S/PV.7331 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council according to the year of adoption of the related resolutions: His Excellency Mr. Oh Joon, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); His Excellency Mr. Gary Quinlan, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011); Her Excellency Mrs. María Cristina Perceval, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions; Her Excellency Ms. Sylvie Lucas, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; and His Excellency Mr. Eugène-Richard Gasana, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. I now give the floor to Mr. Oh Joon.

At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting, which provides a welcome opportunity for the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council to take stock of their work and share some personal reflections. Over the past two years, the Republic of Korea has had the honour to chair the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea. With regard to the 1540 Committee, I already briefed the Council in my capacity as Committee Chair in November. I therefore do not have much to add today, except to once again offer my heartfelt appreciation to all members of the Committee, the Expert Group of the 1540 Committee, the Secretariat and the wider United Nations membership for their support during the two years of my country’s chairmanship. Looking back, the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) was an opportune moment to renew our political commitment and explore future strategies for the full and universal implementation of the resolution. I hope that those efforts will give renewed impetus to the work of the Committee in the years ahead, including its preparations for the comprehensive review to be conducted by 2016. I also wish the incoming Chair every success in his new chairmanship role. Let me turn to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea. While chairing this Committee, I have organized the work of the Committee around three core principles. First, I have focused on enhancing the credibility of the sanctions regime, while considering how sanctions can further promote peace and stability in the region. The situation in Somalia is complex and requires a holistic and comprehensive approach. While we have seen considerable progress in recent years, there is still a variety of obstacles to overcome, such as the continuing military threats from Al-Shabaab, arms embargo violations, the humanitarian crisis and violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, to name a few. In the light of the fragile situation, the effective implementation of the sanctions regime, including an arms embargo and charcoal ban, remains of vital importance for the country’s path towards stability. Accordingly, we have been vigilant with respect to the potential flow of arms into the hands of armed groups. In particular, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Federal Government of Somalia as authorized by resolutions 2093 (2013), 2142 (2014) and 2182 (2014), the Committee paid special attention to the implementation of the relevant resolutions, including the Somali Government’s advanced notification and reporting obligations. We also tried to support the Somali Government in improving its weapons-management capacity. Furthermore, cutting off Al-Shabaab’s financing derived from the charcoal trade is also a significant tool that will ensure a safer and more secure environment in Somalia. This year, the Committee adopted its first implementation assistance notice, which outlines practical recommendations and guidance on measures to assist Member States in implementing the ban more effectively. Secondly, I have always sought to strengthen engagement with the countries concerned. I believe that the effective and responsible implementation of sanctions cannot be accomplished without the support and cooperation of the countries concerned and other regional actors. During my two years as Committee Chair, I met with representatives from Somalia and Eritrea as well as other countries in the Horn of Africa. Their views on the Committee’s work helped provide a balanced perspective on relevant issues. On multiple occasions, we also invited the representatives of Somalia and Eritrea to Committee meetings to share their views, which gave us a better understanding of the issues and challenges they have faced in implementing the sanctions regime. As a part of such constructive engagement efforts, I was privileged to contribute to the improvement of relations between the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea, which at the outset of my chairmanship had reached a low point. I appreciate the strong support of Council members for my initiative to engage Eritrea. Since last December, I facilitated two face-to- face meetings in Paris and Cairo, and one meeting via videoconference between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea. Those meetings were important for promoting dialogue and building confidence. Following that constructive dialogue, the Eritrean Government’s opinion was reflected in the Group’s final report. While it unfortunately was not possible for the Monitoring Group to visit Eritrea during my tenure, I strongly encourage my successor to continue facilitating dialogue in the lead-up to the Monitoring Group’s visit to Asmara. Finally, I believe that the successful implementation of the Committee’s mandate requires close working relations between the Monitoring Group and the Committee. In that regard, we took into serious consideration the analyses and recommendations made by the Group on the most effective ways to implement the sanctions regime. I am pleased to note that we have a competent Monitoring Group, which provides us with an excellent basis for deliberation. In conclusion, I would like to thank the members of the Committee for their cooperation, active participation, valuable contributions and enriching discussions during my tenure as Chair. Despite the many challenges, I believe that the Somalia and Eritrea sanctions regimes have contributed to the Council’s shared goal of promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, a region whose peoples have experienced far too much suffering during the past two decades. I hope our sustained efforts will bear fruit.

I thank Ambassador Oh for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Quinlan.

I have been assured that, on this very special occasion of the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies being able to reflect on their chairmanships, I can speak for one or two minutes longer than usual. With your agreement, Mr. President, I intend to indulge myself in that way. Of all the Council’s functions, sanctions are one area in which elected members of the Security Council have a truly distinctive opportunity to make a difference. While the permanent members may be the architects of the sanctions regimes, the elected 10 are in essence the engineers — it is our job, through our role as Chairs, to ensure they work. As you indicated, Mr. President, Australia has chaired three Committees — the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) on the Taliban and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) on Iran. We have also very actively engaged in the Council’s other sanctions committees and subsidiary bodies. We have made an effort to demonstrate the positive impact that sanctions can have, given their role in protecting fragile States emerging from crisis or conflict, as well as vulnerable populations in those States, and in preventing the escalation or recurrence of violence. As part of the high-level review of United Nations sanctions that we co-sponsored over the last six months with Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden, Australia has consulted with States with the greatest stake in the effectiveness of sanctions, that is, the States to which the measures apply, and their neighbours. What emerged, among many other things, was the critical role that sanctions committees need to play in partnership with the Member State and its neighbours and regional organizations. I will focus on four themes that arose from those consultations. My first theme is greater transparency. In previous years, today’s briefing  — the briefing of outgoing subsidiary body Chairs  — was the only public statement made in the Council about the work of many of the bodies. There were exceptions  — the Iran Committee and the Al-Qaida Committee, jointly with the Non-Proliferation Committee established by resolution 1540 (2004), and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya have long made their reports to the Council in public meetings. But generally, the default has been that committees, to the extent they report to the Council at all, have done so in closed consultations. That practice is now changing. This month, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) concerning Yemen will again make their reports in the open Chamber. In recent months, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire both reported to the Council in public for the first time. The default should be that all sanctions committees deliver their reports to the Council in public. Sanctions are part of the collective security framework enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. How they are administered is of interest to all Member States, because these measures impose obligations on all Member States. My second theme, which was also just touched upon by Ambassador Oh Joon, is that of closer engagement with affected Member States. Sanctions — and therefore the activities of the sanctions committees  — are of particular and special interest to those States to which the sanctions apply. Our experience on the Council has shown that the greater the engagement between the stakeholder States and the committees, the more effectively the sanctions can deliver the outcomes intended for them by the Council. In some ways, the Taliban sanctions regime is a model for such collaborative engagement, thanks to the crucial role played by the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan, Ambassador Tanin, and his team in New York, as well as the active efforts of the focal point in the Afghan Government, Isaaq Kamkai. The confidence generated by that relationship means that the Government of Afghanistan allows the Monitoring Team access to all levels of the Afghan National Security Forces, not just in Kabul but across all the provinces. That significantly enhances the quality of the Team’s analysis and the implementation of sanctions. Over the past two years, that kind of engagement has increasingly become the norm, due to the proactivity of the Committee Chairs. Sanctions committees now regularly meet with the focus country for the sanctions regime and its regional partners. In recent weeks, the Committees concerning the Central African Republic, the Sudan and Yemen and Libya have held consultations with the relevant Member States and regional countries, and the Somalia and Eritrea Committee also recently met with representatives of those Governments. Such a practice applies also to the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, as Al-Qaida affiliates and splinter groups threaten the territorial integrity of States. Last year we held consultations with countries of the Sahel and Maghreb to consider how the Al-Qaida sanctions regime could be made a more effective instrument against the threat posed by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. This year we held consultations with Yemen, jointly with the Yemen Sanctions Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, on how the three Committees could work collaboratively with authorities in Yemen against the twin scourges of organized political violence and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. That practice will build understanding and trust between the stakeholder countries and the Council’s committees and expert groups, which will in turn should make the sanctions a more effective instrument to restore and maintain international peace and security. My third theme concerns the synergies across Committees. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Committees have long been incubators for innovations that enhance the implementation and effectiveness of sanctions measures. The trouble has been that much of that innovation, despite its applicability to other sanctions regimes, was being applied only to the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regimes. It was a surprise to me to find that there was no capacity, either in the Council or in the Secretariat, to consider sanctions in a cross-cutting way. The only way to ensure a unified Council approach was through a bureaucratic and time-consuming process of correspondence between all the relevant sanctions committees. Those representatives who attended the 25 November briefing (see S/PV.7323) in the Council on sanctions during Australia’s presidency know that Australia is promoting the establishment of a capacity to allow cross-cutting discussions of sanctions issues, as well as to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to Member States. We have been negotiating a draft resolution to meet those widely endorsed objectives, and we will continue to do so. We made an effort from the beginning of our chairing roles to consult with other committee Chairs to see how we could exploit the obvious synergies in the work of our committees. For so long as there is no organized coordination mechanism on the work of sanctions, at a time when the Council’s use of sanctions is increasing and becoming more complex, the need for future committee Chairs to continue that consultation among themselves will be even greater. My fourth and last theme is the indispensable role of the expert groups that support the work of the committees. I have had the privilege and the great pleasure of working closely with two such groups, the Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team and the Panel of Experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Over the last few months, the Al-Qaida Monitoring Team has generated its regular threat assessment, as well as reports on the specific threat posed by the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and on the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon. The reports have been of stand-out quality and instrumental in the Council’s ability to respond to those threats. They underpinned presidential statement S/PRST/2014/23, adopted by the Council on 19 November. The Team’s reporting early next year will be essential to the development of further strategies by the Council to combat the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters in particular. No less impressive is the investigative and analytical work done by the Iran Panel of Experts into possible incidents of non-compliance. I would also like to single out the Panel’s outreach activities, which are so critical in helping Member States understand the complexities of the sanctions regime. Particularly at a time when the focus seems to be on the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, the Panel’s work in reminding Member States that the Council’s measures remain fully in force is even more important. To conclude, I will brief the Council in my capacity as Chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee on 18 December, therefore I will reserve my 1737 Committee farewells for then. But I would like to take this opportunity today to convey my unvarnished thanks and appreciation to the members of the 1267 and 1988 Sanctions Committees; to the Monitoring Team, whose praises I have already sung; to the Al-Qaida Sanctions Ombudsperson, Kimberly Prost, for her fierce independence and professional integrity; and to our patient and hardworking colleagues in the Secretariat, without whose support none of our work would be possible.

I thank Ambassador Quinlan for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Perceval.

I would like to thank the Security Council for this opportunity afforded us to share our points of view and assessments of the work undertaken by the two subsidiary bodies that I have had the honour of presiding over during my country’s mandate as a Council member. I will begin by addressing the work of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, which I have had the honour to preside over during the past two years. The Working Group was established in 1993. We all know that it does not address substantive issues, but it has the important task of considering proposals and making recommendations to the Council in order, on the one hand, to improve the efficiency of this organ and, on the other, to make the work among the Security Council members more democratic and to enable the Council to respond to the need to be a more responsible and transparent body, as well as more open to dialogue and consultations with interested Member States and other bodies. During the two years of Argentina’s chairmanship, the Working Group concluded the drafting of six notes by the President of the Council, with the aim of complementing note S/2010/507. Note S/2013/515, initiated by Australia, aimed at improving dialogue with Members of the United Nations that are not members of the Council and with other bodies. Note S/2013/630, presented by the chairmanship, seeks to strengthen consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Allow me to underscore one aspect on which there is a need for cooperation from the Secretariat. The Secretariat should provide the troop- and police-contributing countries with copies of the reports of the Secretary-General with enough lead time, as possible, to ensure that preparations and timely meetings are held with said countries prior to the consultations on the relevant draft resolutions. Another important note (S/2014/268) during our chairmanship had to do with penholders. I emphasize this because it shows the manner in which some topics that initially gave rise to resistance could become acceptable for all Council members when it was made clear that at issue was a potential matter for worthwhile action, and furthermore when there was an attempt to favour more democratic and egalitarian participation among Council members without giving rise to a revolution in the Council’s methods by doing so. The co-penholdership came about in practice prior to the adoption of the note, and the more harmonious manner in which the practice was implemented facilitated its incorporation into note S/2014/268. With regard to dialogue among Council members, the initiative of Pakistan is another aspect of a reiterated call by the non-permanent members of the Council to make the work more democratic — and it was taken up in note S/2014/565. The Group also agreed on presidential note S/2014/739, concerning the list of speakers in the Council  — an initiative of the Russian Federation seeking to clarify this issue based on Council practice. The Group also considered the issue of the translation of sanctions lists into all of the official languages of the United Nations, at the behest of the President of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, on the initiative of Argentina. The Council resolved the issue in its resolutions 2160 (2014) and 2161 (2014). Further, there was an agreement to request that the Secretariat implement a new practice for the issuance of edited and concorded versions of the resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Council. Finally, very recently we considered the issue of the production of the verbatim records of Council meetings so as to make clear to members  — not just Council members but the wider membership — how we can all cooperate with the objective of ensuring the accuracy of the verbatim records of the Council. We hope to be able to adopt a presidential note in the next few days, before we conclude our term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. What matters remain pending for the next Chair and for incoming members? There is a draft on the Arria Formula, submitted by the Russian Federation, and one on the report of the Security Council, submitted by Lithuania. Regarding the issue of the Arria Formula, which will be addressed by the Working Group next year, I should like to recall that even though Council members participate in this, it is not a Council activity. We are talking about a concept that was born of the need for flexibility, and because of that it can evolve constantly, as needed. Regarding the report of the Council to the General Assembly, which will also be addressed in the year ahead, I should like to touch on an issue that I stressed in my capacity as Chair of the Group. The report to the General Assembly is not a mere formality; rather, it has a specific objective: accountability, as required by Article 24(3) of the Charter. It is possible to improve the way in which the report is prepared, including the timetable for its drafting, but I am convinced that shortening it or replacing it with the content of a webpage does not seem to be the right path to take. The report of the Security Council has value as a document in the context of accountability to the plenary body of the Organization, and also historical value. The cost of document production is not a consideration that applies in this case; the content of a web page represents not documentation but dissemination and hence cannot substitute for a Charter obligation. Lastly, allow me to refer to the importance of ensuring continuity in the work of the subsidiary bodies. All of those bodies are presided over by non-permanent members. It think that it is essential that the Security Council continue to undertake efforts in two areas: first, in naming the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies as soon as possible, so that they can begin to get a handle on the work of the organ over which they will be presiding, and so that they can work with the outgoing Chairs in this process. That would facilitate the transition. Note S/2014/393, submitted by the Argentine presidency, has the goal of contributing to such continuity. I should also like to highlight an aspect related to the democratization of the work of the Council. Note S/2012/937, adopted under the Portuguese chairmanship of the Working Group, stresses the importance of consultations with respect to the appointment of the Chairs of subsidiary bodies. We hope that the idea will continue to gain ground that holding transparent consultations with incoming members on the chairmanship of the subsidiary organs does not mean undermining the role of the permanent members; rather, it adds to the role of elected members, given that, after all, the Security Council is an organ made up of 15 members. I conclude by expressing my conviction that to achieve reform of the working methods of the Security Council within and outside the informal Working Group, the best way is that of dialogue. It is a matter of preserving that which is legitimate and effective and of creating what is missing. We must promote harmonization and minimize opacity and arbitrary aspects, recognizing that working methods are valid when they are validated by results. We must base our practices and procedures on normative legitimacy, practical validity, ethical legitimacy and political need. In assuming the chairmanship of the Group, Argentina had no other ambition than that of contributing to a joint task. Lastly, I would say to the non-permanent members that will be coming on board that they can bring about transformation; they have can influence. I should like here to assure the delegation of Angola, which will succeed Argentina as Chair of the informal Working Group, of our full cooperation and best wishes for success in 2015. Now, if I may, I will address the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and our responsibility in having chaired this group over the past two years. In the final report of December 2012, the outgoing Colombian Chair of the Committee advised a deepening of direct dialogue between the Committee and the authorities of the Sudan, in order to improve the understanding of the impact that the sanctions regime could have on the peace process in Darfur and to exchange views on remaining concerns regarding the measures imposed by the Security Council. That is a recommendation that as Chair I wish to see implemented, because the deepening of dialogue and the strengthening of trust, cooperation and transparency are goals of Argentina’s foreign policy. It is for that reason that we could not overlook them in taking on the chairmanship of the Group. Much of our efforts went towards bringing about two concrete initiatives that we deemed important. First, we undertook the Committee’s first visit to Khartoum and Darfur, from 20 to 24 January 2014. We had an intensive working agenda, meeting with interlocutors from the Government of the Sudan as well as the Joint Special Representative of the the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), diplomatic representatives of States members of the Security Council in Khartoum, the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations and the United Nations country team in the Sudan, and representatives of the African Union, the European Union and the donors community. On 24 November, we held the first meeting since the establishment of the Committee with representatives of the Sudan and countries of the region, in order to identify shortfalls in the area of information and address the need for capacity-building in the context of the implementation of the sanctions. The most recent 90-day report of the Chair of the Committee was submitted for the first time publicly in this Chamber. We call for this to continue with respect to the submission of future reports of the Committee. All of these initiatives, as I see it, contribute to bringing about a greater culture of dialogue, allowing for the building of trust, and for this reason contribute to the effectiveness of the Committee. I would recall that one of the challenges that we faced in assuming the chairmanship was that of facilitating access to the Sudan for the Group of Experts. The timely issuance of visas and entry permits for Darfur had been a recurring limitation, whereas now we can underscore that there has been an improvement in the cooperation between the Group of Experts and the Sudanese authorities. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to underscore the professionalism of the experts that have made up the Panel over the past two years. I should like also to underscore the valuable cooperation provided by UNAMID under the leadership of Mr. Chambas to the Group of Exprts and the Committee. I should like to take this opportunity to express here a few ideas that are not new but that I have been formulating over the past two years. The first observation concerns the high level of confusion that seems to prevail between the sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which consist of a targeted arms embargo on Darfur, a travel ban and the freezing of assets for individuals and entities specifically designated in the Committee’s sanctions list, and, on the other hand, the unilateral sanctions imposed by member States. Along these lines, it is important to us that the Committee undertake a pedagogical task to raise awareness and clarify the content and scope of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council, as well as their objective, which is not that of punishing the Sudan or its people. Rather, they are an instrument  — not the only instrument and perhaps not even the most appropriate — for promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict in Darfur. A second observation is that certain difficulties remain with respect to the implementation of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. I say that in all lucidity. Darfur is plagued by weapons, and the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council is not being implemented. A third observation is that the sanctions in place against the Sudan are having a significant impact on the well-being of the population. The sanctions imposed by the Security Council, although targeted, may have legitimized the unilateral sanctions that were already in place. This has contributed to confusion between the multilateral sanctions regime, on the one hand, and those imposed by Member States individually, on the other. Both regimes have an impact on the resolve of countries and private donors to provide humanitarian or other types of assistance and to make investments in Sudan. During my visit to Darfur, I had the opportunity to visit one of the largest refugee camps, Zamzam, just kilometres from El Fasher, the capital of the Northern Darfur state. I met there with primary leaders of the various ethnic groups. They described the great suffering imposed by their situation, and laid out their demands for the international community. I underscore their yearning to work and to exercise their human rights to a healthy life and to education. I believe that the matter of the refugee camps — which clearly goes beyond the issue of the Sudan  — requires deep reflection on the part of our entire Organization in the post-2015 period. Ultimately, I believe that the Security Council needs to undertake, and that the people of the Sudan and its Government deserve, a full review of the way the international community is managing the situation in Darfur and addressing the peace process, and in particular of whether the sanctions, at least as currently conceived, are the ideal tool, or whether they point to the need to find a solution to this historic conflict in Darfur. It is important, we believe, for the members of the Security Council, in particular its permanent members, to reflect upon the situation in the Sudan, setting aside their differences. Darfur, given not only its geographical situation, but also its many natural resources and its people with their remarkable millennial history, deserves nothing less. Peace in the region, particularly in light of the new conflicts in South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, depends to a large degree on peace in Darfur. I should like to pay homage to the troops of the United Nations who have fallen in the line of duty. I should like to underscore that all attacks on the United Nations and its personnel are unacceptable and should be investigated. Those responsible should be brought to justice. The people of Darfur are part of the United Nations. In 1973 Darfur had 1.3 million people; now it is believed to have 7.5 million. It has grown enormously, but 52 per cent of the population of Darfur is under 16 years old, and they have never known anything but conflict. The United Nations has forecast that the population growth is expected to continue. Two million of them live in refugee camps. Forty-eight per cent of women are illiterate. The children represent half of the population in the camps; 700,000 children are living in a culture of conflict, if we can call it culture. What can I say? The international community needs to extirpate this logic of war entertained among the primary political stakeholders. We need to follow the worrisome humanitarian situation in Darfur very closely. We should not compete among our organizations; we should cooperate. We have to improve the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur programme because it is not working. In the past, inter-ethnic clashes between nomads and farmers were resolved through traditional justice, thanks to a consensus among the traditional chiefs, but in 2003 we saw the rise of militarization and a build-up of weapons. Dialogue was not used to resolve problems among the tribal leaders; the survival of the fittest became the norm, and whoever had the most weapons was the strongest. This context of regional insecurity requires us all to be fully responsible for resolving the situation in Darfur once and for all. I reiterate, all international stakeholders must work hand in hand. Your country is attempting to do just that, Mr. President. We have to craft measures that create incentives for the people of the Sudan to seek peace. We need to make it clear to the younger generation that weapons are not the way; studies and work are the way. We also have to consider lightening the Sudan’s debt burden and lifting unilateral sanctions. The Security Council should perhaps undertake other types of activities, and speak and work with the General Assembly. Above all, we must listen to the African Union when former President Mbeki, who is leading the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, calls upon us time and time again to deepen our diplomatic efforts, and not merely our punishments.

I thank Ambassador Perceval for her briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Lucas.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this briefing, which allows me to review the work accomplished as Chair of two subsidiary bodies of the Security Council in 2013 and 2014. I would like to begin by sharing my ideas as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It has been my honour and pleasure to chair that Committee over the past two years. I will divide my briefing into two parts: a summary of the work accomplished over our two-year term, followed by my assessment. The first part of my briefing will reflect the two principal areas work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), namely, the implementation of resolutions and the response to non-compliance with the measures, on the one hand, and outreach, assistance and cooperation, on the other. The past two years were particularly intense and active in terms of non-proliferation issues concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A nuclear test by that country took place on 12 February 2013 and a number of ballistic missile launches were conducted throughout 2014, in contravention of the international obligations of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. In early 2013, the Security Council adopted resolutions 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), strengthening and broadening the sanctions regime with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. One of the main tasks of the Sanctions Committee during the period under review was to monitor the effective implementation of the newly agreed measures and to provide assistance and practical guidance to that end. By the end of this month, the 1718 Committee will have held a total of 15 informal advisory sessions over the past two years, representing a considerable increase with respect to prior years and demonstrating the continued commitment of all members of the Committee to advancing on the matters of its mandate. Over the past two years, the Committee has been called upon to address the most serious incident that had been brought before it to date. In July 2013, Panama alerted the Committee to the inspection and seizure of a large shipment of conventional weapons aboard the vessel Chong Chon Gang. The incident highlighted the continuing shift in the techniques used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to avoid sanctions, as well as the important role of Member States in moving to intercept suspect shipments in a timely fashion. The Chong Chon Gang incident required an appropriate response from the Committee, commensurate with the gravity of the violation. In implementation of paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013), under which the Security Council has tasked the Committee with implementing the necessary consequences for violations of the relevant resolutions by designating additional individuals and entities that have contributed to the nuclear or ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or to other activities prohibited by those resolutions. On 28 July, the Committee concluded its deliberations on the designation of an additional entity, the Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited, which played a key role in the organization of the transport to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the shipment of weapons and related materiel discovered on board the Chong Chon Gang in July 2013. Through its actions, Ocean Maritime Management contributed to activities prohibited by the resolutions by violating the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1718 (2006) and modified by resolution 1874 (2009), and assisted in evading the measures imposed by those resolutions. Similarly, on 28 July the Committee adopted a detailed implementation assistance notice based on the resolutions. Implementation assistance notice No. 5, entitled “The Chong Chon Gang incident”, provides information on that incident and clarifies certain provisions of the resolutions. In April, the Committee approved the updated list of items whose import into or export from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is prohibited, as well as the list of designated individuals and entities, in accordance with paragraph 21 of resolution 2094 (2013) and presidential statement S/PRST/2012/13 of 16 April 2012. The Committee thereby fulfilled its responsibilities by strengthening the relevance of the measures adopted, thanks to an improvement in the quality of the list of prohibited items and the list of designated individuals and entities. I shall now address the awareness-raising and cooperation activities. In 2013, a large share of the Committee’s activities was devoted to the implementation of the two new resolutions adopted by the Council, as well as to enhancing Member States’ awareness of the obligations they entail. In that regard, the Committee updated its existing implementation notices to provide Member States with practical guidance to ensure their compliance with resolutions 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). With a view to making the sanctions regime more reader-friendly, the Committee also developed a fact sheet that gives an overview of the measures imposed by the four resolutions that concern the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their ensuing obligations for Member States. In February, the 1718 Committee adopted an additional implementation assistance notice that provides practical information on the correct implementation of the interdiction regarding the transport of any item to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea if a Member State determines that said article could contribute to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes. The Committee is still in the process of considering a draft notice regarding the neutralization of seized goods. The Chong Chon Gang incident highlighted the need for the Committee to provide practical guidance to Member States in that regard. I hope that the Committee will soon conclude its deliberations on that matter. The 1718 Committee, with the help of its Panel of Experts, held two open briefings, in June 2013 and July 2014, respectively. The aim of those meetings was twofold. They sought, on the one hand, to share information on the work of the Committee and the Panel of Experts, and, on the other, to identify the assistance the Committee is able to offer Member States with respect to their implementation of resolutions and the submission of their national reports. I believe that this was an important demonstration of transparency that gave Member States a deeper understanding of their obligations pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions. I recall that all Member States are required to report to the Security Council on the specific measures they have adopted to effectively implement the provisions of the resolutions. The number of Member States that have filed their reports has now risen to 98. I have engaged on a bilateral basis with the States that have not yet submitted their reports to the Security Council in order to encourage them to do so. Concerning increased awareness, I note the open briefing convened on 18 November 2013 by the Chairs of the anti-terrorism committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), along with the Chairs of the committees engaged in the fight to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, established pursuant to resolutions 1540 (2004), 1718 (2006) and 1737 (2006). The briefing was organized with the President of the General Authority for Investment (GAFI) in order to explain the respective roles of the Security Council and GAFI in the implementation of financial sanctions. During the period under review, the 1718 Committee also responded to numerous requests from Member States and international organizations for clarification or interpretation of the sanctions measures. I come now to the second part of my briefing, which concerns my personal reflections, which my team shares. In the light of the experience gathered over the course of the past two years, it is my view that the 1718 Committee faces two key challenges. Member States and other concerned actors need to be more aware, and our measures need to be effectively implemented in all countries and throughout the world, with assistance and advice provided where needed to ensure success. The Panel of Experts, in its final report, observed that the existing measures provided for by the Council support the prevention of proscribed activities so long as they are correctly implemented. With respect to such challenges, I can only reiterate the importance the Committee ascribes to enhancing dialogue and cooperation with Member States in order to strengthen their capacity to implement the measures adopted by the Council. To that end, the Committee should continue the practice of holding open briefings for Member States and should engage more directly with Member States faced with particular difficulties in the implementation of the measures. The effective implementation of Security Council resolutions requires the commitment and full cooperation of all Member States. It is equally important for the Committee to continue to fully shoulder its responsibilities in the implementation of the sanctions regime by acting in a timely fashion and, as needed, by taking the necessary measures to respond with appropriate firmness in the case of proven violations of Council resolutions. The Security Council’s recent open debate on horizontal matters related to sanctions (see S/PV.7323) made it clear that, despite the high number of similar concerns shared by the various sanctions regimes, the Committees and their secretariats barely interact or communicate with one another. I therefore fully agree with the objective of seeking better coordination within the Secretariat so as to streamline its work and make support to the Committees more effective, thereby improving the implementation of the measures imposed by the Council. The efforts made in this regard by the Department of Political Affairs, especially the Security Council Affairs Division, are commendable. It is important to continue to identify good practices and to facilitate their exchange among the various sanctions committees. I welcome in particular the work carried out by the Secretariat to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists and establish a consolidated list of the Security Council sanctions in all official languages of the Organization. This will facilitate their implementation by Member States and private-sector actors. For the 1718 Committee, this task was completed in October. It was also in October that, at the request of the Chair, the Secretariat updated the Committee’s guidelines for the conduct of its work in order to bring them into line with current best practices. Such technical exercises had already been carried out by the majority of the sanctions committees. Once they have been approved by the Committee in 1718, which I hope will be soon, the revised guidelines will be posted on the Committee’s website. Clarifying and streamlining the procedures for the conduct of business, these guidelines should allow the 1718 Committee to discharge its duties yet more efficiently. I also believe that the Council and its sanctions committees could benefit from increased interaction with relevant international and regional organizations, whether in the form of joint meetings or practical cooperation. I would point to the example of the cooperation between INTERPOL and several sanctions committees concerning the publication of special notices. These notices are used to disseminate information about individuals on sanctions lists to actors on the front-line of implementation. Luxembourg supports this tool for disseminating information that better informs Member States with regard to their obligations under the sanctions regimes. With the aim of promoting consistency in the work of the various sanctions committees, I believe that it could be useful for the 1718 Committee to consider, in turn, closer cooperation with INTERPOL. I would like to thank the Panel of Experts for its valuable contribution to the work of the Committee and for the thorough and professional manner in which it fulfils its mandate. Despite the often difficult political context in which it must operate, the Panel has always been a reliable source of information for the Committee in monitoring the application of sanctions. Throughout the past two years, my team and I have been able to count on excellent cooperation and interaction with the Panel. In fulfiling its mandate, the Panel relies on the cooperation of Member States. I take this opportunity to encourage Member States to promptly provide the Panel with all the information necessary to its investigations — confidentially, when the need arises. Likewise, I call on the Member States to cooperate fully with the Panel and to facilitate expert visits. Finally, as Chair of the 1718 Committee, my aim has been to guide the work of the Committee in the most effective manner, while seeking to facilitate consensus on the actions to be taken and establishing open dialogue with Member States and other partners. Here I wish to thank the Committee members for their excellent collaboration and the collegial and friendly relations they established with my entire team. Together, we have made significant progress in the implementation of the measures decided upon by the Council. Even if we do not always agree on everything, we are united by the common desire to ensure compliance with the objectives of Council resolutions. In this sense, our discussions have always been rewarding. I believe I speak for all members of the Committee when I say that together we have managed to make the 1718 Committee more effective in its functioning and more transparent and accessible to all Member States. I will turn, more briefly now, to the work achieved chairing the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. For 15 years, the Security Council has been paying increased attention to children affected by armed conflict. Situations regularly appearing on the agenda of the Security Council — those in Syria, the Central African Republic or South Sudan, to name just three examples — remind us of the urgent need to make every effort to protect children from the consequences of conflict. While the issue of children and armed conflict was essentially equated with that of child soldiers at the time when resolution 1261 (1999) was adopted, it has since undergone a considerable evolution, with the gradual implementation of an apparatus that takes into account the great many repercussions of conflict on children and the whole range of serious violations committed against them. The Security Council therefore established, with resolution 1612 (2005), the monitoring and reporting mechanism to provide reliable and comprehensive data on violations committed against children in all countries concerned, on the one hand, and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to develop conclusions and recommendations to parties to conflict, on the other hand. The Working Group’s adoption on 26 November of conclusions regarding the plight of children in armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic shows that, despite the differences of opinion within the Security Council on the Syrian conflict, the Working Group has been able to fulfil its mandate responsibly and in solidarity. Here I express my hope and wish that the spirit of consensus and unity that characterized the Working Group can be maintained in the future. Luxembourg has worked to strengthen the protection of children by strengthening existing mechanisms while making more systematic use of other tools available to the Working Group. Our work has focused on three priorities. First, we have attached great importance to the consistent integration of the issue of child protection into the work of the Security Council. Provisions for the protection of children become of practical use when transposed into the mandates of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Luxembourg has worked with determination to ensure that the protection of children in armed conflicts is duly taken into account when all existing mandates come up for renewal, as well as in the establishment of new mandates. Luxembourg has also endeavoured to ensure that the issue of children affected by conflict is reflected in all other relevant resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Council. During the deliberations of the Security Council on the situation in the countries concerned, we have consistently raised the issue of children and armed conflict. Furthermore, when a specific situation has required more information  — as was the case for Syria and the Central African Republic  — and we have deemed it beneficial for the Security Council to hear from the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, we have ensured that Ms. Leila Zerrougui was able to speak before the Council. Finally, I would like to mention the importance of consistently including violations and abuses against children, including the recruitment and use of children, in the listing criteria of sanctions regimes — as we did in resolution 2134 (2014), adopted on 28 January 2014, for the Central African Republic. As a second priority, as Chair Luxembourg sought to reinvigorate the activities of the Working Group by organizing regular update briefings. The Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflicts has thus briefed the Working Group regarding the latest developments in the countries on its agenda —to name just a few, the Central African Republic, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Such briefings usefully complement the more substantial but less frequently updated information contained in the periodic reports of the Secretary-General. We have also invited, in full accordance with the mandate of the Working Group, qualified individuals who could participate in its work. The African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, briefed the Working Group on cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in the protection of children in times of armed conflict. The participation of Ambassador Chergui was also in the spirit of greater involvement of regional organizations in the protection of children in armed conflict, which we sought to promote both in presidential statement S/PRST/2013/8, of 17 June 2013, and in resolution 2143 (2014) of 7 March 2014, to which I will return in a moment. We also heard a briefing by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ms. Fatou Bensouda, regarding the important work carried out by the ICC in bringing to justice those who have committed grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict. Finally, on 2 June we were able to talk via video-teleconference with the special country team of the monitoring and reporting mechanism for South Sudan, after which a press statement (SC/11429) was adopted. In the same spirit, in order to allow better interaction between the Working Group and the actors responsible for child protection in the field, we revived the practice of conducting field missions. The Working Group visited Myanmar from 30 November to 4 December 2013 at the invitation of the Government of Myanmar. Last week, I had the opportunity to lead a mission of the Working Group to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During both visits, members of the Working Group, many of whom participated, were able to meet the relevant ministers, United Nations officials, representatives of civil society and affected children, thereby demonstrating the importance that the Council attaches to the issue of the protection of children affected by armed conflict. I hope that, like the sanctions committees, field visits of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in the near future will be covered by the United Nations budget. We believe that the exchanges I have just mentioned enrich the actions of the Working Group, helping it to better fulfil its role. We hope that these practices will be continued in the future. On the third priority, Luxembourg has worked to strengthen the normative framework on the matter of child protection with the adoption of presidential statement S/PRST/2013/8 on 17 June 2013, and of resolution 2143 (2014) on 7 March 2014, during the Luxembourg presidency of the Security Council. The resolution condemns in particular the use of schools for military purposes and encourages all States to take concrete measures to deter armed forces and non-State armed groups from using schools. Resolution 2143 (2014) also recommends that Member States include child protection in training programmes, military orders and military directives, and that United Nations entities and troop- and police-contributing countries involved in United Nations peacekeeping be provided with targeted and operational information so as to better prepare their staff to contribute to the prevention of violations against children. Through the open debate in which resolution 2143 (2014) was adopted (see S/PV.7129), we called for discussions on how to progressively implement the full realization of the children and armed conflict agenda. New challenges are on the horizon. At the same time, recurring problems persist. The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict must redouble its efforts to solve them. These problems include the issue of persistent perpetrators, to which we dedicated a thematic meeting in May 2013 in order to explore how best to address the fact that some parties to a conflict have been identified in the annexes to the Secretary- General’s annual reports for five consecutive years, or even longer. Among these persistent perpetrators are a large number of non-State actors. Now that the Children, Not Soldiers campaign, launched by the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF in March, is beginning to bear fruit, we must tackle head-on the problem of non-State actors, who make up the vast majority of the parties listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s annual report. In conclusion, let me thank very warmly the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms. Leila Zerrougui, and her formidable team, as well as UNICEF, for the praiseworthy work they do every day at Headquarters and especially in the field. Luxembourg is proud to have been able to make a contribution on behalf of children affected by armed conflicts during the past two years. I also wish to thank all members of the Working Group and the Council, who have contributed to re-establishing Security Council unity on the imperative need to protect children. As our term draws to a close, I assure the Council that we will continue to commit to this noble cause, which concerns us all.

I thank Ambassador Lucas for her briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Gasana.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting and for providing me with the opportunity to share my reflections and observations as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya for the past two years and as Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations for the past year. I will begin with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya. Only in its fourth year, the regime has likely been the most rapidly evolving Security Council sanctions regime in recent years. While initially the core objectives of the measures were to prevent further attacks against the civilian population in Libya, the political context has necessitated modifications of the measures that have provided better support to the Libyan-led transition and the rebuilding process, and benefitted regional security. The sanctions regime has also provided a good example of how the Security Council has been proactive in terms of quickly moving to respond to developments on the ground, as evidenced by the 10 resolutions adopted in the record time of four years, with four resolutions during my tenure. As one example, this year, as the security situation in Libya was deteriorating, the Security Council acted quickly in adopting resolution 2174 (2014), which reinforced the arms embargo and introduced criteria to designate spoilers to Libya’s political transition. Following an incident in March 2014 involving the illegal seizure of oil by a militia in Libya, the Council also responded with resolution 2146 (2014), introducing measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil. In all, the flexibility of the Council in that case allowed the sanctions regime to evolve to better serve its remedial and preventative purpose. As well stated by Ambassador Lucas regarding the cooperation between the various sanctions committees with INTERPOL, during Rwanda’s tenure the Committee reached an agreement with INTERPOL concerning the INTERPOL-Security Council Special Notices. INTERPOL is an important partner in promoting effective implementation of measures. It is our belief that the Council and its sanctions committees could strengthen even more interaction with relevant international and regional organizations. As for interaction with Member States, in February we convened an informal open briefing for all Member States with the participation of the Panel of Experts, and in November a briefing with Libya and the interested Member States, in particular those of the region. In both briefings there was interactive participation from Member States. For instance, at our briefing with neighbouring countries, the views and perspectives expressed on the challenges faced in implementing the measures imposed by the Security Council shed light on how the Committee can better assist Member States. We therefore endorse continuing this practice, since we believe that these types of dialogue help to increase transparency and initiate an important process that can contribute greatly to the effectiveness of the Committee’s work. As for interaction between the Committee and the States concerned, we have noted some success, particularly the invitation to the Permanent Representative of Libya to join the Committee at two meetings. Additionally, in our efforts to be more transparent, the Committee shared with Libya unofficial and informal information on the exemption requests and notifications relating to the assets freeze and arms embargo imposed under resolution 1970 (2011) and modified by subsequent resolutions. That was a first step in the right direction and I am sure that in future the Committee will try to improve information-sharing with the Permanent Mission of Libya. I should also add that in the light of the increased relevance of the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Committee’s work in the wake of the adoption of resolution 2174 (2014), we believe it will be useful to invite him to Committee meetings in the near future. We regret that we could not organize such a meeting during my tenure. Concerning the scope of the Committee’s work, we note that while the total number of issues before it has decreased, their complexity has increased significantly. That has been due largely to the changes that have been made to the measures, with a particular focus on the arms embargo, which has received a lot of attention, especially in recent months. The Committee has exercised vigilance with regard to exemption requests and exchanged letters with individual Member States seeking clarification when necessary. However, despite our vigilance, the situation on the ground today shows gaps in the implementation of the arms embargo. The Panel of Experts has reported transfers of non-exempt material, both into and out of Libya. In that context, I would like to emphasize that the Committee’s vigilance is not a silver bullet, and that Member States should fully implement the arms embargo. It is also important to emphasize that the Committee will remain ready to provide guidance on the scope and application of the measures to any Member State requesting it, in order to ensure a clear and consistent understanding on everyone’s part. Regarding the Panel of Experts, I would first like to extend my sincere appreciation to the experts for the tremendous work they do and for their consistent provision of detailed and exhaustive reports. During Rwanda’s tenure, the Committee has been proactive and in regular communication with Member States, seeking support for the Panel and following up on its recommendations and input. Unfortunately, the response rate remains low, and I would encourage Member States to cooperate more closely with the Committee. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to the secretariat of the Subsidiary Organs Branch for its invaluable assistance, and to the members of the Committee for their support and cooperation during the past two years, which has enabled us to address the complex issues submitted to the Committee in a timely manner. Turning now to the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, during its tenure Rwanda has addressed important thematic debates relating to the complexity of international peacekeeping operations today. Overall, the programme of meetings, eight in total, including the upcoming one scheduled for 17 December, has reflected not only the current activities of the wider Security Council and its members’ priorities, but also the concerns and issues important to Member States that have personnel and equipment on the ground. Specific topics have included mission start-ups and rehatting challenges, inter-mission cooperation, women’s participation in peacekeeping, troop and police preparedness, and the role of United Nations police in peacekeeping. For our first subject, given the earlier rehatting challenges in Mali, we believed it was critical to improve future rehatting processes, and our topic in April was on the Central African Republic, ahead of the rehatting of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. The following month we considered the question of inter-mission cooperation, focusing on the recent example of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Several participants made proposals that could make such cooperation more effective, including the possibility of developing airlift capabilities for the regional service centres. In June, we addressed the challenges confronting United Nations efforts to increase female participation in peacekeeping operations, both in the field and at Headquarters. Rwanda’s Assistant Commissioner of Police travelled all the way from Kigali to share insights into how Rwanda is able to deploy such a high percentage of female peacekeepers to United Nations operations. Many Member States raised important points, including recognizing the value of national action plans in promoting the use of women, providing more opportunities for predeployment training, utilizing the skill sets that female personnel have to offer and recruiting women into leadership posts. The last meeting I would like to highlight will be our final one, scheduled for 17 December, next week. It will address the complex issue of the protection of civilians, with the aim of working towards a common understanding of the definition of the protection of civilians and mandate design and implementation. We believe it paramount that we delve into the evolution of protection-of-civilian mandates and address key conceptual issues that affect the work on the ground. It is our hope that the discussion among Member States will illustrate varying visions for the protection of civilians, as well as laying the groundwork for an attempt to move this discussion forward. In conclusion, I would like to point out that next year the Secretary-General’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations will provide, for the first time in 20 years, a comprehensive assessment of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. We hope that the recommendations of the Panel and of other review and assessment efforts will inform the agenda of the Working Group in 2015. Finally, I would like to thank the Secretariat for its support in ensuring that the work of the Working Group has been conducted smoothly, and to thank all Member States for their contributions, which without a doubt have helped to enrich the discussion. I would also like to wish the delegations of Chad and Malaysia the best of luck in discharging their duties at the helm of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the 1970 Committee, respectively.

I thank Ambassador Gasana for his briefing. On behalf of the Security Council, I take this opportunity to commend the outgoing Chairs for the way in which they have discharged the important duties entrusted to them by the Council. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.