meeting, para. 58), Ecuador (553rd meeting, para. 122), and the Netherlands (5S3rd meeting, paras. 15 and 18). The representative of the Netherlands correctly pointed Ottt that the right of self-defence defined in Article SI of our Charter e.1CÏsts only when an armed attack bas been carried out and even then only until sucb time as the Security Council bas intervened, and that neither of these two conditions has ever existed. Egypt has never been subjected to or threatened by an armed attack from Israel, although, as l have pointed out, Israel has been invaded by Egypt and is still a target of an Egyptian doctrine and practice of belligerency. On the other hand, the Security Coundl has been dealing with the Arab-Israel affair since May 1948. 88. With these arguments lying at its feet in ruins, Egypt had recourse in 1951, as again today, to the most wild and reckless manœuvres. Thus, it stated at one ,time that the Security Council lacked compe- tence to deal with the question. Little was heard of that assertion in the course of the debate, and l doubt if we shall hear it now. 89. The Security Council might find what l am now going to say hard to believe, but the Egyptian delegation asserted in 1951 [553rd ml8eting, paras. 98-110] that since five members of the Security Council had protested to Egypt against its maritime restrictions, they were parties to a "dispute" and should not be allowed to vote in the Secüïity Council. This nonsense wasted the Council's time for 48 hours, which was presumably its solitary objective. 90. At other ti~es Egypt has taken refuge in perhaps the most irrelevant argument of all, namely that there are other questions outside Suez affecting the relations of Israel with its neighbours in which the Arab States Il ••• Depuis près de deux an's et demi existe entre l'Egypte et Israël un armistice qui se distingue des armistices classiques en ce sens qu'il a un carac- tèrr expressément permanent, qu'il ne peut, par définition, se résoudre par un retour aux hostilités et qu'il ne doit arriver à sa consonunation que par la consécration de la paix qu'il a déjà introduite. Puisqu'il n'y a pas, entre les deux pays, de belli- gérance active, il n'y a pas non plus de fondement à l'exercice des droits de visite, de perquisition et de saisie." 86. Après avoir invoqué les droits de belligérance et la nature des conventions d'armistice, l'EID-rpte a avancé un troisième argument, selon lequel elle aurait recouru à ces restrictions pour pouvoir exercer ainsi son droit de "légitime défense" et de "conservation". 87. Au contraire, le Conseil de sécurité constatait, au paragraphe 8 de sa résolution du 1er septembre 1951, "qu'il est impossible, dans les circonstances présentes, de justifier ces pratiques [de blocus] en alléguant que des raisons de légitime défense le'1. ren- dent indispensables". La doctrine de la "légitime dé- fense" a été rejetée après discussion par les repré- sentants du Royaume-Uni (550ème séance, par. 9$ et 94), du Brésil (552ème séance, par. 58), de l'Eg,uateur (553ème 'séance, par. 122) et des Pays-Bas (553ème séance, par. 15 et 18). Le représentant des Pays-Bas a signalé à juste -titre que le droit de "légitimJe défep.se", tel qu'il est défini à l'Article 51 de la Charte, n'existait qu'en cas d'agression armée et, là encore, il n'était valable que jusqu'à ce que le Conseil de sécurité soit intervenu. Or, a-t-il ajouté, aucune de ces deux conditions n'a été remplie. Israël n'a jamais soumis l'Egypte à une agression armée et n'a jamais menacé ce pays d'une pareille agression. En revanche, conune je l'ai signalé, l'Egypte a envahi Israël, qui est toujours visé par la doctrine égyptienne de la belligé- rance et les conséquences que les Egyptiens en tirent. Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que le Conseil de sécu- rité s'occupe de l'affaire arabo-israélienne depuis le mois de mai 1948. 88. Tous ses arguments annihilés, l'Egypte a recours aujourd'hui, conune elle l'a fait en 1951, aux manœu- vres les plus extrêmes et les plus insensées. Ainsi, l'Egypte a déclaré. un j<.rur, que le Conseil de sécurité n'avait pas com.pétence pour examiner la question. On a fait peu de cas de cette affirmation au cours du débat, et je doute que nous l'entendions aujourd'hui. 89. Le Conseil de sécurité aura peut-être peine à croire ce que je vais dire, mais la délégation de l'Egypte a soutenu en 1951 [553ème séance, pat·. 98 à 110] que, puisque cinq membres du Conseil de sécu- rité avaient protesté auprès de l'Egypte contre les restrictions maritimes imposées par ce. pays, ces cinq membres devenaient de ce fait parties à un "différend" et ne devaient pas être autorisés à voter. Ces sornettes ont fait perdre quarante-huit heures au Conseil, ce qui était, il faut le croire, leur seul objet. 90. Une autre fois, l'Egypte a eu recours à ce qui est peut-être le plus étrange de tous les a.rguments à savoir qu'il y a d'autres questions, en dehors de c~lle du canal de Suez, qui affectent les relations entre

The President has antici- Pated my intention. 1 do propose to accept the view that nothing outside the Suez Canal matter may be discussed under this item. The document which has been cir- culated has no official status at aIl until and unless it is read. It is simply an act of courtesy ta give the Press a genel'al oudine of what is to be said. On my copy, however, this has been eliminated with the sole single generalization, which 1 think is in the spirit of the President's remarks, that the answer to any question affecting other complaints is that aIl parties have a right and duty to do what Israel has done in the Suez Canal case - namely, to take aIl complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission; then, if there is an appeal, to the Special Committee; and finally, if a solution is not reached, to the Security Council itself, where aIl problems will doubtless be considered on their merits - but that the position relating to another com- olaint with respect to the armistice cannot possibly have ân effect upon the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the Suez Canal blockade restrictions. 93. Is not the duty of the Security Couneil, therefore, clear and urgent? Every consideration of international principle and regional peace requires the confirmation and reinforcement by the Security Counei! of its estab- lished policy. 94. Such action is required, in the first place, to save the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement from total coIlapse. For how can such a treaty function effectively between two parties, one of whi,ch regards it as a total ' renuneiation of hostile acts, while the other interprets it as a cIoak for acts of unilateral war? My Government is not prepared to acquiesce in such a travesty, or to suffer acts of war without due response. 95. On this matter of the mutuality of the ar"1istice, the representative of the United States, two and a balf years ago, said (552nd meeting, para. 44] : "The United States is firmly of the opinion tbat the restrictions which Egypt is exercising over ships passing through the Suez Canal are inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Armistice Agreement ... The result of this hostile act is the engendering of hostility in return which places in jeopardy the peace and stability of that area." 96. Indeed, what value couid be attached to other armistice decisions, to other requests and verdicts, if in qu'~ucune antre question que celle du canal de Snez ne peut être examinée au cours du présent débat. Le document qui a été distribué n'a aucun caractère officiel tant qu'il n'a pas été lu devant le Conseil. La distribution de ce texte, dictée par un souci de cour- toisie, devait simplement fournir à la presse les grandes lignes de mon intervention. Sur l'exemplaire que je lis, tout ce qui est étranger à la question a été supprimé et je me suis borné à dire d'une façon générale - et je crois me conformer à l'esprit qui a dicté l'observation du Président - que pour toute question relative à d'autres plaintes, les parties ont le droit et le devoir de faire ce qu'Israël a fait pour la question du canal de Suez, à savoir: saisir la Commission mixte d'armistice, puis, s'il y a lieu, faire appel devant le Comité spécial ct, enfin, si l'affaire n'est pas réglée, saisir le Conseil de sécurité lui-même, où toutes les questions recevront. sans aucun doute la solution qui convient. En tout cas, ce qui a trait à une plainte relative à une violation de la Convention d'armistice ne peut avoir aucun effet sur le caractère licite ou illicite des mesures de blocus appliquées dans le canal de Suez. 93. Dès lors, le devoir du Conseil de sécurité n'est-il pas clair et pressant? La norme internationale et la paix régionale exigent absolument que le Conseil de sécurité confirme et accentue sa politique antérieure. 94. Le Conseil de sécurité doit agir ainsi, tout d'abord, pour éviter la ruine totale de la Convention d'armistice général égypto-israélienne. En effet, comment une telle convention peut-elle régir efficacement les rapports entre deux parties dont l'une y voit l'interdiction absolue de tout acte d'hostilité, tandis que l'autre s'en sert pour couvrir les actes de guerre auxquels elle se livre unila- téralement? Mon gouvernement n'est pas disposé à accepter une telle défurmation de la ConventiOil d'armis- tice, ni à subir des actes de belligérance sans y répondre. 95. Sur cette question de la réciprocité des obligations nées de la Convention d'armistice, le représentant 'des Etats-Unis d'Amérique a déclaré, il y a deux ans et demi (552ème séance, par. 44].: "Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis est fermement convaincu que les restrictions imposées par l'Egypte au passage des navires par le canal de Suez sont incompatibles avec l'esprit et l'intention de la Con- yention d'armistice... Le résultat de cet acte d'hos- tilité est d'engendrer des représailles et, par consé- quent, de mettre en danger la paix et la stabilité politique dans la région." 96. Quelle valeur peuvent, en effet, garder d'autres décisions ou d'autres requêtes intervenues sous le 98. With reference to the obligatory character of the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951, let me recaU that in the Security Council's debates in 1948, the present Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, expressed himself vehemently concerning the optional character of General Assembly resolutions. He said [255th meeting] : "We do not choose to comply with the General Assembly's resolution on Palestine. This is our privilege under the Charter." 99. Whatever the juridical merits of that Egyptian view concerning other organs of the United Nations, the fact remains that Egypt has, by its signature, recog- nized the Security Council's authority to supervise the Egyptian-1srael General Armistice Agreement. 100. 1t is clear from this fact and from our Charter that in such matters affecting international peace and security as the rights of war or hostile acts, decisions taken by· this Council, such as that handed down on 1 September 1951, possess a far greater legal and moral force than do the resolutions of any other international bocly. A grave moment will be reached in the history of the Security Coundl if this precedent for total defiance of its will becomes more firmly established. 101. Beyond the integrity of the armistice system and the authority of the Security Council, which are both in deadly hazard, there arise in this case the great prin- ciples of international law relating to free navigation, principles sanctioned by long usage in the past and never violated except at the risk of war. In November 1951, a Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, established by the American Association for the United Nations, cogently declared: "To permit particular countries to take advantage of territorial. propinquity, as newspaper reports indicate that Egypt is doing, will certainly provoke controversy and, perhaps, result in a threat to the peace." "Permettre à certains pays de tirer avantage de leur proximité territoriale, comme, d'après la presse ce serait le cas de l'Egypte, c'est certainement sus~ citer des controverses, et cela risque même de compromettre la paix:' 103. Another issue, then, is the peace of the Middle East, which is bound to recede even further into the future if the existing armistice agreements, based in the last resort on Security Council resolutions, are aUowed to degenerate into a sequence of hostile acts, and if the spiritual basis of the agreements is to be the doctrine of a legal state of war. 104. 50, too, will the economic welfare of our region be undermined if sanction is given ta these outrageous, wasteful practices, forcing States in the area to depend on remote markets and sources of supply, thus re- maining artificially dependent on external assistance. 105. \i\'hile Israel is the avowed target of these illegal policies, we cannot fail to be inspired and encouraged by the messages of solidarity and support which have reached us on this issue from so many maritime coun- tries - both within and outside the Security Council- whose legitimate freedom to navigate the seas in peace is an essential clement of their welfare and security. 106. The question now before the Security Council is not whether Egypt's conduct is legitimate or illegi- timate, or indeed whether Egypt should terminate its illegal practices. The illegality of Egypt's practices and its obligation to abandon them havt: atready been dearly determined. The main tas _. now is to devise measures for the prompt fulfilment of the Council's decision so as to safeguard the freedom of international waterways from interference based on daims of belligerency, and thus to secure respect of Egypt's obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations. Perhaps the most frustrating feature of that situation is that Egypt's compliance with the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951 would involve no difficulty, no danger tt) Egypt. It could be done overnight by a stroke of the pe~ê_ Tt would involve no prejudice to Egypt's economy or security, no burden upon its political or ecollomic freedom. There has never in history been a Security Council resolutioll with which it was more easy to comply. 107. Moreover, in this very Security Council, in its 175th meeting on 5 August 1947, the Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha, while justly emphasizing the absoluteness of EgypWm sovereignty over every inch of Egyptian soil, stated that the Suez Canal was "an international artery, open to aIl nations in time of peace and in time of war". 109. The leaders of my Government have stated on many occasions that they have no desire whatever ta impede the full attainment of Egypt's legitimate national aspirations, and 1 am empowered to reiterate that assurance here. But how remarkably would Egypt's prestige and authority be exalted throughout the world for the benefit of its wider cause if, by the 'abandonment of these ilIicit regulations, it were to demonstrate its respect for international agreements and its concern for the undoubted rights of other countries near and far 1 110. For these reasons, it is hard ta imagine how the Security Council could render a more significant con- tribution to the peace of the Middle East and to the world than by gathering the full weight of its influence behind its declared policy of complete termination of these restrictions. Rarely could a single success com- municate such wide influences of benefit ta so many sectors of international Iife. 111. Accordingly, the Government of Israel requests the Security Council to bring about the immediate and total cessation of aIl belligerent practices and restric- tions both in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Elath. We urge the Counci! ta safeguard its own dignity by rescuing its previously adopted resolution from contempt. 112. We consider that the Security Council cannot pass, without the strongest censure, over the fact that its verdict has already been defied for so long. \Ve hold that on this occasion the Security Council should not be content with a vigorous expression of its desire, which, 1 am certain, will be forthcoming; but that it should aiso establish such machineries and procedures as will enable it to follow up the course of its resolutions and to receive regular reports on the fulfilment or non- fulfilment of its behest. In calling for the total can- ce11ation of aIl these restrictions, old and new, which have already been the subject of the Security Council's categorical opposition, my Government dedicated itself to the prosecution of this case ta its ultimate Iimit. 113. The continuation of a hostile act, based on the assertion of a state of war, in prolonged and deliberate defiance of a Security Council resolution, c1early creates the kind of situation to which the enforcement measures laid down in Chapter VII of the Charter should pro- perlyapply. My Government beHeves that the Security Council should take such measures in response to Egypt's violation, unless it receives assurance in this debate, as we a11 hope it will, that the restrictions will he immediately cancelled. 114. We reserve our right to engage the constant attention of the Security Council in this matter until such time as these restrictions are totally abandoned. Their abolition will be art event of high importance, hringing deep satisfaction ta the world community, high credit and advantage to Egypt, and blessed relief to the security and welfare of the Middle East. i '''In the opmlOn of my delegation, the Security Council is not the most appropriate body for the adjudication of questions involving complicated legal issues. The draft resolution before us seeks to avoid the legal issues involved. "My delegation feels that questions regarding the legal rights of the parties cannot be brushed aside as mere technicalities." 119. At the same meeting of the Council, .the repre- sentative of China spoke as follows [553rd meeting, para. 40] : "The draft seems to have assumed the validity of, the claim that the measures adopted by Egypt in the Suez Canal are in violation of general international law and the provisions of the Suez Canal Convention and the Armistice Agreements. In our opinion, that is a point yet to be proved." 120. In spite of these serious remarks and in spite of Article 27 of the Charter, a majority of the Council, for reasons which 1 should not Iike at present to discuss in detail, went so far as to adopt a decision described as a politicai one without, as 1 have already said, being able seriously to contest our rights. 121. At the 552nd meeting of the Council, the meeting at which the representative of the United Kingdom presented on behalf of the three Powers the draft resolution which was later adopted by the Council, he twice made the following statement. He said [552nd meeting, para. 10] : "For the reasons which 1 have already stated, the draft resolution does not attempt to say whether or "Pour les raisons que j'ai déjà indiquées, le projet n'essaie pas de préciser si 'l'Egypte est ou non fondée, 122. Thus the Couneil arrived at a resolution which, it was said, contemplated the establishment of peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab countries. Some delegations, believing that such a resolution might promote the development of peaceful tendencies in the Middle East, thought it their dutY to vote for that resolution. 123. It is unfortunate that the Council resolution of 1 September 1951, which certainly had some very praiseworthy aims in view, should be..used today by Israel as a propaganda weapon for camouflaging its premeditated acts of aggression. 124. Members of the Council and world public opinion will sure1y recall the resolution adopted on 24 November 1953 in which, after considering the inhtiman acts committed by the armed forces of Israel at Qibya, the Security Council was compelled to find that those acts constituted a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter andexpressed ...

1 wish to interrupt the representative of Egypt at this stage. 1 have read through page 3 of the Press release of his statement which has been handed to members of the Council. As I said earlier in this debate, it is not for me to presume that he is going necessarily to read what is written there, but the reference to Qibya is actually quite foreign to this discussion on the Suez Canal dispute. He may not, as I say, be intending to read this, but on page 3 and down to the end of the first paragraph on page 4, which conc1udes with the word "aujourd'hui", he unquestionably goes on to discuss item (b) on the agenda.

I do not intend today to go into details con- cerning Egypt's complaint of violations of the Armi- stice Agreement at the demilitarized zone; but I think I am entitled to lay before the Council certa[n facts which constitute arguments in support of the Egyptian view of the Suez Canal affair. I do not intend to mix the two questions, but there is in the demilitarized zone a danger which threatens Egypt's secudty. To defend its territory and its very existence, Egypt is entitled and compelled to take certain measures in the Suez Canal. At the end of my statement 1 shaH lay before the Council aIl the documents concerning the second complaint in order to reply to statements which were made yesterday on the matter. 127. In my view, if 1 am prevented from stating certain facts in support of my delegation's contention, my right of reply is in fact being limited. 128. The PRESIDENT: 1 have read through page 3 of the Press re1ease and down to the end of the first paragraph on page 4. As· 1 understand the represen- tative of Egypt he intends ta read that. 129. Mr. ABDELRAZEK (Egypt) 1 think so.

There has been a reference ta Qibya, and l think that that matter has been adequately discussed. However, as l see it, the remarks on page 3 of the speech, after dealing with Qibya and commeneing "!'attrai à exposer", deal speeificalIy with item (b) of our agenda. If the representative of Egypt is determined to go on with it l will role him out of order, as l ruled out of order the statement comprised in the speech of the representative of Israel which he said he had no intention of reading. 134. l calI on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order. 135. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (translated trom Russian): l must recall that yesterday, when the President was asked for guarantees as a condition for the inclusion of item 2 (b) - the Egyptian complaint - in the Security Council's agenda, l pointed out that if these two questions - the I:3rael complaint against Egypt and the Egyptian com- ~ljnt. against Israel- were considereçl separately, it would be very difficult to maintain a meticulous and exact distinction between aIl the matters which might or might not be touched upon in the discussion of each of those complaints. J36. That was a perfect1y natural remark, especially' as I.;j' y<:sterday's decision of the Security Couneil both those complaints were included in the agenda under the single item "The Palestine question". 137. There will of course be many intersecting argu- ments on this matter. l quite understand that if both questions appear on the agenda as questions possessing - in addition to aIl that has been said - independent significanœ, then it will he in the interests of aIl con- cerned not ta confuse the discussion of these questions. 138. It was my understanding that the representatives of Israel and Egypt were bath agreed that these ques- tions should not he confused. 139. . But does this mean that it is impossible even ta mention a particular fact, even without commenting on it, or using it as an argument which might meet with objections and which consequent1y might lead the Security Couneil into a completely different discussion? It seems ta me that that would he an excessively rigid procedure. It would he a type of formalism incom- 136. La chose est toute naturelle, d'autant plus que le Con.:ieil a pris hier la décision d'inscrire les deux plaintes sous un seul et même point: "La question de Palestine". 137. Il est tout naturel qu'il y ait dans cette matière de nombreuses interférences. J'admets très hien que si les deux questions sont inscrites comme ayant une signification indépendante - en dehors de tout ce qui vient d'être dit - il y a tout intérêt à ne pas en mélanger l'examen. 138. S~ j'ai bien compris, le représentant d'Israël et le représentant de l'Egypte sont d'accord pour estimer qu'il ne faut pas mélanger ces deux questions. 139. Est-ce à dire, cependant, que nous ne puissions même pas mentionner tel ou tel fait, même sans y consacrer d'observations, sans l'employer dans notre argumentation, ce qui peut suseiter de l'opposition et par conséquent orienter le Conseil dans une tout autre voie? Il me semble que ce serait là procéder avec trop de rigueur. Ce serait faire preuve d'un formalisme qui ~ (b), that might be admissible·- although the distinc- tIon between mentioning the item and discussing it is rather fine. If he completed his reading of page 3 with the words "zone démilitarisée d'El Auja", that would not, it seems to me, exceed the limits of what was agreed upon yesterday. 1 do think, however, that the remainder of that page - or, at any rate, from the words "d'après le général Bennike" ta the words "moins grièvement blessés" - contains remarks which have the nature of discussion. sub~ile. Si en lisant la page 3, le représentant de l'Egypte s'arrête aux mots "zone démilitarisée d'El Auja", il ne dépassera pas, à mon avis, les limites que nous nous sommes fixées hier. J'estime cependant que dans le reste de la page 3 - ou tout au moins le passage qui commence aux mots "d'après le général Bennike" et s'arrête aux mots "moins grièvement blessés"- figurent des observations auxquelles s'applique le nom de "discussion". 147. Je prie le représentant de l'Egypte de bien vouloir facrliter ma tâche à cet égard. Le Conseil- ou du moins la majorité de ses membres - a convenu que nous ~47.. 1 ask the representative of Egypt to co-operate lU thIS respect. It has been made c1ear - at anY rate by the majority of the members of this Council- that 148. 1 appeal to the representativ,~ of Egypt to approach this matter in the light of the understanding reached yesterday by at least the majority of the mem- bers of the .Security Council. 149. Mr. ABDELRAZEK (Egypt) (translated trom French) : 1 am satisfied if the President has read page 3 of my statement; 1 am ready to meet his wishes and to co-operate with thl:\ Council. Shall 1 start with the complaint which is bèfore the Security Council today, or shaH 1 continue to read my statement at page 4? 150. The PRESIDENT: 1 should prefer it if the representative of Egypt would start with the second paragraph on page 4 of his text. 151. Mr. ABDELRAZEK (Egypt) (translated trom French): 1 should like, however, to lay before the Council sorne facts of undoubted significance to show the worth of the allegations made in Israel's complaint. 152. First, Israel accuses Egypt of illegal interference with shipping in the Suez Canal, by claiming in its memorandum [S/3168/Add.l] to the Conncil that "aIl ships passing through the canal are subject to arbitrary arrest and search". 153. May 1 be permitted to state in this connexion, on behalf of my Government, that since the adoption of the Security Couneil resolution of 1 September 1951 neither ship nor cargo has been confiscated by Egypt? 154. 1 wish to state further that since 1 September 1951, out of 32,047 ships passing through the Suez Canal, only 55 suspect ships have been inspected, or 0.17 per cent of the total. 155. Moreover, the monthly statistics of the Com- pagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez con- cerning the number of ships and the company's income afford a categorical denial of any allegation that Egypt is hindering the free use of the canal, sinee these statistics show a continuaI increase in the number of ships passing through the canal and a rise in the company's incorne. 156. It would be unreasonable to assume that a coun- try which, like Egypt, draws much of its national income from trade would take measures hindering the free flow of world commerce. 157. Second, Israel presumes to accuse us of com- mitting unlawful acts and of causing it grave harm by adding foodstuffs to the list of contraband of war. It is, however, to be observed that: (a) Under the international law of our time food- stuffs are undoubtedly to be regarded as contraband of war. 1 am prepared to cite to the Council five, or ten, or twenty authorities on international law to prove this. (b) In making out the list of commodities regarded as contraband, my Government has confined the seizure 154. Je voudrais déclarer de plus que depuis cette date du 1er septembre 1951, sur 32.047 bateaux tra- versant le canal de Suez, seulement 55 navires suspectés ont été soumis à la procédure d'inspection, soit 0,17 pour 100 ou 1,7 pour 1.000. 155. D'a~tre part, les statistiques mensuelles publiées par la Compagnie universeile du canal maritime de Suez concernant le nombre de navires et les revenus de la compagnie démentent catégoriquement toutes alléga- tions prétendant que l'Egypte gêne le libre passage du canal, car ces statistiques démontrent l'augmentation continuelle du nombre des navires traversant le canal ainsi que l'accroissement des revenus de la compagnie. 156. Il serait d'ailleurs il10gique de croire qu'un pays comme l'Egypte, dont une bonne partie du revenu national dépend de son commerce, prenne des mesures entravant la libre circulation du commerce mondial. 157. Deuxièmement, Israël prend la liberté de nous accuser de commettre des actes iUicites et de lui porter un préjudice grave en ajoutant les denrées alimentaires à la liste de la contrebande de guerre. Or il est à remarquer que: a) Il n'y a aucun doute qu'en droit international de notre époque, les denrées alimentaires sont considérées comme contrebande de guerre. A cet éga..d, je suis prêt à présenter au Conseil cinq, dix ou vingt ouvrages de droit international à l'appui de ma thèse. b) Mon gouvernement, en précisant la liste de mar- chandises considérées comme contrebande, a limité la JO d) Je crois que le., Conseil ne sera pas surpris, vu l'attitude toujours modérée de mon gouvernement, d'apprendre que mon gouvernement, en suivant sa scrupuleuse modération, n'a jamais appliqué la procé- dure de confiscation à aucune cargaison de produits alimentaires. (d) In view of my Government's consistently moderate attitude, the Council will not, 1 believe, be surprised to learn that, adhering to its attitude of scrupulous moderation, my Government has never applied the confiscation procedure to any cargo of foodstuffs. 158. Troisièmement, la délégation d'Israël consacre une partie importante de son mémoire à accuser l'Egypte d'avoir édicté un nouveau règlement qui serait appliqué à la navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba. Elle est allée dans ses allégations jusqu'au point de fixer la date du 25 janvier 1954 pour la promulgathn de ce prétendu nouveau règlement. 158. Third, the Israel delegation devotes a large part of its memorandum to accusing Egypt of issuing new regulations to be applied to shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. It went so far in its allegations as to name 25 January 1954 as the date of promulgation of these alleged new regulations. 159. 1 am in a position to say that these allegations are absolutely ullfounded. 159. Je suis en mesure de décli:lrer au Conseil que ces allégations sont dénuées de tout fondement. 160. l hesitate to en.ter now upon a detailed consider- ation of the fundament..<l.l legal questions raised by the Israel complaint. Let me be allowed to say, however, that Egypt's attitude cannot be described as defying the authority of the Security Couneil, or as contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Armistice Agreement signed in 1949 between Egypt and Israel. 160. J'hésite à aborder dès maintenant, d'une façon détaillée, les questions juridiques fondamentales sou- levées par la plainte d'Israël. Qu'il me soit pennis cependant de déclarer que la position de l'Egypte ne saurait être qualifiée comme défiant l'autorité du Conseil de sécurité, comme allant à l'encontre des principes de la Charte des Nations Unies et de la Convention d'ar- mistice signée en 1949 entre l'Egypte et Israël. 161. Pour répondre à ces allégations, il me suffit de poser les points suivants: 161. In reply to these allegations 1 need only make the following observations: 162. Although the SecurityCouncil resolution of 1 September 1951 related to a matter which in our view is outside the Couneil's jurisdiction; although the Couneil did not recognize the predominent importance of the legal aspect of the problem; although the Couneil chose a political solution which we regard as contrary tG the requirements of the political situation in the Near East; although Israel refuses to comply with the resolu- "tions of the various organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council itself - despit~ aIl this, my Government has at aIl times demonstrated its good will by refraini~g from exereising its most legitimate rights and by confining it~ action to what has been strictly necessary for its self-defence and self-pre- servation. 162. Bien que la résolution du Conseil de sécurité du 1er septembre 1951 soit rendue sur une matière qui, à notre avis, échappe à la compétence du Conseil de sécurité; bien que le Conseil n'ait pas tenu compte de la prédominance de l'aspect juridique du problème; bien que le Conseil ait choisi une solution poiitique qui nous semble contraire aux exigences de la situation politique dans le Proche-Orient; bien qu'Israël refuse de son côté de se soumettre aux résolutions des différents organes des Nations Unies - y compris le Conseil de sécurité lui-même - mon gouvernement n'a cessé de manifester sa bonne volonté en s'abstenant d'exercer ses droits les plus légitimes et en limitant son action aux mesures strictement nécessaires pour assurer sa légitime défense et son droit de conservation. 163. Egypt has never decreed or applied a blockade of the Suez Canal. Its action is confined to the boarding and inspection by customs employees of a very small number of suspected merchant vessels. Can such an attitude be described as defiance of the Security Council or as an abuse of some right? 163. L'Egypte n'a jamais décrété ou exercé un blocus du canal de Suez. Elle se borne à faire visiter et inspecter par les douaniers - et non pa~ l'armée- quelques navires marchands suspects, d'un nombre insi- gnifiant. Peut-on qualifier une pareille attitude d'un défi à l'égard du Conseil de sécurité ou d'Un abus d'un droit quelconque? 164. With regard to the General Armistice Agreement I would draw the Ccuncil's attention to the final decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission dated 12 June 1951. [S/2194], in which the Commission stated that it had no right to require the Egyptian Government to i"efrain from impeding the transport through the Sue:- Canal of goods consigned to Israel. 164. En ce qui concerne la Convention d'armistice, je voudrais attirer l'attention du Conseil sur la décision définitive de la Commission mixte d'armistice, en dace du 12 juin 1951 [S/2194], qui affirmait que cette com- ~ission.n'a,pas le droit d'exiger du <?ouverne111ent égyp- ben qu'lI n entrave pas le transport a travers le canal de Suez des marchandises destinées à Israël. 166. As regards the allegation by Israel that Egypt is violating the provisions of the Charter, 1 should like to be told plainly which Articles of the Charter my Government. is violating by exercising the powers undoubtedly inherent in its national sovereignty. 167. 1 shall do no more now than state this question, since 1 am certain that no deluge of insults can submerge the lofty principles of the Charter or impugn in any manner the honour of Egypt. 168. It follows from the foregoing that Israel's com- plaint cannat be accepted by the Security Council, in view of its nature and purpose and of the legitimate rights exercised by Egypt in conformity with the General Armistice Agreement signed at Rhodes on 24 February 1949, the Treaty of Constantinople signed on 29 October 1888 - ta article X of whi~ 1 draw the Council's attention - the provisions of the Charter, and the principles of international law. 169. My Government therefore instructs me to reserve its positions especially with regard ta the following matters: First: any act likely to limit or threaten the sovereign rights of Egypt. Second: any ~ct calculated to deprive us of our rights derived from the principles of justice and equity and the provisions o~ the United Nations Charter, including Article 27. . 170. 1 beg the President to give me an opportunity of stating my Government's point of view in detail at a subsequent meeting, and ta grant me a reasonable time to study thoroughly the arguments put forward today by the Israel representative. 171. In expressing my hearty thanks once again to the President and the members of the Security Council for permitting me ta speak today, 1 wish ta express my gratitude to the Council for the realistic and mod~rn attitude it has shawn in agreeing to place on its agenda the Egyptian complaint against Israel concerning violations by Israel of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement ~.t the demilitarized zone of El Auja (5/3172). 172. 1 shall not deal with this matter today, but at the appropriate time l shaH be at the Council's lisposal ta give any information likely to assist it in finding a just and equitable solution. 1 beg members ta read page 3 of my statement. 173. The PRESIDENT: The Secutity Council has now heard a lengthy statement by the representative of Israel and one of some length by the representative of Egypt. This is an important question; of course many members of the Council are a:lready seized of most of its details. 1~4. As 1 understood him, the representative of Egypt wlshes ta have an opportunity of elaborating on his present reply in respect of item 2 (a). 10 Tout acte de nature d porter une limitation ou une atteinte quelconque aux droits souverains de l'Egypte. 2 0 Tout acte de nature à nous priver de nos droits découlant des principes de justice et d'équité et des dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies, y compris la disposition de l'Article 27 de la Charte. 170. Je me permets de demander au Président de me donner la possibilité d'exposer en détail les vue.. de mon gouvernement à une séance ultérieure, pour pou- voir étudier à fond les arguments qui ont été avancés aujourd'hui par le représentant d'Israël. 171. En présentant une fois de plus au Président, ,dasi qu'aux distingués membres du Conseil de sécurité, mes vifs remerciements de m'avoir accordé l'occasion de prendre la parole aujourd'hui, je voudrais remercier le Conseil pour l'attitude réaliste. et moderne dont il a fait preuve en acceptant d'inscrire à son ordre du jour la plainte de l'Egypte contre Israël pour violations par Israël de la Convention d'armistice général égypto- israélienne dans la zone démilitarisée d'El Auja (S/3172). 172. Je m'abstiens d'aborder cette question. Au mo- ment opportun, je serai à la disposition du Conseil pour lui fournir tous renseignements susceptibles de l'aider à trouver la solution juste et équitable, et je prie ses membres de lire la page 3 de mon exposé. 173. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Con- seil de sécurité vient d'entendre une longue déclara~ton du représentant d'Israël et une déclaration assez longue du représentant de l'Egypte. Il s'agit d'une question importante, et je suis certain que plusieurs membres du Conseil n'en ignorent pas les détails. 174. Si j'ai bien compris, le représentant de l'Egypte désirerait pouvoir préparer sa réponse sur la question qui fait l'objet du point 2, a, de l'ordre du jour. 176. Comme il n'y a pas d'objection, le Conseil se réunira le lundi 15 février, à 15 heures. 1ï6. As there is no objection, the Council will meet on Monday. 15 February, at 3 p.m. The II/ceting "ose at 5.35 p.1l!. La séance est le:'ée à 17 h. 35.