S/PV.667 Security Council

In the first place, 1 wish to thank the President for having explained to me at the last meeting what he meant by his use of the word "arder". 1 wish also to thank the representative of Brazil for having been good enough to explain, Ht my request, the essence of his proposaI. As a conse- quence, 1 can be very brief, particularly as the repre- sentative of New Zealand has today expressed views which are very similar to mine. 26. It seems to me that there should be no furthcr difficulty regarding the provisional agenda itself, and 1 doubt very much that there are now any serious diffi": culties in the way of planning the process of examina- tion. If, as suggested by the representative of Brazil, we can, under a general discussion, present the general aspect of the matter - bring in (a), bring in (b), bring in points ii or iii of item 2 (a), and have the right at any time to put forward draft resolutions - it would seem to me that we should have such broad possibilities for dis- cussion that the right which we shaU require if we are to take (iecisions, will appear at the proper time. Only in such light can we, 1 believe, act in accordance with the task which has been assigned to the Security Council by the Charter in the interest of maintaining peace, or of re- establishing peace where war has broken out. There- fore, 1 shall be quite willing to accept the suggestions made by the representative of Brazil if he presents them in the form of a proposaI. 27. Mr. GOUTHIER (Brazil): At the last meeting, the Brazilian de1egation, supported by the Colombian representative, had the honour to make sorne suggestions to the Council regarding the adoption of the agenda and the manner in which we should dispose of its items. 1 was encouraged to see that the ideas 1 ventured to submit met with the approval of a considerable number of representatives on this CounciI. 1 wàs also heartened by the remarks of the representative of Lebanon 1"e- 27. M. GOUTHIER (Brésil) (traduit de l'anglais): Lors de la dernière séance, la délégation brésilienne, appuyée par le représentant de la Colombie, a fait aU Conseil quelques suggestions sur l'adoption de l'ordre du jour et la manière d'en étudier les l"iifférents points. Les idées que j'ai exposées ont recueilli l'approbation d'un grand nombre de représentants du Conseil, et cela m'3 ~ncoufagé. Les observations du représentant d't Liban touchant mes suggestions m'ont également donné 28. Then fore, pursuing our efforts to narrow even further the gap which 1s dividing the Couneil, we endeavoured to ascertain whether there remained any possibility of overcoming the last difficultiea. We are confident that we have performed our dutY in com- plete objectivity and detachment an.d to the best of our ability. 29. Let us now survey very briefly the progress which we have made towards our common goal of conciliation since we started this procedural discussion. 30. The Council will recall that at its first meeting on this matter [665th meeting] the representative of the United Kingdom stated that he was prepared to agree "that the provisional agenda before us should bE adopted, on the assumption that, since the two items were interrelated, the Council would consider them as a whole". The representatives of France, the United States and New Zealand endorsed this view. Mr. Malik could not agree with that thesis. He stressed that the Council had before it two sets cf complaints which should be dealt with in an orderly manner, "first dis- posing of item 2 (a) as it appears on the agenda, hearing bath sides of the issue, and then going to item 2 (b)". 31. These were, as we understood, the main positions on the question. A number of representatives, inc1uding myself, put for~vard other suggestions as to the method of cstablishing the agenda and proceeding with the discussion. Such was the picture when the Brazilian delegation, by way of compromise, tried a new approach ta the problem and presented its formula. We tried a middle-of-the-road solution. On the one hand we favoured a generaJ. debate on the agenda as a whole and, on the other hand, taking into account the views expressed by Mr. Malik, we stated c1early that the Council would not commit itself at this stage as ta the character of any future resolution or resolutions. Thus, the possibility was left open to Mr. Malik to choose for himself the most appropriate n'loment to move that the Council should take a specifie decision on any of the points listed on the agenda. 32. The wid~ acceptance which this formula received shows a considerable improvement upon the previous positions. Both sides have made concessÎons. The repre- sentative of the United Kingdom and those who pre- 5 33. Brazil and Colombia realize that this formula can- not give full satisfaction ta our fri~nd, Mr. Malik, but it is also true that it does not give full satisfaction to those who, at our nrst meeting, favoured the views ex- pressed by Sir Pierson Dixon. 1 am also very grateful for the remarks made today in this Council regarding the BraziHan-Colombian suggestion. 1t shows that a clear majority of this Council favours our formula. 34. Therefore, the Brazilian and the Colombian dele- garions formally introduce their proposaI reading as follows: "1. The provisional agenda is adopted. "2. A general discu~sion shall be held in which referenc:e may be made to any or aIl of the items of the agenda. "3. The Security Council does not commit itself at this stage as to the separate or joint character of its eventual resolution or resolutions." 35. In the same spirit of conciliation, guided by a sense of t:eality, and aware of the necessity for avoiding any clash that would poison our discussions on the substance of the complaints, we call upon the Council toconsider our motion. At the same rime we wish to make it clear that we will always be ready to endorse any suggestion that, in the opinion of the Council, would be an improvement on our proposaI.

My delegation h~,s listened with great interest to the statement which the representative of Brazil has just made, and 1 can state that it fully shares the views he expressed. 37. 1 should like to repeat what 1 said at the 666th meeting of the Security Council: "Both the delegations of Brazil and of Colombia, which represent the Latin-American regional block on this Council and are therefore not directly concerned with the problems which have recently arisen in the Middle East, are of the opinion that for that very reason we are in an excellent position to make a suggestion which, we think, combines the points of view expressed by the representatives of the various countries members of the Security CounciI." 38. 1 wish to thank the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and New Zealand for the support they have given to the proposaI submitted by our two coun- tries, and also the representarive of Lebanon for having viewed our proposaI with favour, in spite of his remarks to the effect that each item should be discussed separ- arely. "1. Le Conseil adopte l'ordre du jour provisoire. "2. Il procédera à une discussion générale, au cours de laquelle les orateurs pourront évoquer l'un quelconque ou tous les points de l'ordre du jour. "3. Il ne prend pour le moment aucun engagement sur le point de savoir s'il adoptera en définitive une résolution ou des résolutions distinctes pour chacun des points examinés Oî.1 une ou plusieurs résolutions portant sur l'ensemble de ces points." 35. Dans le même esprit de conciliation, guidés par notre sens des réalités et nous rendant compte de la nécessité d'éviter des heurts qui risqueraient d'enve- nimer nos diScl1ssions sur le fond des plaintes dont le Conseil est saisi, nous demand,ms aux membres du Conseil d'examiner notre proposition. Nous tenons à préciser en même temps que nous serons toujours dis- p'1sés à appuyer toute suggestion qui, de l'avis du Conseil, serait de nature à améliorer notre proposition. 36. M. ECHEVERRI CORTES (Colombie) (traduit de l'espagnol): Ma délélf~tion a écouté avec très grand intérêt l'intervention que vient de faire le représentant du Brésil; je puis affirmer qu'elle partage sans réserve les idées qu'il a exposées au Conseil. 37. Permettez-moi de rappeler ce que j'ai dit à la 666ème séanœ: "Ce sont les délégations brésilienne et colombienne qui représentant au Conseil les pays de l'Amérique latine. Les événements du Moyen-Orient ne nous touchent donc pas directement, et nous sommes bien placés, je crois, pour présenter une suggestion qui, selon nous, concilie les vues exposées par les repré- sentants des pays membres du Conseil de sécurité." 38. Je voudrais remercier les représentants de la France, du Royaume-Uni et de la Nouvelle-Zélande de l'appui qu'ils ont donné à la proposition présentée par nos deux pays; je voudrais également remercier le représentant du Liban d'avoir accueilli notre proposition avec bienveillance, quoique, d'après ce qu'il a dit, il préfère que chacune des· deux questions soit examinée séparément. 44. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): The United Nations is a whole separate world. It is a fascinating world. It has its own sense of humour, it has its own ideas, it has its own proprieties and amenities. It has its tacit understandings and, l might add, it has its own tacit m\sunderstandings. l mean that we quite understand each other, and we allow each other to indulge in a little misunderstanding. It is not very harmfu!, since we all have this unconquerable sense of humour which always exhibits itself at the right time. 45. l heard the representative of New Zealand say here that in his view, after a consideration of our .-e- marks during the last two meetings, the difference between the various points of view is really very nar- row. AU lcan say is that if my distinguished friend and neighbour - and he is my friend and neighbour bath here and elsewhere - should really prove quite objec- 'tively that the difference is very narrow, l assure him that l will jump that difference. l would not want any- body else to jump it; l would jump it myself. But he must really prove that the difference is, as .he put it, very narrow. . 41. Quant à nous, nous continuons d'espérer que l'ar- mistice qui a été signé entre les pays arabes ét Israë! aboutira tôt ou tard à la conclusion d'un traité dt: paix; nous considérons de notre devoir d'exprimer le fervent espoir que ce traité inaugurera dans le Moyen-Orient une ère de tranquillité. 42. Madéiégation espère que, si le Conseil adopte la proposition du Brésil et de la Colombie tendant à résou- dre la question accessoire de la procédure à suivre :Jans l'examen de l'ordre du jour, nous pourrons aborder immédiatement le fond du problème ~t regagner le temps que nous avons perdu au l:ours de nos séances précédentes. 43. En terminant, je tiens à souligner le très vif intérêt que les délégations brésilienne et colombienne portent au présent débat; elies en ont donné la preuve en s'effor- çant de trouver une solution de compromis qui co'nci- lierait, dans toute la mesure du possible, les différents points de vue présentés. Au cas où notre proposition serait adoptée, nos deux délégations seraient· fières d'avoir pu contribuer à faciliter les futurs débats du Conseil. 44. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (trad1tit de l'an- glais): L'Organisation des Nations Unies est Un monde bien à part. C'est un monde fascinant. Il a un sens de l'humour qui est bien à lui. Il a des idées qui lui sont propres. Il a ses propres règles en ce q1.liconcerne ce qui se fait et ce qui ne se fait pas. Il a ses ententes tacites et, si j'ose m'exprimer ainsi, il a ses malentendus tacites. Je veux dire par là que nous nous comprenons bien et que nous nous laissons tous aller à créer de petits malentendus. Cela n'est pas très grave, car nous possédons tous un sens de l'humour invincible, qui· se manifeste toujours au moment opportun. 45. Le représentant de la Nouvelle-Zélande a dit qu'aprb avoir examiné les observations qui avaient été faites au cours de nos deux dernières réunions il estimaü que les divergences de vues qui s'étaient fait jour étaient, en réalité, minimes. Tout ce que je peux dire à mon ho- norable ami et voisin - il est bien mon ami et voisin ici même et ailleurs - c'est qu'il devrait prouver de ma- nière objective que ces divergences sont vraiment minimes. S'il le fait, je serai le premier à néglig~r ::es divergences de vues, sans laisser à personne d'autre la possibilité de le faire avant moi. Mais il faut qu'il prouve d'abord que ces divergences de vues sont vrai- ment minimes. 47. l should now like to ask another question, ad- dressed this time to the representative of Brazil. He has circulated a document containing the suggestion he made at the 666th meeting. What the Brazilian repre- sentative is putting forward this aftemoon is precisely what he told us at that meeting; there is no change whatsoever in it. He made that kind of suggestion the other day, and now he is putting it fOl'ward as a formaI proposal. 48. l now come to my question, which 1 address to whoever cares to answer it. l hope that somebody answers it; l hope that somebody feels he owes me the elementary politeness of an answer to this question. My question is this: wherein lies the difference between the Brazilian proposai and the United Kingdom pro- pesaI? Thàt is a very simple question: wherein lies the difference between the Brazilian proposaI and the United Kingdom proposai? 49. It is obvious that here we have two attitudes, two points of view. Either they are the same, or they are different. If they are the same, 1 am certain that the representative of the United Kingdom cûuld put for- ward bis own point of view without the initiative of the representative of Brazil, and l am sure that the repre- sentative of Brazil himself would not want to encroach on the freedûm of initiative of the representative of the United Kingdom. If they are different, on the other hand, then l beg the representative of Brazil or the representative of the United Kingdom - or the Presi- dent, who may help us here - to tell me what the difference is between the Brazilian text and the ideas put forward by Sir Pierson Dixon in his first speech at the first of this series of meetings. Wherein is the difference? This is an important point, because l am sure that the representative of the United Kingdom would not want any proposaI wbich is really his to be adopted under any other name, nor would the repre- sentative of Brazil want his own proposaI to be in reality the United Kingdom proposaI. l therefore beg the President or the Council, or wGoever would care to answer this very elementary question, to tell me what the difference is between the United Kingdom proposaI and the Brazilian proposaI. 50. What did Sir Pierson Dixon tell us at that meeting? It will be recalled that it was the represen- tative of the United Kingdom who took the initiative in putting forward ideas conceming the consideration Li" . 8 qt~dques mots que ces divergences ne sont nullement minimes, et il est loisible à M. Munro de me réfuter. J'aurai d'ailleurs à ajouter quelques mots plus tard au sujet de cette question de réfutation. Il est évident que l'un de nous deux interprète la situation telle qu'elle se présente objectivement, et il faut envisager ces deux 111terprétations avec calme pour décider ensuite laquelle des deu.x correspond à la vérité. 47. Je voudrais maintenant poser une autre question que j'adresserai au représentant du Brésil. Celui-ci a fait distribuer un document qui reprend mot pour mot la suggestion qu'il avait formulée à la 666ème séance. Ce que le représentant du Brésil nous propose cet après- midi correspond exactement à ce Iqu'il nous a dit à cette séance. Il n'y a rien de changé. L'autre jour, il a pré- senté sa suggestion, et il nous la soumet aujourd'hui sous forme de proposition. 48. J'en arrive maintenant à la question que je veux poser à celui des membres du Conseil qui voudra bien y répondre. J'espère que quelqu'un répondra, car c'est là me semble-t-il, la moindre des politesses. Ma question est la suivante: en quoi la proposition du Brésil diffère- t-elle de celle du Royaume-Uni? Question très simple: y a-t-il une différence entre la proposition du Brésil et celle du Royaume-Uni, et quelle est cette différence? 49. Il est évident que nous sommes en présence de deux points de vue. Ils sont ou bien semblables, ou bien différents. S'ils sont semblables, je suis sûr que le représentant du Royaume-Uni pourra exposer son opinion sans l'aide du représentant du Brésil. Je suis certain que ce dernier lui-même ne voudrait pas empiéter sur la liberté d'initiative du représentant du Royaume-Uni. En revanche, si les deux points de vue en question diffèrent, je demanderai alors au représen- tant du Brésil ou à celui du Royaume-Uni - ou au Président, qui nous aidera peut-être sur ce point - de me dire en quoi le texte du Brésil s'écarte des idées que le représentant du Royaume-Uni a exposées lors de sa première intervention, au début de l'examen de cette question. En quoi consiste cette différence? La question est importante, car, j'en suis ce:-tain, le représentant du Royaume-Uni ne voudrait pas que le Conseil adopte, sous un autre nom, une proposition qui émane véritable- ment de lui, pas plus que le représentant du Brésil ne désirerait voir sa propre proposition transformée en fait en proposition du Royaume-Uni. Je prie donc le Président ou les membres du Conseil qui voudront bien me répondre de me dire en quoi la proposition du Royaume-Uni diffère de celle du Brésil. 50. Que nous a dit sir Pierson Dixon à cette séance? On se souviendra que c'est lui qui, dès le début de ces réunions, a pris l'initiative au sujet de la méthode à suivre pour l'examen de notre ordre du jour. J'ai devant cc. •• Il serait souhaitable qu'en adoptant notre ordre du jour, nous partions de l'hypothèse que les deux questions constituent un tout." 51. Enfin, à l'issue de sa première intervention, le représentant du Royatune-Uni s'est exprimé en ces termes: cc••• pourvu que [le Conseil] ait le loisir d'exa- miner à fond l'ensemble de la question". Sans doute a-t-il à nouveau défendu ce point de vue au cours de ses interventions ultérieures, mais, comme c'est sa pre- mière intervention qui a doru.é dès le début le ton au présent débat, je ne cite que l~s termes qu'il a employés alors. 52. Je suis maintenant certain que le représentant du Royaume-Uni a pensé dès le début que sa thèse aurait l'appui de sept des membres du Conseil. Telle a été sa position. 53. Je ne parviens à voir aucune différence entre cette attitude et la proposition du représentant du Brésil. Selon cette proposition, le Conseil commencerait par adopter l'ordre du jour provisoire. Or, c'est ce que sir Pierson Dixon a proposé, En deuxième lieu, suivant le représentant du Brésil, il y a lieu d'instituer une discussion générale au cours de laquelle nous pourrons évoquer l'un q~'elconque ou tous les points à l'ordre du jour. Or, c'est tê que sir Pierson Diy.ùn a proposé: il a déclaré que nous devions procéder à une discussion générale. En troisième lieu, et c'est là ce qui est censé représenter l'élément nouveau dans le texte en question, le représentant du Brésil propose au Conseil de sécurité de ne pas déterminer, à ce stade du débat, si la résolu- tion ou les résolutions qu'il adoptera en fin de compte concerneront tel ou tel aspect de la question ou l'en- semble de ses aspects. Or, sir Pierson Dixon n'a pas dit que le. Conseil de sécurité devait, pour le moment, s'engager, de sorte que la proposition brésilienne n'ap- porte à cet égard ~ucun élément nouveau. Même si sir Pierson Dixon avait fait cette assertion, le Conseil pourrait toujours décider par la suite, s'il adoptera une, deux ou plusieurs résolutions. 54. Toute la préoccupation du représentant du Royaume-Uni et de ceux qui l'ont appuyé dès Ïe début a été d'écarter un examen séparé des plaintes et d'ins- tituer une discussion générale sur l'ensemble du pro- blème. Sir Pierson Dixon n'a pas dit qu'à la fin du débat le Conseil de sécurité devrait adopter une, deux ou vingt résolutions. Il s'agit là d'une question de règle- ment intérieur. Le Conseil, ou tout organe de l'Org-cl.- nisation des Nations Unies peut, après une discussion générale, et à la lumière de cette discussion, décider qu'il adoptera une seule résolution, deux résolutions séparées, quatre résolutions séparées, ou encore qu'il n'adoptera aucune résolution. Par conséquent, avec tout le respect que je dois au représentant du Brésil, je déclare que le troisième paragraphe de sa proposition n'apporte aucun élément qui diffère de l'attitude que sir Pierson Dixon a adoptée depuis le début même de la discussion. 55. Telle est ma première question, et je voudrais que l'un ou l'autre des membres du Conseil, y compris le Présidentl m'explique où réside la différence réelle, si 9 52. Now, 1 am sure that the representative of the United Kingdom, from the very beginning, felt that he had seven votes with which he could carry the day- and that was his position. 53. I fail to see any difference whatsoever between that position and the proposai submitted to the Council by the representative of Brazil. In the proposaI sub- mitted by the representative of Brazil it is suggested, first, that the provisional agenda be adopted. WeIl, that is what Sir Pierson Dixon suggested. The represen- tative of Brazil proposes, secondly, that a general dis- cussion shaIl be held in which reference may be made to any or aIl of the items of the agenda. VVeIl, that is what Sir Pierson Dixon proposed, that we should have a general discussion. In the third pi3.ce, and this may be what is supposed to he the novel element in the text, the representative of Brazil proposes that the Security Council does not commit itself at this stage as to the separate or joint character of its eventual resolution or resolutions. WeIl, Sir Pierson Dixon did not sav that the Security Council should commit itself at this'point, so this does not contribute anything new. Even if Sir Pierson Dixon had said that, the Council can always determine later whether it will adopt one, two or more resolutions. 54. The whole idea of the representative of the United Kingdom and of those who supported him from the very beginning was to put aside an individual examina- tion of the individual complaints and to hold a general debate on the problem as a whole. Sir Pierson Dixon did not say that at the end of the debate the Security Council should adopt one resolution or two, or twenty. That is left to the rules of procedure. The Council, or any organ of the United Nations, after a general debate can, in the light of that debate, decide whether it will adopt one resolution, two separate resolutions, four separate resolutions, or none at all. Therefore, 1 say, with all respect to my friend, the representative of Brazil, that the third paragraph of his proposaI intro- duces nothing new whatsoever in the position taken by Sir Pierson Dixon from the very beginning of our con- sideration of this problem. 55. That is my first question, and 1 beg any member of the Council, including the President, to explain to me where there is any real difference wha.têQ~Yer be- •1 56. What l want to say is this. This is the third time we have examined this important problem and l claim - and l want this claim to be disproved - we have not moved a single hair's breadth from the initial position taken by the gentlemen who are sure 'i:hey have seven votes in their poeket. If this is true, l beg' Mr. Munro to tell me wherein is the very narrow di!ference which he mentioned at the beginning of our debate this after- noon. l cao show in my last intervention there was a real attempt - a very painful but a very real attempt - on my part to move from my original position. After Mr. Lodge told us that people did at times change their opinions, that ideas could evolve, after l had aecepted this prineiple and put it into practice, l hoped that we would avoid devoting a third meeting to the consideration of this problem without making any pro- gress. 57. As l said at the beginning of my statement, the United Nations is a fascinating world. AIl of us under- stand this, but when the moment of decision arrives without any progress whatsoever, then we have to call a spade a spade and act accordingly. The representa- tives of Brazil and Colombia both have said that they appreciated my profound appreciation of their initia- tive, which l assure the Council is a real appreciation on my part. l am glad the Latin-American world is, stepping into our mêlée, ;:I.nd l hope they will maintain their interest and their initiative, even if their very first step may not be as happy as it looks on the surface. One should never be discouraged if one makes a false step the first time. One should try again and learn from experience. Both the representative of Brazil and the representative of Colombia referred to my statement at our last meeting, a.'ld it is perfectly true tha:r while weIcoming their initiative, l did say it should he Ï;t1- . proved upon. l did think that the representative of '1 Brazil, in quoting those words today, was going to tell us that there ,JI,as an 4nprovement, but l recall the three parts of the proposaI he read for us at the last meeting, before l begged him for an improvement, and l compare them with the document he distributed today, and l find no change whatsoever. Therefore, l still heg for an improvement. l felt that there was a note of hope at the end of the speech of the represen- tative of Brazil when he said that he would still accept suggestions as to how this proposaI might be improved. It is quite true, as they said, that after welcoming their initiative l did beg for a genuine improvement in this matter. [ [ 59. There is another point that 1 should like to l'aise in arder to demonstrate that there has been no move- ment whatsoever away from the' initial position taken by Sir Pierson Dixon and seconded by several other members of the Counci1. 60. In attempting to rationalize and justify the pro- posaI which he, together with the representative of Brazil, is sponsoring, the representative of Colombia said that we should not revert to the original position. Who, however, is reverting to the original position? The answer 18: the representative of Colombia and the representative of Braiil. Those are the representatives who are reverting to the original position taken by the United Kingdom representative. At the last meeting, l indicated that l was prepared to move away from my initial position, but there has been no indication what- soever that the opposite side is prepared to do that, also. 61. What are the important issues in this case? There are two important issues. One school of thought - to which l do not belong - says this: "It is quite true that the Security Council has before it separate com- plaints put forward by Jordan, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. But the situation in the Near East is so serious from an international point of view"- and here l would say that the Security Council's point of view obviously can be only international- "that, whatever may be the causes of that situation, the matter must be examined as a whole." l respect that point of view. As l shall show in a moment, l share it only ta a certain extent, to what l believe is the proper extent. The representatives who belong to that school of thought conc1ude from their original premise that these sepa- rate items should not be examined separately but should be thrown into one pool of a general discussion, that speakers should be allowed to refer to the items in any way they please and that we should then see what results from such a general discussion. 62. The first school of thought, ù'ïen, 1S in favour of a general discussion, without any commitment con- cerning the results of such a discussion. 1 have already said that 1 do not completely share that point of vi~w. 60. S'efforçant de justifier et d'expliquer la propo- sition qu'il a présentée conjointement avec le représen- tant du Brésil, le représentant de la Colombie a dit que nous ne devrions pas revenir à notre position initiaie. Mais quels sont ceux qui reviennent à cette position initiale? Ce sont les représentants de la Colombie et du Brésil. Ce sont eux qui reviennent à la position initiale prise par le représentant du Royaume-Uni. J'ai indiqué, à la dernière séance, que j'étais disposé à m'&..:arter de la position que j'ai prise au début, mais absolument rien ne me permet de penser que les adversaires de ma thèse sont prêts à en faire autant. 61. Quelles sont les questions importantes qui se posent en l'occurrence? Il Yen a deux. Les partisans de ' l'une des thèses en présence - dont je ne suis-pas- disent ceci: "Il est exact que le Conseil de sécurité est saisi de plaintes distinctes prés~ntées, d'une part parla. Jordanie, d'autre part par Israël. Mais la sîtuation dans le Proche-Orient est si grave du point de vue iriter- national" - et je voudrais dire ici que le point de vue du Conseil de sécurité ne peut être qu'international- "que, quelles que soient les causes de cette situation, la question doit être examinée dans son ensemble." Je respecte cette opinion, mais, comme je le montrerai dans un instant, je ne la partage que dans une certaine • mesure, dans la mesure où selon moi elle peut être l, approuvée. Les membres du Conseil qui appuient cette thèse concluent, partant de leur prémisse initiale, que les divers points de l'ordre du jour ne doivent pas être examinés séparément mais doivent faire l'objet d'une discussion d'ensemble, que les orateurs doivent pouvoir évoquer les divers points de l'ordre du jour comme bon leur semble, et que le Conseil devra ensuite dégager les résultats de cette discussion générale. 62. Les partisans de la première thèse sont donc en raveur d'ûne discussion générale, mais ne veulent pas préjuger les résultats de cette discussion. J'ai déjà dit que j~ ne partage pas entièrement cette façon de voir. 64. Hence, at the beginning of this discussion, there were two diametrically opposed positions: one in favour of a general debate, and the other in favour of a parti- cular debate on a particular complaint. 65. The United Kingdom representative has not taken a single step away from his position. l, on the other hand, have moved away from my original position, and 1 indicated at the last meeting the direction in which 1 was prepared to move. 1 said that 1 would be pre- pared to accept a generaI debate, but in its proper place. On the other hand, the United Kingdom representative - and, as 1 have said, until it is proven l.O me that this is not tr1'e, I hold that the United Kingdom repre- sentative' is saying that which the representative of Brazil has said here this afternoon - declares: "No, we hold to our original position, and we shall not move away from it at all. We shall have a general debate." Of course, the United Kingdom representative is familiar with the rules of procedure, and he knows that a gen- eraI debate does not prejudge the resolutions which may be adopted; under the rules of procedure, a general debate leads to whatever follows naturally and automa- tically. 66. Thus, while we have taken a reai step in the direc- tion of a truly objective compromise, I fail to see the slightest evidence - I should welcome such evidence if it did exist - of any movement by the other sidé towards a truly objective compromise. Why, therefore, have we wasted three meetings on this matter? If the other side still has in its pocket the seven or more votes which it had before, if it is going to use those votes immediately to have its position adopted, what has been gained during these two weeks of debate, when l, at least, have really attempted to draw representa- tives into a real argument about this fundamental proce- duraI matter? Absolutely nothing has been gained. So far as any rapprochement is concerned, tIJe three meetings have been absolutely wasted. 67. I am certain that we can do better than L;at, 1 am certain that the infinitely resourceful statesmanship of the Western world can do better than to hold three meetings .and make no progress whatsoever in the direc- tion of agreement and understanding. 1 understand that the representatives of the Western world may be very busy with many other matters. The problems of the Near East, while they are very important to us, may not be the most important problems at present. The minds of those representatives of the Western world may be preoccupied with ail kinds of Qth~r~ infinitely 68. My last remark on this point in this procedurai debate is the following. 1 thought at the tirne of the Brazilian representative's initial intervention at the 665th meeting that he was groping in a fairly fruitfui direction, and 1 would ask him very respectfully what it was that prcvt:nted him from l:ontinuing to grope in that direction, and what made him give up some of those illuminating - as 1 thought - ideas which he had and simply revert to the initial position t(l which the representéltive of Colombia has said that l was reverting. Thus, since Ml'. Gouthier has done m~ the houour of quoting my remarks, 1 shall quote what he said during his intervention at that meeting. Re said: "Logically viewing the agenda, we might divide the issues before us into two main groups: frontier conflicts and armed incidents, on the one hand, and implementation of the machinery of the Armistice Agreement, on the other. 1 The first group would indude the Jordanian and Israeli complaints of the infringement of the General Armistice Agreement. It would deal with aets of hostility, attacks, reta1iation, killings and property damage on one side or the other of the demarcation line, since they are c1early the result of the unfortunate sequence of incidents which are taking place with increasing frequency in that region, and some of them have the character of repri- saIs." 69. Then he went on: "The conflicts referred to in points i and iv of the Israel· complaint could be inc1uded in the second group. Point i refers to Jordan's refusaI to attend the conference convoked by the Secretary-General, and point iv refers to Jordan's refusal to co-operate in the establishment of a special committee componed of representatives of Jordan and Israel, for the pur- pose of enlarging the scope of the General Armistice Agreement and effecting an improvement inthe appli- cation of that Agreement. Those cases are similar in nature." ïO. Then Ml'. Gouthier conc1uded: "Although it seems to my delegation that the mat- ters on the provisional agenda are c10sely related" -- and no. one denies that - "the frontier incidents could perhaps be dealt with jointly and, after that, the Councii could discuss simultaneouslv the other two points, which concern the implementation of the armistice machinery, have a broader scope, and, as I have pointed out, are similar in nature. r ~n doute; "cept'ndant, on pourrait peut-être traiter ,-ùnjointement ies incidents de frontières, après quoi 1 le Conseil pourrait exanliner simultanément les deux • autres points, qui concernent la mise en œuvrê du mécanisme de l'armistice, qui ont une portée plus vaste et qui, je l'ai fait observer, sont de même nature. 1 Voir Procès-verbaux officiels dl~ Conseil de sécltrité. quatrième almée, Sltpplémel~t spécial No 1. 71. It seems ta me that this is an interesting method, and it may be - l am not committing myself but merely making the suggestion - that such a method might provide the improvement to which l referred in my statement from which the representatives of Colombia and Brazil have been kind enough to quote this after- noon. Here is a method that is different from that of the United Kingdom. There is indeed a difference here. But, for the life of me, l find no difference whatsoever - and l want Ml'. Munro to prove to me that such a difference exists - between the tc.xt of the Brazilian- Colombian proposal and the fundamental attitude of the representative of the United Kingdom. 72. Accordingly, in view of the c.xceeding gravitY of the situation and of the decision which the Council may take, l urge members, in aIl sincerity and in aIl truth, not to take a decision which would mean that, after some ten hours of debate on a procedural problem alone, the Council had not moved one step from the original position taken by the representative of the United King- dom and his supporters. l beg the Council to take a decision indicating some movement from that original United Kingdom position, because it seems to me that we owe it to ourselves - and to the future of the United Nations insofar as our own procedures affect it - to see to it that a debate brings about some progress. l beg the Council to show, in whatever it wants to do, that the ten hours of proceduraI wrangle have not com- pletely failed ta budge some members from their funda- mental'position. 73. Ml'. GOUTHIER (Brazil): It was not my inten- tion to speak again on the matter before us. l was under the impression that l had made quite clear to the Council the motives and the exact meaning underlying the joint proposaI of Colombia and Brazil, but l regret that the representative of Lebanon appears to have misunderstood the scope of our suggestion. 74. Ml'. Malik has implied that our proposaI was nothing but a reword.:ng of the proposaI introduced by the United Kingdom "epresentative at the beginning of our discussion. l subnit that anyone who is familial' with the matter under consideration can easily note the difference between tht two proposaIs. 1 may remind the representative of L ~banon that paragraph 3 of our proposaI reads as fol1ows: "[The Security COL 'lcil] does not commit itself at this stage as to the sel arate or joint character of its eventual resolution or lesolutions." What connexion, even by implication, does this have with the United Kingdom proposal? None at aIl. 75. The proposaI submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom clearly implied that the Council would, in due course, have before it a draft resolution on the whole question, and in my statement l made a 77. At the 66Sth meeting l suggested that the issues couid be grouped under two main subjects, namely, frontier conflicts and armed incidents, and implemen- tation of the machinery of the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Malik now indicates some acceptance of that sug- gestion, although l am not altogether c1ear on this point. l should like to say to Mr. Malik that, even if the motion presented today is approved, l intend later to put forward my previous suggestion - when the time cornes for presenting draft resolutions - to deal first with the subject of frontier conflicts and armed inci- dents, and then with the implementation of the machi- nery of the Armistice Agreement. Our first suggestion is not at aH inconsistent with the proposaI formally sub- mitted today by Brazil and Colombia. 78. l can assure the representative of Lebanon that l do not intend to deviate from my previous position. Frontier incidents, as l stated before, have assumed a routine character. l venture to suggest that the Council might in the future explore the possibility of having the Mixed Armistice Commission deal with conflicts that do not appear to be armed incidents, while the Council should deal only with the latter. The grouping of similar sets of complaints would perhaps favour any possible attempt to deal with the general problem of conaicts. 79. l repeat, l do not intend to depart from my pre- vious position. My intention was merely to suggest a sort of compromise, since the Council is faced with a deadlock in procedure. Our ptoposal appeared to meet with the approval of the majority of representatives, and that was the reason why l put it forward.

If no one wishes to speak, l should like to speak as repre- sentative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALI5T REPUBLICS. l shaH of course try not to repeat my- self, because we have devoted much time ta the ques- tion we are discussing today, and we have in a way elucidated some of its aspects. 81. l should like ta recall that l described the atti- tude of the Soviet Union on this question at the 666th meeting, and the representative of New Zealand has referred to that today. l should nevertheless like to c1a- rify his reference, because what he said is a rather free translation from the Russian into English. Perhaps what l am saying now will be translated just as freely; but all the same l shall try to make the meaning of my observations c1earer. ~2. At the last meeting l said that two different ques- !Ions should not be combined. It would appear that the Items on our agenda relate to different questions. While they have in common a number of interwoven themes 1 82. J'ai dit à notre dernière séance qu'il ne fallait pas confondre deux questions distinctes. Si nous examinons de près les questions inscrites à notre ordre du jour, nous constatons en effet qu'il s'agit de questions diffé- 84. We aIl know that the Palestine question is quite a serions one. We all know that the efforts so far to secure the full and just solution which we all desire- and 1 believe 1 am not mistaken in saying so - have not yet achieved any positive results. 85. Accordingly the Soviet Union, through me, has taken the following position: since a complaint has been submitted, the Council should consider it and aIl the factual details together with all the specific ques- tions it involves; the Council should not try to bury these spedic and separate questions in a discussion on general, very broad and important political problems. 86. On the other hand, the second complaint should also be dealt with in exactly the same way. Specific cases should be considered without allowing these cases to be examined, in the course of the discussion, in the context of general political problems which would lead to a new impasse and new difficulties, and' consequently hamper the consideration of this question. 1 also said that one cannot, of course, during the discussion of one item disallow any reference to the other, provided that such reference is within reasonable limits, that is, one cannot replace one question by another or by more gen- eral and wider political issues. 8ï. At the same time, 1 should like to recall that, un- less 1 am mistaken, the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, as weIl as other representatives - whom with your permission 1 shall not name, not because 1 do not want to name them, but in order to save time - advocated a so-called gen- eral discussion on both these complaints. 88. What kind of "general discussion" would it be? To what would it refer? What matters shbuld be dealt with in it? It was simply and openly stated that the debate on these questions should cover aIl aspects of the Palestine problem. 89. That is exactly what the Brazilian representative said, as may be seen from his statement at the 66Sth meeting. 1 have the English text here before me; ac- carding ta this text Mr. Gouthier said that, in his opi- 90. The words he used were: "A general discussion of the two items U , that is, of these same two complaints. He proceeded to say that-as MI'. Eden had stated in the House of Ccmmons -lùs Government was con- sidering, together with the Governments of France and the United States, the desirability of calling an early meeting of the Security Council to discuss the position or situation. 91. Thus it was supposed that there would be a spe- cial Palestine item put forward on the initiative of the British Governrnent by agreement with the Govern- ments of the United States and France. That may be understood and discussed, but that means that there is no need at present to consider the Palestine question in all its aspects in connexion with these two particular complaints. 92. To do so would really be to anticipate events, be- cause the British Governrnent is preparing to place this question on the agenda. It will probably put forward definite proposaIs, and these will probably be preceded by definite communications of sorne kind, by a report on this question which will show what the essence of the situation is, what kind of situation it is, and what steps must be taken. Thus, the Council will be con- fronted with a series of serious questions; l realize that. When the United Kingdom representative said that his Government intended to bring such an item before the Security Council, it became clearer to me that such an item must not be confused with the items relath,g to the consideration of the Israel complaint against Jordan and the Jordan complaint against Israel. : 90. Il a donc dit: "Discussion générale des deux ques- tionsu , c'est-à-dire des deux plaintes soumises au Con- seil, et il a ajouté que son gouvernement a même envisagé, en consultation avec les Gouvernements de la France et des Etats-Unis - ainsi que M. Eden l'a annoncé à la Chambre des Communes - l'opportunité de convoquer à une date rapprochée le Conseil de sécu- rité pour y examiner cette situation. 91. Il était donc pl,-évu que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, après s'être concerté avec les Gouverne- ments des Etats-Unis et de la France, prendrait l'initia- tive de saisir le Conseil de sécurité de la question de Palestine. Cela est parfaitement compréhensible, et il y aura lieu d'examiner ce problème. Toutefois, à l'heure actuelle, il n'est point besoin d'examiner la question de Palestine sous tous ses aspects pour se prononcer sur deux plaintes qui ont un caractère très particulier. 92. En procédant de la sorte, on irait au-devant des événements, car le Gouvernement britannique se pro- pose de toute façon de soulever le problème général. Il présentera _probablement des propositions concrètes, après avoir communiqué au Conseil des renseignements précis et après lui avoir soumis un rapport sur cette question, rapport qui indiquera sans doute la nature exacte de la situation et les mesures à prendre. L'en- semble du problème mettra donc le Conseil devant toute une série complexe de questions très graves; je m'en rends bien compte. Lorsque le représentant du Royaume-Uni a déclaré que son gouvernement entendait soumettre cette question au Conseil de sécurité, j'ai encore mieux compris qu'il ne fallait pas la confondre avec les plaintes d'Israël contre la Jordanie et de la Jordanie contre Israël. 93. J'ai vu clairement que la question de Palestine dont parlait sir Pierson Dixon était bien la question de Palestine dans son ensemble; en effet, les trois Puis- sances occidentales -les Etats-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France - se proposaient de la porter devant le Conseil de sécurité. Pourquoi insister alors pour qu'on examine cette question en passant, à l'occasion des plaintes d'Israël et de la Jordanie, et en la confondant avec ces deux plaintes? 94. Voilà ce que j'avais de la peine à comprendre au début et ce que je ne comprends pas davantage main- tenant. Ce n'est pas que je m'oppose en principe à ce que plusieurs plaintes soient examinées simultanément. Bien au contraire, le 4 février dernier [657ème séance], 96. Our view is that this proposaI would mean driving the disease beneath the surface. It would mean that instead of dealing more or less easily with simple prac- tical issues, we would be dealing with the wider aspect of what 1 believe are very deep political disagreements between the Arab countries and Israel; and we should of course go astray in doing so. There is no doubt that at the present time we are not prepared for this. It seems to me, therefore, that to combine the items can- not facilitate our task. If it is decided to relate our con- sideration of the Jordan-Lebanon complaillt against Israel and our consideration of the Israel complaint against Jordan to the general Palestine political ques- tion, that would of course amount to a completely dif- ferent .task, a task which would, 1 should say, be to the detriment of our immediate consideration of the com- plaints which we have before us. 97. Speaking from a strictly legal point of view, l am at a loss to understand how anyone can completely transform a complaint submitted by one or another government, or even attempt to do so. We are asked by the two parties to consider their complaints, and you reply: we shall not consider your complaints as such, but we shall deal with them in the general context of the whole Palestine question. But neither the Arab countries nor Israel have asked us as yet to consider the Palestine question as a whole. So far as 1 under- stand, neither the United Kingdom, France nor the United States have requested that. On the contrary, the United Kingdom representative, whose statement 1 have just quoted, told us that his Government in- tended to submit that question at a later date, and that it had already come to an agreement on the subject with the United States and French Governments. What question? The general Palestine question; that is to say, what the Brazilian representative obviously had in mind originally. He even stated that it would be neces- sary to consider some aspects of the Palestine question as a whole. But that is an entirely different problem, a different task. 98. Turning to the proposaI submitted by the Brazilian representative -and here 1 venture to speak for a few moments as PRESIDENT - 1 feel bound to say that such a proposaI will make things very difficult for me as President in the future conduct of the debate. ~~~~ ~~t~al;~~b~~~~su~~n t~~:e:~~~ :c~~. c'est là un 1 98. Si nous examinons la proposition qu'a présentée '2 le représentant du Brésil- et ici, je me permettrai pendant quelques secondes de parler en ma qualité de PRESIDENT - je dois dire que cette proposition me mettrait dans un grand embarras pour diriger la suite des débats. 101. Let us now tum ta the agenda. It is suggested that we be allowed to refer to any item. That is to say, we may refer to item 2 (a), to the complaint by Jordan and the charges adduced in support of that complaint. And those charges include the breach of article III, paragraph 2, of the General Armistice Agreement by the attack on Nahhalin Village on 28-29 March, the killing of certain persons, the killing of certain other persans and the damages caused ta property. 102. Under the Brazilian representative's proposaI reference may he made to those matters. But to do so would in fact be to refer to the very same complaint. That, of course, would be quite proper, but it does not imply dealing with the general aspect of the matter. That is not the general Palestine question at aIl. That being so, what shall we discuss? 103. Let us tum to the complaint by Israel. Under the proposaI, obviously, we could refer ta any part of the item. Here is item 2 (b), complaint by Ii'rael: violation of article XII of the General Armistice Agree- ment; armed attack on a bus near Scorpion Pass; acts of hostility inc1uding attacks and raids, etc.; and refusaI by Jordan to carry out her obligations under article VIII of the General Armistice Agreement. That is all. 104. Consequently, it will be permissible to refer to these points. 1 do not know therefore why the represen- tative of Lebanon should object. After all, that is what he wants and what, to my mind, is correct. 105. Do you wish to consider these complaints? These complaints even go somewhat further. 1 think that a number of general questions may even be touched upon. The proposaI itself states that reference may be made to any item. 106. Further. Paragraph 3 states that the Security Council does not commit itself at this stage to the separate or joint character of its eventual resolution or resolutions. But that is elementary. How can the Coun- cil commit itself today in respect of sorne resolution or other which does not even yet exist? 107. Consequently, the essence of the matter is: in the first place, as 1 understand the proposaI, we now stop talking about the general Palestine question. We do not propose the discussion of the general Palestine question as a whole, that is, we do not propose any general discussion on the whole Palestine question. Consequently, if we adopt this proposaI, we cai1l1ot, in I ..:..! ~onsideringthe coniplaints of Israel and Jordan, engage ln any general discussion of the Palestine question. 103. Si nous examinons la plainte d'Israël, nous pour- rons, aux termes de la proposition du Brésil, parler de n'importe quelle partie de ce point de l'ordre du jour. Ce point, 2 b, le voici: plainte portée par Israël: viola- tion des dispositions de l'article XII de la Convention d'armistice général; attaque à main armée d'un autobus près du col du Scorpion; actes d'hostilité, notanlffient attaques et raids, etc.; et refus de la Jordanie de remplir les .obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de l'article VIII de la Convention d'armistice général. Et C'est tout. 104. Nous pourrons donc évoquer toutes ces questions. Je ne vois pas pourquoi le représentant du Liban s'y oppose. C'est bien ce qu'il demande, et cela me semble normal. 105. Vous voulez examiner ces plaintes? Mais elles vont encore plus loin. Je pense qu'on pourra même aborder certaines questions générales. La proposition prévoit, en effet, qu'on pourra évoquer n'importe quelle question. 106. Je continue. Aux termes du paragraphe 3 de la proposition, le Conseil de sécurité ne prend pour le moment aucun engagement sur le point de savoir s'il adoptera une résolution ou des résolutions distinctes sur chacun des points examinés ou une ou plusieurs résolu- tions portant sur l'ensemble de ces points. Mais cela est élémentaire. Comment le Conseil pourrait-il prendre des engagements au sujet de résolutions dont il n'est pas encore saisi? 107. La situation est donc la suivante: je déduis de la proposition qui nous est soumise qu'il ne s'agit plus de la question de Palestine en général. Il ne s'agit plus d'examiner l'ensemble de ce problème, de procéder à une discussion générale de la question de Palestine dans son ensemble. Si nous adoptons cette proposition, l'exa- men des plaintes d'Israël et de la Jordanie ne donnera donc pas lieu à une discussion générale de la question de Palestine dans son ensemble. 114. Further, in considering the complaint of Lebanon, it may be impossible - that will depend on who is speaking and the ideas he is expressing - not to touch upon matters which to sorne extent go beyond (1 mean, within reasonable limits) the framework of that par- ticular complaint and which may perhaps relate even to the questions which are involved in the general Palestine situation and also in the complaint of Israel. 115. That is our position in prineiple, and it seems to me to be the only position which can ensure fulfil- ment of the desire by which we aU should, and by which l have no doubt we all are, in this case actuated, the desire to find a way out of the present deadlock- or deadlocks. 116. Our first deadlock is due to the faet that we cannot adopt the agenda. We insist on making the adoption of the agenda conditional upon the method of &~aling with the items. This is quite unprecedented, s;nce the items are completely different. 117. It is possible to adopt a particular agenda with- out any regard to the methods by which the items are to he considered and then - the Couneil decides on each question individually - dedde what methods can most conveniently be employed. That is what gave rise to the first deadlock. 118. The second deadlock is due to the faet that the members of the Council refuse to consider these com- plaints as complaints - a third deadlock will arise in 1 connexion with the question whether they are to be considered separately or together - but insist on re- lating them to the general background of what l would calI the Palestine crisis, the Palestine question, with all its political significance. 112. Voici donc en quelques mots l'attitude de l'Union soviétique: 113. Pour les raisons que je viens d'expos:.r, nou~ estimons qu'il n'y a pas lieu de relier ces deux plaintes à l'examen de l'ensemble de la que~tion de Palestine, que ces plaintes soient examinées simultanément ou séparément. Je déclare au nom de l'Union soviéti'lue qu'il convient d'examiner séparément les deux points de l'ordre du jour, à savoir la plainte présentée par le Liban et celle qu'a présentée Israël. 114. Je déclare en outre que, lors de l'examen de la plainte du Liban, il sera peut-être difficile - cela dé- pendra évidemment des arguments et des considérations que feront valoir les orateurs - de ne pas évoquer certaines questions dépassant quelque peu (j'ai bien dit, dans des limites raisonnables) le cadre de la plainte, et de ne pas traiter, dans une certaine mesure, de ques- tions qui intéressent la situation politique générale, et que soulève aussi la plainte d'Israël. 115. Voilà notre attitude fondamentale, la seule qui, me semble-t-il, puisse nous permettre d'atteindre ce but commun, qui nous est certainement cher à tous: sortir de l'impasse - ou des impasses - où nous nous trouvons. 116. La première impasse est constituée par le fait que nous ne parvenons pas à adopter l'ordre du jour. Nous voulons à tout prix lier l'adoption de l'ordre du jour à une décision sur la méthode d'examen des plaintes dont nous sommes saisis. Cela serait sans précé- dent, car il s'agit de questions entièrement différentes. 117. Il est parfaitement possible d'adopter un ordre du jour, quitte à déeider ensuite - puisque le Conseil statue sur chaque question séparément - des méthodes à su:vre. Voilà ce qui a suscité la première Impasse. 118. La deuxième impasse est constituée par le fait que le Conseil ne veut pas examiner ces plaintes comme telles -le point de savoir s'il faut· les examiner con- jointement ou séparément constitue la troisième im- passe - mais il veut à tout prix les examiner dans le cadre général de ce qu'on pourrait appeler la crise pales- tinienne, de la question de Palestine, avec toute sa portée politique. 20 122. What 1 said on the first occasion when the Council discussed this question [665th meeting], was that my Government Wél.S very seriously concerned indeed with the situation which had developed on the borders between Jordan and Israell and 1 went on to say: "That is why [my Government] attaches such importance to a general consideration of the two items before us." 123. This, l should have thought, was clear in its meaning, but the representative of the Soviet Union has reverted to that very passage again and tended to give it a meaning which, as 1 saYI it does not bear. He did the same thing when we resumed our discussion on 12 April [666th meeting], and in the course of my statement then 1 said that 1 should like to e1aborate what 1 had in mind in order to make my meaning clear. 1 said the following in specific terms - and this refers to the passage which 1 have just read: "It was not my intention to ask the Counci1 to emhark on any discussion which might be rcgarded as an attempt to work out a final solution of the Palestine problem. This goal, unfortunate1y, seems a long way off, and a greatcr degree of confidence than at present exists between the parties concerned must first be established." 124. Finally, at that same meeting, 1 said: ". .. the Council as a who1e will, 1 am sure, wish to consider what the most dangerous features are in the present situation and how it can he1p to reduce the existing state of tension between Jordan and Israel. If it is to do this, it must he allowed to review the existing state of tension on either side of the armistice demarcation lines, with particular reference to the Israel-Jordan border areas, and to do thiEi in as çalm and as objective a manner as possible," 124. Finalement, à cette même séance du 12 avrill j'ai déclaré: "... je suis convaincu que tous les membres du Conseil tiendront à examiner quels sont les éléments les plus dangereux de la situation présente et comment on pourrait atténuer la tension entre la Jordanie et Israël. Si le Conseil doit suivre cette méthode, il faut qu'on lui permette de passer en revue l'état de tension qui existe de part et d'autre de la ligne de démar- cation, en particulier dans la zone frontière entre Israël et la Jordanie, et de le faire d'une manière aussi calme et aussi objective que possible/I 130. If the Brazilian representative cannat or does not intend to give any explanation today, perhaps he might wish to do so at the next meeting. If he does not wish to offer any explanation at aIl, then 1 shaH wish to speak again in order ta emphasize a number of particularly important points which 1 feel require further consideration and clarification. 131. Therefore, the French representative's conclusion that, since no member has asked to speak for the present, there are no more speakers at aH appears to me to be rather hasty. Indeed, that is proved by the fact that the Lebanese representative has just asked to speak. 132. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): If 1 under- stood the President's remark about the intention of the representative of the United Kingdom and Sir P;erson's reply just now, it seems clear that the representative of the United Kingdom did not intend that we embark upon a debate on every conceivable aspect of the Palestine situation. Therefore, so far as that is con- cerned, one can only welcome such an assurance on the part of the representative of the United Kingdom, and 1 take it that the President's misunderstanding may have been dispelled to the extent, namely, that he is convinced that the representative of the United Kingdom does not want, as he told us and as he brought out in quotations from his previous remarks, ta open wide the whole Palestine problem. But it follows from the United Kingdom representative's statement that he is in COl••- pIete agreement with the representative of Brazil, his position from the very beginning was identical ta the Brazilian representative's position. Sa 1 again say that what the representative of Brazil has put forward to us this afternoon is identical to the initial position put forwarcl by the representative of the United Kingdom. 133. The President tried to find out whether there was any difference between the position of the representative of the United Kingdom and the position of the repre- sentative of Bra;!;il, l am grateful to the United Kingdom 129. Le PRESIDENT (traduit o.u mssc): En ma qualité ck représentant de l'UNION DES REPU- BLIQUES SOCIALISTES SOVIETIQUES, je ne pense pas que l'on puisse considérer que les débats sont terminés. Au nom du Gouvernement de l'Union soviétique, j'ai posé un certain nombre de questions à propos de la teneur de la proposition du représentant du Brésil. Je voudrais quelques éclaircissements, car, comme l'a montré mon intervention, une série de ques- dons me semblent encore fort confuses. 130. Si le représentant du Brésil ne peut pas, ou ne souhaite pas me fournir aujourd'hui ces éclaircisse- ments, il voudra peut-être le faire à notre prochaine séance. S'il ne désire pas me les donner du tout, je prendrai la parole encore une fois pour souligner les passages particulièrement importants qui, me semble- t-il, appellent un nouvel examen et des précisions sup- plémentaires. 131. En conséquence, la conclusion de M. Hoppenot selon laquelle, si personne ne veut actuellement prendre la parole, c'est que personne n'a plus rien à dire, est quelque peu hâtive. Nous avons pu constater tout à l'heure que M. Malik d~mandait encore la parole. 132. M. Charles MALIK (Liban) (traduit de l'an- glais): Si j'ai bien compris l'observation du Prés.~Jent au sujet des intentions du représentant du Royaume- Uni et la réponse que sir Pierson Dixon vient de lui faire, il est clair que le représentant du Royaume-Uni n'était pas, selon ses propres termes, d'avis d'engager une discussion sur tous les aspects possibles de la situation en Palestine. Ainsi, sur ce point, on ne peut que se féliciter de l'assurance donnée par le représen- tant du Royaume-Uni et, dans ces conditions, je con- sidère que le doute Gprouvé à cet égard par le Président a ptt se dissiper et qu'il est acquis maintenant que le représentant du Royaum~-Uni ne désire pas, ainsi qu'il ressort de ses déclarations et des extraits qu'il nous a donnés de ses précédentes interventions, voir rouvrir toute la question palestinienne. Mais il suit de la position prise par le représentant du Royaume-Uni et qu'il vient de nous exposer, qu'il est entièrement d'accord avec le représentant du Brésil et que l'attitude qu'il a adoptée dès le début est identique à celle du représentant du Brésil. Ainsi, je le répète, la thèse que le représentant du Brésil a fait valoir cet après-midi correspond en tous points à la position initiale du repré- sentant du Royaume-Uni. 133. Le Président a cherché à savoir s'il y avait une différence entre la position du représentant du Royau- me-Uni et celle du représentant du Brésil. Je suis recon- naissant au représentant du Royaume-Uni de noUS 134. If it is the desire of the Security Couneil to make absolutely no progress, no movement whatsoever from the initial position taken by the three 'Western Powers in the present situation, it is up to the Council ta take that decision. For my part, 1 consider it to be a pre- mature and an ul1\vise decision, and one that could he avoided. 1 believe that the Council can do better. 1 beg ~he United Kingdom representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, and his associates who support him to see my position and to tell us if they really be1ieve that the best they can do, after ten hours of debate, is to do what they coulel have donc at the beginning of this debate. Is that the best spectacle we can give to the worIel after our discussions during these three meetings? 135. 1 heard what my friend, Ml'. Gouthier, saiel about my modest remar1':s. 1 am sorry if 1 contributed to any misunderstanding in his mind about my words "admirable attempt". If he understood it to mean that 1 was supporting his proposaI, obviously 1 was not because 1 had already said so. What 1 meant by the \Yards "admirable attempt" - and 1 still repeat it- is that 1 think that both he and the representative of Colombia have made and are still making admirable attempts in this affair. But 1 do not mean an "admirable attempt" with respect to the proposaI, because 1 have shown - and, if 1 may use a bold word, 1 have defied anybody to refute me - that the representative of Brazil is reiterating parrotwisc what Sir Pierson Dixon told us during the first five minutes of our debate on this pro?lem. Obviously, therefore,. by "admirable attempt" 1 (lId not mean the text of 111S proposaI. What 1 did mean \Vas that 1 welcomed his initiative, and 1 hope that both Brazil and Colombia will maintain their enthusiasm and their interest and their initiative - their admirable initiative - in trying to approach our prob- lems, ta understand them and to do whatever thev can to help us to solve them. So the phrase "admirable attt'mpt" was not intended at aIl to apply ta the Brazilian representative's proposaI which is, as l have shawn at length, none other than the United Kingdom position. The phrase "admirable attempt" refers only to Mr. Gouthier's initiative, which 1 welcome and which 1 hope will be maintained despite aIl the adversity and aIl the discouragement that he might feel. 136. Again, 1 could not but welcome - and this time 1 choose my words very carefully - the sentence that fell from the lips of the representative of Brazil when he said that he clid not intend in the future to depart from this position. He repeated that at least twice, perhaps more, and he was referring to the idea, wlùch ~bsolument aucun progrès, de ne prendre aucune me- sure, de se confiner dans la position initiale prise par les trois Puissances occidentales à l'égard de la situation actuelle, libre à lui de le faire. Pour ma part, je consi- dère qu'il serait prématuré et déraisonnable de prendre une décision qui peut être évitée. Je pense que le Con- seil peut faire mieux. Je demande au représentant du Royaume-Uni et aux membres du Conseil qui l'appuient de considérer ma situation et de nous dire s'ils croient vraiment que le mieux à faire, après dix heures de débat, est de revenir exactement à ce qu'ils auraient pu faire au début de cette discussion. Après les débats de ces trois dernières séances, est-ce là le spectacle le plus édifiant que nous puissions donner au monde? 135. J'ai écouté ce que M. Gauthier a dit de mes mo- destes observations. Je regrette d'avoir, en employant les mots "initiative louable", créé un malentendu dans son esprit. Si le représentant du Brésil a interprété ces mots comme signifiant que j'appuyais sa proposition, il s'est trompé, car j'ai déjà indiqué que tel n'est pas le cas. Ce que j'ai voulu dire - et je le répète - c'est que j'estime que le représentant du Brésil et le repré- sentant de la Colombie ont fait et continuent de faire preuve d'une initiative louable dans la présente affaire. Lorsque je parle d"'initiative louable", je ne pense pas à la proposition du Brésil: en défiant - dirai-je même, pour employer un terme un peu hardi - que l'on me réfute, j'ai montré que le représentant du Brésil nous répète scrupuleusement ce que le représentant du Royaume-Uni nous a dit lors des cinq premières mi- nutes du débat. Il est donc évident qu'en parlant d"'ini- tiative louable" je ne me référais pas au texte du repré- sentant du Brésil. J'ai seulement voulu dire que je me félicitais de son initiative, et j'espère que le Brésil et la Colombie conserveront cet enthousiasme, cet intérêt, cette initiative - cette initiative 10uabJ~ - dont ils ont fait preuve en essayant d'aborder nos difficultés, de les comprendre, et de rien négliger pour nous aider à les résoudre. Par conséquent, ces mots que j'ai employés ne visaient pas du tout le texte du représentant du Brésil qui ne fait rien d'autre - je l'ai assez montré- que refléter la position du Royaume-Uni. Les mots en question ne s'appliquent qu'à l'initiative dont a fait preuve le représentant du Brésil, initiative que j'ac- cueille avec faveur et à laquelle j'espère qu'ilue renon- c~ra pas malgré les difficultés et le découragement qu'il risque d'éprouver. 136. Encore une fois - et je pèse ici tout particulière- ment mes mots - je ne peux qu'approuver le repré- sentant du Brésil lorsqu'il dit qu'il n'a pas l'intention de s'écarter à l'avenir de sa position actuelle. Il l'a dit deux fois, peut-être même davantage, à propos de l'idée - exposée par lui le premier - de ranger dans

May 1 once again draw the attention of represer.tatives to the fact that it is now 6.2G p.rn. Since 1 still intend to say a few words and would prefer not to do so today but at another time, in view of the lateness of the hour, 1 will ask members whether they would prefer to continue today's meeting or adjourn, and, if we are to continue, until what hour. 140. If there are no objections to adjourning the meeting, l shall do so after we have agreed on the date of the Security Council's next meeting. Perhaps we might meet tomorrow at 3 p.m.? 141. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand): 1 understand that there is another engagement which will involve the presence of several members of this Coundl tomorrow, and 1 suggest, in the circumstances, that the Council adjourn until 27 April at 3 p.m. 142. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (translated trom French) : 1 for my part am in favour of the President's first proposaI, which was that we should meet again tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m. Actually, no meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow afternoon, and 1 think the sooner the Council puts an end to the sad spectacle it has provided at its last three meetings, the better it will be. 137. Il est évident qu'une certaine évolution se pro- duit, une évolution réelle, au moins pour ce qui est du représentant du Brésil et de moi-même. Quant aux autres membres du Conseil, je n'arrive pas à compren- dre pourquoi ils en restent au même point. J'ai fait de mon mieux. J'ai stimulé - dans toute l'acception du terme -le Conseil, je l'ai encouragé, défié, invité, prié, j'ai fait tout ce que j'ai pu pour amener mes collègues à exposer leurs idées touchant certains points que j'ai soulevés. A vous de juger le résultat. Au moins y a-t-il eu un certain aialogue entre le représentant du Brésil et moi-même. C'est un fait très encourageant, et je pense que nous devrions tous nous en féliciter et en tirer le plus grand parti possible. 138. Je souhaite donc que la force de l'inertie ne con- tinue pas de l'emporter: le représentant du Brésil dé- clare qu'il n'a pas l'intention de modifier ultérieurement sa position, c'est-à-dire, sauf erreur de ma part - et je voudrais alors qu'il me détrompe - qu'il continuera de préconiser la répartition des plaintes entre les deux catégories qu'il a indiquées au départ; que d'autres fas- sent preuve de la même initiative. Bien entendu, le geste du représentant du Brésil ne me satisfait pas complètement, mais c'est au moins un geste que j'ap- prouve. Je sais, hélas, que mon appel est sans écho. Néanmoins, si ce débat se poursuit vainement jusqu'au bout, j'aurai certainement, le moment venu, mon mot à dire. Si, après tout ce que j'ai dit et fait, après les prières les plus ferventes - je le dis en toute honnêteté - si, après tous mes efforts, et au bout de dix heures de discussion, je ne reçois de personne aucune réponse et continue de me heurter à la volonté rigide, inébran- lable de ceux qui veulent exécuter ce à quoi ils étaient décidés dès le premier instant de nos réunions, j'aurai alors, le moment venu, une importante déclaration à faire. 139. Le PRESIDENT (traduit du nesse): Je rap- pelle encore une fois aux membres du Conseil qu'il est déjà 18 h. 20. J'ai encore quelques observations à for- muler, mais je préférerais ne pas le faire aujourd'hui même et attendre une autre séance. Devons-nous con- tinuer à siéger ou allons-nous lever la séance? Si nous devons continuer à siéger, je voudrais savoir jusqu'à quelle heure. 140. S'il n'y a pas d'objection à ce que je lève la séance, je vais le faire dès que nous aurons fixé la date de notre prochaine réunion. Peut-être pourrions-nous nous réunir demain à 1S heures? 141. M. MUNRO (Nouvelle-Zélande) (traduit de l'anglais): Je crois llavoir que plusieurs membres du Conseil ont d'autres engagements pour demain et, dans ces conditions, je propose que le Conseil tienne sa pro- chaine séance le mardi 27 avril à lS heures. 142. M. HOPPENOT (France): Je suis en faveur, pour ma part, de la première proposition du Président, qui était de nous réunir de nouveau demain vendredi à lS heures. Aucune réunion, en effet, n'est prévue pour demain après-midi, et je crois que, plus tôt le Conseil mettra fin au triste spectacle qu'il a donné au cours de ses trois dernières séances, mieux cela vaudra. 144. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): There are two motions as regards the next meeting of the Couneil, one for- tomorrow afternoon and one for Tuesday after- noon. l do not lmow what the other members of the Couneil think about this, but l must, in aIl fran1mess, say - and l apologize for it - that l am physically unable to be present tomorrow; however, that does not mean you should not meet as l will have somebody take my place.

Perhaps as a compromise we could meet on Monday?

l am sorry to have to break up a compromise, but unfortunately, due to commitments which are absolutely unbreakable both Ambassador Lodge and l have to be in Washington on Monday. 147. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand): l do not wish to inconvenience the Couneil. l have commitments to- morrow which, from one point of view, are unbrea1mble. l am not anxious to delay the proceedings of the Couneil on this .matter 'which have a1ready, l know, been inordinately delayed. However, it is important that we should aIl be here and l feel that in the eircum- stances an adjournment until Tuesday will be the arrangement most convenient to aIl members of the Couneil and will enable us, l hope, to come to the meeting after due deliberation, and despatch these proceedings. 148. The PRESIDENT (translated trom Russian): In view of the eircumstances l propose to convene the next meeting at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 27 April. If there are no objections, it will he so decided. l t was sa decided. 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