S/PV.7487 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Somalia to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. Mulet. Mr. Mulet: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Council on the outcome of the joint African Union-United Nations mission deployed pursuant to resolution 2182 (2014). The mission was mandated to review progress towards achieving the benchmarks of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia; assess the impact of the temporary surge of troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to 22,126, authorized in resolution 2124 (2013); and make recommendations on the next steps in the military campaign. Let me begin by echoing the Secretary- General’s profound appreciation of the African Union Commission for the admirable spirit of collaboration that prevailed throughout the joint mission. The close partnership demonstrated by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations in that exercise reflects the solidity of our partnership in Somalia and beyond. I also wish to express appreciation to all other partners who participated. Their contributions were central to the success of the joint mission. The joint mission concluded that the surge of AMISOM uniformed personnel and the logistical support package for the Somali national army authorized in resolution 2124 (2013) enabled AMISOM to realize significant gains against Al-Shabaab. That progress would not have been possible without the continuing sacrifices of AMISOM troops and the Somali national army. Their heroism deserves our collective tribute. However, in the face of these advances, Al-Shabaab has continued to adapt, launching asymmetric attacks and blocking access to some of the newly recovered areas. The group has also expanded its presence in Puntland and become a more significant threat within the subregion. Against this backdrop, the Secretary-General is of the view that despite the progress made towards achieving the benchmarks endorsed by resolution 2124 (2013), a United Nations peacekeeping mission at this time would be a high-risk undertaking. The Secretary- General has recommended refining the language of the benchmarks to better adapt them to the evolving situation in Somalia without altering the substance endorsed by the Council in resolution 2124 (2013). The benchmarks cover issues related to the political process and the extension of State authority, the threat level, the development of the Somali security institutions, and the support of the Somalis for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. I would urge the Council to endorse the adjusted benchmarks. In making its recommendations for the coming period, the joint mission recognized the importance of the international community’s engaging in Somalia in accordance with the new federal map. The recommended security strategy is therefore designed to create an enabling environment for the political process to unfold in Mogadishu and the regions during the next critical 18 months. The proposed strategy will be guided by three interlocking objectives: first, enabling the political process at the federal, regional and district levels; secondly, reinitiating offensive operations against Al-Shabaab strongholds as soon as possible, while maintaining continuous and flexible offensive capabilities; and thirdly, enabling consolidation efforts. These objectives are ambitious and will require strong commitments on the part of all partners involved in Somalia. In particular, the Somali Federal Government, the African Union and troop-contributing countries, the United Nations and key partners must plan and implement the strategy together and fulfil their respective commitments. Only through the dynamic and integrated management of the strategy’s implementation can we hope to bring greater and durable security to the Somali people. At the core of the proposals of the joint mission rests the need to maintain the surge in AMISOM uniformed personnel until the end of 2016, as recommended by the Secretary-General, while improving the efficiency and effectiveness of AMISOM. We welcome the recommendations of the Chairperson of the African Union, as well as the decision taken by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 521st meeting, on 30 June, to undertake a structured and targeted reconfiguration of AMISOM within the authorized ceiling of uniformed personnel. The reconfiguration mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council includes the enhancement of the AMISOM police component, the deployment of requisite capabilities, such as quick-reaction and special forces, to enable AMISOM to become more agile and to facilitate cross-sectoral operations and the streamlining of AMISOM command and control. We are encouraged by the ongoing efforts of the African Union Commission to explore concrete avenues to implement AMISOM’s reconfiguration. Ultimately, the proposed security strategy will succeed only if the Somali security institutions are supported and able to progressively assume greater responsibility for their own security. If they are to achieve this goal, it is important to devise an enhanced and more coherent architecture for the delivery by international partners of capacity-building support to the Somali national army and Somalia’s overall defence sector. More importantly, we must make a more concerted effort to gradually hand over responsibility for security to the Somalis. The adoption on 23 April of the Guulwade Plan for the development of the Somali national army was a critical step forward. It is essential that all Member States abide by their responsibility to effectively coordinate and fully share information on their bilateral contributions to the security sector through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). Such a renewed spirit of partnership and transparency is a prerequisite for ensuring that our collective resources achieve optimal results. The continued provision of the non-lethal support package to the Somali national army authorized in resolution 2124 (2013) will also be essential to enabling its continued engagement in joint operations alongside AMISOM. A gradual shift of efforts towards establishing and capacitating the Somali police force is equally critical. We must accelerate the development of effective and accountable Somali police forces, particularly in the regions, with a focus on maintaining citizen security. This is important for buttressing State-building efforts, freeing up military capacity and avoiding the militarization of law and order functions. AMISOM and UNSOM have an important role to play in this regard, including in Puntland. The finalization of a realistic police plan, currently being prepared under the structures of the New Deal Compact, is essential. Short-term assistance to jump- start the establishment of police in the regions is needed alongside the recommended increase in AMISOM police, which is expected to provide operational assistance, mentoring and training. That is why the Secretary-General recommends the delivery of an immediate non-lethal support package to the Somali police forces to bridge the gap between assistance that can be provided today and the longer-term support that will be provided under the New Deal. The package would provide the rudimentary infrastructure, equipment and sustainment items required to jump-start basic policing operations in the regions, including Puntland. We are very concerned about the evolution of Al-Shabaab’s threat in Puntland and the potential impact of the situation in Yemen. The security of Puntland should not be forgotten by the international community. We therefore recommend extending the non-lethal support package to the Somali national army, as approved in resolution 2124 (2013), to 3,000 Puntland forces on an exceptional basis until the end of 2016, but only upon completion of their integration into the Somali national army as well, as their formal inclusion in the Guulwade Plan. We are concerned about the unfolding influence of Al-Shabaab in Kenya, as well as the rest of the subregion. A comprehensive approach is a logical way by which to counter this threat, integrated with a security strategy to combat violent extremism both in Somalia and across the region. Following the joint mission, Al-Shabaab mounted a number of attacks in Somalia that coincided with the holy month of Ramadan. These renewed efforts are a source of concern, which further reinforces the need for the overall security effort in Somalia to become more nimble in order to degrade an increasingly adaptable Al-Shabaab. We are encouraged by the commitments expressed by the African Union and by the troop- and police-contributing countries to work towards that objective. Collective action to take forward the recommendations of the joint mission is urgently needed.

I thank Mr. Mulet for his briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of Somalia.

I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting. I acknowledge the briefing given to the Security Council by Assistant Secretary- General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmund Mulet Somalia has achieved significant progress in the past two years since the Council reviewed the previous benchmarking report. The Council was briefed recently, but I would like to highlight the fact that we reached a new milestone last week with the election of a President of the Galmuduug Interim Regional Assembly and the confirmation by Parliament of the members of the National Independent Electoral Commission and of the Boundaries and Federation Commission. Those achievements, especially on the federal front, would not have been possible without the military gains of 2013 and 2014, which opened up political space. And that is thanks to the sacrifices of the Somali National Army and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). However, our military efforts are not over. Al-Shabaab no longer controls vast areas of the country, but it is still capable of conducting attacks against the Somali National Army and AMISOM. We are concerned about the degradation it has caused during the period of Ramadan. Just last Friday, Al-Shabaab conducted an attack in Mogadishu. Once again, the attack was repelled, but we need to be able to degrade Al-Shabaab’s capacity to conduct such attacks. It is important to support AMISOM and maintain its troop levels in Somalia, as well as to provide it with enablers to improve its efficiency. More important, we will be able to stabilize Somalia in the long term and to withdraw international troops only by building a strong security sector in the country. We have achieved some progress this year, especially with the adoption of the Gulwade plan for the development of the Somali National Army. The non-lethal support package to the Somali National Army has been very helpful. I welcome the recommendation to extend it until the end of 2016, and to expand it to the 3,000 troops from Puntland. It is also now time for us to step up our work to develop the police sector in Somalia and to focus on community security. Public security in a country should be provided by the police, and that is the ultimate goal in Somalia. It should start happening now with more support provided to the police, especially outside of Mogadishu, where we need to re-establish police services. The Somali Government also welcomes the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the entire international community begin gradual hand- over to the Somali security institutions. While we are mindful that the full achievement of that objective will take time, it needs to become the guiding light of the international community’s efforts on the security front. Finally, the problem of armed violence in Somalia will not be resolved by working on the security front alone. We need the Council’s support to build the capacity of Somali institutions in Mogadishu and in the interim regional administrations. We also need to provide opportunities to the youth of the country, to develop infrastructure and to progressively tackle the roots of violence. That is a longer-term ambition, and the Council’s support for the recommendations of the benchmarking report is an indispensable building block.

I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.