S/PV.8018 Security Council

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. Zerihoun. Mr. Zerihoun: I thank you, Mr. President for the opportunity to address the Security Council on issues related to United Nations sanctions. This Security Council discussion on sanctions is set against a backdrop of wide-ranging and sustained challenges to international peace and security. New crises are straining the collective capacity to respond, while older conflicts are simmering, without resolution and with the potential to reignite. It seems timely, therefore, to take stock of the efficacy of United Nations sanctions, as was recently done for peace operations, peacebuilding and the women peace and security agenda. Just as the causes of conflicts are complex and interlinked, the responses must be effective, complementary and mutually reinforcing. Sanctions are not an end in themselves. At their most effective, sanctions should contribute to a comprehensive political strategy, working in tandem with other Charter-based instruments, to prevent and peacefully resolve conflicts. Today, 13 Security Council sanctions regimes play an enabling role in preventing conflict, countering terrorism and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Council has adopted tailored and calibrated sanctions measures to deter unconstitutional change of government; the illicit exploitation of natural resources, which funds the activities of armed groups; as well as violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular sexual violence in conflict as an act of terror. Conversely, sanctions measures have been adopted to support the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts. The Council’s sanctions regimes on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Da’esh and Al-Qaida, as well as the regime under resolution 1718 (2006), on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, are central to international efforts to tackle terrorism and proliferation, respectively. Both have been continually adjusted to meet specific and evolving challenges, with due regard to the impact on civilian populations. Security Council sanctions are also a flexible instrument, subject to regular reviews, adjustments and terminations. In 2016, three sanctions regimes — those concerning Iran, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia — were terminated. While the Council has adopted 26 sanctions regimes since 1966, it has also terminated 15 regimes to date. That invalidates the often-heard criticism that the Council establishes but does not terminate its sanctions regimes. In its commitment to continually reviewing its sanctions regimes, the Council has also requested the Secretary-General to take stock of various elements of sanctions regimes. Since 2014, the Secretary- General has provided assessments to the Council on the arms embargoes in Somalia and the Central African Republic, as well as on the sanctions regimes in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. In his next report to the Security Council on small arms and light weapons, the Secretary-General will provide lessons learned on the implementation of arms embargoes in field missions. Reviews of sanctions regimes have also resulted in strengthening responses to growing threats. Last year, the Council adopted resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), which considerably strengthened the existing sanctions regime on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In Libya, the Council expanded the prohibitions on the export of petroleum products and designation criteria were adopted this year for acts of sexual violence in the Central African Republic, as well as in the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Moreover, the Council has combined the robust enforcement of sanctions with due respect for human rights through the Focal Point for Delisting in the Secretariat and the Office of the Ombudsperson for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Over the past decade, the Council has made important strides in its due process commitments when imposing targeted sanctions on individuals and entities. Effective United Nations sanctions require the broad-based support of Member States and the international community at large. Even the best designed United Nations sanctions resolutions are not self-implementing. Member States still need to fulfil their implementation obligations. While there may have been different assessments of the implementation gap of United Nations sanctions, it is undeniable that the diversity and complexity of targeted United Nations sanctions regimes have imposed a considerable burden of implementation on Member States and other implementing entities. In order to mitigate those difficulties, the Security Council and its sanctions committees have enhanced outreach to Member States, especially to regional countries affected by sanctions. Sanctions committees routinely meet with regional countries to discuss implementation challenges. Chairs of sanctions committees have also held open briefings, including for regional groups, in order to promote awareness of Council sanctions regimes. Those are supplemented with the travel of committee Chairs to countries and regions impacted by sanctions. That allows for the accrual of first-hand understanding of the effectiveness of sanctions measures. Furthermore, all Security Council sanctions lists have been made available in the six official United Nations languages, with linkages to Security Council- INTERPOL Special Notices, where available. The Secretariat has also been working on the implementation of an enhanced data model of United Nations sanctions lists in order to deepen the information base, which will allow for more accurate screening of individuals and entities by relevant national and international authorities. While those are all useful means to enhance the application of sanctions, the implementation of United Nations sanctions is necessarily a whole-of-Government endeavour. Member States would benefit from even greater in-country assistance. Sanctions are adopted in New York, but they are mainly implemented at border crossings, ports and airports, as well as in banking and financial institutions, bringing together a multitude of Government institutions at various levels, as well as the private sector. Beyond Member States, the positive experience of Council’s partnership with INTERPOL, especially through the use of the Special Notices, should be applied to other important partnerships, especially the aviation and financial sectors. All previous State-led reviews of United Nations sanctions have stressed the importance of coordinated United Nations system-wide support to sanctions regimes. Since 2014, under the leadership of the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Sanctions, which is comprised of 26 United Nations entities, has continued its work to ensure system-wide support to United Nations sanctions. The Working Group is an important forum for promoting better understanding of United Nations sanctions regimes, facilitating the preparation of sanctions assessment reports, and promoting productive interactions among United Nations entities, sanctions committees and sanctions experts. The Department of Political Affairs, through its Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD), has also continued its support to the Security Council in the design, implementation and evaluation of United Nations sanctions. In recent years, SCAD has further enhanced its support to the Council, sanctions committees and their experts on substantive, procedural and technical issues. Sanctions workshops and regime-specific briefings were organized for incoming members of the Council in order to explain working methods and procedural issues, as well as the substantive aspects of each sanctions regime. Furthermore, advisory support was also provided to Member States in order to facilitate the implementation of United Nations sanctions regimes, in particular regarding exemption requests and implementation reports. The Security Council Affairs Division also plays a key role in supporting and managing the nine sanctions monitoring groups, teams and panels, which are comprised of 59 sanctions experts. Since 2013, the Division has organized an annual inter-panel workshop for all sanctions experts. Since 2015, it has organized an investigative techniques workshop for relevant experts, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Internal Oversight and Audit. The importance of our support to sanctions experts was, tragically, brought into sharp focus with the killings in March of Ms. Zaida Catalán and Mr. Michael Sharp, members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Even as we continue to press for full accountability for those abhorrent crimes, we need to also reassess the security arrangements that govern the work of sanctions experts in order to ensure that such crimes never happen again. In that regard, the findings and recommendations of the board of inquiry will be instructive. We look forward to the support of the Security Council in the implementation of the necessary changes that may be required. United Nations sanctions are a formidable instrument for global peace and security. It is important that they continue to be deployed in tandem with other Charter-based instruments in the service of clearly established objectives, and with respect for due process and human rights.

I thank Mr. Zerihoun for his briefing. I now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

I thank Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his briefing, which has made clear that sanctions are a vital part of the Security Council’s arsenal. As Article 41 of the United Nations Charter makes clear, they give real effect to our decisions, turning words spoken in this Chamber into tangible actions against those who threaten international peace and security. They are not our first resort, nor are they a measure that we can ever take lightly, but we know that sanctions work. They helped bring peace and security to countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. They helped bring Iran to the negotiating table, which led in turn to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. And sanctions continue to play a vital role in the fight against Da’esh and Al-Qaida in Iraq, Syria and beyond. All of these examples illustrate not just the efficacy of sanctions but the importance of using them together with the other tools at our disposal. The Iran deal was not forged from sanctions alone. Our victory over Da’esh will not be secured through the hard work of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, alone. Sanctions must sit alongside all our other tools: direct political dialogue, mediation, peacekeeping and special political missions. And just as with all other tools of the Council, it is important that sanctions remain fit for purpose. So I want to thank you, Mr. President, for bringing this issue before the Council again so that we can consider if there are further ways to improve our collective work on sanctions. All future work on sanctions should build on the great deal of valuable work that has already been carried out by States and stakeholders on this issue. In particular, I want to highlight both the work of the United Nations informal working group from 2006 and also the high-level review of United Nations sanctions led by Sweden and other sponsors. They have produced good recommendations. But as we all know, building the political commitment required for effective follow-up has been challenging. This issue of political will applies above all when it comes to the serious implementation of sanctions. For such measures to be truly effective, it is absolutely essential that all States implement them fully. It is not good enough just for the majority of countries to do so. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. All Member States must recognize and respect the fact that there can be no ifs, no buts: sanctions agreed in the Council are legally binding Chapter VII obligations. I recognize that even when there is strong political will, implementation can be challenging, not just for States but also for businesses. There is already much good work in this area: outreach from sanctions committees, the development of networks and capacity- building, the sharing of information and best practices among States. But a great deal more can still be done, especially on the most important of sanctions dossiers, such as North Korea, where the number of States reporting on implementation still falls far short of what it needs to be. That is why, Mr. President, we welcome further consideration of your delegation’s recent suggestion for a Secretary-General’s report on cross-cutting issues related to sanctions. If this report builds on the existing work I have referred to, draws lessons from current sanctions regimes and offers concrete practical suggestions on how to improve implementation and effectiveness, then we think that this could be a valuable addition to our sanctions work, one that will help set a clear agenda for further improvements, building on the high-level review and other efforts. There is, quite simply, no clearer reminder of the need to strengthen our sanctions capability that the current situation that we confront in relation to North Korea. Here we face a State that continues to act in flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions, a State that continues to threaten not just its region but the whole world in its reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and illegal missiles. Their latest ICBM launch last week suggests a capability that puts most Security Council members, including the United Kingdom, within range. I have said before in this Chamber, but it bears repeating today, that we as the Security Council must act and must be prepared to use sanctions to raise the cost to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of pursuing these illegal actions.

At the outset, let me thank Egypt for having organized this timely meeting on sanctions, which are an important tool under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council has a long-standing history and practice of applying sanctions. However, several key issues need to be considered to make sanctions relevant, such as the best means of increasing their effectiveness by making them more carefully targeted; ensuring their worldwide implementation in the most efficient and balanced way; averting negative socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences for innocent populations and third States; and preventing double standards in their application. Kazakhstan supports the need for Security Council sanctions mechanisms and the implementation of Council sanctions that are important preventive measures and help sustain or restore international peace and security. In accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the use of sanctions, and the subsequent use of force, should be undertaken with caution. They must not be seen as an early response but rather as a last resort, after all preventive and diplomatic means have been exhausted. Sanctions should be designed to modify behaviour. Wherever possible, they must be subject to a pre-assessment on the probable impact of the proposed sanctions from a humanitarian point of view, as well as enforcement and efficacy. Equally crucial is the need for monitoring and regular review, taking full account of collateral effects. Bodies imposing or supervising sanctions must ensure the maximum possible transparency and accountability, accompanied by improved working methods and processes. Correspondingly, Secretariat budgeting and staffing on sanctions needs to be strengthened so as to bring about substantial improvement in means of sanctions enforcement. We join others in their recommendation that the ad hoc Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions should be strengthened. My delegation welcomes the restructuring of the Security Council Affairs Division team so as to meet the needs of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). We hope that this process will be concluded soon in order to reinforce technical and administrative support for the Monitoring Team and thus fulfil that high-profile mandate in a challenging security and political environment. Every sanction regime is unique and carefully tailored to address specific, clear objectives. However, there is always room for improvement, such as disseminating the best practices of various committees so as to enhance the overall effectiveness of United Nations sanctions regimes. These also can be enhanced by greater cooperation and information-sharing. Throughout the sanctions phase, every effort should be made to continue with diplomacy and mediation so as to ensure that Member States comply with Security Council resolutions. Sanctions should have clear, precisely defined objectives and termination criteria, and, when these have been met, they should be lifted. It is important for the Security Council sanctions committees to closely cooperate and engage in dialogue with the Member States affected and raise their awareness regarding the reasons for and the objectives and nature of the sanctions measures undertaken. Lack of awareness and absence of a relationship with the affected Member States could potentially erode the credibility of United Nations sanctions and result in a reluctance to implement them. We also call for close interaction among all interested Member States so as to influence those States and bring about regional global compliance. Just as vital is timely information management and sharing among the Council, Member States, regional or subregional bodies and technical bodies, including INTERPOL, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Air Transport Association, the World Customs Organization and the Financial Action Task Force, with the aim of monitoring covert illegal operations. The role of the private sector is critical to uphold norms so that some entities do not become illegal trading or export or import partners with countries under sanctions regimes. We also call for greater vigilance by chambers of commerce working as key partners with all actors involved in this complex and wide-ranging stakeholder arrangement. Capacity-building for Member States that are at various stages of the economic continuum is necessary. States must be helped to understand and upgrade their legal procedures and enact new domestic legislation in keeping with United Nations standards. Similarly, assistance in technical guidance and the provision of equipment and scientific tools are necessary to detect the inflow and outflow of money and goods that constitute sanctions violations. To conclude, Kazakhstan, as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al Qa’ida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea will strive, as part of the larger multilateral effort, to enhance United Nations sanctions regimes as tools for promoting regional and global peace and security.

I thank Egypt for having its initiative to convene today’s meeting. I would like to thank Assistant Secretary- General Zerihoun for his briefing. Under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, sanctions measures, as one of the peaceful means of conflict resolution, play a positive role in maintaining international peace and security. Over the years, the Security Council has established multiple sanctions regimes to address conflict situations. Some of those regimes have served their purpose and have been lifted. At the same time, some sanctions regimes have problems and require careful consideration by the Security Council in order to improve them effectively. We must pay particular attention to the following aspects. First, the use of sanctions by the Security Council must be in full keeping with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. There must be prudence and responsibility when employing sanctions. As a matter of priority, the Security Council should use non-coercive means, such as negotiations, mediation and good offices to respond to the threats to international peace and security. The imposition of sanctions should be predicated upon the exhaustion of non-coercive means. Sanctions are peaceful means and should therefore be implemented in a peaceful manner, rather than being imposed through the use of force. Secondly, the Security Council’s decision to impose sanctions must be part of an overall political settlement package. Sanctions are not the end in themselves. Sanctions alone cannot resolve issues. The fundamental way out is through the use of political and diplomatic means, such as dialogue and negotiation. In quite a few cases, the weak link in the solution lies not with the level of sanctions implementation, but rather with the lack of progress in the political track. The Security Council’s decision on the overall political package should be advanced holistically. The implementation of Security Council resolutions should not be selective. The use of sanctions measures by the Security Council should serve the overall purpose of the political process. It should be conducive to the mediation and good offices efforts by the relevant countries, regional organizations and the United Nations, thereby truly helping to ease the situation on the ground and reach solutions. Thirdly, the Security Council should enhance the relevance of sanctions in order to avoid negative consequences. The Council should determinedly focus on the key aspects of issues at hand and be prudent when considering the measures and scope of sanctions. Sanctions should serve the purpose of conflict resolution. To the greatest extent possible, sanctions measures should have a low negative impact on the general population and third countries. In addition, sanctions measures should not affect the normal legal trade and economic relations of the sanctioned countries nor people’s livelihoods and the humanitarian situation in the countries concerned. As the situation on the ground and the resolution process evolve, the Security Council should conduct timely evaluations and assessments of the sanctions measures and, as needed, adjust, suspend and, ultimately, terminate them. Imposing sanctions is a very important decision. It should be done properly and strictly in line with decisions taken by the Security Council so as to avoid any attempt outside the framework of the Security Council to impose unilateral sanctions or wilfully expand their scope. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China will continue to maintain its prudent and responsible approach in addressing the issue of sanctions so as to ensure that the sanctions measures decided by the Security Council will serve the ultimate purpose of the political process and be subject to it, in order for it to play its part in maintaining international peace and security in a constructive and positive manner.

We express appreciation to the Egyptian presidency for organizing today’s briefing on enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions, building on the Arria-formula meeting held last month. We thank the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, for his very useful briefing. As defined in the Charter of the United Nations and as colleagues have indicated, sanctions are one of the important tools at the disposal of the Security Council for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. As Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun stated and as is also self-evident, sanctions are not an end in themselves. They are and should be part of a broader political strategy, aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. Without them, they cannot achieve the desired results. We recognize that sanctions have evolved significantly over time. The way that the Security Council uses sanctions has changed from its earlier practice of imposing comprehensive sanctions to its contemporary practice of applying targeted measures. That is an important development, which would make the sanctions regime more effective and, most importantly, provide a mechanism to address the unintended and adverse effects of comprehensive sanctions. If used appropriately and in a targeted manner, we believe that sanctions have the potential to exert pressure on specific individuals or entities whose behaviour the Council is seeking to influence. We understand that important work has been done in the past to review the efficacy of sanctions, following the Council’s willingness, as shown in practice, to make use of targeted sanctions more often and apply them to a broader range of activities and more diverse kinds of threats to international peace and security. We thank the presidency for taking up this subject matter and its effort to build on this important work. We agree that sanctions should be carefully designed and implemented to include clear objectives, as well as a defined scope and to periodically review the progress made against their objectives. More often than not, discussions tend to be polarized with arguments in favour of or against the application of sanctions in general terms. We do not believe that that will help to make progress in enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions. In our opinion, perhaps a better approach to achieving the desired objective would be to look at the merit of each case and its specific context. We recognize that sanctions are not meant to stay in place forever. If the situation warrants the modification or lifting of a sanction, the Council should not hesitate to take appropriate measures accordingly. However, specific situations may also require that sanctions be strengthened, and the Council should not shy away from that. Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun mentioned instances where that has happened. What really matters is the reality on the ground, and the importance of ensuring that the Council uses its tools effectively so as to induce changes in behaviour. That underscores the need for realism and pragmatism in dealing with various situations. We are opposed to politicizing sanctions and allowing double standards in their design and implementation. Nonetheless, we do not think that that should lead us to reject the use of sanctions as a tool. Rather, we should avoid politicization and double standards and apply sanctions judiciously, when appropriate, and based on the merits of the case. Moreover, the Council and Member States’ level of enthusiasm and determination for implementing sanctions should not differ from one sanction regime to another. That is another reason why we should continually review the way the Council uses and implements this tool, and draw valuable lessons for improving sanctions’ application and implementation. Lastly, the important role that regional and subregional organizations play in improving the design and effective implementation of sanctions regimes cannot be overlooked. Coordinating efforts with regional and subregional organizations and mechanisms is very important for the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. If we look at the Constitutive Act of the African Union, it has a much more progressive stance on the issue, and it is one reason why we urge the Council to further enhance its cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, including on the issue under discussion.

We are grateful to the Egyptian delegation for organizing today’s meeting and for the briefing by Mr. Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. Sanctions are one of the most important instruments in the Security Council’s toolbox. However, political practice has shown that restrictive measures cannot be an end in themselves. Their job is to assist in the achievement of political and diplomatic solutions to conflict situations, and the Council alone has the right to impose and use them in support of the clear and legitimate goals that are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. We recognize the importance of improving sanctions. We believe they should be limited in duration, subject to regular review and have clear criteria for being phased out. It is important to ensure that they focus on those who are genuinely responsible for instigating crises. They should not harm civilians or socioeconomic development, which is why it is essential to study the situation carefully before introducing them. Using restrictive measures to overthrow objectionable regimes, including through economic strangulation or by influencing their circumstances, is unacceptable. We believe that the wilful interpretation of sanctions decisions is illegitimate. Experience has shown that it is liable to increase chaos and worsen civilian populations’ suffering. It is also important to ensure that sanctions texts do not depart from generally recognized international legal standards. Sanctions should never be wielded as a club against diplomatic and consular representatives, whose activities have been seriously complicated by expanded interpretations of existing restrictions, constituting a violation of the Vienna Conventions. With regard to the work of the Security Council Sanctions Committees, I would like to emphasize that any infringement on their prerogatives should not tolerated. In particular, we see no need for duplicating their powers by adding bureaucratic superstructures, including working groups. Every sanctions regime is individual and unique by definition, and what is useful for some issues can be counterproductive for others. It is important to emphasize that as an intergovernmental organization, the United Nations should reserve the prerogative of decision-making for Member States. In that context, we are wary of the idea of introducing supporters of stakeholders into the decision-making chain. It is no secret that they may be fronting for influence groups interested in a particular outcome, not to mention the fact that most of the Sanctions Committees have their own monitoring groups providing independent evaluations and recommendations. It is regrettable that the use of unilateral restrictions, often on top of Security Council decisions, is becoming the norm today. That frequently implies unfair economic competition. Such policies undermine political and diplomatic efforts to resolve crises, run counter to efforts to strengthen international cooperation, violate States’ sovereignty and legitimate interests and have nothing to do with the concerns of a global Organization. We are ready to continue constructive discussion of the issue of improving sanctions mechanisms. In that context, we believe it would be useful to return to the results of the Council’s Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions. Its achievements, including a final report (S/2006/997), made a significant contribution to improving the effectiveness of the work of the relevant Committees. Many of them could be adapted to current realities.

I would like to thank the Egyptian presidency for organizing today’s meeting and Assistant Secretary- General Zerihoun for his thorough briefing. For more than 50 years now, the prohibitions and restrictions imposed by the Security Council have been recognized as the most powerful non-military response to threats to global peace and security that we have. We share the view that sanctions continue to be an important tool for countering terrorism, preventing conflicts, consolidating peace agreements, protecting civilians and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the current practice of introducing more precise and targeted sanctions is aimed at striking a balance between the desired result and any possible unintended or adverse socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences in specific States or third States. Significant progress has also been made in designing and monitoring the implementation of sanctions regimes since April 2000, when the Council’s Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions was first established. Another successful step has been the establishment of expert panels to assist the relevant Security Council Committees, while the introduction of an entirely new institution — the Office of the Ombudsperson of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities — is a notable leap forward in ensuring that sanctions meet human rights standards. The processes of designing, implementing, evaluating and following up sanctions, as well as of the relevant Committees’ working methods, monitoring and enforcement, are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing. At the same time, we have to recognize that the Council’s sustained attention is needed not only for developments in the design of sanctions and calibration of their nature and scope, but also for the issue of enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency. That clearly depends largely on Member States’ prompt, comprehensive implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. We see two major challenges in making United Nations sanctions more efficient. The first — and here we echo the comments of the delegation of the United Kingdom — is a lack of political will, which prevents the Council from responding promptly and decisively to grave violations of international law. The second is outright obstruction or evasion of existing sanctions. While the lack of political will and abuses of the right to the veto should be the subject of a separate debate, I would like to recall that paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations states, among other things, that Member States shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. In that respect, Security Council should explore ways to further strengthen the roles of the respective Committees in identifying possible cases of non-compliance and determining the appropriate course of action with regard to those who violate the relevant international obligations. Outreach activities, including awareness-raising and dialogue with the relevant international and regional organizations, as well as the effective means of enforcing sanctions, are seen as important elements in curbing, eliminating and further preventing sanctions’ evasion. At the same time, assistance to States in implementing United Nations sanctions is an area in which, in our view, more can and should be done to increase the effect of decisions made by the Council. Let me also stress in that connection the important role played by various international organizations in implementing sanction regimes to respond to breaches of peace and other grave violations of international law. The use of additional measures and their own specific instruments for better targeting international wrongdoing is an essential part of the international toolbox in that area. The efforts of the European Union should be seen as an example of a consistent and coherent sanctions policy firmly rooted in international law. Ukraine is among those countries that fully recognize the importance of undertaking continuous efforts, including periodic reviews, to further improve the proper design, implementation, evaluation and follow-up of sanctions regimes and to increase the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. To that end, we are in favour of further endeavours, including relevant reports of the Secretary-General, aimed at the independent review of cross-cutting issues and trends in the application of sanctions and the best practices and challenges relating to their implementation, as well as preparing recommendations, including with regard to practical options to better support Member States’ capacities in that area. I should like to conclude by citing Jan Eliasson: “[S]anctions can work — when they are designed and implemented well and when they enjoy the support of Member States on and outside the Security Council.” (DSG/SM/777)

Bolivia expresses its appreciation for the briefing given by Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary- General for Political Affairs. My delegation also welcomes the initiative of Egypt in organizing today’s informative meeting, highlighting a very important and sensitive issue that affects the maintenance of international peace and security. Our Organization is based on the values ​of multilateralism, and it is precisely through those values that the United Nations, as a multilateral system, depends on the legitimacy and international legality that allow it to address global problems and conflicts and, at the same time, to respond to threats to international peace and security through, inter alia, the imposition of sanctions. Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, sanctions must be considered only when all other means of peacefully settling disputes set forth in Chapter VI of the Charter have been exhausted and only after their short-term and long-term effects have been evaluated in detail. In that vein, sanctions must not be an end in themselves. They must be used as a measure of last resort in the event of a breach of the provisional measures established under the Charter, and must be imposed only when there is a clear threat to international peace and security, the breach thereof or an impending act of aggression. Currently, we are witnessing a dangerous trend towards the proliferation of the application and imposition of unilateral sanctions. The Plurinational State of Bolivia categorically rejects the implementation of such measures because they represent a flagrant violation of multilateralism and a serious threat to the international order, and constitute illegal measures that impose the jurisdiction and internal legislation of one State over another, thereby violating the principles of equality, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the States. Such actions are not only illegal — constituting, as I said, an imposition of one State’s domestic law on another’s and upon the international order — but also constitute actions that usurp the functions of legal bodies, such as the Security Council, which is the only international legal body that can impose sanctions on States and non-State actors within the framework of the Charter. Accordingly, we reiterate that any measure adopted unilaterally by one State to the detriment of another through the use of force or any other coercive measures is outside the framework of the Security Council and therefore illegal and contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter. We believe that, when the imposition of sanctions is to be considered, the right to due process and respect for international law must be taken into account, which, through official and reliable sources of information, helps to clearly establish the situation in a given national context that might represent a threat to international peace and security, while at all times observing the principle of the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes before resorting to measures that warrant the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. The design and development of sanctions must be governed by fair and transparent procedures that help to clearly identify the conditions demanded of States or parties upon which sanctions have been imposed, with a periodic review of those measures to assess their effects and modify them as needed with respect to developments. We believe that the imposition of sanctions must not affect the development of States subject to such measures, and in all cases must be implemented with a view to minimizing the impact on and possible humanitarian cost for the civilian population affected by the implementation of such measures. Those issues were addressed at the World Summit held during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, on 24 October 2005, at which it was reiterated that sanctions must be selective and have clear goals, thereby ensuring that their implementation strikes a balance between their effectiveness in achieving the desired outcomes and their potentially negative consequences, including socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences involving the population and third States. That was in line with the final document of the seventeenth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Isla Margarita in 2016, which states: (spoke in English) “The objectives of sanctions are not to punish or otherwise exact retribution on the populace. In this regard, the objectives of sanctions regimes should be clearly defined, and that its imposition should be for a specified time frame and be based on tenable legal grounds, and that it should be lifted as soon as the objectives are achieved. The conditions demanded of the State or party on which sanctions are imposed should be clearly defined and subject to periodic review. Sanctions should be imposed only when there exists a threat to international peace and security or an act of aggression, in accordance with the Charter, and that it is not applicable “preventively” in instances of mere violation of international law, norms or standards. Targeted sanctions may be a better alternative so long as the population of targeted State concerned is not victimised whether directly or indirectly”. (spoke in Spanish) Lastly, we believe that it is necessary to develop a process for evaluating the methodology, implementation, impact and modification of sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which must carry out that task so as to improve the desired results with the ultimate goal being, at all times, to ensure that international peace and security prevail. Bolivia supports the preparation by the Secretary-General of a report on the impact of sanctions, which should also cover the impact of unilateral sanctions on international law and international peace and security. We recall that the sanctions that the Security Council imposes are under no circumstances the foundation on which more sanctions can be added. Rather they constitute the ceiling or limit that is legally and legitimately agreed within the framework of the Charter.

I should also like to thank the Egyptian delegation for convening today’s meeting, as well as the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Tayé- Brook Zerihoun, for his briefing today. For Uruguay, it is important that the Security Council work to improve the effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. In that regard, the ongoing analysis of sanctions regimes is a necessary exercise of systemic importance aimed at reviewing the efficiency and the effectiveness of any tool that the Security Council has at its disposal for the maintenance of international peace and security. In that regard, we also recognize the value of the contributions that Member States often make, including the high-level review that was undertaken several years ago under the auspices of Germany, Australia, Finland, Greece and Sweden (see S/2015/432). That review was an important task that could be continued in order improve the design of Security Council sanctions regimes. I would like to focus my statement on one fundamental area: the need for sanctions regimes to be effective, with effectiveness meaning the complete achievement of the goal of the sanctions. Each of the sanctions regimes should be conceived as a tool that allows the Security Council to achieve a goal. In order to be effective, that tool must complement other tools, such as mediation and dialogue. At the same time, I would like, on that point, to mention the importance of naming specific objectives when designing sanctions regimes, objectives that, once achieved, will serve as the basis for lifting those sanctions. Generally, the Council imposes sanctions without establishing the conditions under which they may be lifted. No specific goals are set out, and there is a lack of guarantees for those who are the object of the sanctions. In turn, individuals, entities or States subject to sanctions do not know if at any given time they can be absolved and, if that were to happen, under what conditions. Moreover, sanctions should be designed in such a way as to minimize the adverse effects on the civilian population. The periodic review and improvement of the initial design of sanctions regimes, for which specific commitments have been set out, are therefore crucial. Secondly, Uruguay recognizes the suitability of a comprehensive sanctions review, similar to those conducted on the peacebuilding architecture, on peacekeeping operations, and on women and peace and security. I wish to mention the importance of cooperation for the effective implementation of all sanctions-regime provisions. It would be useful for the information collected by a group of experts to be made available to other groups of experts, if they are considered to be of relevance. We would also point out the necessity of strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and other institutions, such as INTERPOL or the regional or international financial institutions. It is also appropriate to highlight the importance of cooperation between States for the effective implementation of sanctions regimes. For that level of cooperation to be viable, two variables come into play: the capacities of States and their political will. Frequently, the effective implementation of sanctions regimes requires an infrastructure and logistical capacities that are often lacking in developing countries. That may include software, intelligence, data cross-referencing, cutting-edge technology, etc. That sort of lack directly affects the implementation of the provisions of the various sanctions regimes and undermines their legitimacy. In conclusion, I wish to recall the importance of systematic political commitment to the correct implementation and design of sanctions regimes, which are always understood as a means or tool of the Security Council aimed at achieving an ultimate goal.

First of all, I should like to thank the Egyptian presidency of the Security Council for organizing this important meeting, as well as the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, for his very informative briefing. With 13 active sanctions regimes, sanctions have become a crucial tool available to the Security Council. Although they are never an end in themselves, sanctions can be an essential instrument for preserving international peace and security in two ways. The first is by targeting terrorist groups or individuals. Collectively, the sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and Da’esh represents more than half of the entities and individuals sanctioned by the Security Council today. The second way is by intervening in support of States weakened by insecurity, the presence of armed groups in their territory, deficiencies in the political process, the prevalence of weapons, or human rights violations, factors that have triggered the majority of the Security Council sanctions regimes. Sanctions regimes can make a significant contribution to advancing a political process. The adoption of targeted measures against individuals or entities impeding the peace process is an important lever for stopping such behaviour or for weakening those who do so. That was particularly the case in Côte d’Ivoire at the height of the post-election crisis there. In Somalia, the embargo on charcoal undermines one of Al-Shabaab’s sources of funding. These are just a few examples. Implemented in the 1990s, sometimes indiscriminately, sanctions regimes have since undergone considerable change, taking into account both the humanitarian needs and the rights of individuals. In its practice, the Council has ensured that such schemes have been targeted as precisely as possible to reach the persons, entities or sectors that directly affect the stability of States, and that such schemes have no negative consequences for the population. No one can say in good faith that, in a context of active armed conflict and large-scale violence against civilians, an arms embargo is a measure that would negatively affect the population. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, it was possible to adapt the sanctions regime to changing circumstances. Introduced in 2003, the arms embargo there has been continually adjusted. Since 2008, it has only targeted non-State entities. Individual sanctions against armed groups have also had to be adapted to developments in the situation. France also attaches great importance to strengthening respect for the rules for a fair hearing with regard to sanctions decided by the Council. Considerable progress has been made in that area, with the creation of a focal-point mechanism and, above all, the Office of the Ombudsperson in 2009. In that respect, France wishes to recall the importance of ensuring a rapid and effective transition following the departure of Ms. Marchi-Uhel, who is to take on other functions. It is essential that we continue to improve the functioning and transparency of sanctions regimes. It is also essential that sanctions and embargoes, whether targeting arms or other products, be fully respected and implemented by all actors present in the territory to which they apply. There are often exemption mechanisms that provide flexibility for specific cases. It is necessary to remind and educate everyone of the need to respect the procedures laid down for that purpose. France will, of course, continue to fully play its part in such efforts.

My delegation would like to thank the Egyptian presidency for the opportunity to discuss a particularly important issue in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security. The interest of the subject that brings us together today, namely, sanctions as measures decided on by the Security Council that do not involve the use of force, is that it highlights a central element of our collective action aimed at achieving our common goal of peace and security for all, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security. As highlighted by the High-level Review of United Nations Sanctions and the subsequent Compendium issued in June 2015 (S/2015/432), sanctions form an important tool for maintaining collective security and, as such, have been used with increasing regularity in order to deal with various increasingly complex threats to international peace and security, such as terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, violations of human rights and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. It is, therefore, understandable that the design, implementation and scope of such measures should be the subject of a common understanding, mutual reinforcement and equal commitment by all the parties concerned, in particular all of the entities of the United Nations system. It is in that spirit that the 2005 World Summit Outcome recalls that we must “ensure that sanctions are implemented in ways that balance effectiveness to achieve the desired results against the possible adverse consequences, including socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences, for populations and third States.” (General Assembly resolution 60/1, para.106) It is now recognized that United Nations sanctions have evolved significantly over the years. They tend to be more clever, more intelligent and more adapted to the situations to which they apply. Experience has shown, however, that their effectiveness and positive contribution to the improvement of given situations depend to a large extent on the transparency and clarity of their purpose and the objectives that the sanctions hope to achieve, as well as on the adherence of the different parties. Additionally, the effectiveness of sanctions depends especially on the consistency of the sanctions concerned with other measures or actions carried out by the United Nations with their partners, in particular regional and national partners, in response to the given problem or situation. The issue of the effectiveness of sanctions can be approached from various angles — notably angles related to their legitimacy and their timeliness, the political will of the actors in charge of their application and their adaptation to specific situations and to the various methods of the Council or its various sanctions committees used to monitor the development and implementation of the regimes established. However, my delegation would like to highlight some aspects that we consider to be essential for the effectiveness and efficiency of sanctions regimes. The challenge is, first and foremost, to address the challenge of consistency with other United Nations responses and actions, as advocated by the aforementioned High-level Review, which indicates that the integration of sanctions in other United Nations interventions is essential for identifying synergies, preventing incompatible actions and enhancing the overall effectiveness of the collective security system. Given the increasing importance of the regional dimension in the system of collective peace and security, we believe that the second challenge is to place greater emphasis on the synergy of the efforts of regional, sub-regional and international actors with the policies and actions of the United Nations. Indeed, in most of the regimes in effect, cooperation between the sanctions committees and the countries in the region has proved to be an essential element of the effectiveness of the measures adopted. Finally, we believe that in a context characterized by the growth of the Internet and digital technologies, coupled with the growing complexity of the financial environment — a context in which the free movement of people and goods is developing — capacity-building is a crucial dimension of international cooperation. The level of the capacities of the countries and institutions involved in the implementation of sanctions is decisive, if one bears in mind that most sanctions regimes relate to developing countries. It is therefore important to pay particular attention to those developing countries that fully understand that in an international environment where emerging threats are transnational challenges, those countries cannot be the weak links in the collective security system. It should be noted, for example, that the same national systems for combating illegal financial transactions or the financing of terrorism can also detect assets from individuals or entities subject to sanctions and can allow countries to act accordingly. In most developing countries, therefore, such technical assistance is necessary in order to ensure an adequate flow of information, harmonize actions between the competent services of the State and integrate aspects relating to sanctions into the domestic judicial systems of States. I cannot end my remarks without raising the issue of natural resources, which are increasingly being addressed by sanctions regimes, particularly in the context of African countries. The challenge for sanctions regimes in the area of natural resources is to thwart the exploitation of natural resources by the entities or individuals targeted so as to prevent them from benefiting from such resources without impinging on legal activities and the rights that the countries and regions concerned have over their own natural resources. Once again, it is through the strengthening of dialogue and cooperation between the Security Council and its sanctions committees, on the one hand, and the countries and regions concerned, on the other, that sanctions on natural resources can become more effective and legitimate. That takes place by strengthening the national economies of the countries in question and ensuring that those natural resources are preserved for development and not used as a source of conflict and instability.

I would like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his briefing. We welcome the opportunity to highlight the importance and potential of sanctions, which comprise one of the few non-violent tools that the Council has to protect international peace and security. Someone once said that patience is the art of concealing impatience. There are times when I think that the saying can be very appropriately applied to the United States. We feel strongly about our principles and our sovereignty because they come from us, the people. When we see a threat to our national security or when we see violations of human dignity, we want to act sooner rather than later. Most often we stifle that urge and show patience. However, beneath our patience is a fundamental unwillingness to passively accept insecurity and injustice. Sanctions require us to be patient, but imposing sanctions is one of the most important things that the United Nations can do. When they are formulated with wide participation and implemented swiftly and consistently, multilateral sanctions are effective. An excellent example is the sanctions that the Council recently strengthened against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and their affiliated groups. The United States and Russia worked together in formulating these sanctions and in making sure that they are adapted to the latest terrorist threat. To ensure that these sanctions are implemented fully and fairly, the resolution reaffirmed our support for the Monitoring Team. The vote approving them was unanimous, and, because the Security Council spoke with one voice, these sanctions are showing results. The flow of funds and other support to these terrorist groups has been reduced. By the same token, when sanctions lack wide support and when they lack enforcement, they are meaningless. Worse than meaningless, they degrade the credibility and effectiveness of the Council. Not only do they fail to stop the threat they are supposed to address, they make the next threat to peace and security more likely. What could be the argument against seeing that sanctions, once imposed, are enforced? And yet the Council has been unable to come together to agree on routine reporting on sanctions. Even agreeing on a format to discuss cross-cutting sanctions issues seems to be beyond our capability. When it does this, the Council shoots itself in the foot. It takes away from itself one of the best tools to achieve what we are all supposed to be here to achieve: peace, security and respect for human rights. If widespread support and strict enforcement is the way to do sanctions right, the way to do them wrong is unfolding right in front of us. When a State Member of the United Nations is subject to multiple Security Council resolutions and we allow it to violate these resolutions with impunity, it will not change its behaviour. When States Members of the United Nations do not comply with the sanctions levelled against an aggressor, the Council’s threats become hollow. When States Members of the United Nations violate human rights and crack down on their own people for exercising their God-given freedoms and the Council says nothing, it loses credibility. When the Council threatens again and again but refuses to follow up, nothing changes. The United States prefers to impose sanctions through the Security Council. Security Council-imposed sanctions have or should have universal reach. They represent our political unity. But when the Council fails to act, the United States is not going to wait. When the Council closes its eyes to repeated violations of its sanctions resolutions, the United States begins to lose patience. The United States will act to address threats to our security. We will act to defend universal human rights. From Venezuela to Zimbabwe and from the situation in Crimea to the war crimes in Syria, we will do what we have to do to defend ourselves, our allies and our values. That is the inevitable choice of a nation facing a dire threat. It is the promise of a people no longer able to conceal their impatience. And it is my great hope that my country and the Council will continue to work together so that we never reach this point.

At the outset, I wish to thank the Egyptian presidency for having convened today’s meeting and Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his very considered and illuminating briefing. As the Council and the whole of the United Nations are reviewing the tools at their disposal to maintain or restore international peace and security, my delegation believes that it is important to also assess and review all measures that do not involve the use of force, such as sanctions, and work on actions that can be taken to further improve their elaboration and implementation. It is also important that we do so with an open and balanced view so as to actually improve the use of these important tools by the Council. Over the years the Security Council has shifted from comprehensive and stand-alone measures to combining smart and targeted measures aimed at the decision-making elites and targeted individuals while avoiding harm to the general population. These represent an improvement of the measures decided by the Council and key aspects to build upon. The evolution of Security Council measures have included the establishment of panels of experts and monitoring teams to ensure improved implementation of our decisions. In addition, peacekeeping or mission mandates have been looked at so as to ensure that they take into account the effective implementation of Security Council sanctions. But more needs to be done in this area. For instance, it will be important to further advance with respect to due process, guaranteeing listing and delisting procedures for targeted measures. At the same time, it will be important to also include in the reporting a gender and women’s rights analysis, including with respect to the impact of sanctions and a counterterrorism strategy. If we agree that further progress is needed, then an ongoing assessment and review of Security Council measures becomes essential. Such periodic assessment needs to determine whether the implementation of sanctions regimes continues to be coherent with the objectives set by the Council. Sanctions are not an end in themselves and should be integrated into a wider political strategy. Furthermore, despite the name, they must be intended not as punitive, but rather as a useful tool to support the political process and lead the targeted entities and persons to the path of dialogue and negotiation. We have clear examples of sanction regimes contributing to this end. The need to ensure coherence between the end and the means and verification on an ongoing basis are important. Establishing or strengthening a mechanism for periodic review could help the Council to adjust its course of action. Such a review process should have a twofold impact: first, on sanctions design, and secondly, on their implementation. Inputs from Member States, including targeted entities and persons, should help the Council to adjust both current and future restrictive measures for the sake of improving their effectiveness and averting unintended consequences, in particular for the civilian population. On the implementation side, sanctions committees play an essential role. Also building on our experience as Chair of a Committee, we are convinced that there is a need for constant, sustained and effective dialogue with Member States. The Committee must provide clarity as to the overall framework for the measures and offer guidance both through general guidelines and on a case-by-case basis. In this regard, the role of the Secretariat may prove crucial, as the process of maintaining strict coordination with the Committee Chair could be strengthened. The Committees should consider greater engagement in outreach activities to illustrate Council measures, thus fostering proper and better implementation, and to provide Member States with a platform to exchange views and receive feedback on these measures. The same should apply to monitoring teams, expert groups and panels of experts. They should be encouraged to have more genuine and transparent interactions with Member States, more informal opportunities for dialogue and open doors vis-à-vis the Member States. To sum up, from our point of view what is needed is: first, clarity as to what Member States are asked to do; secondly, guidance and assistance with respect to any issues Member States may raise on sanction implementation; and, thirdly, constant outreach to and dialogue with the membership to improve both the design and the implementation of sanctions. Any review and potential reform of the sanctions system should ensure an appropriate balance between greater coherence and uniformity and the need to take into account the specificities of each situation in which the Council intervenes. To conclude, I would like to touch on a more general point: cross-cutting issues, including sanctions, justice and accountability, the protection of civilians, and women and children, call for coherence in Security Council action. If the Council is perceived as lacking coherence in its proceedings, there will be issues in terms of legitimacy and acceptance of the measures adopted, the spillover consequences of the implementation of such measures. As the Council is aware, we have been awaiting the broadening of the work of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals so as to make it become an informal working group on justice and accountability in situations of conflict. Were we to follow a similar approach with the issue of sanctions, Italy would focus its attention on issues of implementation, on including all relevant actors and on the overarching goal of providing constructive contributions to sanctions design.

I, too, would like to thank Egypt for having organized today’s briefing on this important topic and Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun for his valuable presentation this morning. In the mid-1980s, Sweden introduced economic sanctions against the apartheid regime of South Africa. Those sanctions were essentially unilateral in nature but had strong political symbolism. Since then, Sweden has been engaged in processes aimed at making sanctions more effective and transparent, including, most recently, the High-level Review of United Nations Sanctions (see S/2015/432). Existing efforts, such as the High-level Review with its 150 recommendations, remain relevant and should be followed up on so as to improve the implementation and effectiveness of United Nations sanctions. Sanctions can be described as an effective measure between words and war. We believe that United Nations sanctions, when properly applied and well calibrated within a broader political strategy, can serve as a versatile tool for responding to security challenges. That is why we have supported the effective implementation of current sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and support swift additional measures in view of the recent violations, while at the same time underlining that creative diplomatic efforts and dialogue are urgently needed, in parallel, so as to find a peaceful, diplomatic and comprehensive solution. The legal basis for United Nations sanctions derives from the Charter of the United Nations. The sanctions instrument has evolved over time. Over the past quarter of a century, the Security Council has deployed sanctions with increasing regularity and with increasingly broad aims. We must build on that experience and learn from less effective measures, as well as draw lessons from the successes. The evolution from comprehensive to targeted sanctions has largely addressed many concerns about unintended consequences and adverse effects. Over time, assessments and pre-assessments have been conducted, and there has been a steady move towards standardizing humanitarian exemptions. The Security Council could, nevertheless, put even more emphasis on the assessment of the impact of its measures, both ex ante and ex post. Additionally, sanctions regimes and measures should be periodically reviewed by the Council to ensure that their objectives are being properly met. The Council should also conduct periodic reviews of listed individuals and entities in all sanctions regimes so as to ensure that information is up-to-date and that the listings remain appropriate. As we have heard from many colleagues here today, sanctions can never be successful in isolation. They must always be part of a broader political strategy, featuring elements of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Sanctions must also be evaluated within an overall approach to support peace and security. When evaluating sanctions, one must remember that every sanctions regime is unique and that targeted sanctions have multiple purposes. It is important to safeguard and build upon the achievements made so far in the areas of the rule of law and due process, in particular through the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson. Our common obligation to implement decisions by the Council coexists with obligations to respect fundamental human rights. By further improving fair and clear procedures, the Council would render the sanctions tool more effective and legitimate, thereby enhancing the authority of the Council and that of the United Nations, as a whole. We would also like to see greater attention being paid to women, peace and security and children in armed conflict in both thematic and country-specific actions on sanctions, for example, by adding sexual and gender-based violence as criteria for designation and inviting the Special Representatives of the Secretary- General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and Children and Armed Conflict to brief sanctions committees. Furthermore, we would like to see gender analysis in the reporting of experts, including on the impacts of sanctions and counter-terrorism strategies and the gender dimensions of the flow of arms and the illicit trafficking in humans, drugs and natural resources. In conclusion, let me, once again, underline that sanctions are a key instrument in the limited tool box that the Council has at its disposal to prevent conflicts and promote peace. We hope that today’s discussion, as well as efforts to implement the recommendations of the High-level Review, and, not least, the ongoing hard work in the sanctions committees will help to further enhance the effectiveness and credibility of this important tool.

I also thank Mr. Zerihoun for his presentation. At the outset, Japan thanks Egypt for its initiative to hold today’s briefing. United Nations sanctions are one of the measures provided for by the Charter of the United Nations to maintain or restore international peace and security. Where used properly, they can be effective, and they should be well integrated into broader strategies. Sanctions are tools for the achievement of specific political objectives. Those objectives are wide-ranging, including the restoration of peace after civil war, the prohibition of support for terrorists, the disarmament of armed groups and denuclearization. Each sanctions regime should be tailor-made to its specific context. Sanctions are not imposed for their own sake, and they are certainly not tools for punishment. They should have clear goals and exit strategies. Each sanctions regime generally has its own internal exemption clauses or mechanisms to minimize unwanted adverse effects. To that end, the evolution in the way the Security Council uses smart sanctions, including financial sanctions, is a welcome one. The periodic review of sanctions in each sanctions committee could be useful. Once the Security Council decides to take certain sanctions measures, they need to be fully implemented in order to be effective. That can be challenging and complex, and may require both time and capacity- building on the part of Member States. Neighbouring countries have a particularly vital role to play in ensuring that the sanctions measures are effective. We must all work together to address the problem of sanctions evasion and loopholes. I would also like to emphasize that where sanctions have been agreed upon and adopted by the Council, we should first work for their full and faithful implementation by each Member State before we discuss their effectiveness. Member States’ awareness and capacity-building are key. Japan has long been a supporter of capacity- building efforts aimed at strengthening implementation and will continue to provide support to that end. We believe that where sanctions are selected among the various tools available, the Council must ensure that they are as effective as possible in achieving their desired aim.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Egypt. At the outset, I would like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Tayé- Brook Zerihoun, for his important briefing on this vital aspect of the work of the Security Council. As stipulated in Article 41, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations grants the Security Council the mandate to take various measures to confront threats to international peace and security without the use of force. Despite the use of the word “sanctions” to describe such measures, the Charter does not make any reference to that term. The term has been widely used in Security Council resolutions that impose such measures. The Council has a great responsibility to clarify that concept, which is a commonly used term, and its punitive connotations. The measures stipulated in the Charter seek to maintain or restore international peace and security, not to punish any party. The Council has made considerable progress in developing the concept of sanctions, moving from comprehensive to smarter and more effective measures, while benefiting from the knowledge accumulated from previous experiences. Because of that, we have been able to mitigate the unintended negative repercussions of the sanctions, especially on civilians and States that are not party to conflicts. We have also been able to limit the measures to parties that are a threat to international peace and security. These improvements have helped to make the measures more effective and improve the likelihood that they will achieve the desired result. While this progress is commendable, it is not enough. The uniqueness of every new threat to international peace and stability means that we have to adopt sanctions regimes that are tailored to particular situations and suited to a threat’s particular nature, treating each on a case-by-case basis. That does not mean, however, that we should not make use of previous experiences of sanctions regimes and lessons learned from their implementation. Maintaining an identical approach and a narrow perspective while considering sanctions on a case-by-case basis will not help us improve them unless we also make them complementary with other, more comprehensive and inclusive mechanisms that seek to study all the means that can potentially improve this important tool in both style and substance. Finding appropriate mechanisms for dialogue; monitoring, assessing and incorporating lessons learned from previous sanctions regimes; and taking the views of every involved party into consideration are therefore elements that the Council should not undermine, underestimate or ignore, considering all the means to achieve it. The Arria-Formula meeting organized by Egypt last month, entitled “Enhancing the design process of United Nations sanctions regimes: perspectives from all stakeholders”, presented a genuine opportunity to listen to the views of three African countries on the impact of sanctions on efforts aimed at stabilization. Wide participation by Council members and the broader United Nations membership showed the depth of the interest in this issue and the importance of studying and analysing previous experience, which can help us improve the design of our sanctions regimes. Ensuring that this tool is just and fair will help to guarantee its effectiveness, while any abuse of it could undermine its credibility with the international community and lead to repercussions that could aggravate crises rather than help to settle them. We should also help Member States understand the diverse nature of sanctions regimes and build their technical capacity to implement sanctions measures properly. Egypt is ready to contribute to that important effort. In that regard, I would like to thank the Secretariat for taking part in the first round table held to raise awareness of the sanctions regimes, which we hosted in Cairo on 12 and 13 July with the participation of Egypt’s national coordinating committee on United Nations sanctions. We believe that such cooperation is a model that deserves support and look forward to expanding it, including at the regional level. I have listened carefully to members’ statements today and noted their differences of opinion and position. However, I also noted their agreement on the importance of developing United Nations sanctions regimes. The Council has a collective responsibility to translate those positions into action that demonstrates our seriousness and good intentions, sending a clear message to all members of the United Nations and the international community that the Council is present on this issue and aware of the importance of this vital tool and the need to develop it properly. The Council’s role is not complete if it is not accompanied by a genuine partnership with all Member States and stakeholders, creating the channels and mechanisms that will enable it to listen to stakeholders’ views, which constitute an important tool for helping it achieve its goal of improving current and future sanctions regimes. This would also enable the Council to hold periodic dialogues on the issue and take any measures that might be necessary. In that regard, Egypt looks forward to cooperating with Member States during its presidency of the Council and to pursuing our collective efforts to translate our positions and the positive statements we have heard today into political will and practical measures. Those positions, and our collective will, will help us to agree on practical procedures and effective mechanisms that will enable the Council to further develop its sanctions regimes so as to achieve their objective as a tool for restoring peace and security while avoiding any negative repercussions or deviations from its desired objectives, rectifying them according to each individual case. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.