S/PV.7845 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council according to the year of adoption of the related Council resolutions: Ambassador Rafael Ramírez Carreño, Permanent Representative of Venezuela and Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)concerning the Sudan; Ambassador Gerard van Bohemen, Permanent Representative of New Zealand and Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011); Ambassador Ismael Abraáo Gaspar Martins, Permanent Representative of Angola and Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Ambassador Ramlan Bin Ibrahim, Permanent Representative of Malaysia and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, and Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; and myself, in my capacity as Permanent Representative of Spain and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). Before giving the floor to Ambassador Ramírez Carreño, on behalf of all members of the Security Council, I would like to express our deepest condolences for the passing today of the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Ankara. . I now give the floor to Ambassador Ramírez Carreño.

We associate ourselves with your words of condolences, Mr. President, and we would like to reiterate our deep dismay over the killing of Ambassador Andrey Karlov. We would also like to express all of our solidarity and support to the Russian Federation, its people, its Mission and Government. I would like to draw attention the danger of instigating campaigns of hatred against countries, as was the case with the campaign promoted for political reasons against the Russian Federation. It is a warning to understand that everything that is said and done in relation to a situation so fraught with extremist thinking, such as the situation in Syria, has unfortunate consequences. Therefore, we express our solidarity and will take part in the Security Council initiative to condemn that horrendous assassination. I thank you, Mr. President, for giving us the floor at the end of our term as a Council members and of our responsibilities in the sanctions committees. On behalf of our team, I would like to begin my briefing by thanking Mr. Kelvin Ong, Chief of the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch; Ms. Snjezana Gillingham, Secretary of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea; and Ms. Sana Khan, Secretary of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan. We also thank their respective teams for their support over these two years and for their extraordinary work in facilitating our work. During the period 1991 to 1998, between 500,000 and 2 million people in Iraq were affected by the sanctions regime imposed under the guardianship of a few permanent members of the Security Council. Fortunately, much has changed after the devastating consequences of that sanctions regime. In many respects, the Security Council has learned its lesson, and today the impact of coercive measures on populations is undoubtedly lesser. However, the Council still does not seem to have grasped the notion that the sole objective of sanctions regimes is to contribute to the political solution of a conflict and achieve lasting peace, not to punish a country, whether for revenge or for the specific geostrategic reasons of one of its permanent members. Our experience as Chair of two sanctions committees has shown us that, despite repeated calls and questions about the real nature of this instrument, sanctions are still seen as an end in themselves and not a tool to solve political problems and achieve lasting peace. In many cases, the notion prevails that for some permanent members, sanctions are a mere extension of their foreign policy and national interests. In the final report I presented as Chair of the Sanctions Committee on Somalia and Eritrea, it was clear that the Committee’s Monitoring Group had concluded, for the third consecutive year, that there was no indication that Eritrea was collaborating with or supporting Al-Shabaab. On the other hand, it acknowledged, as set out in the Group’s final report (S/2016/920), that the cooperation of the State of Qatar in mediating between Djibouti and Eritrea with a view to both resolving the border issue — which is in a signed agreement between the parties — and obtaining the release of a number of prisoners of war. We welcome these advances, which were recognized as a positive element in the operation of the Committee. I understand that Qatar will continue its effective, direct and steady mediation until the resolution of the matter between the two countries. In any normal situation, those elements would have been enough — perhaps not to lift the sanctions immediately, as that would require more time, but to at least establish a road map for their future lifting. Yet even that could not be achieved. Why? Because the establishment of a road map was obviously inconvenient to the national interests of certain permanent members of the Security Council. Little does it seem to matter in the decisions of the Security Council what Eritrea does, the positive steps it takes or what is contained in the report of the Monitoring Group. I ask, therefore, what is the point of all the meetings and deliberations held by the Committee, if the decision ultimately depends on one or two permanent members? That is an issue that needs to be reviewed. Regarding the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan , the Chair of that subsidiary body sought to maintain smooth communication with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur throughout the two years of our mandate. Special Representative and joint Chief Mediator Martin lhoeghian Uhomoibhi kept the Committee up to date on the situation on the ground, particularly as it concerned the mandate of that subsidiary body. including with regard to the evolution of the political process in Darfur. On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing that a fundamental aspect for our delegation has been the improvement of the working methods and transparency of that body. Therefore, at the end of our Sanctions Committee meetings we chose either to issue a press release or to distribute a note verbale to all States Members of the Organization with a brief summary of the meeting. That practice is in accordance with the provisions of the Note by the President S/2016/170, issued on 22 February 2016 under our country’s presidency of the Security Council. Despite these advances, much remains to be done to strengthen the role of the 1591 Sanctions Committee, a subsidiary body which, due to its own dynamics, is often handcuffed and ineffective owing to its politicization, inter alia, by abuse in the use of the rule of consensus. Such abuses during the past 24 months led to the Committee being prevented from submitting its quarterly report in an open format, in this very Chamber, to the entire membership of the Organization. Similarly, the Committee was unfortunately affected by relative inactivity for approximately six months due to an inability to reach consensus on the membership of the Panel of Experts. The same occurred in the delay in the issuance of the final report of the Panel of Experts, available since December 2015 but only published in September this year. During this period, the Committee did not have the opportunity to receive information on the situation on the ground. While the Committee should not always agree with the Panel’s evaluations, the information it provides is certainly very useful for its deliberations. In that connection, we emphasize that the Panel of Experts is an independent entity in its work and must operate strictly under the principles of impartiality and objectivity. In short, the information provided by the Panel of Experts to the Committee should be purely technical so that the latter may do the political evaluation and the respective decision-making as it considers necessary. We once again express our solidarity with our African brothers, who are the targets of more than 70 per cent of the sanctions regimes of the Security Council. That is disconcerting and has no reason to be, especially when the sponsors and drafters of resolutions are precisely those who were the ones to colonize these countries. This is a subject matter for reflection and open debate. Those of us from Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to work to the best of our ability to promote political solutions, motivated and grounded in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to all of these terrible conflicts that affect our sister countries. It is curious, however, that those who stand as strong human rights defenders use sanctions regimes to punish the peoples and Governments who are the objects of such coercive measures. These sanctions regimes infringe on elementary human rights by depriving their citizens of basic health and food needs. Likewise, those in favour of sanctions apply restrictive policies on migration to prevent citizens who are victims of armed conflict and extreme poverty from crossing borders in search of a better life. How do we explain the fact that nations of the developed world that are members of the Council have refused to welcome more than 1,500 Syrian refugees? Meanwhile, Lebanon, a country of 4.5 million people, is sheltering more than 1.7 million Syrian refugees, equivalent to 28 per cent of the country’s total population. That does not include the 300,000 Palestinian refugees who have been living in Lebanon for decades. We wonder why those countries are reluctant to respond to the legitimate causes of self-determination of the Palestinian and Saharawi peoples. Why does their suffering not deserve the same attention? What about the massacre of the Yemeni people and the invasion of Iraq and Libya and their devastating consequences? The deaths of millions of innocent people, including hundreds of thousands of children and women; the unprecedented expansion of terrorism; violence and organized crime in the Middle East and North Africa; and one of the greatest waves of forced migration in the history of mankind are being ignored. Where are the sanctions regimes imposed on the States — on all States, without double standards — that commit flagrant violations of international law? In light of our consideration of the role of sanctions committees, and bearing in mind the similar assessments of them by other chairs of subsidiary bodies, it would be advisable for the Council to consider giving the chairs greater freedom in the preparation and issuance of reports to prevent their possible blocking through the abusive application of the consensus rule. We also propose the establishment of the post of ombudsman to examine with greater justice and due process the inclusion on or exclusion from the sanctions list of persons or entities that are linked to a conflict situation. Furthermore, we recommend that the Security Council end its dangerous trend of controlling the management of natural resources of sanctioned countries. That also applies to aspects related to finances, budgets and all other decisions of countries concerned. We also suggest that the Council continuously consult with countries of the region, neighbours of the States under a sanctions regime, as they can play a positive role in achieving a solution, bearing in mind that at the same time, those countries are also affected by the adverse consequences resulting from sanctions. The experience in these committees has highlighted the need to address those matters in public meetings of the Security Council, with the participation of the States concerned. Of equal relevance is the establishment of specified limits for the duration of the work of the committee, considering that we cannot place a country under a sanctions regime indefinitely, without taking into account the cooperation of that State and the opinions of the groups of experts. In that regard, we should avoid the biased use of the assessments of the groups of experts by some permanent members that sometimes accept or reject, as convenient, the points of view and guidelines of the panels of experts that assist the committees. What is required in sanctions cases is constant review to help the country to achieve an end to the conflict, and not to supervise the country or to administer it under a permanent sanctions regime. From the very outset, Venezuela took on the intensive work in the framework of the Council’s agenda with a sense of utmost responsibility and a constructive attitude. That led us to take positions on matters of vital importance for today’s world, matters that require the international community’s urgent attention with a view to peacefully resolving the armed conflicts and the situations of poverty and fear of millions of people around the world. We were, and are, always ready to condemn the structural causes of conflicts, such as poverty and social exclusion, to help achieve real and sustainable solutions to such problems. Respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of peoples as a principle, denouncing the real causes of the crisis of refugees and migrants, the growing expansion of terrorism and its promoters, induced wars, preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding in post-conflict areas, the role of regional organizations, disarmament, the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to their free self-determination, the Saharawi cause, the war against the Syrian people: among many current affairs of crucial importance, these were the pillars of our actions during the last two years, both in public positions and in negotiations. Throughout, we embraced the principles of the Bolivarian foreign policy that was promoted by President Chavez, such as solidarity, integration and the vision of the countries of the South. I am proud to say today that the work has been completed, also thanks to the tireless efforts and professionalism of a committed working team that, with the support of those present, was able to complete the ambitious task. We speak out on important global problems that many others, with significant power and influence, ignore. At the same time, we contribute in a modest and dignified fashion from our position, reaffirming the importance of promoting a more just and inclusive world, a more democratic United Nations and a Security Council that can, many times, truly fulfil its role in peacefully resolving conflicts that compromise international peace and security. The United Nations is entering a crucial stage next year, both for the importance of making real progress in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the very serious humanitarian and security crises that are unfolding. At the same time, with António Guterres assuming the position of Secretary-General — and we wish him the best of luck in the upcoming years — we hope that there will be an effective improvement in the working methods of this Organization, in particular of the Security Council, for the sake of greater transparency and democratization. In that connection, a thorough review of the performance of the sanctions committees, as soon as possible, is needed. Very briefly, I would like to mention a few pending tasks of the Security Council. Complying with the responsibility of this organ to maintain international peace and security means that we must draw attention to those unresolved cases that require decisive and urgent action by the Council. The Palestinian issue and the colonial situation of Western Sahara must no longer be silenced conflicts in the Council, products of the policy of double standards. It is necessary for the Council to speak out once and for all through a resolution on ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and its related policies with a view to this body complying with its mandate of effectively contribute to the achievement of the two- State solution, where Palestine and Israel can live side by side in peace, within the pre-1967 internationally safe and recognized borders. In the case of Western Sahara, the last colony in Africa, there must be an end to the practice that prevents the consideration of that important matter in a public meeting, with a view to promoting a broad discussion — which happens with other issues — that would push the Council to move towards a referendum on self-determination, as established by resolution 690 (1991), with the support of the United Nations and the African Union, to enable the Saharawi people to freely choose their future. On another line of thought, we call on the Council to avoid the harmful trend of dealing with items that fall outside of its purview and correspond to other bodies, in particular to the General Assembly. The Security Council must stay vigilant, given the very serious conflicts that are impacting the regions of North Africa and the Middle East. It must promot political and peaceful solutions to the armed conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Libya. Such conflicts stem from interventism and military aggression that provoke destabilization through the proliferation of terrorist groups that are used to overthrow Governments. All of that is to the detriment of the human rights of the people of those countries — the men, women, young people and children who are suffering the consequences of those terrible conflicts and awaiting proper action from this Council, in keeping with its mandate, and who want to be taken into account. To conclude, we would like to thank Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon for his tireless efforts in promoting the objectives of the Organization in the sphere of international peace and security and the development of human rights. We would also like to thank the representatives of the members of the Security Council and their respective teams for the working relationship that we have built over the last two years. Despite our diverging, and sometimes even conflicting, points of view, respect prevailed for the people and the countries they represent. Lastly, we extend our acknowledgement to all the Member States that accompanied us without fail and in the spirit of solidarity, the Secretariat staff and the support staff of the Security Council, with whom we developed a very fluid and constructive cooperation. We thank the Organization and the membership from here forward, keeping open the doors to our country and to our Permanent Mission and giving our enduring support as we enter into a new agenda of commitments in favour of social struggles, the fight against poverty and the true democratization of the Organization.

I thank Mr. Ramírez Carreño for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Van Bohemen.

I welcome the opportunity to discuss this important and often overlooked aspect of the Council’s work: the work of our subsidiary bodies. As an elected member for the past two years, New Zealand has been an active participant in the subsidiary bodies of the Council, including as Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). I have been honoured to chair those sanctions committees. I have been frank about my experiences as Chair, and I will continue in that spirit today, focusing on two working methods areas: the effectiveness of our sanctions committees, and the preparation of and process for appointing Chairs. But as a first order of business, I record my thanks and appreciation to the Committee’s Monitoring Team, the Ombudsperson and the Secretariat staff for their hard work and support. On effectiveness, one thing that has struck me is how little consideration or priority the Council gives to ensuring that its sanctions committees are effective. Sanctions are one of the few tools we have, short of force, to respond to situations that threaten international peace and security. Yet the way these committees are established and the procedures under which they operate mean they struggle to discharge their mandates effectively. First, we silo those bodies away from the Council’s work and from each other. It would seem logical that when there is a country-specific item in our programme of work regarding a country where there is also a sanctions regime, we should discuss the two together, and indeed we did that this morning. It would seem sensible that where there is a field mission operating where there is also a sanctions regime, the two would be reinforcing and we should discuss them as such. It would also seem reasonable that when the Council discusses items like the threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, we could have the coordinator of the Monitoring Team in the room to brief us and field questions. Yet, making any suggestions for improvement in that area very often encounters active resistance, usually from a permanent member. Secondly, we have allowed the process of those Committees to get in the way of their outcomes. Process is important, but it should not obstruct our primary goal as a Council or the discharge of our obligations under Chapter VII resolutions. That is most clearly illustrated by the requirement — I hesitate to call it a rule because it has no basis in the Charter — that any Committee decision, no matter how minor, must be taken by consensus. My colleague Ambassador Ramírez Carreño also referred to that point in his remarks. What we have done, in fact, has been to confer the right of veto on all Council members, and that right extends to all decisions — procedural and substantive — no matter how minor. In my opinion, that is the single biggest inhibitor to Committee effectiveness. Around this table, we can share endless examples of that, but I will highlight just a few that have arisen in the Committees that I have chaired, where the consensus rule has prevented what I consider to be obviously sensible decisions. First, we have been unable to update the details of the deceased former Taliban leader on our sanctions list so that we can stop his considerable assets ending up in the hands of the Taliban. Today, I am deeply concerned after learning that the compromise proposal we have worked on for so many weeks has not been accepted. We have been unable to take practical steps to put the Office of the Ombudsperson on a more secure and independent footing, despite the clear directions in resolution 2253 (2015), adopted last year. So far, we have been unable to update our Committee’s guidelines to help serve our effective functioning. In the course of the past year, we have seen attempts to extend the no-objection procedure — in other words, the 15-country veto — to even more minor matters including, incredibly, my ability as Chair to invite Committee members to an informal meeting in my own Mission. I am yet to hear any convincing reason for the Council’s subsidiary bodies operating under a far more restrictive set of rules than those that apply to the Council itself under the Charter or under its provisional rules of procedure. That is particularly true in view of the reality that it is almost invariably a permanent member that uses the no-objection procedure to block a decision. I am not cavilling because New Zealand is an elected member, while others are permanent. My objection is that that procedure allows members — usually permanent members — to play politics, either on their own account or on behalf of others, to obstruct the effective functioning of a regime that all United Nations Members are required to comply with. That erodes confidence in the sanctions regime and in the Council itself. On how the Council appoints its chairs, I am pleased that the elected members have worked together to secure improvements to the process this year. No longer is that an intra-permanent five decision; it is now a process facilitated by two Council members, including an elected member. No longer will elected members be told which Committee they can chair just a few days before they start their Council term. They will now have time to prepare for the significant responsibilities of being a subsidiary body Chair. That said, there is still room for further improvement in our view. In closing, I would like to offer five recommendations to the Council: First, I would urge Council members to think about how we do our business and the small, practical steps we can take to be more efficient, avoid duplication and maximize the tools we have. That includes more coherent scheduling of our Council programmes of work and requesting that the Secretary-General report on sanctions in his reports, where applicable. Secondly, when Chairs do brief in closed consultations, we should reconsider the use of formulaic statements approved by the Committee. The substance and utility of our conversations would improve vastly if Chairs were instead able to come with a couple of points for discussion that they had formulated themselves. Thirdly, we must have a serious conversation about the decision-making of our Committees, with a view to reform. Fourthly, the burden of chairing subsidiary bodies should be spread to all Council members. We are a Council not of 5 or 10, but of 15, and chairing should reflect that. Fifthly, the elected members must continue to support each other as Chairs. New Zealand established an informal group of chairing experts that meets semi-regularly, and last week we hosted a workshop on the practicalities of chairing for incoming members. We hope elected members will keep those alive next year. None of these recommendations require a new resolution or presidential statement; they require courage and behavioural change, and I believe that the whole Council would be better for it.

I thank Ambassador Van Bohemen for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Martins.

Let me also join you, Mr. President, in reiterating the condolences of the Council over the occurrence in Ankara this afternoon, which caused the death of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey. We thank you, Mr. President, for giving us the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. I would also like to acknowledge the strong support that we have received from the Secretariat regarding the work of the Committee, especially the participation of Mr. James Sutterlin, who has been Secretary for the Working Group. As decided by the Council, the Ad Hoc Working Group has served as the forum through which the Security Council has prepared the joint session of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Working Group discussed the programme, the draft agenda and the joint communiqué issued after the informal meeting of the joint session, which took place on 23 May. The Group was to address two points on its agenda. Unfortunately, we could not agree on the inclusion of specific points raised by the African Union, in particular the inclusion of the question of the situation of Western Sahara. During the informal consultations, the Peace and Security Council expressed its concern for the rejection of the proposal of items of the African Union in the agenda. That affected the good work of the joint session, especially considering that conflicts in Africa are very much on the agenda of the Security Council. Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, the African Union Peace and Security Council did not until recently respond to our repeated communications regarding the latest version of the draft joint communiqué discussed in New York on 23 May, which contained several outstanding issues. These developments are worrying signs for the future of the Security Council’s engagement with the Peace and Security Council, which is its main partner in matters related to peace and security in Africa. As our successor now takes over and prepares for the eleventh joint session, which will take place in Addis Ababa, those matters should be carefully addressed. The second focus of activity this year was a meeting on improving the cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council in sustaining peace in Africa. This meeting was based upon the adoption of resolution 2282 (2016), in which the Council expressed an intent to regularly request, deliberate and draw upon the specific strategic and targeted advice of the Peacebuilding Commission. This was a remarkable development, as it will definitely make the Peacebuilding Commission a very important body in the work of the Council. The discussion afforded the members of the Working Group an opportunity to evaluate how we can enhance the relationship between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, assess how the Peacebuilding Commission can be more relevant to the work of the Security Council, taking into account its bridging role, and contribute to overcoming a problem that has been detected — the lack of synchronization or the existence of the silo mentality — which has been identified as one of the problems affecting the work of the United Nations. We recommend that the annual programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group include peacebuilding and sustaining peace thematics. We further recommend that the choice of the thematics be proposed by the Chair following consultations with relevant structures of the Secretariat. This is also in line with resolution 2282 (2016). To conclude, we would like to thank the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the Secretariat for their invaluable contributions in supporting the work of the Chair. We also convey our best wishes to our successor in the chairmanship of the Working Group .

I thank Ambassador Gaspar Martins for his briefing. I shall now make a statement as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). In the exercise of the chairmanship of three committees on non-proliferation, Spain had always made clear that its main role was to search for consensus. As the main drivers in this task, we have acted responsibly and, above all, transparently. For that, we always counted on the cooperation of the members of the Council. I thank them for their support and the manner in which they helped us to solve problems. Now, there are three ideas that, in my opinion, would contribute to improving the effectiveness of the Committees. The first is relevance. I believe that formalisms should be avoided in Security Council meetings, where there should be greater focus on discussion and analysis of relevant issues. I believe that briefings to the Council by the President should avoid the mechanical reading of a previously circulated text that is sometimes incomprehensible, not just for non-experts but also for the Chairs of the Committees themselves. The briefings should therefore be simple and allow for a substantive debate. The second is transparency. Transparency is essential in the actions of the Committees and in reflecting their decisions, particularly in the area of ​ sanctions. States should be able to understand, with simple and complete clarity, the obligations they must fulfil. I therefore welcome the progress made by the Secretariat in the management of the Committees’ websites. The third is unity. The Council must act united in both the adoption and implementation of the resolutions. Ambiguous clauses should be avoided, which create uncertainties and make implementation difficult. To those three I would add a fourth. I fully endorse the five proposals that the Ambassador of New Zealand put forward and which seem to me to be perfect, and of the five, I would emphasize one in particular: the way in which the need to get 15 votes in favour, which in the end turns the Committees into gatherings of 15 delegations each with a right of veto, makes decision-making in the Committees difficult. I shall now briefly refer to specific issues in the three Committees I have chaired: the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), the 1718 Committee and the 1540 Committee. With respect to the 1737 Committee, my greatest joy was to see it disappear in January. The signing of the nuclear agreement in 2015, thanks to the efforts of many, made it possible for diplomacy to triumph. I am confident that the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) will allow this matter to be definitively resolved. With respect to the 1718 Committee, it was always clear that the sanctions are directed exclusively against the military nuclear programme and ballistic missiles, not against the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It was this that led to the Council adopting resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), and we have always made sure that we do not affect the humanitarian situation. In the coming months, there remains much to do, and I am sure that the Italian presidency will do it brilliantly. For example, if I might make a recommendation, it would be useful to have an open briefing on resolution 2321 (2016). It is necessary for the various aspects of the implementation of a resolution as complex as resolution 2321 (2016) to be explained to the members of the United Nations. Obviously, I have failed in my efforts to see the 1718 Committee disappear, but I do not lose hope that this will happen in the near future. It is in the hands of Pyongyang to return to international legality and bring about an end to the sanctions. As always, I have confidence in the way of diplomacy and in dialogue. With respect to the 1540 Committee, little needs to be added. The activities over the last two years have been intense. We worked hard on the global review and a few days ago we adopted, under the presidency of my Minister for Foreign Affairs, resolution 2325 (2016), which updates resolution 1540 (2004), while maintaining its cooperative and preventive approach. I would like to thank all the members of the Security Council for their help in this effort. Finally, I offer a word of final thanks, making special mention of those who have been our “family” in the management of the Committees: the Security Council Affairs Division, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the 1540 Committee Panel of Experts and the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts. Without them, from their Directors or Coordinators, to the officials who took care of the correspondence or the web page, we would not have been able to carry out our task. They were our eyes and our ears. With professional rigour and patience, they were able to advise, inform or support us. We will miss them all, as we will miss our colleagues in the Security Council. And we will support all of them from the other side of this table. I resume my functions as President of the Council. I now give the floor to Ambassador Ibrahim.

I thank you, Mr. President, for providing this opportunity for the outgoing Security Council members to reflect on our work in leading the Council’s subsidiary bodies over the past two years. Malaysia has had the honour of chairing the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict as well as the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya. I would like to share some observations gathered in the course of our tenure, beginning with the Working Group. The magnitude of the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security is never more deeply felt than when we consider the devastating impact of armed conflict on children. The past two years have unfortunately seen a grave deterioration in the situation of children in many countries affected by conflict, as well as unprecedented trends and challenges related to ensuring their protection. In undertaking the responsibility of chairing the Working Group and tackling its challenges, Malaysia has focused on strengthening the normative framework of the Council’s agenda on children and armed conflict, as well as mainstreaming the issue of child protection into its wider work. Where possible, we have also continued the tradition of innovative approaches that characterized the spirit of the Working Group when it was first created. During our presidency in June 2015, with regard to strengthening the agenda’s normative framework, the Council adopted resolution 2225 (2015), which introduced child abduction as a fifth trigger for listing in the annex to the Secretary-General’s report, along with children’s recruitment and use; killing or maiming; rape and other forms of sexual violence against children; and attacks on schools and hospitals. It therefore expanded the tools available to enable the Security Council and the United Nations to address grave violations against children, including those committed by non-State armed groups. During Malaysia’s two years at the helm of the Working Group, we adopted conclusions on the situation of children in armed conflicts in South Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Central African Republic, in accordance with the Working Group’s mandate, as established in resolution 1612 (2005). In coming up with recommendations for parties to conflicts and child protection actors for each specific country situation, we were cognizant of the lack of a mechanism for regular follow-up on the implementation of conclusions documents. As a result, all of the Working Group’s conclusions incorporate provisions that encourage sustained engagement in child protection efforts with concerned Member States and international actors, including the donor community. While we did not have the chance to conduct follow-up engagement during our term, we hope that this will create a foothold for future Chairs to build on in ensuring the effective implementation of Working Group conclusions. We also strove to continue the efforts of our predecessors to ensure that child protection concerns are sufficiently mainstreamed into the wider work of the Council, including in the establishment and renewal of United Nations peace operations mandates. The establishment of child protection capacity in United Nations missions through the appointment of advisers has been a critical development in strengthening the implementation of the agenda on children and armed conflict. It is therefore imperative that child protection advisers continue to be given an effective mandate and allocated the resources they need to carry out their crucial work in the field. Similarly, we emphasized the important role of the relevant Sanctions Committees in using sanctions designations to hold accountable those responsible for violations and abuses against children, including the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. In that regard, we have continued to support the sharing of information with relevant Sanctions Committees, including through periodic briefings, by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. We further pioneered the practice of inviting the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to provide joint briefings to the Working Group and the relevant Sanctions Committees as part of efforts to promote understanding and collaboration on the complementary work of the subsidiary bodies. We believe that this platform for cross-fertilization between subsidiary bodies on the issue of child protection can be further explored. I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to Ms. Leila Zerrougui, Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, and her Office, and to UNICEF, for their tireless dedication and commitment to upholding the protection and rights of children. I would also like to pay tribute to all the United Nations child protection advisers and the other United Nations officials and personnel who implement its agenda on children and armed conflict on the ground, as well as to civil society actors. Although our term in the Council has come to an end, our solidarity with and commitment to this important agenda will continue. I now turn to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya. Since I briefed the Council in my capacity as Chair of the Committee just two weeks ago (see S/PV.7827), I do not intend to elaborate too much on the details of its work. In the past two years, during Malaysia’s chairmanship of the Committee, Libya has been through very challenging times. The political scene has been split, and most of the first half of our tenure as Chair of the Committee saw the parties working to negotiate the Libyan Political Agreement. Even after the adoption a year ago of the Political Agreement, and since the Presidency Council’s arrival in Tripoli, the process of establishing a Government of National Accord is still not complete. The work of the Committee over this period has therefore had to be balanced carefully and delicately in order to ensure that in 2015 the sanctions regime did not interfere with the political process, and in 2016 that it supported the establishment of a Government of National Accord. Accordingly, while the issues before the Committee during 2015 were evenly distributed, there was a significant increase in the second half of 2016, mostly in requests for guidance on the measures’ scope. In that regard, the Committee issued one additional Implementation Assistance Notice, and also incorporated updates to such notices twice in 2016. They are aimed at providing greater clarity for the relevant sanctions measures, as well as at assisting Member States in discharging their obligations to implement Security Council resolutions on Libya. Over the course of 2015 and 2016, the Committee has kept a close eye on the arms embargo and particularly on movements of arms and military materiel into Libya, as well as the risk of diversions. One of the most notable changes to the sanctions regime has been the authorization permitting Member States to interdict vessels on the high seas believed to be violating the arms embargo. Despite the Committee’s efforts, the embargo continues to be violated, with reports of increases in the flow of arms and military materiel and the presence of mercenaries and foreign military forces in Libya, as well as foreign air strikes. Another key aspect of the Committee’s work was the assets-freeze measures, aimed at protecting Libya’s public assets in order to ultimately make them available to the Libyan people. Similarly, the Committee remains committed to the protection of Libya’s natural resources in the same cause. In that regard, the listing and subsequent delisting of the vessel Distya Ameya was a success story that demonstrated the Committee’s resolve to support the Government of National Accord and ensure that Libya’s natural resources are used for the Libyan people. Here I would like to highlight the tremendous contribution and relentless efforts of the Committee’s Panel of Experts. It has been a vital component of the Committee’s work, particularly in monitoring and enhancing the implementation of the relevant sanctions measures. As a result, the Committee has consistently taken action to follow up on the Panel’s recommendations. I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation and gratitude to the Panel of Experts for their excellent work in that regard. Moving forward, we would like to encourage the new Chair to continue pursuing the possibility of organizing a visit to Libya, given the appropriate timing and conditions. It is unfortunate that none of the Chairs of the Committee, including me, have been able to undertake such a visit since the Committee was established in 2011. At the same time, engagements with regional partners and the international community should continue to be strengthened. In supporting the Libyan-led transition, regional partners and the international community must work hand in hand and live up to their responsibilities and obligations by respecting and implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions. Regional partners and the international community should also assist and cooperate with the Libyan authorities, particularly in the current climate in which the Libyans lack the means to do so. Finally, I wish to express our heartfelt appreciation to all of the members of the Committee for their cooperation, the Panel of Experts for their contributions and especially to the Subsidiary Organs Branch for their invaluable assistance and depth of knowledge. I also thank the wider United Nations membership for the support and cooperation during the two years of my country’s chairmanship. To conclude, I should like to assure the delegation of Sweden, which will succeed Malaysia as Chair of both the Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, of our full cooperation and best wishes for success in 2017.

I sincerely thank the outgoing Chairs for their briefings, in particular those who made a valiant effort to adhere to the five-minute time limit.