S/PV.7791 Security Council
Provisional
The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts Third report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2016/830)
In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.
I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/830, which contains the third report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.
I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman.
Mr. Feltman: I wish to thank the Security Council for the opportunity to brief it on the third report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIL) (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2016/830).
As with previous ones, the report was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and in close collaboration with the Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and other relevant United Nations actors and international organizations.
The report stresses that ISIL and its affiliates have continued to experience significant military setbacks, which has undermined ISIL’s ability to hold territory, generate assets and maintain “governmental” structures. ISIL is attempting to adapt to this new reality and has intensified its efforts at extortion so as to compensate for the loss of revenue from oil. In Iraq and Syria, ISIL’s previous success in holding territory and operating as a quasi-State has been significantly challenged owing to the efforts of several Member States.
However, the report notes that the threat posed by ISIL continues to be significant and to diversify. ISIL and associated entities continue to compete strategically but also to cooperate tactically, occasionally providing one another with operational support. The military pressure currently being exerted on ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has resulted in an increase in the number of foreign terrorist fighter returnees, in particular to Europe and the Maghreb, presenting a growing challenge to global security. ISIL has also increased the number of attacks outside conflict zones and employs deadlier tactics.
Increasingly complex and nearly simultaneous attacks in different countries, committed through large-scale operations and individual or small terrorist cells either directed or inspired by ISIL, have a significant impact and present particular problems to Member States in terms of a security response. ISIL continues to assert itself in cyberspace, using closed forums, encrypted messaging systems, and communications through the so-called dark net to recruit and distribute its propaganda.
To highlight the impact of ISIL in various regions of the globe, the report focuses on South-East Asia, Yemen and East Africa. In South-East Asia, ISIL’s propaganda has re-energized pre-existing terrorist networks and inspired individuals to travel to conflict zones as foreign terrorist fighters. The region hosts foreign terrorist fighters actively directing attacks and is affected by ISIL propaganda and fund-raising efforts, as well as the risks presented by foreign terrorist fighter returnees. In Yemen, even though ISIL has intensified its recruitment efforts and attacks, especially in the Aden area, ISIL has not yet managed to gain significant local support and is generally rejected by the population. The ISIL leadership nonetheless maintains a close interest in the country. Two new ISIL cells have emerged in Somalia. One of those groups, operating in the Puntland region, is being supported by ISIL in Yemen. The second is
operating in southern Somalia. Both groups face strong resistance from Al-Shabaab.
With regard to Member States’ efforts to address the threat of ISIL, the report highlights some of the actions taken in South-East Asia. For example, it stresses that countries of the region have introduced and continue to update national counter-terrorism strategies and legislation; established national counter-terrorism coordinating bodies; strengthened international cooperation, although more work needs to be done in that area; developed institutional and legislative counter- terrorism financing tools; recognized the importance of putting in place effective border controls; and given increased attention to developing comprehensive approaches to countering and preventing recruitment and violent extremism.
A growing number of Member States have addressed the potential threat posed by returnees through a broad range of criminal justice, administrative and rehabilitation and reintegration measures, as the Council called for in resolution 2178 (2014). They have also taken a preventive approach, including by charging individuals with inchoate and preparatory offences. However, Member States continue to face numerous challenges in that context, such as the difficulty of generating and converting intelligence information into admissible evidence. The overall progress made by Member States in developing and implementing rehabilitation-and-reintegration strategies remains more limited among Member States of some of the most affected regions.
During the reporting period, a number of United Nations entities have taken further steps to support Member States’ efforts to counter the threat of ISIL. Examples include the fact that the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has further developed the capacity-building implementation plan mandated by the Security Council for countering the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. The plan was presented to Member States almost 10 months ago, but has only been 20 per cent funded to date.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is developing a programme for States in South and South- East Asia on strengthening legal and institutional frameworks in order to target the financial flows and economic resources of ISIL, Al-Qaida and their associates. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has submitted a
report on best practices relating to how protecting and promoting human rights helps prevent violent extremism. CTED has been assisting the police chiefs of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in establishing a regional joint pperations centre in Kuala Lumpur. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute is enhancing its cooperation with Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia on the design and implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist offenders and foreign terrorist fighters. In the field, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya continues to prepare assessment reports on ISIL that it shares with Member States.
As the military operations against ISIL in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya continue to make progress, we anticipate an increase in the number of returnees and attacks outside conflict zones. The increasingly transnational threat that ISIL represents may therefore become a growing challenge to international peace and security. In that context, the Secretary-General’s call for comprehensive and purposeful international cooperation to effectively prevent violent extremism and counter-terrorism becomes all the more important.
Despite the international community’s efforts, international cooperation on counter-terrorism is still not up to the level of the danger we are facing. Furthermore, if we aim to anticipate new terrorist threats and dynamically address ISIL’s evolving nature, we must complement military, security and law enforcement measures with preventive action that addresses the drivers of violent extremism conducive to terrorism, as demonstrated by the focus provided by the Security Council.
Nevertheless, to effectively address the growing transnational threat of terrorism and violent extremism, I would like to underscore the importance of political will. I would also like to encourage the Council to consider the importance of further mobilizing the financial and technical resources needed to meet the growing demands of programmes to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism. Such efforts would be an enormous help to the United Nations in supporting Member States in implementing the relevant Security Council and the General Assembly resolutions.
I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing.
The representative of Uruguay has asked for the floor to make a statement.
I would first like to thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing on the Secretary-General’s third report (S/2016/830) on the evolution of the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or Da’esh, to international peace and security, and on the range of activities to combat it undertaken by the United Nations in support to Member States.
The report notes that Da’esh has continued to suffer military defeats in Iraq and Syria and to lose territory and the financial capacity to govern. While that would seem to be encouraging, there are many reasons for us to feel seriously concerned, especially in view of the diversification of the threat posed by Da’esh. Its ability to adapt to new circumstances, which allows it to expand its action geographically and change its modus operandi, means that we are constantly facing new challenges and diminishes our ability to react and respond.
The dangerous personal relationships among terrorists; the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters who are returning to Europe and the Maghreb as a result of the military pressure currently being exerted in Iraq and Syria; the use of so-called broken travel, encryption and the dark net; the planning of multiple and simultaneous attacks; the actions perpetrated by individuals or small groups; the use of the Internet and cyberspace; the use of encrypted messaging systems and closed forums; the building of an ever- increasing transnational network of sympathizers and fighters; and the proliferation of online propaganda are all manifestations of Da’esh’s rapid evolution and adaptation to new conditions. Particularly repellent is the use of sexual violence against Yazidi women and girls in Iraq and Syria, as well as other minorities trapped in the conflict, which we firmly condemn.
The report focuses on South-East Asia, Yemen and East Africa and considers the revitalization of foreign terrorist networks in South-East Asia, the Da’esh leadership’s interest in Yemen and the emergence of Da’esh cells in Somalia. Since we are far from winning the battle against terrorism and its despicable partisans, we must ask ourselves where we are failing and what
we can do, both in this forum and nationally, to combat them more effectively and forcefully.
First, and as the Secretary-General’s report clearly indicates, the primary responsibility falls to States. We welcome the measures adopted by some countries, as reflected in the Secretary-General’s report. We also note the remaining shortfalls, including the difficulty encountered by some countries in adopting measures to implement resolution 2178 (2014) or Security Council resolutions on preventing terrorism and its financing.
We are aware that the goodwill and resolve of States alone are often not sufficient for the national implementation of comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies. For many, it is also and above all necessary that they receive technical and financial assistance. We are also aware that at other times, what is lacking is not resources but rather the political will. We stress the need for a unified voice in affirming that the fight against terrorism does not allow for ambiguity or doublespeak.
Members of the international community also have a shared responsibility to act jointly and in solidarity in order to more effectively and efficiently combat terrorism. It is in the interests of all for the United Nations to be able to play the role of primary coordinator among States and subregional, regional and international organizations. That perception should be shared by all members of the international community. To that end, we should also consider strategies to build confidence among various States and regions, at all times highlighting that the ultimate objective is the common good — the good of all.
I cannot conclude without noting that as we develop counter-terrorism strategies, we must always bear in mind the obligations of States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law. We should also not lose sight of the fact that by promoting the rule of law and fundamental liberties, and by encouraging inclusive, diverse, multicultural societies, we will enable new and future generations to practice and choose tolerance, which is probably the most important tool for neutralizing any manner of extremism.
I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.
The meeting rose at 3.55 p.m.