S/PV.7076 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council, who will speak in order according to the year of adoption of the related resolutions. First is His Excellency Mr. Masood Khan, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia, and Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. Next will be His Excellency Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and then His Excellency Mr. Gert Rosenthal, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, and Chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. Lastly, we will hear His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Loulichki, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea- Bissau. I now give the floor to Mr. Masood Khan.

I am making these remarks in my dual capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia — the Liberia sanctions Committee — and Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. The Liberia sanctions Committee was established almost 10 years ago. Pakistan chaired it in 2003 and 2004. At that time, Liberia was taking initial steps away from a debilitating civil war. Since then, Liberia has come a long way in its quest to restore peace, security and stability. With the support of the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, the country has made substantial progress. The role of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has been instrumental in achieving these gains. Pakistani peacekeepers have remained an integral part of UNMIL since its inception. We take pride in our association with Liberia as a troop contributor and as Chair of the Liberia sanctions Committee twice during the past decade, which has seen Liberia’s transition from civil war to stability. Over the past two years, the Committee has held six informal consultations in the light of reports submitted by the Panel of Experts, and taken several follow-up actions. My predecesssor, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee, visited Liberia in May 2012. His interaction with the Liberian stakeholders on the ground helped us to fine-tune the general directions of the sanctions regime. The Panel’s reports have identified both progress and shortcomings. In its most recent report, the Panel has concluded that a majority of the individuals and entities listed for assets freezes and travel bans do not pose a threat to peace and stability in Liberia and the subregion. There are some cases of concern among the listed entities and individuals. The Panel does not find any evidence that revenues from the diamond and alluvial-gold sectors are providing financing for weapons and arm smuggling. The Panel has, however, identified huge institutional capacity deficits in the Liberian Government and security forces in the following areas: diamond trafficking and gold mining, the marking of arms, the legal framework to prevent trafficking in illicit arms, conflict related to palm-oil production, accountability and oversight in the forestry sector, land-tenure issues, threats posed by the cross-border military activities of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militias, and security concerns along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border. The panelists have confirmed that Liberia’s inability to pass a firearms-control act to ensure the marking of arms and ammunition and to interdict armed groups in the interior boils down to capacity issues. This is a prime factor in slowing down the full implementation of sanctions. The fundamental questions before the Council today are how to consolidate the achievements made so far, how to maintain the momentum towards peace and stability, and how to decide on the nature and role of sanctions in the future. The decision to lift the sanctions should be based on the Council’s collective political judgement. As I relinquish my responsibilities, the Council is inclined towards scaling down the sanctions gradually, in consultation with the Liberian Government. Liberia still faces many challenges. These include a frail State security apparatus, land-rights issues and ineffectual natural-resources management. Transnational organized crime and illicit drug trafficking are becoming major problems. The Council wants to use sanctions most efficiently and effectively. There is a time for imposing them and a time for winding them down. No country would like to remain under sanctions indefinitely. I would say, in my personal capacity, that we should scale back but not disengage or lower our guard. It should be a measured, calibrated response from the Council. Before rendering this report, I held meetings with the Permanent Representative of Liberia and members of the Panel. They concur that the situation in Liberia remains fragile and fraught with danger. As UNMIL moves towards drawdown, the nature of the United Nations engagement with the Liberian authorities should be modulated to help the Liberian Government build its capacities, including its civilian capacities. The role of the Peacebuilding Commission, regional and subregional organizations and the international financial institutions remains crucial in this context. Our efforts should be in sync with the Government’s priorities for institution-building. Liberia’s security cooperation with Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte D’Ivoire should be bolstered to build a broader strategic approach to establishing regional stability. Finally, I acknowledge with deep appreciation the cooperation and support of all Committee members. I also thank Committee Secretary Kelvin Ong, Political Affairs Officer Anne Viken and Assistant Maria Carmela Javier-Bobby for their support to the work of the Committee. I also commend the comprehensive, solid and substantive work done by the members of the Panel — Christian Dietrich, Caspar Fithen and Lansana Gberie — over the past two years. They are thorough and very hard-working. I now turn to the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, which I have chaired in 2013. Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki of Morocco ably carried out that responsibility in 2012. For Pakistan, it was a unique honour to be a top troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping and to lead the Working Group. We started off in 2013 with the adoption of resolution 2086 (2013) in January, under Pakistan’s presidency. That comprehensive resolution on peacekeeping, the first of its kind in over a decade, focused on multidimensional missions based on a comprehensive approach to addressing complex crises involving security, political, humanitarian and development aspects. The spotlight and new momentum on peacekeeping generated by resolution 2086 (2013) were sustained in the activities of the Working Group, which, in accordance with its mandate, considered a number of mission-specific and crosscutting thematic issues. In February, in the run-up to the renewal of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, the Working Group brought together the representatives of the African Union, the troop-contributing countries, and senior leadership from the Secretariat to discuss and address the challenges in Somalia. The discussion on safety and security underscored the need for elaborate force-protection measures, emergency evacuation plans, the deployment of critical enablers and clear and achievable mandates backed by adequate resources. The Working Group also took up the use of modern technologies in United Nations peacekeeping operations in the wake of the authorization for deployment of unarmed, unmanned aerial systems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The exchange of views in the related legal, operational, political and administrative aspects was rich. The Group underlined the need for fuller discussion of the issue in the relevant United Nations forums. The deliberations of the Working Group on transition and drawdown were timely, given that several multidimensional missions were and are at various stages of these processes. In another meeting, the Working Group held discussions on a capability-driven approach, which is vital to enhancing the effectiveness of missions in view of their evolving nature and complex and challenging mandates. The discussion brought forth the importance of planning and training, the provision of adequate military resources — particularly critical enablers such as aviation and engineering assets — and the efficient utilization of resources in mission areas. The important and evolving role of United Nations policing in peacekeeping and the related challenges and opportunities were discussed in November in the first-ever meeting of the Working Group dedicated to United Nations police. At its final substantive meeting, scheduled for 20 December, the Working Group will look into issues related to force generation and mission start-up. Before concluding, I should like to make some personal observations. First, the Working Group is one of the most important subsidiary bodies because of the centrality of peacekeeping to the Council’s work. The Working Group has a lot of space and opportunity to be proactive and support the Council’s deliberations on peacekeeping. We try to do just that. I am pleased to report that the Working Group had a substantive and dynamic agenda, and it was responsive to current peacekeeping issues. Secondly, we planned early and developed a good understanding among members on a range of indicative topics and issues, and covered many of them in great detail. Thirdly, from the procedural point of view, it was all along a smooth affair. All credit goes to the members of the Working Group who extended full cooperation to the Chair. The Secretariat supported us ably. We consulted them extensively and benefitted from their engagement and briefings at the highest levels. I would like to convey our deepest gratitude to Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon and his peacekeeping team, led by Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous and Under-Secretary-General Ameerah Haq, and all their colleagues for their availability, advice and contribution to our work. I convey my appreciation to Mr. Movses Abelian and his team, in particular Mr. Nikolai Galkin and his predecessor, for facilitating our work. I am also happy to inform the Council that there will be a website for the Working Group in the coming days. Fourthly, one of the objectives we set at the very beginning was to strengthen the synergy among the Security Council, the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat. Although we could not hold an exclusive meeting on the subject, we promoted such cooperation in practice by creating an environment for full engagement and participation by them in all our meetings. That open interaction enriched our discussions and enhanced transparency and inclusiveness in our work

I thank Ambassador Masood Khan for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Mehdiyev.

At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for providing me and other outgoing Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council with an opportunity to summarize our work and share some observations as our countries complete their two-year terms as non-permanent members of the Council. For the past two years, I have had the honour and privilege to chair the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During my tenure, I have endeavoured to keep the Committee centred in the overall implementation of the sanctions regime, to offer all assistance possible to the Group of Experts in support of their arduous work and to establish an open, two-way dialogue with Member States inside and outside the Committee, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the neighbouring States. Since January 2012, the Committee held a total of six meetings, during many of which it exchanged views with the Group of Experts in connection with the Group’s reports and took decisions on various recommendations contained in those reports. The Committee also updated the sanctions list in April 2013, based on elements provided by a member of the Committee and the Group of Experts. In accordance with its guidelines, which allow for non-members and others to participate in its meetings and informal consultations, in August 2012 the Committee met with and heard the views of Major Patrick Karuretwa, Defence and Security Adviser to the President of the Republic of Rwanda, and His Excellency Mr. Raymond Tshibanda N’tungamulongo, Minister for International and Regional Cooperation and Francophone Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In early March 2012, the Committee held a discussion with the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations. That meeting led to an agreement on the exchange of information among INTERPOL, the Committee and the Group of Experts in late 2012, which provided for the dissemination of INTERPOL-Security Council special notices on the individuals named in the Committee’s sanctions list. Over the course of the past two years, in my capacity as a Council member and Chair of the 1533 Committee, I have witnessed the effective use of such instruments as peacekeeping, peacemaking and sanctions, and their positive impact on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, which radically deteriorated in May 2012 with the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M-23) rebellion. Continued efforts to end the rebellion and address the drivers of chronic instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo led to the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region and the subsequent adoption by the Council of resolution 2098 (2013). The international community’s search for a political solution to the crisis was accompanied by the actions taken in the 1533 Committee, which reacted to violations of international law and the sanctions regime by designating five M-23 leaders — Sultani Makenga, Baudoin Ngaruye, Innocent Kaina, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero and Eric Badege — as well as the listing of the M-23 itself and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). The robust actions of the Congolese army and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), supported by the Force Intervention Brigade, have recently had a major military impact on the ground. However, the military defeat of the M-23 is not an end, which can only be achieved through a political solution. There is still plenty of work to do in terms of neutralizing other armed groups, such as the FDLR and the Allied Democratic Forces, restoring State authority throughout the country and creating space for peacebuilding and national dialogue. But the building blocks of change are there and the sanctions tool has proven to be an integral part of these collective efforts. The signing of the Framework Agreement and the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade clearly demonstrate that the international community, including the United Nations and the regional organizations, has become increasingly involved in the active pursuit of political and security-related solutions to the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In my view, similar energy should be directed towards the exploitation of natural resources and the development of infrastructure, for the benefit of the Congolese people, with a view to opening up the nearly untapped potential of the region and creating less space for spoilers like armed groups and criminal networks. While the number of notifications of arms deliveries by Member States to the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government sent to the Committee has increased over the past two years, which are allowed under the sanctions regime, armed groups’ access to weapons in violation of the arms embargo continues to affect the lives of millions of civilians and threaten the stability of the region as a whole. Addressing the issue of arms proliferation could also be an area where increased regional collaboration may have a major impact, through the establishment of confidence-building measures and control mechanisms. The unmanned aerial systems recently deployed by MONUSCO could play an important role in identifying the movement of arms and armed groups. In conjunction with the publication of the due diligence guidelines produced by the Group of Experts in 2010, which are designed to mitigate the risk of further exacerbating the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo by providing direct or indirect support to illegal armed groups, criminal networks and sanctioned individuals and entities, the issue of the traceability of minerals has gained more international visibility in the past years. The Group of Experts has engaged with the private sector and industry on this issue, as well as with intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Increasingly, as noted in the Group’s 2013 midterm report (see S/2013/433), continuous instability in various parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is exacting a heavy toll on the fragile equilibrium of wildlife and the unique ecosystems, mostly for the trafficking of ivory beyond the Great Lakes region. This is also a domain where the cooperation between the Group of Experts and other actors, such as INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, could be encouraged. I would like to conclude by expressing my profound appreciation to the members of the Committee for their collegiality, spirit of cooperation and their interest in adding value to the work of the Committee and increasing the effectiveness of the sanctions regime overall. I also wish to extend my sincere gratitude to the Group of Experts, its previous and current members, for the work done in contributing to compliance with the sanctions regime, often in very trying and tense situations. I would also like to convey my sincere appreciation to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. David Biggs, and his team for their professionalism, dedication and invaluable assistance extended to me. Finally, I wish the next Chair of the Committee every success in the discharge of the chairmanship functions.

I thank Ambassador Mehdiyev for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Rosenthal.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to brief the Security Council with my reflections as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire and as Chair of the Council’s Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. The first issue that I would like to point out is the difference between those two subsidiary bodies. One is a typical sanctions committee that acts pursuant to Articles 40 and 41 of the Charter, while the other can be viewed as a consultation and consensus- building mechanism useful needed to further the work of the Security Council, in particular in the area of international criminal justice. For that reason, my personal observations on such two different bodies must be presented separately. I will divide my presentation into two parts, each in turn divided into a very brief review of the work achieved during our two-year term, followed by my assessments. The reason for brevity is clear: we have reported on the work of the 1572 Sanctions Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire to the Council when it was considering the mid-term reports and mandate renewals of the original resolution. We have also kept the Council informed of the activities of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. I will therefore move on to the first part on the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004). By the end of this month, the Committee will have held a total of seven informal consultations over the past two years, the majority of which were devoted to exchanging views with the Group of Experts on the Group’s midterm and final reports, and to taking decisions on the Group’s various recommendations in the form of draft letters, notes verbales or press releases to be approved by the Committee. In terms of other consultations, the Committee also held an exchange of views with the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations, which led to an information-sharing agreement between the Committee and its Group of Experts with INTERPOL. The Committee also met with the Chairs of the Kimberley Process on two occasions regarding the implementation of paragraph 6 of resolution 2101 (2013) on the situation in CÔte d’Ivoire. Beyond the informal consultations, the Committee has also received three monthly reports on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, namely, on media monitoring, assessing the embargo and human rights. In short, I believe that the implementation of the arms embargo, the diamond embargo, the assets freeze and the travel ban have played the desired role in the pursuit of a lasting political solution in Côte d’Ivoire, but there remains a considerable way to go in order to reach the full potential of those instruments. What lessons can I and others transmit to the Council? I would make the following brief points, some of which are probably relevant to the other sanctions committees as well. First, the sanctions committees are certainly flawed mechanisms, but, like the Security Council itself, they fulfil an important role. Among the main problems that we identified is the lack of compliance by some stakeholders with the various kinds of sanctions adopted by the Council. That is certainly true of non-State actors but also applies to many State actors, in particular in the area of the arms embargoes. It remains necessary to continue improving transparency and the provision of detailed information, with a particular emphasis on ensuring that notifications and exemption requests include the purpose, the end user, the technical specifications and the quantity of the equipment to be shipped and, when applicable, the supplier, the proposed date of delivery, the mode of transportation and the itinerary of shipments. Secondly, although relations with the host Government was generally good, there were at times problems with the Mission in New York and in the capital, in particular with the provision of timely information and with receiving feedback regarding the sanctions regime. The pace of dismantling the sanctions was an ongoing source of underlying tension, with the Government understandably pushing for its rapid dismantling, while many Member States sought a more conservative approach. Thirdly, the interaction between the experts and the members of the Committee was generally good, but again, on occasion, there were some tensions, including over the selection of experts and the differing views on their performance. That area of interaction between the Secretariat and Member States is particularly sensitive, given the real consequences on the ground arising from the implementation or lack of implementation of the experts’ recommendations. Fourthly, the sanctions committees seem to function as independent units, with relatively little interaction and coordination among them. I wish, however, to acknowledge the cooperation and information-sharing between the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire and the Panel of Experts on Liberia established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003). To sum up, we will, as I have said earlier, nevertheless hand over to our successor a sanctions committee that operates reasonably well in dealing with a country that is moving in the right direction to achieve peace, stability, democratic governance and development. I will now move on to the second part of my remarks to deal with the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. That Working Group held several meetings, drafted four resolutions, and the experts are now in the process of negotiating a fifth resolution. In addition, two press statements were issued concerning the contribution of the international criminal tribunals in the fight against impunity. In order to facilitate the completion strategies of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Working Group considered various requests by the Presidents of the Tribunals, including the extension of the judges’ terms of office. By maintaining a flexible programme of work over the reporting period, the Working Group successfully accommodated the views and concerns of all delegations. During our chairmanship, the Working Group supported the setting up and commencement of functioning of the Arusha and Hague branches of the Residual Mechanism and a smooth transition from the Tribunals to the Residual Mechanism. Mechanisms dealing with residual functions are a unique feature that is steadily increasing in contemporary international tribunals. The establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals guarantees that the closure of the Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia does not leave the door open to impunity for the remaining fugitives and for the trials or appeals that have not yet been completed. I consider the Residual Mechanism exemplary for striking a balance between two sets of potentially conflicting requirements: on the one hand, the need to respect due process and justice, and on the other, the demand for efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In addition, the value added by the Working Group derives from the fact that it constitutes a platform for strengthening cooperation between the Tribunals and the Security Council. I also believe that the discussions in the Working Group have enriched the debates of the Council during the crucial phases of the Tribunals’ life and that of the Mechanism. To balance out this evaluation, allow me to recognize the Tribunals’ achievements, especially in signaling that leaders who commit crimes will be held to account regardless of their official position, in bringing justice to victims and in strengthening the rule of law by working in partnership with domestic courts in the region. The Tribunals have inspired the creation of other courts, including the International Criminal Court. As to my personal reflections — which are actually my team’s reflections as well — I would like first of all to say how pleased we have been to preside over the Working Group. We took a strategic decision even before being elected to the Council that we would try to carve out a niche for our tenure in the general area of peace and justice, as a reflection of our own national experience of transition from conflict to peace and from authoritarian to democratic governance. I would say that respect for the rule of law was our “brand” during our tenure and certainly during our presidency of the Security Council, and chairing the Working Group served to the same effect. A second personal reflection concerns the satisfaction of managing what has become a genuinely cross-cutting issue for the Security Council. Questions of accountability, consolidating the rule of law and judicial systems probably appear in the majority of our resolutions. A third personal reflection has to do with the cost- benefit calculations of the Tribunals. When I had the honour to preside over the Fifth Committee, I must confess that I harboured doubts regarding the high cost involved in bringing a relatively small number of perpetrators to justice. But of course the teaching of justice cannot be measured solely in monetary terms. Indeed, the rule of law is priceless, and the impact of the Tribunals cannot be measured via metrics such as the number of people judged. It lies rather in their dissuasive effect, through the knowledge that the entire international community has mechanisms to ensure that justice prevails, especially in symbolic terms. Then there are relatively minor reflections. For example, the Tribunals still face important challenges, large and small. Staff retention is essential for the timely completion of their work. I also regret that we could not do more to address the urgent situation of persons who have been acquitted or those who have served their sentences who are living in safe houses in Arusha. On another note, I would like to acknowledge the invaluable role that State cooperation has played in allowing the Tribunals to fulfil their mandates. It is praiseworthy that, 20 years after the establishment of the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, all persons indicted by the Tribunal have appeared before it. With regard to the Tribunal for Rwanda, it should be noted that while it is true that the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions has facilitated the early conclusion of its work, that will be achieved in reality only when all its fugitives have been arrested and brought to justice, whether through the Residual Mechanism or in national courts. My final reflection is that, in order to maintain the momentum that has been generated, the Working Group should continue to hold regular meetings and briefings, to maintain a regular dialogue with the Tribunals and close contacts with the affected countries and host countries of the Tribunals and the Residual Mechanism, and to pursue close cooperation with the Office of Legal Affairs. As the importance and relevance of the Working Group continue to increase, delegations should give serious consideration to finding a forum for experts to discuss issues that concern the International Criminal Court in order to institutionalize the Council’s cooperation with that Court. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the sustained support of the members of the two Committees and of the Secretariat, in particular David Biggs and Manuel Bressan in the work of of the 1572 Committee and Davey McNab in the work in the Working Group on International Tribunals. In closing, I strongly urge the Security Council to continue to play its essential role in the fight against impunity.

I thank Ambassador Rosenthal for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Loulichki.

After submitting my final report to the Council a few days ago in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), more commonly known as the Counter- Terrorism Committee, it is now incumbent upon me to report to the Council one last time on the outcome of the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau. That Committee’s mandate, as defined by the Security Council, was to monitor implementation of the measures envisaged in paragraph 9 of that resolution. The Committee is the most recent to have been established by the Council and the only one concerned exclusively with interdicting travel. The Committee to deal with the Central African Republic has been created, but has not yet been established. The Committee concerning Guinea-Bissau was established following the events of 12 April 2012, which ended the electoral process in that country. The Committee imposed a travel ban on all individuals seeking to prevent the restoration of the constitutional “seeking to prevent the restoration of the constitutional order or taking action that undermined stability in Guinea-Bissau, in particular those who played a leading role in the coup d’état of 12 April 2012 and who aimed, through their actions, at undermining the rule of law, curtailing the primacy of civilian power and furthering impunity and instability in the country” (S/2012/627, p. 4). During the period in question, the Committee held informal consultations, maintained channels of communication among its members, and facilitated discussions and decision-making within the Committee’s framework. Examples of decisions taken include the implementation of the sanctions regime, the expansion of the list of individuals subject to the travel ban, and the conclusion of an agreement with INTERPOL on Interpol/Security Council Special Notices, aimed at strengthening measures adopted by Member States. The main difficulty faced during the period was quite clearly access to information, and the communication of that information by the members of the Committee. The Committee is one of the rare, one of the very few committees, alongside the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) concerning Iraq and Kuwait and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005) concerning Lebanon, not to have a panel of experts available to it. Nevertheless, the Committee tried to discharge its mandate in cooperation with the members of the Security Council and of course all the other Members of the United Nations. Thus, through an exchange of communications with Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, the Committee was in a position to detect a violation of the travel ban by one of the individuals subject to the ban. Despite the very low number of reports received — fewer than 20 — I would like to urge all Member States that have not yet done so to report to the Committee measures undertaken to implement the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 2048 (2012). In the next few days, a note will be addressed to the Member States to assist my successor in launching his term of office with an updated list of data that would enable the Committee to continue to discharge its mandate. The 2048 Committee is one of the levers available to the Security Council to address the situation in Guinea- Bissau. It is an instrument of information, coordination and deliberation that can assist the Security Council’s work regarding the many challenges facing that African State. For my part, I am gratified by the growing interest shown by the Security Council in that country, and by the Council’s commitment to assisting it in its current transition phase and contributing to stabilizing it, side by side with the Economic Community of West African States, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau and the bilateral partners of Guinea-Bissau. I cherish the hope that the momentum will continue to grow in the coming few years. Finally, like all my predecessors, I would like to convey my gratitude to all the members of the Committee for their assistance and their cooperation during the Moroccan chairmanship, and to pay tribute to the high level of professionalism and availability on the part of the Secretariat in facilitating the work of the Committee and its Chairman.

On behalf of the Security Council, I would like to take this opportunity to convey our heartfelt gratitude to the outgoing Chairmen for the way in which they have discharged the very important duties entrusted to them by the Council. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.