S/PV.7323 Security Council

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Mr. Jürgen Stock, Secretary- General of INTERPOL. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to also draw the attention of Council members to document S/2014/793, which contains a letter dated 5 November 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to address the Security Council on the issue of United Nations sanctions — an indispensable Charter-based instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. Today’s discussion is set against a backdrop of unprecedented challenges facing the international community, including the Council. To echo the Secretary-General’s words before the General Assembly prior to the opening of this year’s general debate, it may seem as if the world is falling apart and turbulence is testing the multilateral system (see A/69/PV.6). Overcoming our common peace and security challenges requires a Council united in purpose and action, Member States fulfilling their international obligations, an effective United Nations system delivering as one, and a full range of supportive partnerships. That is certainly the requirement when we speak about the effective implementation of United Nations sanctions. The Security Council has a long history of employing sanctions. The Council has established 25 sanctions regimes in total, the first dating back to 1966, when the Council imposed sanctions on Southern Rhodesia, and the most recent in Yemen this year. United Nations sanctions have been used to support conflict-resolution efforts, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to counter terrorism. Security Council sanctions, together with United Nations peacekeeping and political efforts, have made a critical difference in Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, Libya and Sierra Leone, among other places. United Nations sanctions, in short, work. In fact, the regularity with which the Council has turned to such instruments is testimony to their efficacy. Today, we have 15 sanctions regimes — the highest number in the history of the Organization. Moreover, United Nations sanctions are also fairly economical. The total cost of supporting the 15 sanctions regimes is a comparatively modest sum of less than $30 million per year. The Council has also shown its ability to continuously innovate and adjust its sanctions regimes. The most significant transformation was the shift from comprehensive to targeted sanctions. Since 1994, all new sanctions regimes have been targeted, comprising travel bans, asset freezes and arms embargoes; bans on the trade in commodities, such as diamonds, coal, wildlife products and charcoal; restrictions on items, material, equipment, goods and technology related to nuclear ballistic missiles and other weapons-of-mass- destruction programmes; as well as bans on the export of certain luxury goods. In 1999, the Council introduced another important innovation, with the establishment of its sanctions monitoring group on Angola. Today, 11 monitoring groups, teams and panels, with a total of 66 experts, work worldwide in support of the Security Council and its Sanctions Committees. At the direction of the Council and its sanctions committees, expert panels regularly cooperate with international organizations, such as INTERPOL, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Transport Association, on issues related to travel bans, and with national authorities and the private sector on asset freezes. I would like to thank INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock, who is here with us today, and his predecessor, Ronald Noble, for the excellent cooperation that we have received from INTERPOL. We look forward to building on that partnership so as to further enhance sanctions implementation. Over the past decade, the Security Council has calibrated the designation criteria of its sanctions regimes to clearly identify the kind of behaviour or actions that it seeks to modify. Designation criteria have evolved to include human rights violations, the targeting of civilians, hate speech, sexual violence in conflict and even wildlife poaching. In order to ensure that sanctions designations meet human rights standards, the Council established the Focal Point for Delisting in the Secretariat and the Office of the Ombudsperson of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. Both are important parts of the Council’s sanctions history. The Council has also mandated some United Nations field missions to monitor certain aspects of sanctions regimes, cooperate with expert panels, and provide assistance to national Governments. The Council’s achievements on United Nations sanctions thus far allow us to see clearly what more needs to be done. Work is required to raise the awareness among all Member States that United Nations sanctions are supportive, not punitive. They are not meant to cripple States but to help them overcome instability, address massive human rights violations, curb illegal smuggling, and counter terrorism. Some Member States already understand that and have requested the Security Council to adopt, fine-tune or strengthen targeted measures so as to support their fragile political transitions and national reconciliation efforts. Many others request the Council to strengthen targeted measures so as to help protect them against terrorism and other illicit activities. Those Governments offer valuable information on listed individuals and entities, and in a few cases, even put forward listing requests for consideration. More work is also needed to provide assistance to Member States implementing United Nations sanctions. That will clearly take effort and resources. And some more work is needed to take more fully into account the rights of individuals, entities and Member States designated for targeted measures. Every day, the Department of Political Affairs Security Council Affairs Division provides substantive and administrative support to the Sanctions Committees and expert panels, and works to engage the broader United Nations system in support of United Nations sanctions. That effort is central to the work of my Department, and I would like to take a few minutes to brief you on steps taken to properly perform that important responsibility. In the past year alone, Council members will have noticed several changes. They include standardizing the methods and formats of communication among Sanctions Committees, the Secretariat and expert panels; relaunching the Department’s roster of experts on sanctions; revamping the recruitment process; and establishing induction programmes for Chairs, delegates and experts. In December 2013, The Department for Political Affairs conducted the first inter-panel coordination workshop. The aim of the workshop was to fulfil the call in many Council resolutions for expert panels to work closely together and exchange best practices. At last year’s workshop, we focused on enhancing cooperation among arms and finance experts working on sanction regimes in Africa. This year, we intend to focus on enhancing the engagement between experts and the United Nations system. This year, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) also led two assessment missions on sanctions issues, one on the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia and the other on the termination of sanctions in Liberia. Those assessment missions strengthened the understanding of the two Member States on what the Council expects of them on sanctions issues and enhanced coordination within the United Nations system to support sanctions implementation in those countries. On 31 October, DPA completed the harmonization of the format of all committee sanctions lists and officially launched the consolidated Security Council sanctions list. The list is being translated into all six official United Nations languages and, along with a redesigned subsidiary organs website, will be launched by April 2015. All those initiatives are intended to support the Council’s efforts to effectively design, implement and evaluate United Nations sanctions. DPA is the committed partner in that effort, as is the United Nations system as a whole. This year, the United Nations system conducted its own internal review of United Nations sanctions, alongside the State-led high-level review of United Nations sanctions. An internal inter-agency working group, chaired by me, brought together 20 United Nations departments and offices, agencies, funds and programmes working on peace and security, humanitarian, human rights, legal, protection and development issues. It is clear from our internal review process that the United Nations Secretariat needs to develop clear and coherent system-wide policy and guidance to support United Nations sanctions implementation. That should be done within existing mandates and resources and with due regard for principles applicable to humanitarian actors. Regular briefings, trainings and the sharing of expertise on sanctions issues within United Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field are also needed. That is especially important at the outset of a new sanctions regime, particularly when it coincides with the establishment of a new United Nations field mission. We also concluded that the United Nations system possesses the technical capacity in several key areas to assist Member States in implementing United Nations sanctions.Those capacities, however, need to be better coordinated in-house, better leveraged by the sanctions committee and better utilized by the Member States. In some cases, additional financial resources may be required. Our internal review process also generated several proposals for the consideration of the Security Council. First, the Security Council may wish to consider increasing the use of assessment missions to take stock of the impact and effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. Periodic assessments should also be undertaken to evaluate the continued relevance of sanctions measures. Secondly, where appropriate, the Security Council should consider expanding the relevant designation criteria to address specific human rights violations, such as the use of children for extremist agendas, the role of mid-level commanders in facilitating human rights violations, gross violations of women’s rights committed by extremist groups, sexual violence, other forms of gender-based crimes, targeted attacks against women and failure to comply with the responsibility to protect. Thirdly, in our view all United Nations sanctions resolutions should have a clear and standardized listing and delisting framework. Such a framework should include clear designation criteria and the requirement for detailed statements of case. In addition, narrative summaries should be publicly available, biometric information should be sought so as to reduce false positives, and a clear reference should be made to the relevant delisting mechanism. Fourthly, the Council should continue its efforts to further strengthen due process when considering the designation of individuals and entities. In 2006, the Secretary-General outlined four elements: the right to be informed, the right to be heard, the right to be reviewed by an effective review mechanism, and the need for periodic reviews, especially regarding the freezing of assets. Those elements are consistent with the Security Council’s continuing efforts to improve the fairness and transparency of the sanctions procedures. Finally, given that expert panels have been in use for a considerable amount of time, the concept and practice of expert panels, including the Office of the Ombudsperson, should be subject to a comprehensive review with the aim of enhancing this important tool of the Council. Likewise, the focal point for delisting, established in the Security Council Affairs Division, should also be carefully reviewed and optimized. United Nations sanctions have proved to be an effective complement to other Security Council instruments and actions. We know it is not perfect, but there is also no doubt that it works. It has to be continuously improved, and the United Nations system stands ready to support the Security Council in its effort to do so.

I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Stock. Mr. Stock: It is a great honour to address the Security Council, and I would like to thank the Australian presidency very much for inviting me. I am here today to speak about how INTERPOL assists countries with the technical implementation and monitoring of the Security Council’s sanctions regimes. As United Nations sanctions have become more targeted, their implementation has become more complex for national authorities. INTERPOL can help countries to fulfil their implementation objectives and can enhance the effectiveness of targeted United Nations sanctions for countries transitioning out of conflict. I would like to ask the Council to consider the following question. How does the information on the sanctions committees’ lists reach the implementing authorities dealing directly with the individuals and entities? How does a border control officer know what to do when a person subject to a travel ban appears in front of him? How can details obtained in an investigation by national law enforcement be identified and used to enhance the listings and improve the reports of panels of experts? With its global cross-border network and modern tools, INTERPOL is well placed to address those practical aspects of implemention of United Nations sanctions. We achieve concrete results. Last year the Australian police used INTERPOL’s databases to check fingerprints and found a match with a set shared by INTERPOL’s National Central Bureau in Washington, D.C. The individual is subject to a travel ban imposed by the Security Council, and his whereabouts had previously been unknown. Thus with the use of INTERPOL’s tools, Australia and the United States were able to support Liberia in targeting a designated individual who had threatened their security. In my brief statement today, I will describe INTERPOL’s assistance in general terms, and then as it relates to specific types of targeted United Nations sanctions. I will conclude with some ideas as to how that could be further improved. INTERPOL’s capacity to communicate information on United Nations sanctions to police worldwide greatly increases their visibility. The INTERPOL-Security Council Special Notice was created in response to resolution 1617 (2005) and an INTERPOL General Assembly resolution. There are currently 526 valid Special Notices, issued at the request of 10 of the 15 sanctions committees. INTERPOL notices are alerts or requests for cooperation from national police that are published and circulated in a standard, recognizable format by our General Secretariat. The Special Notice is one of many types of INTERPOL notices, which include other non-criminal notices such as those that help to locate missing persons and minors. The Special Notices make the information from the United Nations sanctions lists accessible to the 25,000 authorized users in INTERPOL’s 190 member countries, including some immigration and border-control services, and to visitors to its public website, where an extract is also published. INTERPOL supports the implementation of United Nations sanctions by enhancing the quality of information available to the sanctions committees. That involves seeking additional details and identifiers — such as aliases, date and place of birth, identity documents, fingerprints and photographs — to supplement the lists. Sometimes that information is already in INTERPOL’s databases, such as in the case of an individual subject to United Nations sanctions who was listed in 2001. The limited data in the sanctions list was greatly expanded when a check revealed identity information and photographs from 1996 provided by INTERPOL’s National Central Bureau in Tashkent. Authorized personnel of the secretariats of the sanctions committees can conduct checks against INTERPOL’s nominal database to search for relevant information or ask INTERPOL to make enquiries on their behalf. In all cases, INTERPOL will contact the country that owns the information for permission to share it before any data can be used. In addition to that support, INTERPOL also assists in the effective implementation of specific types of United Nations sanctions related to individuals, such as travel bans and asset-freezing, or to goods, such as the arms embargo and illegal natural resource exploitation. With regard to the travel ban, INTERPOL is directly alerted by our National Central Bureaus in many cases when there is an attempted violation of this measure by an individual subject to a Special Notice. Monthly statistics are also produced by INTERPOL showing which individuals and entities have been checked, when and by whom. If further information is available, and when authorized to do so by the country concerned, INTERPOL shares details of operational checks with the sanctions committees. Those details have included border crossing times and dates and, in some cases, copies of new passports or pages with entry stamps. For instance, last year an individual on the travel ban list of a sanctions committee, who is the subject of a Special Notice, generated an alert in INTERPOL’s system when he attempted to leave Côte d’Ivoire. The national authorities prevented him from boarding the aeroplane and sent INTERPOL copies of his travel document, the statement he made, his address and a recent photograph, all of which was communicated to the sanctions committee with the permission of Côte d’Ivoire. Concerning asset-freezing, INTERPOL is increasingly involved in coordinating international law enforcement cooperation on that subject. The second INTERPOL Expert Working Group meeting on the identification, location and seizure of assets will be held here at the United Nations in December. Over 100 experts, including those from the sanctions committees and their panels, have been invited to produce recommendations on how to strengthen existing tools and identify new trends and challenges. As to the arms embargo, INTERPOL has a number of tools that can assist the sanctions committees and their panels of experts in helping countries to apply that measure by tracing the origin of trafficked weapons. INTERPOL regularly uses its reference table, network and records to confirm the identification of weapons depicted in photographs provided by the secretariat of the sanctions committees or panels of experts. INTERPOL recently assisted in the process to identify handguns used in assassinations of Afghan police officers, contacted the countries of manufacture for further details, and then informed the Secretariat. Due to INTERPOL’s broad range of activities and connections, specialized information can be provided when designations extend to the illicit exploitation of natural resources. Last year, a report on transnational ivory-poaching syndicates was produced in the framework of an INTERPOL operation in West and Central Africa and shared with the panel of experts of a sanctions committee with the permission of national authorities in the Central African Republic. Now that the Special Notices successfully disseminate information from the United Nations sanctions lists, the next step could involve increased leverage of our network and contacts. Meetings could be organized for law enforcement officers to exchange information based on region, sanctions committee or type of measure. Other innovations could include a compilation of national guidelines for the implementation of United Nations sanctions and the possibility of a new type of notice linked to asset-freezing. A further initiative is training for law enforcement officers on United Nations sanctions and the use of Special Notices, building on the seminars already organized thanks to funding from the Canadian Government and collaboration with a monitoring team. We were interested to hear ideas put forward during the recent high-level review of United Nations sanctions, and remain keen to assist countries through our cross-border capabilities in boosting their capacity for implementation. INTERPOL has been privileged to enjoy a close working relationship with the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, with which we are in constant contact. We would like to take this opportunity to thank the Division for its unstinting work over the years, and look forward to continued excellent collaboration. In conclusion, this month INTERPOL celebrates 100 years of international police cooperation and has worked with the United Nations since 1949. Our long-standing collaboration with the Security Council sanctions committees has evolved over the years, and I am confident that it will continue to move from strength to strength.

I thank Mr. Stock for his briefing and congratulate INTERPOL on its 100th anniversary. I now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this important briefing to examine how the United Nations system can work concertedly to give greater effect to the sanctions decisions made by the Security Council. My delegation appreciates the excellent concept note you have provided to guide our discussions today (S/2014/793, annex). I also thank our briefers, Under-Secretary-General Feltman and Mr. Jürgen Stock, for their valuable and informative insights. Sanctions are a useful conflict-management tool and play an important role in ensuring compliance with our collective security architecture, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The evolving landscape in the approach to the maintenance of international peace and security has necessitated a commensurate modification of the imposition of measures to discourage the perpetration of conflict. The 15 United Nations sanctions regimes currently in place are designed to effectively achieve conflict resolution, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, democratization and the protection of civilians. On their own, however, they have been assessed as insufficient to induce compliance with Security Council resolutions. As sanctions regimes have become more targeted within the context of intra-State conflicts, the adverse humanitarian impacts of broad sanctions and a lack of precision has been, in our opinion, successfully surmounted. By focusing on spoilers, targeted sanctions have contributed to the avoidance of unintended adverse side effects of broad sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries. That effort to avoid collective punishment has enabled the Council to demonstrate its responsiveness to the human rights and humanitarian dimensions of its decisions. To ensure that sanctions remain an effective component of the Council’s toolkit to promote post- conflict stabilization, it is imperative that all actors involved in their implementation continue to adapt to the intricacies of the new threats to international peace and security. That implies that new partnerships and, in some cases, new strategies may be required to ensure effectiveness. We acknowledge the positive contributions of the Governments of Australia, Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden in facilitating the review of United Nations integration and coordination of sanctions to achieve that objective. We are confident that the assessment undertaken of current sanctions practices will provide a springboard for the development of practical, policy-oriented options that will enhance their implementation. It is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach will not be effective, and that sanctions regimes must be tailored to address specific situations. The Council must therefore, through the various panels of experts, assess the situation on the ground with a view to identifying ways to engender compliance. In certain situations, sanctions not involving the use of force, such as asset freezes and travel bans, can be a useful tool for the Security Council. Experience shows that they have indeed been instrumental in helping to fulfil mandates. There are also situations where sanctions have not quite achieved their purpose. A case in point is Guinea-Bissau. The sanctions regime in that case should be given more impetus, for example by appointing a panel of experts to monitor and report on the sanctions’ effectiveness. From a cost-benefit perspective, sanctions are a relatively low-cost option when considered against deploying peacekeeping operations. However, their effectiveness is compromised when regimes are not complied with. It is therefore essential that the Council ensure strict compliance with such regimes at all times. That is crucial to safeguard the Council’s credibility and helping to maintain its important role in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for taking the initiative to organize this very timely briefing on sanctions. I also thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman and Jürgen Stock, Secretary General of INTERPOL, for their detailed briefings. With the latest additions of sanctions, on Yemen and the Central African Republic, we now have a total of 15 sanctions regimes. While that is the highest number in history, sanctions remain a rather exceptional measure taken by the Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter with a view to maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Whether intended to coerce, constrain or deter, sanctions can serve their underlying purpose only when they are properly targeted and implemented. Even the best-designed sanctions regime will not have the desired effect when gaps persist in communication and the capacity to implement, or where there is a lack of political will to pursue that implementation. Communication, outreach and transparency in the work of the sanctions committees are paramount. My delegation believes that sanctions committees should actively engage with the countries concerned, consulting on the expectations and requirements in regard to sanctions implementation ,as well as in response to the needs and difficulties that arise as countries set out to implement the sanctions. Ongoing interaction is required, and not only with the country that gives its name to a sanctions committee and its immediate neighbours. The wider United Nations membership needs to be informed and engaged. Public briefings by chairs of sanctions committees should be standard, not an exception, and we are pleased to note that more chairs have chosen to hold public briefings this year. Only yesterday an open briefing by the Argentine Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan (see S/PV.7320) reinforced that upward trend. Results-oriented communication also requires readily accessible online information. We welcome and encourage further progress in developing sanctions committee websites available in all official United Nations languages. The regular use of press releases on sanctions committee work, available in languages other than English, is important. Visits by chairs of sanctions committees and assessment missions to the countries concerned should also be encouraged as a useful tool for enhancing awareness of sanctions regimes and compliance with them. Regarding the committees’ work, we have found it useful to engage with the Secretary-General’s thematic Special Representatives, including those on children and armed conflict and sexual violence in conflict, and with his Special Advisers on the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect. We also see added value in contacts and exchanges between relevant sanctions committees, panels of experts and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, as well as relevant commissions of inquiry. Close cooperation with INTERPOL, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other specialized bodies has been very useful and needs to be further developed. Likewise, we have also found it useful to hold joint meetings with other relevant subsidiary bodies of the Council, such as, for example, a joint meeting of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on Yemen, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. We believe such practice and synergies between relevant committees should be further explored and encouraged. With regard to implementation, we believe a change of attitude towards sanctions is needed so that sanctions regimes are taken as an opportunity for national and regional capacity-building. Better use should be made of reporting on sanctions implementation and committee dialogue with the countries concerned so as to identify countries’ capacity, training and technical assistance needs and enable them to seek practical help. Improved sanctions implementation capacities can also add to the overall improvement of countries’ ability to respond to wider security concerns. For example, assistance to border or financial controls in relation to sanctions implementation would also strengthen the capacity to tackle threats arising from terrorism, international organized crime and trafficking in and illicit flows of arms. In that regard, my delegation sees merit in establishing a dedicated unit within the Security Council Affairs Division tasked with improving the coordination and integration of sanctions implementation. In addition to providing better support to sanctions committees, such a unit would also improve the mobilization of technical assistance and capacity-building in response to needs articulated by individual Member States. That latter aspect would be particularly useful, since there are many potential assistance providers within the United Nations system, including the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, as well as specialized agencies such as ICAO and the International Maritime Organization, along with INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization, the Financial Action Task Force and others. With regard to the panels of experts and monitoring groups, even if sanctions regimes differ, in our view there is distinct added value in sharing relevant information, good practices and lessons learned, including on establishing patterns of trafficking of natural resources, illegal financial and arms flows, and identifying the movements, interdependence and affiliations of armed groups. Again, the existence of a dedicated unit would enable us to do that in a more coherent and systematic way. Periodic reporting on sanctions implementation by the Secretary-General would also be useful to highlight implementation challenges and in discussing how the Council can better address the coordination of sanctions regimes with other peace and security mechanisms and providing recommendations for improving coordination within the United Nations system and support to Member States. I would like to conclude by commenting briefly on the due-process mechanisms related to the sanctions regimes. In our view, due process must be a basic standard and an imperative in all such regimes. As has been noted on many previous occasions, the Office of the Ombudsperson is an important mechanism for improving the credibility of measures taken within the Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Providing similar mechanisms for review or redress would be important to all existing sanctions regimes, either by extending or replicating the Ombudsperson’s mandate or by applying other mechanisms to the same effect.

We are grateful for Australia’s initiative in bringing the subject of sanctions to the Security Council’s attention. We also thank Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, and Jürgen Stock, Secretary General of INTERPOL, for their briefings. We believe that the universal nature of the United Nations makes it the appropriate body for establishing and monitoring such measures. But beyond the differences that there may be in the Council in this regard, we see this meeting as an opportunity to evaluate the functioning of the multilateral-sanctions regimes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, especially if the idea is to discuss the elements that can facilitate their effective implementation. From the perspective of a developing country, it seems reasonable to us to identify and establish some criteria that are conducive to facilitating the implementation of sanctions, while always bearing in mind the different situations that exist on the ground. It is important to establish minimum thresholds of convergence that are applicable in different contexts. We value the concept of targeted sanctions, something that might seem obvious today but was not during our previous tenure on the Council, in 2003. We note that the sanctions have become more selective and focused, although they are being applied to a wider range of situations related to threats to international peace and security. In connection with the latter point, the intra-State nature of the majority of the current crises is a dimension that should also be considered. It is necessary to consider whether conflicts of that type deserve to be subject to sanctions by the Council. We should not ignore due process. We appreciate the attempts to improve the listing and delisting of individuals and entities on the sanctions lists, but we believe that challenges remain in adjusting those procedures. The adoption of resolution 1730 (2006) and the establishment of the focal point for delisting of names on the lists was a significant advance, but still insufficient. Therefore, we hope progress can be made in extending the mandate of the Ombudsperson of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities to other sanctions committees. We further believe that, to the degree that the situation allows, it is important to promote field visits by the sanctions committees and their chairs to verify on the ground and evaluate the implementation and compliance. We had the experience of doing that a few weeks ago as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, and it became clear that such visits are necessary to maintain a good dialogue and to bridge any gaps in perception between Headquarters and the field. The integration and coordination of sanctions implementation among the various United Nations agencies remains a central challenge. In that vein, we support the idea of creating a body for interaction among them. When it comes to the groups of experts, we appreciate the specific and objective contributions they make. It is our duty as a Council to provide clear guidelines for their work so that they can concentrate on what is really important. It is the duty of the Secretariat to prepare and provide appropriate conceptual tools to the new experts who join in those tasks. We reiterate our position that the members of the groups of experts should be elected because of their professional capacity, also taking into consideration the principle of equitable geographical representation and gender balance. We hope that there will soon be progress towards an agreement to replicate the selection system for short lists used by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Finally, we note that progress has been made in this area, for example through the establishment of a consolidated sanctions list, but there is still much room for improvement. We must take into account the experience of other entities, such as INTERPOL and regional and subregional organizations, in order to establish cooperation that will benefit the implementation of the sanctions adopted by the Council. Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I thank Australia for convening this briefing and for its work on trying to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. Australia was one of the main sponsors and contributors to the recent high-level review of United Nations sanctions, and your efforts, Mr. President, as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) show clearly that you are putting theory into practice. I also thank Mr. Feltman and the Secretary General of INTERPOL for their briefings this morning. As Mr. Feltman set out, sanctions are a vital foreign policy tool that can contribute to achieving United Nations objectives. They are used to prevent conflict, human rights abuses, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons. They have made a critical and positive difference in situations from Afghanistan to Yemen. It is incumbent on the Security Council to ensure that sanctions are used properly. That means designing them to have maximum and targeted impact and ensuring that they are implemented properly. Each sanctions regime is designed to achieve its own specific objective and has its own specific challenges. Sanctions have been used to support negotiations towards peace agreements and wider efforts to prevent conflict. We have seen that in the cases of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire sanctions. Even the threat of sanctions, as we saw with the build-up to the eventual creation of the Yemen sanctions regime, can make spoilers to peace and security think twice about their actions. Sanctions have also been used effectively to counter terrorism. The ability of Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups to operate has been significantly constrained by United Nations counter-terrorism sanctions. The United Nations has united to tackle the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and sanctions will help to degrade ISIL’s capability. Moreover, counter-proliferation sanctions have made it more difficult for some States to acquire goods that could aid the development of weapons of mass destruction. They have helped to restrict Iran’s access to proliferation-sensitive materials and technologies, and, with other economic sanctions, they have been important in bringing Iran to the negotiating table. Discussions between the E3+3 Governments and Iran have made progress in recent days. We have explored with Iran ways to bridge some of the significant gaps that remain. Both sides are committed to a deal and we still believe that that is possible, but Iran needs to show greater flexibility on its programme and to take some tough decisions if we are to achieve that. We need to sustain the momentum generated from recent rounds of discussion in order to secure the comprehensive agreement that is in everyone’s interests. Given that sanctions are increasingly being relied upon to tackle a variety of challenges, it is important that we consider how to make best use of them. The sanctions committees, the Secretariat and expert groups all have a role to play in this. Their work should mutually reinforce each other. They should continue to work together to ensure that sanctions help to achieve the political goals set out by the Security Council. I welcome Mr. Feltman’s recommendations to further improve sanctions’ procedures. We should look carefully at those recommendations. In addition, the United Kingdom believes that there is scope for the commitees themselves to be more active. We suggest that all committees should meet every six months at the level of deputy permanent representative or higher. That would bring a periodic discussion at a more strategic level, which could be an opportunity to review some of the longer-term aspects of the respective regimes. Are we closer to achieving our goals? How might we adjust the regime? What can we learn from implementation efforts to date? We also see scope for sharing best practice and lessons learned to cross the regimes. Visits by experts from capitals can contribute to the debate. We welcome the efforts by the presidency to set out ways to make best use of sanctions in a resolution. We strongly support that work and hope that we will be in a position to adopt the draft resolution in the very near future. Effective implementation is crucial. Without it, sanctions will not achieve their goals. It is worth restating that sanctions regimes established by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations place obligations on all Member States. That is vital, for example, when it comes to choking off support for ISIL in line with presidential statement S/PRST/2014/23, adopted by the Council on 19 November. Assistance on implementation should be made available to those unable to comply. Sharing information on challenges to effective implementation will help Member States in their own implementation. And we should name and shame those Member States that do not implement sanctions properly. We continue to be strong supporters of fair and clear procedures for United Nations sanctions regimes. For instance, we have supported the strengthening of due process provisions under the 1267 (1999) Al-Qaida regime. However, no two regimes are alike, so we need to tailor special solutions for each circumstance, rather than replicating an identical approach for all regimes. Sanctions remain a vital part of the Council’s toolbox. It is important that we continue to use sanctions in an appropriate manner ‑ targeted and aimed at signalling, constraining or coercing actors towards peaceful ends. In that way, smart sanctions can continue to be used in the long term as an effective tool of the Council in the support of the maintenance of international peace and security.

I would like to begin by thank the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the Secretary General of INTERPOL for their very specific and useful briefings. I also want to thank you, Mr. President, and Australia for your commitment to this issue and for organizing today’s debate. It allows us to consider sanctions, a tool increasingly used by the Security Council. Last week, on 19 November, Ansar al-Sharia Derna and Ansar al-Sharia Benghazi were placed under sanctions. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities thereby showed its vital role in support of the political process carried out in Libya by Special Representative Bernardino León. The designation of Ansar al-Sharia sends a clear message to the terrorists: it confirms the determination of the international community, and it encourages moderate Islamists to distance themselves from terrorists and to rejoin the political dialogue. Increasingly, Security Council sanctions are a way of assisting States in restoring stability. That was one of the goals of the Security Council this year when it established a new sanctions regime in the Central African Republic. In imposing sanctions against individuals who threaten the return to peace and in restricting the flow of arms or trafficking in natural resources, the international community is assisting the Central African Republic in its stabilization process. Indeed, sanctions are not an end in and of themselves. They are a tool at our disposal to achieve a political objective. In that context, the application of sanctions requires maintaining a firm attitude while remaining open to dialogue as part of a dual approach. As I said earlier, sanctions are not punitive but rather preventive instruments. The Security Council is not a judge and has no intention of becoming one, but it does bear the responsibility to maintain international peace and security. It is clear that sanctions are an important instrument at the Security Council’s disposal in exercising its responsibilities. We welcome the increased use by the Council of this tool, and it is a positive development that its usage has evolved in recent years. Sanctions are now targeted, and procedural guarantees have been put in place. Among the procedural guarantees, mechanisms aimed at enabling the delisting of persons are key, as stressed earlier by Jeffrey Feltman. It is vital to respect the fundamental freedoms of listed persons and to ensure that the regimes have adequate procedural guarantees. That is why France supported the establishment of a focal point for delisting requests regarding the other sanctions regimes and the gradual strengthening of the Ombudsperson’s mandate within the Al-Qaida sanctions Committee, who is working specifically on the issue of persons seeking to be delisted. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the high quality of the work carried out by the Ombudsperson. Moreover, sanctions lists are useful only if they accurately reflect the status of the threat. Sanctions must therefore be based on a political strategy that is continuously being tailored to the context. Here I wish to highlight the specificity of each of the various sanctions regimes. It is vital that sanctions be implemented in a universal manner. Here cooperation between INTERPOL and the sanctions Committees has been exemplary. The establishment of special INTERPOL- United Nations notices allows the services responsible for the application of the law around the world to be informed of whether an individual or entity is subject to Security Council sanctions. With the threat posed by the issue of foreign terrorist combatants and in the framework of the struggle against Daesh, this type of mechanism is all the more vital. Finally, the private sector, like States, has a key role to play in the implementation of sanctions regimes. It would be desirable if the United Nations and Member States stepped up their dialogue with the private sector. Economic operators should be encouraged to adopt good practices in terms of the application of sanctions in the form of the implementation of specific prevention measures and through increased cooperation with public authorities, in order to facilitate the interception of illicit merchandise and combat trafficking. All measures that can be taken to assist States in their efforts to implement that goal must be supported. Sanctions are the only instruments at our disposal that contain a coercive dimension but that do not include the use of force. They are valuable instruments that help us to shoulder our responsibilities in the area of peace and security, and it is in our interest to improve their effectiveness and universality.

Allow me to begin by thanking Under-Secretary- General Jeffrey Feltman and the Secretary General of INTERPOL, Mr. Jürgen Stock, for their briefings. Mr. President, as stressed in the concept note (S/2014/793, annex) that your delegation prepared for this meeting, the role of sanctions in the collective security framework enshrined in the Charter has evolved significantly over the past 25 years, as has the way in which the Council uses them. Sanctions have become measures targeted against individuals and entities with particular responsibility for the situation that the Council seeks to address. Likewise, the Council is increasingly aware of the need to avoid consequences for the population at large. We deem it important to bear in mind that sanctions are a tool that the Charter provided to the Council in given circumstances that threaten international peace and security. They are therefore temporary in nature, since they are designed to be lifted when the objective sought in each case in achieved. Argentina considers that, as the Security Council moves more decisively towards the use of sanctions to fulfil its mandate to maintain international peace and security, it must comprehensively deal with the need to improve the administration, design and monitoring of sanctions policies. We are grateful for and welcome Australia’s initiative to convene this meeting, which gives us the opportunity to address the issue of sanctions in a comprehensive manner. We believe that the Council should continue to consider the issue periodically to assess the impact of the measures, the challenges faced in terms of implementation and improvements that could contribute to increasing their effectiveness and ensure respect for due process. We also believe that the debate on this issue should be extended to all Member States, which, ultimately, are responsible for applying the measures imposed by the Council. Argentina has repeatedly expressed its firm conviction that the maintenance of international peace and security should take place in the framework of the rule of law and respect for due process. The measures that the Council adopts to maintain international peace and security, including sanctions, must fully respect international law, especially international human rights law, international humanitarian law and the rights of refugees. Such measures should also respect the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, the political independence of States and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Likewise, Argentina advocates respect for due process in the work of the Council. That is why resolution 1904 (2009) deserves special mention, which established the Office of the Ombudsperson as an independent and impartial figure that considers the requests of persons, groups, companies and entities that wish to be removed from the list drawn up by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. The establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson represented substantive progress in terms of due process, but Members of the Organization continue to have concerns with regard to the procedural guarantees of sanctions regimes. One of the most important causes for concern is the fact that the mandate of the Ombudperson includes only individuals appearing on the list of the Al-Qaida sanctions Committee. Of even greater concern is the fact that, as the Ombudsperson indicated during the debate on working methods held on 23 October, “there is no evident rationale as to why an independent review mechanism is made available to one set of individuals subject to targeted sanctions, but not to others. That is particularly the case when the matter is considered from the perspective of those subject to the sanctions” (S/PV.7285, p. 2). As we also noted during the aforementioned debate, Argentina advocates extending the mandate of that Office to all sanctions committees of the Council, adapting its structure to the need to address a larger number of cases. We understand that the Council should discuss the issue of due process in sanctions with the intention of improving it, both to enhance respect for individual rights of those subject to those measures and to strengthen the credibility of the various regimes and advance their implementation by Member States. In improving due process in the sanctions regimes, while recognizing the existence of the mechanism of the focal point, we believe that by its very nature and structure it does not have the basic features needed to serve as a mechanism for independent review. We therefore believe that the Council should seek to strengthen the Office of the Ombudsperson and ensure that it has the necessary resources to carry out its work. In that context, we understand that, even from a structural point of view, the Office must have administrative and contractual arrangements that in practice provide institutional safeguards that ensure its necessary independence. I wish to refer to the process for the selection of experts who are part of groups that support the committees in carrying out their work. We believe people with experience and the necessary training should be selected so that each committee may fulfil its mandate and that geographical distribution and gender balance should be respected. We also understand that the process to identify the most qualified candidates should be transparent. As in other aspects, transparency in the selection of experts will bring greater credibility to their work and to the sanctions committees. Therefore, we are convinced that the various committees should know which candidates have been submitted and should have the relevant information about their experience and training. In addition, we believe that the committees should participate in the selection of experts after a first intervention by the Secretariat and take the decision on each available opening, as in the case of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) . In closing, I wish to reiterate that Argentina strongly opposes the use of unilateral coercive measures, the extraterritorial application of domestic trade laws and the adoption of discriminatory trade practices, as they are measures in violation of the United Nations Charter, the rules of international law and the spirit of multilateralism. Therefore I want to recall that it is the United Nations that has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as the cornerstone of the multilateral system. Argentina is convinced that multilateral action through the United Nations, in conformity with the principles of the Organization, will allow us to address the threats to the international peace and security in an effective manner and to achieve a safer world for all.

I thank you, Mr. President, for organizing today’s debate on sanctions. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, and the Secretary General of INTERPOL, Mr. Jürgen Stock, for their briefings. Measures targeting individuals or entities that the Security Council has taken over 25 years are a recent development in the area of sanctions. They are designed to protect civilian populations and to punish those who are alleged to have committed acts that violate international humanitarian law or human rights law. They also now used to fight terrorism, limit the flow of arms and protect children. Therefore, these sanctions are a valuable tool for maintaining peace and international security. Generally speaking, however, the practice of sanctions still has many shortcomings, particularly in terms of respect for due process and human rights guarantees during the process of listing and delisting. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson and the procedures established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) have helped to improve the situation, but corrective measures are still needed. For that reason, the practice of sanctions is constantly being challenged. Recently, in the last debate on the Council’s working methods, on 23 October 2014 (S/PV.7285), the members expressed the need to continue in that direction. If problems involving respect for human rights arise with regard to listing and delisting procedures during the adoption of sanctions, the question of their effectiveness comes up more strongly, as effectiveness depends on their implementation. You opened the debate on that aspect of the question today, Mr. President. The high- level review of sanctions that your Mission sponsored, with the participation of several other Missions and organizations, highlighted the various issues related to implementing sanctions at different levels. It showed the weakness in the coordination and monitoring both among the 15 sanctions committees and between them and other bodies in charge of sanctions. Considerable difficulties are also evident in the implementation of sanctions at the national level. The issue of capacity-building and strengthening technical expertise at this level and the lack of funding are also obstacles to the successful implementation of sanctions. The Council should take measures to solve these problems, including by improving dialogue and information-sharing in the United Nations system, regional organizations and countries affected by sanctions. Those countries should receive more technical assistance and assistance in building the capacity needed to implement sanctions. United Nations missions on the ground should be more deeply involved in information exchange with the sanctions committees and expert groups. Coordination with United Nations agencies and regional and intergovernmental organizations could also be strengthened. However, we believe that given the overlapping technical and political aspects of sanctions implementation, those measures will not really achieve their objectives unless they are implemented with good collaboration with regional organizations and in strict respect for national laws and the sovereignty of the countries concerned. It also seems wise to us to use other methods provided for under the Charter, such as dialogue and mediation. We welcome the effective and efficient cooperation between the United Nations and INTERPOL in the implementation of sanctions. The discussions we are having today will definitely contribute to deeper thinking on the necessity of adopting measures to improve the effectiveness of sanctions through better implementation.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman and Secretary General Stock of INTERPOL for their briefings. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council shoulders the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. For many years, the Council has used a combination of measures, including sanctions, in response to various security threats and in pushing for a proper settlement of the relevant issues through peaceful means and has had positive results. In its practice, the Council has also continued to evaluate its experiences, both positive and negative, and has gradually formed a complete system for sanctions implementation through the important role it has played. Meanwhile, in formulating, applying and enforcing sanctions, the Council is also facing a series of problems and challenges. In addition, a small number of countries act at will according their domestic laws and impose or threaten to impose unilateral sanctions against other States, which is not only in violation of the principle of sovereign equality among Member States but also undermine the authority of Council sanctions. As to how the Council can best utilize the mechanism of sanctions, I would like to make three points. First, the pre-eminence of the Charter of the United Nations over sanctions should be safeguarded. The Council should strictly comply with the provisions of the Charter and adopt a prudent and responsible attitude on the question of sanctions. In coping with situations of concern, the Council should give priority to such tools as mediation, good offices and negotiations. The enforcement of sanctions should be predicated on the exhaustion of other non-coercive means and should be in keeping with the principles of the United Nations Charter and relevant international law. Sanctions should not be a tool for one country to use in pursuit of power politics. The domestic law of one country should not become the basis for sanctions against other States. China is opposed to any practice of imposing sanctions on other countries on the basis of one’s domestic law. Secondly, we should adhere to the overall pattern of sanctions serving political settlements, as sanctions are not the goal but the means. The Council’s sanctions should be based on the overall goal of achieving a political settlement of the issue in question. In the course of the formulation, application and enforcement of sanctions, the need for a political settlement should be taken into account at all times and the actions taken should be truly conducive to an easing of tensions and to furthering the efforts for mediation and good offices by the countries and regional organizations in question. Sanctions should not be carried out for their own sake, much less interfere with efforts for political settlement — that would be penny wise and pound foolish and would put the cart before the horse. Thirdly, it is imperative to maintain the existing sanctions implementation system. Currently, sanctions are generally an effective tool for the Council. An implementation system has taken shape, which is comprised of implementation by Member States, guidance and supervision by the sanctions committees and professional support by the panels of experts. Since imposing sanctions is a power given to the Council by the Charter of the United Nations, at is imperative for Member States to maintain their ownership of the issue of sanctions. As the various sanctions regimes have been established in response to various situations, discussions on sanctions should focus on the differences among the various sanctions regimes, and the implementation of sanctions should be tailored to specific situations, and we should avoid one-size-fits- all approaches. Meanwhile, the improvement and perfection of the existing system of sanctions implementation should prioritize increasing the relevance and effectiveness of the sanctions, and efforts should be made to minimize the negative impact of sanctions on the general population and third-party States. The Council should not just add sanctions; it should also reduce them. In the light of the developments in the countries in question, it should regularly assess sanctions results and, based on the needs, amend, suspend and ultimately lift sanctions. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has consistently adopted a prudent and responsible approach towards issues involving sanctions and has been pushing for greater relevance and effectiveness in the Council’s sanctions regime in order to serve the overall interest of the political settlement of the relevant questions. We are ready to join the other members of the Council and the wider United Nations membership in pushing for a Security Council that will better fulfil its responsibilities and contribute positively and constructively to the maintenance of common security and lasting peace around the world.

I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for having taken the initiative to organize this briefing. Luxembourg shares Australia’s view of the importance of a proper implementation of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. That is even more important now, as the number of sanctions regimes has never been higher. We hope that a draft resolution that will allow us to strengthen and better coordinate the United Nations system’s capacity to implement the sanctions regimes will be adopted as soon as possible. I would also like to thank the Under-Secretary- General for Political Affairs, Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, and the Secretary General of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Mr. Jürgen Stock, for their very informative briefings and their concrete recommendations. Luxembourg has actively participated in the work of the high-level review of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, and we await the final document of that process with interest. We thank Australia in particular for having chaired the working group on integration and coordination within the United Nations system. As Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, I fully agree with the objective of achieving better coordination within the Secretariat and better awareness among Member States. This is not about affecting the primacy of the Security Council or constraining the sanctions committees, but about streamlining their work, making the support to Committees more effective and improving the implementation of the measures imposed by the Council. The efforts of the Department of Political Affairs, especially the Security Council Affairs Division, to that end are commendable. To move forward, we support the idea of establishing a coordination and policy unit within the Security Council Affairs Division. The unit would be responsible for identifying good practices and facilitating exchanges of such practices among the various sanctions committees, managing the roster of experts and the consolidated sanctions list, and identifying and mobilizing within the United Nations system the expertise required for the effective implementation of sanctions. The unit could also support the Security Council’s efforts and those of its subsidiary bodies aimed at providing practical guidance to Member States, building their capacity and providing them with technical assistance for the implementation of sanctions. We commend the work done by the Secretariat to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists and establish a consolidated list of Security Council sanctions in all the official languages of the Organization, to facilitate their implementation by Member States. To go further, each committee should be responsible for maintaining and publishing a document that consolidates all existing measures for the regime being applied. That would further enhance the readability of sanctions for Member States and private sector actors. The assistance of panels of experts is essential to allowing sanctions committees to fully discharge the mandates entrusted to them by our Council. All panels of experts must receive the administrative and technical support needed to do their jobs. Similarly, Member States and all stakeholders should be encouraged to cooperate fully with the panels of experts, including by providing them with any information they have about possible violations of sanctions. This cooperation is essential to ensuring the safety of experts and unhindered access for them, particularly the access to persons, documents and sites necessary to successfully carry out their mandate. We also believe that the Council and its sanctions committees could benefit from increased interaction with the relevant international and regional organizations. I will cite as one example the cooperation between INTERPOL and several sanctions committees concerning the publication of Special Notices. Secretary General Stock has just described the scope of those notices. Luxembourg supports that tool for disseminating information that educates Member States on their obligations under the sanctions regimes. In the spirit of enhancing the coherence of the work of the various sanctions committees, we hope that all committees will be able to cooperate with INTERPOL in the future. In its resolutions establishing sanctions on Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Security Council has recognized the value of standards and further guidance from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the implementation of financial sanctions. The FATF recommendations provide useful guidance to Member States on the requirements they must meet in order to effectively implement these restrictive measures. The FATF guidelines also provide particularly useful guidance to banks and other financial institutions, which are on the front lines, so to speak, in terms of sanctions implementation. In our view, it is also essential that, in its management of sanctions regimes, the Security Council take into account its cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC). A practical way to do this would be to include individuals subject to an arrest warrant from the ICC on the lists of relevant sanctions committee of the Security Council. Let me conclude my remarks by turning to a matter that quite rightly figures in the concept note (S/2014/793, annex) that you circulated, Sir, prior to this meeting. I am talking about the reconciliation of sanctions with the principles of the rule of law, in particular respect for due process and for human rights. Targeted sanctions are an important tool of the Security Council. They are intended to apply restrictive measures against individuals or entities that contribute to threats against international peace and security. But if sanctions are to be effective, the processes of listing and delisting must be guided by the principles of fairness, respect for the rule of law, credibility and transparency. The establishment and strengthening of the tools of the Ombudsperson for the Al-Qaida sanctions regime helped to affirm these principles. As an independent and effective sanctions review mechanism, the Office of the Ombudsperson plays an indispensable role to ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of the sanctions list. At present, only individuals and entities on the list of sanctions against Al-Qaida have access to the Ombudsperson. Yet individuals and entities covered by other sanctions committees should also be entitled to fair process. That is why I would like to reaffirm the conviction of Luxembourg that the Security Council should expand the mandate of the Ombudsperson to cover the other sanctions regimes.

I thank the Australian presidency for organizing this briefing on the evolution of sanctions. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman and INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock for their informative briefings. We share the view that, together with Peacekeeping Operations, sanctions are a useful tool for the Security Council in achieving the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, especially in maintaining international peace and security. The increase in Security Council sanctions resolutions over the past two decades demonstrates their necessity and the international community’s support for their utilization in response to threats to peace and security. We emphasize that all Member States are obligated to implement Security Council resolutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. As mentioned in the concept note before us (S/2014/793, annex) and in the briefings, today’s sanctions regimes are evolving and defined by their targeted application. They stand in contrast to the comprehensive trade and economic embargoes of the past. Sanctions are now applied not only to assist conflict resolution, but also to address a wide variety of security challenges, including counter-terrorism, violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, despite the development of sanctions by the Council, gaps still remain. The level of understanding of sanctions and the implementation capabilities of Member States, as well as the resources of the Secretariat, seem to lag behind this evolving trend. With regard to the Security Council sanctions, we would like to emphasize the following several points. First, Security Council sanctions must be effective. If we fail to ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, they lose their raison d’être. By their nature, sanctions are a means to achieve a specific goal. We should bear in mind that this can only be achieved when sanctions are effective enough. Secondly, the Security Council must improve Member States’ understanding of the obligations imposed by Security Council sanctions. Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations are binding, but this does not in itself automatically lead to implementation. Sanctions will only be effective when implementation by Member States and cooperation by international and regional organizations, as well as from the private sector converge. In this vein, the sanctions committees should utilize more open briefings to explain the sanction regimes to the broader United Nations membership and facilitate the exchange of views. The committees and their groups of experts should engage in proactive outreach to further clarify the measures to various actors on the ground and to hear their input on challenges they face or good practices that they may have developed. Thirdly, the Republic of Korea shares the view that there is a growing need to support capacity-building of Member States in order to assist implementation efforts. Such support is necessary because States face different challenges and operate in different environments. While the responsibility to implement sanctions lies with Member States, the sanctions committees and the Secretariat have important roles in assisting Member States to fulfil their obligations. Today’s briefing is a part of an ongoing process to calibrate and strengthen sanctions implementation as an important policy tool of the Security Council. We look forward to continued consultations among actors, including the Security Council, its subsidiary committees, the groups of experts, the Secretariat and relevant international organizations and civil society with a view to enhancing Security Council sanctions as an effective tool for maintaining international peace and security.

At the outset, I would like to thank you, Sir, for your initiative in convening this briefing on the evaluation of sanctions. Such initiative has been a hallmark of your presidency and of Australia’s tenure in the Security Council. It is also a coherent follow-up to your close engagement in the recently concluded high-level review of United Nations sanctions, which was sponsored by your country, together with Greece, Norway and Sweden. The high level of participation by Member States, including my country, and other stakeholders in the high-level review was a strong recognition of the important role United Nations sanctions can play in the maintenance of international peace and security. The review also reminded us that improving the effectiveness of sanctions requires a constant dialogue with those affected and those in charge of their implementation. I welcome the briefings delivered by Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who heads the Department that is the focal point of the United Nations system on sanctions issues, and by Mr. Jürgen Stock, Secretary General of INTERPOL  — an important partner in the effective implementation of sanctions imposed by the Council. I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Stock on his appointment. Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is empowered with an important set of tools that it can use to carry out its mandate, and sanctions are among them. Sanctions have become more targeted and more sophisticated so as better to serve their remedial and preventative purposes. From 1966, when the Security Council first imposed sanctions, on Southern Rhodesia, as stated by our friend Jeffrey Feltman, to most recently, when targeted sanctions were imposed in Yemen in 2014 against those obstructing its stability, sanctions have continuously evolved in order to respond to emerging threats to peace and security. However, we all recognize that the first condition for the effectiveness of a sanctions regime is to ensure that they are fully and faithfully implemented by Member States. The increasing sophistication and complexity of the targeted sanctions measures that we enact require that we account for the practical challenges associated with implementation, which in our view include the following. First, we know that the legally binding nature of the Council’s sanctions is not in itself sufficient to ensure their effective implementation. A commitment to compliance requires that sanctions be perceived as just and contributing to peace and security. However, what is often the case on the ground is the lack of knowledge about sanctions and the perception that they are punitive rather than preventive. We therefore see a need to establish, throughout the life of a sanctions regime, effective communication between the sanctions committees and the affected countries and regions on the purpose of the sanctions. A regional consensus on the necessity and legitimacy of a sanctions regime can go a long way towards ensuring that they are effectively implemented. Secondly, presently the large majority of sanctions regimes are in Africa. Very often, the targeted States and their neighbours do not have the institutional capacity to implement the sanctions. It is therefore a challenge to translate those measures into a national regulatory system. There is thus a need to renew efforts and focus on ensuring that those crucial actors are better assisted in capacity-building and accessing technical assistance. Thirdly, as we know, the range of actors involved in the implementation of sanctions is broad and continues to expand as the sanctions evolve. Therefore, the Council should encourage cooperation and coordination with neighbouring States, regional and subregional organizations, and international organizations. All those stakeholders must join efforts to first and foremost promote the basic principle that sanctions are intended to help Member States, not to undermine them. Fourthly, I would wish to make some recommendations as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. For example, the decision that the sanctions committees should be chaired by newly elected members should be made at an early stage. That would allow members to prepare adequately, as they do not have time for an appropriate hand-over from the outgoing chairpersons of the subsidiary bodies, or to choose their national experts to be included in their Security Council teams. Incoming members also need to avail themselves, at an early stage, of comprehensive information on the sanctions regime. We are provided only with initial information by the Security Council Affairs Division, which I commend here. It is done only towards the end of November or December, which can be very helpful, but one basically learns on the job while already assuming the chairmanship of the sanctions committees. We therefore call on the Council to change the system to give more time for the preparation of new members, which should be adequately informed on the sanctions implementation mechanisms and given the means to keep track of the evolution of sanctions. My fifth and last point is on the groups or panels of experts. We underscore their crucial support for the work of the sanctions committees, acting as their eyes and ears on the ground. It is therefore important to have minimum standards for the selection and training process for those experts, which also need to reflect a balanced geographical distribution. It is also important that experts execute their mandate in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. As we have stated in the past, Member States play a critical role in the implementation of sanctions. It is therefore essential that when they are mentioned in the report of a group or panel of experts, they be provided with an opportunity to review the preliminary draft of the report and put forward relevant comments and responses they may have, with a view to enabling the group or panel to adjust the conclusion by reflecting the positions of the said Member States in the reports. That is a fundamental and indispensable step in legitimizing the procedural and substantive components of the reporting of the groups or panels of experts. We note that such a heightened standard can serve only to increase the credibility of those groups or panels of experts, and to bolster the collaborative efforts of the Member States and the sanctions committees. To conclude, Rwanda reiterates its views that Security Council sanctions play a prominent role in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. We further believe that the Council can benefit from holding regular meetings or briefings on the general issues of sanctions, with the participation of national, regional and international actors, in order to take on the challenges that come with the effective use of sanctions.

We thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman and INTERPOL Secretary General Mr. Stock for their interesting briefings. For our part, we would like to note the following. Sanctions are one of the most important instruments at the disposal of the international community in the interests of resolving crisis situations. Moreover, in introducing them it is the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council to identify clear and precise objectives, as defined by the Charter of the United Nations. In taking an appropriate decision, the Security Council needs to take into account that sanctions must be proportionate to the threats to international peace and security. The imposition of sanctions, especially comprehensive ones, is a very harsh and a double-edged measure. They should not be allowed to be a mechanism for collective punishment affecting the well-being of the population of a given country, and undermining the legitimate interests of third countries. Given all the possible negative consequences of sanctions, their introduction should be a last resort to be taken only in cases where all other methods of political persuasion have been exhausted, and when the Security Council determines the presence of a genuine threat to international peace and security. Both at the preparation stages and in the implementation of sanctions, it is critical to make an objective assessment of the socioeconomic and humanitarian impact of the measures introduced. We should not create a situation in which sanctions cause unacceptable suffering for civilians, especially the most vulnerable, when they effectively turn into an instrument for human rights violations. Sanctions must be targeted and calibrated. In that regard, we believe that any sanctions decisions of the Council should necessarily be open to periodic adjustment, suspension or lifting in the light of the humanitarian situation and of whether those targeted have responded to the Security Council’s demands. They must be able to see a light at the end of the tunnel. Lately, there has been much talk of the need to improve the effectiveness of the mechanism of the Security Council’s restrictive measures and to strengthen the capacities of Member States with respect to their implementation, which has allegedly been inconsistent. We do not share that concern. There may be some problems, but they are not of a systemic nature, as some would like us to believe, including the apologists who would like to tighten the so-called sanctions screw. Instead, they are linked to an absence of good will on the part of certain Member States with respect to fulfilling their obligations under the decisions of the Council. We look favourably on all rational proposals concerning ways to optimize the practices for upholding Security Council sanctions, but we believe that it would be unwise and harmful to periodically toss around ideas, especially those not supported by convincing arguments, regarding the creation of additional bureaucratic barriers, whether inter-State or at the level of the Secretariat. Moreover, what we detect in such initiatives is not simply the danger of creating excessive red tape but an attempt to consolidate the approaches of a narrow group of States with regard to the issue of sanctions, as well as to infringe on the exclusive prerogatives of the Security Council itself with respect to sanctions. Nevertheless, in the spirit of constructive discussion of ways to improve the effectiveness of sanctions. we might explore the underutilized mechanism of the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions, whose work, in its day, made a significant contribution to improving the work of the relevant Council committees. We firmly believe that the issue of sanctions falls within the purview and exclusive competence of the United Nations Member States. The Secretariat has nothing to do with issues relating to the implementation and development of relevant recommendations. If Member States require any kind of assistance in implementing a given sanctions regime, they are fully entitled to directly address the relevant sanctions committee with regard to necessary clarifications and assistance. That is all the more true inasmuch as each sanctions regime is, by its very nature, unique and specific. In discussing the issue of sanctions, we should not overlook other important issues, such as the illegitimacy of unilateral sanctions or the fact that it is unacceptable to use existing Security Council sanctions to arbitrarily intensify or develop restrictive measures at the national or regional levels. We categorically oppose arbitrary, expansive interpretations of the Security Council sanctions regime. Unfortunately, there has been a number of attempts via unilateral restrictions to circumvent the Security Council. We believe that such actions only undermine the system of international relations and torpedo political and diplomatic efforts in the quest to resolve crisis situations. Moreover, such actions are often of an extraterritorial nature, violating the sovereignty of third States and their lawful interests, in particular with regard to foreign trade. The Russian Federation stands ready to participate in the collective task of improving the sanctions regime. However, such an undertaking will have added value only if certain well known States abandon the futile practice of unilateral restrictions. It is time to end the practice of diktat in the international arena.

At the outset, I wish to extend Jordan’s appreciation to Australia for convening this meeting and for organizing the high- level review of United Nations sanctions, bearing in mind that the last review took place in 2006. I would also like to express my thanks to Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and to the Secretary General of INTERPOL, Mr. Jürgen Stock. Jordan appreciates Australia’s efforts to comprehensively review the sanctions regimes, including initiating targeted measures, improving procedures and assessing the position of States affected by sanctions aimed at preserving international peace and security. Sanctions regimes have become multiple and intricate. The challenge of our deliberations under the high-level review has been to build on the progress in sanctions policy that has occurred in recent years through improved procedures for listing and de-listing, as well as the use of panels of experts for monitoring technical sanctions and arms embargoes. Our discussions have revealed that there is room for improvement in the process of consultation and coordination within the United Nations system, including the Security Council, the sanctions committees and the concerned Member States. The same conclusion applies to issues relating to technical assistance and capacity-building, which have been identified as key obstacles to the optimization of United Nations sanctions. It is undeniable that developing countries face the greatest burden with respect to enforcing sanctions throughout Africa and the Middle East. They need to address significant challenges that include the need to enhance their capacity to monitor and implement increasingly technical and targeted measures over long and porous borders, as well as to improve their data systems. To address such tasks, my delegation hopes that the Security Council, together with the sanctions committees and the Secretariat, will be able lay the foundation for an institutional dialogue among assistance providers, donors and adversely affected States, through which the former may be able and willing to provide sanctions-related assistance for clearly identified needs. In that respect, we welcome the idea of establishing a voluntary United Nations sanctions trust fund to aid such endeavours and proactively involve recipient States concerning their needs. More importantly, Jordan hopes that the Security Council will be able to pave the way for developing a structured approach, as envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations, for close cooperation between the adversely affected States — both targeted and neighbouring States — and the sanctions committees. To that end, there needs to be a systematic dialogue that can identify the views, burdens and needs of the concerned States from the moment that such measures are imposed. That is becoming all the more important inasmuch as a considerable number of affected States implementing sanctions are failed or fragile States at best. In other words, the main issue is not simply to provide technical assistance, but also to pay attention to States and regions that are disproportionately burdened. In order to enable them to fulfil their obligations under the Charter, it is vital to work cooperatively with them towards finding sustainable solutions that address their needs.

The United States thanks Secretary General Stock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their informative briefings. We are grateful to Australia for its efforts to focus the Security Council’s attention on strengthening the implementation of United Nations sanctions. We share Australia’s view that the Council should be constantly evaluating the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions and asking how they can be improved. As United Nations sanctions have become more targeted in recent years, their implementation has also become more challenging. Today, United Nations sanctions resolutions often contain multiple technically complex provisions, such as asset freezes, travel bans, arms embargoes, cargo inspections, natural-resource bans, maritime interdiction authorizations and bans on luxury goods. They have the capacity to target narrower groups than before and focus on non-State as well as Government actors. And sanctions targets have grown more adept at evading them. The growing complexity of sanctions regimes, and the increasing sophistication of attempts to evade them, necessitates a greater degree of coordination in enforcing sanctions. At the same time, as sanctions have become more challenging to implement, the Council relies on them more than ever before in responding to global threats. We need sanctions to be effective. Just look at some of the places and ways we use sanctions today. Sanctions make it harder for the terrorist group Al-Shabaab to fill its coffers through the environmentally ruinous charcoal trade; sanctions help obstruct the efforts of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to use the international financial system to fund its horrendous and destabilizing terrorism and violence and recruit foreign terrorist fighters into its ranks; sanctions limit illicit arms flows to post-conflict States such as Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. Earlier this month, sanctions supported Yemen’s transitional Government by marginalizing spoilers. In conflicts where armed groups have committed unspeakable atrocities against civilians, such as the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, sanctions have imposed a significant cost on such groups’ leaders, limiting their mobility and targeting their assets. Sanctions have helped stop North Korea from acquiring sensitive nuclear technology and were a major factor in getting Iran to the negotiating table. Of course, that is not to say that sanctions alone are the silver bullet for complex crises. They must be part of a broader strategy for exerting pressure on bad actors. But what is certain is that without sanctions, each of these challenges to our collective security would be much more acute and harder to contain. In spite of all of this, some see sanctions as unfair or illegitimate — unfair, because sanctions may have a broader impact beyond the individuals or groups they are intended to target; and illegitimate, because they question the very idea that the Security Council should be able to impose such measures. Both critiques are flawed. While it is true that in the past sanctions were at times a blunt instrument where a more precise one was needed, the Security Council has come a long way towards significantly reducing the unintended humanitarian effects of such measures, including through precision targeting, humanitarian exemptions and fair and clear sanctioning procedures. Meanwhile, those who question the right to impose sanctions and the grounds on which they are based are very often the ones who are violating international norms and laws, and who see little obligation to abide by the collective standards we have all embraced. In addition, by imposing sanctions on those who break international laws and standards — the proliferators, arms smugglers, human rights abusers, traffickers in conflict minerals, terrorists and their financiers — we deepen respect for key principles of our international system. Tough, effective sanctions can change behaviour without resorting to the use of force, helping to avoid the horrific consequences of war. If sanctions are to be effective, they must be implemented. In recent years, however, enforcement of those measures has not kept pace with their increasing value for the Security Council’s work. Implementation gaps undermine the Council’s efforts and exacerbate threats. That is why Australia’s work on focusing the Council, through these briefings and a draft resolution aimed at improving implementation of United Nations sanctions, is so critical. In the spirit of that draft resolution, we propose two goals for improving sanctions enforcement. First, the Security Council should continue to encourage all parts of the United Nations system to foster and facilitate full implementation of United Nations sanctions. Field missions, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Force Commanders and United Nations mediators should be working hand in hand with the relevant sanctions committees. Diverse parts of the United Nations system should consider the ways in which effective sanctions implementation can directly support their efforts to build more peaceful, stable societies. Secondly, the Security Council should devote more attention to helping States enforce United Nations sanctions. We frequently hear from States that they sometimes lack the guidance and capacity to implement those measures effectively, as is required under the Charter of the United Nations. Instead of just piling on more obligations that cannot be implemented, the Council should explore mechanisms designed to provide States with the help they need. The draft resolution on United Nations sanctions includes some practical ideas on how to do this, such as establishing a sanctions policy coordination unit within the Department of Political Affairs that would support better communication between the Council and the States implementing these measures. Over time, we hope this conversation will lead to more initiatives to bolster State capacity in this area. In conclusion, I would again like to welcome the renewed focus on this critical tool. As today’s threats to peace become more complex and multifaceted, the Council must continually review and improve all means at its disposal, including sanctions. We should seek to ensure that all our tools — peacekeeping, mediation, dialogue, engagement and, yes, sanctions — are being used together to common purpose and in the pursuit of peace.

I will now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Australia. I would first like to thank Jeffrey Feltman, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Jürgen Stock, the Secretary General of INTERPOL, for their very helpful and forward-looking briefings on how the United Nations system can best operationalize the Council’s sanctions decisions. Today more than ever, sanctions are at the very heart of the collective security framework of the Charter of the United Nations. They are the instrument the Council relies on increasingly to maintain and restore international peace and security. As Mr. Feltman said this morning, we now have the highest number of sanctions in the history of the United Nations, and, as several speakers have said today, they are an exceptionally adaptable instrument, bolstering States recovering from conflict, protecting vulnerable populations from the predations of armed groups and terrorists, preventing a State’s natural resources being abused for the benefit of insurgents and criminal networks and blocking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The reason the Council relies so much on sanctions is that they are recognized by all Council members as the only effective tool, short of more interventionist measures, for maintaining and restoring international peace and security. In turn, the general United Nations membership is increasingly recognizing the preventive and protective character of sanctions. It is therefore in the interests of the Council and all Member States to ensure that the measures the Council decides on are implemented effectively. As others have pointed out, Australia, together with Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden, has sponsored the high-level review of United Nations sanctions conducted over the past six months. Our contribution to the review has been to lead consultations on how the United Nations system itself comes together, internally and with Member States, to give effect to the Council’s sanctions regimes. We have consulted primarily with Member States to which sanctions currently apply, as well as with their immediate neighbours and States that regularly have dealings with the sanctions system. Those States are the key beneficiaries of an effective sanctions regime, in terms of delivering peace and security, but they are also pivotal in making the sanctions effective in the first place. It remains Australia’s intention to shortly put to the Council a draft resolution that draws on the experience of those Member States and other stakeholders to formulate a blueprint for improving the implementation of Council sanctions that would allow cross-cutting discussions of sanctions issues and would facilitate the provision of technical assistance to Member States. Under-Secretary-General Feltman’s briefing demonstrated how the Council and the Secretariat are already moving in the direction sought by Member States during the consultations over the past six months, towards a simpler and more consultative, transparent and coherent sanctions system. Briefings of the Council are increasingly public, Committees are more actively engaging with key stakeholder States, and the Secretariat has made implementation simpler by standardizing sanctions lists. As described by Under-Secretary-General Feltman, the new Interagency Working Group on Sanctions within the Secretariat, which was created to coordinate and provide United Nations inputs into the high- level review from the 20 United Nations entities that contribute to sanctions implementation, is itself a highly productive legacy of the review. It has the potential to further improve the effectiveness of the Council’s sanctions measures, but clearly there is scope to do more. We see value in building the Secretariat’s capacity to further support the Council and Member States. There is untapped potential in the Secretariat to identify best practices, mobilize expertise within the United Nations system relevant to effective sanctions implementation, and support efforts by the Council and the sanctions committees to provide practical guidance on sanctions implementation issues and capacity- building and technical assistance for Member States. As Under-Secretary-General Feltman noted today, “we need an effective United Nations system delivering as one”. More broadly, we see value in the Secretary- General’s reports to the Council on specific situations discussing in more detail the coordination between sanctions and other United Nations conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. We would also welcome periodic reports from the Secretary-General on Council practice and Member State challenges related to sanctions generally, including recommendations for better support to Member States in their implementation of sanctions measures. To use the expression of the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, Ambassador Gasana, from this morning, expert groups assisting the sanctions committees are our eyes and ears on the ground. They have proven to be an indispensable asset for improving the effectiveness of sanctions. While it is essential that those groups receive the necessary support and cooperation across the United Nations system and from all Member States, the way in which the expert groups engage with the key Member States for a particular sanctions regime is particularly crucial. A more interactive relationship between Member States and expert groups, between Member States and Committees and, as both our colleagues from France and the Republic of Korea have reminded us, with the private sector as well, would build trust and confidence and break down barriers to cooperation. Looking beyond the United Nations itself, INTERPOL Secretary General Stock’s briefing highlighted how international and regional organizations and intergovernmental bodies can provide both Member States and the Council with better tools to implement Security Council sanctions measures. The Council’s relationship with INTERPOL is long-standing. Its relationship with the United Nations dates from 1949 and continues to evolve. It provides a model for how the systems and networks of relevant international organizations can enhance the effectiveness of the Council’s sanctions measures, while at the same time building key capabilities in stakeholder Member States. The Council needs more such partners. In conclusion, ultimately the key to the effectiveness of the United Nations sanctions system remains how it engages with Member States. It is Member States that are obligated to implement our decisions in respect of sanctions. Australia will work over the next few days to reach a Council consensus on our draft resolution to put in place these and other measures. We firmly believe that our draft resolution would improve Member States’ access to information and assistance on sanctions implementation, as well as enhance the transparency and responsiveness of the United Nations sanctions system generally, and the relationship between Member States and the sanctions committees and expert groups in particular. That would benefit us all. We encourage the Chairs of sanctions committees to continue to engage Member States and other stakeholders as partners in the implementation of sanctions. And we encourage Member States to demand greater transparency from and interaction with the United Nations sanctions system, if it is ever not forthcoming. Under the collective security framework of the Charter, sanctions are a shared responsibility between the Council and Member States, and the more we engage with each other, the stronger that framework will be. Finally, as Chair of three of the Council’s sanctions committees, let me endorse the practical recommendations of Ambassador Gasana on better ways to ensure professional continuity in the task of presiding over Sanctions Committees as the new Committee Chairs are identified and transition to their new roles. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I thank my colleagues for their participation this morning. I also thank our briefers, Jeffrey Feltman and Jürgen Stock. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.