S/PV.7586 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council according to the year of adoption of the related Council resolutions: His Excellency Mr. Mahamat Zene Cherif, Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations; Her Excellency Ms. Raimonda Murmokaitė, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), concerning the Central African Republic, and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014); Her Excellency Mrs. Dina Kawar, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003), concerning Liberia, and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo; His Excellency Mr. Cristián Barros Melet, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004), concerning Côte d’Ivoire, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015), concerning South Sudan, and Chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals; and Her Excellency Mrs. Joy Ogwu, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012), concerning Guinea-Bissau. I now give the floor to Ambassador Cherif.

I thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting to enable me, as Chairman of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, to share with Council members some of our thoughts on the activities of that Group. During its chairmanship of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in 2015, Chad has organized nine thematic discussions on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations. These have included the following topics: traditional peacemaking versus peace enforcement; the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers: asymmetric threats; lessons learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali: a peacekeeping operation in the context of the fight against terrorism; bilateral and multilateral support for capacity-building for troop- and police-contributing countries; lessons learned from the Force Intervention Brigade of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); the importance of regional peacekeeping initiatives in the context of partnerships; and strengthening the strategic dialogue among the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat. In addition to the meetings on these eight topics, the Group also held a special meeting with the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. All of these issues are important and have been the subject of intense discussions in the Working Group, but my remarks will focus on only some of them so as to highlight the most salient points. It has emerged from various recent reports on peacekeeping operations and from discussions held at various levels that there is a clear gap between the classical doctrine of peacekeeping and the realities of today’s world. In that regard, while we understand and respect the legitimate misgivings over the use of force in peacekeeping, it should be noted that in certain exceptional circumstances, the resort to the use of force is inevitable. Despite the controversial nature of the activities of the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade in favour of peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo following the adoption of resolution 2098 (2013), the results of this intervention are instructive. If United Nations doctrine cannot accommodate the use of force, even when necessary and despite the radical change in the context of peacekeeping operations, it will be essential to strengthen partnerships with regional and subregional organizations by availing them of the means necessary to maintain or enforce peace in their respective regions. In this light, it is time to strengthen the strategic, operational and tactical partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations, such as the African Union, including by addressing the issue of financing African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council. AMISOM is an example of trilateral cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union that has had tangible results. This operation, initiated by Africa and supported by external partners in the financial, logistical and technical areas, is a model that shows the way forward. Furthermore, given the multiple risks and threats that are increasingly facing peacekeepers, it is urgent to strengthen their safety and security, particularly against improvised explosive devices. In that regard, I welcome the commitment of all States members of the Security Council, and thank New Zealand in particular for having organized, together with Chad and the International Peace Institute, a workshop on this issue. The maintenance of peace is a collective enterprise to which all United Nations Member States should contribute to the extent of their possibilities. As such, we should focus particularly on strengthening the capacities of countries contributing troops and police personnel, which put their best men and women at the disposal of the Organization. It is extremely important for the wealthy countries that enjoy an advantage in technology, information, equipment and training experience to share with those that do not. In addition, regarding the strategic dialogue among the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, it is critical that these three actors enhance their consultations in informal and formal meetings. In that regard, the major difficulties of such dialogue, which is deemed to be inadequate, are, on the one hand, the lack of meaningful consultation with troop-contributing countries before the formulation, adjustment or replacement of mandates and the drawdown of operations; and on the other, the inadequate exchange of information relating to the aforementioned aspects. In that regard, the troop-contributing countries are deeply frustrated at not receiving the necessary information, or draft resolutions and presidential statements on peacekeeping operations, with enough advance time to share their views on these aspects of mission mandates. The Council must respond to these legitimate concerns. Lastly, I stress the need to pay attention to the work and recommendations of the Working Group so that they can be translated into deed. I cannot conclude without expressing my gratitude to all who have shared their views with the members of the Working Group. I refer in particular to officials of the Secretariat and the African Union Commission; the Permanent Observer of the African Union, the Permanent Observer of the European Union and the Permanent Representatives of Uganda, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bangladesh and New Zealand; and the Deputy Permanent Representatives of the United States of America, France, Malawi and Japan. I congratulate Senegal, which will assume the leadership of the Working Group in 2016, and wish it every success in its chairmanship.

I thank Mr. Cherif for his briefing. I also thank the Chadian delegation and Ambassador Cherif for their leadership of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. I now give the floor to Ambassador Kawar.

At the outset, I would like to thank you, Sir, for providing me and the other outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council with an opportunity to take stock of our work and to share some personal observations as we complete our two-year terms as elected members of the Council. Over the course of the past two years, Jordan has had the honour to chair the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which represent two of the longest-serving Sanctions Committees, established respectively in 2003 and 2004. With regard to the 1521 Committee concerning Liberia, the sanctions regime has witnessed a number of landmark changes during my tenure and that of my predecessor, Prince Zeid Al Hussein. These modifications were facilitated by the Security Council and the 1521 Committee and by following best practices, with a parallel track of close cooperation between the Chair and the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations in New York, and in collaboration with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). My delegation was also fortunate to have an enriched understanding of the post-conflict peacebuilding challenges faced by Liberia through my predecessor’s chairmanship of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as our commitment to Liberia since its inception. Today, I pay tribute to UNMIL and the 256 Jordanian police personnel who still proudly serve therein even after withstanding the toughest of circumstances, including the Ebola epidemic. A major positive shift in the Liberia sanctions regime took place on 2 September with the adoption of resolution 2237 (2015), by which the Security Council terminated the travel and financial measures set forth in paragraph 4 of resolution 1521 (2003) and in paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004). Those measures are therefore no longer applicable to any individual or entity, and the 1521 sanctions list has been terminated. By the same resolution, the Council decided, for a period of nine months, to renew the arms embargo against all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the territory of Liberia. In the lead-up to the adoption of resolution 2237 (2004), there were a number of important developments in the 1521 sanctions regime. On 21 July, the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs presented to the 1521 Committee the main findings set out in the Secretary-General’s update on the progress made by the Government of Liberia in implementing recommendations on the proper management of arms and ammunition, including enacting the necessary legislative frameworks and on facilitating the effective monitoring and management of the border regions between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, pursuant to resolution 2188 (2014). That presentation followed several important developments in the Committee in 2014, namely, the Committee’s agreement on 11 July 2014 to recommend to the Security Council that the Council request the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment mission to Liberia as an outcome of the review of the measures of the sanctions regime in Liberia, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 2128 (2013), as well as the Committee’s consideration, on 12 November 2014, of the report of the assessment mission concerning the Liberia sanctions regime, annexed to the letter dated 29 September that same year from the Secretary- General to the President of the Council. We believe that such assessment missions are part of the best practices that sanctions committees, and the Security Council itself, should strive to streamline across all sanctions regimes from their inception until their termination. Last but not least, as Chair of the 1521 Committee, my engagement with the Government of Liberia was positive in both identifying remaining challenges and finding solutions to overcome them. I will encourage the Ambassador of Ukraine, as incoming Chair of the 1521 Committee, to continue engaging the Government of Liberia, the penholder and the experts in identifying ways of assisting Liberia to address the few challenges that remain towards the total lifting of the arms embargo. Turning to the 1533 Committee, concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the situation in the country remains fragile, with the eastern provinces continuing to suffer from a plethora of predatory armed groups. Some progress has been achieved on the ground, notably the military operations conducted by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), supported in part by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and its Force Intervention Brigade against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in North Kivu. The Committee’s designation of the ADF for sanctions in June 2014 dovetailed with the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO to target that armed group. It is also encouraging that Jamil Mukulu, the ADF leader who was placed on the Committee’s sanctions list in October 2011, was arrested in Tanzania in July this year and subsequently extradited to Uganda. However, there is still plenty of work to be done in terms of combating the involvement of both the armed groups and FARDC fringe elements in the trafficking of natural resources, restoring State authority throughout the country and creating space for peacebuilding and national dialogue. It is troubling that so many armed groups, with no more than several hundred combatants, have been able to prey on the civilian population in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo for so long. The numerous predatory actors in North and South Kivu survive thanks to the widespread availability of small arms and ammunition, their ability to traffic natural resources, such as the three T’s — tin, tantalum and tungsten — charcoal, timber and alluvial gold, with State and private actors in the region, as well as their propensity to abuse and pillage civilians. In that connection, I must say that, during my visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I was privileged to take a helicopter ride over Virunga National Park, where we actually saw the cars of those who were involved in the act of smuggling. That is a common occurrence. We have spoken too long about the need for proper weapon-stockpile management in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo; there have to be tangible and transparent results. To make any progress on the ground, weapons, whether pilfered from Government stocks or possibly trafficked from abroad, must no longer be freely available. There must also be a more forensic approach with a view to identifying and choking off many of the predatory armed groups, which have little if any political agenda and are in fact criminal gangs. As such, we need to follow the money and consider assessing sanctions on downstream companies outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo that are illicitly sourcing natural resources such as tin, tantalum and tungsten, as well as gold, from areas controlled by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, thereby helping to sustain the same criminal elements who destabilize the east. We also may need better tools to track the movement of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources from the sites where they are mined all the way across the border to the international markets in order to support legitimate mining and trading that can provide jobs and revenues to the Congolese people and to penalize the illicit trafficking that fuels conflict. I must add here that, during our visit to some of the mines, I saw 5-year- old children who were actually involved in gold mining because it brought more money to their families than going to school. These are very serious problems that are affecting the future generation. Despite these challenges, I am pleased to note that, with the help of the international community, the capacities of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to respond to security threats have increased, and there has been some progress in the fight against impunity for human rights violations committed by armed groups and elements of the FARDC and Congolese police. Given the importance of this collaborative approach, during my tenure and that of my predecessor, there was a focus on sharpening the engagement of the Committee with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with the countries of the Great Lakes region. In that connection, I visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda from 24 to 29 May. It was the first occasion in which a Chair of the 1533 Sanctions Committee travelled to the Great Lakes region since the establishment of the sanctions regime, in 2004. During my visit, I was able to collect first-hand information about the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the neighbouring States to learn how to assist those States in capacity-building, in addition to improving the effectiveness of sanctions provisions. I also personally conveyed the requests and concerns of the 1533 Committee and the Group of Experts. The main message for me was that it was only with the help of the Committee and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that we are able to move on to the next step. In addition to my travel to the region, the 1533 Committee held two formal meetings in 2015 to exchange views with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with States of the region on the implementation of the sanctions regime, and in particular on the reports of the Group of Experts. That exchange of views has helped the Committee to gain a more in-depth perspective on the relevant issues. Earlier this week, for example, members of the Committee heard the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo echo what the Minister of the Interior told me in a meeting during my visit to Kinshasa in May, namely, that even though the embargo as of the adoption of resolution 1807 (2008) in March 2008 no longer applied to the Government, the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities were of the view that the embargo still affected their ability to procure the weapons they need in a timely manner. While such issues might be addressed through a reiteration of the relevant paragraph of resolution 1807 (2008) in the next Council resolution on Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions, it is clear that the Committee will need to continue its close collaboration with the country’s authorities to underline that the sanctions regime is in place to protect the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rather than to hinder it. During my tenure as Chair of the 1533 Committee, I also sought out opportunities for the Committee to benefit from the insights of other partners. Indeed, as part of the 12 meetings convened in the 2014- 2015 period, the Committee heard briefings from a number of external partners, including the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, MONUSCO, the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Committee also sent over 80 letters to Member States during the course of 2014 and 2015, sharing and/ or requesting information. In some cases, Member States were forthcoming with information; in many others, however, States failed to respond to the Chair’s letters despite repeated follow-ups by the Chair. We just discussed this matter in the Committee earlier this week in connection with letters that I sent on 8 May to the delegations of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania as regards the findings and recommendations of the 2014 report of the Group of Experts. In two cases, pursuant to an initiative of the President of the Security Council, the President and I held joint bilateral consultations with the Member States concerned with a view to underlining the importance of the Committee’s requests for information. Yet the fact remains that none of the Member States concerned has responded to my letters of 8 May, some of which encouraged the Governments of those States to undertake investigations in connection with the Group’s findings and recommendations. Going forward, it may be useful to put more creative thought into how Member States can be encouraged to cooperate with the sanctions committees and the expert panels; otherwise, the credibility of the Security Council and its sanctions resolutions, adopted under Chapter VII as mandatory measures, will continue to be called into question. Along these lines, given that the same sanctions regime has now been in place for such a long period of time, it may be an appropriate time for some stocktaking. I alluded to this need for reflection during my statement to the Council on 14 July (see S/PV.7484), following my visit to the Great Lakes region in May. To reinforce the continued credibility of the sanctions regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, my discussions with the regional States affirmed the need for more sanctions designations, particularly for predatory actors who abuse civilians and traffic natural resources. No individual has been designated by the Committee since December 2012, and I have made efforts in that regard to encourage members of the Committee to revisit the confidential annexes that have been submitted by the Group of Experts in tandem with its final reports and to submit to the Committee the names of individuals and entities for possible sanctioning. There should be no perception among Member States, particularly those in the Great Lakes region, that the importance of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions regime is waning and that the Council is less concerned about the climate of impunity, particularly in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. I hope that my visit to the Great Lakes region was a signal that, on the contrary, we are looking closely at the sanctions regime, and I trust that the incoming Chair will undertake another visit to the region to follow through and undertake pledges in addition to engaging those States and their assistance needs. In closing, I would like to conclude by expressing my profound appreciation to the members of the Committees I presided over for their collegiality and spirit of cooperation. I also wish to extend my sincere thanks to the Panel of Experts on Liberia and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as their previous and current members, for the diligent work accomplished in contributing to compliance with the sanctions regime. Those Groups of Experts are tasked with investigating complex issues in difficult political and security environments, often at great personal cost. The 1521 and 1533 Committees have endeavoured over the past two years to offer all possible assistance to support the Panel’s and Group’s work, including during my visit to the Great Lakes region in May, and took into serious consideration the findings and the recommendations made by the Panel and the Group on the most effective ways to implement the sanctions regime. Last but not least, I would like to pay tribute to MONUSCO, its work and all its efforts on the ground. Allow me, in the name of my country, to thank my Jordanian compatriot Armed Forces serving therein for their unwavering commitment towards establishing peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and their sacrifices in fulfilling mission goals, particularly during very challenging circumstances.

I thank Mrs. Kawar for her briefing. I also thank the Ambassador of Jordan and the Jordanian delegation for their excellent leadership of these important Committees. I now give the floor to Ambassador Murmokaitė.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to present the outgoing Chairs’ views on the work done in steering the Council’s subsidiary bodies. I have had the privilege to set up and preside over two sanctions committees: the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) concerning Yemen, as well as the Counter- Terrorism Committee. I am afraid my text will be rather long because those are three bodies to which we have dedicated a lot of effort and passion. I would first like to touch upon some of the working methods and good practices in the work of the subsidiary bodies that I presided over and then move on specifically to the Counter-Terrorism Committee. With regard to the working methods, lessons learned and suggested good practices, whether with the sanctions committees or other subsidiary bodies, we have sought to promote transparency and openness. While the work is done among the 15 members of the Security Council, we believe it would defeat the purpose for respective bodies to keep it all to themselves. Because even if it is the 15 members that deliberate and make decisions, all States Members of the United Nations are expected to implement the sanctions regimes and to report accordingly. In both areas we have considerable problems, as my colleague, the Jordanian Ambassador, referred to. For that to happen, the entire United Nations membership needs to understand clearly what the subsidiary bodies are doing and what is expected of them in particular. From the outset, we have therefore insisted on open briefings to Security Council members on the work of the bodies we presided over. We have also organized the first-ever open briefing to the wider United Nations membership on the Yemen sanctions regime, and I wish I had organized a similar one on the Central African Republic sanctions regime. I am well aware of the scepticism from some quarters within the Council on the merits of such openness. To that, I can only say that my delegation is happy to see more and more chairs of subsidiary bodies choosing open Council briefings on their work. To us, that is proof that we have chosen the right path. Better compliance and implementation can come only through such openness and better communication. To that end, we have also issued regularly press statements on the work of the sanctions committees aimed at sensitizing the wider audience on the work we do. Such statements may not be the most exciting read, but they allow to better disseminate relevant information, develop better understanding of the aims of and expectations from the respective committees and can remind the spoilers that we are watching very closely and are ready to take further action. We have also considered introducing Chair’s statements where appropriate, but I would leave that idea for the incoming Chairs to consider. In the case of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, we have used the Chair’s discretion to organize a series of open briefings and thematic meetings on specific counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism issues, which have seen large audiences and active participation. We think it is a good practice that should continue because if counter-terrorism efforts are to be effective, we need the engagement of all United Nations membership. With the terrorist threat as grave as ever and even more serious than before, work behind close doors must be combined with transparency and inclusiveness. A related issue is access to information. Again, it matters if we want sanctions regimes to be implemented and have an impact on the ground. In that respect, we welcome the efforts taken by the Secretariat to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions lists by standardizing the formats and creating a consolidated list. Such lists and other related information should be readily available in all official languages of the Organization. How can we speak about the Yemen sanctions regime, for example, if the information is not available in Arabic? The Secretariat has done some work on making the sanctions committee websites more user-friendly, but there is clearly scope for further improvements in that respect. Introducing simplified user-friendly matrixes of exemptions requests is another improvement, which we implemented with the Central African Republic sanctions regime, and I think it represents a good way forward. My next point concerns outreach and engagement with a diverse range of actors concerned. Again, my colleagues have spoken on some of those issues from their own perspective. From the very outset, we have sought to engage the respective countries — Yemen and the Central African Republic — their neighbours, and other interested partners, inviting them to formal, informal and informal informal meetings, which we held regularly at our Mission. We have also provided informal briefings to countries concerned on the work of the Committees. Such interaction is vital for the sanctions regimes to work, and needs to be done consistently and persistently. For example, as a result of engaging with the Central African Republic Transitional Authorities on the arms embargo, including by video- teleconference with Government authorities in Bangui, the Committee’s guidelines were amended, for the first time, to allow the Central African Republic itself to submit arms embargo exemption requests. However, the Committee remains of the opinion that lethal arms cannot be provided until there are credible assurances regarding proper storage of and accountability for weapons and until proper vetting and restructuring of the Forces armées centrafricaines has taken place. Such was also the view I heard from representatives of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) during my visit on the ground. I believe that geographical contacts need to be expanded beyond the immediate neighbourhood because sanctions trails tend to take us to quite distant destinations from time to time with serious consequences for compliance. Involving regional organizations should be further explored, and I thank the AU, ECCAS and the mediator’s office in Bangui for being ready and willing to engage on the issues related to the sanctions regime. We have also sought to expand the range of briefers, both in sanctions committees and in the Counter- Terrorism Committee. To that end, we have organized briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; INTERPOL, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. On the Central African Republic, we have suggested that Kimberly Process representatives be involved. We have not done that, but I think it is important because about 1 million people in the Central African Republic depend on the diamond industry. We have also suggested engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission country configuration on the Central African Republic and the International Criminal Court, as we see clear links between the work of the sanctions committees and those bodies. I can only regret that we could not proceed along those lines, owing to the individual objections. In the case of the Counter-Terrorism Committee again, emphasis was placed on expanding the geographical, as well as regional and thematic engagement. I am pleased to note that we organized the first-ever briefings by the European Union and the Council of Europe, and expanded contacts with NATO on very practical matters, such as the early response to terrorist attacks and foreign terrorist fighters. We have also involved the World Tourism Organization, the World Health Organization and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and engaged with the International Civil Aviation Organization and INTERPOL, in particular, on a regular basis, because those organizations have very practical and accessible tools that could allow countries to reduce the threat of foreign terrorist fighters travelling. Unfortunately, those tools are dramatically underutilized by countries, and I believe that work should continue to bring to the attention of Member States the tools that are readily available. Concerning coordination and synergy building, I believe that we have also taken innovative and practical steps in that respect. On Yemen, in June 2014, the 2140 Sanctions Committee held a common meeting for the first time with the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities and the Counter- Terrorism Committee, because there are overlapping and common interests that had to be discussed in the context of Yemen in its fight against terrorism. As terrorist groups continue to benefit from instability in the country, another result-oriented meeting of that kind, I believe, is in order. We also initiated joint meetings between the Central African Republic and Yemen sanctions committees and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, with biefings from Special Representative of the Secretary-General Zerrougui. We are very satisfied with the cooperation that we have received on the part Malaysia in its capacity as Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. While such joint formats are practical in saving resources and reducing the burden placed on the briefers, they also enable to combine forces in seeking better responses to the problem at hand. I believe that travel to the countries concerned — the Ambassador of Jordan has spoken extensively of her recent trip — is a most useful tool. I regret having been unable to visit Yemen because of conditions on the ground. I would suggest that the incoming Chairs undertake annual visits, where possible. My visit to the Central African Republic from 25 to 28 August provided an important opportunity to receive feedback on the ground from a wide range of actors, including the Transitional Authorities, diplomatic missions, senior management of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, mining authorities, the United Nations family, UNMAS, aid workers on the ground, and local civil and opinion leaders. During my visit, I also met with representatives of ECCAS, the African Union and the Office of the Mediator. The visit also served to pave the way for improved communication and collaboration between the Panel of Experts and the Central African Transitional Authorities. It also helped to better understand existing misconceptions with regard to the sanctions regime, as well as local expectations. My suggestion for the future would be for the Chairs to include not only the country concerned in their visits, but also some key actors in the region while on such trips. With regard to what could be improved, we believe that there is a clear need for a dedicated capacity on sanctions regimes within the Secretariat. For the time being, Secretariat work is rather patchy in that regard, depending as it does on the enthusiasm of individual staff members. We extend our huge thanks to David Biggs, whose advice and initiative have been a tremendous help in our work on the Central African Republic Sanctions Committee. However, I believe that that should be a standard practice and not depend on individual good will, passion or enthusiasm, especially with regard to the huge need for capacity-building mobilization, because, besides the lack of political will, it is often the lack of capacity that prevents countries from complying. We need to design ways to help the countries concerned, especially focusing on capacity- building with multiplier effects on the ground. There are additional concerns, including the lack of compliance and reporting, and the Ambassador of Jordan has just spoken extensively on that subject. Despite all the explanation and outreach work that we have carried out informally in our mission, that has been a constant source of concern. In the case of the Central African Republic, sanctioned individuals have been travelling freely, and on some occasions their travel has been facilitated by Member States of the region, despite repeated communication on the part of the Chair and the Panel of Experts and the express requests of the Transitional Authorities of the Central African Republic, including the Transitional President herself. We call on all the States concerned to abstain from any further actions that interfere with the extremely fragile transition process in the Central African Republic and to respect the will of the Transitional Authorities and the people of the Central African Republic in that regard. Spoilers should not be allowed to travel freely, and messages of incitement should not be allowed to be aired from outside the country. It hurts the transition and, above all, it hurts the people of the Central African Republic. As long as the conflict in the Central African Republic continues, it will hurt the neighbouring countries too. There are therefore regional consequences to non-compliance. I continue to call for more resolute action on the part of Committee with regard to sanctions designations. The Panel has provided a total of 25 detailed statements of cases involving individuals and entities that, in the Panel’s view, meet the designation criteria set by the Security Council. Only five individuals and one entity have been sanctioned to date. Today, the Committee is to conclude its consideration of two additional names for designation, but I believe that we should send a stronger message at this particularly crucial moment in the history of the Central African Republic, ahead of the elections, as spoilers continue to interfere with the transition and lives continue to be lost in the Central African Republic. On Yemen, I regret to note that the Committee acted too little and too late when the processes on the ground were spinning out of control. I also regret the unintended humanitarian consequences that have been hitting the civilian population and the lack of reporting on sanctions implementation, including on the implementation of the arms embargo. Cutting off the flow of financial resources to the sanctioned individuals, in the case of Yemen, also requires more effort. With regard to both Yemen and the Central African Republic, I sincerely thank all countries for their cooperation with the respective Panels of Experts, enabling visits and information-gathering on the ground. It has been a tremendous help. I hope that full and continued cooperation with the Panels will be extended in the future. Finally, I would like to say a few general words on sanctions, which are very much in line with what the Ambassador of Jordan has said. Sanctions are not a cure-all, but they do have a role to play in tackling impunity and restraining perpetrators, especially wherever and whenever other means of bringing the perpetrators to account may not be at hand. Imposing sanctions is a way of telling the rapists, murderers, abusers, child recruiters and spoilers of fragile political processes that the world, and the Council in particular, are watching and are ready to step up and put an end to the harm that they inflict. It is especially important, as I have already stated, in cases in which there is no other recourse to accountability and justice. I would like to turn to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, specifically. We live in a world where business as usual is no longer an option. My delegation has sought to make the Committee more proactive, forward-looking and operational in its work, while at the same time seeking to promote greater interaction, coherence and synergies among the various counter- terrorism actors within the United Nations system. We have worked to identify specific measures that States need to take in order to further strengthen their implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014), including measures to address the aforementioned issues, trends and developments. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) has completed detailed assessments of the progress made by 39 States in implementing resolution 1373 (2001) on measures introduced by States to strengthen counter-terrorism legislation, financial monitoring regimes, border control and law enforcement mechanisms, criminal justice systems, international cooperation, human rights mechanisms and strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism. In accordance with resolution 2178 (2014), CTED has also prepared five analytical reports for the Council on foreign terrorist fighters. We have strengthened our engagement with civil society and academia, including through the launch of the Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network. Our interaction with our Network partners has deepened our analytical capacities and strengthened our ability to identify new and emerging terrorism threats and developments and to advise Member States on how to deal with them. In order to raise awareness of the main challenges arising from new and emerging terrorism issues, as well as the good practices developed to address them, the Committee, assisted by CTED, has convened a number of special meetings and open briefings. In July, in accordance with the presidential statement S/PRST/2014/23, the Committee held a special meeting in Madrid on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. At this very moment, the Committee is holding a special meeting on preventing terrorists from exploiting the Internet and social media. Among other innovations that we sought to include were the first high-level political regional visit conducted by myself, the CTED Executive Director, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel and the African Union Special Representative for Counter- Terrorism to Mali and the Niger at the beginning of this year, following which I transmitted a letter directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Office, conveying the Committee’s request that the CTITF and United Nations Counter- Terrorism Centre give priority consideration to the list of capacity-building projects identified. We also focused on vulnerable regions in a targeted way. We convened two such meetings on the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. I believe that such regional approaches could be continued, in addition to individual country assessments and individual approaches. We have also sought to bring the Committee’s work up to date by shortening the time between country visits and reporting, because what good does it do to discuss today a visit or assessment that took place two or three years ago? I have also introduced specific proposals to activate the role of the Vice-Chairs of the Committee. During my period as Chair, I have worked with members of the Committee, CTED and other United Nations system partners to improve the speed and efficiency with which capacity-building assistance is delivered, reaching out to the Department of Political Affairs and CTITF, in particular. As part of our continuing efforts in that area, the Committee recently held its first retreat with key United Nations partners. Participants included CTITF, the Rule of Law Unit in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, the Assistant Secretary-General for Information and Communications Technology, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Office of Legal Affairs, the 1267 (1999) Committee, the Department of Safety and Security, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Public Information, International Monetary Fund, INTERPOL, the International Organization for Migration and the World Bank. The discussions focused, inter alia, on the effective delivery of counter-terrorism strategies and measures, the assessment of their impact on ground, shortening the road from assessment to assistance and the improved delivery of capacity-building. Looking ahead, as a matter of priority the Committee and CTED must continue working with Member States on the implementation of the recommendations of the analytical reports on foreign terrorist fighters, as well as the priority recommendations identified during the Committee’s two special meetings. The Committee will also need to devote particular attention to a number of emerging thematic issues, including the problems associated with children and adolescents in the terrorism environment, and the diversification of terrorism financing. Compliance with human rights and the rule of law has always been and should remain a key pillar of the Committee’s and CTED’s efforts. I would like to take this opportunity to convey my most sincere thanks and appreciation to all those who have worked with and supported us during the implementation of our mandate: the Secretariat; the two Panels of Experts, in particular the Panel of Experts of the Central African Republic Committee; the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; every country with which we have interacted during the past two years; my colleagues within the Council; my own team, which has done its utmost; and the interpreters, who have suffered through the rapid delivery of my remarks today. In conclusion, I encourage the incoming Chairs to do their jobs with their hearts. It cannot be bureaucratic task. We deal with the most vulnerable and fragile countries, where tremendous tragedies are taking place at the individual and community levels. I do not think that doing it in a bureaucratic frame of mind is the right way to go. Only with the full engagement of both the heart and mind in this work can a difference be made.

I thank Ms. Murmokaitė for her briefing. I also thank the Ambassador of Lithuania and the Lithuanian delegation for their vigorous leadership of these committees. I now give the floor to Ambassador Barros Melet.

I am thankful for this opportunity to address the Council in my capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2013) concerning South Sudan, and the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, with a view to sharing my insight and thoughts on these three subsidiary bodies. I will start with my work as Chair of the 1572 Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire. My November 2014 visit to the country was undoubtedly the highlight of my tenure as Chairman. The opportunity to meet with the highest authorities of Côte d’Ivoire on the ground, including President Ouattara and his chief ministers, to visit the diamond- producing areas near the Liberian border, and to witness first-hand the work carried out by the United Nations via the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) were enriching experiences that greatly facilitated my work. Meeting my counterparts strengthened the channels of cooperation. Hearing their comments and concerns on the implementation of the sanctions regime was essential to improving the effectiveness of the work of the Committee and its secretariat team. As a result of that visit, I proposed to the Committee certain actions that allowed us to streamline its work, in particular the consideration of requests for notification and exceptions of the current sanctions regime. Processing times were shortened thanks to the close cooperation between the secretariat of the Committee and the Permanent Mission of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Nations. The work of the Panel of Experts that advises the Committee also benefited from that visit. Although there was a certain distrust concerning its work prior to the visit, cooperation between the Government in Abidjan and the Panel of Experts deepened thereafter. The work of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General and Head of UNOCI was instrumental in that regard. An important lesson learned is that if we wish to have an intelligent sanctions regime, we should not allow too much time pass before visiting the country that is the object of sanctions. The reality on the ground is subject to change, and visits make it possible to avoid misconceptions. I believe that Côte d’Ivoire has made significant progress in re-establishing democracy, territoriaol control, security and development that should spur the Council to consider lifting the sanctions regime in the short term. During my two years as Chair of the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee, the list of sanctioned individuals has grown shorter; the embargo on diamonds has been lifted, and the arms embargo regime has been substantially modified. I appeal to Council members to consider these elements during the upcoming renewal of sanctions. Côte d’Ivoire has a level of development and national capacity that allow it, with the support of the United Nations and the international community, to confront certain challenges it faces alongside any other developing country, but that do not, in my opinion, affect international peace and security and do not justify the continuation of the sanctions regime mandated by the Security Council. As pointed out by other Committee Chairs, there is a time to impose sanctions and a time to lift them. The reduction of sanctions should be evaluated and does not imply any detachment or reduced vigilance on our part. I will now discuss my work as Chair of the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee. Since its establishment nine months ago, our task has been to meet the challenge of establishing conditions conducive to its proper functioning, beginning with the negotiation of guidelines — a process that is not without its challenges and during which we encountered the factors limiting the Chair when defining the Committee’s course of action. In addition, during that period the Committee agreed to add six individuals to the sanctions list. In that initial and essential phase, the Committee met with representatives of INTERPOL, the United Nations Mine Action Service, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and on Sexual Violence in Conflict, as well as with representatives of South Sudan and countries of the region, in order to understand their challenges and needs as we implement the agreed sanctions. The object of those meetings was to establish channels of communication and cooperation that may contribute to the work of the Committee. I stress the importance of the meetings with the country concerned, countries of the region and representatives of regional organizations. It is a good practice that should become a permanent fixture in the work of the various committees and repeated throughout the year in order to build trust and generate frank discussion. Without the commitment of the international community, especially neighbouring countries, the implementation of any sanctions regime will be difficult. We acknowledge the work of the Panel of Experts and its monthly and mid-term reports. Its final report, which is expected shortly, will be considered by the incoming Chair in January. We also appreciate the agreement reached by the Committee with INTERPOL to exchange information between that body and the Committee and its Panel of Experts. In the same vein, the practice of open briefings for the presentation of the Chair’s reports, as we did in the 2206 Committee, should be the general rule. It contributes to the transparency of the work of the Committee, promotes State understanding of the sanctions regime, and reminds us that these are individual rather than collective measures. The imposition of sanctions is one of many tools at our dispoal, though perhaps not the best, to move the international peace and security agenda forward. The establishment of a sanctions framework should therefore be accompanied by the necessary monitoring of its implementation by the Council. Otherwise, they do not serve their purpose and undermine the actions of the Council. The Council should, in a united and consistent way, demonstrate and reaffirm that sanctions regimes ultimately seek to create conditions conducive to international peace and security in the countries concerned, ensure accountability and the protection of civilians, and combat impunity. My work and that of my team would not have been possible without the support of other members of the Committee and the secretariat. I would like to express my gratitude to everyone, in particular Kiho Cha, David Biggs, Manuel Bressan and their respective teams. With regard to our work as the Chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, we were involved in a special moment — the closure of the ad hoc tribunals and the launch and closing of the first review process of the initial phase of the Residual Mechanism. It was with great pleasure that we took part in the closing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, whose progress and challenges faced in the contribution to the fight against impunity we noted, in addition to those of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Mechanism itself. As set out in the annual reports of Informal Working Group on International Tribunals — and will continue to be — the Group’s work has also been reflected in resolutions, presidential statements and press releases and various reports of the Security Council. All of them serve to demonstrate the determination of the Group to move forward on issues that are of major interest to the international community. We are aware of the diverse positions with regard to the fulfilment of the mandates of the Tribunals. In that regard, we have fostered a permanent dialogue among all the stakeholders involved, with the appropriate level of flexibility, in order to seek convergence and respond in the most appropriate way to the various realities that we have to deal with. It was particularly rewarding to serve as a facilitator, along with my team, in each of the general discussions that were held regarding the main concerns of the Working Group. My recommendation in that satisfying task is to maintain or even increase such dialogue, especially with the officials of the Tribunals and the Mechanism, at a critical time for the successful culmination of the functioning of the Tribunals and of their proper accountability. Chile is convinced that cooperation with the completion strategy is one of the direct ways of contributing to international justice in situations where there are crimes against humanity. That is why our commitment remains unwavering. I would like to conclude by reiterating our gratitude to all those who have contributed to the work of the Tribunals, with a particular mention of the constant support of the Secretariat and the Office of the Assistant-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs. I should now like to make a few comments that apply to all the subsidiary bodies I have chaired. We should not disregard due process when we discuss Security Council sanctions. It is a matter both of principle and of practical concern, for a lack of due process can complicate the implementation of sanctions in some States and regions. The Council should bolster the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson, which is currently valid for the 1267 (1999) Committee and the 1989 (2011) Commitee, and expand them to other subsidiary bodies. The adoption of resolution 1730 (2006) and the establishment of a focal point for delisting represent a major step forward, although many improvements stillll need to be made. The diversity of this organ should be reflected in various Panels of Experts, and we call on those Panels to fully apply the principles of gender balance and equitable geographical representation. We value these kinds of meetings, as well as the formal and open wrap-up sessions in this Chamber, with the participation of all Council members and including an official record and interpretation. However, we note with concern the tendency to confuse wrap-up sessions carried out by the Council with the informal briefings that should be conducted by the President. Both have different formats and objectives. The first involves the work of the Council, and second that of the presidency, which reports on its work. It is only through well- known formats and clear rules that we will guarantee tthe ransparency and accountability of this organ. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to those who extended support to me throughout my chairmanship. I urge the Security Council to continue working to put an end to impunity, but always hand in hand with due process. I would also like to express the best of luck to the countries that will succeed me in my role as Chair of the two subsidiary bodies and of the Working Group.

I thank Mr. Barros Melet for his briefing. I also thank the Ambassador of Chile and his delegation for their leadership of those two important committees and of the Working Group. I now give the floor to Ambassador Ogwu.

My first words must be to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity for stocktaking and to brief the Council as Chair of the Security Council Committees established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012), concerning Guinea-Bissau, and resolution 1518 (2003), concerning Iraq. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) convened twice in informal consultations to exchange views on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Most recently, it was briefed on the findings and recommendations contained in the report (S/2015/619) of Secretary-General on the progress made with regard to the stabilization and restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. That has been the fulcrum of peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau. I believe that the implementation of the sanctions regime, despite its limited scope, has indeed contributed to the achievement of the desired objective, namely, the pursuit and achievement of a lasting political solution in Guinea-Bissau. In my view, continuous monitoring will remain necessary in the short run to accurately assess the journey towards stability and development. I believe that giving consideration to the recommendations of the Secretary-General will enhance the effectiveness of the Council in administering the sanctions regime in Guinea-Bissau. Maintaining the sanctions regime will send a clear message to the people of Guinea-Bissau that those who impede the process of peace and security will be held accountable, without exception — not only for their actions, but the Council stands ready to adopt additional measures and designations as and when required. We observe a yawning gap in the Committe, namely, the absence of a panel of experts. We believe that the establishment of a panel of experts will go a long way to support the work of the Committee and enhance its effectiveness. That would not only ease the monitoring of established benchmarks, but also facilitate the surveillance of threats to stability and reconciliation. Clear benchmarks that would determine readiness for the lifting of sanctions should include the completion of the retirement and demobilization processes for military personnel; the full re-establishment of civilian control over the military; the completion of the reconciliation process; and the establishment of an effective and efficient judicial system. Those are all components of security sector reform. We also believe that the time has come for the Council to review the situation with respect to the 11 sanctioned individuals to determine if they still meet the listing criteria. In the same vein, a periodic review of the sanctions regime should be undertaken to determine its effectiveness. There is no doubt that the continued engagement of the international community will remain vital not only during, but especially in the aftermath of the recovery period. Concerted action by the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries will also be vital during this time. Concerning the 1518 Committee, we have a spate of communications in connection with the sanctions list, which currently stands at 86 individuals and 208 entities. That is the second largest list of all Security Council sanctions regimes, after the Al-Qaida sanctions list. Unlike my other colleagues, my burden has been lighter. And that explains the brevity of my report. Nevertheless, I want to take this opportunity to convey my immense gratitude to all the members of both Committees for their assistance and their cooperation during the course of our stewardship. I would also like to acknowledge the sustained support of the Secretariat. The officials who worked with us consistently demonstrated a high level of professionalism and were always available to facilitate the activities of the Committees. We are greatly indebted to all of them.

I thank Mrs. Ogwu for her briefing. I also thank the Ambassador of Nigeria and her delegation for their important leadership of those committees. On behalf of the Security Council, I take this opportunity to express appreciation to all of the outgoing Chairs for the manner in which they have discharged their important responsibilites on behalf of the Security Council.