S/PV.7686 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Gerard van Bohemen, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

Since my previous briefing to the Security Council in December (see S/PV.7587), the Security Council has adopted resolution 2253 (2015), which refocused the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or Da’esh, and its affiliates, and on limiting the financing of those groups. Since then, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, tasked with keeping us apprised of the threat posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida and affiliates, has provided the Committee with several updates. In February, the Monitoring Team briefed the 1267 Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, and more recently also briefed the 1267 Committee on the expansion of ISIL beyond Iraq and Syria. I will share some of its findings today. The threat posed by ISIL has shifted somewhat since December. ISIL’s core in Iraq and Syria is under pressure. It has lost control of some territory, and the destruction of significant parts of its oil infrastructure has led to a drop in internal revenue generation. As a response to that, however, we have seen ISIL looking to increase revenue from other streams, including internal taxation, smuggling antiquities and, potentially, kidnapping for ransom. Nor is ISIL short of arms and fighters. Although recent reports indicate that the flow of recruits to it is slowing, estimates suggest that to date upwards of 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters have travelled to Iraq and Syria. As reported by the Monitoring Team, in response to the pressure on its core, ISIL’s centre of gravity is shifting. The threat is expanding geographically as ISIL affiliates spring up around the world. And as pressure on ISIL’s core increases, foreign terrorist fighters are also seeking to return home. Those developments pose both a challenge and an opportunity for improving the impact and effectiveness of the 1267 sanctions regime. While some foreign terrorist fighters return from conflict zones disillusioned by what they have experienced, others come back radicalized, battle-hardened and well networked. Such fighters pose a real threat to the wider international community. Member States from all regions of the world are affected. These fighters can exploit networks, including with local Al-Qaida affiliates, to conduct terror attacks. Their capacity to initiate complex attacks at great speed is already becoming a reality. It is also difficult to detect the travel of foreign terrorist fighters. Many now use broken travel routes to and from conflict zones, making it much harder to track them. Whereas previously they may have travelled directly from their state of residence to a neighbouring country of the conflict zone, they are now taking multiple, indirect routes, often using more than one passport. If we are to get on top of this threat, it is essential that Member States implement the steps called for in resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014) and share information to enable better detection and disruption of travel by foreign terrorist fighters. ISIL affiliates in Libya, Afghanistan and Yemen are steadily gaining a foothold and becoming increasingly important to the survival of ISIL. As pressure increases on the ISIL core in Iraq and Syria, it is expected that ISIL will look to move funds to those affiliates, including through the use of informal money transfer arrangements. It is crucial, therefore, that Member States, particularly those neighbouring Iraq and Syria, be vigilant in implementing the 1267 regime. This movement of funds and fighters outside of ISIL-controlled territory provides an opportunity for Member States to detect and prevent the wider spread of ISIL. This is where the sanctions measures can have the most impact. When effectively targeted and implemented, the sanctions can place pressure on ISIL and its affiliates, preventing the dispersal of funds and disrupting further attacks on civilian populations. The measures for the freezing of assets are one area where the sanctions can really bite. But for this to happen, the Committee needs targeted designations of individuals involved in the generation and movement of assets. Member States with information about these individuals and entities have a role to play by putting forward new listing requests, as encouraged in resolution 2253 (2015). It is also crucial that Member States engage with and provide updated information to the Monitoring Team and 1267 Committee on the nature of the threat, listed individuals and entities, and the status of their implementation and enforcement of sanctions measures. This information is fundamental to the operation of the regime. The Council and international community can target their response effectively only if they have up- to-date information. I encourage those Member States that have not done so to submit their implementation reports called for in paragraph 36 of resolution 2253 (2015). The Committee is also playing its part in assisting Member States’ engagement with the sanctions regime. The Committee already held one open briefing for interested Member States last month, and plans to hold another two such open briefings before the end of this year. A one-page outline is available in the Chamber today, providing an overview of the key upcoming dates and deadlines for 1267 Committee engagement. We are also in the process of updating the Committee’s guidelines with the aim of improving the regime’s efficiency and effectiveness. These guidelines were last updated in 2013. It is important that Committee processes support the efficient and effective operation of the regime. As the Monitoring Team keeps the Committee apprised of the evolving threat posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida and their affiliates, the Committee will also work closely with key actors, including the other relevant Security Council sanctions committees.

I thank Mr. Van Bohemen for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism. (spoke in English) On behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), I wish to give a brief overview of the developments in the work of the Committee and its Executive Directorate (CTED). The Committee, with the support of CTED and as mandated by paragraph 24 of resolution 2178 (2014), has undertaken a wide range of actions to address the threat of foreign terrorist fighters and is currently developing new tools to facilitate its dialogue with Member States on their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), as well as its analysis of measures taken pursuant to resolution 2178 (2014). The Committee has devoted much of its efforts over recent months to identifying principal gaps and good practices in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and to building on the analysis produced, including the three reports issued by the Security Council on the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and ways in which Member States can strengthen countermeasures. The third report (S/2015/975), published on 29 December 2015, provided comprehensive recommendations for all States in regions affected by the threat, as well as global thematic recommendations covering the criminalization requirements of resolution 2178 (2014), the prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters, border control and law enforcement measures to prevent inter-State travel, countering incitement and violent extremism, preventing financing of foreign terrorist fighters, international cooperation, and human rights and the rule of law. The Committee also continued to enhance its cooperation with international and regional organizations and relevant United Nations bodies and partners. The Council published, on 23 December 2015, the conclusions of the Committee’s special meeting (S/2015/939, annex I) with Member States and relevant international and regional organizations on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, held in Madrid on 27 and 28 July 2015, and the guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters (S/2015/939, annex II), adopted following the meeting, as well as the declaration of the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Interior, held on the occasion of the special meeting (S/2015/939, annex III). The guiding principles were identified by the participants in the special meeting and build upon existing good practices identified by international and regional organizations and forums. Intended to assist Member States in their efforts to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, they focus on the detection of, intervention against and prevention of the incitement, recruitment and facilitation of foreign terrorist fighters; preventing their travel; and the criminalization, prosecution  — including prosecution strategies for returnees  — international cooperation, and the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees. As the Council will recall, in January 2016, in my capacity as Chair of the Committee, I submitted to the Council the global surveys of Member States’ implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). The surveys rely on data compiled on the basis of information and updates provided by Member States to the Committee; reports on country visits  — the Executive Directorate has visited more than 90 States on behalf of the Committee; regional workshops; and information provided by international, regional and subregional organizations and partners. Both surveys take stock of the progress achieved and remaining challenges in implementing the measures under resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), which are also relevant to stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, pursuant to resolution 2178 (2014). I would also note that the Committee, with the support of CTED, has been actively addressing the use of information and communications technology for terrorist purposes. Last December, the Committee held a special meeting on this growing and significant threat, attended by Member States, international and regional organizations, private sector leaders, and representatives of civil society. The participants considered ways to develop a multi-stakeholder approach to this challenge, including with respect to the evolution of the threat, the need to strengthen public/private cooperation, self- regulation by the private sector, and online counter- messaging. The Committee, with the support of CTED, intends to hold another special meeting on this topic, at which it will take stock of progress made since the December meeting, including partnerships established with key stakeholders from the private sector. As Council members are aware, I recently chaired a joint open briefing, together with my colleague from New Zealand, focusing on new and emerging terrorist- financing trends. We were joined by the President of the Financial Action Task Force and by representatives from the private sector. As members are also aware, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its affiliates pose significant new challenges to the international community, owing in large part to their exploitation of the natural and economic resources of territories under their control, bank robbery, extortion and the looting of antiquities. The counter-strategy of the international community focuses in part on disrupting financial flows to and from ISIL-controlled areas and ensuring the protection of the international financial system. However, that presents significant challenges for many Member States. In order to disrupt terrorist networks, we must target their income and their ability to provide resources to sleeper cells. By cutting off the flow of funds to such groups we can significantly undermine their capacity to recruit for, incite, plan and carry out attacks. Countering the financing of terrorism must therefore form an integral part of national and regional counter-terrorism strategies. Terrorist groups continue to identify innovative funding methods, and the international community, especially those Member States directly affected, must be equipped with the tools required to mount an effective response. In that regard, the Counter- Terrorism Committee (CTC) — jointly with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities — will convene a three-day joint CTC/1267 Committee special meeting on terrorist financing in December, with the participation of the Financial Action Task Force. At our recent joint open briefing, it became clear that enhanced cooperation within and between public sector agencies, both domestically and internationally, was critical to identifying foreign terrorist fighters and preventing their travel. Participants discussed the possibility that Member States’ financial intelligence units be given access to personal information such as social security and tax records, subject to domestic data and privacy laws, and proposed that they share information more effectively, both among themselves and with other relevant agencies. They also noted the need for deeper public-private partnerships in identifying financing networks of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as the need to establish financial profiles and patterns to support the work of investigators. The Committee continues to adopt a risk-based approach, where appropriate, aimed at facilitating capacity-building tailored to each State’s perception of its own needs. The huge diversity of States in terms of their size and population; the nature of the various threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters to particular States; as well as States’ relative capacities and vulnerabilities to address terrorist threats, makes a one-size-fits-all approach impractical. States should therefore develop responses to the threat of terrorism based on their respective national security concerns, rather than on a fixed template that might have little relevance to their situation. The Committee has also consistently recalled the position of the Council that all measures taken by Member States to combat terrorism must comply with all their obligations under international law and that States should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law. The Committee recognizes that its effectiveness rests not just on what is done but when it is done. To that end, it has been implementing measures to act more rapidly in its dialogue with Member States, and thus to improve its responsiveness to their needs based upon the principle of national ownership, without sacrificing the quality of that dialogue or the opportunity for States to carefully consider their responses to the Committee’s outreach efforts. One example in that regard is the Committee’s request that the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) present its findings immediately upon its return from follow-up visits. This year CTED also reported to the Committee on recent visits to Ghana, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq. Moreover, the Committee arranged an informal meeting with representatives of Iraq, the donor community and technical assistance providers and implementing agencies to discuss collective efforts in assisting Iraq in its counter-terrorism capacity-building. That marks a significant improvement on previous practice, and the Committee looks forward to strengthening its dialogue with each of those Member States. The Committee has adopted its 2016 work programme, which covers all the required objectives and related activities. The Committee will continue to take the necessary measures to ensure a practical, responsive and dynamic approach to its dialogue with all Member States. (spoke in Arabic) I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi.

At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your briefing as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001). I also thank the Ambassador of New Zealand for his briefing as Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. My statement as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) has been approved by all the members of the Security Council, and as such members will be quite familiar with it. I shall therefore not read out the statement in full, but will limit myself to a much- condensed version. The Member States with us today that are not members of the Council will be able to read the official version approved by the Committee on the 1540 Committee’s website, where it will be posted in a few minutes. When I last briefed the Security Council, on 22 December 2015 (see S/PV.7597) I spoke of the extreme violence being perpetrated by terrorists and their supporters around the world. That violence is much more intense today, and the terrorists are much closer to the possibility of acquiring or producing weapons of mass destruction. We are facing a real threat, as best illustrated by the fact that an Interpol report states that Da’esh has a chemical weapons programme under way. As such, the threat is clearly a global one. The European Parliament agrees with that as well, stating a week ago that there was a real risk of a Da’esh attack. Prevention is without a doubt the best solution to that threat. And the best preventive tool available to the international community in the area of non-proliferation is resolution 1540 (2004). It is therefore essential that the comprehensive review of the resolution, to which we are deeply committed, be both ambitious and all- inclusive. I will now turn to the preliminary steps we are working on, which we must develop further this year, in particular at the third session of the review, to take place next week in Madrid. First, with regard to implementation, it is important to highlight that there has been a continued increase in the number of measures adopted by States to implement resolution 1540 (2004), however, we still face the challenge of achieving its universalization. We need to strengthen direct interaction between the Committee and States that need our support. For that to become reality, it is crucial that we make the non-proliferation regime and its architecture more efficient. Secondly, the Committee is aware of the fact that we need to improve the assistance mechanism by way of a process that more precisely defines requests, with a view to making it easier to provide assistance to States and international organizations. That issue was thoroughly addressed at the recently held African Union meeting in Addis Ababa Thirdly, support and greater coordination for the various programmes of specialized international organizations will be a key part of the comprehensive review. We need to focus in particular on areas such as biological weapons, where there is no mechanism comparable to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the relevant specialized body for nuclear weapons, or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is the specialized body for chemical weapons. Finally, with regard to outreach and transparency, we must make a greater effort to interact more with Member States to make the work of the 1540 Committee known, while bearing in mind that there is a direct correlation between the States that are most involved in resolution 1540 (2004) and their participation in the events. It is worth mentioning that the involvement of civil society enriches the Committee with ideas from different sectors, as was seen in the informal meeting with experts held in April, where we were able to talk about new advances in science and technology, and in the consultations we held with academics in early April. In my previous briefing, I said that industry was a key partner in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Thanks to Germany’s support, that will be a cornerstone of the open consultations that will take place at Headquarters from 20 to 22 June, at which Member States, international organizations and selected representatives of civil society will be able to contribute their ideas to the comprehensive review. I will end where I began — on the evolving nature of terrorism affects all States directly and indirectly. Non-State actors are already fully engaged in acquiring technologies and materials that will allow them to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we must also be fully engaged in preventing them from doing so. What better way is there to do so than the comprehensive review of our most powerful and effective weapon in countering their activities, which is resolution 1540 (2004).

I thank Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi for his briefing. I now give the floor to the other members of the Security Council.

We start by thanking the Egyptian presidency for convening this meeting. The holding of open briefings by the Chairs of the Sanctions Committees increases the transparency of Security Council proceedings, which the United Nations membership has been calling, for especially in matters of great political sensibility, such as the sanctions regimes. We took note with appreciation of the briefings provided by the Chairs of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter- terrorism; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) — respectively, the Permanent Representatives of New Zealand, Egypt and Spain. We acknowledge the existence of organic linkages and encourage the strengthening of cooperation among the Sanctions and Counter-Terrorism Committees, their respective groups of experts and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), as well as among United Nations specialized agencies, Member States and the wider international community in dealing with the impending threats to peace and security caused by terrorism worldwide. The holding of this meeting less than a month after the debate on 14 April on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (see S/PV.7670) demonstrates the Council’s commitment to combating the threat posed by terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The report by the Chair of the 1267 Committee highlights the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant beyond Iraq and Syria, the shifting of its centre of gravity due to military pressure, with ensuing loss of territory and destruction of different significant parts of its oil infrastructure. A matter of great concern expressed in the report is the return home to many foreign terrorist fighters and the additional threat caused by those developments, which as the Chair of the Committee stresses, pose a greater risk to the international community and an opportunity for improving the impact and effectiveness of the 1267 (1999) sanctions regime, which has the ultimate goal of degrading and destroying that lethal terrorist organization. Notwithstanding the fact that sanctions by themselves are not enough to win the fight against terrorism, it is imperative to strengthen global international, regional and subregional cooperation, as well as national capacities at all levels, and to find creative ways to launch an ideological struggle to successfully confront the terrorists. The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters calls for enhanced cooperation among States, international and regional organizations, relevant United Nations bodies and partners to put an end to the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, which is an approach that should be at the centre of the Committees’ efforts and runs parallel with the activities employed by the Counter-Terrorism Committees. The guiding principles identified to assist Member States in their efforts to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, the global surveys on the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), the use of information and communication technologies for terrorist purposes, the trends in terrorist financing and the efforts to cut the flow of funds and undermine the terrorists’ capacities to exploit natural and economic resources in territories under their control are matters identified in the Chair’s report as fundamental responses States should develop for their security concerns. Still concerning the report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, we share his view on the need to implement measures permitting the Committee to act more rapidly and efficiently in its dialogue with Member States by improving its responsiveness to their needs based upon the principle of national ownership. The extreme violence of acts perpetrated by the terrorists substantiate that the realization of their already proclaimed determination to make use of weapons of mass destruction would be a development of catastrophic dimensions, which as the Chair of the 1540 Committee reminds us, can be avoided only by constantly vigilance by Member States to prevent non-State actors from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. It is against such a backdrop that the 1540 Committee is undertaking a comprehensive review on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2014) highlighting the need for continued vigilance at national, regional and international levels, along with sustained and intensified support from the Committee. The priorities and the main thrust highlighted by the Chair of the Committee of the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) has our support and encouragement by streamlining Security Council efforts and strengthening cooperation and effective coordination between the Committee and overall framework set up to combat terrorism, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Sanctions Committees related to terrorists activities.

I wish to thank you, Mr. President, Ambassador Van Bohemen and Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi for your respective briefings. The three Ambassadors have been actively promoting the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee; the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to implement their mandates and coordinate international counter-terrorism and non-proliferation efforts. China commends the three Committees on the substantial progress they have made in their respective work. The 1267 (1999) Committee is an important anti-terrorism mechanism of the Council. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaida and other terrorist forces pose a serious threat to international peace and security. The international community should use a variety of political, economic and cultural means to design comprehensive measures and effective responses. China supports the efforts of the 1267 Committee, within its mandate under Council resolutions, strengthen the communication with the relevant countries, to strengthen the review of listings and delistings and periodically review the sanctions list; strengthen cooperation with monitors and monitoring groups; and make greater contributions to the cause of international anti-terrorism. We hope that the work of the Committee will be further improved and that all Members States will, in accordance with the Committee’s rules of procedure, continue to support and facilitate its work and fully uphold the authority and efficacy of the sanctions mechanism. The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) represents an important platform for strengthening the capacity-building of the Member States and international cooperation in combating terrorism. At present, terrorist organizations are using the Internet and social media as important means to carry out their activities. China supports the efforts of the CTC and the Counter- Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) to improve the assessment of the implementation of anti-terrorism resolutions, carry out country visits, organize meetings and undertake activities that are designed to fight the use of the Internet to incite and finance terrorism, in the framework of implementing Council resolutions, and to offer necessary technical assistance to Member States. China hopes that the CTC will continue to strengthen communication with Member States and promote its coordination and cooperation with relevant United Nations agencies in order to strengthen the capacity of Member States and promote international cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism and maintain international peace and security. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is an important mechanism in the field of non-proliferation. In the future, the focus should be on the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The comprehensive review is an important measure to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution and helps to further strengthen the awareness and capacities of countries against proliferation. We need to come to grips with the major threats outlined in the resolution and prohibit non-State actors from engaging in proliferation activities, especially for terrorist purposes. We must also avoid introducing other complex issues that do not fall within the purview of resolution 1540 (2004). The Committee must play its major role in assisting in the implementation of the resolution, strengthen its assistance mechanism and satisfy the assistance needs of the countries. Moreover, all relevant activities carried out by countries should further the work of the Committee. China is an important member of the international campaign against terrorism. The terrorist forces of the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, represented by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, seriously threaten not only China’s national security but also regional security and stability. China supports the fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We believe that anti-terrorism strategies should comply with uniform standards and not be linked to a specific ethnicity or religion. The United Nations and the Security Council need to play a major role in anti-terrorism efforts, in compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We need to strengthen our effective coordination in order to wage a high-intensity campaign against terrorism. We attach great importance to international cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism. As the President of the Council in April, China convened an open debate against terrorism (see S/PV.7670) that served to strengthen the political resolve of all parties against terrorism and devised a series of new anti-terrorism measures and recommendations, lending new impetus to the coordination and cooperation of international efforts against terrorism. China firmly opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We insist on resolving proliferation problems through political and diplomatic means and on effectively preserving and strengthening the international the non-proliferation regime by fostering an international and regional security environment of mutual confidence and cooperation in order to remove the motivations for WMD proliferation. China supports exchanges and cooperation among the various parties in the field of non-proliferation. In September 2015, China hosted a workshop for the 1540 national focal points in the Asia-Pacific region, which has played a positive role in strengthening the capacity- building of the Asia-Pacific countries in implementing the resolution. China will continue to comprehensively participate in and promote international cooperation in the fields of anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation in order to promote further progress in relevant fields. China will continue to support the efforts of the 1267 Committee, the CTC and the 1540 Committee to ensure the comprehensive implementation of the mandates set forth in the Council resolutions, while making new contributions to international cooperation against terrorism and non-proliferation.

We thank the Chairmen of the Committees with counter-terrorism mandates for their detailed briefings. The effectiveness of the work of those bodies will to a large extent determine progress in strengthening the central coordinating role of the United Nations and the Security Council in the field of counter-terrorist cooperation. Today, the world is facing an unprecedented upsurge of terrorist activity. The main threat stems from the so- called Islamic State. Despite its significant territorial, human and financial losses, to a large extent achieved through Russia’s Aerospace Defence Forces, the group misses no opportunity to sew terror and its pseudo- ideology. Its attempts to gain a foothold in Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen and other areas of instability are clear evidence of that. Recently, the Security Council carried out significant work in strengthening the international legal framework for countering the terrorist threat by suppressing its fuelling and financing and improving the work of the sanctions and monitoring mechanisms. In that regard, resolution 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015) were the most important steps. Today, the main problems lie in their full-fledged good-faith implementation both by States Members and within the framework of the Organization as a whole. In that regard, States that border conflict zones bear a special responsibility. We have serious questions about the primary analytical materials of the Secretary-General and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Group of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. The main problem is that they contain insufficient assessments and are not sufficiently concrete. Moreover, such an approach is a necessary prerequisite to a deeper understanding of the thrust of the problem, identifying problems with the implementation of Security Council decisions, and tailoring the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies in counter-terrorism efforts. There is no shortage of such data, including from open sources. We have also circulated to the Security Council a number of documents that shed light on the main channels for smuggled petroleum, artefacts and foreign terrorist fighters, as well as weapons. As is quite clear from those documents, the main routes cross Turkey and are not suppressed by Ankara. We expect that the Secretary-General’s future reports, including the May report on resolution 2253 (2015), and of the Monitoring Group will address the shortcomings that have been pointed out. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, has repeatedly stated, this is no time to bury our heads in the sand like an ostrich. The international community must acknowledge the facts. Only in that way we will overcome a common enemy — the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Referring to the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), we would like to state that we expect constructive cooperation with the group of experts, each of which possesses the requisite knowledge and expertise in terms of weapons of mass destruction and export control. The Committee continues its effective work helping countries to implement the provisions of the resolution. The number of States failing to submit relevant national reports is falling. The Group of Experts is visiting specialized international forums to inform the international community on the specificities and tasks of this non-proliferation mechanism. We are not opposed to convening consultations with international, regional and subregional organizations, industry and business representatives, subject to the understanding, however, that responsibility for implementing resolution 1540 (2004) lies with States and their administrative structures. In other words, civil society is not an independent player in this field. The main task for the subsidiary body of the Security Council in 2016 is to conclude the comprehensive review with a view to identifying existing bottlenecks in the implementation of the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). In our view, the Committee itself requires fine-tuning rather than radical change. We expect the States members of the Security Council to approach the final review with great care. Doing otherwise could have unpredictable consequences. That also applies to the creation of additional bureaucratic structures to address the theme of resolution 1540 (2004). We are quite skeptical in that regard, to put it frankly. States can cooperate directly with the Committee, as is directly stated in the text of the resolution. The creation of additional formats that do not enjoy the consensus support of Committee members could lead to unnecessary duplication and even undermine the work of that subsidiary body of the Security Council.

The international community continues to make significant progress in degrading terrorist groups worldwide, with significant recent gains against Da’esh in Syria and Iraq, as well as Boko Haram and other Al-Qaida groups around the world. But much more needs to be done. We know that those threats persist, and have even begun to spread to other locations around the world. We continue to see Da’esh, Boko Haram and Al-Qaida affiliates radicalizing and recruiting our citizens to carry out their deeds even as they recruit new affiliate groups and establish branches around the world. Da’esh, in particular, seeks to stage more mass casualty attacks in public spaces around the world, in conflict zones and in our very own communities. As we look at terrorist trends, we are now seeing a growing number of returning foreign terrorist fighters from Iraq and Syria posing serious threats to their countries of origin. From Brussels to Istanbul to Paris, returnees are sparking new threats, inspiring new violence and recruiting new sympathizers. The threat of Da’esh-inspired, homegrown violent extremists is also growing, as we saw in San Bernadino and elsewhere. What is clear from all that we have been seeing over the past years is that no country is immune to the terrorist threat today. That is why we must not only counter and respond to terrorist attacks, but we must also take appropriate steps to prevent radicalization to violence while ensuring that it is done in compliance with obligations under international law, including international human rights law. That requires just the sort of all-of-United-Nations and whole-of-society approach offered in the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. We applaud the Secretary-General’s leadership on that issue and hope that all Member States can endorse his plan during this summer’s United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review. In addition to longer-term prevention efforts, we must continue to do more to fully implement Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014) and 2253 (2015), which are central to the world’s counter- terrorism efforts and drive the work of two of the Council’s three counter-terrorism committees. As we stressed in resolution 2253 (2015), the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999),1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities is vital to countering the threats posed by these groups, in particular their financing and recruiting activities. We appreciate Ambassador Van Bohemen’s active stewardship of that Committee and thank the 1267 Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for its great work in developing helpful threat analyses. Thanks to their work, the Council has been kept updated on the changing terrorist threat picture, the challenges in implementing resolution 2253 (2015), and new areas on which the Committee and the Council should focus to better counter the financing activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While implementing sanctions remains key, there is also a critical role for the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Committee’s work is helping the Council to identify Member States’ weaknesses in implementing the core international counter-terrorism obligations, and is driving international attention and resources towards key vulnerabilities and gaps that need to be addressed in order to stop terrorists. We appreciate Ambassador Aboulatta’s active stewardship of that important committee, as well as the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to address the full array of terrorist threats and State capability requirements, in particular against foreign terrorist fighters. That is why the joint work between the Monitoring Team and CTED in countering foreign terrorist fighters is exemplary. That is the kind of solid and actionable analysis to better counter foreign terrorist fighter flows to Da’esh in Syria and Iraq that the Council needs to see more of. In fact, these analyses need to drive the United Nations’ capacity-building efforts. We commend the development by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) of its capacity- building implementation plan for countering the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. We call on the Council and all Member States to increase their support for the efforts of these three counter-terrorism bodies in order to better counter Da’esh and foreign terrorist fighters, including by mobilizing resources to CTITF, as it helps to build needed capacity for those States most affected and in need of assistance. Turning to the important work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to counter weapons of mass destruction terrorism, I would like to note that we see resolution 1540 (2004) as a foundational instrument in our efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We also strongly support the resolution and the work of the 1540 Committee. In light of the allegations of use of chemical weapons by ISIL, we consider that resolution to be timely and vital. We should all redouble our efforts to implement it. Initial information from the Committee’s Group of Experts indicates that States have taken measures for only 48 per cent of items on which the Committee gathers data, representing a meagre 7 per cent increase in implementation of security measures since 2010. The data clearly shows that three United Nations regional groups — Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean — have much lower levels of overall implementation. That is especially troubling considering the numbers of violent non-State actors in Africa and the Middle East. The data also indicate low levels of implementation in several policy areas, such as obligations related to securing biological and chemical items. The second comprehensive review provides an opportunity to improve implementation of the resolution. We hope all States and relevant organizations, civil society and industry will make meaningful contributions to the review, including in the United Nations open meeting on 20 to 22 June, and that we will all seriously consider ways to improve our overall implementation efforts. I would welcome the sending by all Security Council members and all United Nations Member States of a message back to their capital — if they have not already done so — requesting the start of reflection on three main actions with regard to how we all approach resolution 1540 (2004). We think of it as the “3 S’s”: start, strengthen and stop. First, what new thing should we start doing? Secondly, what important thing should we continue to do or strengthen? Thirdly, what should we stop doing because it does not work or is irrelevant? As part of our support for the work of the 1540 Committee, in March the United States submitted an updated report on recent nuclear-security-related measures we have taken to implement our obligations under the resolution. The report can be found on the 1540 Committee’s website. Such reporting also supports the overall objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit, including elements of the recently adopted United Nations action plan, to which we remain committed. We are also preparing to submit a similar updated report on biological security measures. Through this year’s comprehensive review, we need to ensure that resolution 1540 (2004) and the Committee can evolve and retain their critical importance and relevance in addressing the risks that the world faces today. We look forward to working with the other members of the Security Council, as well as the broader international community, to achieving that goal.

Allow me thank you, Mr. President, for convening this briefing on the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are grateful for the briefings Ambassadors Gerad Van Bohemen of New Zealand, Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta of Egypt and Román Oyarzun Marchesi of Spain, in their capacities are the respective chairs of those subsidiary bodies. We thank them for their leadership and for the work they are doing at the helm of the committees. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is convinced that the fight against terrorism must be carried out within the framework of international cooperation, in strict accordance with existing international and regional instruments in that area, the rules of international law, fully respecting the sovereignty of States, human rights and fundamental freedoms. In that regard, Venezuela reiterates its categorical rejection of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, because they constitute a flagrant violation of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. The actions of violent extremism perpetrated by terrorist groups in countries of Africa and the Middle East have intensified. Terrorism therefore continues to pose a serious threat to international peace and security. Accordingly, we have no choice but to fully and effectively implement the measures that have been drawn up to prohibit incitement, the financing of terrorism, training and the transfer of arms to terrorist groups and non-State actors, in accordance with the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. My country reiterates its concern about the nature and activities of non-State actors, as they constitute an ongoing threat and source of violence and, in most cases, they evolve into terrorist groups. The Security Council must take strong measures to prevent the training, financing and supply of arms to them. We must act with a holistic perspective in the fight against terrorism. Above and beyond combating terrorism, the international community must focus on overcoming the root causes of armed conflicts that have impacted the Middle East and North Africa. The humanitarian tragedy in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya, among other places, and the actions of Al-Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) and associated groups demand from the international community systematic and forceful responses to prevent, combat and eradicate the scourge of terrorism. With regard to the work of the Committee on Al-Qaida and associated individuals, we believe that body serves as an important tool in the broader fight against terrorism. Although in recent months ISIS has suffered significant defeats in Syria and Iraq, the activities of that terrorist organization continue to be a source of concern for the international community. According to the latest reports of the Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the terrorist threat has shifted its approach with regard to financing, and the threat continues with attacks on heavily populated areas, which have an enormous media impact. We believe that the role played by the Ombudsperson in facilitating due process has special importance. We are of the view that this mechanism must be strengthened in order to provide greater transparency in reviewing cases of persons linked to Al-Qaida and their associated entities. We hope that, in the wake of the adoption of resolution 2253 (2015), the Office of Catherine Marchi- Uhel will be allocated the necessary resources to ensure the independence and professionalism that have been the hallmark of its work throughout its mandate to date. Moreover, it is important to highlight the work carried out the chairmanship to update the guidelines of the 1267 Committee and the work carried out by the Monitoring Group, which provides regular reports and assessments of the threat posed globally by ISIS. Turning to the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, we welcome the fact that that subsidiary body, with the support of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), continues to focus its efforts for the full and effective implementation of the provisions set out in resolution 2178 (2014), concerning foreign terrorist fighters, and continues its work in identifying good practices and existing gaps that must be filled by Member States to combat a problem that today includes 30,000 individuals, including women and young people, from approximately 100 countries throughout the world. In that regard, we welcome the significant reports issued by that Committee in connection with the threat posed by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and its recommendations for comprehensively addressing this issue of global scope, taking into account, inter alia, of the challenges faced by numerous States in terms of criminalizing the and prosecuting foreign terrorist fighters. Venezuela acknowledges the importance of improving border control capacities, particularly in areas adjacent to influence of terrorist groups. It is also important that we continue our efforts to dismantle the sources of financing of those organizations to restrict and curb their criminal activities. In the same vein, it is crucial to make progress in developing innovative strategies to counter and refute extremist narratives and ideologies and to foment critical thinking in society, in order to prevent radicalization, recruitment and the mobilization of both human and economic resources. With regard to the work of the 1540 Committee and measures to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruciton, we believe that the comprehensive review of the work done by the Committee over the past five years is essential at a time when the use of such weapons by terrorist groups, particularly chemical weapons, has become a genuine and alarming reality, as is indicated in reported cases of the use of such weapons in Syria and Iraq. As far as Venezuela is concerned, the comprehensive review process must be focused on the establishment of both human and technical capacity-building throughout the world, particularly in those countries that are lagging farthest being in implementing the resolution. The main strength of resolution 1540 lies in its preventive capacity, with cooperation and assistance being among its major tools. Through its coordination of the working group on the national implementation of the 1540 Committee, Venezuela is working actively to ensure that the comprehensive review process is successful. Within the context of the comprehensive review, the Committee must work towards establishing a clear link between measures to be implemented within the context of resolution 1540 (2040) and development, given that development is the main and overriding goal of developing countries. Moreover, in order to maximize its effectiveness, the Committee has to duly take into account the context in which the resolution is being implemented. A significant number of countries throughout the world neither produce nor export materials that could be used to manufacture a weapon of mass destruction, but they could nonetheless still serve as transit points or shipment points for non-State actors. Therefore, the work of the 1540 Committee must focus on the implementation of those aspects and provisions of the resolution that are more directly related to the risks associated with each country. We need to take into account that, while the assistance requested by States in nuclear and chemical areas can be channelled efficiently through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the same is not the case in the area of biological weapons because the Biological Weapons Convention’s Implementation Support Unit does not have the necessary human or financial capacity to fulfil that role. That constitutes a very serious gap in an area of ​particular complexity and danger. The Committee should seriously consider all potential measures to reverse that major shortcoming. Finally, we would like to underscore the point that, irrespective of the need to improve the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the work of the 1540 Committee in providing assistance and follow-up in monitoring of the implementation of national plans, its mandate needs to continue to be characterized by collaboration and support.

I would like to join other members in thanking the Chairs of the three Committees, the Permanent Representatives of New Zealand, Egypt and Spain, for sharing the activities of their Committees with us, as well as for their excellent work in serving as Chairs. Today we face terrorist attacks all over the world almost every week. I fully agree with the Permanent Representatives of New Zealand and Egypt that countering foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist financing is the key to coping with the serious threats posed by terrorists. The Security Council addressed those issues in resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2253 (2015). The full implementation of those resolutions is critical. Japan has been strengthening its border security and counter-terrorist financing measures to better implement the relevant resolutions. For example, we have adopted and improved biometric tools, such as fingerprint readers, with the operating function of fingerprint identification for identity certificates and passports and with facial images in the identity certificates as tips to affirm a traveller’s real identification. In October 2015, we enacted new legislation to better cover terrorist funds. Based on those experiences, we urge all Member States to fully implement the resolutions. Terrorists exploit vulnerable countries that are short of legislation, equipment and training, which they use as loopholes. Japan has been assisting countries on capacity-building for enhancing the implementation of measures to plug those loopholes. In particular, Japan has provided assistance to various countries in the Middle East and Africa amounting to nearly $28 million in just the past two years. Terrorists usually try to disguise themselves and use forged travel documents when crossing borders. To discover possible terrorists, Japan has provided fingerprint readers together with training for immigration officers. The officers can help to detect the real identity of terrorists by matching their fingerprints with those in databases. Similarly, in order to cut off terrorist financing, we have provided assistance on enacting laws on counter-terrorist financing and on the building of networks for confiscating criminal proceeds. Those measures provide authorities in the region with a basis for sharing information, freezing assets and prosecuting terrorist financiers in a concerted manner. To combat terrorism more effectively, I wish to highlight the linkage between terrorist activities and illicit businesses. Many terrorists draw profits through illegal business, such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, as well as oil smuggling, in close cooperation with transnational organized crime. Therefore, we need to take into account those connections between terrorists activities and underground businesses when we elaborate counter-terrorism measures. We must highlight resolution 2195 (2014), which stresses the need to work collectively to prevent and combat terrorism benefitting from transnational organized crime. Strengthening the international non-proliferation regime — with resolution 1540 (2004) at its core — is also a high priority for Japan. Capacity-building again has a key role to play, and Japan is committed to providing assistance in that field. For example, for more than 20 years, Japan has hosted Asian export-control seminars to share best practices among participants. It is also important for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to enhance cooperation with relevant international organizations. It was very fruitful for the Committee to have been briefed by the Secretary-General of the World Customs Organization, Mr. Kunio Mikuriya, on 9 February. He said that, although developing countries used to consider customs bodies as revenue-generating agencies, they are now increasingly aware of the customs role in border controls for national security. I was very much encouraged to hear that remark. Finally, in response to rapidly evolving methods of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it is necessary to review, update and enhance resolution 1540 (2004). Japan is determined to actively engage in the ongoing comprehensive review process under the strong leadership of the Permanent Representative of Spain.

At the outset, Mr. President, I welcome your outstanding initiative in organizing this joint briefing on the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated groups, undertakings and entities; the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter- terrorism; and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). I would also like to convey the Senegalese delegation’s most heartfelt congratulations to the Chairs of the Committees — which is to say, to you, Mr. President, as well as to Ambassador Van Bohemen and Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi  — for the outstanding quality of their briefings and their leadership in heading the activities of those bodies. There could be no more opportune time for convening this meeting, given the recurring violent terrorist attacks throughout the world. It is therefore more than urgent to counter the attempts of extremist groups to take possession of weapons of mass destruction. However, suppression and military responses can never be sufficient in themselves in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Given terrorist groups’ ability to change and adapt to a situation, the fight requires a multisectoral approach, one that necessarily includes preventive, suppressive and protective measures. Resolution 1540 (2004), a preventive text that the Security Council adopted unanimously, founded on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, nearly 12 years ago, constitutes a major advantage in our attempts to prevent non-State actors from getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction. The comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both in a retrospective as well as in a forward-looking way, affords us a unique opportunity to refocus our actions and strategies in a comprehensive, coordinated and cohesive approach to meet the numerous challenges facing peace and security throughout the world. The rapid progress in terms of science and technology, globalization, as well as the constant change in terms of the business world, are all factors that non-State actors can utilize to assist them in gaining hold of weapons of mass destruction. My delegation welcomes the regional approach, which the 1540 Committee has decided to adopt in its programme of work. In partnership with the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the first inter-parliamentary meeting on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) took place in Abijan on 22 and 23 February and was attended by more than 72 African legislators from 18 States. The meeting was an opportunity to discuss issues related to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Africa and to reflect on ways to strengthen the national legal frameworks in place to implement the resolution. This initiative should be reproduced in all regions of the world, given the crucial role that lawmakers play in the development and adoption of legal frameworks necessary for avoiding the consequences that could occur if nuclear, chemical or biological weapons were to fall into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists. The other event that reflects the partnership between the 1540 Committee and Africa is the participation of the newest members of the Committee, including the Chair, in the assistance and review conference on the implementation of resolution 1540 in Africa, organized by the African Union on 6 and 7 April in Addis Ababa. We also call for extending the cooperation between the Committee and the African countries, most of which have received its support as they implement the resolution. To that end, strengthening the Committee’s capacities is more necessary than ever, if it is going to extend its assistance activities to all countries that request them. Terrorist groups are increasingly using the Internet and social media to incite people to violence and to recruit, finance and plan terrorist acts. In this regard, it is essential that the relevant provisions of resolutions 1540 (2004), 2178 (2013) and 2253 (2015) be implemented effectively by States, in particular through strengthening their cooperation in information sharing and through better collaboration with private service providers with a view to improving regulation and control systems. In addition, the recruitment by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other extremist groups of foreign terrorist fighters, whose number exceeds 30,000 and who come from over 100 countries, is another major challenge that we must confront in an urgent, effective and coordinated manner. These fighters are a real threat to their countries of origin, as well as to transit and destination countries. In our view, to eradicate this phenomenon, better cooperation with respect to border control is imperative. However, the measures to be taken to this end should not undermine the principle of the free movement of people and goods. In this regard, my delegation wishes to commend the remarkable work done by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), which deserves our full support and cooperation, given its countless activities taken on under the guidance of the Counter- Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, whose recommendations contained in the country visit reports should be regularly assessed with the full cooperation of the States concerned. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate Senegal’s willingness and unwavering commitment to remaining active in the effective implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council in the fight against terrorism, particularly resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2253 (2015), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004).

First, I would like to say that yesterday, which saw the first meeting under the Egyptian presidency of the Security Council (see S/PV.7685), after listening the briefings of the representatives of the Red Cross and Médicins Sans Frontières in this Chamber, I could see how difficult it is follow satisfy all protocols for running these meetings, so I wanted to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your handling the role of president. I also wanted to assure you, Sir, of the full cooperation of the delegation of Uruguay. At the same time, I would like to join those who preceded me in thanking the delegation of China for the excellent work accomplished during its presidency in the month of April. I would also like to thank the three Chairs for their briefings on the activities of their respective Committees, as well as the Groups of Experts that support the work of the three Committees. I will be very brief. My comments actually apply to the work of all of three Committees since each of them are different facets of the same risk that is threatening international peace and security today. First, I would like to reaffirm Uruguay’s commitment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and tolerance. All of these are values that terrorism is seeking to eradicate from the face of the earth. For that reason, we energetically repudiate their activities and their world view. The success of the work of the Committees depends essentially on the responsibility of States in implementing the decisions and recommendations of the Security Council. The exercise of responsibility requires above all the will of States to comply with their obligations. I emphasize that there must be resolute will and a strong commitment from States, and I say this because there has been a distinct impression that such will and commitment have been lacking in certain quarters. But in addition to will, there must also be capacity, and the need to build capacity is a theme that was touched upon by several colleagues who preceded me this morning, including Mr. Yoshifumi Okamura, who provided us with a detailed analysis of the various aspects of capacity-building and institution-building. This is essential for implementing and strengthening the decisions and measures adopted at the Committee level. The various degrees of non-compliance are often not the result of a lack of will, but the result of lack of capacity. Something that might seem simple for some, such as border controls, is something that for others entails huge prior capacity-building, in terms, for example, of personnel — a trained, educated, equipped staff. Infrastructure is also needed, from buildings to communications and transportation infrastructure. Customs staff is needed, and it must be paid well enough to withstand the temptation of bribery. Capacity- building is therefore at the crux of the ability of a State to comply with the task we have given it. International cooperation in this area is therefore crucial. When I speak of international cooperation, I mean not only the United Nations, but also international financial institutions and the different ways to raise the level of development of peoples so that they can take on both the material aspects of implementing resolutions as well as the ultimate way of beating terrorism, which is by changing minds. We must achieve a level of development in which terrorism is no longer seen in the lives of our peoples as a viable option.

I join earlier speakers in thanking Ambassadors Van Bohemen and Oyarzun Marchesi, and you, Mr. President, for the briefings provided in your capacities as Chairs of your respective Committees. I also wish to express my delegation’s sincere appreciation to the Ambassadors for their able stewardship of those Committees. I also take this opportunity to extend my appreciation to the respective Groups of Experts and Monitoring Teams supporting the Committees. Malaysia reiterates its long-standing commitment to our collective effort to combat the scourge of terrorism and eradicate it from our midst. The work of the three Committees under discussion represents an integrated bulwark against the threat posed by potential terrorist acts and actors. In that context, we continue to believe that joint briefings such as today’s provide an important opportunity for holistically reviewing and assessing our efforts to that end, as well as providing us with a space where we can identify areas with the potential for further synergies and cooperation between and among the Committees. For example, a common strain running through all their work concerns outreach to partners and stakeholders, including Member States, international organizations such as Interpol, the Financial Action Task Force, the World Trade Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Transport Association, civil society and academia, as well as the private sector. Such activities are critical to enhancing understanding of the various regimes and their mechanisms and contributing to their improved implementation. Such efforts must continue to be a central focus for the work of all the Committees, and in that regard, we welcome the commitment of all three Committee Chairs to continuing that engagement, including through open briefings and consultations. The adoption in December of resolution 2253 (2015) and the January report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/92) accompanying it have brought the evolving nature of the threat posed by terrorist actors, especially Da’esh, into sharper focus. As Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi noted in his briefing, there is evidence that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is actively pursuing a chemical weapons programme. While we note the existence in relation to that area of strong international institutions, particularly the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which monitors the international trade in chemical substances and related technologies and equipment, the regime of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) provides another layer of protection for guarding against the possible acquisition, development and use of such substances by potential terrorist actors. Against the backdrop of that evolving threat, and within the context of the ongoing comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), my delegation would like to stress the importance of addressing the gaps in the current framework, particularly on the biological and toxic weapons side. Another area of particular interest to my delegation is the possibility of replicating the assistance matching model, as demonstrated last month at the African regional meeting in Addis Ababa, in other regions, including my own. In noting the preliminary findings highlighted by the Chair of the 1540 Committee in his briefing, my delegation stands ready to continue to work closely with all Council members, as well as other partners and stakeholders, in order to ensure a successful outcome for the review. The recent spate of terrorist attacks around the world highlights a disturbing trend in the complexity and sophistication of terrorists’ planning and execution of their attacks. We share the view that the growth of foreign terrorist fighters flocking to theatres of conflict around the world poses a future threat as well as an immediate one, including to their home countries, even if it is not necessarily a definite one. As Ambassador Van Bohemen noted, such fighters will return home battle-hardened, radicalized and well networked. A further threat is posed by the expansion of Da’esh and its affiliates to other territories. It is crucial to recognize that the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addresses primarily the front end of the problem. In order to address it more comprehensively, the continuity and synergies between the Committee and its work could be further explored and, where they already exist, further deepened with other relevant mechanisms and institutions at the national, regional and international levels. In that connection, we support the Chair of the Committee’s call to Member States to actively engage with it, including by submitting the necessary implementation reports. On that note, I would like to conclude by stating our strong approval of and support for the substantial analytical and norm-setting work being actively undertaken by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate under the guidance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, as you highlighted in your briefing, Mr. President.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, and the Ambassadors of New Zealand and Spain, for today’s briefings and for the leadership shown by all three countries in chairing the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. Terrorism continues to be one of the world’s greatest threats to international peace and security, as the all- too-frequent attacks that saturate the news remind us. The Chair of the 1267 Committee emphasized that the past year saw the Committee’s activities refocused on the threat posed by Da’esh and its affiliate groups. In that regard, the adoption of resolution 2253 (2015) was an important step forward in addressing the current terrorist threat. The 1267 Committee carries out at least two essential tasks that France considers extremely important, one of them being analysing the terrorist threat through the very detailed and valuable reports of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. But I should also commend the quality of the joint briefings with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on such major subjects as foreign terrorist fighters and combating terrorism financing. The second is the implementation and rigorous monitoring of the sanctions list. In that regard, we encourage all States Members of the United Nations to continue to submit requests for the inclusion of names on the list. But in order to maintain the regime’s credibility, its procedures must also respect the fundamental freedoms of the individuals on the list. The establishment of the post of an Ombudsperson for the regime represents an unprecedented effort on the part of the Council to improve its procedural safeguards, and I should commend Ms. Marchi-Uhel’s outstanding work on the job. The Counter-Terrorism Committee also fills two essential and complementary functions. The first is doing as much as possible to raise States’ awareness of new trends in the ever-changing terrorist threat. In that regard, the Counter Terrorism-Committee Executive Directorate’s recent work on the issues of data on travellers and on foreign terrorist fighters returning from conflict zones is particularly important. The Committee’s second function is monitoring States’ implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and their fight again terrorism and its financing generally, but also their efforts regarding other resolutions, such as 1624 (2005), on combating incitement to commit acts of terrorism, and 2178 (2014), on foreign terrorist fighters. It is therefore crucial that States accept visits from the Executive Directorate so as to enable it to assess their systems for combating terrorism and make the best possible recommendations. It is also essential to ensure that the United Nations can implement technical assistance programmes based on those assessments and recommendations. We therefore consider it fundamental to ensure that the Executive Directorate continues to work closely with the other United Nations bodies involved in combating terrorism in order to carry out such projects. Finally, I would like to comment briefly on the important work of the 1540 Committee under Spain’s dynamic leadership. Unfortunately, the risk of biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists is real. The especially worrying information reaching us from Iraq and Syria means that we can no longer rule out that possibility. To that we have to add the doubts that remain regarding Syria’s declaration of its chemical programme to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the potential for the existence of residual capacity in Syria, which only increases that risk and which we take very seriously. However, it would be unfair not to emphasize the significant achievements of resolution 1540 (2004) since its adoption. Today an overwhelming majority of Member States have adopted measures translating the resolution’s provisions into national legislation. In areas such as securing sensitive materials and goods, strengthening border controls and even, when necessary, establishing mechanisms for export controls, the international community is working to ensure that such sensitive materials and goods cannot fall into terrorists’ hands. The ongoing comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) will be an opportunity to adapt and strengthen our tools against this threat. By identifying implementation gaps, strengthening assistance mechanisms and the dialogue of the Committee with other international organizations, we will be able to better prevent the risk of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The meetings in Madrid in a few days, and especially the open meeting here in New York in June, will be major landmarks that we must build on. Spain can count on the support of France to make this year a success.

I want to begin by thanking the three briefers — not just for their briefings but for all of their hard work on our collective behalf in chairing the Committees. It has been a decade since the General Assembly unanimously adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and in that time the United Nations has developed a comprehensive architecture to counter terrorism. At our disposal we have sanctions and analysis, we have coordination from the Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and we have project delivery by the United Nations Centre for Counter-Terrorism. But in that decade, the threat has changed. The spectre of Da’esh now hangs over so many of the crises that we deal with in this Chamber. Groups like Boko Haram terrorize some of the world’s poorest people, and the Al-Qaida network has spread to fragile regions across the globe. I therefore hope that we can use the 10-year anniversary of the United Nations Strategy to adapt to this new reality, to refresh the framework and to lay the foundations for another decade of effective support to Member States as we tackle this scourge together. I should like to touch in particular on two aspects of the current threat. First, as many colleagues have noted, Da’esh remains a major threat to international peace and security. The United Kingdom is taking action against that group within the Global Coalition to Counter Da’esh and other forums. Significant gains have been made. Da’esh is now less able to finance its hatred, less able to carry out its terror and less able to recruit followers to its sick cause. We must sustain that pressure. United Nations bodies play a vital supporting role in that effort. The Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime is tightening the noose on Da’esh finance, and United Nations panel assessments offer timely recommendations for States to address gaps in their national systems. We look to all States to fulfil their obligations under United Nations sanctions. On foreign terrorist fighters, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate is helping to map and understanding recruitment flows. We share and welcome the assessment that the flow of people traveling to fight for Da’esh has slowed, but new trends are now emerging. These include increased numbers of returnees and, as Ambassador Van Bohemen said, so-called broken travel  — traveling with multiple documents via multiple destinations to circumvent security. These shifts show that we cannot be complacent. The United Nations must facilitate the sharing of best practice and lessons learned in this area. The second threat I want to touch on is proliferation to non-State actors, especially terrorists. Resolution 1540 (2004) is all about preventing the worst-case scenario  — toxic, poisonous or radioactive materials falling into the hands of terrorists. Full, universal implementation of the resolution by all States would go quite some way towards preventing such deadly proliferation, but that universal ideal is being challenged. Continued allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria and Iraq are exactly what resolution 1540 (2004) and the Chemical Weapons Convention were designed to stop. These are horrific crimes, and all investigations aimed at bringing to justice those responsible for acquisition, development, manufacture or use of chemical weapons must be pursued rigourously. Ultimately, prohibited chemical weapons cannot fall into terrorist hands if they have been destroyed, in line with international law. That is why all Governments in the region should join the Chemical Weapons Convention without delay and all existing signatories must unequivocally fulfil their obligations, including full cooperation with the assessments and fact-finding missions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Looking forward, the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) this summer will be an opportunity to strengthen our collective security on this issue. We should be bold. Areas for improvement could include strengthened regional cooperation, as neighbouring States are best placed to help each other; greater understanding of emerging proliferation challenges, because we need to keep pace with new technology; and well-resourced and structured Secretariat support so that the Committee can fulfil its mandate until 2021 and beyond. We hope that all States will engage with these ideas at the 1540 (2004) conference this summer. Countering Da’esh, stopping foreign terrorist fighters, strengthening non-proliferation, preventing violent extremism — those are all major challenges that require a unified response and coherent support from the United Nations. United Nations counter-terrorism structures must be fit for purpose; that is why the United Kingdom supports an ambitious review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. To close, I have two key recommendations for that review. First, we need to ensure that the concepts of prevention and an all-of-United-Nations approach, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, are incorporated into the United Nations system. Secondly, we must strengthen the strategic-level guidance, communications and coordination of all United Nations counter-terrorism bodies to get the most value from our resources. The United Kingdom looks forward to engaging with all States in the coming months to achieve those aims.

Like others, I thank today’s briefers for providing extensive information on the activities of their respective Committee’s and beyond. We highly commend the dedicated efforts of the three Committee Chairs, as well as the work of the expert groups aimed at ensuring the comprehensive implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and at promoting effective international cooperation among all stakeholders to achieve the objectives set by these instruments. We welcome the close collaboration of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999),1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Counter-Terrorism Committee in overseeing the implementation of specific counter-terrorism measures established by the Security Council, promoting international cooperation in this field, detecting possible gaps in the existing regulations, and introducing sanctions measures with regard to individuals and entities engaged in terrorist activities. Good examples of such teamwork is the cooperation of the 1267 Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in identifying the emergence of new threats posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its affiliates worldwide, sharing thematic reports and holding joint Committees meetings on the topic of depriving terrorists of their sources of funding. Notwithstanding the recent achievements in the suppression of international terrorist threats posed by ISIL, especially of its financing, there are still problems that require cohesive actions to be taken both by the two Committees and by the United Nations membership at large. Among our present tasks are the prevention of terrorism spreading to other regions by staunching the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; the introduction of comprehensive strategies for dealing with returnees, who may endanger the internal security of their States of origin; countering the propaganda of terrorism and violent extremism; and combating abuse of information and communications technologies for terrorist purposes, to name but a few. We are pleased to note that these topics are duly reflected in the Committees’ programmes of work. We also commend the pace kept by the expert groups in conducting their country visits and producing credible reports and recommendations aimed at strengthening national counter-terrorism mechanisms. Apart from the activities of the international community in combating terrorism outbreaks at the global level, we also should not forget about the available tools to exert pressure on terrorists within the existing sanctions framework, reinforced by the recent resolution 2253 (2015). In that regard, Ukraine supports the call for introducing a broad range of targeted counter-terrorism sanctions to disrupt terrorists’ financing and their travelling to conflict regions. Since 2004, resolution 1540 (2004) has played a crucial role in strengthening regional and global non-proliferation efforts. Ukraine, as a State with a nuclear-weapon past and as a full-fledged party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, is strongly committed to the implementation resolution 1540 (2004) and makes every effort to prevent non-State actors from acquiring materials and technologies that could be used as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). At the same time, despite the measures taken by Member States to prevent proliferation risks, we are witnessing growing and even more complicated threats in this area. On the one hand, risks may arise not only from poor national legislation being in place but also from the rapid development of science and technology coupled with a lack of threat awareness among the members of academia, industry and civil society. On the other hand, international legal prohibitions have little relevance to terrorists and criminals who might be tempted to engage in attacks using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. Unlike States, non-State actors pursue their hostile intentions and are prone to unconventional and highly unpredictable actions. Moreover, the erosion of the existing world order, continuous breaches and unaddressed violations of international law and the ongoing conflicts in different parts of the globe continue to weaken as a whole the security architecture on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. With a view to tackling the growing threat of WMD proliferation globally, we support initiatives aimed at further strengthening the role and potential of resolution 1540 (2004) for a long-term perspective, such as the recent establishment of the 1540 Group of Friends, which we fully support. Ukraine welcomes the constructive and results-oriented approach of the Spanish chairmanship in the process of the comprehensive review of the resolution’s implementation, to be concluded by December. It is important that the process also focus on ways to ensure that the relevant international legal norms are fully respected and implemented by all Member States. Ukraine stands ready to engage constructively with all like-minded partners on those crucial matters. To conclude my intervention, I would like to reiterate that, while terrorism and the risk of WMD proliferation by non-State actors continue to pose a serious threat to international peace and security, there is a persistent need to ensure close and effective cooperation and coordination between the relevant subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, in particular in the outreach activities and country visits conducted within their respective mandates, as well as in the exchange of information.