S/PV.7985 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Viet Nam to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Mr. Joseph Ballard, senior officer of the Office of Strategy and Policy, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting. I propose that the Council invite the Permanent Observer of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations to participate in this meeting, in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard. There being no objection, it is so decided. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Ms. Nakamitsu. Ms. Nakamitsu: Mr. President, I thank you very much for having convened this important open debate today. The possibility of non-State actors, including terrorists, acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) remains a significant threat to global security, and the international community must step up its efforts to ensure that the disastrous scenario of WMD terrorism is avoided. Since its adoption in 2004, resolution 1540 (2004) has played and continues to play a vital role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its delivery systems to non-State actors. Substantial progress has been made over the past years by Member States in their efforts to minimize proliferation risks; however, we are increasingly witnessing new and even more complicated threats in this area. In my very brief remarks today, let me highlight three key issues in our joint efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. First, we need to closely examine the emerging nexus between rapidly advancing technologies and weapons of mass destruction in the globalized and connected world, and identify actions to grapple with its impact on non-proliferation. While globalization obviously brings new opportunities for economic growth and development around the world, it also facilitates the rapid movement of materials, technologies and the latest discoveries in science and technology, as well as of personnel with relevant expertise to use and potentially exploit them with malicious intent. These risks are ever-changing. Terrorist groups evolve and spread their destructive ideologies in cyberspace, and illicit networks develop new tactics. Technology once perceived as the domain of military experts is now freely available to broader audiences. Non-State actors, including terrorist organizations, will exploit any loophole to obtain these technologies. While there are still significant technical hurdles that terrorist groups need to overcome to effectively use weapons of mass destruction, a growing number of emerging technologies could make that barrier easier to cross. Several new areas of concern have emerged, such as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, 3D printers and the exploitation of the so-called dark web. The global reach and anonymity of dark web provides non-State actors with new marketplaces to acquire dual-use equipment and materials. Dual use is further complicating our efforts to address the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must keep in mind that many of the technologies, goods and raw materials required for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery derive from legitimate commercial applications that benefit many people. Striking the right balance between commercial opportunity, on the one hand, and our collective security and the need to prevent proliferation, on the other, is important. This brings me to my second point, which is the importance of international cooperation and the need for continuous and enhanced dialogue with industry as well. The emergence of countless suppliers, along with developments in international trade and sophisticated procurement networks, make concealment easier, allowing illicit trafficking networks to circumvent national and international controls. This means that better international cooperation is essential if we are to prevent terrorist access and use of weapons of mass destruction. In the worst-case scenarios where these weapons are used, seeking accountability will be critical. The international community must uphold the norms that have been established in this area and prosecute those responsible for committing or supporting such acts. My third point relates to the importance of national capacities in our joint endeavour to prevent proliferation. Recent terrorist attacks have revealed shortcomings in interactions among security agencies, even in countries whose policies are otherwise deeply integrated. Coordination and information-sharing will be vital to overcoming these shortcomings. All Member States should further strengthen export controls, work to prevent any financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ensure the security of sensitive goods and materials. It is clear that, despite the undeniable success of the past 13 years, we must remain vigilant. Much remains to be done. The United Nations is obviously fully committed to working with Member States in this area. I strongly encourage the Council to use today’s debate to be proactive and devise effective solutions to ensure the full and universal implementation of Member States disarmament and non-proliferation commitments.

I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Ballard. Mr. Ballard: On behalf of the Director-General, I wish to thank you, Sir, for inviting the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to address the Security Council today. We firmly believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing, and meetings such as this provide valuable opportunities to engage with each other and reflect on how to further deepen our cooperation. This year, the OPCW is commemorating its twentieth anniversary. As we reflect on the challenges that we have overcome and that we continue to face, we are also using the opportunity provided by our twentieth anniversary to look ahead, and what we can see is that our environment is changing. The rising threat of non-State actors, the pace of economic development and the evolution of science and technology are all shaping the future of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, including the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW. The use by non-State actors of chemical weapons is no longer a threat but a chilling reality. As an organization, we recognize that we must be prepared to respond to these changes, to shift our focus to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, and to adjust our resources and programmes when the need arises. As an international community, we must work even more closely together to confront our common challenges. Preventing non-State actors from acquiring dual-use materials, equipment and technologies is of critical importance to the maintenance of the global norm against chemical weapons, as it is to international peace and security more broadly. To that end, the OPCW is intensively engaged across a number of programme areas that all spring from the singular objective of completely uprooting both the incentive and the means for producing or using chemical weapons. As recently reconfirmed through resolution 2325 (2016), domestic implementation of international counter-proliferation commitments is of critical importance to the fight against terrorism using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The Chemical Weapons Convention also requires comprehensive national implementation of its provisions, and the OPCW dedicates considerable effort and resources to assist our States parties in fulfilling these obligations. As the Group of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) knows, this is not an easy task, and it relates not only to ensuring that legislation is drafted but also that it is implemented and enforced. We also work with our States parties, through our Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, to coordinate the sharing of best practices when it comes to national implementation, particularly in the light of emerging threats to the Convention. Again, this ties in with the encouragement to United Nations Member States, as expressed in resolution 2325 (2016), to review their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in light of new and evolving security risks. One of the key areas of focus identified through the recent review of resolution 1540 (2004) was transboundary movements of dual-use materials and technologies. The OPCW focuses considerable energy in this area. A recent memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the World Customs Organization is aimed at reinforcing our efforts and at enhancing the security of the global supply chain. Similarly, our work with the global chemical industry is more important than ever. Collaboration and transparency in ensuring that toxic chemicals do not fall into the wrong hands are essential to preserving chemical security and ensuring the use of chemical science towards peaceful ends. The OPCW is also working to improve coordination within the United Nations system on WMD-related issues. We have an active partnership with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the OPCW co-chairs the working group on preventing and responding to WMD terrorist attacks with chemical or biological weapons. In January, the OPCW hosted a table-top exercise with the participation of 15 different organizations to test an inter-agency mechanism to respond to a chemical terrorist attack. That mechanism will enhance the interoperability of the relevant organizations for an effective, coordinated response. We believe that the newly established OCPW Rapid Response and Assistance Mission will provide an important capability to the mechanism. The international community must continuously work to respond to the challenge of WMD terrorism. In that regard, the OPCW is committed to playing its part, in close cooperation with the Security Council, through its 1540 Committee, and with the range of stakeholders that are so critical to our collective goals.

I thank Mr. Ballard for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). As Chair of the 1540 Committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to lead this open debate on the global effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. All States have a responsibility to effectively implement resolution 1540 (2004), which was adopted unanimously on 28 April 2004. The resolution should be at the heart of our discussion today. As all members are aware, the main purpose of the resolution is to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, along with their delivery systems and related materials for their development and manufacture, from falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists. I should stress that the resolution is unique in that regard, as it is the only legally binding instrument dealing with the proliferation of all three types of weapons of mass destruction. In the nearly 13 years since its adoption, resolution 1540 (2004) has become one of the key components of the international regime to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Participants are aware that the range of legislation and enforcement provisions required is broad. However, as a background to this debate, allow me to recall that the resolution includes prohibitions on non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Those seven prohibitions must also cover anyone acting as an accomplice to assist in any way, including by financing such activities. Similarly, domestic controls are needed on related materials, including measures in the areas of accounting, security, physical protection, border and law enforcement, and export controls. Substantial efforts have already been made by many States to promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In that regard, while the responsibility for implementation lies with individual States, such efforts can benefit from collaboration, whether bilaterally or collectively, on a regional basis. That is key to successful implementation. As stated in the concept note for this meeting, resolution 1540 (2004) is a platform for cooperation to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. Without cooperation it would be impossible to address the issue at a global level. It would also be counterproductive to undermine the cooperative spirit that is already evident in the way the resolution is being implemented by moving in the direction of a strict mechanism for Member States. The Security Council has called upon States “to take note in its work, where relevant, of the continually evolving nature of the risks of proliferation, including the use by non-State actors of rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce for proliferation purposes, in the context of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) (resolution 2325 (2016), para. 8). The Council has also called on the 1540 Committee “to take into account developments on the evolving nature of risk of proliferation and rapid advances in science and technology in their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)” (ibid., para. 7). The Council thereby impressed upon States that they have the ultimate responsibility for those obligations in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). In the 13 years since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), the developments I referred to have had a major impact on how cross-border movements and trade are conducted. While those are positive developments that bring about humanitarian and economic benefits, they also present challenges to the effective implementation of the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004). Keeping those and other developments under review in relation to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors requires constant vigilance and effective international collaboration. I will be very interested in the experiences and views of Member States in that regard. With regard to resolution 2325 (2016), which is an important prt of implementing resolution 1540 (2004), I would like to draw attention to paragraph 12 of resolution 2325 (2016). It calls for the full implementation of the obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) as a result of the 1540 Committee’s 2016 comprehensive review of the implementation of the resolution. The paragraph also clearly notes the need for more attention on enforcement measures; measures relating to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; measures on the financing of proliferation; measures on accounting for and securing related materials; and national export and trans-shipment controls. It will be interesting to hear how Member States are approaching those aspects of the resolution. I would also be grateful for the views of the international organizations represented here. The Council very much appreciates the participation of those representatives as key partners in our joint endeavours. In the interests of time, I have highlighted just a few points of importance for our debate. However, not everything has to do with the obligations of States. I therefore look forward with interest to hearing more information from all participants in this meeting. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I shall now give the floor to the members of the Council.

At the outset, I would like to thank the Bolivian presidency for holding today’s open debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I also thank you, Sir, for the statement delivered in your capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). I am also grateful for the briefings delivered by Ms. Nakamitsu and Mr. Ballard. While fully aligning myself with the statement to be delivered later in this debate on behalf of the European Union, I would like to make some comments in my national capacity. I fully share the view that the uniqueness of resolution 1540 (2004) lies in its complementarity of the existing international regimes on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Resolution 1540 (2004) adds a new dimension to the issue of non-proliferation by addressing the illegal trafficking in relevant materials and by prohibiting their acquisition by non-State actors, including terrorists. The year 2016 marked a significant stage in promoting WMD non-proliferation. I wish to reiterate Ukraine’s support for the outcomes of the recently concluded comprehensive review process, which culminated in the unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016). Once properly implemented, the conclusions and recommendations of the review will reinforce resolution 1540 (2004). The report of the review (see S/2016/1038) — while clearly demonstrating both the varying progress made with regard to implementation on various types of WMD and the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004) — helps to define specific areas for each party concerned as to where national or regional efforts should be intensified. Indeed, many significant challenges remain in terms of keeping the world’s most dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands, both intentionally or as a result of neglect or oversight. Ukraine, as a State with a nuclear-weapons past and as a full-fledged party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as all export-control regimes, is strongly committed to the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and is determined to further increase the effectiveness of the national response to combat proliferation through collaboration, capacity- building and outreach. Despite all the measures taken by Member States to reduce proliferation risks, we are witnessing growing and even more sophisticated challenges in this area. These risks arise not only from gaps in national legislation or insufficient resources, but also from the rapid development of science and technology, as well as e-commerce, along with a lack of threat awareness among academia, industry and civil society. In the past decade, chemical and biological agents have quite often been referred to as potential weapons to be used by terrorists, other non-State actors and rogue States. Regrettably, there have been several confirmed cases of the use of chemical weapons, particularly in Syria, Iraq and Malaysia. Ukraine’s positon in that regard is very clear: there can be no impunity, and all the perpetrators must be brought to justice. We stand united in condemning, in the strongest terms, any use of any type of WMD, which constitutes a violation of international law, a war crime and a crime against humanity. The erosion to the existing world order, continuous breaches and unaddressed violations of international law, along with ongoing conflicts in different parts of the globe, continue to weaken the chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear security architecture as a whole. It is critical to find practical ways to ensure that the international legal norms related to WMD non-proliferation do not remain on paper, but that they are also properly enforced and fully respected. The international community should act decisively and in a united fashion with a view to preventing any attempts and countering every action taken to endanger the relevant international instruments through either aggressive policies and violations of State sovereignty and territorial integrity or through blocking important decisions to be adopted by the United Nations or its bodies. With a view to tackling the growing threat of the proliferation of WMD globally, intensifying effective interactions among States and building synergies among all stakeholders, including the relevant international, regional, subregional, non-governmental organizations and civil society, are important and urgent tasks. In that regard, I wish to commend the historic contribution of Spain, the previous Chair of the 1540 Committee, to strengthening the role of that resolution for a long-term perspective, including through the establishment last year of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). We fully support the statement to be delivered later today on behalf of the Group. As far as the broader context of global non-proliferation efforts is concerned, I cannot but mention that Ukraine attaches particular importance to the Global Partnership initiative as a proper format for strengthening capabilities to resist today’s threats and challenges in the area of WMD proliferation, including its terrorist dimension. In that regard, my country appreciates the efforts of Italy, President of the Group of Seven, for its able leadership in this area and for the promising results of the last Global Partnership working group meeting, held in Rome in February. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that facilitating the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) underpins my country’s position in the field of non-proliferation and anti-terrorist activities. Ukraine will continue to be engaged constructively both within the 1540 Committee and with the broader United Nations membership to ensure that the outcomes of the comprehensive review bear fruit. In that regard, I would like to mention that, in November this year in Kyiv, an international workshop on promoting the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the context of evolving proliferation risks and challenges will be held in cooperation with the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

I thank you, Mr. President, for organizing today’s open debate. I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Nakamitsu, Mr. Ballard and you, Mr. President, for the very comprehensive and informative briefings this morning. Sweden aligns itself with the statements that will be made later by the observer of the European Union, by the representative of Spain, on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004), and by the representative of Norway on behalf of the Nordic countries. Today’s discussion on resolution 1540 (2004) and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly with regard to non-State actors, is very timely. As we have seen from recent terrorist attacks, the aim of the perpetrators is to indiscriminately injure and kill as many innocent people as possible. Therefore, we must be alert to the fact that there is a real threat of non-State actors seeking to procure and use weapons of mass destruction. Sweden remains strongly committed to the strengthening of the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, not least in the field of nuclear disarmament. Resolution 1540 (2004) is an important complement to those regimes. The use of chemical weapons by Da’esh and the enduring ability of some States with weapons of mass destruction aspirations to contravene export controls bear witness to the continuing and growing relevance of resolution 1540 (2004). As we heard from your own briefing this morning, Mr. President, progress has been achieved in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); however, much work remains to be done to ensure its application globally. Sweden is committed to supporting that work. We recently made a special financial contribution to the Office for Disarmament Affairs for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, we are contributing to global efforts in support of the resolution’s objectives through the nuclear security cooperation programme of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, and our engagement in the Group of Seven Global Partnership programme, where we currently co-chair the biosecurity sub-working group. However, we should not limit our attention to items and materials alone; knowledge and information also represent important factors in the attainment of weapons of mass destruction. It is important to highlight the risks associated with intangible transfers of technology, whereby sensitive know-how might be transferred through research, industry or social media. This is an issue that we raised repeatedly during last year’s comprehensive review. As Vice-Chair of the 1540 Committee, we are currently considering ways of highlighting this issue, including through outreach events. Finally, we would like to congratulate Spain once more for the proactive and committed way in which it led the comprehensive review last year, and to commend Bolivia for the continuation of those efforts under its leadership. It is essential that we continue to take into consideration the evolving proliferation threats as we move forward towards the global implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016). The threat that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses to international peace and security continues to grow. It is only through States working together in full support for the multilateral institutions we have put in place that this threat can be managed.

Allow me, first of all, to thank the Bolivian presidency for taking the initiative to organize this debate on the important issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I would also like to thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu and Mr. Joseph Ballard for their particularly informative presentations. Assuredly, our debate is timely, given the current situation, which reminds us constantly of the sad realities that are the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors may acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Those threats are all the more worrying against the backdrop of the rapid developments in science and technology, globalization and the constantly changing business and trade environment, which are new factors that non-State actors can take advantage of in order to gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, that risk is very real today with the use of chemical weapons in the Middle East, as well as with regard to issues related to cybersecurity, the consequences of which could be even more serious if such attacks were directed against nuclear power plants, for example. That is why the topic under discussion today should encourage us to redouble our efforts and fully implement the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004). Moreover, strengthening the prevention system to avoid the humanitarian, political, economic and environmental disaster that could result from the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by non-State actors, including terrorists, is more urgent than ever. In that connection, the Security Council, seriously concerned about that threat, felt compelled to address a series of requests and to impose a set of obligations on Member States through the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). Today we must accurately take inventory of all the sources of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world in order to ensure that they can be systematically safeguarded or simply destroyed. While important steps have already been taken, much remains to be done. In the light of all those challenges, my country is of the view that, in today’s interdependent world where our interests are interlinked, we must strengthen cooperation in terms of border control, monitoring of financial flows and Internet networks, and legal assistance in order to develop an appropriate strategy to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands. To that end, we will need to generate synergies among all the stakeholders concerned and share our experiences. Moreover, countries should take steps to implement their obligations arising from resolution 1540 (2004). Those include, inter alia, first, developing voluntary five-year national action plans for implementing resolution 1540 (2004); secondly, establishing national coordination mechanisms for detecting activities by non-State actors in order to boost cooperation among the relevant national actors; thirdly, the implementing national legislative frameworks on terrorism; and, fourthly, putting in place physical protection systems for nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical materials and their installations to cover the entire life cycle of said material and to govern their transportation, as well as to strengthen the capacities of border services, in particular through the training of agents and the provision of detection equipment. In 2016, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2325 (2016), which substantially reinforced the provisions already in force in resolution 1540 (2014). It should be noted that the measures added to the recommendations emanating from the comprehensive review process of resolution 1540 (2004) have enabled Member States, relevant international and regional organizations and civil society to redirect their efforts and strategies towards a more comprehensive, coordinated and consistent approach in order sustainably address the multiple challenges facing international peace and security. If properly implemented, those proposals for concrete, practical and appropriate measures by Member States could greatly contribute to strengthening the system in order to prevent any potential catastrophe that could be caused by the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. In the case of Africa, an analysis of the data shows steady progress in the implementation of the measures established by resolution 1540 (2004), in particular in terms of the development of appropriate legislation and the submission of implementation reports. That development should be welcomed, although we must bear in mind that such measures need to be improved, in particular through the adoption of national legislative frameworks for biological weapons, which many African countries still lack. There is also a need for effective domestic controls to monitor sensitive materials and technologies. Moreover, the Senegalese delegation would like to recall the political commitment of the African Union to support the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by African States, which was reflected in the organization of several meetings on the subject. We therefore call for the continuation of such cooperation initiatives between the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and African countries, the majority of which have benefited from the Committee’s support in terms of the implementation of their obligations under the resolution. Assistance is also a key aspect of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Progress could be made, in particular as we seek to improve assistance procedures, data gathering and an analysis of assistance needs. We could also further our discussions on the topic of assistance with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and, where appropriate, with non-governmental organizations. That would require enhancing the capacities of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to better provide assistance to those countries that request it. At the same time, the Security Council could consider ways to strengthen the warning and prevention system to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular among non-State actors, by strengthening coordination among the system’s components, as well as by monitoring the implementation of the obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) and through an analysis of the risks of proliferation. We also encourage the training of national focal points, and therefore call on the Member States with sufficient resources to contribute them. We reiterate the need to create a sustainable mechanism to improve interaction and coordination among those requesting and those providing assistance in order to avoid duplication and identify best practices for assistance in order to replicate them. The primary challenge is therefore to improve the coordination of existing tools in order to limit the likelihood for non-State actors to engage in proliferation. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate Senegal’s willingness and unwavering commitment to make every effort to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To that end, my country has taken steps to fulfil its obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). Among those measures, we underscore the establishment of national coordination mechanisms to detect the activities of non-State actors, which facilitates collaboration between the relevant national actors, and the implementation of programmes for the technical and human capacity-building of the National Commission on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Authority for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety. Senegal will continue to focus its efforts on fulfilling its commitments in this area, because it is aware that cooperation and the pooling of efforts, experiences and expertise are the only way to ensure that we will have a better understanding of these threats in order to develop consistent, holistic and comprehensive strategies and approaches to effectively deal with these challenges.

I thank our briefers for their presentations today. In the context of the evolving threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, today’s debate reminds us of the importance of the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The is committed to assisting States and international organizations in their efforts to prevent non-State actors from developing and acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. We also align ourselves with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). Despite the progress made over the past 13 years, significant gaps remain in the implementation of the resolution’s obligations, particularly in the areas of chemical and biological security and controlling means of delivery. We must work more smartly as we move forward. The 2016 report (see S/2016/1038) on the comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) along with resolution 2325 (2016), adopted in December 2016, provide guidance on how to achieve future progress. Today I am going to touch on a few of those challenges and discuss ways whereby we might overcome them. Recently, we have seen the horror of chemical-weapon attacks by States and non-State actors in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. The confirmed use of the deadly nerve agent VX in Malaysia is even more shocking. Those trends are unsettling and alarming, which is why the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) must work to hold States more accountable for preventing the use and spread of chemical weapons and ensuring effective control over such materials. As part of our commitment to stopping the use of chemical weapons, we need to work together to help States in promoting best practices on chemical security to detect and prevent the misuse of chemicals. Moreover, the comprehensive review and resolution 2325 (2016) called for increased assistance through matchmaking and dialogue. The exchange of expertise and assistance is extremely valuable to States, to the Committee and to the global non-proliferation regime. While resolution 1540 (2004) is aimed at deterring non-State actors, its obligations are binding on Member States. It is therefore troubling that the Syrian regime has continued to use chemical weapons. We call on all Member States that oppose the use of chemical weapons to urge President Al-Assad to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and cease using chemicals as weapons. President Trump made that clear this week. Moreover, Syria’s continued use of chemical weapons will only increase the risk that elements of its chemical weapons programme could fall into the wrong hands. The 1540 Committee must also continue to work towards strengthening the global nuclear security architecture and increase cooperation among international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and INTERPOL. We must help States build their capacity to secure nuclear and other radioactive materials, convert research reactors from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium and address critical gaps to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The comprehensive review and resolution 2325 (2016) also highlighted the need for States to establish effective control over materials that could be used for weapons of mass destruction, including through the development of national control lists to monitor production and the movement of such materials. To prevent the illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction-related materials, the United States is providing training and technical assistance and detection, inspection and interdiction equipment to border and customs authorities all over the world. Last year’s report and resolution 2325 (2016) also recommended that the 1540 Committee give greater consideration to the evolving nature of the risk of proliferation and the rapid advances in science and technology. Such developments could lower the barriers to the development of weapons of mass destruction, thereby making the mitigation of those risks even more complex and challenging. The United States is eager to work with others to ensure that we strengthen key obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). The 1540 Committee and resolution 2325 (2016) are key tools in stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction and helping to maintain international peace and security.

First of all, I would like to thank the briefers — Ms. Nakamitsu and Mr. Ballard — for their valuable presentations. Likewise, I thank you, Sir, as President of the Council, for organizing this open debate and for providing us with a very interesting concept note, as well as the information that you just provided to us in your capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Uruguay aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). Uruguay is a country firmly committed to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and calls for strengthening multilateralism as part of its efforts to promote universal and complete disarmament. True to its commitment, Uruguay has adhered to and ratified existing regional and international treaties for such purposes. Similarly, we promote and support those forums designed to advance universal and transparent negotiations in the field of disarmament, such as the United Nations conference currently taking place at Headquarter to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, Lleading to their total elimination. On many occasions we have addressed the theme of weapons of mass destruction here in the Chamber. It goes without saying that, in the framework of adopting measures on preventing the use or threat of use of such weapons, it is the obligation of Member States to scrupulously respect their obligations under international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Uruguay is concerned about the growing threat of terrorism and the growing risk that these weapons will fall into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorist groups, which would bring about unpredictable and devastating consequences for humankind. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a serious and real threat to world security. The use of chemical weapons in countries of the Middle East and Asia demonstrates how real and dangerous this threat is. Uruguay has followed with concern the continuing attacks taking place in Syria, including most recently in Khan Shaykun last April. In that regard, we support the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission in Syria and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to shed light on those incidents so that the perpetrators thereof are brought to justice for committing such grave crimes. The Joint Investigative Mechanism has already identified the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham/Da’esh and the Syrian Government as the perpetrators of some of those attacks in Syria. There are reports that the same has happened in Iraq, and therefore investigations should also be carried out in that country to corroborate the facts. Resolution 1540 (2004) is the main legally binding instrument that we have that covers the three types of weapons of mass destruction. The role the resolution in preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors along with the work of the 1540 Committee in its four areas of work are crucial to combating the threat. The full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and resolution 2325 (2016) requires the ongoing efforts of all States — at the national, regional and international levels — as well as greater assistance and cooperation in capacity-building and in the exchange of best practices among States. International cooperation must be strengthened even further in order to prevent, deter, halt and eliminate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by terrorist groups. Uruguay stresses the need to enhance assistance and cooperation among States, and among States and international, regional and subregional organizations that are relevant to the 1540 Committee. The primary responsibility of States is to take appropriate steps at the national level, in line with their national legislation and international law, to strengthen export controls and to control access to intangible technology transfers and to information that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Both importing and exporting countries should exercise due control over their operations and ensure the full security of sensitive materials to prevent them falling under the control of terrorist groups. In conclusion, I would like to express Uruguay’s firm commitment to implementing the resolution. I also thank the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for their valuable visit to Uruguay in April, which enabled us to begin drafting our national plan of action for the resolution’s implementation.

We welcome you, Mr. President, in your capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We listened with great interest to your statement and the briefings by Ms. Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Mr. Ballard, representing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We are also grateful to the Bolivian chairship of the Committee for its responsible and professional leadership of that subsidiary body of the Council. Resolution 1540 (2004), initiated jointly by Russia and the United States in 2004, is one of the pillars of non-proliferation. Ensuring that every country can fully implement it is one of the international community’s pressing tasks, and it is our hope that today’s debate will be a major contribution to tackling that global challenge. Resolution 1540 (2004) remains the sole universal international document on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), obliging all countries to establish effective national systems for controlling WMDs, their delivery systems and related materials, and preventing them from falling into the hands of non-State actors. That goal has taken on major significance in the wake of the unprecedentedly complex and numerous regional conflicts taking place in the world today. The terror organizations involved in them have access to the technology and infrastructure needed to develop and use chemical weapons. We agree with Mr. Ballard that this is no longer a mere threat but a harsh reality. The events in the Middle East are a clear example of that, and serve to emphasize the relevance of our meeting today. The threat of chemical and biological terrorism is becoming ever greater in scale and in its transborder nature. We have heard again and again about militants from the Islamic State and other groups using industrial chemicals, and even chemical warfare substances, for terrorist purposes, facts that have been confirmed — even officially confirmed — by the Western intelligence community. With regard to such crimes, we would in particular like to emphasize that we must realize that, over the past five or six years, extremist organizations have gained considerable experience not just in using chemical weapons but in manufacturing them. The proliferation of that knowledge is as much of a threat as is the use of such WMDs. We support strengthening the counter-terrorist aspects of non-proliferation. We understand how urgent it is to find responses to new challenges and threats. In the light of the current terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq by the so-called Islamic State, the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist groups, the significance of resolution 1540 (2004) can only grow. The Council should thoroughly investigate and respond to any reports that non-State actors may have gained access to chemical weapons, with an objective, impartial and professional investigation with no potential for politicization. The process should be based on credible and verifiable facts and should avoid any potential for deliberate disinformation. We need to see a tough reaction from the Council to any violations of the resolution. Any assistance to non-State actors in acquiring WMDs or the materials, components and technologies used in their production is impermissible. Only collaborative efforts on the part of all Member States to implement the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) can ensure successful results. We support the appeals that Ms. Nakamitsu made on the subject in her briefing. The issue of combating terrorist attacks is so acute that the machinery designed to enable resolution 1540 (2004) to carry out its vital function is not enough. We would therefore like to remind the Council of Russia’s initiative concerning the drafting of an international convention on the fight against acts of chemical or biological terrorism. Such a convention could cover the advances that the international community has approved in recent years, particularly through provisions criminalizing activities falling within its purview, defining jurisdictions and appropriate levels of legal response, implementing the principle of extradite-or- prosecute, and so forth. It is clear that traditional views of what constitutes arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are gradually blurring. Effectively, the entire area has acquired a new element and another dimension — the counter-terrorism dimension. The so-called Islamic State’s acquisition of the industrial capacity to produce chemical weapons and the danger of their proliferation throughout the Middle East serve to emphasize the relevance of Russia’s efforts to formulate the such a convention. We believe that we should work actively to define the national and regional components for implementing resolution 1540 (2004). We should study best practices and conduct seminars for points of contact, because their benefits are clear. A number of Member States, including Russia, have already commended the seminars that have been held for national points of contact, and we welcome the intention of the People’s Republic of China to organize a similar event in August. In order to improve the effectiveness of the Committee’s work, we should draw on the capacities of international and regional organizations and ensure that their planned tasks conform with States’ requests. We also support the involvement of the scientific and business communities. Needless to say, all of this should take place under the leadership and oversight of State entities. Russia is committed to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, including within the framework of the 1540 Committee, and will make every possible effort to deal with this challenge. With regard to the statement by the representative of the United States, I would like to point out that Syria’s armed forces pose no threat to the American specialists. We have no information about anything like that, whatever the reports may be. However, we once again affirm our position that Russia will continue to insist on a comprehensive, professional and politically impartial investigation of chemical attacks — not just in Khan Shaykhun but also with regard to any other occurrence, or recurrence, of chemical terrorism in Syria and Iraq — as provided for in resolution 2319 (2016). With regard to extending the mandate of the OPCW- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism for another year, its geographic scope and counter-terrorism dimension must be expanded. An objective investigation is the only way to get to the truth — not based on the fabrications of terrorists, extremists, opposition members, their foreign sympathizers and sponsors and non-governmental organizations and all their efforts to blame Damascus. For now, it is important that we avoid any provocation and prevent any unilateral acts, and that we support the significant political momentum that the discussions in Astana and the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva represent.

At the outset, I should like to thank Bolivia for its initiative in convening a key discussion as we seek to strengthen international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and to ensure that they do not fall into the hands of non-State actors, particularly terrorist organizations. We also congratulate you, Sir, on your wise and able chairship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We welcomed the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) under the Spanish presidency of the Security Council in December last year. I also thank Ms. Nakamitsu and the representative of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for their briefings to the Council. The year 2004 was marked by effective efforts on the part of the international community to prevent non-State actors and entities from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, transporting or using WMDs in all their forms — whether that be nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapons. Consequently, in 2004 the Security Council adopted resolution 1540 (2004) in response to the clamour of the international community for steps to be taken. Nevertheless, we need to acknowledge that the world has become more complicated since 2004. International security threats have evolved very rapidly and it is difficult to keep up with them. The arsenal of armed groups and terrorists has expanded to include the use of chemical weapons — to which they have recourse as a standard weapon — and other WMDs. That is borne out by the current state of affairs in the Middle East and the actions undertaken by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Da’esh — actions proven by the investigations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Other terrorist groups, such as Jabhat Al-Nusra and other militias, have also used WMDs to sow destruction and suffering among the population of that region. The challenges that the international community must overcome in that regard will require us to pay more attention to the way we prevent those entities and groups from obtaining WMDs and using them. We would like to share some observations and proposals on how the international community could step up its efforts. First of all, we need to develop an integrated and effective United Nations model in order to open the door to a world free of the threat of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists. We will need to coordinate and harmonize United Nations counter-terrorism strategies. We also must avoid any meddling or interference in the affairs of sovereign States as the United Nations seeks to play a coordinating role. States bear the primary responsibility for setting up national preventive mechanisms under resolution 1540 (2004). That is a key responsibility and obligation and a crucial step towards ensuring the full and effective implementation of the resolution. States must remember that responsibility. Secondly, we must take steps to provide timely and relevant technical assistance to States that request it. We must plug the current gaps in financing that assistance by, inter alia, fully funding the voluntary trust fund of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Thirdly, we must enhance our cooperation with international and regional organizations, as well as the relevant subregional organizations. The Egyptian delegation is responsible for coordinating those efforts within the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and, through its role in the Committee, spearheads action to improve collaboration with all the relevant stakeholders. Fourthly, we must raise awareness and ensure more comprehensive and integrated international efforts on issues pertaining to transportation and transparency. We must work more closely with the Department of Political Affairs and UNODA, as well as the Office of the Secretary-General, so as to coordinate our efforts and approaches. All of those bodies must collaborate more closely with the Group of Experts of the 1540 (2004) Committee, particularly with regard to chemical and biological threats, as needed, as well as nuclear threats. Fifthly, Egypt suggests that we review the ways in which we legally deal with new technologies like e-commerce and other emerging technologies, such as in the field of biology, to make sure that there is a proper legal framework that covers new developments. Egypt will work tirelessly to support efforts in that regard, whether nationally or internationally. It submitted four reports — in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2016 — commensurate with its responsibilities under resolution 1540 (2004). Those reports detail the steps taken by the relevant Egyptian authorities towards the resolution’s implementation at the national. We also adopted the voluntary national matrix following its review and endorsement by the specialized authorities in Cairo. Similarly, in 2007 Egypt set up out a national commission on this issue. We are firmly convinced that the only way to prevent non-State actors and terrorists from acquiring WMDs is by ensuring that we live in a world free of such weapons in all their forms. Any such effort must first seek to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, including a zone free of WMDs in the Middle East, in line with the resolution of the 1995 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in response to the calls of the relevant international bodies. Finally, I would like to convey my gratitude to Bolivia for all its efforts on this matter.

I thank Under- Secretary-General Nakamitsu and her team, as well as Mr. Joseph Ballard. It is always good to have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) represented here in the Chamber, as cooperation between our institutions is vital. While this agenda item is a regular feature of the Security Council’s programme of work, there is in fact nothing regular about it. The spectre of biological, chemical or nuclear materials falling into terrorist hands is the nightmare scenario for many of us in the Chamber. The use of such materials by terrorists is, sadly, not hypothetical matter. Thanks to the hard work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria, we know what happens when terrorists’ hateful intent is paired with these equally hateful weapons. We saw the results in the sulfur mustard attack that Da’esh carried out in Aleppo’s Mari district in August 2015, leaving residents blistered and burning. Other cases are also under investigation. Clearly, preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) from falling into terrorist hands is a vital linchpin for preserving international peace and security. That is why it is so crucial that, following the comprehensive review and adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) focus on reaching the ultimate goal of full, worldwide implementation — turning resolution 1540 (2004) into reality. As the 1540 Committee does that, it must take account of new and emerging challenges from the evolving terrorist threat and advances in science and technology. The Committee must also look to improve technical assistance, including by strengthening the 1540 Committee’s process for matching Member States’ requests for support with offers for assistance. We must do all we can to encourage Member States to submit their reports on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the national level. That applies in particular to the few remaining States that are yet to submit a national report. Much remains to be done, but the Committee should not do it alone. Indeed, the challenges we face are far too great to simply rely on the 15 Governments gathered around this table. We must strengthen regional and international cooperation and outreach to civil society and industry to support implementation efforts. Every country and every sector has a role to play, and we should embrace their help. While we must take every step to ensure that these terrible weapons never fall into the hands of terrorists, we must also never overlook the horrific and, sadly, growing allegations of the use of these weapons by State actors. The United Kingdom unreservedly condemns the use of any chemical weapon in any circumstance. In particular, we are horrified about reports that Kim Jong-nam was apparently killed with VX in Malaysia earlier this year. Confirmation that a nerve agent once banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention was used at the instigation of a State would be yet another troubling rejection of international norms. The United Kingdom has also concluded that the Al-Assad regime has continued to use chemical weapons against its own people — in breach of international law and the rules of war. We look forward to receiving further reporting from the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. Once we have the results of those investigations, the international community must send a united response. Let me conclude by calling on the 1540 Committee to redouble its efforts. The United Kingdom is committed to playing its part in ensuring that the Committee succeeds in its vital task ahead. The cost of failure, of allowing further weapons of mass destruction to fall into the hands of those who wish to wreak havoc, is simply too high to bear.

We would like to thank Bolivia, as President of the Council and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), for convening today’s vital debate. I would also like to commend Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu and Mr. Ballard for their insights and to pay tribute to their commitment to ensuring a safe and secure world for us. Kazakhstan urges that we ensure the full and effective implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016), which we consider extremely important. The international community must make a concerted effort if it is to comply with their provisions, for these two resolutions have a special contribution to make to strengthening the international non-proliferation architecture. Our country has experienced first-hand the horrifying consequences of the testing of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and is determined to be at the forefront of the global fight against their proliferation and the risk of their use. Strict adherence to all the obligations to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and relentless efforts to improve national systems of control over materials that could be used to produce WMDs are more important than they have ever been. I would first like to draw the Council’s attention to the following achievements and specific activities that we have undertaken at the national and regional level. Thanks to its stringent nuclear-security measures, Kazakhstan is among the top 20 countries in the world in its security levels for nuclear facilities and materials. All our nuclear facilities are under the comprehensive control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and accompanied by strong controls of our borders with neighbouring countries as well as of aviation and other transit modes. The IAEA’s low- enriched uranium bank will launch in Kazakhstan on 29 August and is a clear indication of the global commitment to halting the proliferation of such sensitive technologies. Through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative of the United States and the Russian Federation’s Energy and Security Centre, active steps are being taken to ensure the security of nuclear facilities and materials in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Early in May, Kazakhstan hosted a two-day seminar in Astana on strengthening the safety of radiation sources with a view to preventing illicit trafficking in radioactive materials in Central Asia. The participation of all our neighbours will ensure a well-coordinated intra-regional collaboration in this area. Very recently, on 12 May, we opened the first regional nuclear security training centre in Almaty. With the support of international organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, INTERPOL and other specialized institutions, it will play a valuable role in providing expertise to specialists in relevant fields for the entire Central Asian region and beyond. Secondly, while commending the considerable progress that has been made on implementing resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016), we must acknowledge the fact that there is still much more to be done. In that regard, we would like to propose what we feel are the most salient steps for the way forward. We are confident that individual interactions with every country, increased outreach activities and the provision of sufficient financial resources will contribute significantly to ensuring strict control over the implementation of national commitments in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Given the importance of capacity-building among Member States, Kazakhstan has decided to make a voluntary contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities, with the goal of helping States to implement their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). Taking the evolving nature of the risks of the proliferation of WMDs into account, including the use by non-State actors of the rapid advances that are being made in science and technology, we would like to emphasize the initiative we have taken to establish a United Nations register of scientific developments that can lead to the creation or advancement of WMDs, designed to track such dangerous discoveries. Since funding for travelling and regional outreach is limited, much progress could also be made through the creation of online training modules, to be offered in a number of languages on the 1540 Committee website for various categories of Government personnel — lawmakers, executives, law-enforcement officials, border-control agents and criminal prosecutors. We believe that the Committee’s limited resources and staff could be supplemented by the academic, scientific, technical and legal communities, providing valuable input on new trends and training on the completion of matrices and on standards verification and assessments. Lastly, I would like to reaffirm Kazakhstan’s firm commitment to consolidating the international community’s efforts to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. To achieve that, we must consistently strengthen and expand the non-proliferation regime, primarily within the framework of resolution 1540 (2004).

I would like to thank you, Sir, for your dual role, as President of the Council and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), in organizing today’s important meeting. I would also like to thank Ms. Nakamitsu and Mr. Ballard for their very informative briefings. I should add that France associates itself with the statement to be delivered by the observer of the European Union and supports the statement that the representative of Spain will make on behalf of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540. The past few months have seen a heavy assault on fundamental aspects of our collective security, in violation of rules that we all value and of which resolution 1540 (2004) is a crucial part. The proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the risk of their use by non-State actors, have become a dangerous reality. But we should make no mistake — the repeated assaults on the non-proliferation regime that we are witnessing in Asia and the Middle East are far from being a monopoly of non-State actors, and terrorist groups in particular. In Asia, we have seen North Korea’s crash development of its nuclear and ballistic programmes and its chemical-weapon attack in Malaysia this winter. It is also the case in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, where the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and Da’esh has been confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. That is made even more worrying by the fact that the suspected continued existence of toxic chemical stocks in Syria increases the likelihood that they will be more accessible to terrorist groups. In this difficult context, we must work harder than ever to mobilize in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by anyone, and by non-State actors in particular. That demands above all that we do better at considering the risks of exploiting technological advances for the purposes of proliferation, a subject that the 1540 Committee has to address. In that regard, I would like to commend the analytical and advocacy efforts of the Group of Experts in support of the Committee. Needless to say, we must all work harder to intensify and assess our implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We must all prevent and discourage the financing of proliferation, ensure the highest possible levels of security for sensitive goods and materials on our territories and strengthen export controls, especially considering the risk of the use of emerging technologies. For its part, France has modernized its national legal framework for combating proliferation, criminalizing proliferation activities and punishing their financing. We are also very involved in working to prevent the risk of terrorists acquiring sensitive nuclear materials and we are an active supporter of the efforts of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. I should also mention the role of the European Union, whose dynamic and continuing awareness-raising efforts have contributed to this cooperative action. The EU adopted a new decision last month giving €2.6 million to support the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We also welcome other actions that have already been undertaken or announced, including regional workshops for training points of contact in the implementation of the resolution. However, the sum of our individual actions is not enough. As stated in the concept note, resolution 1540 (2004) is a unique platform for cooperation. We have to make this happen by concrete actions through two means: further anchoring the logic of assistance and cooperation in our efforts and taking the specificity of each country concerned into account. As Coordinator of the Working Group on Assistance, France attaches particular importance to strengthening the regional dimension and to improving the coherence between the needs and the assistance offered. The Committee’s newly updated template for requests for assistance, for example, should contribute to that end. Finally, we must take stock of current challenges by strengthening synergies with forums facing the same issues, be they within the United Nations or outside it, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the World Customs Organization, or such export- control regimes as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, of which France is the secretariat, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, whose plenary meeting is being held in Paris this week, from 26 to 30 June 2017. These interactions should be encouraged and strengthened. The Council can count on France’s steadfast commitment on this priority issue.

First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on having convened this timely debate in your capacity both as President of the Security Council for this month and as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Italy aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. We also align ourselves with the statement to be made by Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi, representative of Spain, on behalf of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Spain for the work accomplished in the Security Council and for its leadership of the Group of Friends. (spoke in English) I also would like to thank both the Under-Secretary- General, Ms. Nakamitsu, and Mr. Joseph Ballard for their briefings. Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016) constitute the central pillars of the international non-proliferation architecture and are key instruments for preventing the most dangerous materials in the world from falling into the wrong hands. The report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has proven and confirmed the use of chemical weapons by both State and non-State actors. The rapid advances in science and technology, as well as the globalization of commercial, logistic and economic transactions, make it harder for States to control proliferation activities and enable terrorists to take advantage of transnational criminal networks to gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). In this regard, more attention should also be paid to the so-called intangible transfer of technology, which is reflected both in resolution 2325 (2016) and in the programme of work of the 1540 Committee. Strengthening cooperation and the exchange of experience in the areas of border control, surveillance of financial flows on the Internet and other networks and legal assistance have today grown in importance. Similarly, enhancing protection of critical infrastructure relevant to the non-proliferation of WMDs from the increasing risk of cyberattack is more important than ever. It remains imperative for Member States to effectively implement the provisions of this resolution, establish domestic controls, have effective points of contact and maintain an active dialogue with the Committees. We take this opportunity to emphasize the need to achieve the universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the importance for States to submit their first national implementation reports. Despite admirable progress, the non-proliferation regime continues to be confronted with serious threats, and recent alarming developments have clearly demonstrated that no State is immune to this danger. We know this from the work that we have been carrying out this year in the Security Council. As underscored in last year’s comprehensive review, the delivery of technical assistance continues to represent the key element to facilitating and improving Member States’s compliance with their obligations. In this regard, we welcome all the outreach activities conducted by the 1540 Committee and its strong engagement in providing capacity-building assistance to those stakeholders that need it the most, despite the resource constraints of which we are all aware. As Chair of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, we invited the 1540 Committee to make a presentation of its work, in particular with regard to Africa, in order to highlight current needs and increase opportunities for donors to cooperate with the potential recipients, as well as with the Committee itself. We are willing to continue this cooperation with the 1540 Committee. Last year represented a significant step forward for efforts to prevent non-State actors from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. It is important now that we build upon that momentum. We thank Bolivia for its leadership and commitment at the helm of the Committee and pledge our full support.

I would like to start by commending Bolivia for organizing today’s debate and for its leadership in steering the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu and Mr. Joseph Ballard for their respective briefings. Ethiopia aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Ethiopia welcomes the progress made in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery to non-State actors. However, we note with great concern the continued risk of proliferation, particularly considering reports on the use of chemical weapons by terrorists in the Middle East. Such reports clearly indicate the serious threats posed by the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery when they fall into the hands of non-State actors. In relation to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2325 (2016), I would like to highlight the following four points. First, addressing the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would primarily require a total ban and elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. That is why it is important to work towards the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. The successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiation on a legally binding instrument on the prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons, if not a total ban on them, with the possible adoption of a legally binding outcome document would, in our view, significantly contribute to addressing the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of non-State actors. Secondly, as you highlighted in your opening remarks, Mr. President, the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of non-State actors would require a range of legislative and enforcement measures that prohibits them from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using WMDs and their means of delivery. Coordinated national measures by Member States involving all relevant stakeholders, such as the law-enforcement, customs and financial sectors, will be critical in preventing the risk of proliferation. Such national efforts could be complemented by international and regional efforts. They could also be supported by assistance programmes within the framework of the 1540 Committee. Thirdly, enhancing cooperation between the 1540 Committee and regional organizations would also be relevant. For instance, the African region, through the Common African Defence and Security Policy, has identified the accumulation of stockpiling, proliferation and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, as a common external threat to continental security as they may endanger or pose a direct or indirect constraint on individual and collective efforts to achieve continental security goals. It is therefore important for the Committee to further strengthen its cooperation with the African Union and its member States in the implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and other regional frameworks, such as the African nuclear- weapon-free zone. Through such a regional approach, the Committee could identify the specific priorities and challenges of each region and subregion and strengthen its support and assistance accordingly. Enhanced cooperation at the regional and international levels within the framework of the 1540 Committee, including through assistance programmes and exchange of information and best practices, is very important. In this regard, we welcome the holding of the three original courses for 1540 points of contact. We would further encourage the Committee to explore other mechanisms to strengthen its support for member States and regional organizations in accordance with paragraph 9 of the 1540 Committee’s programme of work. I would like to conclude my statement by reaffirming Ethiopia’s commitment to continuing to take all the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from falling into the hands of non-State actors and to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent Security Council resolutions on the issue, in particular by strengthening the legal and administrative framework for prohibiting the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transport, transfer or use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

I would like to begin by thanking the Bolivian presidency for organizing today’s open debate. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is a priority for Japan. I also wish to thank the two briefers, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu and Mr. Joseph Ballard, for their clear and informative briefings. Japan aligns itself with the joint statement of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 (2004), which is to be delivered later by the representative of Spain. Japan once again welcomes the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) in December of last year. However, we must recognize and remain vigilant against the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction taking place now. The threat from North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile development has reached a new level. These activities are in blatant violation of Security Council resolutions and present a clear challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. This is simply not acceptable. Japan strongly urges North Korea to refrain from further provocations and violations and to comply faithfully and fully with the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2270 (2016), as well as its other commitments. The threat of WMD proliferation is also evident in Syria, with the actual use of chemical weapons. Japan strongly condemn such acts, which are not permissible under any circumstances. In the light of these clear and present threats, it is the responsibility of every State to protect itself and its people by strengthening international and domestic non-proliferation measures. Malicious actors are misusing rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce for proliferation purposes. Proliferation activities must be prevented whenever and wherever they are attempted. States must be all the more vigilant, as their people and entities can unwittingly become complicit in proliferation activities. Japan strongly believes that enhancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), especially the obligations set forth in the resolution related to domestic and export control, is imperative. Let me reiterate that resolution 2325 (2016) calls upon States that have not done so to start developing effective national control lists. State capacity-building is key for further implementation because proliferation can occur through the weakest link. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts can help States strengthen their domestic non-proliferation systems by, for example, sharing expertise to formulate national implementation action plans and clarifying actual assistance needs. Facilitating direct interactions between Member States and the Committee will strongly bolster the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). This year, Japan disbursed $1 million to the Trust Fund to support the work of the 1540 Committee. A significant portion will be used to finance these types of direct interactions. Japan urges interested States to contact the Committee and would also be happy to relay any message to the Committee as the Coordinator of the Working Group on Monitoring and National Implementation. In today’s security environment, we must urgently strengthen the non-proliferation regime at the global, regional and national levels. Japan will continue to actively support these endeavours.

China appreciates Bolivia’s holding of today’s meeting. I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu and Mr. Joseph Ballard of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for their briefings. China appreciates the role played by Bolivia as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery bears on international peace, security and stability. It is a common challenge and a major task facing the international community and an important component part of global governance. In recent years, thanks to the joint efforts of the international community, the international consensus on non-proliferation has grown in depth and the relevant mechanisms have kept improving. Countries have scaled up capacity-building in non-proliferation and deepened cooperation in this area. Reviewing past experience in international non-proliferation, we can draw the following four lessons. First, seeking common security is a fundamental way to advance international non-proliferation. Creating a peaceful and stable international environment, building security architecture that features fairness, justice, joint contributions and shared benefits, and seeking common security for all countries represent the ultimate guarantee for the elimination of the driving forces of terrorism and proliferation. Secondly, justice and balance constitute the basic principles in advancing international non-proliferation. Unilateralism, double standards and discriminatory practices are detrimental to the authority and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime. While fulfilling their non-proliferation obligations, countries are entitled to peacefully enjoy the fruits of scientific and technological development. Thirdly, leveraging the role of the international non-proliferation regime is an important guarantee for the advancement of international non-proliferation. The threat of WMD proliferation knows no borders. On the basis of the universal participation of and democratic consultation among countries, having the United Nations and the relevant international organizations coordinate in non-proliferation efforts can help strengthen and optimize the international non-proliferation regime. Fourthly, dialogue and cooperation are the most effective way to advance international non-proliferation. Confrontation, the focus on sanctions and pressure can only lead to the escalation and overspill of conflicts, thereby further exacerbating the risk of proliferation. Dialogue, consultation and seeking peaceful settlements of regional hotspot issues of proliferation through political and diplomatic means can produce more durable and effective results. Over the past several years, the international non-proliferation situation has remained serious with certain regional hotspot issues concerning proliferation defying a solution. Technological progress has lowered the threshold of proliferation, and the risk of non-State actors, especially terrorists, acquiring WMDs and related materials has increased. The international community needs to work together and do a better job in the following areas of global non-proliferation governance. First, we need to build political consensus and a process for addressing both the symptoms and root causes of the problem. We need to abandon the Cold War mentality; establish a new concept of common, integrated, cooperative and sustainable security; improve the security environment of all countries; and eradicate the breeding grounds of terrorism and proliferation activities as soon as possible. At the same time, there is a need to comprehensively implement non-proliferation obligations and political commitment in that regard, and commit ourselves to combating the existing threats of proliferation. Secondly, we need to strengthen national responsibility and build a line of defence against proliferation. National Governments bear the primary responsibility for non-proliferation. We need to respect and provide support to countries — based on their specific circumstances — in their efforts to formulate non-proliferation policies, improve legal and regulatory systems on non-proliferation and enhance capacity- building in non-proliferation law enforcement with a view to building a strong line of defence. Thirdly we need to deepen international cooperation and enhance non-proliferation capacity. All countries must actively participate in global non-proliferation governance, while ensuring the respect for the sovereignty of all countries engaged in exchanges and mutual learning, as well as pragmatic cooperation in an open, inclusive, mutually beneficial and win-win spirit so as to improve the capacity and the level of non-proliferation of all countries. The needs of developing countries for international systems in non-proliferation should be effectively met. Fourthly, we need to take a multipronged approach to implement resolution 1540 (2004) comprehensively and effectively. Resolution 1540 (2004) was the first of its kind adopted by the Security Council specifically concerning non-proliferation, and it represents the common understanding of all countries in connection with non-proliferation. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) needs to strictly abide by the mandate conferred upon it by the resolution, continue to take forward the spirit of cooperation, focus on strengthening its assistance function so as to enhance the awareness and capacity of Member States in implementing the resolution and promote international cooperation in the area of non-proliferation. China resolutely opposes the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, and has always strictly fulfilled its international non-proliferation obligations. We have taken an active part in regional and international non-proliferation cooperation, worked hard to promote the political settlement of hotspot issues in the area of non-proliferation and supported the United Nations while playing a key role in that regard. In September 2015 in Qingdao, China, in cooperation with the 1540 Committee, hosted the first training course for the points of contact in the Asia-Pacific region, which yielded positive results. In August, China, also in cooperation with the 1540 Committee, will co-host another training course in China. We believe that that training course will play a constructive role in helping the concerned parties build capacity in the area of non-proliferation. China will continue to work with all parties to contribute to the improvement of the international non-proliferation regime, the strengthening of global non-proliferation governance and the maintenance of international peace and security

I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statement to no more than four minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate their texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version. I also wish to inform all concerned that, with the consent of the members of the Security Council, I will suspend this meeting between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. I now welcome and give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Montenegro.

I would like to thank the Bolivian presidency for organizing this timely open debate on the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by non-State actors and for preparing an informative concept note (see S/2016/1038). I also thank the briefers for their input at today’s debate. Montenegro aligns itself with the statement to be delivered on behalf of the European Union, as well as with the statement to be made on behalf of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 (2004). I would, however, like to make some additional remarks in my national capacity. We have witnessed the security, health, environmental and social effects of testing nuclear weapons. The nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and putative further technological developments in its pursuit of military nuclear capability pose a serious threat to international peace and security. Montenegro condemns in the strongest terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s repeated violations of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Iraq and Malaysia, and the possible existence of residual capabilities on Syrian territory, increase the risk of the proliferation of such weapons and their falling into the hands of terrorist groups. We have to face the fact that this imminent threat requires our immediate action so as to avert consequences of a global scale. Montenegro supports the global agenda for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as set out in resolution 2325 (2016). At the national level, we take a proactive and comprehensive approach in trying to contribute to regional efforts in addressing this urgent threat. As a State party to all key international agreements and instruments related to WMD proliferation and their means of delivery, Montenegro has established a solid national framework and built administrative and institutional capacities to address the threat efficiently. We were the first country in the Western Balkans to adopt a strategy for the non-proliferation of WMDs for the period between 2016 and 2020. In Montenegro, through the implementation of that strategy and the implementation of all accompanying action plans — including the action plan for resolution 1540 (2004) and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear action plan — our focus is on taking a number of measures at the national level that ensure full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, thereby contributing to regional efforts in addressing that threat. Aware of the fact that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is closely related to other aspects of arms control in general, our attention is on the effective enforcement of legislation and the establishment of domestic control. In that context, we have established an effective export control system, while taking into account measures, such as those regarding intangible technology transfers and other matters requiring particular vigilance, including the transfer of the sensitive facilities, equipment, technology and material usable as weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We firmly believe that putting an emphasis on the universality of the international provisions on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction derives from the fact that even small States that do not possess nuclear capacities or industries are an important part of the security architecture, which aims at controlling the use of sensitive materials for peaceful purposes. The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors is a global one, which requires a response at the national, regional and international levels. We are confident that, only through the joint and coherent efforts of the international community, including increased cooperation between the United Nations and the relevant international and regional organizations, as well as among the relevant Security Council Committees and active participation of all stakeholders — parliamentarians, civil society, industry and academia — this threat of grave concern can be effectively addressed. Montenegro stands ready to make a further contribution in that regard.

I now give the floor to the representative of Panama.

At the outset, Sir, let me commend your leadership of the Security Council this month. We are grateful for the concept note and thank Ms. Nakamitsu and Mr. Ballard for their briefings at today’s relevant debate, which, once again, draws the attention of the Council to the growing threat of the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world. Panama aligns itself with the statements to be made by the Permanent Representative of Spain, on behalf of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 (2004), and by the Permanent Representative of Venezuela, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. As a country that is fully committed to strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, Panama reaffirms its commitment to resolution 2325 (2016) and the ongoing fight against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems because it believes that they pose a serious threat to international peace and security, in particular when in the hands of non-State actors. Panama attaches particular importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to resolution 1540 (2004) because they are the only legally binding multilateral instruments currently in force that address global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As a member of the Human Security Network, whose chairmanship we recently assumed, Panama promotes the safety and security of all of the world’s citizens and their right to a life of freedom and dignity, free of threats, so that they can exert their true potential. Based on that premise, we must combat the cruel threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. In February, Latin America and the Caribbean celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco — the first regional agreement on disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that gave rise to the first nuclear-free zone, which has retained that status. Today, under our region’s proven leadership, we welcome the progress made by the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. We believe that Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez will steer the conference to a successful outcome. Panama reiterated its commitment to non-proliferation in 1999 by signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, 21 years after its adoption, urges that greater efforts be made to achieve its universalization and entry into force, through a commitment by all States, without standards or exceptions. Although Panama does not import, manufacture or stockpile weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons, it is fully aware of the emerging trends in proliferation through scientific and technological advances and in international trade that could be vulnerable to the risk of the possession and use of such weapons by non-State actors. That is why we have been adopting and strengthening a series of practical measures. As a country that is pivotal to logistics and global transit, with a larger Panama Canal, it has even greater challenges and responsibilities. That is why we are stepping up efforts to assist in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Our geographic location, marine biodiversity and the advantages of the connectivity that Panama offers are all assets, but also pose security challenges, which our country is addressing. We have worked to draft modern legislation that allows us to prevent, combat and punish the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have adopted a national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) for the period 2016-2019 to regulate dual use materials. We have established a National Coordination Council against International Terrorism, which is interinstitutional and has the support of international experts from the Organization of American States and the United Nations. In addition, Panama is part of the Global Container Control Programme, which is a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Customs Organization initiative. It was implemented to facilitate information-sharing and cooperation among participating countries in order to limit the use of maritime containers for transnational organized crime. At the regional level, Panama chairs the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, which we hope will continue to enhance constructive efforts and cooperation as we stress that they are fundamental to addressing this grave challenge. My Government firmly condemns the recent launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea because they are in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions and merely heighten tensions in the region. In that regard, we have reiterated that the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons cannot continue to be used as a political tool to assign power in the world. The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is irreversible and unquantifiable. The global development of such weapons is measured not only by the number of human lives that are directly affected, but also by the amount of resources diverted, which then make it impossible to meet the aspirations of the well-being of humankind. We cannot continue to shirk that responsibility. In conclusion, I underscore the importance of maintaining a multidimensional approach to security in the light of the human rights/development nexus, which is indispensable to building a peaceful and safe world. Nuclear disarmament must be a global imperative that, with the necessary political will, can promote peace and free up billions of dollars for sustainable development. In that regard, the commitments outlined here today encourage us to continue the fight, which is a struggle for humankind, the future and present and future generations, including the young people who are with me today and who will take part in the meeting convened by the President of the General Assembly on education, as part of the efforts to improve the quality of education in Panama. Sir, you have Panama’s ongoing support in ensuring that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continues to fulfil its overarching goal of encouraging global efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects.

I now give the floor to the representative of Chile.

We thank the Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ambassador Sacha Llorentty Solíz, in his double capacity as President of the Security Council and as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), for convening today’s important debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. We welcome the briefings delivered by the Under- Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, and the Senior Officer from the Office of Strategy and Policy of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Mr. Joseph Ballard. Chile aligns itself with the statement to be made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540. Today’s debate could not be more timely. It is being held as a treaty is being negotiated in this very building to prohibit weapons of mass destruction. The most recent category of weapons of mass destruction, which is contrary to international law, in particular international humanitarian law, has still not been expressly prohibited by a convention. There is no doubt that such a convention would help to strengthen the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. One of the key components of the non-proliferation architecture is resolution 1540 (2004), which was unanimously adopted on 28 April 2004 and represents a historic milestone, to which Chile was proud to contribute at the time as a non-permanent member of the Council. It is indeed the first resolution of the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations that established concrete measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery on the part of non-State actors. In that sense, resolution 1540 (2004) is today an instrument of prime importance that provides a specific framework for States to combat more effectively the terrorist threat linked to the proliferation of such weapons. Likewise, we especially value the final document on the 2016 comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) (see S/2016/1038, carried out under the leadership of Spain and which is endorsed in resolution 2325 (2016), adopted by the Security Council on 15 December 2016. It is important to note that current global trends are intensifying proliferation threats. For example, globalization and increased trade in components and in trans-shipment, accelerating technological advances and the facilitation of the intangible transfer of technologies, shell companies, overseas procurement networks and black-market distribution networks must all be considered in developing effective measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and dual-use components. Strategic controls are key to preventing important technologies from reaching the hands of non-State actors. Proliferation agents attack the weaknesses of the existing control and commercial distribution chains. That is why resolution 1540 (2004) requires States to adopt and enforce effective measures to establish national controls aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related materials. We are convinced that strengthening national capacities, assistance and cooperation are essential to progress in the implementation of existing measures and in considering future actions. Therefore, Chile, together with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, organized a training course for focal points in Latin America and the Caribbean that are responsible for its implementation, which was held in Santiago from 24 to 28 October of last year. The use of chemical weapons or toxic chemicals by non-State actors is no longer just a threat, but a worrying reality, as confirmed by the research of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In conclusion, we hope that those results will deter those who are determined to use chemical weapons in the future.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

I thank you, Mr. President, and Bolivia for convening this important meeting. Allow me to start by reiterating the obvious. We must strengthen the collective response through cooperation and international law in order to address the increasing risk of weapons capable of wiping out entire communities through cruel, indiscriminate effects, as well as the risk that they may fall into the hands of non-State actors and terrorist groups. Mexico categorically condemns the existence of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their use by any actor under any circumstance. This meeting coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and shows that a world free of nuclear weapons is a goal within our reach. As the concept note prepared for the previous Council meeting on this topic in December indicates (S/2016/1013, annex), the extraordinary advances in science and technology and the dynamism of international trade should not threaten our security. Our challenge is to find a balance that will enable us to meet our non-proliferation commitments, while avoiding obstacles to trade, technology and our own industries. Mexico is a responsible global actor and a country that rejects weapons of mass destruction, as well as being the world’s leading recipient of foreign direct investment in its aerospace industry. With one of the largest chemical industries in the world, we have developed a national export-control regime for dual-use materials, based on coordinated efforts generating firm, flexible and sophisticated responses, thereby enabling us to fulfil our international obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), and those under our voluntary memberships, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. But such efforts are of little or no use if we do not strengthen our national capacities and if we do not engage in real-time information exchange and continuous cooperation among States. In those efforts, the leadership of the Security Council is essential, as is the commitment of the five permanent members. The review of the status of resolution 1540 (2004) by the Council last year. under the leadership of Spain, highlighted the urgent need to strengthen our collective efforts. Two weeks ago, in collaboration with Germany, the 1540 Committee Group of Experts and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, Mexico hosted a successful meeting on the Wiesbaden process that enabled us to share our experience and good practices with the countries of the Pacific Ocean Alliance and with Brazil. Industry representatives from those countries participated in awareness-raising with regard to the diversion of dual-use goods and technologies for proliferation purposes. Important efforts that are critical to ensuring a safer region are taking place in Latin America. Multilateralism and the United Nations remain key in addressing the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their materials and in forging the secure world that we all desire.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru.

I wish to thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu and Mr. Joseph Ballard for their informative briefings today. My delegation aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). We would also like to add a few comments in our national capacity. My delegation is grateful for this opportunity to engage in dialogue on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as for the efforts undertaken by the chairmanship of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), currently held by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, with a view to strengthening international cooperation on this very important issue. Peru believes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems represents one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. The situation has deteriorated in recent years, with an increased likelihood of non-State actors, in particular terrorist groups, developing, acquiring or using such weapons and their means of delivery, or trading in them. The threat is real, as we have seen in recent instances, and has been facilitated by rapid advances in science and technology as well as by the expansion of international trade. Spurred on by this realization, Peru co-sponsored resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016), which we deem vital instruments for promoting the urgently needed universalization and comprehensive implementation of the multilateral treaties aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, we consider it imperative to develop and implement national legislation so as effectively to monitor the illicit trade in such weapons and their components and delivery systems. In that connection, we would underscore that Peru has made considerable efforts to meet its obligations under the resolutions I mentioned — in terms of nuclear safety, radiological security and the physical protection of nuclear material. As set out in the reports we have submitted, we have adapted our legislation and taken various criminal and administrative measures to ensure effective migration and customs control in the aerial and maritime areas. Peru believes, moreover, that efforts to address the threat of such weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors must go hand in hand with greater cooperation at the subregional and regional levels, with the goal of prevention and of the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes. That was the stance taken recently by Peru at the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) Regional Industry Outreach Conference for the Pacific Alliance States and Brazil, organized recently by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Mexico City last June. By the same token, we believe it vital to ensure accurate, predictable and coherent action by those bodies charged with implementing the non-proliferation regime, in particular the Security Council. Another key challenge facing the international legal regime on that issue is the imperative need to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction currently held by various States. That is a long-standing aspiration of the international community whose realization will require greater involvement on the part of civil society and the scientific community, including non-governmental organizations, in our efforts to foster understanding of and outreach on the obligations borne by States under resolution 1540 (2004) and other related instruments. To conclude, Peru reaffirms its unstinting commitment to complying with international norms aimed at ensuring the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its concomitant international cooperation and coordination efforts, with the ultimate goal of setting the world free from the daunting threat of such weapons.

I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.

The alarming threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-State actors continues to grow. Advances in science and technology, alongside the evolving nature of terror, present challenges never before seen. To stop the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to ill-intentioned actors, the Security Council adopted resolution 1540 (2004), the only legally binding document dedicated specifically to the non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery to non-State actors, especially terrorists. Israel understands the severity of this issue first- hand, as our citizens live under constant threat, both conventional and unconventional. As such, we consider the non-proliferation of WMD a top priority. In recent years, the absolute norm against the use of chemical weapons has been eroded and challenged time and again. Failing States have transformed the Middle East region into a breeding ground for terrorists. The recklessness of some States has aggravated the threat of proliferation of WMD to non-State actors. The Al-Assad regime’s systematic use of chemical weapons has incentivized terrorists and non-State actors to obtain the materials and know-how to produce and deploy WMD. It is clear, therefore, that the responsibility for the proliferation of chemical weapons in Syria lies squarely at the feet of Al-Assad. The United Nations-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) found both the Al-Assad regime and Da’esh guilty of employing chemical weapons against innocent civilians. Last fall, after the JIM concluded that the Syrian regime was responsible for three chemical attacks, some in the international community had hoped this finding would deter Al-Assad from continuing to carry out such horrible attacks. But, sadly, they were wrong. On 4 April, at 6:30 a.m., the Al-Assad regime bombarded the people of Khan Shaykhun, a small town in the Hama area, with air strikes including sarin gas. As a first responder recalled: “I saw something I had never seen in my life ... children trying to breathe a gasp of air, with saliva and foam coming out of their mouths and nostrils”. With approximately 100 people killed and hundreds more wounded that morning, the attack on Khan Shaykhun is the latest example of the repeated abuses committed against innocent Syrians since 2013. The Al-Assad regime’s systematic use of chemical weapons must be stopped. Resolution 1540 (2004) prohibits the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. The development and testing of ballistic missiles increases the risk of proliferation of this means of delivery. Having developed and fired ballistic missiles consistently since the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), Iran has done its part to increase this global threat. On 18 and 19 June, Iran fired six Zulfiqar surface-to- surface missiles and one Qiam medium-range missile at the Deir ez-Zor area in Syria, claiming to have been targeting Da’esh. Following these launches, Sheikh Hussein al-Islam, an adviser to Iran’s Foreign Minister, made Iran’s true intention clear. He stated: “Israel is the main enemy of Iran. I think [Israel] understood the message. It now has to worry.” The international community must understand this message. It cannot ignore such a direct threat by one Member State against another. Today I shall use this forum to present new information outlining yet another unacceptable, blatant threat by Iran against Israel. This information has only recently come to light. Last December, Iran conducted a launch test of the Qiam, a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) category 1 missile that can carry a nuclear warhead. The missile landed very close to the target: a bullseye shaped like a Star of David. This use of the Star of David, the symbol of the Jewish people, for target practice is hateful and unacceptable. In the light of Iran’s missile launches, support for terror and bolstering of Al-Assad’s murderous regime, the Security Council must guarantee Iran’s full compliance with the relevant resolutions, especially on the eve of the Security Council’s briefing on non-proliferation. Over the years, Israel has taken extensive steps to implement resolution 1540 (2004). Israel has joined the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 and supports the statement delivered by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group today. The Israeli Government has instituted intelligence-gathering and intelligence-sharing improvements in border control and the development of advanced detection and identification devices. Israel has also enhanced facility and relevant dual-use material security as well as the strengthening of export controls. We believe that this multipronged strategy is key to the successful implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Finally, the international community must take clear action to counter State-sponsored proliferation and the proliferation of WMD to terrorists. Israel is fully committed to serving as an active partner in this international effort.

I now give the floor to the Permanent Representative of Pakistan.

Let me begin by expressing the appreciation of my delegation for your personal efforts, Sir, in leading the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and for holding this open debate. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the representative of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for their statements. Pakistan aligns itself with the statement to be delivered on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The debate on global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors is important and timely. It needs to be situated within the larger non-proliferation context. Resolution 1540 (2004) has emerged as an important instrument in the global non-proliferation architecture, as it seeks to prevent non-State actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. It has made a useful contribution to the advancement of our shared non-proliferation goals. While two recent successes, first in the Disarmament Commission and then the agreement reached on objectives and the agenda for a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, are encouraging. However, other aspects of the disarmament and non-proliferation landscape do not evoke similar optimism. Some nuclear-weapon States are not willing to give up their large inventories of nuclear weapons or their modernization programmes, even as they pursue non-proliferation with great zeal, purposively ignoring the fact that disarmament and non-proliferation are organically linked. Further progress may be impeded by recent developments, including the fact that one of the five permanent mebers of the Security Council has vowed to greatly strengthen and expand nuclear capabilities by outmatching and outlasting potential competitors. That would renew a nuclear arms race, in flagrant disregard of the basic principles enshrined at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Another key challenge to long-held non-proliferation norms and rules remains the granting of discriminatory waivers to some nations, thereby creating exceptions based on power or profit motives. Such special arrangements carry obvious proliferation risks and open up the possibility of the diversion of material intended for peaceful uses to military purposes, in addition, of course, to undermining regional strategic stability. With regard to the implementation of the resolution, the importance of staying one step ahead of non-State actors who seek to kill and maim innocent people by using weapons of mass destruction, especially in view of the rapid advancements in science and technology, cannot be overstated. Effective cooperation is the only way to proceed in that matter. It is imperative to leverage the cooperative approach and the spirit of national ownership that resolution 1540 (2004) engenders. Pakistan has been a consistent supporter of the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), and our commitment to its implementation is, we believe, exemplary. We have submitted five national implementation reports, the latest only last month. Over the years, Pakistan has acquired considerable experience and expertise in the safe and secure utilization of nuclear energy, as well as in the application of chemistry and biology for peaceful purposes. With regard to assistance in particular, our latest implementation report notes Pakistan’s readiness to offer assistance, in collaboration with the 1540 Committee, to interested States for capacity-building, technical assistance and training in the following areas: regulatory infrastructure in export controls and the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive materials; commodity identification training for enforcement officials; training for licensing officers; internal compliance; industry outreach and public awareness- raising; and academic and specialized courses in the field of nuclear safety and nuclear security, assistance and protection courses related to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as chemical safety and security. Pakistan also hosted a two-day regional seminar on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in Islamabad in March 2017, in which representatives from 18 countries and officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the OPCW and INTERPOL actively participated. The seminar also emphasized the key role of assistance aimed at strengthening the implementation of the resolution. However, the real value of such assistance will remain limited at best until we transform the process from one that is donor-driven to the one that caters to the actual needs of the States in need of help and assistance. In conclusion, let me reiterate that as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) deliberates on the legal, technical and political aspects of the membership of countries that are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it must establish and adhere to transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria that ensures equal treatment of non-NPT applicants for the Group’s membership, thereby strengthening, and not weakening, the non-proliferation regime. Pakistan’s strong credentials as an active partner in global non-proliferation efforts has established its eligibility to become a member of the NSG.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Archbishop Bernardito Cleopas Auza, Permanent Observer of the Observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations. Archbishop Auza: Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery constitutes a common challenge facing the international community and is a key element in global governance and international peace and security. It has been nearly six months since the Council’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, the situation has not, in our view, substantially changed, because, as Pope Francis has stated, we may say, “never again”, but at the same time we produce weapons and sell them to those who are at war with one another. The Pope would like to remind us that it is an absurd contradiction to speak of peace and to negotiate peace, while at the same time promoting or permitting the arms trade. He invites national leaders to commit themselves firmly to ending the arms trade, which victimizes so many innocent people, and he reiterates his strong support for the rapid adoption of steps that would lead to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and to the reduction of the world’s reliance on armed force in the conduct of national and international affairs. The principal legally binding instrument currently available for combating the proliferation threat is resolution 1540 (2004), adopted unanimously more than a decade ago. That resolution’s preventive role and the 1540 Committee’s efforts in the five areas of its work, namely, implementation, assistance, cooperation, transparency and dissemination, are fundamental in guiding the actions of all States in seeking to pool efforts to combat proliferation. In that regard, my delegation would like to reiterate that it is essential to improve assistance to States and cooperation among them, if we are to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is necessary to increase the coordination of national, regional and international efforts, as appropriate, so as to strengthen our response to that serious challenge. All States ought to take appropriate measures,in accordance with national and international law, and they ought to fulfil scrupulously their obligations under international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The establishment of zones free of weapons of mass destruction would also be a big step in the right direction, as it would demonstrate that we can indeed move toward a universal agreement to eliminate all such weapons. The proliferation of weapons, both conventional and those of mass destruction, aggravates conflict situations and results in huge human and material costs that profoundly undermine development and the search for lasting peace. Indeed, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament underpin global security and sustainable development. Without them, the achievement of the much-vaunted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will be seriously jeopardized, peace will continue to be dangerously in grave deficit and human sufferings will sadly remain unabated. It is imperative, therefore, that all State actors overcome their differences and find political solutions that can prevent and halt the involvement of non-State actors in wars and conflicts. Otherwise, the human cost of wars and conflicts will continue to grow and the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, along with their delivery systems and the risk of their use by States or terrorist groups, will remain very clear and present dangers.

I now give the floor to the representative of Estonia.

Estonia aligns itself with the statement to be made by the observer of the European Union. First, we would like to thank Bolivia for convening an open debate on this relevant topic, which is more pressing than ever. We fully agree that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. Such threats are continuously evolving, owing, inter alia, to rapid developments in science, technology and international commerce. The risk of State or non-State actors, particularly terrorists, seeking to develop or acquiring weapons of mass destruction is especially worrisome and, unfortunately, we have already seen those risks materializing. Toxic chemicals have repeatedly been used as weapons in Syria, and new credible allegations have been reported by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism attributed the responsibility for the series of chemical-weapon attacks to both the Syrian armed forces and the terrorists. The threatening and destabilizing actions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea represent a serious threat to international peace and security and undermine the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We therefore need to redouble our efforts at the national, regional and global levels to prevent non-State actors from acquiring sensitive materials and technologies. We believe that the key to effective counter-proliferation is universal adherence and the full implementation of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. We also must strive to make progress towards strengthening the existing instruments and regimes. We strongly support the multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms-control treaties, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty. We also stand ready for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We welcome the establishment of the high- level expert preparatory group whose mandate it is to make recommendations on substantive elements for a future treaty. Resolution 1540 (2004) remains the fundamental pillar and a key preventive instrument for a cooperative approach aimed at helping Member States to develop capabilities to face evolving threats in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I would like to reaffirm Estonia’s readiness to implement, in a proactive manner, resolution 1540 (2004), as urged in resolution 2325 (2016) and the comprehensive review report (see S/2016/1038). We believe that effective implementation entails effective legal enforcement and export controls. We also attach high importance to the existing multilateral export- control regimes. We continue to contribute to a number of global and regional non-proliferation initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. We also continue to support resolution 1540 (2004) by sharing our experience and knowledge in the area of the export control of dual-use items. Every step promoting transparency and greater responsibility contributes to the broader capacity-building of interested States.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. João Pedro Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. Mr. Vale de Almeida: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The following countries align themselves with this statement: the candidate countries Turkey, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania; the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to you, Mr. President, for convening this debate and for putting this important issue on the agenda of our meeting today. That is a clear and welcome sign of the Security Council’s continued engagement in support of resolution 1540 (2004) and its determination to drive forward the implementation of last year’s comprehensive review of that resolution. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing threat to international peace and security. It puts at risk the security of our States and our peoples. Some States have sought, or are seeking, the means and technology to develop weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The risk that terrorists could acquire such weapons is particularly worrisome. That should be a cause of serious concern for all of us. The international community needs to respond firmly. In the European Union’s view, our response should be based on a number of principles. First of all, we must continue to address the root causes of instability. Secondly, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements must be upheld and strengthened. Thirdly, multilateral institutions, especially those dealing with verification and compliance, deserve our full support. Fourthly, export-control lists and regimes play an important role in stemming proliferation. Finally, we must mainstream non-proliferation into our overall policies, resources and instruments. The European Union’s global strategy, issued one year ago, provides the foundation for the EU to continue, and even step up, its efforts in the coming years. In line with the global strategy, we strongly support the multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms-control treaties and regimes, and we will use every means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did with the Iranian nuclear programme. The EU and its member States believe that resolution 1540 (2004) remains a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture. Resolution 1540 (2004) has become even more important in the current security environment, which is characterized by acute and diffuse threats, and where external and internal security issues must be seen and tackled together. We are therefore pleased to see that the comprehensive review conducted in 2016 reaffirmed the centrality, importance and authority of resolution 1540 (2004) in the multilateral non-proliferation architecture. All 28 EU member States sponsored the new resolution 2325 (2016), which the Security Council unanimously adopted on 15 December 2016. I would like to warmly congratulate my Spanish colleagues for their outstanding work on that topic. As a follow-up to the comprehensive review and the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), last month the EU Council adopted a decision in support of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). That new EU Council decision is an ambitious funding scheme designed to help implement the outcome of the comprehensive review. Based on our fruitful cooperation in the past, we will again ask the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to perform the role of implementing partner for this project. The new scheme extends over a three-year period and is worth more than €2.6 million. Through the new Council decision, we will support cooperation and capacity-building, both nationally and at the regional level. We will pay special attention to the role of industry and support the relevant initiatives. Last but not least, we are keen to foster closer cooperation between EU-funded projects implemented by the Office for Disarmament Affairs and by other regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and those implemented by the European Commission through our centres of excellence. In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm the readiness of the European Union and its 28 member States to implement in a proactive manner the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). We will do so in close cooperation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and in partnership with all United Nations States Members and with other non-governmental stakeholders. The proliferation challenges are multifaceted and complex, and its consequences extremely worrying. But, working together, we can succeed in preventing the worst-case scenario from happening.

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland

Poland aligns itself with the statement just delivered by the observer of the European Union and with the statement delivered by the Chair of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). My delegation would like to make some additional comments from our national perspective. We thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this open debate and for your first quarterly message in your capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which was circulated in May. The ability of non-State actors to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction poses a continuous and real threat to global security and to the non-proliferation regime. This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) — one of the most universal treaties in the field of disarmament. However, it is with grave concern that we are following the recurring cases of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq. Reports by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism have confirmed that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham was among those responsible for horrific attacks on civilian populations over the past few years. Any use of chemical weapons strikes at the very foundations on which the CWC has been built. Although the OPCW is not an anti-terrorist organization, Poland believes it has the potential to counter the threat of the misuse of toxic chemicals by non-State actors. The OPCW position against terrorism can be strengthened by the full implementation of CWC provisions by States Parties. Poland also supports OPCW cooperation with other international stakeholders, including the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the 1540 Committee. Half a year ago, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2325 (2016), which Poland had the honour to support and co-sponsor. It was the culmination of the six-month-long comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and identified the strengths and areas for the improvement of the resolution. The resolution drew conclusions on the evolving nature of the risk of proliferation and the rapid advances in science and technology that might influence the non-proliferation regime. We fully share the approach taken in resolution 2325 (2016), which states that more attention should be paid by States to enforcement measures, to measures relating to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and to national export and transshipment controls. As you have accurately pointed out, Mr. President, “Experience shows that taking full advantage of direct interactions with Member States is the best way to achieve sustainable and measurable results with regard to effective implementation of the resolution”. We therefore commend Chile, China and the Russian Federation, which hosted regional courses for the 1540 contact points. Based on our own experience, we understand how important it is to develop cooperation at the regional level in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). We also repeat our readiness to assist other States, at their request, in their capacity- building efforts. Some simple steps may significantly strengthen non-proliferation. To name just the basic ones — we encourage the remaining 16 States to submit their national implementation plans with regard to resolution 1540 (2004). We also call on States that have not yet done so to accede to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Poland welcomes enhanced cooperation between the 1540 Committee and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We encourage Member States to develop direct engagement with the 1540 Committee and with other relevant forums, such as the Global Partnership, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australian Group, the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. In conclusion, I wish to state that my country has traditionally been a firm advocate of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at all levels. We stand ready to cooperate with all actors interested in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and security for all in a world free of weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 1540 (2004) plays a pivotal role in achieving that goal. I can therefore assure you of our full support, Mr. President, as well as of our support for the work of the 1540 Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of Norway.

I have the privilege of speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, namely, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and my own country, Norway. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, such as resolution 2325 (2016), supplement agreements on disarmament and on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It fills a critical gap in terms of preventing non-State actors, notably terrorist groups, from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. The resolution’s continued relevance is underscored by recent reports of use of chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria. Efforts to prevent non-State actors, including terrorists, from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction is an ongoing process. Hence, we agree with the President’s view that the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term task. It requires the continued vigilance and active participation of all relevant stakeholders, such as States Members of the United Nations, relevant international and regional organizations, the private sector and other civil-society partners. Our efforts must be dynamic. New threats are emerging, such as cyberthreats relating to weapons of mass destruction. The biological and chemical sectors require more attention, as significant gaps remain there as well. It is crucial that we take into account the rapid pace of technological development. Technological advances may, on the one hand, facilitate our efforts to implement resolution 1540 (2004), but new technologies may also lead to new threats. It is therefore important that we continuously update our tool box for combating WMD terrorism. That must be an important task for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as for the Council itself during its regular deliberations on WMD-related issues. States that have the necessary legislation and enforcement measures in place are better placed to benefit from ongoing technological advances. Hence, the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) also contributes to social and economic progress. The comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), undertaken last year, showed that considerable progress has been made in both the outreach and the implementation of the resolution. Initial reporting from Member States has clearly improved, but progress has been uneven. We need to do more to ensure that domestic legislation and enforcement measures are adequate for addressing the current challenges. That is primarily a national responsibility, but the Nordic countries recognize the need for international support and assistance, and we provide such support in various ways. Since its adoption by the Security Council, resolution 1540 (2004) has become more firmly anchored within the United Nations system and is complemented by work under relevant multilateral treaties. Such extensive ownership is crucial, since no nation is immune to WMD terrorism. Over the past decade, a broader international architecture of initiatives and partnerships has emerged to fight WMD terrorism. It is of the greatest importance that all such efforts be mutually supportive. The Nordic countries are active in the broader partnership. We have contributed financially to the Secretariat’s work on resolution 1540 (2004). At the latest Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., in 2016, individual Nordic countries made national pledges, such as working towards minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector and enhancing the nuclear-detection architecture. We are also engaged in long-standing technical cooperation with several countries on both nuclear safety and nuclear security. Other examples of relevant cooperation projects include the training of chemists from developing countries and assisting States in building their capacity to prevent and counter biological threats. Resolution 1540 (2004) is clearly a key component of the international security architecture. We must all strive towards its full and global implementation.

I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil.

I thank you, Sir, for organizing this open debate. I also thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Mr. Joseph Ballard, Senior Officer of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, for their briefings. The mere existence of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to humankind, and therefore to international peace and security. The possibility that such weapons may fall into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists, is of particular concern — all the more so today, as evidenced by the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq. We are also concerned about the vulnerability of countries in the face of new threats resulting from the development of new information and communication technologies, which have been used by non-State actors to carry out cyberattacks specifically designed to target States’ critical infrastructure. As a member of the Security Council, Brazil actively participated in the discussions that led to the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), and we have remained firmly committed to its implementation — as demonstrated by the national matrix prepared by the Group of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and approved by the Committee. Our Constitution prohibits any nuclear activity for non-peaceful purposes on Brazilian territory. Brazil is a party to all of the major treaties and conventions in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. At the same time, Brazil clearly promotes the peaceful uses of sensitive and dual-use goods and products, especially in activities related to industry, research and development. Brazil has followed with interest the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), concluded last December, and participated in the open consultations convened in June 2016 by the Chairman of the 1540 Committee. As the report on compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) acknowledges, the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long- term task that requires continued efforts at the national, regional and international levels. We are pleased that resolution 2325 (2016) also assigns a key role to international cooperation and assistance for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We recognize the important work carried out by the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, in particular in trying to match offers of and requests for cooperation. In order to address some of the shortcomings of that process, countries in a position to do so should assist countries to formulate requests for assistance. Brazil has participated in cooperation and assistance initiatives that contribute to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), especially in the drafting of national legislation on chemical and biological weapons and related materials. Despite the importance of resolution 1540 (2004), the focusing of international efforts exclusively on the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is insufficient. Disarmament measures are a fundamental component of any reasonable strategy to prevent such weapons from falling into the hands of non-State actors. Over the past 50 years, the international community has successfully adopted legally binding multilateral instruments banning biological and chemical weapons. Given the destruction and unimaginable suffering that nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting, the lack of similar instruments for such weapons is unacceptable and constitutes a flagrant violation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As we meet in the Council, the United Nations — in a debate open to all States, international organizations and civil society under a mandate pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/258 — is taking a decisive step to fill that vacuum through the negotiation of a nuclear- weapon-ban treaty. We are pleased with the constructive nature of today’s debate, and we are optimistic that by 7 July we will reach a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would represent an important contribution towards their total elimination, since, as evidenced by the example of chemical weapons and anti-personnel mines, prohibition is the first step towards elimination. The international community has often been confronted with the reasoning that security and stability concerns hamper the goal of nuclear disarmament. That is a false dichotomy. Relying on nuclear deterrence doctrines and strategies undermines the medium- and long-term security of all States. The risk that non-State actors may wish to acquire nuclear weapons is just one of many examples of such threats to international security. As former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has repeatedly said, “There are no right hands for wrong weapons.” We hope that, after years of stagnation, the international community will finally make concrete progress towards the goal of a world free from all weapons of mass destruction.

There are still a number of speakers remaining on my list. Given the lateness of the hour, I intend, with the consent of the members of the Security Council, to suspend this meeing until 2 p.m.