S/PV.662 Security Council

Before taking up the business in hand, I am sure the Security Couricil would wish me 1.0 extend on its behalf a most hearty welcome 1.0 our distinguished colleague, Sir Pie1"son Dixon, on the occasion of his joining us around this table as the pennanent representative of the United Kingdom. 2. A career diplomat with a brilliant record, Sir Pierson Dixon is not a newcomer 1.0 the United Nations. Ever sinœ the San Francisco Conference, he has served on United Kingdom delegations te the United Nations. His fine qualities and his past association with the work of the United Nations more than assure us thaï he will prave a most worthy successor 1.0 Sir Gladwyn Tebh. 3. In expressing warm delight in having Sir Piersoll Dixon in our midst, I feel sure that he will contribute splendidly 1.0 our patient deliberations in search of peace and security. It also gives me great ple~sure, as the representative of TURKEY, ta mention here that Sir Pierson, in the early stages of his career, served in thè British Embassy in Ankara, my country, and this I believe entitles me, as the representative of Turkey, ta address ta him, in Turkish, the words: "Welcome, Sir Pierson". Président: M. S. SARPER (Turquie). a) Plainte d'Israël contre l'Egypte, au sujet de: i) L'imposition par l'Egypte de restrictions au passage par le canal de Suez des na- vires faisant commerce avec Israël; ii) L'application par l'Egypte d'entraves à la navigation des navires se rendant au port israélien d'Elath, dans le golfe d'Akaba; b) Plainte de l'Egypte contre Israël pour: "Vio- lations par Israël de 11', Conventic'l d'armistice général égypto-israélienne dans la zone démili- tarisée d'EI-Auja". Souhaits de bienvenue à sir Pierson Dixon 5. 1 feel it no easy task t'J succeed Sir Gladwyn Jebb ln this 'seat, but 1 shaH 1- fortified by the same ideals as he was and by the ,arne considerations of policy. 1 need !.lot say how keenly 1 look forward to my work here in co-operation with i:he member'S of the Council, and onCè more 1 should lir.:e to thank them, through the President, and the Prèsident himself, for the warm welcome which has been extended to me. Adoption of the agenda The agenda wa.:. adopted. The Palestine question (a) Complaint by Israel agamst Egypt (i) en· forcement by Egypt of i"estrictions on the passage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal; (ii) interferencè by Egypt w~th smpping proceeùing to the Israeli port 01 Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba (S/3168 and Add.l, S/3179, S/3188/Corr.l) (con- tinued) At the 'invita,tion of the President, MI'. A.!:~1"t, repre- senlta#ve of Egyp,t, and MI'. Eban, represen"ative of Israel, took places at the Security Council table. 6. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand): On 28 January 1954, the Government of Israel placed before the Counci1 the complaint [S/3168 and Add.1] appearing on today's agenda concerning interference by Egypt with shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. We have since had the benefit of the very full and able presentations made in support of that complaint and in rebuttaI. 7. The Council will recall that last month [660th meeting], in view of my responsibility as President, 1 urged upon members of 'Che Couneil the need for the adoption of a 'Suitable resolution and ir..dicated that the delegation of New Zealandwas therefore exploring the possibility of such a resolution. 1 would add that for maritime nations - countries which, like my own, depend on their overseas trade for their prosperity and indeed their existence - the preservation. of free- dom of passage on the high seas and in recognized inter- national waterways is a matter of profound concern. These considerations have led my Government to take the initiative in submitting to the Council the draft resolution which appears in document S/3188/ Corr.I. Adoption de l'ordre du jouit' L'ordre du jour est adopté. La question de Palestine a) Plainte d'Israël contre l'Egypte, au sujet de: i) l'impositinn par l'Egypte de rel3trictions au passage par le canal de Suez des navires fai· sant commerce avec Israël; ii) l'application par l'Egypte d'entraves à la navigation des navires se rendant au port israélien d'Elath, dans le golfe d'Akaba (S/3168 et Add.l, S/3179, S/3188/Ccrr.l et 2) [suite] Sur l'i1l'lJÏtation du Président, M. Azmi, représentant de l'Egypte, et M. Eba.n, représenlta-nt d'Israifl, pren- nent place à la table du Conseil. 6. M. MUNRO (Nouvelle-Zélande) (traduit de l'an- glais): Le 28 janvier "1954, le Gouvernement israélien a saisi le Conseil de la plainte [S/3168 et Add.l] qui figure aujourd'hui à notre ordre du jour, c'est-à-dire la plainte relative à l'application par l'Egypte d'entraves à la navigation dans le canal de Suez et le golfe d'Akaba. Depuis lors, nous avons et; l'avantage d'entendre exposer avec talent et de façon très complète les argu- ments pour et contre. 7. Les membres du Conseil se souviendront que le mois dernier [660èmle séance], en ma qualité de Pré- sident, je m'étais permis d'insister sur la nécessité d'adopter une résolution appropriée, et avais indiqué que la délégation de la Nouvelle-Zélande étudiait la possibilité d'élaborer une telle résolution. J'ajouterai que pour les Puissances maritimes - c'est-à-dire pour les pays comme le mien dont la prospérité, voire l'existence, dépendent de leur commerce maritime -la question de la liberté des mers et du libre passage par les voies maritimes internationales revêt une impor- tance considérable. Ce sont ces considérations qui ont amené mon gouvernement à prendre l'initiative de présenter au Conseil le projet de résolution qui figure dans le document S/3188/Corr. 1 et 2. 10. Even if it should be the position that the regula- tions ha~Te not been enforced to their full extent, the Council cannot, 1 suggest, overlook the fact that amendments enacted only a few months ago have e:'{tended bath the scope and the apparent geographical extent of the restrictive measures. The facts which the Couneil must face, after giving full weight to aU that has been said by the representative of Egypt, are that the 1951 resolution has not been complied with and' that the degree of non-compliance is not nominal but substantial. 11. The representative of Egypt has also placed before us certain arguments on the "Wstorical and psychological elements" which he feels are involved in this dispute. 1 do not, of course, question the sincerity III his presentation. Nor do 1 mean to imply any Jack ofconcern on the part of my Government over the general problem of Arab-Israel re1;:,4-;~ms when 1 say that, in the consideration of this item, the central issue is one of non-compliance with the previous resolution of the Council. 11. Le représentant de l'Egypte nous a également présenté certains arguments touchant des "éléments historiques et psychologiques" qui, à son avis, jouent un certain rôle dans le différend. Il va sans dire que je ne mets pas en doute la sincérité de ses arguments. Je ne veux pas non plus laisser entendre que mon gouvernement se désintéresse de l'ensemble du pro- blème des relations israélo-arabes lorsque je dis que, dans l'examen de cette affaire, le problème fondamental est celui de la non-observation de la précédente réso- lution du Conseil. 12. A notre avis, il est de l'intérêt de l'Egypte et de l'intérêt du monde arabe tout entier que les résolutions du Conseil soient respectées. Le Conseil a la respon- sabilité principale de veiller à ce que la paix soit maintenue en Palestine. Sinon, s'il continue de régner dans la région un état de belligérance active, il sera impossible de résoudre les problèmes difficiles qui se posent en Palestine, et notamment ceux qui, de l'avis 12. In our opinion, it is in Egypt's interests and in the interests of the Arab world as a whole that the resolutions of the Council should be complied with. This Council is primarily responsible for seeing that peace is kept in Palestine. If peace i's not kept _.- if a state of active belligerency is maintained - there can be no real solution of the difficult problems associated \Vith the Palestine question, inc1uding those problems 14. With respect, l must point out that the validity of that assertion was specifically denied by the Council's resolution of September 1951 [S/2322]. Paragraph 5 of that resolution, "vith which members of the Council will be familiar, says that "since the armistice régime, which has been in existence fOi- nearly two and a half vears," - it is now five years - "is of a permanent ~haracter, neither party can rea'Sonably assert that it is active!y a belligerent or requires ta exercise the right 'of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence". 15. As the Council has placed itself on record on this issue, l do not considér it neœssary for the Counci! to restate its position nor for me ta argue again in detail questions concerning the status of the Armistice 4greement or the issue of belligerency. l am bound to say, howe\"'~r, that in our opinion the pél!ssage of time has strengthened, ana will continue to strengthen, the general principle enunciated by the Council in 1951. 16. Finally, we have been told that Egypt ~ntered certain reservations when the resolution of 1 September 1951 was adopted, and that the convictions on which those reservations were based are still maintained today. On this argument l shall say only that the 1951 reso- lution was a resolution which the Council waS entitled to adopt and that it was legally and properly adopted by the prescribed majority without the dissenting vote of any permanent member. 17. Under the Charter- and if we are to have the beginnings of law and order in an uncertain world- it is the clear dutY of aIl Members of the Organization to observe the resolutioll!s of this Council. We cannot accept the argument that Egypt is entitled to disregard the terms of the resolution of September 1951 by reason of a reservation entered at the time of its adoption. 18. As l said eartier, the draft resolution which l have the honour to submit is directed primarily to the issue of non-compliance with the 1951 resolution. l should like to recall the terms of that resolution. It contained the statement of general principle which l havequoted already on the status of the armistice régime and on belligerency and self-defence. On the basis of that statement of principle, it found that the practice of interfering with the passage through the 19. It will he recalled that when the Council 'was considering that resolution, it had before it a report [5/2194J from the Chief of Staff of the Truce Super- vi ion Organization. The report set out the explana- tion of the vote of the Chief of Staff in the Egyptian- Israel Special Committee on the question whether the Mixed Armistice Commission had jurisdiction in the Suez Canal case. The Chief of Staff expressed the opinion that Egypt's interference with shipping in the Suez Canal was ar. aggressive action and a hostile act, that it did not foster the objectives of thf~ General Armistice Agreement and was entirely contrary to the spirit of that agreement and jeopardized its dtectiv~ functioning. N evertheless GeneraI Riley Wa3 ;n:ed to the conclusion that, in the absence of evidence of the use of Egyptian armed forces, the Mixed Armis- tice Commission had no jurisdiction under the terms of the Arnùstice Agreement. He stated quite explicitly, howeve:r, that he would hold that the interference constituted a violation of the General Armistice Agree- ment "if I had certain knowledge that it was being committed by the armed forces of Egypt -land, sea or air, or paramilitary forces, including non-regular forces". Following tbis decision on the lack of compe- tence of. the Mixed Armisitce- Commission., the matter came before the Security Council. Jl.l Chef d'état-major cIe l'Organisme chargé de la smveillance de Ja trêve. Dans ce rapport, le Chef d'état-major expliquait le vote qu'ïl avait émis au Comité spécial égypto-iraélien sur la question de savoir si la Commission mixte d'armistice avait compétence dans l'affaire du canal de Suez. Le Chef d'état-major exprimait l'opinion que les entraves apportées par l'E~}pte à la navigation dans le canal de Suez consti- tuaient un acte d'ag'1"ession et une action hostile, qu'ellev étaient absolument contraires aux: objectifs de la Conveation d'armistice général et à l'esprit de cette convention et qu'elles étaient de nature à en gêner l'application. Néanmoins, le général Riley avait été amené à la conclusion qu'en l'absence de toute preuve de l'intervention de forces armées égyptiennes, la Commission mixte d'armistice n'était pas compé- tente, aux termes de la Convention d'armistice général. Le général Riley a déclaré en termes très explicites qu'il considérerait ces entraves comme une violation de la Convention d'armistice général "s'il avait la certitude qu'elles étaient apportées par les forces armées de l'Egypte-les forces terrestres, navales ou aériennes ou les forces paramilitaires, y compris les 'forces non régulières". La Commission mixte d'armistice s'étant déclarée incompétente, la question a été portée devant le Conseil de sécurité. 20. The situation w:lich th~ Council now faces seems to my delegation to comprise the following elements. Egypt has not terminated the restrictions on shipping nor ceased interfering with shipping in the Suez Canal. Egypt, re1ying on arguments whase validity has already been denied by the Council, is interfering with 'Shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba proceeding to the 20. De l'avis de mCl; délégation, la situation que le Conseil examine en ce moment comprend les éléments suivants. L'Egypte n'a pas levé les restrictions im- posées à la navigation et elle n'a pas cessé de mettre des entraves à la navigation dans le cana' de Suez. L'Egypte, s'appuyant sur des arguments que le Con- seil a déjà rejetés, met des entraves à la navigation, dans le golfe d'Akaba, des navires qui se rendent au port israélien d'Elath. Le représentant d'Israël a dé- claré que pour appliquer ces restrictions à la navi- gation dans le golfe d'Akaba, l'Egypte emploie "l'artil- lerie ou des unités navale5 arméeS". En d'autres termes, si cette accusation est fondée, le seul élément dont l'absence détermine l'incompétence de la Commission mixte d'arnùstice dans l'affaire du canal de Suez, l'intervention de forces armées, existe réellement dans le cas du golfe d'Akaba. Isr~el port of Elath. It is charged by the represen- tatIve of Israel that "the restrictions in the Gulf of Aqaba are applied by the actual use of artillerv or armed naval units". In other words, if this charge is well founded, the one absent element of armed force which denied the jurisdiction of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the Suez Canal case is present in regard ta the Gulf of Aqaba. 21. I should like now to explain the terms of the New Zealand draft resolution. It is not necessary to comment on paragraphs 1 and 2. Paragraph 3 recalls the Council's resolution of 1 September 1951. l would emphasize that it recalls the ",hale of that resolution - the enunciation of principle, the findings and the 21. Je voudrais maintenant présenter le projet de résolution de la Nouvelle-Zélande. Les paragraphes 1 et 2 n'appellent aucune observation. Le paragraphe .3 rappelle la résolution du Conseil en date du 1er sep- tembre 1951. Je soulignerai qu'il rappelle cette réso- lution dans sa totalité, l'énoncé de principes, les cons- 23. Paragraph 5 represents what we regard as the appropriate action for the Couneil ,to take at this stage. It caUs upon Egypt to comply with the resolu- tion of 1 September 1951 - to comply with th~ whole of that resolution, to terminate the restrictions and cease interference,· with shipping in the Suez Canal, and to ob:;erve the prineiple enuneiated in paragraph 5 of the 1951 resolution by abjuring all acts of intet- ference with shipping anywhere based on the assertion of belligerency and self-defence. The resolution refiects our view that Egypt has had ample time in which to adjust her policies to the terms of the resolution and that it is now essential for the Couneil to repeat its calI for Egypt's compliance. 24. The final paragraph of the draft resC'lution, para- graph 6, refers only to the complaint of interference with shipping in the Gulf. of Aqaba. In the view of my delegation, the arguments advanced by the repre- sentative of Egypt in justification of that' interference cannot be sustained and, in fact, have already been rejected by the Couneil. In our opinion, however, the machinery established under the General Armistice Agreement should be used, wherever possible, to deal with the complaints of either party to the agreemen.t To fail to do so would reduce the effectiveness of the machinery and might tend to weaken the validity of the agreement itself. In the case of interference with shipping in the Suez Canal, the Chief of Staff decided in 1951 that the Mixed Armistice Commission did not have jurisdiction because one essential eIement of that jurisdiction was lacking. In the case of inter- ference with shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba, however, there has been no such determination. The complaint has not been submitted to the Mixed Armistice Commission and the information given to the Couneil 3uggests prima facie a case within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission might, of course, for one reason or another, fail to reach a decision. 25. Paragraph 6 of the odraft resolution, which states that the complaint should be dealt with in the first instance by the Mixed Armistice Commission, does not diminish the Council's authority or affect the state- ment of principle which the Council has already made. Equall~T it does not preclude the possibility that Egypt might revoke the restrictive regulations and abandon an interfereilce with shipping proceeding to the port of Elath through the Gulf of Aqaba, thus making it unnecessary for Israel, with whom the decision must 6 27. Tont observateur impartial doit reconnaître que, depuis l'adoption de la résolution du 1er septembre 1951, le Gouvernement égyptien a, d'une façon qui parait parfaitement délibérée, fait fi des injonctions du Conseil de sécurité. En agissant ainsi depuis plus de deux ans, le Gouve-:-nement égyptien a empêché de nombreux navires qui, autrement, ~t1jraient légitime- ment traversé le canal de Suez ou le golfe d'Akaba, de commercer avec Israël, ou les a contraints à d'oné- reux détours pour parvenir à leur destination. Am:un gouvernement soucieux de faire régner Ip. droit sur le plan international, et surtout aucun gouvernement qui compte sur son commerce maritime pour assurer l'exis- tence de son peupie, ne peut envisager cet état de choses sans éprouver le désir sincère d'y mettre fm. Les diffé- r-.:nds et les incidents qui troublf'nt depuis si lorigtemps les fron"ières d'Israël ne '>aaraient laisser les membres du Conseil indifférents. ~1ais ni ces îndd~nts, ni les autres griefs que l'Egypte et ses alliés peuvent entre- tenir à l'égard d'Israël ne suffisent à justifier la 11on- observation d'une résolution du Conseil de sécurité qui proclame le droit de tous les navires. quel que soit leur pavillon, de naviguer librerr~ent sur les mers et d'em- prunter sans entrave l'une des voies maritimes les p:us importantes du monde. 28. Si ma délégation a pris l'initiative dans cette affaire, ce n'est pas parce qu'elle désire prendre pàrti, ni parce qu'elle méconnaît les problèmes plus géné- raux qui se posent aujourd'hui. Je tiens à rappeler que ma délégation a fait connaitre sa position en la matière dès le 24 février [660è11ie séaln'ce]. A l'époque, nous Îfmorions certains événements d'ordre intérieur qui se 'sont produits dans les Etats arabes, et dont il a été question, depuis, au cours de nos d~libérations. On reconnaîtra qu'il ne peut exister aucun lien entre ces événements et l'initiative que nous avons prise. Au contraire, tout comme nous le ferons pour toute nou- velle plainte dont le Conseil de sécurité serait saisi à l'avenir, nous avons examiné la plainte qui nous occupe aujourd'hui dans un esprit d'entière objectivité, en ne considérant que les éléments propres à l'affaire. C'est dans ce même esprit que nous présentons notre projet de résolution, avec la conviction qu'il mé':ite le ferme appui du Conseil. 29. M. AZMI (Egypte): Nous avons écouté avec attention l'excellent exposé qu'a fait le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande pour proposer son projet de réso- lution lSj3188jCorr.l ct 2] au Conseil de sécurité. Avant de formuler des observations à la fois sur l'exposé et sur le projet de résolution, je voudrais 27. Any impartial survey of events since the resolution of 1 Septemher 1951 must record that the Egyptian Government has with every appearance of deliberation ignored the injunctions of thi's Council. This course of conduct, oersisted in for over two years, has resulted in many ships, which would otherwise have gone on their lawful occasions through the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba, being deterred from trading with Israel Oi diverted at great cast. over other routes to their destination, No government interested in the preservation of the rule of law in international affairs, and least of aIl any government depending for the livelihood of its people on maritime trade, l:an con- template this ttnhappy state of affairs without an earnest desire ta bring it ta an end. Every member of the Couneil grieves over the affrays and troubles which have so long disturbed the borders of Israel and its neighbours. But neither their occurrence nor the other grievances which Egypt and its allies may have a,.,crainst Is-rael can serve ta justify a continuing I)reach of a· resolution of this Counèil a:ffirming the free right of passage for the 'Ships of aIl nations on the seas and through one of the greatest waterways of the world. 28. My delegation has taken the initiative in this matter with no motive of partisanship or lack of regard for wider issues. I wish ta draw attention to the fact that my delegation's intentions in this regard were announced on 24 February [660th meeting]. At that time we had no knowledge of certain internaI events in Arab States which were then impending arld to which reference has since been made in this debate. It will be obvious that there was no connexion between these events and our initiative. On the con- trary, we have examined the complaint before the Council, as we shall in future examine other complaints, in a spirit of impartiality and on the merits of the case. It is in this spirit the we now submit our draft reso- lution, confident that it will merit the full support of the Council as a whole. 29. Mr. AZMI (Egypt). (tmnsl4ted fr01'f~ Frmch): We have listened attentively to the New Zealand repre- sentative's excellent statement in proposing his drait resolution [SrH88jCo-yr. 1] ta the Security CDuncil. Before commenting on thai statement and on the draft resolutioll, l should like to make a brief statement in ~mme position and did nat ltuderstand it very weIl either. Let us bath he modest, 1 shall not press the point. The Israel representative has always maintained that Egypt's attitude is contrary to the principles of inter- national law, to the United Nations Charter, ta the W88 Convention and to the armistice agreements, but has produced no praof of those statement:>. As far as international law was concerned, the I~rael ,t"epre- sentative himself admitted that he was mereIy,"xpressing his own opinion. He did not wish to go into any detailed considerations of international law. 1 sha11 not repeat all I said before in conne...don \Vith these considerations, which leave my country convinced of having acted in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law. Nevertheless, I readity accept the Israel representative's assertion that the Armistice Agreement constitutes law for the parties. I shall not refer again to international law and shall base my arguments only on the Armistice Agreement, which is binding on Israel and oUïselves. 31. In faet, paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 1 and para- . graph 2 of article III of the Armistice Agreement set out the obligations imposed on the two parties. Article l, paragraph 2 states that: "No aggressive action by the arrried forces- land, sea, or air - of either Party shall be under- . taken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term 'planned' in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations." Similarly, paragraph 3 reads as follows: "The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shaH he fully respected." Let me also read the beginning of article II, para- graph 2: "Na element of the land, sea or air military or paramilitary forces of either Party, including non- regular forces, shaH commit any warlike or hostile . act against the military or paramilitary forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party." 32. Egypt affirms that no military or paramilitary naval element has taken part in any vi'Sit imposed upon vessels using the Suez Canal or crossing the Gulf of Aqaba. It is true that the New Zealand repre- sentative referred to a statement by the Israel repre- sentative ta the effect tha', military personnel were concerned. According to the ~'Jew Zealand representa- tive, that assertion of the Israel representative can be regarded as a reply ta the statement of the Chairman 33. '''hat proof is the1'e of this statement of the brud rep1'esentatÎ\'e which the New Zealancl 1'epre- ~entative records as an abic1ing truth? \Ve daim that the inspecting staff are ctlstoms employees and include no 111ilitary or paramilitary elements. \Ve have the confirmation of the Chairman of the Armistice Com- mission, who himself stated that he had no knowledge of military forces being employed on such duties. Nevertheless, a purely gratuitotls statement by the representative of Israel is cited and treated as cogent praof that military forcf''; have been involved in the inspection of ship-' fiassing through the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. 34. There are two relevant Armistice Commission decisions, one of 8 June 1949 and the other of 12 June 1951' [S/2194]. Both state that the Egyptian Govern- ment merely made an inspection. l quote for example: "It follows, therefore, that l have no other choice but to cast my vote with Egypt that the Mixed Armistice Commission dacs not have the right to demand from the Egyptian Governmcnt that it should not interfere with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal." This decision of 12 June 1951 was taken after consul- tation with the United Nations Secretariat, paIticu- larly with the Legal Dei:~rtment. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission postponed ms deci- sion 50 that he could obtain the opinion of the Legal Department of the United Nations Secretariat. 35. At the last meeting, l spoke of the correspondence that passed between the Ambassador of the U.nited Kingdom at Cairo and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of what l shall calI the organization of the visit imposed by the Egyptian authorities upon British vessels proceeding, via Suez, not to Elath, but to Aqaba, l mean the Jordan and not the Israel port. l shall not read that correspündence again. It will he rememhered that it dealt with an agree- ment, an arrangement. British vessds leaving Suez or the port of Adahia and bound for Aqaba could he visited .before their departure at the port of Adabia. Thus, we cabled to the port at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba to report that the vesse1s in question had already been visited and to prevent a second visit. The vesse1s concerned were, l repeat, vesse1s bound for Aqaba, not Elath. Thus, the United Kingdom has already accepted the principle of the visit. It ha's even, by agreement with the Egyptian Government, provided for the ways and means of such visit. 36. Today l shall mention another document, which is of the greatest importance. This time we have not an exchange of letters between the British Embassy and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affair's, but an agreement between the two parties involved, be- tween the official representatives of Israel and Egypt. This agreement conc1uded hetween the two parties "In the event a non-military vessel of either party carrying non-military cargo is forced by engine trouble, storm or any other reason beyond the control of the vessel and its crew to seek refuge in the territorial waters of the other party, it shall be granted shelter therein and shall he allowed ther~after to proceed on its \Vay freely and at the earhest possible time, together with its cargo, crew and passengers. "For Egypt: (signcd) Lieutenant Colonel S. Gohar "For Israel: (sigllcd) Lieutenant Colonel Gaon "Witnessed by Olairman, Egyptian Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission (signed) Colonel T. Hinckle." Thi~ document means that if, for reasons of force maJe·u.re - on account of storm bad weather or even because it hérs lost its way - ~ Israel vessel enters Egyptian territorial waters, the Egyptia.ll authorities wiII grant it shelter and wiII then let it proceed in peace to its destination. A;nd .similarly, if an Egyptian vesse! enters Israel terntonal waters in the same circumstances - that is to say by accident and as a result of f~rce ma/eure - the Israel authorities will grant shelter ta that vessel and then let it put out to sea again wherever it may wish ta go. 37. Let us now apply a little logic and reason a con- trario. We shaH see that this document means that if an Egyptian vessel enters Israel territorial waters with- out having. to do so under force ffl(J}jettre, that vesse! may be selzed and impounded. The same rule will apply if an Israel vesse! goes through Egyptian terri- torial wa~ers without bl:ing compelted ta do sa by force majeure. Thus thlS document constitutes and absolute recognition on the part of bath parties that the normal passage of a vessel through the territorial waters of either party makes that vessel subject to the ~les of international and military law - the right . of VlSlt and even capture. It is useless ta try ta show from the letters exchanged between the Ambassador of the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Minister that the visit was "organized"; the text itself says: "The following is herewith agreed by bath parties ... " 38. Let us see what actually happens. One vessel for example, was carrying a cargo of spare parts fo; military aircraft. It sailed from Los Angeles and was to touch at Havana, San Diego, Alexandria. Port Said and Beirut. The value of the spare parts was $22,597.80. En route between the Pacifie and the Mediterranean the boat was ordered ta alter course and put in at Haifa. vVhen it reached that port, the Israel author- ities c?~scated the cargo. Egypt lodged no protest, rec~gnlzlOg t~at the ~tate of Israel was exercising a belhgerent nght whlch Egypt tao was exercising. Another well-known case was that of the vessel Charmpollion, carrying a military' cargo of munitions and arms destined for the Egyptianarmy, which also put in at Haifa and had its entire cargo seized by the "Pot~r Israël: (signé) Le lieutenant-colonel Gaon "Témoin: le Président de la Commission mixte d'arnlistice égypto-israélienne: (signé) le colonel T. Hinckle." Que signifie ce document? Ce document veut dire que, si un bateau israélien, pour une raison de force majeure, à cause du mauvais temps ou même parce qu'il a perdu sa route, entre dans les eaux tf'rritoriales égyptiennes, les autorités égyptieimes lui accordent refuge, le gar- dent, puis le laissent repartir librement vers sa desti- nation.' De même, si un bateau égyptien entre dans les .. eaux territoriales israéliennes dans les mêmes condi- tions, c'est-à-dire fortuitement et en cas de force majeure, les autorités israéliennes donneront refuge à ce bateau, puis le laisseront reprendre la mer pour aller où il voudra. 37. Faisons preuve ici d'un peu de logique; employons la méthode du raisonnement a contrario; d'après ce document, si un bateau égyptien pénètre dans les eaux territoriales israéliennes sans y être obligé' par un cas de force majeure, il peut être saisi et capturé; la même règle s'applique si un bateau israélien traverse les eaux territoriales égyptiennes sans y être obligé par un cas de force majeure. Ce document constitue donc une reconnaissance absolue, de la part des deux parties en cause, que le passage normal d'un navire à travers les eaux territoriales de l'une ou de l'autre partie soumet le navire en cause aux règles du droit international et aux règles du droit en vigueur en temps de guerre: visite et même capture. Il est inutile d'invoquer ici les lettres échangées entre l'Ambassa- deur de Grande--Bretagne et le ministre d'Egypte pour dire que la visite a été "organisée"; le texte dit lui- même: "Les parties sont convenues ... " 38. Voyons ce qui se passe en pratique.. Par exemple, un certain navire portait une cargaison de pièces de rechange pour avions militaires; il était parti de. Los Angeles et devait passer par La Havane, San-DIego, Alexandrie, Port-Saïd et Beyrouth; les pièces de re- change avaient une valeur de 22.597 dollars 80. En route, le bateau reçut de la compagnie de navigation, alors qu'il était entre le Pacifique et la Méditerrané~, l'ordre de changer d'itinéraire et de faire escale a Haïfa. Lorsque le navire arriva dans ce dernier port, les autorités israéliennes confisquèrent la cargaison. L'Egypte ne protesta pas; elle reconnut qu'il s:agis- sait de l'exercice, par l'Etat d'Israël, d'un dro}t de belligérant que l'Egypte, de son côté, exerce egale- ment. Le bateau Champollion-le fait est connu- 39. 1 have reread the Security Council's resolt1tion of Septembe. 1951 with the greatest care. In the statement he has just made, the New Zealand repre- sentative made a uumber of references to that resolu- tian and used the same word which 1 stressed. Para- graph 7 of the Security Council resolution of 1951 "Finds further that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit. search and seizure". In m)' view that is a recognition of the right of visit, search and seizure. The charge the 1951 resolution makes against Egypt is abuse of a right; but by that very faet it recognizes a right. Consequently, the right of visit is recognized by the resolution. A question of abuse may he discussed; we may inquire into the reasons and consider the justice of the assertion. But paragraph 7 of the 1951 resolution is an unconditiona1 recognition of the right. 40. The Israel representative challenged the tntth of the faets which 1 stated in my previous intervention. He said: «1 cannat, however, let the record he silent and 1 therefore must comprehensiveIy deny bath the relevance and the tntth of the account which the represetitative of Egypt has given of the recent history of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agree- ment." For my part, 1 was not prepared for such a categorical statement. To question the veracity of a statement in such a manner is ta impugn the moral character of the person who made it. When the Israel represen- tative made that remark he may not have seen the letter to the President of the Security Council which \Vas circu1ated at the last meeting as document S/ 3186. This document con.tains a letter dated 20 September 1951 to the Chairman of the Mixed Annis- tice Comnùssion in which complaints are made. The United Nations observer gives his opinion on those complaints. A study of the document will show that it reproduces official documents submitted to and signed by United Nations officers who are members of the Mixed ArIt".istice Commission. The la:st of these docu- ments is dated 11 September 1953 and cantains the appeal to the Secretary-General and a confirmation of what has been said. These are official and authentic documents which certainly do not deserve to be described as absolutely unfounded and untruthful, a description which the Council has heard. 41. Telle est ma réponse aux observations du repré- sentant d'Israël. J'en arrive maintenant au proje~ de résolution soumis pa:- le représentant de la Nouvel1e- Zélande. 42. Ce projet de résolution ressemble à la résolution adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité le 1er septembre 1951 en ce sens qu'il ne tient aucun compte du caractère juridique du conflit dont. le Conseil est saisi. On est belligérant ou on n~ l'est pas. Il ya armistice ou paix. 41. That concludes my reply to the Israel represen- tative's remarks. l 'shall now turn to the draft resolu- tian submitted by the New Zealand representative. 42. This drait re,c;clution resembles the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 1 September 1951 in that it takes no account of the legal characœr of the conflict submitted to the Council. Is a particular State a belligerent or is it not? Is the position one The representative of China expressed himself in the following terms at the same meeting of the Council: "The draft seems to have assumed the vaiidity of the claim that the measures adopted by Egypt in the Suez Canal are in violation of general inter- national la'w and the pr'lvisions of the Suez Canal Convention and the Armistice Agreements. In our opinion, that is a point yet to De proved." .\.t the 552nd meeting of the Security Council, at which, on hehalf of the three Powers, he presented.. the draft resolution which subsequently became the resolution of the Security Council, the representative of the United Kingdom twice expressed rus opinion. He said, for instance: "For the reasons which 1 have alteady stated, the draft resolution does not attempt to say whether . or not Egypt can technically daim to be entitled to belligerent rights." He also used the following language: "As 1 said on 1 August, these legal issues are 1 no doubt debatable, but 1 still do not consider that it is necessary for the Security Council to go into them." This was virtually an admission that the Council had not examined the juridical aspect of the question; yet this is·an essentially juridical problem. 43. The new draft resolution, like the old one, completely disregards the juridical e1ement, which is the most important element in the prbblem before us. Paragraph 4 of he draft resolution submitted by New Zealand reads as follows: "Notes with grave concern that Egypt has not complied with that resolution." "Vhy \Vith grave concern? "Vhat has happened since 1951 to cause such grave concern? Egypt has not impounded any vesse!. Egypt has carried out visits on scarcely twû out of every thousand vesse1s which have passed through its waters. Egypt has relaxed its control, aB 1 said in my last statement. The Egyptian represen- tative has shown the utmost good wiII on the question of an even greater relaxation of the control measures concerned. Let me add that he is officially authorized by his Government to state that Egypt is prepared to rt:Juce its restrictions in certain respects. The Egyptian representative had hoped to make an official declaration '~e la questio?Ma délégation estime que la ques- tIon de saVOlr quels sont les droits légitimes des partie::; ne peut être écartée comme s'il s'agissait d'un point de détail purement teclmique." Le représentant de la Chine, à la même séance du Conseil, s'est ~primé en ces termes: "Ce projet semble supposer que la thèse d'après laquell~ les mesures prises par l'Egypte dans le canal ete Suez violent le droit international les dis- positions de la Conven.tion de Constantinople èt les Conventions d'armistice est une thèse bien fondée. A notre avis, c'est là une chose qui reste à prouver." Le représentant du Royaume-Uni a exprimé la même opinion à deux reprises, à la 552ème séance du Conseil de sécurité, à laquelle il a présenté au nom des trois Puissances, le projet de résolution qui est devenu par la suite, la résolution du Conseil de sécurité. II ~ dit, entre autres choses: "Pour les raisons que j'ai déjà indiquées, le projet n'essaie pas de préciser si l'Egypte est ou non fondée, en droit strict, à se prévaloir des droits de belli- gérance." D'autre part, il s'est exprimé en ces termes: "Comme je l'ai déjà dit le 1er août, il ne fait pas de doute que ces questions juridiques peuvent se discuter, mais je persiste à croire qu'il est inutile que le Conseil les e.."<amine." C'est avouer que le Conseil n'a pas examiné .l'aspect juridique du problème. Or il s'agit d'un problème essentiellement juridique. 43. Le nouveau projet de résolution, tout comme l'ancienne résolution, ne tient aucun compte de l'élé- ment juridique, qui est le plus important dans le con- flit dont le Conseil est saisi. Le paragraphe 4 du projet. de fésolution présenté par la Nouvelle-Zélande .dit que le Conseil de sécurité: . "Constate avec une vive inquiétude que l'Egypte n'a pas observé cette résolution." Pourquoi avec une vive inquiétude? Que s'est-il passé, depuis 1951 jusqu'à ce jour, pour faire naître cette vive inquiétude? L'Egypte n'a confisqué aucun bateau: L'Egypte a visité 2 sur 1.000, à peine, des navires qUI ont passé. Ainsi que je l'ai déjà indiqué au cours de ma dernière déclaration, elle a allégé les mesures prises. Le représentant de l'Egypte a montré la meilleure volonté en ce qui concerne un adoucissement encore plus grand des mesures en question. J'ajoute qu'il est officiellement autorisé par son gouvernement à déclarer que l'Egypte est prête à diminuer les restrictions sur des éléments déterminés. Le représentant de l'Egypte 44. The Israel representative said in his last statelllent that he had learned that the Government of Egypt ",as prepared ta take a step forward, but had changed its mind. That is true. But it changed its mind only because the Egyptiau representative received abso- lutely no encouragement. His good will and his excellent intentions ~mained unrecognized: And today we are told that the Council "notes \Vith grave concem ... " What can we do? \Ve are ttnable to di:::pel sucb grave concern. \Ve are convinced that we are acting in accordance with the rules of la\V. Out' sovereignty is d~ to us and we will not allow any invasion of it. 45. Paragraph 5 of the New Z,ealand draft resolution reads as follows: "Calls upon 'Egypt, in accordance with its obligations under the Charter, to comply there- \Vith." What are these obligations? \Vhat article of the Charter has Egypt contravened? The resolution is silent on that point. Indeed, it may weIl he asked who is violating the Charter and failing ta cOlnply \Vith its obligations under the Charter. l shaH not cite Israel; it is manifest to us that Israel is violating the provisions of the Charter and engaging in aggression. 47. The representative of New ZealandJ howeverJ states: "1 would add that for maritime nations - coun- tries whichJ like my ownJ depend on their overseas trade for their prosperity and indeed their e..ds- tence ... JI And he refer..s to the measures taken by Egypt in the Suez Canal. Maritime Powers? Very weIl. But do not come to the Security Coundl in that capacity. Maritime Powers? Suez Canal? Freedom of navigation? Excel- lent. You have an instnlment - the 1888 Convention regulating the freedom of shipping in the Suez Canal. That is the document you should appeal to. That is the international instrument you should bring into operation. Article 8 of that Convention states: "The agents in Egypt of the signatory Powers of the present Treaty shaH be charged to watch over its exectttion. In case of any event threatening the security or the free passage of the CanalJ they shall .meet on the summons of three of their number under the presidency of their doyen, in order to proeeed ta the necessary verifications. They sha11 inform the Khedival Government of the danger which they may have perceived, in arder that that Govemment may take proper steps to ensure the protection and the free use of the Canal."l It is article 8 which you should bring into operation, not the Security Council. Apply to the signatories' representatives in Cairo. You are perfectly entitled to complain of obstacles to the free passage of shipping through the Canal. l believe you know that the signa- tories are France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. These countries exist. They even have successors. Their number is increasing. You can easily find any of these countries. You can find three to calI together the signatories' representatives in Cairo. Take YOllr complaint ta them. But to raise the question of free passage through the Suez Canal in the Security Council is wrong. It is completely at variance with Article 24 of the United Nations Charter. 48. In paragraph 6 of the operative part, the authors of the New Zealand draft resolution use the words: "Considers that, without prejudice to the provisions of 1 Convention respecting the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal. See A complete collection of the treaties a/ld c.Dnventi01!s •.. bel'ween Great Britait/. alld fOl'eign Powers ... London, Butterworths, 1893, Vol. XVIII, p. 369. C'est cet article 8 que vous devez faire agir, et non pas le Conseil de sécurité. Adressez-vous aux repré- sentants des ·signataires présents au Caire. Vous pou- vez très bien vous plaindre des entraves apportées à la liberté de passage à travers le canal. Vous savez, je crois, que les pays signataires sont la France, l'Alle- magne, l'Autriche-Hongrie, l'Espagne, la Grande- Bretagne, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas, la Russie et l'Empire ottoman. Ces pays existent encore. Ils ont même des héritiers. Leur nombre augmente. Vons pouvez très bien trouver n'importe lequel de ces pays. Vous pouvez en trouver trois pour réunir les représentants de ces signataires au Caire. Portez-leur votre plainte. Mais la liberté de passage du canal au Conseil de sécurité, non. C'est un abus. C'est un abus aux termes de l'Arti- cle 24 de la Charte des Nations Unies. 48. Les auteurs du projet de résolution de la Nou- velle-Zélande déclarent, dans le paragraphe 6 du dispo- sitif: le Conseil "considère que, sans préjudice des 1 Convention destinée à garantir le libre usage du canal ma- ritime de Suez, signée à Constantinople le 29 octobre 1888. Voir Georg Friedrich von Martens, N O'lweall Recueil général de traités et alI/l'eS actes relatifs aux rapports de droit int~r­ national, Gœttingue, Librairie Dieterich, 1891, 2ème séne, t. XV, p. 557. 14 ~hould this question of Aqaba he linked with the September 1951 resolution? Though somewhat astute, the manœuvre is not quite regular. 49. The fact that l have analysed and commented on paragraphs of this draft resolution certainly does Ilot mean that Egypt accepts the draft. We have assumed the problem solved, as we used to do with a problem in geometry, and have then go""e on from that point. Today, however, the problem is far from solved and wc must go back to our starting point. This draft resolution is not accepted by Egypt. Egypt rejects it \Vith the utmost vigour, just as it rejected the 1951 resolution. It is convinced that the two texts do not deal with the question as it should he dealt with. The legal element, which is fundamental to this dispute, is completely ignored in both. 50. Egypt is the object of continuous acts of aggres-· sion on the part of Israel. The expansionist attitude is at all times evident in Israel's hehaviour. The last ward on this matter is to be found in the New York T~1nes of 21 March 1954, which, l hope, will not be regarded by the Israel representative as a tabloid or an unauthoritative newspaper. The editorial to which l refer appears in the "News of the week in review" section of the New York Times, a part of the news- paper which is very well edited and esteemed through-:- out the world. In that article, l find the following staternent: "The difficulty is that the Arabs still regard Israel as a usurper and they are adamant in their refusai to negotiate peace with her. The Israelis, for their part, .are determined to mah a go of their state- either with or without Arab approval- and they are prepared to use force if need he." "La difficulté est que les Arabes continuent à voir en Israël un usurpateur et qu'ils refusent obstiné· ment d'entamer les négociations de paix avec Israël. De leur côté, les Israéliens sont résolus à défendre l'existence de leur Etat, avec ou sans l'approbation arabe, et ils n'en démordront pas; s'il le faut, ils sont prêts à recourir à la force." Voilà donc un commentateur, un journaliste, un ré- dacteur en chef qui nous dit: "s'il le faut, ils sont prêts à recourir à la force". C'est justeJr.::nt cette préparation au recours à la force qui est it la base de l'inquiétude, de la "vive inquiétude" qui se manifeste dans tout le Proche-Orient. 51. Prene~ donc vos responsabilités, Messieurs, et .pesez bien vos décisions avant de les prendre. L'Egypte, de son côté, pèsera le vote de chacun d'entre vous à la lumière de la question primordiale de sa souveraineté. Elle prendra avec les autres pays arabes solidaires une attitude qui sera fonction de la vôtre. That is the way a commentator, a joumalist an editor puts it: "they are prepared ta use force if need be". This readiness to resort to force is at the TOot of the concern, of the "grave concem", which is felt through- out the Near East. 51. Members must accept their responsibilities and weigh their decisions weIl before they take them. Egypt, for its part, will weigh the vote of each one of them against the supreme question of its own sovereignty. E~pt, and the other Arab nations ranged solidly behmd it, will adopt an attitude which will depend on that of the Council members. 52. But l do not wish to conc1ude without reminding them for the second time of the only course ta be followed. l said in my last statement, and l repeat,. that if the measures taken by Egypt are ta cease, Israel's attacks and violations must also cease, and Egypt must have formaI guarantees that such attacks and violations will not be repeated. 52. Je ne voudrais pas terminer sans vous rappeler pour la deuxième fois l'unique voie à suivre. J'ai dé- claré dans ma dernière intervention et je répète au- jourd'hui que si l'on veut que cessent les mesures prises par l'Egypte, il faut que prennent fin, du côté d'Israël, les attaques et les violations, et que l'Egypte ait des garanties fornlelles que de telles attaques et violations ne se produiront plus. 53. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (tmduit de l'C14'lI-:' glais): Je vais essayer d'être aussi bref que possible; 53. MI'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l shall try to be as brief as possible, but there are a few things 55. There is no doubt about the good" intentions of New Zealand as expressed in the initiative which its representative has taken. But I think it i,g also fair ta say that the representative of New Zealand has actually, to a large extent, proved ta be the advocate of Israel in his presentation. I think that the case Qf Israel is ably presented in his document. Perhaps that is the way he ,sees the justice of the present situation; he may see it as falling entirely on the side of Israel. But it would he a very strange thing if, in any situation in the Near East, especially with regard ta Palestine, all the justice would completely fall on the side of one of the parties. 56. I shall now say a few words about the draft resolution. I shaH speak very briefly this afternoon hecause I have a few important things I want to say, . but I shall talk about the substance of this matter at a later stage. 1 want to point out to the representative of New Zealand how, in my opinion, the e1ement of impartiality, the element of balance and the element of non-partisanship is objectively lacking in this text hefore us. What does it say? It begins by saying: "Having considered the complaint of Israel against Egypt concerning", and then it quotes the text of Israel's complaint. This is a departure from precedent. Where do we have such quotations cited in past reso- lutions? 1 have hefore me the text relating to Qibya [S/3139/Rev.2] and also the text concerning the Jordan River [S/3151/Rev.2]. There is no reference, Ml". Munro, to the exact language of the complaint that was presented before the Council. In fact, in one of the draft resolutions there is no mention of the complaint at aIl; there is only the mention of the sO~lci d'équité. 1\L Munro a cherché à mettre le Con- sel1 sur la bonne voie, à trouver un équilibre et en dernière analyse, à aider le Conseil à prendre une' dé- cision utile dans les circonstances difficiles que connaît le Proche-Orient; en effet la situation, comme je vais le montrer dans un instant, se complique, non seule- ment de jour en jour mais, il faut bien le dire, d'heure en heure. Je suis persuadé que le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande n'a nullement l'intention de blesser l'Egypte. En fait, même s'il n'avait pas protesté, à la fin de son discours, de l'impartialité de sa délégation même s'il n'avait pas dit qu'elle ne voulait pas prend~ parti ni méconnaître les problèmes plus généraux qui se posent aujourd'hui, je lui aurais quand même prêté ces nobles sentiments. Je ne doute pas un instant que le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande et le grand pays qu'il représente n'aient jamais eu l'inten- tion de commettre la moindre injustice envers l'Egypte ni de lui faire injure. Nous savons tous en effet- et le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande le premier - que la vaillante armée de son pays a combattu à deux reprises dans le désert de Libye et qu'elle compte de nombreux anlis tant en Egypte que dans le monde arabe. Jerne souviens que les soldats néo-zélandais venaient dans mon pays en permission ou pour s'y faire hospitaliser. J'ai parmi eux de nombreux amis avec lesquels je reste en contact. 55. On ne peut mettre en doute les bonnes intentions de la Nouvelle-Zélande telles qu'elles s'expriment dans l'initiative que son représentant vient de prendre. Cependant, je crois devoir dire que le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande semble, dans cette initiative, s'être nettement fait le défenseur d'Israël. La cause d'Israël me paraît fort bien présentée dans son docu- ment. C'est peut-être ainsi qu'il interprète la situation actuelle; il est possible qu'à ses yeux la justice soit entièrement du côté d'Israël. Mais il serait vraiment étrange que dans le Proche-Orient, notamment lors- qu'il s'agit de la Palestine, la justice soit entièrement du côté de l'une des parties. 56. J'en viens maintenant au projet de résolution. Je me bornerai cet après-midi à quelques brèves obser- vations; en effet je voudrais seulement faire ressortir quelques aspects importants de la question, que je traiterai au fond à une séance prochaine. Je tiens ~ faire remarquer au représentant de la ~ouvelle-Z~lande, à quel point, selon moi, le texte dont nous sommes saisis est dépourvu de ces éléments d'impartialité, d'équilibre et d'objectivité dont il nous a parlé. Que dit-il? Tout d'abord: "Ayant examiné les plaintes d'Israël contre l'Egypte au sujet de ... "; vient ensuite l'intitulé de ces plaintes israéliennes. Voilà qui s'écarte des précédents établis. Est-il d'autres résolutions du Conseil qui contiennent pareilles citations? J'ai devant moi le texte de la résolution relative à l'affaire de Qibya [S/ 3139/Rev.2] , celui de la résolution concer- nant le Jourdain [S/3151/Rev.2]. Je n'y retrouve pas les termes exacts de la plainte qui avait été présentée au Conseil. En fait, l'un de ces projets de résolution ne mentionne même pas la plainte; c'est dans le titre 57. My second observation concerns the phrase in the New Zealand draft resolution "with grave concern", which the representative of Egypt sa lucidly attacked, l thought. Why? Because 20 tons of meat were held for twenty-four hours in an Egyptian port? That is the grave concern - or things of that arder. If what the representative of New Zealand says about the grave concern of the maritime Powers is true, and l am prepared for the sake of argument to admit its truth- with fnll reservations, which the representative of Egypt has made this afternoon, about the propriety or impropriety of these issues being raised by a mem- ber of the Security Council which should be above its own maritime or non-maritime interests - then with all these reservations let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the concern which the representative of New Zealand has shown is well founded. Does it follow from that that if a maritime Power is deeply concerned about its interests it has the right ta dis- regard the interests of another country like Egypt which is acting in self-defenée? Should it not take theseinterests into account at the same time that it is trying to defend its own interests through the waterway in which it wants ta have its goods pass? It is certainly far more impartial to prove that you have taken into account the interests of the other Powers at the same time that you are fully defending your own interests. Sa much for "with grave concern". 58. J'aimerais maintenant présenter quelques obser- vations sur le dernier membre de phrase du para- graphe 5: "conformément aux obligations qui lui in- combent aux termes de la Charte". Je ne vois rien à ajouter à ce qu'a dit le représentant de l'Egypte. Il est clair que toutes les décisions du Conseil de sécurité doivent êtœ conformes aux obligations qui incombent à chacun des Etats aux termes de la Charte. 59. Pour ce qui est des mots "sans préjudice des dispositions de la résolution du 1er septembre 1951", qui figurent au paragraphe 6, ils constituent le membre de phrase le plus étrange, le plus déplacé, de tout le texte. L'affaire n'a absolument rien à. voir avec' les événements qui se sont déroulés en 1951. Pourquoi, dès lors, insérer ce membre de phrase à cet endroit? Cela dépasse mon entendement, à moins qu'il n'ait été ajouté que pour plaire à Israël. 60. Toutefois, après ces quatre observations, je n'ai pas encore fait ma critique essentielle. Je tiens à mettre les membres. du Conseil en garde contre ce texte, car, même si ces quatre griefs n'existaient pas, je voterais quand même contre ce projet. On ne s'est pas suffisamment arrêté au principal défaut qu'il pré- 58. l come now to the phrase in paragraph 5, "in accordance with its obligations under the Charter". l think what the representative of Egypt has said is enough. Obviously, everything that is decided upon in the Security Council is decided upon in accordance with the obligations of each one of us under the Charter. 59. As regards the phrase in paragraph 6, "without prejudice ta the provisions of the resolutionof 1 September 1951", this is the strangest irrelevant inser- tion l find in the whole text. The eve11.ts of this affair have absolutely nothing ta do with what transpired in 1951. Why, therefore, inject this reference here? It is beyond my comprehension, unless it is simply in order to please Israel. 60. However, none of these four objections is the fUl1danlental one. l want to urge the members of the Council to vote against this text. Indeed, even if account were .taken of all four of them, l would still vote against this text. However, the basic criticism is one to which enough attention has not been paid. The l am certain this is the intention of the representative of New Zealand and of his country, but when l compare that intention with the objective text before me l find, in aIl respect, a discrepancy, because this text is constructed from beginning to end only with a view to bringing pressure upon Egypt. I think that no student whatsoever of this affair cau hold with fairness .that' this is only a one-sided issue. This is a two-sided issue. ·If you really want to construct a balanced text that will show Egypt what itshould do and show Israel at the same time what it should do - a text that would help the promotion of sorne settlement, 'Some adjustment in that part of the world - then the whole philosophy of that text ought to be different, because one of the major contentions of the representative of Egypt is that this is a measure of self-defence. 61. l should like to refer to one thing in connexion with this point, a thing that is of great importance and that I want the members of the Council to listen to because it may have important repercussions later on in the. deve10pment of this affair. Egypt is a member, and a . leading member, of the Arab League. The Arab Le~aue is a regional arrangement under the Charter of the United Nations. It is an arrangement that is registered in the United Nations just like the Panamerican secu- rity arrangement among the American States. It is a recognized regional arrangement under the Charter 01 the United Nations. In fact, it was built up four months before the United Nations was horn. 62. According to the charter of the Arab League, there is a solidarity of interest and of defenœ among the members of the League, so that, if any one of them is attacked, the others will conie to its support, and there is a so-called Arab Collective Securïty Pact which is a consequence of the implementation of the terms of the Arab League charter. And there is in the language. of the charter of ·the Arab League itself, which is registered in the United Nations, special reference to the rights of the Arq.bs of Palestine. 63. It follows from aU this that Egypt, just like Lebanon or Iraq or any other Arab State, is bound by its own international obligations which are in full conformhy with the Charter of the U~ited Nations, to take defensive action against anybody who attacks the Arabs of Palestine or any Arab State and to come to the support of the victims of the attack. This follows internationally. 64. l should now like to ask Mr. Eban a question. l asked him a question last time and I am now going to ask another in the hope that he will be kind enough, w~en he has a chance to speak, to answer both questions, but, in any event, certainly this one that l am about to put to him. Is it or is it not a fact that in Israe1i law, at the present moment, the seized Arab property which is held by the Government of Israel 66. Egypt, like any Arab country, b-=ing bound by the terms of the Arab League and the Arab Collective Security Pact, must take defensive action against the action which Israel has been taking all these year:s in seizing and treating as enemy property the $12,000 million to which the former Mayor of Jaffa called our attention some time ago. 66. L'Egypte, comme tout Etat arabe, doit s'acquit- ter des obligations qu'elle a contractées en tant que membre de la Ligue arabe et signataire du Pacte de sécurité collective qui lie le monde arabe; à ce titre, elle doit prendre des mesures de défense contre Israël qui, depuis des années, 'séquestre, comme s'il s'agissait de biens ennemis, les 12 milliards de dollars sur lesquels l'ancien maire de Jaffa a appelé l'attention il y a quelque temps. 67. Now, here is the point at issue with respect to the text proposed by the representative of New Zealand. If there were a real desire - l have no doubt that the desire is there, but somehow, in the translation of a desire from idea to text, in that penum- braI p!"ocess, something happens which always produces most unfortunate results - if there were a real desire, or, rather, if the execution of that real desire were a perfect execution, then there ought to appear in tbis text - if one really wanted to strike a balance and did not want only' to exert pressure upon one side- something to the effect that Israel is asked to release the $12,000 million wbich it has been enjoying for the last seven years. If such language were introduced, namely, that Israel is called upon ta release the seized Arab properties, amounting to $12 billion, which it has been using illegally for the la3t seven .years, if such an injunction were introduced into the present text then, the text, l suggest, would be far more halanced, far more impartial, far more palatable, than it is at present. And then the representative of New Zealand, if he succeeded in convincing us to give him a majority for the adoption of that text, would really have made a contribution to peace in the Near East, hecause the text would be a balanced text. But, as it 67. Voici l'essentiel des critiques que nous formulons à l'égard du texte que nous propose le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande. Si l'on veut vraiment - je ne doute pas que cette volonté n'existe, mais il arrive tou- jours, lorsque l'on cherche à passer du désir à la réa- lité d'un texte écrit, opération qui ne laisse pas d'être obscure, qu'un élément regrettable vienne fausser le résultat espéré - si l'on veut vraiment, dis-je, ou plutôt si cette volonté pouvait être parfaitement réa- Hsée, alors ce texte, pour arriver à l'équilibre voulu, sans exercer de pression sur tme partie seulement, devrait contenir une disposition qui demande à Israël de restituer les 12 milliards de dollars dont il profite depuis sept ans. Si une telle disposition était intro- duite dans le texte, c'est-à-dire si Israël était sommé de restituer les biens arabes qu'il a saisis et dont la valeur s'élève à 12 mdlliards de dollars, biens dont il profite illégalement depuis sept ans, si le texte que nous examinons contenait une injonction à cet effet, alors ce texte serait, je l'affirme, be1!-ucoup mieux équi- libré, beaucoup plus impartial, beaucoup plus acceptable qu'il ne l'est à présent. Si le représentant de la Nou- velle-Zélande réussit à nous convaincre et à gagner à son texte la majorité, il aura apporté une contribution réelle à la cause de la paix dans le Proche-Orient, car 68. l am certain that these few remarks of min~ will he considered by the representative of New Zealand. l hope that somebody - if not the representative of New Zealand, then somebody -will try to seize upon sorne of the ideas l have been urging and will introduce amendments whereby Israel will he asked to do some- thing that would balance to somè extent what Egypt is asked to do. If this is done, the Council will really make a contri.l,mtion to peace and to the adjustment of these differences in the Near East. 69. If no one is moved to introduce such amend- ments, then l am afraid that that will force me at the appropriate time - just before the President takes action on this text - to introduce them myself. l shall then introduce ameildments to this text along the lines l have suggested. But l do hope, as l have said, that somebody else will seize upon these ideas and will try to amend the present text in the manner and in the direction l have suggested. 70. l have only one final remark to make, and then l shall have finished. l have been asked, just a few . minutes ago, to atL110unce to the Council a grave situa- tion that has arisen. l shall announce it in two sentences only. 71. The grave situation is this. As the result of the defeat, only a few hours ago, in the 'Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission of a draft resolution wherein Israel accused Jordan of having committed the bus massacre a few days ago, the Arab States say tHat Israel is so incensed at the present moment that it has withdrawn from the Commission and may ... 72. The PRESIDENT: l should like to ask the representative of Lebanon to deeide for himself whether the matter to which he was just referring has anything to do with the Council's agenda for today. 73. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l fully agree that it has nothing to do with the agenda of the Couneil. But, with permission, l should like to make the announ- cement. l have already completed three quarters of it, so that only one fourth remains.

l disapprove, but if it is only one fourth the representative of Lebanon may continue. 75. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): l assure the President that it is only one fourth. l wanted to say only that the representatives of Israel have left the Commission and have boycotted it, and that the Arab States have reason to believe that as a result of that Israd might strike somewhere in the Arab world. 76. The PRESIDENT: There is a genei.il desire among members of the Council that the Security Council should meet again on Thursday, 25 March, at 3 p.m. If there is no objection, that will be the date of the next meeting. 71. Voici les faits. Lorsque, il y a à peine quelques heures, la Commission mixte d'armistice jordano-israé- nienne a rejeté le projet de résolution dans lequel Israël accusait la Jordanie d'avoir massacré, il y a quelques jours, les passagers d'un autocar, la délé- gation d'Israël a été si furieuse, qu'elle s'est retirée de la Commission et peut ... 72. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je laisse au représentant du Liban le soin de décider lui-même si la question qu'il vient de 'Soulever a quoi que ce soit de commun avec l'ordre du jour du Conseil. 73. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais): Je reconnais volontiers que cette question n'a rien à voir avec l'ordre du jour du Conseil. Cependant, avec votre permission, Monsieur le Président, je vou- drais en terminer avec l'information dont j'ai déjà donné les trois quarts; il ne m'en reste plus qu'un quart. 74. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne suis pas d'accord, mais s'il ne lui reste qu'un quart, le représentant du Liban peut continuer. 75. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais): Je donne au Président l'assurance qu'il ne s'agit vraiment que d'un quart. Je voulais simplement dire que les représentants d'Israël ont quitté la Com- mission et l'ont boycottée, et que les Etats arabes ont des raisons de craindre qu'Israël ne vienne maintenant à s'attaquer ailleurs au monde arabe. 76.. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Il semble que les membres du Conseil dêsirent se réunir à nouveau le jeudi 25 mars, à 15 heures. Sauf objec- tions, il en sera ainsi. 78. Le PRESIDENT (tradztit de l'anglœis): Quel- qu'un s'oppose-t-il à ce que nous nous réunissions le lundi 29 mars comme le représentant du Liban vient de le proposer? 79. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaume-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais): La discussion du projet de résolution de la Nouvelle-Zélande n'a guère avancé, et j'eusse sou- haité qu'on ne tardât pas tant à reprendre le débat. Je ne vous cacherai pas' ma préférence pour après- demain jeudi, ce qui laisserait à tous les intéressés une bonne journée de réflexion.

We have not got very far today with our discussion of the New Zealand draft resolution, and 1 should have thought that it would be better to leave a rather shorter interval for the resumption of our discussion of that question. l, myself, should have a decided preference for continuing the discussion on Thursday - that is, two days from now - which would leave an interval of a day in which all coneerned could reflect upon the matter. 80. The PRESIDENT: As 1 have already said, a number of members expressed a desire that the Coun- cil's next meeting should he held on Thursdav. 1 gather that the representatlve of Lebanon is - not fonnally objecting to that date, but is just making a suggestion. In fact, he said he would aceept the decision of the majority of the Couneil. 1 assume, therefore, that he does not object ta a meeting on Thursday. Renee, the next meeting will he he1d on Thursday, 25 March, at 3 p.rn. 80. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglœis): Comme je l'ai indiqué, plusieurs membres du Conseil ont exprimé le désir que la ~rochaine réunion du Conseil soit fixée à jeudi. Je crois comprendre que le repré- sentant du Liban n'est pas formell~ent opposé à cette date et qu'il n'a fait que SOtunettre une suggestion. En fait, le représentant du Liban a dit qu'il se range- rait à ravis de la majorité du Conseil. Je pense donc qu'il ne verra pas d'objection à ce que le Conseil se réunisse jeudi. Le Conseil tiendra donc sa prochaine séance jeudi 25 mars, à 15 heures. La séance est levée à 18 h. 15. The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m. SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS DEPOSIrA'RES DES PUllICArlONS ~rs NArlONS UNIrS FUlKE Editions A. Pedono. 13. ru. Soumot, P.ris V. SlEEeE- 5IECE "Eleftheruud.kis." PI.co do le Constitu· tion. Ath~no'• 5UATElIALA Gouboud & CIe. Ltd..;, S., Av.nide lur 2B. Guetomele. IIAITl Libr.irie" "A le C.r.vell.... BoIt_ postel. Ill·B, Port·.u·Prince. HONDUIAS Librerl. 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