S/PV.7028 Security Council

As this is the first meeting of the Council for the month of September, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to Her Excellency Mrs. María Cristina Perceval, Permanent Representative of the Argentina, for her service as President of the Security Council for the month of August. I know that I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Perceval and her delegation for the skill, perseverance and good humour with which they conducted the Council’s business last month. They have set a very high benchmark. Adoption of the agenda

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I shall now give a briefing in my capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). I have the honour to present the report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), in accordance with paragraph 18 (h) of that resolution. The present report covers the period from 16 July to 5 September, during which time the Committee held two informal meetings and conducted additional work using the no-objection procedure envisaged by paragraph 15 of the guidelines for the conduct of its work. I am happy to report that the Committee adopted, on 9 August, its programme of work for the period of 1 July to 31 December 2013, which was brought to the Council’s attention on the same date. During this period, the Committee continued to consider the recommendations made by the Panel of Experts in its final report (S/2013/331, annex). The Committee, which shares the objective of improving the implementation of Security Council measures, has made progress in reviewing those recommendations and considering whether to take practical steps to implement them. To date, however, none of those recommendations has been approved by the Committee. The Committee invited the special representative of INTERPOL to brief us, at our informal consultations on 25 July, on cooperation between INTERPOL and other Sanctions Committees in promoting the implementation of Security Council measures. The Committee is now debating whether it should sign an agreement with INTERPOL to apply INTERPOL special notices to disseminate information to Member States regarding the Council’s targeted sanctions list. Some Committee members have said, however, that they do not favour signing an agreement. The Permanent Representative for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Khazaee, called on me at his request on 1 August to discuss that issue. We continued our discussion on whether and how to respond to the Panel’s compilation of publicly available statements made by Iranian officials and alleged recipients of Iranian military assistance, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hizbullah, regarding potential violations of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007). In that compilation, the Panel includes quotes from officials who spoke of transfers from Iran; some officials spoke of transfers that are prohibited by paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007). As requested by the Committee, the Panel continued to collect information on the matter regarding such transfers and submitted additional information to the Committee that the Panel coordinator said was “submitted following the request of the Committee to provide any information additional to the compilation of public statements of transfers of arms to Gaza by Iran”. We are studying that information carefully. At my previous briefing to the Council in July (see S/PV.6999), I informed members that the Committee was considering an appropriate response to the United Nations Compensation Commission relating to the release of funds for two environmental claims to Iran. The Committee responded, on 24 July, to inform the Commission that the release of funds was not prohibited by the resolutions. In July, I undertook to provide an update on our follow-up to the Panel’s unanimous conclusion that Iran’s launches of Shahab-1 and — 3 missiles during the Great Prophet VII exercises contravened paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010). A number of Committee members continued to express the view, as confirmed by the Panel of Experts, that the launches constituted a clear violation of resolution 1929 (2010), and that therefore all Member States should redouble their efforts to implement ballistic missile-related sanctions on Iran. At the present stage, some Committee members cannot share that view. Iran still has not responded to the Committee’s letter of 12 April on that matter, despite the effort of the President of the Security Council to reach out to the Iranian Mission on 28 June on its intentions regarding the letter. I had my own opportunity to raise the matter directly with Iran’s Permanent Representative during his call on me on 1 August. Unfortunately, he could not give me any indication as to whether an answer would be forthcoming. I also asked him about Iran’s intentions to respond to the Committee’s letter of 21 May, which had sought Iran’s comment on another Panel report, this time concluding that an intercepted arms shipment was, at the very least, a probable violation by Iran of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007). Again, he was unable to advise whether Iran intended to reply; and, to date, Iran has not replied. On both issues, the Committee remains actively engaged in discussing next steps. I would like to reiterate the Committee’s hope that Iran will answer those communications as soon as possible. The Committee intends to continue to consider its options for action in response to each of those incidents and will provide an update in its next 90-day report to the Council. I am happy to inform representatives that the Committee continues to receive information from States related to actions taken to implement the relevant Security Council measures. By a letter dated 12 July, a State forwarded preliminary information concerning the interception of valves destined for Iran. Another State, by a letter dated 1 August, transmitted a report on shipments confiscated by its authorities during the first half of this year and on measures taken to prevent the transit of shipments to Iran that were suspected of containing prohibited items. Such information is very useful to the Committee and its Panel of Experts, which is currently investigating those cases. I would like to take this opportunity to encourage all Member States to transmit relevant information regarding the implementation of the Council’s measures. Through the Focal Point for Delisting, the Committee has received additional information from the First East Export Bank, an entity that is currently on the Committee’s consolidated list, and whose request for delisting is on the Committee’s agenda. The Committee will carefully study the information and will take it fully into account when considering the delisting request. During the reporting period, the Committee received one notification with reference to paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006) concerning the delivery of a video unit for use in the monitoring system of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. That is the end of my report. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your briefing and your leadership of this important Committee. Congratulations on a great first few days as President of the Council. Like others here, the United States hopes that the inauguration of President Rouhani creates an opportunity for Iran to act quickly to resolve the international community’s serious concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions. Unfortunately, we have not yet seen any clear signs that Iran is committed to addressing the most pressing concerns about its nuclear programme. On the contrary, recent developments trouble us. Just last week, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Amano, reported that Iran was continuing to march forward with its prohibited nuclear activities. The Director General stated that “the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation”. That is a conclusion we have heard repeatedly from the IAEA. Rather than taking steps to meet the obligations imposed by the Security Council, Iran is installing advanced centrifuges that may be two to three times more efficient at enriching uranium than its current centrifuges. The Director General also reported that Iran is continuing to add to its stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran’s expanded enrichment, its construction of the IR-40 heavy-water reactor at Arak and other examples raised by the Director General not only violate multiple Security Council resolutions, they move us further away from a negotiated solution. Later this month, the IAEA will hold a new round of talks with Iran. At the talks we strongly encourage Iran to adopt a cooperative and transparent approach with the IAEA. In the meantime, and until concrete progress has been made, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) must step up its efforts to improve the implementation of sanctions. In recent months, its work has not kept pace with the threat. As the President indicated, we were disappointed to find that, despite the best efforts of the Chair to find consensus, the Committee often fails to take even routine steps to implement its technical mandate. That must change. As a first step, the Committee should implement the recommendations contained in the May 2013 final report of the Panel of Experts (S/2013/331, annex). The recommendations are reasonable. If implemented, they would provide clarity and guidance to States about aspects of the sanctions. The Committee should also sign an agreement with INTERPOL to help disseminate information about individuals subject to targeted sanctions. Other Sanctions Committees routinely take such measures to implement the Council’s resolutions. In this Committee, however, some members have politicized such actions and prevented the Committee from doing its job. Even more critical, the Committee must improve its ability to respond to Iran’s sanctions violations. It should immediately respond to Iran’s July 2012 ballistic missile launches, which were a clear violation of resolution 1929 (2010). An effective response to that violation would include new targeted sanctions on those responsible. The Committee should also follow up vigorously on violations involving Iran’s attempts to procure proliferation-sensitive items. A failure to address those and other violations would undermine the Council’s credibility and authority. In line with its mandate, the Committee must do more to address Iran’s arms smuggling. Its steady supply of weapons and military support to extremist groups clearly violates resolution 1747 (2007). In addition to violating sanctions, such assistance directly threatens stability in Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and other regions. Needless to say, Iran’s longstanding military support of the Al-Assad regime is, under the current circumstances, simply unconscionable. Even in the light of Iran’s troubling actions, we remain convinced that principled diplomacy is still the best tool to achieve a comprehensive and peaceful solution to the international community’s serious concerns. We would welcome a constructive sign that Iran may be prepared to engage substantively and seriously with the international community. If Iran chooses to do so, it will find a willing partner in the United States. We hope that Iran’s new leadership chooses that path. Until Iran decides to meet its obligations, the Committee’s work remains critical to the diplomacy of holding Iran accountable to the Council and to the broader international community.

I would first like to thank Argentina for its efforts in presiding over the Council for the month of August. And I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency for September, and to wish you success in our work this month. I would also like to thank you, Sir, for your briefing in your capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), and to commend you for your efforts on behalf of the Committee. China has always greatly valued and supported the work of the Committee and will continue to cooperate closely with it in advancing all aspects of that work in a pragmatic, orderly and steady way, aimed at the comprehensive, balanced implementation of the resolution. While all parties have an obligation to implement the resolution accurately and in earnest, sanctions are not the resolution’s fundamental objective or the criteria for judging the Committee’s work. China has always believed that the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts should help the parties to build confidence, carry on dialogue and negotiations and facilitate the diplomatic process of settlement. The Committee’s work concerning individual cases where violations are suspected is very sensitive. All parties involved should carry out their work and make decisions based on the merits of the facts and in a pragmatic, objective and cautious manner. China will continue to abide by those principles and to participate actively and responsibly in the work. Finding a peaceful negotiated settlement to the Iranian issue through dialogue is the only correct and viable path. China has always opposed the use or threat of use of force, and is not in favour of putting excessive pressure on Iran or taking new sanctions measures against it. The current situation in the area is increasingly complicated, and against that background all parties should continue to make efforts to maintain and promote a process of dialogue and to find a negotiated and appropriate settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue. This is extremely important to maintaining peace in the Middle East and preventing further turbulence in the situation. All the parties should therefore seize the moment and mobilize every possible favourable factor with the aim of holding a new round of talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, while expanding consensus and taking due account of the consent of all parties. China has taken note of the latest report (GOV/2013/40) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and encourages cooperation between Iran and the Agency, so that all can work together to achieve positive results in a new round of negotiations, to begin on 27 September. China has always taken an objective, responsible and fair approach to this issue and will continue to work with all sides to seek a settlement of the nuclear issue by diplomatic means.

First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of September and reiterate my delegation’s full willingness to work constructively with you and support you during your presidency. I would also like to thank you for the submission of the quarterly report on the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and for your leading role in chairing it. Argentina has a firm and historic commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and believes that the international community should support the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its cornerstone, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time, my country reiterates the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop their research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. That is a principled position that we have expressed in this and other relevant forums. In that context, we maintain a robust and peaceful nuclear programme that has made us leaders in the field in our region. We have received the most recent report (GOV/2013/40) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), dated 28 August 2013, and continue to share his assessment of and concern about the lack of progress in providing clarity on the outstanding issues. We consider it essential that Iran actively cooperate with the Agency and provide all required information about its nuclear programme by providing access to all the necessary areas to allow for effective verification. In that regard, we believe it is important that Iran take the necessary steps to fully implement its obligations, including the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and restore the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We remain convinced that it is essential to continue to seek a solution through talks that provide certainty about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We therefore encourage the parties to continue their efforts to that end in a responsible manner and without preconditions. We also reiterate that Iran must adopt and implement the so-called structured approach to resolve the outstanding issues, in accordance with the call by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution of September 2012 (GOV/2012/50). While we regret that no concrete results have been achieved thus far, we hope that the new round of negotiations between Iran and the IAEA, scheduled for 27 September, will make it possible to achieve substantive progress aimed at finalizing the structured approach document in order to begin the process of clarifying outstanding issues. With regard to the work of the Committee, I would like to thank the Panel of Experts for its final report (S/2013/331, annex) and the recommendations made, which we fully support. While we highlight the swift publication of the report as an official document of the Council, we hope that the Committee will continue to consider the recommendations and other outstanding issues. Finally, let me reiterate my country’s position on the importance of improving the quality of the list of persons and entities subject to sanctions. We understand that it is essential that States provide, on a voluntary basis, additional information to enable the accurate identification of such persons and entities, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the measures imposed on Iran.

At the outset, I would like to join others, Mr. President, in wishing you every success in your presidency of the Security Council and thank you for the quarterly report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), which you have just presented. The report shows, if anyone still doubted it, that Iran continues to refuse to comply with its international obligations. It continues its prohibited nuclear and missile activities and its arms transfers, which are illicit under Council resolutions. We are particularly concerned by Iran’s repeated violations, especially in the Middle East, of the arms embargo set out in resolution 1747 (2007). Those violations contribute to weakening a region that is already plagued by violence and instability. During our most recent debate on the subject (see S/PV.6999), held in July, I stressed that the seizure of a large shipment of Iranian weapons off the coast of Yemen last February was worrying. The report of the Panel of Experts on that incident noted that the quantity and quality of the weapons seized  — man- portable air defence systems, rocket launchers and explosives  — could seriously undermine the political process under way in Yemen. The Committee’s Panel of Experts, whose work should be welcomed, also continued its research on shipments of Iranian weapons to non-State groups in Gaza. It provided the Committee with an additional document containing information that was also very worrying, showing that the weapons used by those non-State groups against Israel were indeed of Iranian origin. Similarly, the Committee has repeatedly looked into incidents of arms shipments from Iran to Syria, where Iranian agents help the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in committing atrocities, as we are all well aware. Iran is also pursuing its ballistic missile programme, in violation of resolution 1929 (2010). In July 2012, it fired Shahab-1 and — 3 ballistic missiles during the Great Prophet VII military exercise. The Panel of Experts investigated the matter, and its report confirmed without a doubt that there had been a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010). We call on the Committee, which has all the information necessary to declare this an infringement, to draw the necessary conclusions. Faced with all those provocations, the Committee has sought to establish a dialogue with Iran by sending letters, if only to hear its side of the story. Iran has never responded. The Committee also has a report by the Experts that includes a series of operational recommendations to improve the implementation of the sanctions that we have agreed on. The Committee must now take concrete measures to that effect, be it by helping countries to better target materials that could be used by Iran for its nuclear programme or by naming the entities involved in violations. All of the incidents that I have just mentioned have taken place within the larger context of Iran’s lack of cooperation with the international community. On 28 August 2013, the Director General of the IAEA presented a report (GOV/2013/40)on the implementation of safeguards in Iran. The report once again shows that Tehran is continuing to choose the path of defiance rather than dialogue, and confirms the continuation of the overall direction of Iran’s nuclear programme. The enrichment of uranium to 3.5 per cent and 20 per cent at the Natanz and Fordow sites continues in an alarming manner, with an ever-increasing number of increasingly sophisticated centrifuges. The accelerated construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak that will be capable of producing plutonium also continues, in violation of Security Council resolutions. The reactor vessel is now in place, and Iran has a sufficient amount of heavy water for it to begin operating. Finally, the dialogue on the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme has not made any progress. November will be the second anniversary of the report of the Director General of the IAEA on the subject. Eighteen months after discussions were launched, no agreement has been reached with Iran. The work done on the Parchin site, to which IAEA has been requesting access for 18 months, poses a real obstacle to the Agency’s verification work. The group of six remains united in its efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian proliferation crisis. We also agree on the strategy to be adopted based on the balanced proposals that we made ​to Iran in Almaty. We will meet again in New York on the sidelines of the General Assembly on 26 September to continue our dialogue. We understand the expectations that have been generated by the establishment of a new Government in Tehran. We also have expectations, and we remain open to constructive dialogue that will allow us to resolve this serious proliferation crisis. But given such a serious threat, we cannot be satisfied by the declarations of intent by the new authorities in Iran. In order to be sincere, the Iranian declarations must be translated into action; otherwise, our international pressure on Iran will be maintained. Respect for the international regime on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the maintenance of international peace and security are at stake.

We congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month and wish you success in your endeavours. We also thank you for presenting the 90-day report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). We take note of the recent report (GOV/2013/40) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the implementation in Iran of the safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue is both possible and necessary. Such a solution must also be anchored in dialogue and negotiations. We welcome the recent positive overtures and statements. We hope that the new Government of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) can resume their diplomatic engagement as early as possible to find ways of resolving outstanding issues. Demonstrations of political will and flexibility by all concerned will be required, as well as mutual confidence-building measures. A negotiated solution can and should be facilitated by striking a balance between sanctions and negotiations. Iran, as a party to the NPT and the IAEA, is entitled to certain rights that should be respected, in line with the provisions of those instruments. At the same time, Iran should fulfil its legal obligations under those instruments. We urge Iran to stay engaged with the IAEA and extend its full cooperation to it, with a view to addressing the remaining issues. As other Council members have continued to point out, the work of the Panel of Experts and its activities should conform strictly to its mandate. Its reports, analyses and recommendations must be based on objectivity and impartiality and backed by solid evidence. Their findings and reports will carry the weight they deserve when they enjoy consensus within the Panel. At the same time, the 1737 Committee should also adhere to high standards of neutrality and professionalism. Security Council sanctions should not be pursued as an end in themselves. Neither should sanctions negatively impact legitimate trade activity. The Council needs to support a negotiated solution to the unresolved issues. We once again urge the Council and the 1737 Committee to re-evaluate the objectives and strategy as set out in the relevant resolutions. Finally, the Council and the Committee will only benefit by broadening the composition of the Panel, particularly with members from developing countries. The Secretariat must consult all Council members prior to the commencement of the appointment, or reappointment, of experts. The principle of transparency in recruiting must also be fully complied with.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your briefing today on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). I commend your leadership of that important Committee. Iran’s nuclear programme remains a source of deep concern for the international community. The latest report (GOV/2013/40) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates that the number of Iran’s centrifuges and its stockpile of enriched uranium continue to increase, in contravention of the relevant Security Council and IAEA resolutions. Iran is still uncooperative in resolving issues related to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme, including access to the Parchin site. It is also disappointing that, despite 10 rounds of talks between the IAEA and Iran since January 2012, an agreement has not been reached on the structured approach document. Some have expressed hopeful expectations that the new Government in Iran will bring positive change to the stagnant political negotiations. However, others have expressed concern that such expectations are prematurely optimistic. The new Government may need some time to meet the hopes of the international community. Iran needs to realize the necessity of regaining the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme through credible actions. The next round of talks with the IAEA, in late September, will provide a timely opportunity for Iran to show its sincerity. We hope that the new Government will cooperate with the IAEA and make substantial progress. We also call upon the new Government to respond more constructively to the current proposal of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. Turning to the Committee’s work, we are concerned that pending issues — such as the July 2012 ballistic missile launches, the transfer of arms to Yemen and military support to Gaza  — still remain under discussion without progress. It is regrettable that the Committee has not received any response from Iran to the letters it had sent in April and May concerning those pending issues. As a Member State of the United Nations, Iran should fully cooperate with the Committee by responding to those letters promptly and sincerely. At the same time, the Committee must not await such responses in perpetuity. We expect the Committee members to discuss ways to move forward on those matters. It is the Committee’s primary responsibility to respond to such violations. The Committee’s inaction on violations will undermine the authority and credibility of the Council. In the same vein, we reiterate that the Committee should properly implement the recommendations of the Panel of Experts. The Panel’s final report (S/2013/331, annex) provides a clear picture of the sophisticated methods that Iran uses to evade sanctions and procure items from abroad for its prohibited programmes. The Panel’s recommendations are effective countermeasures against those illicit activities and are designed to help Member States better implement the resolutions. Finally, we consider it desirable that the Committee expand cooperation with other United Nations agencies and international institutions. INTERPOL’s special notice system has already benefited many Sanctions Committees, as noted in resolution 1699 (2006). We hope that the Committee can reach a positive conclusion on the matter.

Allow me to begin by thanking the Argentine delegation for steering the work of the Council during the month of August and to congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Council for the month of September. My delegation also thanks you for your informative briefing and your work at the helm of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as well as the work of your team. With respect to today’s briefing, it is difficult to find anything new to contribute, not only because of the particularly short time period covered by the report and the lack of cooperation on the part of the Iranian Government, but also due to the minimal progress that has been made. While the topic is highly politically sensitive, we regret the stalemate in considering the recommendations set out in the Panel of Experts’ final report (S/2013/331, annex), submitted in May, which my delegation supports. We also support the Committee’s programme of work for the period 1 July to 31 December, which was adopted on 9 August. It would appear that, today, the problem does not involve publishing final reports as Security Council documents but, rather, the Committee taking action based on the reports’ recommendations. We would urge all members to redouble their efforts in order to reach a consensus on the recommendations contained in the final report. We hope that in upcoming informal meetings, it will be possible to agree on possible steps to be taken in order to implement the recommendations. With regard to the question of public statements attributed to Iranian officials and the alleged beneficiaries of Iranian weapons transfers, as the Council will recall, my delegation expressed its reservations about taking action within the Committee based on information collected from the media and without taking into account additional testimony of the Panel of Experts, based on exhaustive investigation into the matter, including the verification of facts. We take note of the additional information, and are prepared to consider it in an objective manner. In that regard, as indicated by other delegations in the context of discussions of similar incidents in other sanctions committees, while my delegation supports any action taken by the Committee and Panel of Experts to investigate all notifications of alleged violations of sanctions, we do believe it necessary to carefully analyse whether or not the news provided by the media is a good basis for such action. My delegation finds it difficult to accord the same degree of seriousness and credibility to information obtained from the press or the Internet as that obtained by an in-depth and broad investigation into matters. We consider it important to reach agreement on a consistent approach through the different subsidiary bodies of the Security Council. We note the concerns expressed in the recent report (GOV/2013/40) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the implementation of the safeguards regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The report again indicates that Iran is not cooperating as necessary and that pending issues, including those related to a possible military dimension of its nuclear programme, remain unresolved. The lack of results and progress in the dialogue between Iran and the IAEA, despite 10 rounds of talks with the Agency since January 2012, remains a source of frustration and concern for the international community. We again urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to adopt measures for the full application of its Safeguards Agreement and other obligations and commitments undertaken under the NPT, especially with regard to opening itself to inspections and to reaching an agreement on a structured approach. We take note of the round of conversations planned for late September and ask the new Government to take advantage of that opportunity to send a signal of good faith through real and specific advances in its discussions with the Agency.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your presentation of the report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). We recognize your committed work as Chair of that subsidiary body of the Security Council. The report shows that the 1737 Committee continues to work hard; however, we also note the absence of progress on a number of cases of which the Committee is seized. It is regrettable that, despite the efforts of the Chair of that Committee, none of the recommendations in the final report of the Panel of Experts has yet been adopted. Those recommendations were nevertheless balanced. They had been presented unanimously by the Panel of Experts, whose exemplary work I commend. The implementation of the recommendations would allow us to make the sanctions regime more operational. We must continue to ensure that the Committee pursues its consideration thereof. Another important issue is the firing of Shahab-1 and-3 ballistic missiles during the Great Prophet VII military exercises. More than a year has gone by since that flagrant violation of the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010) took place. It is time for the Committee to adopt the required measures. The absence of any response to the letter sent to the Iranian authorities should not serve as a pretext for inaction. It is a question of credibility. The same reasoning applies to the interception on 23 January of the Jihan, a vessel that was transporting arms to Yemen. The absence of a reply to the letter sent in May to the Iranian authorities does not exempt the Committee from continuing to work to adopt appropriate measures in response to that effort to avoid the sanctions regime, especially since such a delivery of arms could further destabilize a region that is already in a precarious situation. Such potential regional instability also leads us to be concerned by Iranian leaders’ public statements about the delivery of arms to Gaza. On that issue, we have enough information, gathered by the Panel of Experts, to request clarifications from the Iranian authorities. Today’s briefing by the Chair of the 1737 Committee referred to the very useful briefing of the Special Representative of Interpol on 25 July to the Committee. In that context, we would welcome an agreement between the 1737 Committee and Interpol with respect to the distribution of special notices. Those notices have been successful in providing information and in raising awareness among States Members of their commitments under the sanctions regime. We believe that there is no serious justification for the 1737 Committee’s failure to use them when almost all other sanctions committees do so. While it is true that sanctions do not represent an end in themselves, we should also remember that they are not the result of happenstance. Such measures are the outcome of ongoing concern over the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. They represent the international community’s response to Iran’s refusal to respect international commitments and to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In that regard, too little progress has been achieved, judging by the most recent report of the IAEA (GOV/2013/40) published on 28 August. The report clearly shows that there has been a slowdown in the growth of the stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 per cent, but it also confirms enrichment activities and the development of capacities to produce enriched uranium, thanks to the establishment of hundreds of new IR-2m centrifuges. Moreover, the construction of a heavy-water reactor in Arak is advancing, and Iran continues to refuse to allow access to the Parchin site to IAEA inspectors. All those developments cast doubt on Iran’s real attentions. We note with interest the scheduled relaunching of discussions on 27 September between Iran and the IAEA to define a so-called structured approach in order to resolve outstanding issues with regard to the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme. We sincerely hope that, unlike previous talks, these will allow us to move forward. On 17 August, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Catherine Ashton, informed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, of the determination of the E3+3 to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. She reasserted the importance of holding substantive talks that would rapidly lead to tangible results. We endorse that appeal, and we encourage the new leadership in Iran to commit as soon as possible to constructive negotiations with the E3+3 and to take the measures necessary to demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear programme has strictly peaceful ends.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your work as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), and for presenting the 90-day report of the Committee. Resolutions of the Security Council  — an organ that, according to the Charter of the United Nations, has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security  — are binding upon all Member States and must be strictly implemented. Azerbaijan attaches great importance to the work of the Committee concerning the implementation of Security Council measures, the objective of which we have seen in contributing to a political and diplomatic solution to the problem based on international law. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NPT’s safeguards agreement provide solid bases to that end. During the reporting period, the Committee adopted its programme of work for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2013. It also continued to receive information from Member States relating to actions taken to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions. It is essential that Member States cooperate with the Committee and the Panel of Experts by providing information about the implementation measures. We note that the Committee has made progress in reviewing the recommendations contained in the final report of the Panel of Experts, although to date none of them has been approved by the Committee. We also note the Panel’s visits to several Member States to discuss matters pertaining to the mandate of the Panel, including the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. It is essential that the Panel continue its outreach activities, which play an important role in increasing the number of national implementation reports from Member States. I would also like to refer to the report of the IAEA Board of Governors of 28 August (GOV/2013/40), which, inter alia, points out that despite 10 rounds of talks held between the Agency and Iranian officials with a view to reaching agreement on the structured approach document, no concrete results were achieved and it was not possible to begin substantive work on resolving the outstanding issues. It is important that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran continue its efforts to build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. It is essential to continue dialogue and cooperation on the issues, on which progress is urgently needed to ensure regional stability. We look forward to the next round of talks that is planned for 27 September in Vienna. We hope that diplomatic efforts will help make concrete progress and move the resolution of the problem forward.

I hope you do not mind, Sir, that I introduce myself by name, because this is the first time that I am addressing the Council. My name is Peter Wilson, and I am the new Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. It is an honour to be in this group, and I am proud to be here. First of all, I really do want to thank the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), under your chairmanship, Sir, as well as the Panel of Experts for their continued work in supporting the implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions on Iran. The United Kingdom, like others in the international community, remains deeply concerned by Iran’s nuclear programme, as others have said very clearly today. The latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), released on 28 August (GOV/2013/40), highlights Iran’s installation of around 1,000 more advanced centrifuges, which are now capable of beginning enrichment at short notice, and its continued rapid installation of regular centrifuges elsewhere. There is no plausible civilian purpose for the amount of enriched material that Iran already possesses, let alone the amount that it can now produce. After 10 meetings, Iran has also made no progress on addressing the IAEA’s questions over possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme. Iran has a new President and a new Cabinet team. We were interested to hear from Under-Secretary-General Feltman, during the horizon-scan meeting that was held yesterday, about his discussions early this week. We agree with others in the Council that President Rouhani has an opportunity to pursue a different course for the future by addressing international concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme and its other destabilizing activities across the Middle East. If he does this, a more constructive relationship with the international community will be possible. As the British Foreign Secretary said recently, if Iran is prepared to make that choice, we are prepared to respond in good faith. Turning to the work of the Committee, we regret that Iran continues to breach its international obligations. In particular, the Panel of Experts reached the clear and unanimous conclusion, in its January report, that Iran’s launch of a ballistic missile last year constituted a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010). As you, Sir, have just briefed us and others have underlined in the Council, the efforts of the Chair to engage with Iran on this issue have, unfortunately, been spurned. Iran has still not responded to the Committee’s letter of 12 April requesting further information, despite requests that it do so. We, along with others, therefore reiterate our view that the Committee must now take appropriate action in response. The evidence of this breach is compelling. The Committee needs to recognize that formally as a violation of United Nations sanctions. It should then take further action, including by sending an implementation assistance notice to assist all Member States in implementing ballastic missile-related sanctions on Iran, as well as considering the designation of those involved. The Panel of Experts’ final report, issued in May, makes six recommendations to the Committee, including the designation of a company involved in Iran’s proliferation efforts, and proposals to provide guidance to Member State on the implementation of sanctions. It is disappointing that little progress has been made in implementing these recommendations. They are, or should be, uncontroversial. The Committee should redouble its efforts to make swift progress on implementing these. We in the United Kingdom are also concerned by credible information that Iran continues to illicitly transfer arms within the region, in contravention of the United Nations embargo on the export of weapons by Iran, as the Panel’s reports on Gaza and the illicit arms interdiction reported by the Government of Yemen demonstrate. Iran’s continued efforts to increase instability across the wider region and beyond must end. The United Kingdom calls on the Panel to continue to monitor these issues, identify individuals and entities responsible, and include recommendations in due course. More generally, we are increasingly concerned about the failure of the Committee to take clear action in a number of specific recent cases. It is the role and responsibility of the 1737 Committee to monitor and take action on alleged violations of Security Council resolutions on Iran, and to strengthen the effectiveness of those measures. This unity and resolve have become less evident in recent months. We urge the Committee to come together and to collectively address these issues, or it will not fulfil its mandate. The United Kingdom remains committed to finding a peaceful, negotiated solution to the nuclear issue, as others have said and argued for. If Iran is prepared to engage seriously in negotiations on its nuclear programme, we are ready to respond in good faith. The confidence-building measures proposal submitted by the E3+3 in Almaty is a fair and credible offer. We urge Iran to engage with that offer seriously, but until Iran takes positive steps to address international concerns, the political and economic pressure will increase.

I would like first to thank you, Sir, for your briefing. I join the 10 representatives who have spoken before me in conrgatulating you on your admirable work chairing the Committee. We note the efforts towards communication and cooperation made by the Islamic Republic of Iran vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since our meeting in July (see S/P.6999). That includes information supplied by Iran on its enrichment activities at Natanz in the context of the updated questionnaire on descriptive information issued in late July. Similarly, the following month, the descriptions provided by Iran of the installation of IR- 2m centrifuges were widely confirmed by the IAEA. Some progress has also been made by Iran in terms of information provided about uranium conversion and the manufacture of fuels. In view of all this, the IAEA was able to conclude that the system worked as Iran had said, which Togo welcomes. Furthermore, we welcome the exchanges between Iran and the IAEA, the fundamental elements of which will appear in the structured approach document, which will allow the IAEA to conduct an effective audit. We hope that the talks in Vienna on 27 September will record progress on the issue. While these efforts should be highlighted, the list of Iran’s pending obligations remains long. Indeed, in its latest report (GOV/2013/40), the IAEA notes that some of the activities undertaken by Iran in certain installations that are in principle subject to the Safeguards Agreement are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the Board of Governors. Similarly, the Agency’s conclusions show that, in spite of the efforts at communication to which I have referred, enrichment-related activities have not ceased at the declared installations of Natanz and Fordow. With regard to the Fordow facility in particular, we urge Iran to heed the Agency’s requests for access and to provide the information requested. Answers are also expected with regard to the IAEA’s requests for explanations concerning the announcements made by Iran about new enrichment facilities. My delegation calls once again on Iran to fully cooperate in the various relevant areas and to allow inspectors to verify and to report. Iran’s cooperation is also necessary with regard to the pursuit of reprocessing activities and projects related to heavy water in the uranium conversion and fuel fabrication processes. We hope that the willingness expressed recently by Iran will extend also to pending requests. We have already placed great hopes in the willingness expressed by the new President, Mr. Hassan Rouhani, to resume talks with the group made up of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. I should like to conclude with three brief comments. First, we believe that cooperation between INTERPOL and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) would be a good thing, provided that modalities can be determined in order to dispel reservations in various quarters. With regard to the compilation arrived at by the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) concerning public statements made by Iranian officials on the matter of military assistance to non-State armed groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hizbullah, Togo supports further serious and impartial investigation. Togo believes that there is some doubt as to whether statements made in the press could be used as tangible proof of events. The same requirement for transparency and impartiality in investigations applies to the case of the ship seized in Yemen. Finally, we would emphasize the importance of the Islamic Republic of Iran cooperating closely with the 1737 Committee. I would like to conclude by reiterating my gratitude not only to the 1737 Committee but also to the Group of Experts, which we urge to continue its rigour and impartiality in the investigations it carries out.

We would like to thank the delegation of Argentina for its successful presidency of the Security Council last month. We are also grateful to Ambassador Quinlan for his briefing on the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). We thank him and the entire Australian delegation for their skilful chairmanship of that Council body. It is important that the Committee continue to act in an impartial and objective manner, in the interest of a diplomatic political settlement to the situation regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. The Panel of Experts provides the Committee with useful support. However, we continue to believe that the Panel should carry out its work under the guidance of the Committee while fully respecting the working methods and carrying out its investigations based solely on reliable and verifiable information. We welcome statements by the new President of Iran, Mr. Hassan Rouhani, concerning Tehran’s willingness to show greater openness with regard to its nuclear programme. We hope that those intensions will be in evidence during the forthcoming round of regular discussions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), slated for 27 September. It is necessary that a new round of dialogue under the 3+3 format of international mediation take place as soon as possible. The groundwork has already been laid for the first negotiations under that framework. We would also like to point out that statements by representatives of the new Iranian Administration are in line with the well-known Russian view concerning a settlement of the problem, namely, that a final decision can be arrived at only through a recognition of the unconditional right of Iran to develop a civilian nuclear programme, including the right to enrich uranium. Of course, that should precede the resolution of all outstanding problems with regard to Iranian nuclear activities, under reliable and comprehensive IAIA controls, and the lifting of any sanctions against Iran. We see no alternative to a diplomatic and political settlement. Efforts to that end should be made in a phased manner, based on the principle of reciprocity and in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, we are convinced that the collective and effective nature of steps on the part of the international community to address and resolve problems related to the Iranian nuclear problem are undermined by unilateral sanctions, many of which are extraterritorial in nature. That is categorically unacceptable under international law. Our country will continue to make every effort to achieve progress in resolving the situation concerning Iran’s nuclear programme.

I would like to begin by congratulating Argentina on its successful presidency of the Security Council last month. I also congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Council’s presidency. We wish you every success. I also thank Ambassador Gary Quinlan for his quarterly report on the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as well as the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010). The briefing given to us today shows that the Committee continues to consider every case referred to it, in particular reports of the Panel of Experts concerning developments that undermine the provisions of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. In that regard, the Committee should overcome differences in order to respond to potential violations of the sanctions and proceed to consider the recommendations of the final report (S/2013/331, annex) of the Panel of Experts, with a view to arrive at consensual conclusions on implementing them. We also encourage the Committee to positively consider the possibility of signing a cooperation agreement with INTERPOL, while fully abiding by the relevant resolutions of the Council. We hope that the Committee will continue to benefit from the impartiality and professionalism of the Panel of Experts. However, the cooperation of all Member States, including with regard to requests for information, is essential to fulfilling the mandate entrusted to the Committee by the Council. We call on the Committee to continue to make available to Member States any information and clarifications that could facilitate the implementation of the Council’s relevant resolutions. The summary to the most recent report (GOV/2013/40) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates that, in spite of the stepped up dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran since January 2012, it has not been possible to arrive at an agreement on the structured approach document to settle pending questions concerning the possible military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. In the light of the most recent developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran, we hope that that country and the IAEA will be able to swiftly arrive at an agreement to begin substantial work on the issue. As the relevant agency in the area of safeguards, the IAEA should enjoy all the necessary cooperation in order to make concrete progress on pending matters. Based on our ongoing commitment to dialogue and negotiation to peaceably resolve differences, regardless of their nature, complexity or the sensitivities involved, we welcome the continuation of talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1). We hope that this dialogue will make it possible to make progress towards a solution that is acceptable to the parties. The efforts of United Nations bodies should aim to support the role and work of the IAEA and encourage the stepping up of talks between Iran and the P5+1 to reach a negotiated solution. It is of crucial importance to prevent any weakening of the non-proliferation regime and to work to ensure that all States fulfil their safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The strength and impact of the NPT and the pursuit of the strategic objective of nuclear disarmament remain dependent on the respect of all States for their obligations arising from that fundamental instrument. My country continues to support the global objective of nuclear disarmament and to recognize the right of all States to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful ends. The non-proliferation regime is based on a delicate balance between States’ rights and obligations that must be protected, preserved and strengthened through the full respect of its provisions.

I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the 90-day update report and a job well done in leading the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) since January — an experience that will certainly help as you, Sir, also preside over the Council for the month of September. We also appreciate the support that the Panel of Experts continues to provide to the Committee and we stress the importance for the Panel to follow the principles of objectivity and impartiality. We would like to reiterate our belief in the application of the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, namely, non-proliferation, disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is therefore our view that every country has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that respect, we are concerned by the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 28 August (GOV/2013/40), in which the Agency’s Director General states that Iran’s activities reflect no willingness to stop its proliferation activities. We hope, however, that the talks scheduled for 27 September in Vienna between Iran and the IAEA will be an opportunity to strengthen cooperation and build confidence among all parties. In that context, we regret that Iran has yet to collaborate with the 1737 (2006) Committee and did not reply to the letters sent in April and May related to last year’s launches of Shahab-1 and — 3 missiles and the seizure of a vessel suspected of violating the arms embargo against Iran. However, we remain hopeful that the new Government will bring more diplomatic openness to discussing and resolving the current nuclear crisis. As such, we believe that at this time, and especially due to the tense situation in the region, it would be prudent for the Committee to refrain from taking any further action against Iran. In that regard, we call on the Council to engage with the new Iranian leadership in order to ensure transparency on the nuclear programme in Iran. We believe that it is in the interests of the new Government of Iran to quickly show willingness and openness and allow the 1737 (2006) Committee to carry out its mandate. Let me conclude by reiterating our firm belief that the current Iranian nuclear crisis can be resolved only through diplomatic and political dialogue, including with the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany. As a member of the 1737 (2006) Committee, Rwanda is committed to continuing to work with Iran and all countries in the Middle East towards the denuclearization of the region.

There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.