S/PV.738 Security Council

The Yugoslav Government has viewed with grave concern the evolution of the Suez Canal question. Our attitude on the variûus aspects of the situation has been made known on several occasions. Neverthe1ess, 1 should like to summarize briefly our views on some of the main questions that have arisen in this connexion. 2. Je parlerai d'abord de la nationalisation de la Com- pagnie du canal de Suez par le Gouvernement égyptien. Le droit de l'Egypte de prendre des mesures de natio- nalisation dans les limites de sa juridiction territoriale n'est pas nié en soi. On soutient, cependant, que la Compagnie du canal de Suez jouissait d'un statut in- ternational et que le Gouvernement égyptien n'avait donc pas le droit de la nationaliser. 3. Nous considérons cette thèse comme sans fonde- ment. Le statut juridique de la Compagnie était régi par les actes de concessiQn et par les firmans, c'est-à- Président: M. C. PINEAU (France). Présents: Les représentants des pays suivants: Australie, Belgique, Chine, Cuba, France,·Iran, Pérou, Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, Royaume- Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats- Unis d'Amérique, Yougoslavie. Ordre du jour provisoire (S/Agenda/738) 1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Situation créée par l'action unilatérale du Gouver- nement égyptien mettant fin au système de gestion internationale du canal de Suez, système confirm~ et complété par la Convention du canal de Suez de 1888. 3. Mesure:> que certaines puissances, notamment la France et ie Royaume-Uni, ont prises contre l'Egypte et qui mettent en danger la paix et la sécu- rité internationales et sont de graves violations de la Charte des Nations Unies. Adoption de l'ordre du jour Situation créée par l'action unilatérale du Gouver- nement égyptien mettant fin au système de ges- tion internationale du canaI de Suez, système confirmé et complété par la Convention du canal de Suez de 1888 (S/3654) Sur l'invitation du Président, M. Fawsi, représentan~ de l'Egypte, prend place à la table du Conseil. 1. M. POPOVIC (Yougoslavie): Le Gouvernement yougoslave a suivi avec une grande préoccupation l'évo- lution de la question du canal de Suez. Nous avons fait connaître en plusieurs occasions notre attitude touchant les divers aspects de ce problème. Qu'il me soit toute- fois permis de résumer brièvement notre opinion sur certaines des principales questions qui se sont posées à ce propos. 4. Thus, in nl:l.tionalizing this company, the Egyptian Government was acting strictly within the sphere of the domestic jurisdiction. 5. The intemational instrument whir!t, while recog- nizing the Canal as an integral part of Egypt, defines the latter's obligations towards the international com- munity, is the ConventLn of 1888.1 This Convention established the international obligation of Egypt to en- sure free nav~gation for ships of an flags, while leaving it to Egypt as the~ territorial State to see that this right was impJemented. The Con- enti!;n thus in no way modified the legal status Oi' the Cûmpany, as is c1ear from its article 14. which provides that Egypt's obli- gations under the Convention are not limited to the duration of the concessions, thereby dra",ring a c1ear distinction between the concessions governing the sta- tus of the Company and Egypt's international obliga- tions with regard to freedom of navigation. 6. The fact that the Suez situation has come before the United Nations is encouraging in itself, regardless .of the actual form in which it has been brought before the Council. It may be taken, 1 thir.k, as the sign of a certain evolution in the approach to the question and, in a sense, in the question itself. It should he expected also to create 'COnditions in which such an approach eould acq. ire a more definite form andbe translated into genuine progress towards a settlement along the !:ines of the United Nations Charter. From that point of view, we have here a proof of what has been rightly called the "inevitability" of the United Nations. But do not let us make any mistake. It is at the same time a severe test for the Organization. Nevertheless, that the question should have assumed the proportions of a crisis calling for Security Couneil action is, of course, a matter of profound regret, all the more 50, it would seem, as it stands in stark contrast with the otherwise improving climate of world affairs. 7. 1 do not intend to go into' the origins of the Suez crisis, since the facts are well known. My Government, for its part, has a1way ~ favoured and supported efforts towards a settlement alllDg the tines of the Vnited Na- tions Qlarter and in ke~?ing both with the sovereign rights and interests of Egypt and the legitimate inter- ests of the international commu..:f.y in the free use of this internationally important waterway. 8. 1 should like in this connédon to quote from a statement made on 12 August 1956 by the President of . Yugoslavia, at the time of the first London Conference. President Tito said : <lIt is obvious that the principle of freedom of navigation in general, and the freedom of navigation 1 Convention r.especting the free navigation of the Suez Mari- time Canal, signed at Constantinople on 29 October 1888. P~'ésident de la République yougoslave a faite le 12 août 1956, au moment de la première Conférence de Londres. Le président Tito a dit: .l "Il est évident que le principe de la liberté de na- vigation en général et de la liberté de navigation 1 Convention destinée à garantir le libre usage du canal mari- time de Suez, signée à Constantinople le 29 octobre 1888. 1 9. One cannot, in this connexion, overlook the dis- turbing display of force and the measures of eeon01Llc pressure that have been brought to bear upon Egypt by France and the United Kingdcm. Snch measures- irrespective of any reservations one may have with regard to the actual manner in which the nationa1iza- tion ·",as carried out--are clearly in conBiet with the oè..Jgations stipu~ated in ilie United Nations Ch<irter and they have certainly had p.nd still have a most un- fortunate effcct on the situation. Such a course is, 1 might add, all the more to be ref,.rretted as the Egyptian Government has aIl along shown readiness to seek an agreement through free and equal negotiations. 10. It is my confident hope that the Couneil will soon find it possible, now that the different '''Îews on the events that have oceurred within the last few months have been placed on record, to pursue its efforts in a constructive and objective atmosphere free from recrimi- nation, that it will find it possible to turn from the past to the future, to look beyond the Suez crisis to the Suez problem. 1 have no intention, of course, of denying the reality of the crisis. What 1 have in mind is that it is essential to try to disentangle the problem from the crisis if we are to solve the problem and settle the crisis. The fact that the problem has presented itse)f in an alarming guise is the reflection of a number of clrcumstanees, which are we1.l known to ail of us. Il. The problem would presumably have arisen sooner or later. The world has not stood still since the days of the Khedive Said and Ferdinand de Lesseps, or sinee the days when the representatives of nine Powers assembled at Constantinople to work out the convention of that name. And, as v·,,: ail know, the march of history has been partîcularly swift in the course of the decade that has elapsed sinœ the Second World War. In this changing international context, answers that were found more than seventy years ago ' to the Suez problem were bound to become obsolete,and the problem itself was bound ta re-emerge in a new shape. 12. It is generally agreed that the crux of the Suez problem, as it now presents itseJf, is to bring E~t's sovereign rights with regard to the Suez Canal mto barmony with the legitimate interests of the world com- munity in navigation through what is undoubtedly- and increasingly-a waterway of exceptional interna- tional importance. This is, of course, but one aspect of the broader problem of adjusting, within a rapidty evolving international fmmework, the particu1ar inter- ests of nations--especially of the newly independent na- I 11. Le problème se serait, nous semble-t-51, poSé tôt ou tard. Le monde a beaucoup changé depuis l'époque du khédive Said et de Ferdinand de Lesseps ou depuis l'époque où les représentants de neuÎ puissances st;; sont" réunis à Constantinople pour mettre au point Ja Convention qui porte ce nom. Et, nous le savons tous, la marche de l'histoire a été particulièrement rapide au cours des 10 années qui se sont écoulées depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale. La situation internationale ayant ainsi évolué, il était pour ainsi dii~ fatal que les réponses qui avaient été trouvées, il y a plus de 70 ans, au problème de Suez deviennent périmées et que le problème lui-même se pose sous une formenouve11e. 12. Il est généralement admis que, en l'état actuel des choses, l'essence du problème de Suez est la suivante: il s'agit d'harmoniser' les droits souverains de l'Egypte sur le canal avec l'intérêt légitime que présente pour la collectivité mondiale la navibQtion dans ce qui est in- contestablement, et toujours davantage, une voie d'eau d'une importance' internationale exceptionnelle. Ûl n'est là évidemment que l'un des aspects du problème plus vaste qui consiste à opérer, dans le cadre d'une évolution rapide des réalités internationales, un ajus- 13. Egypt's sovereign rights with regard to the Suez Canal have never, to my knowledge, been questioned in principle; they have moreover been affirmed and reaffirmed in the different international instruments re- _ lating to the waterway. They have been emphasized in various forms in the documents and proposals that have appeared during the last few months. Bebind this unanimity of principle (which in itse1f should not he underrated), differences have, of course, appeared with regard to the scope to he given to these rights. One thing shou1d be clear, however: it would he idle to expect a nation that has, after many centuries, finally acbieved genuine independence, to consent to more far- reaching restrictions upon its sovereignty than' those acceptd by a nineteenth-century vassal State. It is especially obvious that any limitations which increasing international co-operation might caU for with regard to the sovereignty of aState, can he based ooly on the free agreement of that State. 14. It is no less evident, on the other hand, that the i'_cernational community, in this growingly interde- pendent world of ours, is entitled to adequate assur- ances regarding the freedom and security of navigation through the Canal. 15. It would appear that it is precisely in the quest for the necessary adjustrnent hetween these twobasic aspects of the matter that the main differences of interpretation concerning the nature and extent of both begin to arise. 16. Perhaps the problem will seem somewhat less formidable if we view it on the two different practical levels upoh which it has always been dealt with in the pasto 17. On one level we have the question of freedom of navigation through the Canal in the literal, or, if you prefer, the political sense of the word; we have the question of ensuring that the Canal "shall always be free and open . . . to every vessel . . . without dis- tinction of flag". The obligation to ensure such free- dom, as provided for under the 1888 Convention, has been solemoly reaffirmed by Egypt. Nor has anything occurred to justify the contention that the events of the last months have wrought a change in tbis regard. On the contrary, navigation in the Canal has been pro- gressing in a perfectly smooth and satisfactory manner, despite some artificially created difficulties. 18. It is felt, h\)wever-and we, for our part, would certainly be prepCi red to go along with this view-that the principle of freedom of navigation through the Canal requires sorne more up-to-date instrument than the Constantinople Convention. It is, of course, essen- tial to bear in mind that responsibility for the imple- mentation of such m instrument and for ensuring free- dom of navigation in tbis iiC~S~ must of necessity l'est -as was the case under the Constantinople Conven- tion-with the territorial Power, which assumes a ,very definite internàtional obligation in this respect. 19. Where a new instrument should, in our opinion, seek to improve upon its predecessor at this leve1 of the problem, is in the procedure for settling possible differences arising from its' application; recourse ta the 17. D'un côté, nous avons la question de la liberté de navigation dans le canal au sens littéral ou, si l'on pré- fère, politique du terme; il s'agit d'assurer que le "ca- nal sera toujours libre et ouvert ... à tout navire ... sans distinctions de pavillon". L'obligation d'assurer cette liberté, prévue par la Convention de 1888, a été solennellement confirmée par l'Egypte. Rien ne s'est produit non plus qui puisse justifier l'affirmation que les événements des derniers mois ont apporté un chan- gement à cet égard. Au contraire, la navigation par le canal a progressé d'une façon parfaitement satis- faisante, malgré certaines difficultés artificiellement créées. 18. Il Y en a qui pensent cependant - et nous sommes, quant à nous, certainement disposés à partager c~tte opinion - que le principe de la liberté de navig2.tion dans le canal exige des instruments plus modernell que la Convention de Constantinople. Il est essentiel bien entendu de ne pas perd.re de vue que la responsabi.1it~ de mettre en œuvre un lllstrument de cette nature aInSI que d'assurer la liberté de navigation incombe néces- sairement, comme c'était le cas avec la Convention de Constalltinople, à hi. puissance sur le territolre de la- quelle se trouve le canal, qui assume de ce fait une obligation internationale très précise à cet égard. 19. Si/l'on doit sur ce plan chercher par un nouvel instrument à marquer un progrès sur celui qui l'a pré- cédé, il faut le faire, à notre avis, dans le domaine de la procédure qe règlement des différends auxquels son ap- 4: 20. Now to tum to the other leve1 l mentilmed. Here wc are faced with the various practical or technical re- quirements connected with navigation through the Canal. These requirements relate to the maintenance and development of the Canal, to the question of dues, to the various sel'Vices and facilities that are need~d, etc. Here, it would seem, th~ interests of the international community in general, and of the users of the Canal in particular, could by mutual agreement be given a more direct and tangible form without, however, encroaching upon what Egypt rightly regards as the sphere of its territorial jurisdiction. The Indian proposal made at the first London Conference contains in this respect valuable suggestions providing for the establishment of an international organ will. advisot"j, arbitration and liaison functions. 21. l would, if l may, merely by way of example and without any intention of offering solutions at this stage, refer to sorne of the questions l have in mind here. "[ake the question of Canal dues, for example. This question is such as ta affect, in a variety of ways, the interests both of Egypt and of the user nations. It is therefore only,appropriate thaï this question of dues should he dea1t with by mutllal agreement through ap- propriate machinery, with due consideration for the need of maintaining and deve10ping the Canal, of guar- anteeing to Egypt the revenue to which it is c1early entitled, white making transit as little onerous as pos- sible for the users. Similarly, as regards the mainte- nance and de,.=lopment of the Canal, a system might, 1 think, he devised' whereunder the users (and l U!,!e the tcrm in its general sense) could both have an ade- quate say and assiune the nece;;sary obligations, in keeping with the sovereign rights of Egypt as the terd- torial Power. Possibly, too, certain temporary arrange- ments could he worked out with respect to some of these questions, pending a more lasting and compre- hensive solution. 22. 1t is in the light of these general considerations governing our attitude on the Suez Canal question that we have examined the different proposaIs now before th~ Couneil. 23. The draft resolution 'submitted by France and the United Kingdom [S/3666] is not, in our view, such as 'to provide a basis for agreement. This draft seems to ignore the fact that the proposais it contains have al- reaay proved unacceptable to the party most directly concerned-Egypt. Moreoller, the draft reE'olution tends to prejudge-in a one-sided manner-settlements which œhbe' reached ,pnly through negotiation;con-. ~ême, pour ce qui est de l'entretien et du développe- ment du canal, Je pense 'iue l'on pourrait mettre au point un régime en vertu duquel les usagers (et j'em- ploie ce mot dans son sens général) auraient leur mot à dire et assumeraient en même temps les resnonsabi- 'lités nécessaires, en respectant les droits souverains de l'Egypte, pUissa.11ce sur le territoire de laqueile se trouve le canal. Des mesures temporaires pourraient être également mises au point, portant sur certaines dè ces questions, en attendant que l'on parvienne à une ' soi...tion plus durable et plus générale. 22. C'est à la lumière de ces considérations d'ordre général, qui déterminent l'attitude de mon gouverne- ment à l'égard de la question de Suez, que nous avons examiné les diverses ?ropositions qui se trouvent de- va!lt le Conseil. 23. Le projet de résolution sownis par la France et le Royaume-Uni [S/3666/Rev.1 et Corr.1] ne saurait, à notre avis, offrir, la base d'un accord. Ce projet 'semble, ' en effet, méconnaître le fait que les propositions qu'il contient se SOilt déjà avérées inacceptables à la partie la plus directement intéressée, l'Egypte. Ce projet tend à préjuger, de. manière unilatérale, la solution de ce pro- blème, qui ne peut être résolu que par voie de négocia- e~ possible measurè of obj~~ __ . _. .lld efficacy. Its terms of reÎerence shoulù inc1ude a study of the ideas set forth by Mr. Fawzi in the conc1uding pOl"tion of the statement he made yesterday morning f736th meeting]. 27. 'We are convinced that a solution can he found, because we do not see anything fundame1.ltally irrecon- cilable between the different interests involv~; they should, on the contrary, he expected to merge into the common interest-politica1 as weIl as eC'onomic-of all concemed, which is that the ftow of traffic through the Canal shoqld be free and efficient. We are fully aware that such a solution will require patient and persever- ing efforts, l.'. conciliatory spirit and a substantial dose of realism on the part of aIl. Our discussions here should mark an important stage in the quest for a solu- tion. They should make it possible to find enough com- mon grouna and to establish a basis upon which an agreed settlement may he reached. . 28. Mr. DULLES (United States of America): As our general debate draws to a close, it is important to recall some fundamentals. 29. First, we are here dealing with a situation which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. That is conceded by all concemed. 30. Secondty, the nations of the world, and explicitly the seventy-six Members of the United Nations, have conferred upon us, constituting this Council, the pri- mary ?esponsibility to maintain international peace and security. 31. Thirdly, we are obligated in dIscharging this duty to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and that means to bring about by peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or sett1e- ment of this dangerous situation. 32. Our duty is clear: it is to seek by peaceful means a settlement in accordance with the prineiples of justice and international law. We thus have a two-pbased re- sponsibility; one aspect relates to pea.ce; the other 27. Nous sommes convaincus qu'une solution peut être trouvée, parce que nous ne voyons rien qui soit fondamentalement incompatible entre les divers intérêts en cause. Au contraire, on devrait s'attendre à ce que ces intérêts divers se confondent dans un intérêt com- mun - politique autant qu'économique - qui est celui de la navigation libre et efficace dans le ca.1al. Nous sayons trop bien qu'une telle solution exige des efforts patients et tenaces, un esprit de conciliation et beaucoup de réalisme de la part de tous. Nos discussions ici d~­ vraient marquer une étape importante dans la recherche d'une solution. Elles devraient permettre de trouver assez de points communs pour établir une base sur la- qaelle on pourrait aboutir à une solution concert~e. 28. M. DULLE;:: \.Etats-Unis d'Amérique) [traduit de l',mglaisl: Maintenant que notre dis.~ussion générale s'acb;'ve, il importe de rappeler certains points essen- ti~ls. 29. Premièrement, il s'agit d'une situation qui met en danger le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité interna- tionales. Toutes les parties intéressées reconnaissent ce iait. 30. Deuxièmement, les pays du monde, et plus parti-. culièrement les 76 Etats Membres cie l'Organisation des Nations Unies, nous ont confié, à nous qui fonnons ce conseil, la r~~onsabilité principal€ du maintien de la oaix et de la sécurité internationales. 31.- Troisièmement, pour nous acquitter de ce devoir, nous sommes tenus d'agir conformément aux buts et principes des Nations Unies, c'e~t-à-dire de réaliser par . des moyens pacifiques,selon les principes de la justice et du droit intem:.tional, l'ajustement ou le règlement de cette situation dangereuse. 32. Notre devoir est clair: liOUS devons chercher par des moyens pacifiques un règlement conforme aux prin- cipes de la justice et du. droit international. NQtre re.os- p0l,lsabilité revêt. donc de~ aspects: l~un oonceme la, 6, th~ United Kingdom and the Unitèd States met to- gether and decided that a solution s}'Juld first of an he sought by a meeting together of the twenty··four nations principally concemed, including Egypt. That was the first peace move. 37. From 16 to 24 August 1956, a conference was held in London. Egypt declined to attend. But th~re were repres~nted aIl seven of the unquestionably sur- viving signt'ltories of the Suez Canal Treaty of 1888; seven other countries which are the principal users 01 the Cand, and another eight countries whose econo- mies dtpend most largely upon the Canal. 38. This conference produced an agreement among dghtef:n vf the twenty-two States represented upon a formula for settlement which they believed should he acceptable both to Egyptand to the nations which were users of the Canal or dep~ndent thereon. That was the second peace move. 39. During that conference, a comrr.tÏttee of five na- tions was established, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Australia, to commdllicate the views of the eighteen to Egypt and to ascertain whefuer or not those views would he acceptable as a basi.s for negotiation. A meeting at Geneva was suggested, but the Government of Egypt indicated that it was not convenient for it to meet with the c6mmittee except :!t Cairo. Accordingly, the cori'unittee, consisting of one Prime MitÙster, three Foreign MiQisters and one Deputy Foreign Minister, travelled to Cairo in their quest for peace. That was the third peace move. 40. The committee was in Cairo .from 3 to 9 Sep- tember 1956, presenting and explaining the proposal of the eighteen nations. That was the fourth peace maye. . 41. At ,Cairo, the Government of Egypt rejected the 1 .}roposals of the eighteen Powers, even as a basis for llegotiation, and it made no counter-proposal. 42. Nevertheless, on 19 September 1956, the eighteen nations again met to explore further the possibilities of peaceful adjustment. They re-examined and reaf- firmed their August proposals as a fair basis for a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal problem, taking into account the interests of the user nations as weIl as those of Egypt. . 39. Au cours d~ cette conféI ence, on a constitué, sous la présidence d'" Premier lIin.ist::-: d'Australie, un co- m't~ de cinq paysi chargé de transmettre à l'Egypte les vues des 18 puissances et de déterminer si ces vues const' .'laient ou non une base de négociation accep- table~ ( 'n a suggéré que la réunion ait Heu à Genève. Cependant, le Gouvenlement égyptien a fait savo.ir qu'il lui était di~ci1e de prendre contact avec le comité ail- leurs qu'au Caire. En conséquence, le comité - qui était composé d'un premier ministre, de trois ministres des affaires étrangères et d'un suppléant au ministre des affaires étrangères - s'est rendu av. Caire, voué à sa mission de paix. Telle fut la troisième initiative de paix. 40. Du 3 au 9 septembre 1956, les membres du comité sont demeurés au Caire, où ils ont présenté et expliqué la proposition des 18 puissances. Ce fut la quatrième ini- tiative de paix. 41. Au Caire, le Gouvernement égyptien a rejeté la proposition des 18 puissances, même en tant que base de négociation, et n'a formulé aucune contreproposition. 42. Cependant,.Je 19 septembre 1956, les 18 puissances se sont réunies de nouveau pour étudier plus avant les possibilités d'un règlement pacifique. Elles ont réexa- miné leurs propositions du mois d'août et réaffirmé qu'elles constituaient une base équitable pour le règle- ment pacifique du problème de Suez et qu'elles tenaient compte des ,ntérêts tant des pays usagers que de. l'Egypte. 43. Ces puissances ont r.ontinué à chercher un moyen pratique de coopération avec l'Egypte. Elles ont estimé que, même si l'Egypte n'était pas disposée, pour le présent, à accepter une solution ~rma,nt:tlte, on pour- 44. Then the Governments of France and the United Kindom acted to bring to the attention of this Council the situation with which we are now dealing. That was the sixth peace move. 45. In the light of this history no one, 1 think, can fairly question the peaceful desires of those who ar;,; aggrieved by the action of Egypt. Rarely, if ever, in history have comparable efforts been made to settle peacefully an issue of such dangerous proportions. This Council knows that it is not dealing with Govern.nents bent on the use of force. Even those most aggrieved have shown their desire to bring about a just solution by peaceful means. 46. 1 tum to the second aspect of our problem-that is, to und a solution which will conform to the prin- ciples of justice and international law. And here also the way is clear. 47. Oftentimes we are confronted by situations as ta which there is no relevant body of international law. But in the present situation there is a governing treaty, the Convention of 1888. It provides that for all time the vessels of all the nations shall have the right of free and equal passage through the Suez Canal. It caUs for a "definite system destined to guarantee" such right of use, and it incorporates by reference the concession of 1866 to the Universal Suez Canal Company as pro- viding such a system. 48. Mucn has been said about the need to respect the sovereignty of Egypt in relation to the Canal. 49. Sovereignty exists where a nation can do what- ever it wants. Gell.eraUy speaking, a nation can do what it wants within its own territory and, generally speaking, no nation has any rights within the territory of another sovereign nation. 50. The Suez Canal, to be sure, goes through what is now Egypt, and in this sense the Canal is Egyptian. But the Canal is not, and never has been, a purely internaI affair of Egypt with which Egypt \.Guld do what it wanted. The Canal has always been, from the very day of its opening, an international waterway dedicated to the free passage of the vessels of aU na- tions. Hs character ài> an international right-of-way was guaranteed for aU time by the 1888 Convention. Egypt cannot rightfully stop any vessel or cargo from going through the Canal. And for those who use that right-of-way, to c.ombine to secure the observance of their rights is no violation of Egyptian sovereignty, but a c1ear exercise of their rights accordOO by interna- tional law, namely, by the Convention of 1888. SI. Egypt has accepted this legal view, al'ld bas in- deed expounded it before this CounciI. 52. 1 recall that, on 5 August ~947, the representative of Egypt spoke here before t:.is Council of the situation which existed when the United Kingdom had treaty rights in lands abutting on the Canal. The Egyptian representative pointOO out that that did .not make free- 8 49. 11 y a souveraineté lorsqu'un pays peut agir comme il l'entend. D'une façon générale, un pays peut agir comme il l'entend dans les limites de son propre terri- toire. D'une façon générale, nul pays n'a de droits à l'intérieur du territoire d'un autre pays souverain. 50. Certe~, le canal de Suez traverse le pays qui s'ap- pelle maintenant l'Egypte, et, dans ce sens, il est égyptien. Cependant, il ne constit...e pas, et n'a jamais constitué, une affaire purement mtérieure de l'Egypte, un bien dont ce pays pourrait disposer à sa guise. Dès le jour de sa mise en service, le canal a toujours été une voie maritime internationale ouverte au libre pas- sage des navires de tous les pays. La Convention de 1888 a garanti pour toujours son caractère de voie interna- tionale. L'Egypte n'a le droit d'empêcher aucun navire, aucune cargaison, de passer par le canal. Le fait, pour les usagers de cette voie, de s'associer pour faire res- pecter leurs droits n'est pas une violation de la souve- raineté égyptienne, c'est l'exercice même de.> droits que leur confère le droit international, en l'occurrence la Convention de 1888. 51. L'Egypte a accepté ce point de vue juridique; en fait, elle l'a expo~é devant le Conseil. 52. Le 5 août 1947, le représentant de l'Egypte par· lait, devant le Conseil de sécurité, de la situation qui existait alors et qui donnait au Royaunie-Uni, en vertu d'un traité, des droits sur les terres voisines du canal. Le représentant de l'Egypte a fait observer que la li.. 1 stress the words of the Egyptian representative that, under the Convention of 1888, the nations organized to regulate the traffic of the Canal. . 53. On 14 October 1954, the representative of Egypt, again speaking before tms Security Couneil in the Bat Galim case, said: "The Canal Company, which controls the passage, is an international company controlled by authorities "'~o are neither Egyptian nor necessarily of any par- t':ular nationality. It is a universal company, it functions, and tmngs will continue to be managed tha~ way in future" [682nd meeting, paragraph 150]. 54. 50 much for the law of the case. Then there is the question of j. .tice, which we are also required to hear in mind and to apply. What is the just tm.ng to do? 55. The Council should, 1 believe,. in this matter give much weight to the conclusions of the eighteen nations which joined in an expression of their views last August. The eighteen included aIl but one of the clearly surviving signatories of the 1888 Convention; they rep- resented over 90 per cent of the total traffic; and they represented countries whosc ecanomies are largely de- pendent upon the Canal. Among the eighteen were countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia and America. 56. They affirmed that, as stated in the preamble to the 1888 Convention, there should be established "a definite system destined to guarantee at aIl times, and h- aIl the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal". 57. They enuneiated four basic principles which, with due regard to the sovereign rights af Egypt, should find expression through such a system. 1 qucte their state- ment of these four basic prineiples: fir5t, efficient and dependable operation, maintenance and development of the Canal as a free. open and secure international wa- terway, in accordance with the prineiples of the Con- vention of 1888; secondly, insulation of the operation of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation; thirdly, a return to Egypt for th~ use of the Suez Canal which will be fair and equitable and in- creasing with the enlargement of the Canal's capacity and its greater use; fourthly, Canal to11s as low as is consistent with the foregoing requirements and, except for Egypt's share, rio profit. 58. How can anyone seriously dispute these prin- ciples? Indeed, only one of them was disputed at the August conference, and only by the Soviet Union; it was the second principle ta which 1 referred, name1y, 60. If, as the United Nations Charter commands, we are to seek justice, we must agree that the operation of this international utility shaH be insulated from the politics of any nation. 61. 1 believe that this Couneil can accept unhesitat- ingly the prineiples enunciated by the eighteen nations as prineiples of justice. 62. The eighteen nations then went on to indicate a mechanism by which these prineiples might he applied. They suggested institutional arrangements for co- operation between Egypt and other interested nations, and the creation of a Suez Canal Board on which Egypt and others would he represented. This Board, they sug- gested, should he assoeiated with, and make periodic reports to, the United Nations. They suggested that arbitration should he agreed upon to settle disputes and that there should be effective sanctions against viola- tion of the arrangement. "1 believe that such additional burüen as might result from the adoption of our amendment would not be much as compared with the sacrifices we have :lU suffered and are aIl ready to suffer again for the sake of maintaining peace and security in the world ... If we want to keep peace and security only, we would not differ much from Hitler. who was also trying to do that and who, as a mattèr of fact, partIy succeede<1. But where the difference lies, is that we want to maintain peace and security in conformity with the principles of internationallaw and justice."2 50 spoke the voice of Egypt, and with those sentiments we can, l think, all agree. 69. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this proceeding. Our Couneil finds, on the one hand, a dem- onstrated desire for peace on the part of all the parties. On the other hand, .the situation is governed by prin- eiples of justice and of law such as are rarely evident. If, under these favourable conditions, with all of these assets, our Couneil finds itself impotent to secure a settlement by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of justice and international law, then our failure would be a calamity of immense proportions. 70. This seems to be recognized by those who have spoken around this table, and our general debate has on the whole been temperate and constructive. 71. l say "on the whole", for there have been excep- tions. One such was the portrayal by the Soviet For- eign Minister of so-called "United States monopolies" clad, as he picturesquely put it, in "snow-white robes", and which, with wheited appetites, are on the prowî throughout the world seeking new victims. 2 United Nations Conference on International Organization, 2 Conférence des Nations Unies sur l'Organisation interna- 1/6. t~na1e, 1/6. Il "Dans ces questions, le Conseil de sécurité agit en quelque sorte comme un tribunal politique. C'est dans les décisions qu'il prendra dans ce domaine - et qui toutes viseront au maintien de la paix - qu'il est in- dispensable que la notion de justice et de droit soit toujours présente . . . Enfin, dernier argument ad- verse . . . : le respect intégral des principes de justice et de droit dans toutes les affaires internationales se- rait, dit-on, de nature à augmenter les charges et les obligations de l'Organisation, et plus spécialement celles incombant aux grandes puissances. "Qu'il me suffise . . . de dire q\::- le surcroît de responsabilités et de charges qu'entraînerait l'appli- caâon générale des principes de la justice et du droit serait peu de chose en comparaison des énormes sa- crifices de toutes sortes consentis jusqu'à présent et que tous les Etats ... sont encore prêts à accomplir, en vue d'assuret: au monde la paix et la sécurité ... Maintenir la paix et la sécurité seulement, mais c'est le but que poursuivait Hitler et il y est, dans une certaine mesure, parvenu. Mais où était la justice et où était le droit? . . . Maintenir la paix et la sécurité, oui de tout cœur, mais dans la justice et par le droits." Ainsi parIa la voix de l'Egypte et je crois que nous pouvons tous partager ces sentiments. 69. Il est difficile d'exagérer l'importance de ce dé- bat. D'une part, toutes les parties ont témoigné devant le Conseil d'un désir de paix. D'autre part, il est rare de se trouver devant une situation régie par des prin- cipes de justice et de droit aussi évidents. Si, malgré ces conditions favorables, avec tOllS les éléments inscrits à son actif, notre conseil se trouve impuissant à ob- tenir un règlement pacifique conforme aux principes de la justice et du droit international, notre échec sera une immense catastrophe. 70. C'est là un faIt que semblent reconnaître ceux des orateurs qui sont intervenus dans le débat. Dans l'en- semble, notre discussion générale s'est déroulée sU!' un ton modéré et dans un esprit constructif. 71. Je dis "dans l'ensemble", car i1 ya eu des excep- tions. L'une a été le portrait brossé par le Ministre des aifaires étrangères de l'URSS des prétendus "mono- poles des Etats-Unis", couverts, comme il l'a dit de façon si pittoresque, de la robe blanche de l'innocence, et qui, avec un appétit de loup, rôdent à travers le monde à la recherche de nouvelles victimes. 75. The Government of Egypt, in a more constructive vein, has proposed that we establish a negotiating body which will have the guidance of an agreed set of prin- ciples to work on, and of agreed objectives to keep .in mind and to attain. This was indeed the procedure which we sought to follow at the London Conference which was held last August where, as 1 have indicated, a set of principles was formulated and certain objec- tives were outlined. 76. The heart of the problem, as 1 indicated, seems to me to be whether among these principles we can get acceptance of the principle that there should be a system to ensure that the Canal cannot be used by any country as an instrument of its distinctly national policy. 77. If Egypt accepts that simple and rudimentary principle of justice, then 1 be!ieve that the subsidiary problems can be resolved But if that principle be repu- diated, then it is difficult to foresee a useful role for a negctiating body. Indeed, under those conditions, it is difficult to foresee any settlement in accordance with the principles of justice and of international law. And if this case cannot be so settled, then the whole system of peace with justice sought to be established by this Charter will have been undermined. 78. Surely we can do better than that. 1 feel confident that no nation here desires other than friendly rela- tions with Egypt. Indeed, the settlement proposed by the user nations, representing over 90 per cent of the traffic, will significantly promote the welfare of Egypt. A peaceful and equitable solution of this problem would open up a vista of new hope for an area of the world where the peoples have for long-for too long-been grievously oppressed by alarms of war and by the eco- nomic burdens of preparing for war. Also, we can open up a new hope for ail humanity, which has begun, 1 iear, to lose confidence in the capacity of this Organi- zation to secure peace and justice. 79. When the choices before us are thus clearly seen, who can doubt what our choice will he? AUSTRIA.AUTRICHE Gerold & Co., Graben 31, Wlen, 1. B. WUllerstorff, Marku. Slttlkusstraue 10, Salzburg. BELGIUM.BELGIQUE Agence et Messagerle. de la Preue S.A., 14-22 rUe du Persll, Bruxellel. W. H. Smith & Son, 71-75, boulevard Adolphe.Max, Bruxelles. BOLlVIA.BOLlVIE Librerla Selecclone., Ca.i1la 972, La Paz. 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MEXICO.MEXIQUE Edltarllll Herme. S.A., Ignoelll Marl'CQI 41, Mexico, DJ. NETHERtANDS·PAYS·BAS N.V. MlIrtlnu. Nllhoff, Lange Voorhout 9, '••Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND.NOUVELLE.lELANDE United Nation. Association of New Zell. land, C.P.O. 1011, Wellington. ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Ubrerla Clentfflca, Guayoquil and Qulta. EGYPT·EGYPTE Libralrle "La Renolssonce d'Egypte", 9 Sh. Adly Po.ha, Cairo. EL SALVADOR·SALVADOR Manuel Nova. y CIlI., Ill. Avenlda .ur 37, San Salvador. Orders and Inquirle, 'ram caunlrle, where ,IIIe. agenl. hove no/ yel been appoinled may be .enl 101 Sal.. and Clrculllllon Se,/ian, Uniled Nallon., New York, U.S.A.; or Sale, Section, Uniled Nallon, O;lIco, Palai. de. Nallonr, Ceneva,Swilzerland. Printed inU.S.A. Price; $U.S. 0.15; 1/0 stg.; Sw. fr. 0.50 (or equivalent in other currencies) 28749-November 1956-1,675 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ETATS.UNIS D'AMERIQUE International Document. Service, Colum- bia University Press, 2960 BroodwlI)', New York 27, N. Y. 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