S/PV.674 Security Council

On 3 June the Council had the opportunity of hearing the Thai representative's state- ment, in which he requested, under Articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations Charter, the appointment of a commission to go to Thailand for the purpose of making an authentic and objective report on the true situation existing in his country and the danger which, in the view of his Government, is threatening the peace of Thailand. 6. My delegation, which has always been loyal to the principles of the Charter, heartily we1comed the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Thailand, requesting the Peace Observation Commission to estab- lish a sub-commission composed of not less than three nor more than five members to submit a report and make recommendations to the Peace Observation Com- mission and to the Security CounciJ.. 1 believe that if the same procedure - sending 8. commission to submit a reliable and impartial report and make what recom- mendations were necessary -- had been adopted on prcvious occasions before a conflict broke out, wars and conflicts would probably have been avoided and we should have had very c1ear and accurate information about the situation prevailing in the area concerned. 7, Colombia, which has always been loyal,to the principles of the Charter and did not hesitate to send troops to Korea in compliance with the Charter which we adopted at San Frandsco, considers that the Thai representative's drait resolution is timely and necessary. 8. At the last meeting Mr. Tsiang, the representative of China made the statement that the Communists in his country had already set up a so-called free Thai Government, which is established in the region bordering on Thailand. This statement, in our delega- tion'5 view, is 'one of extreme gravity and offers yet further justification for the Thai Government's request for the appointment of a commission to put into effect General Assembly resolution 377 (V), which set up the Peace Observatioili Commission and defines its functions. 9. In my opinion, if agreement is reached in the con- versations which are still proceeding at Geneva in the attempt to secure peace in Indo-China, that can only be of great benefit to Thailand, since, as is well known, only a river separates that country from Indo-China. But it wo?l~ in no way prejudice the appointment of the commISSIon, since under the tenus of the draft 6. La délégation colombienne, qui a toujours été fidèle aux principes de la Charte, a pris connaissance avec une grande satisfaction du projet de résolution du repré- sentant de la Thaïlande demandant à la Commission d'observation pour la paix de désigner une sous-com- mission de trois membres au moins et de cinq membres au plus, qui présenterait un rapport et ferait des recommandations à la Commission d'observation pour la paix et au Conseil de sécurité. J'estime que, si l'on avait suivi cette procédure en d'autres occasions avant que n'éclate un conflit et si l'on avait envoyé des com- missions chargées de présenter un rapport dÎl:me de foi et impartiài et de fâire les recommandations-appro- priées, on aurait probablement évité des guerres et des conflits, et nous aurions eu des renseignements très clairs et très précis sur 'la situation dans la région en cause. 7. La Colombie, qui a toujours été fidèle aux principes de la Charte et qui n'a pas hésité à envoyer des troupes en Corée, en exécution de l'instrument que nous avons adopté à San-Francisco, estime que le projet de réso- lution du représentant de la Thaïlande est opportun et nécessaire. 8. Lors de la dernière séance du Conseil, M. Tsiang, représentant de la Chine, a fait une déclaration de la plus grande gravité: il a affirmé que les communistes de son pays 'ont constitué un gouvernement qu'ils ont appelé "Gouvernement thaï libre" et que ce gouver- nement est étabH à la frontière de la Thaïlande. De l'avis de la délégation colombienne, cette déclaration est d'une extrême gravité et constitue pour le Gouverne- ment de la Thaïlande une raison de plus de demander que l'on nomme une commission en exécution de la résolution 377 (V) de l'Assemblée générale, qui a créé la Commission d'observation pour la paix et en a défini les fonctions. 9. A mon avis, si les conversations actuellement en cours à Genève et qui ont pour objet de rétablir la paix en Indochine aboutissent à lln accord qui mette fin aux hostilités dans ce pays, la Thaïlande ne pourrait que s'en réjouir vivement puisque, comme chacun le sait, seul "ln fleuve la sépare de l'Indochine; mais cela n'empêche nullement la nomination de la commission 2 12. Since then we have on two occasions, on 3 June [67211d meeting] and 16 June [673rd meeting], heard the representative of Thailand explain to us in detail the object and scope of his Government's request; and nothing in what he said - and we all appreciated the wisdom and moderation of his words - has a1tered the construction which my delegation placed on his Government's appeal nor, accordingly, weakened the general support it stated it wa.s prepared ta give that appeal. Quite the reverse; the explanation we heard from Mr. Pote Sarasin on 16 June of the purpose and limits of his appeal could only encourage the French ~elegation in ,its support, inasmuch as they fully met lts concern - and that of a number of other delega- tions - that the debate opened here should not go beyond its true purpose, which remains the despatch of a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Com- mission to Thai territory, and nothing more. 13. In his second statement the representative of Thailand pointed out that it was to me.et this concern that his Government, in its draft resolution, had c1arified and to a certain extent limited the terms of its request; and he stated that in its present form the wording is the result of a compromise. Sorne de1ega- tions have regretted that; l, however, will venture respectfully to congratulate him. There can be no diplomacy without compromise, for diplomacv is the art of reconciling opposing interests, and such a recon- ciliation is possible only if the parties agree to make sorne sacrifice of their own interests, or in other words to reach a compromise hetween those interests. 14. By taking into account the views which have been expressed on this matter bath inside and outside this c~amber, and by accepting a compromise between those v:tews and ,its own original views, the Thailand de1ega- !lon has glVen us an example of wisdom and a lesson 10 diplomacy which are no surprise to us, coming as they do from its head and from Prince Wan, the 13. Dans sa seconde intervention, le représentant de la Thai1ande a indiqué que c'était pour tenir compte de ce souci que son gouvernement avait précisé et, dans une certaine mesure, limité, dans son projet de résolu- tion, les termes de sa requête, et il a déclaré que les termes, dans leur forme actuelle, étaient le résultat d'un compromis. Certains l'ont regretté. Je me permettrai, pour ma part, de lui en adresser mes respectueuses félicitations. Il n'y a pas de diplomatie Sàns compromis, car la diplomatie est l'art de concilier les intêrêts opposés, et une telle conciliation n'est possible que si les parties en prése~ce acceptent de sacrifieï quelque chose de leurs intérêts respectifs, autrement dit d'abou- tir à un compromis entre ces intérêts. 14. En tenant compte des vues qui, soit en séance, soit hon séance, ont pu être exprimées à ce sujet, et en acceptant un compromis entre ces vues et ses propres vues originelles, la délégation thaïlandaise nous a donné un exemple de sagesse et une leçon de diplomatie qui ne nous étonnent ni de lé: part de son chef, ni de la part du prince Wan, le Ministre universellement res- 16. 1t was in that spirit, and in circumstances not entirely dissimilar to those of the present case, that the Council decided sorne years ago without a single dissenting voice to send a sub-commission of inquiry to the Balkans. The members and staff of that body carried out a task which has not been fully rewarded with the legitimate tribute that it merited. The resulting lessening of tension in that area enabled their mission to be terminated a few weeks ago, All the members of the Council will hope, as l do, that the sub-commission which we propose to establish will conclude its work as happily and within a shorter period. The more encouraging developments which have taken place at the Geneva conference within the last forty-eight hours permit us today to hope for such results. And l have no doubt that if further developments at that conference, in the immediate future, finally remove all threat from the borders of Thailand, the Thai Government will be the first to request us to take the logical action. 17. For the reasons and in the spirit which l have just expressed, the French delegation will vote in favour of the draft l'esolution submitted by the delegation of Thailand. 18. Ml'. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated fram Russian) : At the Security Council's 672nd meeting the Soviet delegation opposed and voted against the inclusion in the agenda of the request submitted by Thailand in a letter from the representative of that country dated 29 May 1954 [Sj3220]. 19. In opposing the inclusion of this question in the agenda the Soviet representative drew the Council's attention to the faet that the question of the restoration of peace in Indo-China is at present being considered by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in Geneva, and that the participants in that conference are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States which are permanent members of the Security Council: the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the People's qu~ réunit les Ministres des affaires étrangères des Etats membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité, à savoir: l'Union soviétique, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, la République populaire de Chine, la France et le J " 'Jf ' 22. At the last meeting of the Security Council the representative of Thailand submitted a draft resolution proposing the establishment of a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission with authority, first of ail, to despatch observers to Thailand. 23. In his statement the representative of Thailand described, in highly obscure and confused phrases, a situation which, he said, constituted a threat to the security of Thailand, and the continuation of which, he c1aimed, would endanger the maintenance of inter- national peace and security. But so far as is known no one is threatening Thailand. If anything. on the contrary, the fact that the United States, through the agency of the Thailand representative, has raised in the Security Council the question of sending observers to Indo-China's borders represents a threat not to the people of Thailand but to the peoples of Indo-China, who have long been the victims of a colonial war, a war which the. United States is now trying to spread in order to stamp out the national liberation movement in Indo-China, to subject the Indo-Chinese people once again to foreign domination and to take up its chosen position in that part of the world. 24. At the last meeting of the Council the represen- tatives of New Zealand, the United Kingdom and some other countries did their best to minimize and belittle the significance of this question, and tried to persuade us that what was involved was some harmless, indeed purely technical measure. The representatives who have spoken today have praised to the skies the draft ~esolution submitted by the Thailand delegation calling lt a moderate, well-founded proposaI, pointing out that it represents a compromise solution, and so forth. 25, But for all the efforts of the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc to minimize the importance of this question, it is dear to everybodv that what is involved here is much more than the' despatch of military observers to Thailand and the'frontiers of Indo-China. 26. Clearly, neither the placing of Thailand's request on the Security Council's agenda, nor the proposaI to send military observers to the Thailand-Indo-Chinese borders can be considered in isolation. The real j 1 .1 .1 .~ significance of this scheme can be seen onlv in relation to the situation prevailing in the area and the policy now being pursued by certain Powers, notably the in~ervention in Indo~Chinese affairs, these aggressive 'circ1es in the United States demanded - over a year aga - the raising of the Indo-Chinese question in the United Nations, again through the agepcy of Thailand, their intention being obviously to repeat the Korean adventure in Indo-China. At that time, a year ago, the representative of Thailand made a number of official statements, which were published in the Press, to the effect that he was about ~o address a special request to the Security Council to consider the question of the Indo-Chinese threat to Thailand. He threatened to sub- mit this request to the Security Couneil as saon as he had received instructions from his Government, which he was expecting from day to day. Yet these instructions did not arrive until 29 May 1954, a year later, when progress was being made in the Geneva negotiations on the question of Indo-China. 29. But it must be pointed out that the delay in raising this question in the Security Council has been due, as many newspapers have reported, ta circum- stances quite extraneous ta the settlement of the Indo- China question. 30. Even then, a year aga, the attempt ta bring the Indo-China question before the Security Council was rightly construed by world public opinion as an attempt by the United States of America to interfere in the affairs of Indo-China. The fact that the Indo-China question was brought before the Security Council in the Thai complaint on 29 May 1954 - just when t.."le Geneva conference gave grounds for hope of a world ,settlement of the Indo-,China question - is by no means a coincidence. The haste with which this question has been raised in the Security Council, just at a moment when progress is being made at Geneva, reveals the alarm felt in aggressive circles in the United States of America lest the Indo-China affair shouldend in peace and make it even more difficult for the United States of America to realize its plan of interfering in Indo- Chinese affairs and spreading the war in Indù-China. 31. This is the real explanation of the haste which is being shown in the attempt to place the Indo~China CJ.uestion before the Security Council at the present time. 32. As you see, it is not concern for th~ security of Tp.ailand which has inspired those who have raised this question for consideration by the Security Council, for - ~ repeat - there exists no threat to Thailand either 32. Comme vous le voyez, personne n'a mê~e songé à la sécurité de la Thaïlande en soumettant la question au Conseil de sécurité. En effet - et je tiens à le sou- ligner une fois de plus - ni l'Indochine ni aucun autre "internation~lization of the conflict" means, in the light of the expenence we have gained in connexion with the Korean question. 36. Not a few reports have appeared recently in the American Press - and, be it said incidentaUy, they have. never been denie;d - in. which it was frankly adml~ted th.at the Amencan chlefs of staff were urging the lmmedmte despatch ta Indo-China of American naval and ai! forces in order to crush. aU resistance by the Indo-Chmese peoples to the colomal Powers. 37. We aU.read in the American papers not long ago that the Umted States National Security Council had taken a decision regarding military intervention by the United States in Indo-China. 38. .Two days ago the newspapers reported that Ad~lral Radford, head of the United States Joint Chlefs of Staff, was urging the immediate use of American air and naval forces in Indo-China in order to prevent the liberation of Hanoi by the aJl~ed forces of t~e Demo~ratic Republi~ of Viet-Nam. Yesterday, for mstance, lt was stated m the American Press that the. real aim of the western Powers, as everyone taclt1y understands, was to obtain from the military observ~rs as rapidly as possible a verdict that the armed ~orces of communist Viet-Minh are guilty of aggression ln Indo-China. That is the real purpose of the despatch of observers ta that area; it is a plan of sh~~r pro- ~aissait ouvertement que les chefs de l'Etat-Major américain insistent pour l'envoi immédiat en Indochine de forces navales et aériennes américaines afin d'écraser la résistance que les peuples d'Indochine opposent aux Puissances coloniales. - 37. Nous avons tous lu récemment dans les commu~ niqués reproduits par les journaux américains que le- Conseil national de sécurité des Etats-Unis a pris une décision concernant l'intervention armée des Etats-Unis dans les affaires d'Indochine. 38. II y a deux jours, les journaux signalaient qûe l'amiral Radford, Président du Comité des chefs d'état- major des Etats-Unis, avait insisté pour que l'on affecte immédiatement au théâtre d'opérations indochinois des forces aériennes et navales des Etats-Unis, en vue d'em- pêcher la Hbération d'Hanoï par les troupes de la Répu- blique démocratique du Viet-Nam. Hier encore on pouvait lire dans un journal américain que le véritable but des Puissances occidentales, que tout le monde com- cl '1" pre~ sans qu on enonce ouvertement, est que, le plus rapIdement possible, les observateurs militaires abou- tissent à la conclusion que les troupes du Viet-Mïnh communis.te se sont livrées à une agression en Indo~ 40. Thus the American Press, a well-informed Press which has access to accurate information on United States policy, assesses the present situatIon with regard to this question. The attempt being made here to confuse the issue and to present the Thai draft resolu- tion as an innocuous, purely technical measure con- sisting of the despatch of observers to the Indo-Chinese frontier to collect information, deceives nobody. Much more is involved, namely, preparation for new armed intervention in lndo-Chinese affairs under cover of the United Nations flag, on the lines of that shameful, dirty intrigue, the armed intervention of the western Powers in the affairs of Korea. 4·1. The Wall Street Journal, also a fairly important paper, recentIy stated that what is required is sorne sort of official or unofficial approval from the United Nations for a police action in Indo-China. Persons in authority, the Washington correspondent of that newspaper stated, believe that it will not be difficult to obtain such approval. Here we see the same terminology being used as was used by ex-President Truman when he decided to commit military intervention in the internaI affairs of Korea. He too called the war which the United States unleashed against Korea a police measure. That sinister expression, a "police measure", is now recurring in connexion with Indo-China. Thus the threat of foreign military intervention obviously looms behind the Thailand draft resolution. 42. On 23 May the New York H erald Tribune stated that the United States was endeavouring ta obtain support for the proposaI that the United Nations should send a commission ta South-East Asia in arder to determine whether the present situation there consti- tuted a threat ta international peace of a kind normally considered ta offer grounds for the submission of such questions for consideration ta the General Assembly or the Security Council. And further on the same news- paper stated that there had recentIy been an increase in the number of reports that by one means or another the Indo~China question would be brought before the United Nations. And the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Ml'. Dulles, stated according ta the New York H erald Tribune that before taking any steps towards intervention in the war in Indo- China the United States of America would wish the United Nations ta clarify the moral problems involved. 43. What are these "moral problems involved"? What kind of clarification does Ml'. Dulles hope to receive from the United Nations? That must be perfectIy plain to all of us. Murder will out. Observers must be sent to the frontiers, where they will easily be able to provoke various border disputes, and so forth. Then they will send a report to the Security Council that Thailand has been invaded, whereupon the Security Council or a special session of the Assembly will 42. Le New York H erald T1'ibune écrivait le 23 mai que les Etats-Unis ne négligent aucun effort pour faire approuver la demande tendant à ce que l'Organisation des Nations Unies envoie rlans l'Asie du Sud-Est une commission qui serait chargée de déterminer si la situa- tion existant dans cette région constitue pour la paix internationale une menace du genre de celles qui sont portées d'ordinaire devant l'Assemblée générale ou le Conseil de sécurité. Plus loin, ce même journal préci- sait que, depuis quelque temps, les raisons se multiplient de croire que l'Organisation des Nations Unies sera saisie, d'une façon ou d'une autre, de la question d'Indo- chine. M. Dulles, Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, a déclaré à son tour - toujours selon le New York Herald Tribune - qu'avant d'intervenir en Indochine, les Etats-Unis voudraient que l'Organisation des Na- tions Unies précisât certains problèmes d'ordre moral qui se posent. 43. De quels "problèmes d'ordre moral" s'agit-il? Et quelles précisions M. Dulles veut-il obtenir de l'Orga- nisation des Nations Unies? Cela est absolument clair pour tous, car il est impossible de dissimuler la vérité: il s'agit d'envoyer des observateurs à la frontière indo- chinoise. Après cela, il sera très facile de provoquer des incidents de frontière, etc. Ensuite, on adressera au Conseil de sécurité un rapport d'où il ressortira que la Thaïlande a fait l'objet d'une agression, el l'on pourra _.fi 45. Suc.h is the background against which we are being asked to decide to send observers ta Indo-China. A peaceful, completely innocent undertaking indeed: ta send observers to collect information and at the same time ta consider the despatch to Indo-China of jet fighters, bombers, heavy artillery, amphibious tanks and other arms. 46. How can two such measures go together? Clearly, the purpose is to broaden the conflict and to use this ostensibly innocent Security Council decision to send observers to the area as a means of throwing the doak of the United Nations around this intrigue, an intrigue dangerous to the cause of peace, around this malieious manœuvre by the United States of America. 47. It serves no purpose here, in my view, to pursue one's policy and pretend that nothing has happened, that this is purely a Thai matter, and so forth. Nothing of the sort. No one will succeed in obscuring this issue or in minimizing its importance; the real state of affairs is plain to a11. We must lay a11 our cards on the table and caU a spade a spade. This is by no means such an innocent undertaking as some are attempting to pretend. 1 could cite innumerable reports which expose the United States plan to spread the war in Indo-China. But the examples 1 have quoted should suffice to convince everyone that the matter which has been put before the Security Council has nothing to do with the security of Thailand. That is quite obvious. The ques- tion of Thailand's security has been dragged in by the ears. Indeed, in many of the American Press reports revealing the American plans for intervention in Indo- China there is not a single mention of Thailand; nor does any American paper make the slightest reference ta a threat to Thailand's security. 48. If any threat to Thailand actually existed, there would be some mention of it in the newspaper articles on these matters; but they say nothing of the kind. It may be added in that connexion, indeed, that there is no evidence either in the statement the representative of Thëliland made in introducing his draft resolution or in the draft resolution itself that there is anv threat to Thailand from any direction whatsoever. It° is aIl a matter of mere words. But we cannot aet on mere words. The Security Council is not a body to which anybody can come and say: "There is a danger threatening me", and expect it to take a deeision to send United Nations troops. 49. Accordingly, no one can still doubt that the United States of America, and no other, is really responsible for raising the Indo-China question in the Security Couneil. It is equally obvious to aIl what aim the United States of America seek§ in 1?ringing the 49. Le doute n'est pas possible: ce sc~t les Etats-Unis qui sont le véritable inspirateur de cette manœuvre et qui ont fait porter la question d'Indochine devant le Conseil de sécurité. De même, tout le monde comprend ce que les Etats-Unis se proposent en imposant au Con- 50. This aim is reflected in the draft resolution intro- duced by Thailand, the last clause of which obviously provides for the possibility of sending military observers or for visits by a sub-commission to the territory of States contiguous ta Thailand, that is, Indo-China and possibly other countries as weIl. 51. And here 1 wish ta draw the Council's attention once again ta the uiter artificiality of the apprehensions spread by Thailand in t.onnexion with alleged threats to its own security caused by a condition of interna- tional tension, according to the draft resolution and the statements that have been made. The falsity of this alarm on Thailand's part is proved, as 1 have aIready said, by the fact that absoIuteIy no faets or evidence have been brought forward to justify it. 52. An that we have heard here about a threat to Thailand is the statement which was made at the last meeting, a slanderous, completely false statement that a free Thai government has been formed on the territory of the People's Republic of China near the Thailand border, with the intention, it is alleged, of invading Thailand's frontiers. The same falsehood was repeated today by the representative of Colombia, but ttnfor- tunately he has presumably not read today's papers. If he had glanced at The New York Times he would have seen a complete refutation of it, a statement that nothing is. known of any government intending to invade Thailand. The story is a complete fabrication, a lie, a plot hatched here by the Kuomintang elements in the Security Council and taken up by the represen- tative of Colombia, who failed to read his morning papers. 53. That was the only evidence or argument in support of the theory that Thailand is under sorne sort of threat; and even this evidence is a patent fabrication, as this morning's New Yorl, Times reveals. Let me ask you to read today's paper. Thus there is absolutely no justification for the examination of this question by the Security Council, a question which has no real found- ation and is a pure invention. 54. In the light of these facts it must be clear to everyone what are the real intentions of the United States in connexion with Indo-China in spite of the United States' efforts to conceal them. Murder will out. 55. Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that the very idea of sending observers to Thailand-Indo- China frontiers at a moment when the termination of hostilities in Indo-China and the settlement of the Indo-Chinese question is under discussion in Geneva shows that the real sponsor." of the draft resolution before us have in mind not the ending of the war in Indo-China nor a peaceful settlement, but the spreading of the war. Why would they want ta send observers if what ,they plan is a peaceful settlement? 52. En ce qui concerne le prétendu danger auquel la Thaïlande serait exposée, le Conseil n'a entendu, à sa dernière séance, qu'u.ne déclaration calomnieuse et dé- pourvue de tout fondement, selon laquelle un gouverne- ment thaï libre aurait été formé sur le territoire de la République populaire de Chine, près de la frontière thaïlandaise; ce gouvernement se proposerait de faire irruption en territoire thaïlandais. Le représentant de la Colombie a répété aujourd'hui ce mensonge. Apparemment, il n'a pas lu les journaux de ce matin, car, s'il avait lu le New York Times, il aurait constaté que cette nouvelle est démentie. Personne n'a entendu parler d'un gouvernement qui se proposerait de péné- trer sur le territoire thaïlandais. C'est là un mensonge, un canard que les partisans du Kouomintang ont lancé au Conseil de sécurité et que le représentant de la Co- lombie, qui n'a pas lu les journaux de ce matin, a pris à son compte. 53. Voilà la seule preuve ou le seul argument qu'on a invoqué pour soutenir qu'une menace pèserait sur la Thaïlande, et cette preuve s'est révélée être un faux manifeste, comme le montre le New Y m'k Times de ce matin, auquel il suffit de se reporter. Le Conseil de sécurité n'a donc aucune raison de s'occuper de cette question, qui n'a aucun rapport avec la réalité et qui est inventée de toutes pièces. 54. Tous ces faits amènent chacun à se rendre compte des véritables visées des Etats-Unis à l'égard de l'Indo- chine, en dépit des efforts que la délégation des Etats- Unis déploie pour les dissimuler; la vérité finit toujours par percer. 55. Enfin, on ne peut passer sous silence te fait suivant: l'idée même d'envoyer des observateurs en Thaïlande, sur les frontières de l'Indochine, au moment précis où . l'on examine à Genève la question de la cessation des hostilités et du règlement pacifique de la question d'In- dochine, prouve que les auteurs véritables du projet de résolution dont nous sommes saisis ne se préparent nul- lement à arrêter les hostilités en Indochine ni à régler la question d'une manière pacifique, mais qu'ils envi- sagent, au contraire, une extension des opérations mili- taires en Indochine. En effet, pourquoi enverrait-on des observateurs s'il s'agissait de régler la question par des voies pacifiques? 59. For these reasons the Soviet delegation cannot support the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council by the representative of Thailand.

Not for the first time 1 detected in the speech of the represen- tative of the Soviet Union a dichotomy in the mind process. There were, it seemed to me, a series of contradictions in his speech. 61. The representative of the Soviet Union first argued that the question of re-esta:blishing peace in Indo-China is being discussed in Geneva and ought not to be dis- cussed here in New York, too. Naturally I agree with that. 1 should think that everybody around this table agrees with that. We all attach the utmost importance to these discussions on the Indo-China question which are proceeding in Geneva, and naturally we should do nothing here which could possibly impede them. But what did the representative of the Soviet Union in fact do? Having made that statement, he then proceeded to discuss this very subject, the lndo-China question, w~ich he had previously said, and quite rightly, was bel11g discussed and ought tQ be discussed in another place, in G~neva. . 57. Il est permis de se demander pourquoi on veut amener le Conseil à se prononcer alors que ses cinq membres permanents se trouvent actuellement à Genève et que le chef du Gouvernement français a déclaré qu'on allait prendre des mesures énergiques pour assurer le succès des négociations concernant l'Indochine? Pour- quoi envoyer des observateurs dans cette région? 58. Si cette question ne reçoit pas de réponse, toute équivoque est impossible: ce que l'on cherche, c'est, en fin de compte, à intensifier la guerre en Indochine. Mais le Conseil n'a pas le droit de jouer avec le feu; il n'a pas le droit d'encourager les tendances qui se sont mani- festées ici et qui traduisent la volonté des Etats-Unis et des milieux agressifs de ce pays de porter la guerre en Indochine. En adoptant le projet de résolution de la Thaïlande, le Conseil de sécurité ne ferait qu'aggra- ver la situation. Loin de faciliter les négociations qui se poursuivent à Genève au sujet d'un règlement paci- fique de la question d'Indochine, il les gênerait COnsi- dérablement. 59. Pour toutes ces raisons, la délégation de l'Union soviétique n'est pas en mesure d'appuyer le projet de résolution dont le Conseil de sécurité est actuellement saisi. 60. Sir Pierson DIXON (Royaum~-Uni) (traduit de l'anglais):. Ce n'est pas la première fois que je relève dans un discours du représentant de l'Union soviétique une véritable dichotomie de la pensée. Son intervention me semble renfermer de multiples contradictions. 61. Le représentant de l'Union soviétique nous a d'abord dit que la question du rétablissement de la paix en Indochine était à l'heure actuelle discutée à Genève et que nous ne devions pas l'examiner à New-York égaleI?ent. Il ya san~ ~ire que j'approuve cette façon de VOIr. Je SUIS porte a penser que tous les membres du Cons.eil l'approuvent. Nous. attachons tous la plus grande Importance aux entretIens de Genève sur la question d'Indochine, et nous ne devons bien entendu rien faire ici qui puisse les gêner. Mais que fait en réa- lité le ,représ;nt~nt de. l'Union soviétiq~e? Après avoir affirme, a tres Juste tItre, que la questIOn d'Indochine est et doit être discutée ailleurs qu'ici, c'est-à-dire à Genève, il a entrepris de la discuter. 63. The general point 1 wish to bring out is that it is no member of the Council but it is the Soviet Union alone which brought up this question of Indo-China here. We are not dealing with that question but with quite a different one. We are dealing with a request from a small country in the general area. 64. 1 thought that the allegations which the represen- tative of the Soviet Union made about Thailand were extraordinary. 1 can only think that he was led to make them by his bemusement with his theory that this appeal by tl1e Government of Thailand is all a great big United States plot. He spoke of a manœuvre to scuttle the cause of a peaceful settlement of the Indo-China question. Those were, I think, the words as they reached me through the simultaneous interpretation. He said that the question of Thailand's security had been "dragged in by the ears" and that there existed no threat to Thailand. But Thailand is a sovereign State. It knows its own mind. It is clearly deeply conscious of its responsibilities under the Charter and the Govern- înent of Thailand has voiced its legitimate apprehensions in the present situation. 65.. This debate, to my mind; clearly shows that in the view of the majority here these apprehensions on the part of the Government of Thailand are legitimate. And what has the Government of Thailand done? It availed itself of certain provisions in the United Nations which exist and which were framed precisely for this purpose. The representative of Thailand has explained most convincingly why it has done so. Does the represen- tative of the Soviet Union really suggest that the Government of Thailand has no right ta voice .these apprehensions and to ask to avail itself of the machinery set up for this purpose? I cannot believe it. 66. As I said, the representative of Thailand, to judge by the general debate; has convinced most of us around this table. But I do not think that the representative of the Soviet Union will have convinced his colleagues. 67. There is a further point to which I should like to draw attention. It was precise1y to deal with this type of request and situation that the Peace Observation Commission machinery was set up. The negative attitude of the representative of the Soviet Union would be more understandable if his Government had refused to recognize the Peace Observation Commission. But, on the contrary, the Soviet Union is a member of that Commission. Therefore, one would presume that it wishes to see that Commission perform the functions for which it was established. Why should there not be readiness now to see it perform those functions? 68. In conclusion, 1 should like to say that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has been striving with its allies to bring about at Geneva 12 A vote was take1Z by show of hands. In favour: Brazil, China, Colombia. Denmark, France, New Zealand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A bstaining: Lebanon. The result of the vote was 9 in favour, 1 against, 'with 1 abstention. The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.

It is now in order for any member of the Security Coundl who wishes to do so ta explain his vote. 73. Mr. TSIANG (China.): 1 referred very briefly at our last meeting ta one of my reasons for supporting this resolution, namely, the existence of the so-called free Thai Government. It has created sorne interest and sorne confusion in the Press. Since that is one of the main reasons for my vote, 1 should Eke to give the Coundl further information on that point. 74. The group which the Chinese Communists have chosen to calI the free Thai Government is composed of people of the Thai race. The majority today are Chinese dtizens of the Thai race. There are in that group people of the Thai race from the Associated States of Indo- China; there are also Thai people from Burma and there are Thai people from Thailand. Up to the present moment, the majority are Chinese people of the Thai race. The leading Thai from Thailand who has played an important role in this so-called free Thai Govern- ment is a man by the name of Nye Beri. 1 do not know if that is his real name. 75. He has had an important politicaI career in Thailand. 1 understand that he failed in his political ambitions there and that that was the reason he chose i 69. Revenons donc au projet de résolution. D'après moi, il s'agit, comme je l'ai dit à plusieurs reprises, d'un projet raisonnable et qui ne peut donner lieu à aucune controverse. Je voterai pour ce projet. 70. Le PRESIDENT (tradttit de l'anglais): Aucun autre orateur n'est inscrit sur la liste. 71. Le seul projet de résolution dont ie Conseil soit saisi est celui de la Thaïlande [S/3229]. J'ai demandé, mercredi dernier, en ma qualité de représentant des Etats-Unis et conformément à l'article 38 du règlement intérieur du Conseil, que cette proposition soit mise aux voix; nous voterons maintenant sur ce projet de réso- lution. Il est procédé au vote à main levée. Votent pour: Brésil, Chine, Colombiè, Danemark, France, Nouvelle-Zélande, Turquie, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Vote contre: l'Union des Républiques socialistes so- viétiques. S'abstient: le Liban. Il y a 9 voix pour) une voix contre et une abstention. Le vote négatif étant celui d'un membre perma1tent du Conseil de sécurité, le projet de 1'ésolutiott n'est pas adopté. 72. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Les membres du Conseil de sécurité qui le désirent peuvent maintenant expliquer leur vote. 73. M. TSIANG (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): J'ai indiqué brièvement, à notre précédente séance, l'une des raisons pour lesquelles j'appuyais le projet de réso- lution sur lequel nous venons de voter, savoir l'existence d'un soi-dil,ant gouvernement thaï libre; ma déclaration a soulevé un certain intérêt et provoqué une certaine confusion dans .la presse. Puisqu'il s'agit de l'une des raisons prindpales qui ont inspiré mon vote, j'aimerais . donner au Conseil d'autres précisions à cet égard. 74. Le groupe que les communistes chinois ont décidé d'appeler le Gouvernement thaï libre est composé de gens de race thaï; il s'agit surtout de Chinois de race thaï. Ce groupe comprend aussi des ressortissants de race thaï des Etats associés d'Indochine; on y trouve également des Birmans et des Thaïlandais de race thaï. A l'heure actuelle, ce groupe est composé en majorité de Chinois de race thal. Le personnage qui a joué le rôle le plus important dans ce prétendu gouvernement thaï libre est un individu du nom de Nye Beri. J'ignore si c'est son nom véritable. 75. Il a joué un rôle politique important en Thaï- lande, et, si je suis bien renseigné, l'échec de ses ambi- tions politiques dans ce pays l'a déterminé à s'associer

The r,epresentative of Thailand has asked for the privilege of making a brief statement, and, if there is no objection, l will recognize him.

It has been for me a source of gratification to listcn with deep attention to the speeches, full of wisdom, of the members of the Council who, because of their keen sense of respon- sibility and their realization of the grave situation with which my country is confronted, have given their valu- able support to the request of Thailand. This support gives us profound inspiration and strengthens our faith in the high authority of the United Nations to maintain peace and good order in the world. 79. l do not think it will be necessary fo!' me to establish the 'right of my country to ask for the pre- ventive measures set forth in our draft resolution. Nor do l wish to stress the simplicity and the appropriate- ness of such measures, because this character has been fully, or almost fully, recognized by nearly all the members of the Council, to whom l wish to take this opportunity of expressing my Government's sincere and profound gratitude. There has been, however, one single loud and discordant voice in this Council, a voice which not only disagreed with the l'est of the members of the Council but also preferred grave and extravagant charges against my Government, as well as against the Government of the United States, with whom. my Government maintains very cordial relations. 80. l am very reluctant to make a reply because, in the first place, these charges come from a permanent member of the Security Council, to whom, as such, respect and consideration are owed. Secondly, these charges were sa blatantly extravagant that no one, not even one unfamiliar either with the affairs of the United Nations or with the situation in South-East Asia, can fail to recognize their groundlessness. How- ever, my delegation feels, though with deep regret, that it is our dutY at least to respond and to expose these charges to the light of truth. 81. It has been said that my country's request was introduced into the United Nations with a view to hampering or scuttling the efforts to arrive at a solution in Geneva. l have. already shown, on two occasions, how this argument is devoid of any validity and how it has been used to cover the tragic machinations of those 78. M. SARASIN (Thaïlande) (t1'aduit de l'anglais): Cela a été d'un grand réconfort pour moi d'entendre- et je les ai écoutés avec beaucoup d'attention -les dis- cours pleins de sagesse des membres du Conseil, qui, faisant preuve d'un sens a~gu de leurs responsabilités et conscients de la gravité de la situation en présence de laquelle se trouve mon pays, ont donné leur précieux apoui à la requête de la Thaïlande. Cet appui constitue pour nous un profond encouragement et fortifie notre foi dans la grande Organisation des Nations Unies pour le maintien de la paix et de l'ordre dans le monde. 79. Je ne pense pas qu'il me soit nécessaire de prouver le droit qu'a mon pays de demander que l'on prenne les mesures préventives indiquées dans notre projet de résolution. Il n'y a pas lieu non plus pour moi de souligner que ces mesures sont simples et opportunes puisque presque tous les membres du Conseil l'ont plei- nement reconnu, ou presque, et je voudrais leur expri- mer la profonde et sincère gratitude de mon gouverne- ment. Il s'est cependant trouvé, au Conseil, une voix isolée, forte et discordante, non seulement pour expri- mer un avis contraire à <:e1ui des autres membres du Conseil, mais aussi pour porter des accusations graves et absurdes contre mon gouvernement et contre celui des Etats-Unis, avec lequel mon gouvernement entre- tient des relations très cordiales. 80. J'hésite beaucoup à répondre parce que, d'une part, ces accusations émanent d'un membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité qui, en cette qualité, a droit à mon respect et à ma considération. D'autre part, l'ab- surdité de ces accusations est si évidente que personne, quand bien même il ;;'agirait de quelqu'un qui ne con- naît ni l'Organisation des Nations Un!es ni la situation dans l'Asie du Sud-Est, ne peut manquer de recon- naître qu'elles sont dénuées de tout fondement. A son grand regret cependant, ma délégation estime qu'elle est au moins tenue de répondre à ces accusations et de les réfuter en montrant où se trouve la vérité. 81. On a dit que la demande dont mon pays a saisi l'Organisation des Nations Unies ne vise qu'à entraver ou à saper les efforts entrepris à Genève. J'ai déjà mon- tré, par deux fois, que cet at:gument n'avait aucune valeur et qu'on s'en était servi pour cacher les sombres manœuvres de ceux qui v~1Jl~nt profiter de la volonté 86. He asks: "What is the hurry?" That is a strange question to ask a small nation which considers itself to be in danger of 'naving its citizens killed. The repre- sentative of the Soviet Union and 1 happen to represent big countries, bu.t 1 continue to hope that we can look at the representah;!es of small countries with sympathy and understanding. The United States was' a small country for a long time and still looks at many things from the standpoint of a small country. 1 hope that 1 will never live to see the day when a small country cornes to the United Nations to ask for protection against war and is simply greeted with the question: "What is the hurry ?" The Thai representative has eloquently told us precisely what the hurry is. 87. Then the Soviet Union representative accused the United States of moving toward the establishment of conditions which make intervention by the United States possible. Let me thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the very effective remarks he made to put the record straight in that particular. This Soviet allegation is particularly ludicrous in view of the com- munist activity in aiding the aggressors in South-East Asia and the increased outpouringof communist sup- plies to those forces from as far away as- the Skoda works _in Czechoslovakia. We recall the fighting in Korea when apparently the Soviet Union was willing to go on fighting to the last Chinese Communist. . 88. The fact is that the United States has tried to respond to requests for aidby the peoples and their governments who were attempting to defend their inde- pendence against imperialistic communism, which is the twentieth century colonialism of the Soviets and which has alrea<;l.y engulfed 600 million people. It is 90. Our position in the present situation is not unlike that proc1aimed recently at the Colombo conference. The five Prime Ministers attending that conference resolved ta preserve in their countries the freedom inherent in democratic institutions and to resist anv interference whatever in their internaI affairs. The United States is certainly in accord with those principles which it endeavours to follow. 91. When you hear some of the statements that have been made here this morning by the ~~presentative of the Soviet Union, you wonder whether it is the plan to "liberat~" Hanoi as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and a g'reat many other places bave been "liberated". ~2. This is not the first time that Soviet vetoes have harmed Asia. Soviet vetoes thwarted Security Council action designed to he1p Indonesia in its newly-won freedom. Vetoes exacerbated the Kcrean conflict. Asian countries, and 1 mean Japan, Viet-Nam, Laos, Cam- bodia, Ceylon and Nepal, have been blocked from United Nations meElbership by Soviet vetoes. To these vetoes directed against the interests of the Asian people must be added today's action, which could, if it were left unchallenged, make it easier for aggression to strike across the borders of Thailand. 93. Thailand, a small Asian, country, has acted i.1 a se1f-respecting manner. As a loyal United Nations Member, it now cornes before us asking for this small measure of protection. The Security COl~i:.cil's è""sire ta respond to Thailand's appeal is c1ear, but Mr. Tsarap- kin's "nyet" turns Thailand away from the United Nations body which has the primary responsihiiity for the maintenance of peace. Thailand will undoubtedly seek a remedy e1sewhere in the United Nations and it will have our support when it does so.. ' 94. In conclusion, 1 wish to say that we havê tried here today to take a modest, helpful step. It was a merci1ul effort to try to bind up one of the wounds of ~ne mesure vraiment modeste pour assurer sa protec- tion. Il semble évident que le Conseil de sécurité sou- haiterait répondre à son appel, mais le ((niet') de M: Tsa- rapkine détourne la Thaïlande de l'organe des Nations Un~es. auquel incpmbe la rc:sponsabilité principale du mamtlen de la paiX. La Thatlanàe ne manquera pas de s'adresser à un autre organe des Nations Unies et elle y bénéficiera de notre a,ppui. ' 94. Je tiens adéclarer, pour conclure, que ce que nous avons essayé de faire ici aujourd'hui, c'était de prendre une mesure modeste, mais utile; il s'agissait J'un effort 16

As the represen- tative of a small country in the Pacific vitally concerned in the present problem, I feel impelled to make sorne brief remarks following the President's important state- ment, and 1 ask this question: why does the represen- tative of the Soviet Union, almost in the same breath, accuse the United States of intervention in Indo~China and abject to the dispatch of observers who can estab- lish what are the real facts in the area and investigate his own allegations? Surely he has proved, by his own words, the insincerity of his own Government. 96. The vetoes earlier this year, by which the Soviet Union stultified resolutions supported by a clear majority of this Council, have b,een appropriately described as of sinister import. Now the representative of the Soviet Union, in equally sinister fashion, has vetoed a resolution supported by the overwhelming majority of the members of this Coundl and designed to send observers who may ascertain the dangers to Thailand from those very flames of fire referred to by Mr. Tsarapkin, and which burn perilously near the borders of Thailand. 97. If the Soviet Union be1ieves that Thailand has nothing to fear, why not let observers go to the area and ascertain the truth of this Soviet belief? The Soviet Union representative, through his gravely disturbing intervention this morning, has served notice on us all that his Government has nothing but contempt for the rights of a small Asian State - for the rights of any small State - for the rights created by this Organiza- tion for the self-protection Ot the peoples of such States.

I have decided to say a few words in connexion with the remarks which have been made since we took the vote. 99. First of all let me reply to the representative of New Zealand, who asked me why ohservers should not be sent to the area. I explained in my statement the hidden motives behind what is being presented to us as an innocuous decision to send observers. I repeat: the war, as reported in New Zealand, American and other newspapers, has been going on for seven years. Negotiations on the Indo-China question have been begun in Geneva with a view to its peaceful settlement. The Premier of France has just made a statement to the effect that a settlement will be achieved within a month; that is, it is hoped Îl1at the entire question will be settled peacefully. A decision to send observers to see how the aggression and so forth is deve10ping in the area would be completely incongruous, contrary to common sense and contrary to that political logicby which the Security Council should be governed in dealing with this matter. But the Security Council does not wish to be governed by any such logic., 103. When' Ml'. Lodge makes his customary well-worn thrusts at the Soviet Union in this Council, it in no way humiliates my country. As for national policy, the Soviet Union is the only country in the wurld which conducts its national policy in the interests of all the peoples which inhabit it; and the peoples of the Soviet Union number not half a score, but more than a hundred. Each of these peoples has its own culture and its own rights, which are safeguarded and guaranteed by the constitution and by the entire policy of the Soviet Government. All your thrusts at the national policy of the Soviet Union fail to sting my country, and 1 do not feel called upon even to answer them, for the achievements of Soviet national policy are already too obvious to be smeared by any such routine and stereo- typed attacks. 104. The PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, the President will take the fioor for one minute as represen- tative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 105. The reference ta the Yugoslav gentleman who works in a laundry in Chicago is rather surprising. 1 am somewhat astounded that the representative of the Soviet Union should denigrate what, after aIl, is honour- able labour. There is nothing disgraceful or wrong about working in a laundry. There is nothing wrong with having laundries. There is no harm in being clean; c1eanliness is next to godliness. The gentleman who got the job in the laundry could get it without going to any commissar or any dictator, and without selling his soul or binding himself to the support of any iron- hearted communism. He could just go and get the job; 101. Je voudrais maintenant répondre en quelques mots au représentant des Etats-Unis. 102. Lorsque j'ai parlé des conséquences néfastes que risquait d'avoir l'adoption du projet de résolution de la Thaïlande, je n'ai pu m'empêcher de rappeler la poli- tique suivie par les Etats-Unis à l'égard de l'Indochine. J'ai cité toute une série de faits indiquant que les Etats- Unis s'apprêtaient à étendre et à encourager les opéra- tions militaires en Indochine pour pouvoir intervenir eux-mêmes dans ce pays, pour y consolider leurs pro- pres positions, pour en chasser d'autres, etc. Cela est absolument inconte:.;table, et M. Lodge n'a pas pu réfu- ter ma thèse. Aussi s'est-il livré, selon son habitude, à des attaques calomnieuses contre l'URSS, attaques qui ne méritent même pns une réponse. Si, en effet, on veut parler d'esclavage, on n'a qu'à étudier la situation des noirs aux Etats-Unis, celle des Indiens forcés de vivre dans des réserves spéciales ou celle des gens qui, tout en étant Américains, vivent dans des conditions extrê- mement défavorables, dénués de toute ressource et privés de tout droit. C'est ainsi que j'ai vu hier, dans un journal, la photographie d'un ancien Ministre you- goslave triant le linge dans une blanchisserie de Chicago. Voilà donc la vie, la liberté, le fameux genre de vie américains. Cette photographie a paru dans le New y ork Times. Tout le monde peut voir la photo de cet ancien Ministre yougoslave. Tout le monde peut se ren- dre compte de ce qu'est le fameux genre de vie amé- ricain. 103. Lorsque M. Lodge entreprend de se livrer aux habituelles, aUx classiques attaques contre l'Union so- viétique, il ne cause nul tort à ma patrie. Et, puisqu'on veut parler de politique des nationalités, il faut dire que l'Union soviétique est le seul pays au monde qui s'atta- che à défendre les intérêts de tous les peuples qui vivent sur son territoire, et ces peuples ne sont pas au nombre d'une dizaine: ils dépassent la centaine. Chacun d'eux a sa propre culture, ses propres droits, qui sont assurés et garantis par la Constitution et par tous les actes du Gouvernement soviétique. Les att1'.ques dirigées contre la politique de l'Union soviétique en matière de nationa- lité ne sauraient toucher ma patrie; même, je considère de mon devoir de ne pas y répondre, car le succès évi- dent .de cette politique voue à l'échec toutes les vieilles calomnies. 104. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais): Avant de lever la séance, je prendrai un instant la parole en qualité de représentant des ETATS-UNIS D'AME- RIQUE. 105. L'allusion au Yougoslave qui travaille dans une blanchisserie de Chicago est assez surprenante. Je suis quelque peu étonné d'entendre le représentant de l'Union soviétique dénigrer ce qui est après tout un travail hocorable. Il n'y a rien de honteux ou de mal à travailler dans une blanchisserie. Il n'y a aucun mal à avoir des blanchisseries. On ne fait de tort à personne en étant propre; la propreté est presque une vertu. La personne qui a trouvé un emploi dans une b1anchisserie l'a obtenu sans se rendre chez un commissaire ou un dictateur et sans vendre son âme ou s'engager à sou- tenir un communisme inhumain. Il lui a suffi de se pré- SALES AGENTS FOR UNITED NATIONS PUBLlCAT.aNS DEPOSITAIRES DES PUBlICArlONS DES NArlONS UNII5 FIANCE Editions A. 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The Pokiston Cooperetive Boo1< Soctety, Chittogong end Docco (Eest Poklsten.) CANAIA Ryorson Proll, 299 QUlln St. West. Toronto. Plrlodico, Inc" 4234 do le Racho; Mon. trool.34. cmON - CEYUN Tho Assoeietod Nowlpe"ers of Coylon ~rd., Lo~o Houso, Colombo. tHILE - CHILI Libror!o Ivons, Monodo 822, S.ntiego. Editor.iol dol Pectlico, Ahuinede 57. Sontiego. CNINA- CHINE Tho World Boo~ Co. Ltd" 99 Chung King Rood. ht Soctlon. Toip.h, Telwen. Conlmorciol Pross. 211 Honen Rd.• Sheng' hoi. COIIOIIIIA - COLOIiIIE Librertii Letln.. Cerrere 6e., 13·05, 80got6. Librorte Am'dce, Modollln. Librerle Necionel Ltde., Borranquille. COSTA Iltl- COSTA·lICA Troios Hermenos, Apertodo 1313, San Jas'. MA U CISO 811gl. O'Rlilly 455, L. Hlbon•• ~OYAII.- TCIlECOSLOYAQUIE 'l:eikoslovlns1<y Splsov.tel. N6rodnl Trld. 9. Prlh. 1. tElllAlI- DAIEllAIl Einer Munhgoerd, Ltd., Nerregodo 6, K.boJ1llovn, K. IOIIINICAN IE'UILIC- IE'UILIGUE DOIIINICAINE Librorto Dominicone, Mercodos 49, Ciu. dad Trujillo. 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AUrlo, Lisbo•• SlMU'OIE- SINGAPOUI The City 'Book Slor., Ltd.. Wlnchest., Hous., Colly., Quoy. SWEDEM - sulDE C. E. Frltz.'s Kungl. Hovbokh.ndll A.B, Fr.dsg.t.n 2. Stockholm. 1WITZEIlAND- SUISSE Llbrolrle Peyot S.A.. L.us.nne. G.n~vI. H.ns R.unh.rdt, Kirchg.sso 17, Zurich 1. SYI)A-SYlIE Llbroirle Uoivers.lle, Dom.s. THAILAND - THAllANDE Pramu.n Mil Ltd.. 55 Ch.kraw.t Roed. Wo~ Tuk. Bong~ok. TUIIEY- TURQUIE Librairie Hechott•• 469 Isliklol C.ddlsi, BOlloglu. lsl.nbul. UNION OF SOUTR AFilCA- UNION SUD-AF,IlCAINE Von Schoik's Bookstorl (Pty.). LM,. Box 724, Prelorl•• UNITED IINGDOII- 10YAUIIE·UNI H.M. St.tion.'Y Office, P.O. Bo~ 569, London. S.E. 1 (end.t H.M.S.O. Shopsl. UNITED STATES OF AIIE1ICA- ETAts-UNIS D'AllO. Infl Documants Sorvice, Columbia Unlv. Press. 2960 Bro.dw.y, Now York 27, N.Y. UIUGUAY Ropresentoci6n d. Editorieles, Prof. H. D'EII•• Av. 18 de Julio 1333. Mont.vidoo. YEME11lElA Distribuidora Escolo, S.A.. .nd Dlstrlbul· dor~ Continentel, Ferrenquln 0 C,uz d. Cond~lerl. 179; Cer.clS. YIET·NAII Plpeteril.Librelrle Nouvelle Alb.rt Par. toil, Boite poslale 2à3. Sorgon. YUGOSLAYI4- YOU'OSUVIE Orx.vno Preduzece. Jugoslovensko IEnllge. Terozlle 27·11. Beogred. Unltod Natlan. puhU.."lon. can also h. ohlalnld from Ihl fa/lowlng flmtll 1•• r.u!>Utallon. d.. Notion. Uni.. p.uv..' 'sa omonl arr. ohlonu.. 'Su" adrellO' c/. dlSlOW' AUSTtlA- AUUICRE B. wallerstorif, W.b::lpletz, 4. S.lzburg. Gerold.!c Co.. 1. Gr.lien 31, Wi.n. 'EiJwIy - ALLEIIA'NE Elwert & M.urar, Heuptstrosse 101. Borlin -Schoneb.r9· W. E. Soorb.ch, Gereonstr.ss. 25.29. Koln (22c). Alex. Horn, Spi.gelg.sse 9, Wlesbeden. JArAH - JA'ON Moruzen Comp.ny. Ltd.. 1> Tori·Nichom•• Nihonboshl. Tokyo. S'AIN·ESPAGNE Librarlo Bosch, Il Ronde Unlversld.d, B.r~elona. Les commandes et demandes de renseignements émanant de pays o~ Il n'existe pa. encore de déposItaires peuvent atre adressées li la Section des ventes et de la c"stribu'" tion, Org~nl~t1on des Nations Unies, New-York (Etats- Unis d'Amérique) ou li la Section d.,s ventes, Orijanlsa- t1"n dei Natton. Unies, Palais des Nations, Gen~Ye (Suisse). (5382) 19445-August 1954-1,600