S/PV.664 Security Council

For a long time now the Security Council has been considering the Israel Government's complaint against the Egyptian Government's action in examining merchant vessels pro- ceeding through the Suez Canal to Israel ports. This is not a new question and this is not the first time that it has been under consideration hy the Security Council. 37. The draft resolution submitted by the New Zea- land representative, though clearly purporting from its title ta deal with the Palestine question, in fact contains nothing related ta the settlement of the Palestine ques- tion; hence there is no connexion between the proposaIs contained in this draft resolution and attempts to settle 40. This is an important circumstance, whicb. l believe the Security Council is overlooking in the pre- sent discussion of this question. It is important also because it demonstrates yet again the need for a speedy settlement of the so-called "political question; it clearly shows that the unsettled state of ti.ùs question is inevitably engendering all kinds of misunder- standings, clashes and disputes which are complicating these relations and the general situation in the Near East, to the detriment of the vital interests of the peoples of the Arab countries and of the people of Israel, to the detriment of the interests of ail peace-Ioving peoples and to the cause of maiataining peace and 'international security. 41. When the question of Israel's complaint against Egypt wasfirst discussed in 1951, the Soviet Union based its position on the opinion that the drait resolu- tion submitted to t.he Security Council 31t that time f6llowed a Hne wmch would not ensure a satisfactory settlement of the question. The .two years that have elapsed since then have proved the correctness of that statement. 42. The present draft resolution submited by the New Zealand representative has, we have seen, been sup- ported at recent meetings and this afternoon by the representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Colombia and Denmark, but has been ;:;trongly opposed - and with sound enough argu- ments - by the representatives of the Arab countries participating in the discussion of this question in the Council. l refer to the representative of. Lebanon, a memher of the Council, and to the representative of Egypt, present at the Council's invitation. This drait resolution merely refers to the 1951 resolution and to the obligation to comply with that resolution. 43. l venture to observe that essentially this changes nothing in the situation, whether or not there is a new drait resolution containing such a reference. Much has been said on this point, especially by Mr. Lodge, who stressed the need to carry out the Security Council's decisions. l shall disregard the general question of the conditions in which any resolution may be regarded as legal. It cannot be so regarded in all conditions; but l shall disregard this question. 44. l would point out that this new draft resolution makes absolutely no change in the attempts, if atte~pts they may he called, to help the Arab States and Israel to enter into conditions of normal co-exis- 46. After listening carefully to the statements of the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the other delegations which I have mentioned here, I have reached the con- clusion that in supporting the Ne'i/ Zealand draft resolution they are, if I may say so, admitting a fun- damentally false premise into their arguments: they are disregarding the impossibility of settling international problems by the method which it seems to me is, so to speak, being fostered here and is being unneœssarily given a serious significance - the method of imposing upon one of the parties a decision which, moreover, has been stated by that party to be absolutely unacceptable from the outset. 47. Such methods are not admitted in international law; and indeed there is ra authority in international law suggesting that international problems can really be settled by any method other than that of agreement between the interested parties. 48. Permit me to remind you of our Charter. In Chapter VI - and 1 should like to draw your special attention to Article 36 of that chapter - the Charter stresses the need to take special mea~lUres for the settle- ~ent of disputes between the interested parties. What are these measures? If you read the Article carefully, you will see that among the methods recommended in Chapter VI there is no such method as that of imposing on one party a decision which is contrary to and completely disregards the will, wishes and interests of the other party. 49. l consider that the principal shortcoming of all the arguments of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Colombia and all those who support this New Zealand draft resolution consists in their failure to recognize that international law is law sui generis and that interna- tional disputes must be settled otherwise than by imposing a decision on either party in contravention of aU its arguments, without any attempt to refute those arguments - whereas I must admit that the arguments submitted here by the defender of the Egyptian position seemed to me to be quite convincing. 50. Tt would therefore be more correct to use another method. I should say that it would he more correct to Use the normal and generally-accepted method of inter- national law and of our Charter, and that it w9uld 47. C'est là une méthode que le droit international ne reconnaît pas. Aucune autorité en matière de droit international ne saurait admettre que les problèmes internationaux puissent réellement se résoudre autre- ment que par voie d'accord entre les parties intéressées. 48. Permettez-moi de vous rappeler les termes de la Charte. Au Chapitre VI, et tout particulièrement à l'Article 36, la Charte souligne la nécessité d'avoir recours à des moyens spéciaux pour régler tout diffé- ïênd qui pourrait surgir entre les parties. Or, quels sont ces moyens? Si vous lisez attentivement cet article, vous constaterez que le Chapitre VI ne prévoit pas la méthode qui consiste à imposer à une partie une déci- sion contraire à la volonté, aux aspirations et aux intérêts de l'autre partie, une décision qui méconnaî- trait complètement cette volonté, ces aspirations et ces intérêts. 49. A mon avis, les arguments qu'ont avancés les représentants des Etats-Unis, du Royanme-Uni, de la France, du Brésil, de la Colombie, et tous ceux, en un mot, qui appuient ce projet de résolution ont un défaut principal: ces représentants oublient que le droit inter- national est un droit très particulier en ce sens qu'il faut régler les problèmes internationaux autrement qu'en imposant à l'une des parties une décision con- traire aux arguments avancés par cette partie, une décision. qui ne tienne pas compte de ces arguments. Or, je dois l'avouer, les arguments présentés ici par le représentant de l'Egypte me paraissent assez convain- cants. 50. Il serait donc plus juste d'avoir recours à une autre méthode. Il serait bon, à mon avis, d'avoir recours à la ItI!éthode normale et généralement admise que nous imposent le droit internation~l et la Charte. Il 'Serait 52. 1 cannat overlook that the question of s~ipping in the Suez Canal and of the observance of the 1888 Convention, which is before the Security Coundl, calls for the special consideration of this question by aU the parties to the convention. However, only some of the States p.1.rtîes to that convention are represented in the Security Council, and they constitute a minority of all those who signed the cC"linention. 53. Indeed, whereas the Constantinople Convention of 1888 was signed by eight Statt's, only four of those are present here. And whereas France wtls then repre- sented by Mr. de Montebello, who signed the conven- tion, it i5 now represented by Mr. Lucet, who may be empowered to speak on the subject as a party to the convention. At that time the United Kingdom was represented by Mr. 'White; now Sir Pierson Dixon is empowered ta take part in the debate and to take decisions in conne...don with the 1888 Convention. The convention \ViaS signed on behalf of Russia by Am- bassador Nelidow and 1 presume that the Soviet Union is fully entitled ta speak here as a party to the coO'V'en- tion and successor to that convention; Turkey may also be considered to be a successor of the then Ottoman Empire as one of the States signatori~s of the Cons- tantinople Convention. 54. But 1 would ask you, what is the position of aU the other States present here - especially in view of article VIII of the convention, which for some reason is being carefully by-passed, although we were promised that we should be able to raise some questions more general than that relating ta Israel's c01l1lplaint. Article VIII states that the agents in ~aypt of the States which have signed this instrument - that is to say the Constanti!1opl~ Convention of 1888 - assume the obligation to supervise its observance and to take certain measures whenever its integrity etc. is t~reatened. 55. By what warrant, then, does the Security Cauncil in its present composition assume the rigut to settle problems which it is not competent to settle even within the meaning of the 1888 Convention, though this constitutes the basis of all the arguments advanced, of the 1951 resolution and of all the positions stated here with regard to Egypt? 56. The principle of free navigation laid down by the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 must, of course, be respected. But the adoption of measures ta ensure free navigation through the Suez Canal is a matter for the States which signed the convention and not for a chance group of States. Such States as China, for example Brazil, Colom:bia, Denmark or NeW' Zealand are not directly concerned with that conven- tion, since they were not signatories to it. It is these States, however, which constitute a majority in this Council. L .. 56. Il est certain qu'il faut respecter la liberté de navigation dont il est question dans la Convention de Constantinople de 1888. Cependant, ce sont certains pays bien définis, ceux qui ont signé la Convention, et non pas un groupe de pays rassemblés au hasard, qui ont le droit de prendre des mesures en vue d'assurer la liberté de passage dans le canal de Suez. Aussi les pays comme la Chine, le Brésil, la Colombie, le Dane- mark ou la Nouvelle-Zélande n'ont-ils rien à voir avec cette convention; ils ne l'ont même pas signée. Or, ces pays sont en majorité ici.

Before our debate ends, 1 should like to make a few remarks in amplification of my stat('ment at our last meeting. 59. The question before the Council has been con- nected, and 10gicaUy connected, W,ith the Palestine problem. This, as 1 say, is logical. But do not let us drive the;; connexion to unnecessary lengths. Does any- one suppose that the adoption of the moderate draft resolution before the Council will increase the tension between the Arab States and Israel? It assuredly will not. What is at the heart of the matter is a different and a broader issue, the issue of compliance by Mem- ber States with a resolution of the Security Council. œ. At our last meeting 1 said that 1 should prefer the drait resolution to contain an additional clause providing for further consideration of the problem by the Council withill a lillù}ed period, say ninety days. The question of compliance with resolutions of the Security Council is 50 important that my Government thinks thàt the Çouncil should keep the question under review. The simplest way of arranging f<;Jr this wiould have been the inclusion in the draft resàlution of a paragraph of the kind that 1 have indicated. But this is only_ one way of arranging the matter, and 1 am not pressing for an additional par~<YTaph. 61. 1 shaU vote for the draft resolution as it stands, but 1 should like to have on record my Government's view that if, as 1 sincerely hope will not be the case, Egypt has not within ninety days complied with the resolution, the Council should stand ready to take the matter up again.

1 should like now to address the Councîl briefly in my capacity as representative of TURKEY. 63. In the discussions that have so far taken place in the Council of the complaint by Israel against Egypt relating, first, to the enforcement by Egypt of restric- tions op the passage of ships trading wdth Israel through the Suez Canal and, second, to interference by Egypt with shipping proceeding ta the Israel port of Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba, both parties to the dispute have given a clear and full eÀ-planation of their respective points of view on the matter. For very sound reasons it was highly desirable that the parties directly concerned should agree between themselves to a conci- liatory solution of their differences. Many of us, including me, hoped against hope that the two parties l1light find such a solution. We can only l'~xpress sincere regret that they have not been able tn do so. 64. It is not our task to seek to place the blame on one or .the other party, for it is certainly desirable and necessary that the decisions not only of the Security Council, but of aU the different organs of the TTnited Nations, should be complied with by those parks. 70. M. MUNRO (Nouvelle-Zélande) (traduit de l'anglais): Je ne me propose pas de retenir longtemps l'attention du Conseil. Les membres du Conseil auront remarqué que je n'ai pas repris la parole au cours du débat: il me semblait que le large appui accordé au projet de résolution de ma délégation prouvait ample- ment combien ce projet répondait aux exigences de la raison. Il tendait essentiellement à réaffirmer la résolu- tion de 1951; c'était dire que nous considérions comme grave le fait que la résolution de 1951 n'est toujours pas respectée. Mieux encore, de l'avis de ma délégation, nous étions tenus d'insister auprès de l'Egypte pour qu'elle se conforme à la résolution de 1951. La dernière disposition du projet de résolution néo-zélandais décou- lait tout naturellement de la Convention d'armistice. 71. Je ne puis m'empêcher, au nom de mon gouv.er- nement, d'exprimer la grave inquiétude que j'éprouve devant Je nouveau veto qui est venu s'opposer à l'adop- tion d'une résolution rédigée en tennes modérés et destinée, du moins nous le pensions, à réduire la tension dans le Proche-Orient. Tous ceux qui ont le souci de sauvegarder l'autorité, le prestige et l'avenir même du Conseil de sécurité doivent nécessairement s'inquiéter de ce veto et y voir une mesure qui ne favorise pas, qui 73. By the time this draft resolution was put to the vote it had become clear that there was a possibility that the representat:.ve of the Soviet Union might once again make use of his veto. When he first did so on a Palestine problem - the question of the Jordan waters - my predecessor, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, described it as a melancholy and sinister event [656th meeting], melancholy because of its frustrating effect on the par- ticular issue then under discussion by the Cauneil, sinister because of its probable effects on the consider- ation of Palestine questi0ns as a whole. 74. The prospects of a Soviet veto on the present draft resolution were, to my mind, even mOrt! disturbing. The Soviet Union delegation had not vetoed l'.he 1951 resolu- tion. Why should it now want to veto a draft resolution which recalled the earlier resolution, expressed the Council's grave concern at Egypt's non-compliance with it and called upon Egypt, in a firm but very moderate way, to comply with it now? . 75. Why should this have been done? Such a veto, we realized, might reduce the Security Couneil to impotence on Palestine questions as Soviet Union vetoes have reduced it to impotence on so many other questions. Since Mr. Vyshinsky has given us no other reason for his action, one is reluctantly driven to the conclusion that this must be the wish of the Soviet Union Government. 76. Mr. Vyshinsky's use of the veto on two con- secutive occasions will. certainly complicate the Coun- cil's further action in regard to Palestine. Given the very serious news that is reaching us almost daily from that area, the prospect is one that must fin us ali with the greatest concern. 77. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 should like to explain my vote and to make one or two brief obser- vations. 78. In the first place, 1 did say previously [662nd meeting] that the present text of the draft resolution was unsatisfactory, and 1 enumerated the reasons why 1 regarded it as unsatisfactory. 1 asked questions of the representative of New Zealand about certain matters and 1 have not yet received replies to these questions. For example, 1 inquired why it was thought helpful or desirable to depart from precedent by quoting the very language of the Israel complaint, and to that pertinent question 1 have so far received no answer at aIl. 79. 1 went on to indicate the reason for my diss- '·is- faction with the text and, above aIl, 1 stated th.. :t seemed to me to be one-sided, to ignore the basic issues involved, to ask nothing of Israel, as though Israel had, in this whole situation, no responsibility and therefore as thoügh nothing needed to be asked of it. 80. 1 pointed out also that there was a way out of such impasses if everybody co-operated, and I even suggested lines of proced.ure according to which, 1 felt, 81. These, then, were among the reasons why l said previously that l would not be able ta vote in favour of the draft resolution. 82. Now we are faced with a sit.uation in which a draft resolutio!1 has not been adopted by the Security Couneil as a result of the negative vot\:: of one of the permanent members of the Couneil. If we had been dealing with the North Pole or some other region which is quite out of the way, oue might feel astonished at what has happened; but we are dealing with the Near East, and the Near East is in the centre of the world, and the whole world bears upon the Near East. Therefore, it seems to me that anyone who could expect important regions of the world not to have a decisive voice in the affairs of the Near East would be very naive indeed. 83. Let us consider the structure of the vote that has been cast. The representative of New Zealand said that he was encouraged because there was a majority of eight in favour of the draft resolutioH. Tt is true that there was a majority of eight, but look at those who either abstained or who voted against it. They were the members who were, ID a sense, most directly concerned - particularly one of them, my country - and the others belonged ta Asian countries. It is not a good thing for a council such as this always to break up, in its voting, on continental and regional tines, but there was every indication that the draft resolution would fail to receive the support of at least three delegations, namely, China, the Soviet Union and my own. There- fore, even if there had been no veto, the representative of New Zealand really could not cali a vote of eight in favour of his text a great and resounding victory. Hence, it Ïs obvious that there is something fundamentally wrong with the text which he proposed. 84. One cannot, it seems to me, in the Near East of aIl places in the world, impose any solution by force. No solution can really have a chance of prospering and remaining in existence, in the Near East of aIl places, that does not command the approval and acceptance of the population of the Near East. For the. rest of the world to be in the regrettable position of having to impose solutions against the wiII of the people of the Near East is something that has not worked and which, owing to the nature of the case, will never work. . 85. The moral, therefore, which l draw from what happened this afternoon is not that there should be any wringing of hands as to the use or abuse of the veto, but that it is necessary that everybody concerned - those of us who come from that area, Arabs and Jews, Israelis an~ Arabs, a!l~ those of the me!Ubers wh? have to take par.t ln the dec1510ns of the Securlty Councd with respect to their part of the world - before coming to a final decision which will provoke the division of the Council as was the case today, should do evervthing possible ta bring about a solution agreeable to the parties concerned. 86. The representative of Egypt, l myself and others, gave every evidence that the present text was one-sided 83. Décomposons le vote. Le représentant de la Nou- veIle-Zélande s'est dit encouragé de ce que le projet de résolution ait réuni une majorité de huit voix. Il y a bien eu huit voix pour, mais quel sont les membres du Conseil qui se sont abstenus ou qui ont voté contre le projet? Ce sont les membres qui en un sens, sont les plus directement intéressés, c'est-à-dire mon pays et les pays d'Asie. Il est malheureux qu'un Conseil comme celui-ci se divise lors du vote en blocs continentau.x ou régionaux. Mais tout laissait penser que le projet de résolution ne recevrait pas l'appui d'au moins trois membres, à savoir: la Chine, l'Union soviétique et mon pays. Par conséquent, même s'il n'y avait pas eu veto, le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande n'aurait pu considérer comme une grande et spectaculaire victoire le fait que son texte ait recueilli huit voix. Il est donc évident qu'il y a un défaut fondamental dans ce texte. 84. On ne peut, selon moi, imposer de solution par la force, et dans le Proche-Orient moins que partout ailleurs. Aucune solution ne peut réellement avoir la moindre chance de survivre, de prospérer et de durer, surtout dans le Proche-Orient, si elle n'a pas l'app:"o- bation et l'assentiment des peuples du Proche-Orient. Que le reste du monde se mette dans la situation regrd- table d'avoir à imposer des solutions contre le gré des peuples du Proche-Orient, cela n'a jamais réussi el:, étant donné la nature même de l'affaire, ne réussira jamais. 85. La morale que je tire de ce qui s'est passé cet après-midi ce n'est pas que nous devrions nous lamenter au sujet de l'emploi ou de l'abus du veto, mais qu'il faut absolument que tous les intéressés - ceux d'entre nous qui viennent du Proche-Oriçnt, les Arabes et les Juifs, les Israéliens et les Arabes, e~ ceux des membres qui dûivcnt participer aux décisions que prend le Conseil de sécurité en ce qui concerne cette partie du monde- avant d;en venir à un vote qui provoque une division du Conseil, comme cela a été le cas aujourd'hui, fassent tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour aboutir à une solution acceptable pour les parties intéressées, 86. Tout ce qu'ont dit le représentant de l'Egypte, d'autres orateurs et moi-même, tend à prouver que la 87. It is hopeless to impose upon the Neal' East a solution which is at variance with the views of the over- whelming majority of the population of that part of the world. i do hope therefore that, insteaà ~f despairing of the situation in the Security Council or in the Near East, as a result of what happel'led today, aU of us will learn to pay attention to the fadors that l have touched upon. Unless and until there is some form of profound satisfaction within the Near East - since we are dealing with an area in which everybody is interested - it is hopeless to try to bring about a decision which could be împlernented in that part of the world. Even if the Council takes the decision, unless there is a fundamental readiness and a sense" of justice about it, it would be impossible ta implernent it. 88. Consequently, l conclude by expl'essing profound regret that the matter was biought to the vote in this way and l very much hope that the members of the Council, in every matter relating to Palestine, will, in the future, take into consideration the profound feelings that agitate our part of the world whenever this issue cornes up. 89. Ml'. VYSHINSKY (Union of. Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian) : l feel compelled to give sorne explanation of my vote and so reply to the reproaches which, altogether unfairly and unjusti- fiably, have been levelled against me as the represen- tative of the Soviet Union for voting against a resolution which the Soviet Union considers wholly unsatisfactory and incapable of providing a solution for the problems it seeks to solve. 90. It has here been said that the veto impairs the authority of the Security CounciI. l believe the contrary to be true: that the veto safeguards the Council's authority. l am convinced that the effect of adopting the draft resolution submitted by the New Zealand repre- sentative would have been precisely to impair the Secu- rity Council's authority, since that resolution, as its author himself admits, merely repeats the resolution of 1951. 91. It is, however, permissible to ask what the two years which have passed since the adoption of the resolution of 1 Sep·~""'1ber 1951 have shown. l should like Ml'. Munro to explain what these two years have shown with respect to this resolution. How effective has it been, and what good purpose has it served? 92. If this resolution has proved ineffective and bas done no good - and because l am convinced of this l have opposed it - the question arises: what is behind the present attempt to compel the Security Council to adopt this draft resolution, which is a repetition of a resolution submitted in 1951? 93. Please answer this question. The only answer- if indeed you can answer it - must be: "Vve are unable ta accomplish anything and we are therefore devoting our time to repeating the same thing every two years." 90. On a affirmé ici que le veto détruisait l'autorité du Conseil de sécurité. Quant à moi, j'estime au contraire qu'il contribue à la rehausser. Je suis convaincu que, si le Conseil avait adopté le projet de résolution présenté par le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande, il aurait porté atteinte à sa propre autorité, car ce texte, ainsi que son auteur l'a lui-même reconnu, se bornait à reprendre les termes de la résolution de 1951. 91. Permettez-moi de vous poser toutefois une ques- tion: que s'est-il passé au cours des deu..'C années qui se sont écoulées depuis l'adoption de la résolution du 1er septembre 1951? Je voudrais demander à M. Munro de me rappeler ce qu'il est advenu de cette résolution au cours de ces deux années. Cette résolution, s'est-elle montrée efficace? Et quelle en a été l'utilité? 92. Je suis convaincu que cette résolution n'a pas été efficace, qu'elle est restée inutile. C'est précisément parce que j'en étais convaincu que je me suis prononcé contre cette résolution. Pourquoi, dans ces conditions, essaie- t-on aujüürd'hui d'imposer au Conseil de sécurité un projet de résolution qui reprend les termes de la résolu- tion de 1951? 93. Je vous demande de répondre à cette question. Si vous pouvez y répondre, vous devrez nécessairement reconnaître que nous sommes impuissants à faire quoi que ce soit et que, pour cette raison, HOllS nous bornons 96. What is the. proper method for this? The method is that of direct negotiation between the interested parties. On one side we have the representative of Israel and on the other the representative of Egypt; they are sitting opposite one another. Let them sit down together at one table and try ta settle the questions which the Security Council cannat settle now. I am deeply con- vinced that they r.an find a better solution. That is why certain representatives and States show a stubborn dis- inclination ta permit direct negotiations between the interested parties and are trying ta interfere in and, unforfunately, ta hinder those negotiations. 97. What arises from these remarks? Must we con- cIude that the Soviet Union should not use the lawful right ta vote which is conferred on it by the Charter? It appears that we are at fault because the Charter gives us the right to vote "against". Why, then, does any member of the Security Council have the right ta vote "against"; why does the Lebanese representative have the right to vote "against" without being accused of some kind of chicanery? When I vote in the same way as Mr. Malik, why do you feel that you can accuse me of impairing the authority of the Security Couneil? 98. 'You are demanding, th€n, that the USSR should never vote "against", that it should either vote "for", OF, at best, abstain; that it should adopt a position which it might not see fit ta support at a particular time, as in 1951. 99. The USSR has the same rights as all the other Mèmhers of the United Nations, and particularly those sitting on the Securi~ Couneil. Ii aIl have the right. to vote "for", to abstam, or to vote "against", then the USSR has the right, not only ta vote "for" or to abstain, but also to vote "against". If this means that a resolution cannot be adopted because of a negative vote by the USSR, this is the procedure laid down in the Charter. Mr. Lodge himself recently said that he would not hesitate ta use the veto if the interests of the United States sorequired. 15 that not sa, Mr. Lodge? 99. Les droits de l'Union soviétique sont exactement les' mêmes que ceux dont jouissent tous les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, particulièrement ceux qui sont représentés au Conseil de sécurité. Si tous ces Membres ont le droit de voter "pour", de s'abstenir ou de voter "contre", l'Union soviétique a, non seule- ment le droit de voter "pour" ou de s'abstenir, mais aussi le droit de voter "contre". Si, en votant contre, nous empêchons le Conseil d'adopter telle ou tei1: résolution, nous n'y pouvons rien, c'est la Charte qUl le veut. M; Lodge a dit récemment qu'il n'hésiterait pas 102. These words constitute my reply to the question which Sir Pierson Dixon asked me, namely why l voted against the draft today although the Soviet Union abstained from voting in 1951. l can explain this elementary point to Sir Pierson Dixon. 103. In 1951, we abstained from voting, although, as l have already said, we saw even then that the resolu- tion was unsatisfactory and could not provide a solution for the problems which had to be settled, but we abstained in the hope -that it might give some results, since we did not wish to hinder the possibility of achieving positive results. If any positive results had been achieved in the past two years, l would not have hesitated to vote for the New Zealand draft resolution. But no positive results have been achieved iri two years and there can be no hope nowfor any positive results, since the representatives of Egypt and Lehanon - the representatives of the Arab States here present - have categorically stated that they do not consider this resolu- tion to be appropriate, and have proposed that other measures be taken. Mr. Malik said definitely that some other proposaIs should be made which would he binding on the other party also. The Egyptian representative said that his country had already mitigated certain measures an'} would continue ta follow that course. l hope that l understood Mr. Azmi correctly. That is my understanding of it ::md it should be yours tao. 104. Despite aIl this,. you disregard the failure of your 1951 resQlution over the past two yars and are trying to inipose this draft resolution on us today. Whether or not l had the right of veto l would vote against this resolution because it is inappropriate. U 1 .0 ··.·n·· •.• - .."~ ••• " ••~,,... ..?.... _..... ·~·".::::L~'~·".:.,""x""';n*...~""'I'i:"".~~~~· Iii!.! J 1111 LIBl 110. Consequently, the Security Council should take into account its own practical experience, which has shown that unsatisfactory and inconclusive resolutions, which can only distract public opinion from the real problem and from the real means of settling that prob- lem, cannot succeed in the Security Council; at any rate, such resolutions cannot count on any support from the Soviet Union. 111. Our task is to achieve positive results in relations between Israel and the Arab States and really to help the parties to the dispute to settle their problems in their common interest, in the interests of maintaining peace and international security.

1 do not wish to prolong this debate, but, since Mr. Vyshinsky has cast yet another veto, it Is necessary for the French delegation to make some c~mments. 113. There is no counting wheth~r this veto is the sixtieth or the hundredth. l do not say that Mr. Yyshinsky is not entitled to cast it; under the Charter he is so entitled. But an action too frequently repeated begins, if it has not already begun, to raise the assumption tha,t the right is being abused to a certain extent, as has already been suggested in tris debate. Vve are alarmed by the fact that after so much consi- deration, and the passage of three years, the USSR has seen fit to veto a very moderate text which in any case could not have caused repeal of a legally-adopted. resolu- tion. 114. Furthermore, apart from the present debate, this is a matter of principle which seems to us very serious. Mr. Vyshinsky told us just now that if a resolution were not applied by the parties it should be abandoned. That seems to us absolutely contrary to the provisions of the Charter, most particularly Article 25, which, as we have already said, obliges Members of the United Nations to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Couneil. 115. The representative of the USSR also told us the Couneil's essential task was to promote agreement be- tween the parties and that it could not coerce anybody. It is true that the Charter calls for direct negotiation, and that that is generally a preliminary stage in any dispute; but we aIl know how far in the present case it has been possible to attempt direct negotiation, how far it would have been desirable and how difficult it is proving, particularly since the USSR representative now tells us that it was the Palestine question as a whole which should have been settled. Mr. Hoppenot has already had occasion in previous interventions to ex- plain how much that was to be desired, but we have been trying to do it for a very long time. +t is too easy 113. Ce veto est-il le soixantième, le centième? Il n'est plus possible de les compter. Je ne dis pas que M. Vychinsky ne possède pas ce droit; il le tient de la Charte, mais une action aussi souvent répétée com- mence à faire naître - si ce n'est déjà fait -la pré- somption d'un certain abus de droit, terme qui a été employé dans ce débat. Ce qui nous inquiète, c'est qu'après tant de réflexion, l'URSS, trois ans après, veuille mettre son veto sur un texte très modéré qui, de toute façon, ne saurait avoir pour effet de supprimer l'existence d'une résolution légalement passée. 114. D'autre part, il s'agit, en laissant de côté la dis- cussion actuelle, d'une question de principe qui nous paraît extrêmement grave. M. Vychinsky nous a dit tout à l'heure que, si une résolution n'était pas appliquée par les parties, on devait l'abandonner. Ceci nous paraît tout à fait contraire aux dispositions de la Charte, à l'Article 25 en particulier, qui, nous l'avons déjà dit, fait obligation aux Membres de l'Organisation d'accep- ter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité. 115. De même, le représentant de l'Union soviétique nous dit que la tâche essentielle du Conseil est de pro- mouvoir l'accord des parties, et que le Conseil ne peut obliger personne. La Charte, certes, oblige à des négo- ciations directes et ce doit être là, généralement, dans tout différend, une phase préliminaire; mais nous savons tous combien, dans le cas présent, les négociations directes ont pu être essayées, combien elles auraient été souhaitables et combien elles se révèlent difficiles, d'autant plus que le représentant de l'Union soviétique nous dit que ce qu'il aurait fallu résoudre, c'est l'en-- semble de la question de Palestine. M. Hoppenot a déjà eu l'occasion, dans ses interventions précédentes, de montrer combien cela était souhaitable, mais enfin il y a 18 116. By his vote today Mr. Vyshinsky is imperilling the entire operation of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and the Council's whole part in the settlement of dispu- tes. This is why we feel sa anxious today: if Mr. Vyshin- sky wished to prevent the Council from taking any action at aU in future, he would hardly set about it otherwise. That· is why the French delegation views with infinite regret the deeision which the representative of the USSR has just taken. 117. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Israel has requested to speak. However, as we have con- c1uded consideration of the item, 1 shaH put the matter to the Couneil. Is there any objection to my calling on the representative of Israel to speak? . 118. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 would glad- ly listen to what the representative of Israel wants to say. There is no doubt that we should listen to him. But 1 am sure that whatever rights the Council may grant to the representative of Israel will likewise be granted to the representative of Egypt, if he should request the same rights. 119. The PRESIDENT: That would, of course, he done. 120. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Repubiics) (translated from Russian): 1 also imagine that the representatives of Israel and Egypt will have to have equal rights. There is, however, a procedural question 1 should like to ask. Are we r:;suming debate on a question on which a decision has already been reached, or are we hearing explanations of votes? 121. If we are resuming the debate, l would ask that the question under discussion today he regarded as unfinished and should like to be told why, after we have taken a decision, we are continuing to discuss the resolution. If, however, we are hearing explanations of votes, why must we listen to explanations of votes by persons who did not vote? 122. 1 find this wholly inexplicable. 1 should be glad if the President would explain what is happening. If delegates are giving explanations of their votes, what are delegates who did not vote doing among them? What will they have to say in explanation of their votes? 1 assume that everyone will speak in explanation of his own vote and not in explanation of another's. 123. If the debate is being resumed, 1 would ask what point there is in resuming debate on a question on which a decision has already been reached. 1 do not understand what is taking place. 124. Quite apart from any explanations the President may give us, 1 do not for my own part object to state- ments being made by the representatives of Israel and Egypt, provided that they are not made in explanation of votes or in resumption of the debate. 125. 1 request an explanation. 126. The PRESIDENT: 1 do not, of course, know what the representative of Israel is going to say. It is for the Council to decide whether the President should permit him to speak now. 1 shall explain briefly why 1 have acted in this way. 1 have acted in accordance with a precedent t:stablished at the 558th meeting of the Security Couneil. At that meeting, held on 1 Sep- 122. Tout cela me semble absolument incompréhen- sible. Je voudrais clone demander au Président de m!('x- pliquer ce qui se passe en ce moment. S'il s'agit d'expli- cations de vote, pourquoi ceux qui n'y ont pas pris part font-ils des déclarations? Qu'ont-ils à expliquer? Il est prévu en effet que chacun doit expliquer son propre vote, et non pas celui d'autrui. 123. Cependant, si la discussion est rouverte, je vous demande de me dire pourquoi il en est ainsi, car nous venons de nous prononcer sur la question dont nous étions saisis. Je ne comprends pas ce qui se passe. 124. Quelle que soit la réponse du Président, je ne m'oppose pas pour ma part à ce que le représentant d'Israël et celui de l'Egypte prennent la parole, mais à condition qu'ils ne le fassent pas dans le cadre des explications de vote ou pour reprendre la discussion. 125. Je demande des précisions à ce sujet. 126. .Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) : J'ignore bien entendu ce que le représentant d'Israël va dire. C'est au Conseil qu'il appartient de décider si le Présiqent doit accorder maintenant la parole au représentant d'Israël. Voici en quelques mots les raisons de mon attitude. J'agis conformément à un précédent établi par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 558ème séance, le 1er sep- 119. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Cest ce que nous ferions, bien entendu. . 120. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques) (traduit du russe): Je pense, moi aussi, que le représentant d'Israël et le représentant de l'Egypte doivent jouir de droits égaux. Je voudrais toutefois poser au Président une question qui concerne la procédure. La discussion sur le projet de résolution qui vient d'être mis alL"'{ voix est-elle rouverte? Ou bien s'agit-il d'une simple explication de vote? 121. Si la discussion est rouverte, je voudrais vous demander ae ne pas considérer la présente discussion comme close et de m'expliquer pourquoi le débat con- tinue après le vote. Si, toutefois, il s'agit d'une simple explication de vote, pourquoi sommes-nous appelés à écouter les explications de ceux qui n'ont pas voté? 128. 1 do not abject; 1 merely consider that neither the Israel representative nor - if he wishes to speak - the representative of Egypt should refer to the explanations of vote or ta the resolution which has already been discussed. and voted upon. 129. 1 believe that representativ~s will bear this in mind. 130. The PRESIDENT: As 1 have said, 1 do not know what the representative of Israel is going ta say, but any member of the Couneil who feels that he is not in arder can always raise a point of order and the President will deeide accordingly. 131. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): As 1 said ear- lier, if the President shouid put the matter ta the vote, 1 should vote in favour of hearing Mr. Eban, and if the representative of Egypt should ask for the same privilege 1 am certain that the Couneil would grant it to bim. , 132. 1 should like ta add, however, that 1 think that it is fair that 1 reserve ta myself, if either or both of the two representatives in question should address the Couneil, the right, should 1 consider it necessary, to make my own comments after 1 he!!r what they have ta say. 1 promise that, if the case should arise, l would be very brief, but 1 think that it is important for mem- bers of the Couneil ta reserve the right to make com- ments on whatever is said. With this understanding, 1 should certainly vote in favour of hearing either the representative of Israel or the representative of Egypt.

1 should like to assure the representativeof Lebanon that the President of the Seçurity Council is quite willing to sit until well aiter midnight, and that he is therefore at the Council's entire disposaI. 134. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand): 1 do not pro- pose ta comment on the matter immediately at issue before us, but we have had a somewhat formidable admonition from the representative of Lebanon - the second, in fact, which he has given today - and while 1 appreciate that he has the right to take part in this debate, if it is a debate, 1 am a iittle concerned at this hour of the night ta be confronted with the possibility that we shall have a speech from the representatjve of Israel, a speech from the representative of Egypt and then one from the representative of Lebanon, and even, possibly, one from the representative of the S viet Union. 135. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It is possible. 135. M. VYCHINSKY (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques) (traduit du russe): C'est possible. 139. 1 do not, of course, wish, as a non-member of the Security Council, to comment at aIl on today's mo- mentous development in the institutional history of the United Nations, but only to speak of certain things which affect my Government's future very clC'sely indeed. 140. It appears that in any dispute between Israel and any of its Arab neighbours the Arab objection must prevail against the views of Israel, irrespective of the objective merits of the case and of the majority will of the Security Council. 141. With reference to the two items which were upon the table of the Council for several weeks, 1 wish ta give my Goverllment's understanding of the present. position and of the future course of its conduct. In our view, the law of the United Nations in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba is not, as it .might have been, the draft resolution of New Zealand presented today, but it is the valid and unrepealed resolution of the Security Council adopted on 1 September 1951. This resolution denied to us and to our neighbour, Egypt, the right of active belligerency and, especially, the right of visit, search and seizure, and called for the termina- tion of aIl restrictions which were applied against com- merce and navigation on the grounds of belligerency. 142. The parties, in our view, are undc obligation ta conform with that decision. Accordingly. my Govern- ment will not recognize, either in word or in deed, the right of Egypt to exercise controIs or restrictions over Israel's commerce or navigation, to apply belligerent rights, or to use visit, search or seizure against cargoes proceeding to Israel. 143. It is our understanding that nothing prevents any maritime Power from exercising the freedom which internationallaw, including the resolution of 1 Septem- ber 1951 which is still the valid law governing this situation, confers upon it, and certainly one maritime Power - not the greatest among them, but:ertainly the second maritime Power among Middle Eastern States, namely, the State of Israel- intends to bring cargoes freely into and out of its ports. 144. It would, in our view, have been well to re- affirm this right. The right nevertheless exists, and it is more important that it be peacefuHy exercised. 145. It is encouraging for us to note that the prin- ciple of non-belligerency, embodied in the standing reso- lution of the Security Couneil of 1 September 1951, is 2l

If there is no objection, J: call on the representative of Egypt. 1

1 shall be still briefer than the representative of Israel. 149. 1 have no notion at aIl of intervening in the vote or meddling with the substance of the question; 1 shaH simply confine myself to submitting a few comments after the vote. 150. 1 should like to thank those membersof the Coun- cil who voted against the New Zealand draft resolution - that is, the representatives of China, Lebanon and the USSR. 1 thank them and 1 hail them as defenders of law and justice. 151. From the outset 1 have put forward the idea that that draft resolution was as illega1 as the resolu- tion of 1951. But the ears of the eight members of the Connèil who voted in favour of the draft remained hermeticalIy Fealed, and they refused to hear a word of our grievances. Such of those eight members as have taken the floor have suggested ta us that the Security Couneil ilS infallible. Unfortunately 1 do not believe that any person or thing in the world is infallible; Egypt believes in the infallibility of God :llone. 152. The United Kingdom representative told us sev- eral times that the legal side of the question had been studied. The Chinese representative reminded him today of what had been said before in that connexion, and quoted to him the words of the representative of the United Kingdom in 1951, which made it Cleàr that the legal aspect had not been studied. 153. The United Kingdom representative insisted that the Egyptian representative had contributed nothing new. He refused to consider the letters exchanged by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom and the Egyp- tian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as new evidence in the caie. He refused to consider as a new factor the agree- ment between the representatives of Israel and Egypt c')ncerning vessels proceeding through territorial waters. He even went further, by asking why use had not been made of the correspondence between the Bri- tish Embassy and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affaira, and why it had not been referred ta in 1951, since the two letters were dated earlier than July of that year. The answer is very simple. The United King- dom representative must remember that the two letters referred to passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1951 the question of Aqaba was not before the Couneil; that L ~as why Egypt did not use the letters exchanged at 22 150. Je voudrais remercier ceux des membres du Conseil qui ont voté contre I.::: projet de résolution de la Nouvelle-Zélande, à savoir les représentants de la Chine, du Liban et de l'Union soviétique. Je les remer- cie, et je les salue en tant que défenseurs de la légalité et de la justice. 151., .Dès le début, j'avais formulé l'idée que ce projet de résolution était illégal, comme l'était la résolution de 1951. Mais les oreilles des huit membres du Conseil qui ont voté en faveur du projet sont demeurées hermé- tiquement closes, et ces représentants n'ont rien voulu entendre de nos doléances. Ceux de ces huit membres qui ont pris la parole nous ont présenté le Conseil de sécurité comme infaillible. Je ne crois malheureusement à l'infaillibilité de personne ni de rien dans le monde; l'Egypte croit à l'infaillibilité de Dieu seul. 152. Le représentant du Royaume-Uni nous a dit et répété que l'aspect légal de la question a été étudié. Le représentant de la Chine lui a rappelé aujourd'hui ce qui a été dit auparavant à ce.t égard, et il lui a cité des paroles prononcées en 1951 par celui qui représentait alors le Royaume-Uni, paroles d'où il ressort que l'aspect légal n'avait pas été étudié. 153. Le représentant du Royaume-Uni a insisté sur le fait que le représentant de l'Egypte n'avait rien apporté de nouveau. Il n'a p~,.s voulu considérer comme élément nouveau en la matière les lettres échangées entre l'Am- bassadeur du Royaume-Uni et le Mini&tère égyptien des affaires étrangères. Il n'a pas voulu considérer comme facteur nouveau l'accord intervenu entre le représentant d'Israël et celui de l'Egypte à propos des navires qui traversent les eaux territoriales. Il est même allé plus loin en posant la question: pourquoi ne pas avoir usé de la correspondance entre l'Ambassade du Royaume- Uni et le Ministère égyptien des affaires étrangères? Pourquoi ne pas l'avoir citée en 1951 alors que les deux lettres dataient d'avant juillet 1951? La réponse est fort simple. Le représentant du Royaume-Uni doit se sou- venir que les deux lettres concernaient le passage par le golfe d'Akaba. La question d'Akaba n'était pas encore devant le Conseil en 1951 i c'est pour cette raison que 155. Le représentant de la France nous a cité aujour- d'hui encore l'Article 25 de la Charte. Il croit que "les Membres de l'Organisation conviennent d'accepter et d'appliquer les décisions du Conseil de sécurité". Mais il y a cinq mots qui terminent l'Article: "conformément à la presente Charte". Or ce sont ces conditions de con- formité à la présente Charte que nous réclamons. Si ces conditions sont réalisées, nous serons les premiers à respecter lesdites décisions, mais nous ne sommes pas convaincus que la résolution de 1951 ait été conforme à l'esprit de la Charte. 156. Je voudrais dire que ce n'est pas par un projet de résolution tel que celui que nous a présenté la déléga- tion de la Nouvelle-Zélande que le fossé - je tiens à ce que vous entendiez bien cela - qui sépare Israël de l'Egypte et des pays arabes sera rétréci. Il est beaucoup trop profond pour cela. 157. Je voudrais dire également pour terminer que maintenant, l'Egypte, libérée de cette pression qui s'exerçait sur elle à travers le projet de résolution, libérée surtout de la menace représentée par la proPQ- 5ition du Royaume-Uni tendant au maintien, pendant un délai de quatre-vingt-dix jours, de la question à l'ordre du jour du Conseil, l'Egypte, dis-je, ira vers la tolérance de son propre gré. 158. Le représentant du Royaume-Uni qui a formulé cette menace connaît mieux que tout autre l'Egypte à travers les relations anglo-égyptiennes durant les soixante-douze dernières années, et il devrait savoir, d'après les précédents, que l'Egypte se raidit devant les menaces et ne se laisse pas intimider. . 159. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais): Je ne vous demanderai que quelques minutes, juste le temps de faire une ou deux observations. Le représentant d'Israël, pour nous décrire la décision prise cet après-midi, l'a qualifiée de "fait mémorable qui a marqué aujourd'hui l'histoire de l'Organisation des Nations Unies". Il devait avoir en tête quelque chose qu'il ne nous a pas exposé complètement. Il y a là évi- 157. 1 should also like to say in conclusion that now Egypt, freed from the pressure which was being brought to bear on her through the draft resolution, freed from the threat of the United Kingdom proposaI that the item should be retained on the Council's agenda for ninety days, will of its own free will move towards tolerance. 158. The United Kingdom representative who made that threat knows Egypt better than anyone else, from the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations over the past seventy-two years, and he must know from those prece- dents that Egypt does not allow itself to be intimidated, but becomes more determined in the face of threats. 159. Ml'. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): 1 would like to take only a few minutes to make one or two remarks. The representative of Israel, in his statement, described the decision of this afternoon as, and 1 use his own words, "a momentous development in the institutional history of the United Nations". He must have some- thing in mind which he did not fully expound to us. This is obviously a reflection on the Security Council into , 163. I wish I had time to talk once more about the objective merits of matters to which he referred. I am very glad he used that phrase because it is pregnant with potentialities for peace and understanding in the future. AlI I can say about this last phrase of the repre- sentative of Israel is that I hope he does not mean that unless in every case Israel's wishes are respected 100 per eerit, Israel will either refuse to deal with the United Nations when it cornes to matters relating to Palestine, or will take the law into its own hands. I hope he did not mean that. 164. Finally, I wish to end on this positive note which the representative of Egypt has afforded us. I wish to underscore what he said about Egypt's spontaneous offer to follow a course of tolerance - that is his own phraseology - now that they are freed of any. threat coming to them from any direction. I believe that if we meditate on t~is positive outcome of our debate during these weeks, we will all be a bit more cheered than sorne of us seem to be as a result of the- negative decision of the Security Council this afternoon. I thirik that what the representative of Egypt has said about Egypt's own voluntal'y - I repeat the word "voluntary" - decision to follow a course of tolerance in this respect, is some- thing which we can all welcome and stress and end upon as a happy note. 165.. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council will be informed by the Secretariat of the date of our next meeting. The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m. 161. M. Eban a dit qu'Israël ne reconnaîtra ni en paroles, ni en actes, le droit de l'Egypte à appliquer cette réglementation; Israël a manifestement toute lati- tude pour reconnaître ou ne pas reconnaître le droit de ses voisins. Mais, je le répète, ses voisins ont la faculté de prendre toutes mesures qu'ils jugent nécessaires à la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts nationaux. 162. Enfin, le représentant d'Israël a déclaré en termes mûrement pesés que, si le Conseil de sécurité se refuse à approuver une résolution qui n'est pas conforme aux intérêts arabes, son gouvernement devra reconsidérer son attitude tant vis-à-vis du Conseil de sécurité qu'en ce qui concerne les plaintes dont il peut saisir l'Organi- sation des Nations Unies. M. Eban a ajouté que le contraire était précisément arrivé dans le cas de résolu- tions auxquelles Israël s'opposait énergiquement - celles-là, le Conseilles avait adoptées. 163. J'aurais aimé avoir le temps de revenir sur les faits de la cause, dont il nous a parlé. Je suis très heu- reux qu'il ait employé cette expression, car elle ouvre de vastes perspectives de paix et d'entente. Il n'y a qu'une chose que je puisse dire de la dernière phrase du représentant d'Israël: j'espère qu'elle ne signifie pas que, si ses vœux ne sont pas entièrement exaucés, Israël se refusera de traiter avec les Nations Unies pour toute question intéressant la Palestine, ou s'arrogera le rôle de justicier. J'espère que ce n'est pas ce qu'il a voulu dire. 164. Enfin, j'aimerais, pour conclure, rappeler l'orien- tation constructive que le représentant de l'Egypte a donnée au débat. Je voudrais faire r~ssortir ce qu'il a dit au sujet de l'offre spontanée de son pays de s'engager sur la voie de la tolérance - ce sont là ses propres paroles - maintenant que l'Egypte n'a plus à craindre de menace, d'où qu'elle vienne. Je crois que, si nous réfléchissons au résultat positif qui est venu cou- ronner des semaines de débat, nous en serons tous réconfortés, et certains d'entre nous seront moins affligés qu'ils ne semblent l'être de la décision négative intervenue cet après-midi au Conseil de sécurité. A mon avis, la déclaration que nous a faite le représentant de l'Egypte au sujet de la décision volontairement - je souligne le mot "volontairement" - prise pa." l'Egypte de s'engager sur la voie de la tolérance est une déclara- tion que nous pouvons tous accueillir et saltter avec satisfaction; grâce à elle, notre débat finit bien. 165. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Le Secrétariat fera connaître a~ membres du Conseil la date de la prochaine séance. La séance est levée à 18 h. 30. FIANCE Edm.ns A. Pedon.. 13, rue soumat, Paris V. GlEECE - GlECE "Elefth.roud.kis," Plec. d. la Constltu· tion, Athènes. AUEliTINA-llGElillNE Editorial S~domericono S.Ï'\" Alsino 500. 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Uniled Nalian. pu"'lcalion. can al... bo oblain.d 'rom th. following "no., l.. p~/lcalionl dl' Nalion. Uni.. poUY...t Igalemonl Siro oblenu.. aux adfOllH ci· d_1II: ," lUSTlIA-lUTllrde B. Wüllerstorff. W.agplefz, 4, Salzburg. Gerold & Co.. 1. Gr.ben 31. Wi.n. GEUm - AllEMAGNe Elwort & Meurer, H.uptstr.sse lOI, B.rlin -Schonober'3' W. E. S••rb.ch. Gere.nstrasse 25.29, Koln (22c). AI••• Horn. Spiegelgesse '/, Wiesb.d.n. JA'AN - JAPON Maru:én Company, L1d" b Tori·Nichom•• Nihonbashi. Tokyo. SPAlH·ESPAGNE Librerl. Bosch. Il Randa Unlve...ldad. Barcelone. Le. commandes et demandes d. renseignements émanant d. pays ott Il n'existe pas encore de dépositaires peuvent être adressées à la Section des ventes et de la dlstrlbù- tilln, Organls~tlon des Nations Unies, New-Yolk (Etats- Unis d'Amérique) ou à la Section des ventes, Organisa· tian des Notions Unie., Palais des Nations, Genève (Suisse). (53112) 13692-July 1954-1,600