S/PV.6955 Security Council

Under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia to participate in this meeting. Under rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting. On behalf of the Security Council, I welcome the presence at this meeting of His Excellency Mr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2013/239, which contains a letter dated 19 April 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting the results of the Secretary-General’s technical assessment mission to Somalia, pursuant to resolution 2093 (2013). I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on recent developments in Somalia and on the findings of the technical assessment mission, as requested in resolution 2093 (2013). I shall start with a brief political update. The Federal Government of Somalia has continued implementing its six-pillar policy for stabilization and peacebuilding in the country. Notably, it has been reaching out beyond Mogadishu in an effort to realize its vision for a federal State of Somalia. The agreement between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somaliland administration to continue dialogue and increase cooperation, signed earlier this month, is a welcome step forward. Similarly, Prime Minister Shirdon’s listening tour — aimed at building trust and consensus between Mogadishu, existing regional administrations and fledgling ones — marks an important step in the national reconciliation and federal State-building process. However, the Government’s approach to building new regional administrations is not accepted by all. An interim draft charter to establish a so-called Jubaland state in southern Somalia was ratified by representatives from three regions on April 2 and is expected to result in the election of a president for Jubaland state in the coming days. While the draft charter envisages Jubaland state as part of the federal system, the Federal Government regards it as unconstitutional, and efforts to find a compromise have reached an impasse. A great deal more work is needed to tackle the inevitable challenges that will arise in the development of a federal system in Somalia. There have been several alarming reminders of the fragile security situation inside Somalia. On 17 March, Al-Shabaab retook the town of Hudur hours after Ethiopian National Defence Forces withdrew. Multiple suicide bombings carried out by Al-Shabaab have claimed the lives of innocent Somali civilians in Mogadishu. The most recent, on 14 April, involved several coordinated attacks, including a double suicide bombing at the regional court in the capital. More than 50 people were reportedly killed. The courthouse attacks were more sophisticated and coordinated than the previous attacks in Somalia, indicating external support, but have so far failed to undermine the optimism that permeates Mogadishu. However, they underscore the need to rapidly strengthen security in Somalia. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is reaching its operational limit in terms of holding and expanding areas under its control. Innovative thinking is required to address that challenge. Additional resources, including enablers and force multipliers, as well as the means to reconfigure the AMISOM forces, are required if it is to maintain the impressive momentum of the past year. The anticipated withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces will add further strain. We remain concerned about the clear challenges faced by AMISOM and the Somali national forces in their current state. A better funded and coordinated strategic approach that recognizes that well-trained and equipped Somali forces are the ultimate exit strategy for international military operations in Somalia is required by the international community. The United Nations has continued dialogue with the Federal Government, as well as the countries of the region and partner organizations. This week, I spoke with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. We discussed the importance of developing mutually reinforcing working relations with Somalia’s neighbours. Today, the Secretary-General and I had constructive meetings with Mr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, who is here with us today, where we underscored the important role that Ethiopia is playing in ensuring stability in Somalia. We urged close coordination between the Ethiopians and AMISOM regarding Ethiopia’s planned withdrawal of its forces from Somalia. I have also been in contact with the African Union and the European Union to ensure a coherent approach to our support to Somalia. The United Nations continues to work with the Federal Government and local authorities in Somalia to establish a new United Nations mission to support peacebuilding and state-building, as requested in resolution 2093 (2013). We are now very clear as to how the United Nations should support the Government through 2016. In his letter to the Council (see S/2013/239, annex), the Secretary-General has outlined his vision for a new United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNAMSOM) — the vehicle that is designed to deliver that support. For that and other reasons, the Mission’s core role will be to act as an enabler, helping to create and to galvanize the political and strategic environment in which stabilization and peacebuilding can proceed, including by leveraging other parts of the United Nations system and international partners. Substantively, the Mission will have four key areas of focus. It will provide good offices, support reconciliation efforts and assist with the mediation of the politically sensitive challenges associated with the constitutional review and the question of federalism. It will help to build national capacities in the rule of law and the security sector and in the protection and promotion of human rights at all levels of society. It will also seek to enhance the Government’s lead in coordinating international assistance efforts through the framework of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Through joint task teams, the Mission will also work with the country team and other partners on urgent issues, such as stabilization in the newly recovered areas, maritime issues, economic triggers of violence and capacity development. The guiding principles outlined by the Secretary- General will be critical to the success of UNAMSOM and, indeed, of the United Nations system as a whole in Somalia. Building Somali capacity and supporting Somali leadership will be central to our efforts to strengthen the peace process. In the longer run, we hope that it will be Somali solutions that will bring an end to conflict and determine the best models for Somalia’s development. That is at the heart of the new United Nations Mission’s approach. The new mission will need to be agile, flexible and mobile to respond and adapt to evolving priorities. The limited space and resources and the challenging security environment mean that the mission will have a limited number of permanent residential staff. However, it will need the resources to bring in specialized experts to support emerging priorities. It will also need a concept of support and a range of security options to enable the United Nations to work side by side with Somalis, including in Villa Somalia. Such a model may be expensive given the security environment of Somalia but, for the United Nations to be relevant, it will require the strong support of the Council, in particular, and of Member States, in general. Collaboration and partnership will also be critical. The Mission will rely on the United Nations country team to bring programmatic support to the political and strategic advice that it will provide, while ensuring that the humanitarian space is protected. Joint leadership and planning teams will guide the work associated with the United Nations presence in Somalia. The Mission will also have a core pillar of analysts and planners, who will provide a multiplier effect, working to integrate the Mission’s capacity and that of the country team and to link those capacities with what AMISOM and other partners would provide. We look forward to strengthening our new strategic partnerships with the African Union and AMISOM through the new mission. We acknowledge that both organizations play essential roles in supporting Somalia’s peacebuilding in all its aspects. We are committed to realizing the synergies between those roles and the United Nations Mission. UNAMSOM and AMISOM planners will meet as soon as the new mission is up and running to work out the parameters of our practical partnership on the ground. As in so many areas, the United Nations partnership with the African Union is vital to our ability to achieve our objectives. We look forward to ongoing cooperation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, as well. The United Nations will require a strong level of commitment from the international community if UNAMSOM is to succeed in the coordination role envisaged by the Council in resolution 2093 (2013). That means a clear commitment to working coherently and patiently to allow the Federal Government to develop its plans and build its capacities. The current spectre of fragmented and duplicative efforts at international assistance is inefficient and could be counterproductive. It risks overwhelming the nascent national capacity. The President of Somalia has told us that. We are hopeful that the conference to be held in London next month and other meetings scheduled in Brussels and Tokyo later in the year will help us to agree on a framework for future coordination. The new mission represents a fresh start for the United Nations in Somalia and a renewed commitment by the Council to support Somali-owned peacebuilding. Results will not be achieved overnight. If we are genuinely committed to Somali leadership, we must be prepared to let Somalis set the timelines, as well as the priorities, and to keep our expectations realistic. However, we firmly believe that the design of the new mission is grounded in real needs and a well-thought- out analysis of the objective reality in Somalia today, as well as in the great goodwill that exists in the international community. With the Council’s support, we believe that we can help continue to move that daunting agenda forward.

I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of Somalia.

I thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this meeting on Somalia and, in particular, on the assessment report on which we have just been briefed (see S/2013/239, annex). I thank the Council for inviting me to address it today. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General for his briefing. On behalf of my Government, I also thank the assessment team that prepared the report. It is one of the best reports I have ever seen. It is clear, it is factual, and it prescribes the medicine Somalia needs right now to get out of the predicament that it is in. I also thank the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Governments of countries that have saved us from Al-Shabaab, in particular our brothers and sisters from Africa. AMISOM has done a good job, and I believe it is now time to ensure that the Somali National Security Forces are able in due course to take over the responsibilities of clearing Al-Shabaab out of all parts of Somalia, thereby providing stability and security for the country. I would also take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for our brother, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, who is here with us. This is the first time I have met him, and I am honoured to do so. I believe that Somalia has passed through many stages. We are now at a time when we can see the light at the end of the tunnel. We hope that the contents of the report will be realized through the full support of the Security Council, and the sooner, the better. Furthermore, I believe that most of the findings and recommendations on the many issues in the report are consonant with what our President set forth in his six-pillar policy as soon as he was elected. The report therefore is very much in accord with what the Government of Somalia believes in and wishes to see realized as soon as possible. I thank the Security Council and the members of the Council who asked the Secretary-General to undertake the assessment.

I give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Mr. President, let me start by thanking you for this opportunity to address the Security Council. As the new Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, I am delighted — really pleased — to make my maiden statement to the Security Council under the presidency of Rwanda, a country which not long ago came out of a horrendous tragedy, quickly stood on its feet and got to where it is now — a beacon of hope for our Africa. Let me also express appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report (S/2013/239, annex). I would also like to thank the Security Council for having begun a process of very fruitful cooperation with the African Union Peace and Security Council, which we hope will continue to be strengthened; there is, undoubtedly, ample room for doing so. I also wish to thank the Security Council for having adopted resolution 2093 (2013), which, among other things, requested the Secretary-General to urgently field a technical assessment mission to Somalia with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the new approach to United Nations support for Somalia set forth in that resolution. I also wish to thank the members of the technical assessment mission for what is, in our judgment, a very useful report. The report has addressed all the relevant issues the mission was called upon to look at. The mission’s assessment of the overall political and security environment and of the humanitarian situation in Somalia is both comprehensive and valid. The report could not have put it better when, in describing the political environment, it says that it is “extremely complex, but there are also impressive capacities for peace and dialogue” (S/2013/239, annex, para. 5). We fully agree that the “strong political will of the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia to rebuild their war-torn society bodes well for the peacebuilding and State-building process” (ibid.). The assessment also highlights a critical achievement that had eluded Somalia for more than 20 years when it states quite correctly that the “Government has considerable legitimacy and inspires hope and optimism” (ibid.). Indeed, the Government’s legitimacy can only be enhanced when it is in a position to provide services to society, thereby strengthening its credibility. The report also underlines the challenges the Federal Government of Somalia is facing, which consist mostly of security issues. In that regard, the assessment manages to reflect the situation on the ground as objectively as possible, for example, when it says that “Somalia is a country in which the international community is seeking to make and build peace in the context of ongoing war and active counter- insurgency operations” (ibid., para. 6). The report also underlines — correctly, in our view — that, although the “struggle against Al-Shabaab has turned a corner… it is far from over” (ibid.). We are also very convinced that the principles underlined by the technical assessment mission as a guide for its work — namely, Somali national ownership, and collaboration and partnership with various actors, particularly the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), inter alia — are indeed critical, and that is also what common sense would counsel. Obviously, in the light of the foregoing, and taking into account both the opportunities, which are immense, and the challenges, it appears that a more serious and stronger effort must be made in order to ensure that the momentum gained in Somalia is not only maintained, but accelerated. That is particularly necessary in the security area. It cannot be denied that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) needs greater support, particularly in terms of “additional enablers and force multipliers” (ibid., para. 46). In fact, as the technical assessment mission says in the report, AMISOM, whose support is critical to ensuring the security of the new assistance mission in Somalia, will not, in many instances, be in a position to provide such services within the existing troop ceiling. The Secretary-General reminds the Council in his report of his earlier recommendation with respect to the option of deploying a United Nations or joint African Union-United Nations peacekeeping operation. But he has introduced a caveat by saying that the matter should be taken up “as conventional combat operations against Al-Shabaab end” (ibid.). We feel that more can be done in that regard, and in our judgment, there is no reason why the two proposed options should not be examined immediately, with a view to speeding up the implementation of one of them. But even more critical is ensuring that everything necessary is done to support the Somali National Security Forces so that they can achieve the capacity to play their proper role in maintaining peace and security throughout the country. In our opinion, that is doable if support is provided by Member States on the basis of an integrated approach and not, as pointed out by the technical assessment mission and reiterated in the report of the Secretary-General, in a fragmented manner. In that regard, I wish to highlight paragraph 22 of resolution 2093 (2013), on supporting the Government’s efforts to manage and coordinate international assistance, particularly in the security sector. It appears to us that the way to proceed is to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the Somali National Security Forces are up and running, including in terms of providing security for a new United Nations mission and avoiding resort to the use of international private security companies. The proposal by the assessment mission in that regard might need to be examined carefully. All this is an argument for doing more to ensure that the Somali National Security Forces are given all the necessary support to handle security throughout the country. That is also what we ourselves have been trying to contribute in practice. Let me before closing refer to one issue that is related to the role of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces and to what the technical assessment mission has referred to as their announced withdrawal from Hudur and their anticipated withdrawal from Baidoa. There has been some misperception concerning this matter which requires explanation. The question of lack of consultation or absence of prior notification on the part of Ethiopia is absolutely groundless. Those who need to know were informed many months prior to the withdrawal. There is no misunderstanding here. What happened does not in any way signify any shirking of responsibility on Ethiopia’s part, though the question of burden-sharing is something that has always been a source of concern for us. But more important was whether Ethiopian forces were deployed in a way that added value in terms of addressing the major threat to the encouraging momentum that has been created in Somalia. Our conclusion was that they were not, but that is in no way related to any diminished commitment on Ethiopia’s part to continue being a factor for peace and stability in Somalia. But again, as I said earlier, the question of burden-sharing and the issue related to the effective use of available forces is something to which we attach great importance. These are issues that we would be ready to discuss with stakeholders. We feel that we have come a long way in Somalia. Not keeping up the momentum is not an option. It is our earnest hope that the new approach and the new mission in Somalia will help to further strengthen the foundation for sustainable peace in Somalia, which no doubt will require, first of all, ensuring that the security environment continues to improve. Both IGAD and the African Union are ready to continue their full cooperation with the Security Council to ensure that that happens. It is our hope that there will be a similar commitment on the part of both the Security Council and the Secretariat to deepen cooperation with the African Union. When everything is said and done, what is critical in the end is that no support will produce results unless it is based on the priorities set by the Government and unless ownership by the Somali Government is respected.

There are no more speakers inscribed on my list. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.