S/PV.7326 Security Council

As this is the first meeting of the Council for the month of December 2014, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Mr. Gary Quinlan, Permanent Representative of Australia, for his service as President of the Council for the month of November 2014. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing my sincere appreciation to Ambassador Quinlan and his delegation for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council’s business last month. Adoption of the agenda

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Sudan to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2014/852, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Following the release on 26 November of the Secretary-General’s periodic report (S/2014/852) on the activities of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), I should like to update the Council on the latest developments in the peace process in Darfur and the current security and humanitarian situation in the region. I would also like to take this opportunity to describe the measures that the United Nations has taken, in consultation with the African Union and UNAMID, in order to implement the Council’s recommendations in resolutions 2148 (2014) and 2173 (2014), aimed at strengthening the mission so as to streamline its operations. On the political front, and with regard to the peace process, direct talks between the Government of the Sudan and armed movements in Darfur — the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement-Gibril Ibrahim — began on 23 November in Addis Ababa, and for the first time were held under the auspices of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. Council members will recall that the Panel is facilitating the talks with the goal of promoting a cessation of hostilities between the armed movements and the Government of the Sudan, and in this way to enable the movements to take part in a future national dialogue. The negotiations were suspended on 30 November to allow the parties to consult with their respective leaders and bases on the format of future negotiations. Concerning relations between the Government of the Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement, we note that they clearly both feel the need to speed up finalization of the Movement’s disarmament verification process. I should also note the information we received yesterday on a joint political statement calling on the Sudan to establish a State based on citizenship and democracy and signed by a number of groups, including Minni Minawi. We will have to study its wording, because its various elements include the groups’ determination to form a united front, and a call for a boycott of the elections scheduled for April 2015 and for popular resistance. I repeat that it is too soon to draw conclusions, but I believe it deserves more careful scrutiny. Regarding security, the report before the Council describes a precarious situation, with clashes between the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements, deadly intercommunal conflicts and increased criminality and banditry, all of which has inevitably had a significant impact on civilians across all five States of Darfur. While there has undoubtedly been an overall decrease in military operations in recent months, most likely as a result of the rainy season, there have nonetheless been intermittent clashes between Government forces and armed movements, as well as reports of aerial bombardments. The report gives a figure of 55 cases of violence and attacks on civilians recorded by UNAMID during the period under consideration, of which 16 were allegedly perpetrated by Arab militias, 23 by Government forces and the remaining 16 by unknown armed elements. Internally displaced persons, in particular, have continued to express concerns about the deteriorating security situation, particularly in the camps in North and West Darfur. That insecurity, along with the continuing restrictions on movement imposed by the Government forces, armed movements and militia groups, has had an effect on the Mission’s ability to implement its mandate, particularly regarding the protection of civilians. It also continues to pose serious problems for the safety and security of both our personnel and humanitarian workers. There have been major concerns throughout the reporting period about our inability to get direct access to all the vulnerable populations in need of protection. While the restrictions on movement have unquestionably decreased — the rainy season being a factor — the issue of obtaining free and unhindered access to communities in need remains a concern and an obstacle to implementation of the mandate. I therefore continue to strongly urge the Government to honour the terms of the status-of-forces agreement and to give Mission personnel full and unhindered freedom of movement throughout Darfur. One incident that was given particular attention by the media on 2 November was the alleged rape of over 200 women and girls on 30 and 31 October in Thabit, North Darfur. Following repeated requests over a number of days for access to the village and surrounding areas in order to interact with the local community and determine a factual account of events, a verification mission was sent a week later, on 9 November. The team’s findings, however, remain inconclusive and require further investigation, in part due to the heavy presence of military and police in the village. I underscore that only a fully independent investigation by UNAMID will effectively shed light on these serious allegations, and I therefore urge the Government of the Sudan once again to grant UNAMID immediate and independent access to Thabit and its population so that these reports can be verified. Another deep concern is the continuation of violent attacks by armed assailants against UNAMID and United Nations personnel, in which three of our peacekeepers and one national staff member have died since our last briefing to the Council (see S/PV.7250). I take this opportunity to express my condolences to the Ethiopian and Rwandan Governments and to the families of those killed and injured in such attacks. The Government of the Sudan must continue to do everything in its power to identify and hold accountable those responsible. Intercommunal violence continues to affect and displace civilian communities. In particular, the conflicts between the Rizeigat and Ma’alia in East Darfur, the Beni Hussein and Northern Rizeigat in North Darfur and the Fallatta and Habbaniya in South Darfur represent the most significant tribal conflicts. While there was a reduction in the number of confrontations during the reporting period, the clashes were markedly more deadly, with a total of 377 fatalities recorded, as compared to 93 confirmed deaths in the previous period. Criminality remains a major concern, with attacks on villages and incidents of rape, hijacking and abduction continuing throughout Darfur. In response to concerns over the rising number of criminal incidents, on 15 July the Government of South Darfur introduced emergency measures, which included a state-wide curfew, a ban on the movement of armed civilians, extensive search- and-detain operations in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the establishment of a court to try emergency cases. While some of these measures have undoubtedly helped to improve, howsoever modestly, the security situation in South Darfur, the displaced have firmly resisted all the Government’s attempts to enter the camps. This includes the case of the Kalma IDP camp, where in mid-August UNAMID engaged both with state and local authorities in an attempt to de-escalate tensions and avert violence, while it also intervened with the camp’s leadership to reassure them of UNAMID’s protection should search operations be conducted. As a result, no search operations have been conducted in the camp to date. The humanitarian situation remains dire and very worrisome. The number of people displaced by conflict since the beginning of the year has risen to more than 430,000, with close to 300,000 remaining in displacement, in addition to some 2 million long-term IDPs. The reporting period was also characterized by heavy rains and floods that affected thousands of IDPs in August. While humanitarian access remains severely problematic, there were some improvements, with several inter-agency field missions undertaken in all five Darfur states to assess needs and deliver assistance. UNAMID continued to work closely with humanitarian agencies to facilitate the delivery of assistance to vulnerable affected communities through the provision, inter alia, of escorts and logistical support. I believe that this assistance has proved to be very useful. Over the past months, the Mission has further recalibrated its activities towards the three strategic priorities defined early this year. It has conducted a comprehensive assessment and adjustment of its structures, personnel and material capacities, as reported in the letter dated 16 September from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of Security Council (S/2014/670). The UNAMID personnel streamlining exercise has been completed. In that connection, 1,260 posts have been identified for abolition — 770 posts in the current budget year, and the remaining 490 posts to follow in the next. An additional 56 posts will be nationalized this budget year. I also note that UNAMID’s aviation fleet has been reconfigured through a reduction of four fixed- wing aircraft and two helicopters, while 400 UNAMID vehicles are being deployed to the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response. UNAMID and the United Nations country team have developed an integrated strategic framework for 2014-2016, which is the principal mechanism for planning, implementing and monitoring joint UNAMID and United Nations country team initiatives. It focuses on the three strategic priorities and is consistent with all other relevant documents, including the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2012-2016, the humanitarian strategic response plan for 2014 and the Darfur Development Strategy. I turn now to the matter of collaboration and coordination between UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan, which is necessary if we are to bring our task to fruition. In that connection, it should be noted that there were tensions between the Government and the mission during the recent period, including with regard to a problem I have already mentioned — access by staff to Thabit to ascertain facts. I should also point out that, on 23 November, UNAMID received a note verbale demanding the immediate withdrawal of two human rights experts stationed at the mission’s liaison office in Khartoum, where they had a long-established role with the Sudan’s National Commission on Human Rights and other organizations on all issues related to Darfur. We had no choice in the matter, but such a demand is clearly unacceptable. Moreover, the Government of the Sudan publicly called for UNAMID’s exit — in those very words. I should say that we currently have a strategic assessment team in Khartoum that began its meetings over the past two days. In particular, the issue of UNAMID’s exit from the Sudan was discussed. I think that the Government has clearly established that this is not about leaving tomorrow, but that we need to agree on a strategy. That is what we are attempting to pursue, in line with the spirit of the Council’s latest resolution. The strategic assessment will make it possible for us to brief the Council on the progress we have made or not made — I do not know yet either way — on the three issues of strengthening military capacity, the level of cooperation received from the Government of the Sudan and the capacity to move forward along with the country team, the agencies and the programmes. Nevertheless, the fact itself that such a public statement was made is something that colours the overall picture somewhat. I also point out that last week we received another note verbale from the Government of the Sudan directing us not to deal further with any Sudanese body without first turning to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We need to assess the impact of that demand, but it is certainly also something that is part of the backdrop. In conclusion, we must regret the security situation and the fact that protection for the local population remains weak. It is true that the main cause of all this are the ubiquitous inter-communal tribal clashes, with the attendant displacement of people they generate. While the mission is making every effort to address the problems facing humanitarian actors in the short term, it is clear that concrete lasting solutions for the population of Darfur are linked to progress on political issues being addressed in the course of the discussions recently begun in Addis Ababa. In practical terms, that implies the aboslute need for a genuine ceasefire and a comprehensive peace agreement.

I thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of the Sudan.

Allow me, at the outset, to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I have every confidence that your presidency will add new momentum to addressing the issue of Darfur, as you come from a country of the region that has participated in stabilizing the situation in Darfur. I therefore thank President Idriss Deby Itno for his efforts to contain inter-tribal clashes and to maintain stability in Darfur, as evidenced at the first two meetings held in Um Jaras. I should also like to thank Mr. Ladsous for his comprehensive briefing today. The report before us (S/2014/852) details the efforts made by the African Union-United Nations Joint Chief Mediator to ensure that the groups that have not signed on to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur join the peace agreement. We welcome the efforts of Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Head of the African-Union High- level Implementation Panel. As I speak here today, delegations are negotiating at Addis Ababa on behalf of the Government of the Sudan. One is headed by the Minister of State responsible for Darfur, Mr. Amin Hassan Omer. It is to discuss with the armed movements in Darfur that have not signed the Doha Document — the Justice and Equality Movement-Jibril Ibrahim and the Sudanese Liberation Army-Minni Minawi — in order to get them to join the peace process. Information we have received regarding those meetings indicates that efforts are being made under the auspices of Mr. Mbeki and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Menkerios. We hope that they will lead to positive results. The second delegation is head by Mr. Ibrahim Ghandour, aide to our country’s President. It aims to negotiate with the popular movements in the north with regard to the situation in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. The negotiations have allowed us to move forward, and we trust that the Security Council will play an effective role in the national dialogue announced by the Sudan’s President. Paragraph 2 of today’s report states that military operations decreased overall in Darfur. However, several paragraphs note that there is still instability in certain parts of Darfur owing to inter-tribal violence and banditry. Those phenomena have been referred to in many statements in the past: they are very ancient features of Darfur. There is also mention of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and of a culture in Darfur of carrying weapons. That too is also nothing new. With regard to the humanitarian situation in the region, paragraph 23 of the report highlights that among the main reasons for the number of displaced persons are the clashes between the Ma’alia and Hamar and between the Ma’alia and Rizeigat in east Darfur, and between Ma’alia and Rizeigat and Beni Hussein and Northern Rizeiga in north Darfur. We welcome paragraph 40 of the report, which clearly states that the implementation of the Doha Document has made it possible to make progress, in particular with regard to security measures on the integration into the Sudanese armed forces of former combatants of movements that are signatories to the Document. Paragraph 42 mentions the progress with regard to the implementation of the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund. It also states that the the Darfur Regional Authority reported that 70 per cent of the 315 development projects launched early in 2014 were nearing completion, including in the areas of education, health and water. In that regard, we thank brotherly Qatar once again for the agreement it signed with the United Nations Development Programme providing $88.5 million for the implementation of reconstruction and development projects in Darfur. The positive developments that I have mentioned with regard to the political process, as well as the progress in the implementation of the Doha Document, strengthen and support the onset of UNAMID’s withdrawal, as I said in my statement to the Council in August (see S/PV.7250). In that regard, we recall that what we said regarding exit strategy was based on clear references, primarily resolution 1769 (2007), which mentions it very clearly, and resolution 2073 (2014), which renewed the Mission’s mandate. We therefore reaffirm that the statements made by officials of the Sudan referred to an exit strategy and not, as Mr. Ladsous said, to an immediate exit. As to the exit strategy to which the Council’s resolutions refer, I recall that I met with Mr. Ladsous personally two months ago and presented him with a note in that regard, stating that it was time to discuss an exit strategy, but not an immediate exit, as he stated. Prior to that, the administration had sent a mission review team specifically to consider the police component. As we speak, a joint peacekeeping mission of the African Union and the agencies concerned is holding consultations in Khartoum as part of a strategic review of the Mission and its exit strategy, specifically the drawdown of the military component. When we talk about an exit strategy, therefore, we are talking about a joint effort to be implemented in coordination with the African Union and the United Nations. In addition, regarding what has been wrongly discussed in some media concerning the closure of the UNAMID human rights office, I would like to point out that I met with Mr. Ladsous on this point, too, and explained to him the nature of that decision. The reports are false. I assure the Council that the main UNAMID human rights office and its branches in Darfur remain open and that they remain unaffected by the decision. What happened, in fact, was that UNAMID opened a small human rights branch office in Khartoum without previously informing the competent authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or even coordinating with them. That branch was therefore closed precisely because UNAMID is mandated and deployed exclusively to the five states of Darfur, and not to Khartoum. In paragraph 57, the report notes allegations and rumours disseminated by Radio Dabanga regarding the village of Thabit, claiming that UNAMID representatives had been prevented from entering the village. We confirm that this information is not correct. We authorized UNAMID and facilitated its access to the village on 9 November in order to carry out its investigation free of any interference or attempts to influence its interviews and investigations. The Mission remained in the village as long as it wanted and then, having completed its mission, it left to prepare and present its report. It was therefore to our great surprise, upon receipt of the report — which proved these lies to be baseless — that some have denounced it because they wished to see it reaffirm the lies of Radio Dabanga and condemn the Government of the Sudan. If the report did not confirm their version of events, they were determined to condemn it. That is why we decided not to let UNAMID return to the village once we were sure that what it ultimately wanted was a report convicting the Government of the Sudan, and that any report to the contrary would not be accepted even if the Mission visited the village several times. The lies spread by Radio Dabanga, which are known to UNAMID, which itself has been criticized several times, have been accepted by some people. The Sudanese Government condemns that radio station, which is known to be affiliated with groups that refuse to sign the peace agreement and which is now advancing an agenda for some states based on those lies. It is therefore only logical to ask whether it is believable that more than 200 women and girls could have been raped in the village without anyone avenging the honour of his wife or daughter, or reporting the incident? Despite our belief that Radio Dabanga does nothing but spread lies, we allowed UNAMID to travel to the village and provided the necessary support to carry out its investigation in total freedom. The Mission completed its investigation, fulfilled its tasks and left the village. We are therefore absolutely astonished by the UNAMID report, which had for years been an unimpeachable and unquestioned reference beyond reproach or doubt. Some parties have requested that UNAMID present a second report, since the first exonerated the Government. The question now is whether they would have asked the Mission to modify its report if it had designated the Government as the guilty party and confirmed the lies of Radio Dabanga. Council members know the answer to that question. That is why we refused to allow the Mission to return to the village once we were totally convinced that the purpose was to draft a report condemning the Government. Thus, every time a report fails to serve that end, it will be rejected by those who will request UNAMID to redraft it again and again. This is provocative to us as a sovereign State and we will not accept it. The very unprofessional manner in which the report was drafted — that is, insisting that it was necessary to return to the village — is in itself is a major shortcoming and shows the lack of professionalism in the Mission, which should have immediately withdrawn from the village if there had been a military presence or other threat hindering its work. But that is not what happened. The Mission carried out its investigation and presented its report. Therefore, the gaps in the investigation or in the way the report is presented are the Mission’s own fault. The Council is very well aware of the many shortcomings and gaps in UNAMID’s performance. A professional approach would have led the Mission to admit that it was unable to carry out its functions and therefore could not present a report. In conclusion, I would like to point out that we submitted a comprehensive report regarding the document of the Prosecutor of the Darfur Criminal Court appointed pursuant to the Doha Peace Accord. The Prosecutor headed a team and conducted investigations into the matter The report, like the first UNAMID report, showed that the accusations were unjustified. We call on the Council to ignore rumours and misinformation, and to play its full role in promoting peace by encouraging the parties that have not yet signed the peace agreement to do so in order to turn the page on the conflict in Darfur once and for all.

There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.