S/PV.6785 Security Council

Under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Roger Meece, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2012/355, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I now give the floor to Mr. Meece.

It is an honour for me to once again address the members of the Security Council in connection with the recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/355) on the current situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on the work of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Since my last briefing, at the beginning of this year (see S/PV.6712), considerable progress has been made, especially on the issue of the security challenges posed by the Rwandan group Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in North and South Kivu provinces. However, that progress has been stalled by the recent mutiny of some soldiers, led by Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga. That mutiny has made for a serious downturn in security for the civilian population of that area, especially in North Kivu, thereby leading to a reduction in pressure on the other armed groups operating in the region. (spoke in English) The mutiny was initiated largely by soldiers integrated in the national Congolese army — the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC)  — essentially under terms of agreements reached in 2009. That integration was never complete, however, and I have spoken in past presentations to the Council of the challenge to State authorities posed by General Ntaganda and those allied to him, who exercised quasi-autonomous authority without accountability to central command or Government authority. While Ntaganda, Makenga and others have asserted that the terms of the 2009 agreements central to their interests were not implemented, their recourse to an armed mutiny is not an acceptable means to address their grievances. It now threatens a general destabilization of the Kivus and the region and dramatically increases the general threat to millions of civilians. Ntaganda did not receive as broad support for the mutiny as he anticipated, and the response of the Congolese Government has been effective, including facilitating the continued presence in loyal military units of large numbers of troops loyal to the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple and successfully persuading many other deserting troops to resume their posts without negative consequences. That has substantially reduced the numbers available to Ntaganda’s mutiny and to the parallel M-23 movement, started by Makenga shortly afterwards. The relationship between Ntaganda and Makenga is not clear, and the M-23 movement strongly denies association with Ntaganda, possibly because of the outstanding International Criminal Court arrest warrant against him. However, Ntaganda and Makenga clearly share fundamental positions, interests and objectives. We have been working in close collaboration with the Congolese Government, and specifically the FARDC, since the beginning of these events in early April, to seek to limit to the extent possible injuries to the civilian population, as much as feasible to provide aid to victims and displaced populations, to contain the area of active fighting and to restore order as quickly and effectively as possible. The mutinous forces were successfully driven out of their base areas relatively quickly, eventually establishing themselves in a small pocket of less than 100 square kilometres near the town of Bunagana, in the eastern part of Virunga National Park adjacent to the Ugandan and Rwandan borders. Major arms caches, apparently belonging to Ntanganda’s and Makenga’s forces, respectively including roughly 25 tons and 32 tons of arms and ammunition, were seized in May by FARDC forces. Estimates of the size of the mutinous forces vary, but generally indicate several hundred combatants since the fighting became concentrated in the Bunagana area. Almost all civilians have fled the immediate area. The FARDC have concentrated substantial forces and arms around this pocket to gain control of the mutinous force positions. We have established jointly manned defensive positions with the FARDC in key strategic locations adjacent to the area of fighting, for example, around the town of Bunagana, aimed at ensuring that potential offensive actions of the mutinous forces can not successfully extend to threaten those areas. The fighting has produced major displacements of civilians, including many who have fled across adjacent borders. In addition, the FDLR and numerous Congolese groups, including at least some previously working with Bosco Ntaganda, have sought to profit from the general increase in instability by stepping up their own activity, compounding the damaging effects on the civilian population. We have, for example, credible information regarding large-scale killings and other serious crimes committed in North and South Kivu. Those include the apparent deliberate targeting by the FDLR and a network of xenophobic domestic armed groups, generally identified as Raiya Mutomboki, of each other’s dependents, primarily unarmed women and children. Most often, those attacks occur sufficiently far from any FARDC or MONUSCO presence to minimize the prospects of intervention until after the killing is done. All of that activity has exacerbated, as well, the ongoing serious problem of rape and other forms of sexual violence. It has also greatly limited humanitarian access throughout the region, imposing further hardships on the population. We have deployed MONUSCO forces and stepped up our operations significantly throughout the affected area, and the recent addition of attack and other military helicopters has been invaluable to our response capability. Our resources have, however, been stretched to the limits attempting to cover developing hot spots, and the overall situation in North Kivu has been deteriorating. That is in dramatic contrast to the situation prior to the start of the mutiny. MONUSCO and FARDC had worked together closely early this year to plan a series of joint operations in North and South Kivu to target the FDLR and other armed groups, which included unprecedented steps to minimize the impact of those operations on civilians, establish monitoring centres and provide for humanitarian access, as well as include a stabilization operational phase, or a holding of cleared areas to prevent the return of armed groups, an action previously lacking usually. Those jointly planned operations had been under way in South Kivu in March and were showing very promising results. For example, the highest number of FDLR combatant and dependant repatriations over the last 18 months had been recorded in March, a result certainly arising from the South Kivu operations. They built on a generally increasing trend of FDLR repatriation achieved in recent months, further weakening the FDLR as a part of the overall strategy to put an end to that long-standing threat. Related North Kivu joint operations were to get under way in April with the aim of further increasing that pressure and trend. Unfortunately, both the South and the North Kivu operations were suspended as a result of the mutiny. Not surprisingly, we have seen, since the suspension, a dramatic reduction in FDLR repatriations, with further damage arising from the Ntaganda and Makenga actions. As is clear, it is important to put an end to the mutiny as soon as possible for multiple reasons. In addition to permitting the return home of large numbers of displaced civilians, that would also permit a timely resumption of coordinated efforts to target armed groups in the Kivus and southern Ituri District, including military operations. Furthermore, a variety of other related actions, including stabilization, conflict resolution and economic development programmes, all threatened by the renewed instability, should resume. All, of course, should be considered in the context of the reinforcement and augmentation of State authority throughout the region, an essential condition for basic order, security and economic and social development for the region. Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo Mapon has underscored to me his concern about the threat that the mutiny and its pernicious effects pose to his agenda of economic reform and development, as well as the obvious direct terrible effects on the civilian population. I am encouraged by the important senior-level delegation that the Prime Minister led last week to the region accompanied by a number of senior-level ministers and other officials to see for themselves what is happening and gain a better understanding of the current situation, the serious problems being faced, and the short- and longer-term options available to deal with them. I must also note, as members of the Council are aware, that there have been recent reports of support being provided to the mutinous forces from across the Rwandan border. Within MONUSCO, we have no means of independently confirming or verifying allegations of actions outside of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I will state that for obvious reasons it is very important for all actions possible to be taken to put an end to any or all external support that the mutinous forces may receive. I appeal to all Member States in the region and beyond to investigate such information as may be available to the extent possible, to make that information available to the relevant national and international bodies and to take all actions necessary to ensure that any external support is stopped. The people of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have already suffered too much and for too long, and any actions that prolong violence and armed conflict in the region must stop. In that regard, I applaud the recent establishment of the Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre in Goma under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), as well as actions by the ICGLR to monitor and control illegal regional trade in conflict minerals, and activities to promote cross-border contacts, such as the regional Governors meeting in Burundi organized by the Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries. As a final note on security threats, I will also report that the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continue to represent a threat not only to northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, but to other countries in the region as well. The overall activity of the Lord’s Resistance Army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has shown little change in recent months, with LRA attacks tending to follow small individual unit requirements, which often include kidnapping and violent attacks in addition to the looting of target villages. Regardless of trends, however, the brutal LRA actions continue to provoke enormous fear throughout the region where they operate. We have continued to work closely with the FARDC in proactive operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo designed to forestall larger-scale LRA attacks, to track and respond to LRA activity through the Joint Information and Operations Centre in Dungu, and to do all that is possible to facilitate regional coordination and information-sharing, including increasing the effectiveness of targeted programmes to promote repatriation. We have supported, and will continue to support, regional initiatives promoted by the Africa Union and supported by the United Nations Office for Central Africa to address this threat and increase coordination and information-sharing among all forces in the region as much as possible. I should also note that MONUSCO has now established a resident military presence in Bas-Uélé district, an initiative long advocated by many humanitarian agencies and shared by MONUSCO. Much of the reporting and analysis work done most recently by the joint assessment process established in 2010 under Council resolution 1925 (2010) was performed prior to the outbreak of the mutiny in the Kivus in early April. I will state, however, that in my view the process conducted by the Congolese Government and MONUSCO provides an excellent vehicle for the analysis of overall threat conditions, provides useful mechanisms for the discussion of fast-breaking developments, such as the mutiny, and furnishes an invaluable basis for decisions regarding overall deployments and other actions. Pursuant to the latest assessments, for example, we are now examining the need for a continued MONUSCO military presence in Equateur province, albeit already at modest levels, a legacy of the 2009 problems in that region. We are in frequent contact at multiple levels regarding a number of other issues and developments based on the joint assessment process, and I would strongly encourage the Council to continue authorization and support for that facility. The new institutions of Government arising from the problematic 2011 national elections have, frankly, taken longer to be established than I would have hoped. Nonetheless, the new National Assembly has now put in place new internal procedures, Assembly officers and standing committees. The officers include two members of the opposition party, the Union pour la démocratie et la progrès social, including the newly elected Assembly Second Vice-President Timothée Nkisi Kombo, and all committees include opposition representation and some presiding officers. I look forward to building MONUSCO relationships with the new National Assembly to support and facilitate their work and their understanding of MONUSCO and general United Nations programme activities. In the executive branch, the new Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo Mapon, recently assumed office and includes two members drawn from opposition parties. I, the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and other MONUSCO officials have had initial introductory meetings with a number of ministers. I look forward to continuing those contacts and relationships when I return to Kinshasa. I strongly believe that it is in the interests of all parties for MONUSCO to have a strong and ongoing dialogue with regard to programme implementation and constructive collaborative relationships, as well as good collaborative relationships with relevant Government agencies and officials. I am firmly committed to doing everything possible to ensure that is the case. While I have been here in New York, I am very pleased that Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Leila Zerrougui, was able to accompany Prime Minister Matata Ponyo Mapon and his delegation on last week’s very important trip to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I hope that trip will make an important contribution towards a continuing strong and effective partnership. The establishment of those bodies, however, underscores the fact that there are many challenges ahead for ensuring the successful conduct of the upcoming provincial and local elections. Provincial elections are needed to elect new provincial legislative bodies, which in turn are responsible for electing national senators and provincial governors. Local elections, which were never held in the initial 2006 electoral cycle, are also very important. It is clear, however, that steps are required to ensure that the problems of the 2011 exercise are not repeated. In that regard, I anticipate that a report soon expected to be presented by the Independent National Electoral Commission to the National Assembly will provide a basis for a national discussion of the past and future election process. That, in turn, could have an important impact on how things are to go forward to complete the election cycle. Major donors, other partners and the United Nations have expressed concerns about the 2011 election irregularities. The Independent National Electoral Commission itself has completed a review that includes extensive recommendations for changes to be adopted for future elections. It is entirely possible that the anticipated National Assembly debate will propose other significant recommendations. All of those recommendations will likely be critical to an assessment by donors, the Council and other partners in terms of engagement with, and support for, the provincial and local elections. It is clearly of paramount importance to have conditions in place that are conducive to credible, transparent and democratic elections. For the most part, those include actions and management by the Commission to ensure effective and timely organizational preparations, adequate checks and other procedures to prevent fraud, abuses or other irregularities, and full and complete implementation plans in place, including critical compilation and verification procedures. The Government as well will need to do everything possible to ensure free conditions for all to participate. The Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel et de la communication also needs strong and appropriate actions to facilitate full and free media access and coverage. In that regard, I salute the recent decision of Government authorities to investigate reports of serious human rights violations and other violence committed during the 2011 election process. I reiterate that we will do everything possible to facilitate and advance those investigations and associated appropriate judicial actions. Also, under the guidance of the Security Council, we will actively assess progress towards the organization of provincial and local elections to determine the appropriate and needed levels of support to achieve free and fair, credible elections. I know that major donors are also conducting their own similar assessments to determine potential future financial support. Obviously, I very much hope that the process can move forward in a timely and productive manner to achieve free and democratic elections at the earliest time practical, as such elections are clearly important for the Congolese people, for the continued consolidation of a democratic process as well as for further progress towards the achievement of the decentralization goals that the Congolese people have set for themselves. The security situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is sobering, especially in North Kivu province. It is important not to forget, however, the very important and considerable progress that has been achieved in a broad variety of areas since the transition marking the formal end of war, in particular in recent years. Clearly, it is of vital importance to recover from the security setbacks in the Kivus as soon as possible. It is also important, however, to move forward on a broader agenda aimed at addressing the key underlying causes of conflict in the eastern of the country and at ensuring much needed durable security and development throughout the country. The stabilization and general development agenda in eastern Congo has accomplished much under the general framework of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the International Security and Stabilization Support programmes. Many roads have been opened, and court facilities, police stations and other facilities have been built. But it is also important to ensure that personnel are deployed to work in those facilities, to identify and solve problems, and generally to extend and strengthen the reach of State authority and institutions. In my view, more focus needs to be placed on how fundamental land disputes and other issues underlying inter-community tensions can be resolved. As we move into a new phase of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan and, it is to be hoped, establish a parallel framework for efforts in other parts of the country under the prospective peace consolidation programme, it is right and proper that all parties review and revise as appropriate the priorities, operations and programmes being implemented. That process is already under way, and its importance is obviously complemented by the establishment of a new national Government. I look forward to the results of those reviews and to seeing how we in MONUSCO and the United Nations agencies may be more effective in realizing the mutually set goals for those programmes. I also look forward to working with the members of the new Government to look at how security sector issues can be most effectively addressed, and institutions strengthened as well. I am pleased with results from police training and related programmes, which I believe have been effective in helping expand the capacity of the Congolese National Police. In that regard, I would again appeal to all donors for additional resources that would permit us to expand and augment those programmes. Likewise, I am optimistic that the United Nations and donors can do even more to support Government programmes and priorities to build on the very encouraging progress already achieved in civilian and military justice systems. In the military area, I look forward to viewing anew with the new Government how we can even more effectively utilize our operational partnership to end security threats by armed groups as quickly as possible and to explore options for doing more to bolster and support FARDC capabilities. In that regard, I would reiterate calls on all partners to review what resources may be available to support Congolese military training, professionalism and reform programmes. Those are not small challenges. I am convinced, however, that beyond the current turmoil we see in the present security situation, there exist major opportunities and prospects for significant progress in all of those areas. I can assure the Council that I, MONUSCO and the United Nations agencies, constituting the United Nations country team presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are committed to doing everything possible towards those ends in the most effective and timely way possible. (spoke in French) Finally, I again wish to convey my sincere gratitude to the members of the Security Council and to the international community for the support that has been given to the Mission and the implementation of its mandate. The Mission and the Congolese people, which still need that support, have benefited considerably, in particular in the context of the recent worrying events that took place in the Kivus. Without that support, it would not be possible to consolidate the significant progress that has been made in recent years on the route to lasting peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I therefore count on that sustained support as well as on the support of MONUSCO personnel and of the United Nations agencies, upon which I rely greatly and whose commitment and constant efforts merit due recognition. (spoke in English) I give my thanks to them, as well as to the Security Council for its support.

I thank Mr. Meece for his briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I would like first of all to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June and to say how honoured we are to see China, a friendly country, steering the Council’s deliberations today. I would like to assure you, Sir, of my delegation’s support for the success of your very noble task, and to thank you for having given me the opportunity to address the Council at this meeting on the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), an issue of vital importance to my country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Mehdiyev of Azerbaijan, on his outstanding Security Council presidency last month. I would particularly like to thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has spared no effort in his quest for solutions to restore lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since his accession to the head of the Organization. The positive efforts of MONUSCO and of his Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Roger Meece, whose presence here I welcome, should be underscored, in particular at this time when our own sources have established beyond doubt, as MONUSCO reported at the very beginning, that Rwandan elements, estimated at between 200 and 300 men, who continue to fight within the ranks of the rebels of Bosco Ntaganda’s M-23 movement, were recruited, trained and deployed from Rwanda. That support continues since, despite the 38 tons of equipment recovered by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the insurgents’ firepower has increased since they moved closed to the Rwandan border. To return to the subject of my remarks this morning, my statement covers the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/355), the main points of which Mr. Meece has just outlined. My statement will focus on three key points, namely, MONUSCO’s mandate, the joint assessment mechanism and the restructuring of the Independent National Electoral Commission. As is often the case, the conclusion of MONUSCO’s mandate, which the Council is about to renew today, coincides with the resurgence of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as an immediate consequence of the desertion of some elements of the armed forces that came under the command of Mr. Ntaganda. He has been subject to an International Criminal Court arrest warrant since 2006. He thought that he would be able to evade it by peacefully seeking refuge within our armed forces. However, with his arrest looming, he did not hesitate to defect and launch a mutiny against the national army in a part of the country already gravely affected by the destabilizing actions of foreign and national armed groups that are raging there. As can be expected, such conflicts have caused the massive displacement of people from the affected areas within the country and to neighbouring countries. But what then is the rationale behind the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Unwavering in his resolve to support the stabilization and peacebuilding efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, when he was in Kinshasa for the fiftieth anniversary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in June 2010, the Secretary-General said that we must certainly continue to give priority to the protection of civilians, in particular women, who bear a disproportionate burden. The Secretary-General pledged to spare no effort in combating that very grave violation of fundamental rights. Today, I am pleased to note that MONUSCO’s mandate will be renewed in respect of the Secretary-General’s vision, pursuant to the spirit and the letter of resolution 1925 (2010), of 28 May 2010. The protection of civilians displaced or threatened by clashes must continue to be at the heart of the Council’s concerns. That is one of the main reasons behind the reconfiguration of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time, the Council emphasized that the protection of civilians should be the priority in deciding on the usage of available capacities and resources. It authorized MONUSCO to use all necessary means to fulfil its protection mandate, which includes the effective protection of civilians. Likewise, the idea of refocusing MONUSCO’s action on the Kivus, where foreign and national armed groups rage, must underpin any extension of the mandate of that United Nations Mission. That is our understanding of the MONUSCO mandate that the Council will renew, and the justification of the importance of the United Nations Mission to the Congolese populations in the affected areas, whether they be in Rutshuru-Lubero, Walikale-Masisi or Kitchanga in North Kivu, or in Bunyakiri-Hombo in South Kivu. In paragraph 86 of the report, the Secretary-General rightly commends the close cooperation and enhanced dialogue between the United Nations and the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities. We also commend it. However, for the Government, whose position has remained unchanged since MONUSCO’s establishment, the work of the joint assessment team, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1925 (2010), must take priority in renewing MONUSCO’s mandate. Indeed, the resolution gave the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO three major goals, with concrete results to be achieved for each. With regard to the findings of the joint assessments on the military operations and to reducing the threat posed by armed groups, the fact remains that the operations led by the FARDC, with MONUSCO’s support, have drastically reduced the operational capacities of the armed groups, even though, owing to their number, their criminal activities are still a threat to the population’s security in some of the country’s remote areas. Progress in reducing the threat against the population’s security and in improving the conditions for the Government’s handling of that security has been noted. With regard to the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Government to effectively protect the population and to increasingly take on MONUSCO’s security functions, work to provide the Democratic Republic of the Congo with effective security forces is under way and will continue. Reports of the FARDC’s reorganization, with actions to identify and to manage troops, equipment and training through the reopening of academies, schools or training centres, the reorganization of forces into regiments, the relaunching of officer training and the retraining of existing troops, are encouraging. Now is the time to ask MONUSCO to resume joint FARDC-MONUSCO operations against national or foreign armed groups. In terms of performance, from 2008 to 2012, cooperation between MONUSCO and the FARDC has proved productive. To take but one example, the Lord’s Resistance Army, which raged in Orientale province, has gone from 1,200 troops in 2008 to almost zero today. The roads from Dungu to Doruma, from Faradje to Watsa and from Dungu to Bangadi, once closed to all traffic, have now been reopened. Things have certainly changed since the insurgents who deserted the ranks of the Congolese army at the start of April turned their weapons against the regular army. Everything leads us to believe, however, that, in terms of balance of forces on the ground, the serious upheavals created by the mutiny could be totally brought under control, provided that the proven involvement in and support for the mutiny on the part of neighbouring countries ceases. Already, we should note that, from Goma to the foothills of Masisi, the Congolese army has taken up positions and calm has returned, and the rebels who crossed the national park have now moved back to the border. Be that as it may, the Government is determined to put a military end to the war in the territories occupied by the armed groups, whether Congolese and foreign, as stated by the Prime Minister and head of Government, Mr. Augustin Matata Ponyo Mapon, upon his arrival in Bunagana, North Kivu, at the head of a major Government delegation on Thursday, 7 June. With regard to the Congolese National Police, we would note the training of the border police, the deployment of police units emanating from armed groups, the retraining of police forces by MONUSCO, and the promulgation a year ago of the organic law on the organization and functioning of the National Police. With regard to improving the rule of law throughout the country through the establishment of civil administration, the guarantor of the rule of law, which is our third goal, we note that the legitimate authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo control virtually all of the territory that was once under the control of armed groups. Today, the Congolese National Police is present virtually throughout all of the liberated territories. The judicial apparatus is increasingly present and is becoming increasingly functional. New civil prosecutors have been recruited, trained and deployed in sensitive areas. Moreover, in provinces where there have been atrocities, mobile military and civilian courts have been brought in, with the support of MONUSCO, to resolve the problem of poor access to courts and tribunals in places where violations have taken place. In that respect, I should like to refer to paragraph 46 of the Secretary-General’s report. The struggle against impunity continues without leniency. Charges have been brought against members of armed groups, the National Police and the FARDC, and even against corrupt magistrates and economic operators, for serious violations of human rights, which have often resulted in long prison terms, even life imprisonment. In that respect, the Government supports the process of establishing prosecution support cells that MONUSCO launched to help the victims of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In conclusion, there is a need for us to take strategic decisions that, inter alia, allow the Government to ensure security, good governance, the consolidation of the rule of law and the economic development of the country. To do that, we are duty-bound to work together to define parameters that will allow us to draw a timetable for the disengagement of United Nations troops while the training of the Congolese army continues. More specifically, it is a matter of working on a road map devoted to an effective and tested transition from a peacekeeping operation to a peacebuilding operation, an operation for supporting the stability of the country. On a different tack, as a stabilization mandate, MONUSCO’s mandate requires a transition to economic recovery after a number of years of instability. The Democratic Republic of the Congo already has a stabilization and reconstruction plan for areas emerging from armed conflict and an International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for the province of North Kivu that extends to cover the districts of Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé in Orientale province, the province of Maniema, the district of North Tanganyika to Katanga, as well as the districts of Sud-Ubangui and Equateur in Equateur province. It is therefore natural, when considering the economic recovery and social rehabilitation and integration components of the stabilization and reconstruction programmes, to think of the need to reassess them and adapt them to the realities of the time. The regions of the north and west, while having been free of conflict, are facing the repercussions of instability in the north and east of the country. We hope that the implementation of the stabilization and reconstruction programme and the programme drafted by the United Nations country team aimed at consolidating and developing the Democratic Republic of the Congo should take into account that dimension of the matter. I now come to the restructuring of the Independent National Electoral Commission, one of the most controversial subjects, both within and outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In paragraphs 76 and 77 of his report, the Secretary-General stresses the need to restore the credibility of the Commission. I would like to reassure everyone here that the Government fully shares that concern and is about to review the Commission. Within the Commission itself, a process of self-criticism has also begun. To give greater credibility to the next elections, the Commission has adopted a series of measures, including intensifying consultations with its various partners; drafting timetables that take into account the technical and operational demands; conducting advocacy with the State and all partners for the reallocation of revenues to new expenditures dictated by operational needs; defining a vision and intensifying its consultations with stakeholders, such as media, political parties and other partners in the process; stabilizing the electoral register and making it more reliable by including those who have been omitted; reopening dialogue with the political class on the subject of the electoral register; and strengthening the criteria for recruiting and training electoral agents, and more specifically those working in polling stations and in local centres for the compilation of results. It is under that new impetus that the Commission published on 6 June the timetable for provincial, senatorial and gubernatorial elections. According to the timetable, three dates have been set aside for the holding of the various elections, which will conclude the electoral process that began on 28 November 2011 with the presidential and legislative elections. The date of 25 February 2013 has been designated for provincial elections, 5 June 2013 for senatorial elections, and 22 June 2013 for elections for governors and vice-governors of provinces. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my Government’s willingness to continue its partnership with MONUSCO with regard to military operations against armed groups, justice and the struggle against impunity, as well as in consolidating authority of the State, and in support of the future reconfiguration of MONUSCO. I would also like to reassure all interested parties that the reforms launched last year in the security sector have continued with a view to establishing a police and army that is fully able to guarantee security throughout the country and improving the already favourable conditions for the restoration of economic and social development. Likewise, I would also like to call on the international community and on friendly countries that wish to do so to come to our country to make major investment and participate in our country’s development and economic recovery. The potential of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the vivacity of its population could enable win-win cooperation. Some countries have already understood that, and we call on others to follow in their footsteps and help us along that road. Finally, when the Council is called on to take action on the extension of the MONUSCO mandate at the end of the consultations that will soon be under way, the people and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo expect it to condemn, in the strongest terms, the Bosco Ntaganda mutiny, which has disrupted our joint efforts to stabilize and consolidate peace in the Democratic Republic. The Council will also, we expect, condemn and remind States in the subregion to respect the commitments that they freely agreed to  — that would be justice.

There are no further names inscribed on my list. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.