S/PV.8032 Security Council

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Libya to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative of the Secretary- General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, to participate in this meeting. Mr. Salamé is joining the meeting via video-teleconference from Tripoli. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2017/726, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings from Mr. Salamé and Ambassador Carl Skau, representative of the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), concerning Libya. I wish to warmly welcome Mr. Salamé, as he is participating in the Council’s proceedings for the first time in his new capacity, and I now give him the floor. Mr. Salamé: At the outset, I would like to congratulate Egypt on its presidency of the Security Council this month. I am very pleased to be speaking to the Council from the compound of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in Tripoli. My presence here is intended to signify the Mission’s and my personal resolve to working as closely as possible with Libyans in Libya. A month ago I assumed my position as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL. I was fortunate enough to have already met Prime Minister Serraj and Marshal Haftar in Paris on 25 July and to have had exchanges with them before taking up my post, as well as to receive on my nomination hundreds of calls, letters and e-mails from representatives of all walks of Libyan society. On 5 August, I made my first official visit to Tripoli and met with the Prime Minister and Mr. Abdelrahman Al-Sweihli. Chairman of the High Council of State. The following day I also met with Mr. Saleh Issa, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Libyan officials. The trip launched my consultations with Libyans across the political spectrum and the country. Since then, I have been present in Libya as often as possible and have been to towns across most of its regions — Tripoli, Al Qubba, Benghazi, Misrata, Zintan and Al Bayda. I am sorry to say that due to external restrictions I have yet to visit the south; in fact, a trip scheduled for last Thursday was cancelled a few hours before departure, but we are working hard to make sure that it happens as soon as possible. In each place I met with political figures, military and security officials and women, intellectuals, activists and young people. I firmly believe that our attachment to the Libyan Political Agreement as a reference should not prevent us from reaching out to all Libyans, whatever their status and their past or present positions. Rather, we must reach out so that there is reconciliation for all. In my external consultations, I have sought to prioritize Libya’s neighbours. They include Tunisia, where I also thanked the authorities for their support and hospitality to UNSMIL over the past three years. In Egypt, I met with the officials in charge of the Libyan dossier, representatives of the League of Arab States, and some of the leading members of the Libyan community established there. When I was in Algeria, Prime Minister Ouyahia and Foreign Minister Messahel reiterated their support for our efforts. I also visited Italy, where Prime Minister Gentiloni Silveri and his ministers expressed their commitment to the success of our efforts. All of those countries will benefit from a stable, peaceful and reconciled Libya, as will many more. I look forward to travelling to the Republic of the Congo next week, where the African Union High-Level Committee on Libya is convening key Libyan actors in Brazzaville. It is my intention to extend the scope of my visits in the coming weeks and months to other neighbours, countries in the region and beyond. From my meetings with Libyans, a clear picture is emerging. People are frustrated with their deteriorating living conditions. I passed the same bank in Tripoli repeatedly from 10 o’clock in the morning until 10 o’clock at night and saw so many people I thought it was a demonstration, but they were just waiting to access a fraction of their month’s salary — the equivalent of what is now worth $25. It is unnatural that in this wealthy country, university departments are closing one after the other because the outrageous gap in the exchange rate has led foreign faculty to quit en masse. People are tired of the endless cuts in electricity and water, which in turn take down the telephone system and the Internet. Libyans cannot understand being poor in a country rich with natural resources, an oil-producing country where they must queue, sometimes for a day, to get 20 litres of petrol. The impression of a now well-rooted political economy of predation is palpable, as if the country were fuelling its own crisis with its own resources to the benefit of the few and the frustration of the many. There is clearly a serious problem of governance that can hardly wait to be addressed. The people’s welfare is, obviously, a fundamental element in Libya’s future stability. I intend to work closely with our partners to ensure that we are fully coordinating in realizing a macroeconomic vision for the country while helping the authorities provide basic services. Unless the economic challenges are addressed, and soon, the humanitarian crisis in Libya will deepen. For civilians in need, access to humanitarian assistance should go unimpeded and relief personnel should be protected. Of particular concern is the present situation in Derna where we have repeatedly called for civilians to have freedom of movement and actively worked for the entry of basic necessities to the city. The other challenge which Libyans are concerned about is, of course, their security. There is much fear of criminality, of kidnapping and the threats posed by the widespread proliferation of arms. My first night in Tripoli, I fell asleep to the protracted staccato of gunfire. Civilians are killed or injured across Libya as a result of sporadic armed clashes and explosive remnants of war. Thousands are also detained for prolonged periods of time, many with no prospects of a fair trial. The terrible attack at the al-Fuqaha checkpoint on Thursday, 24 August, which saw the brutal killing of nine soldiers and two civilians was attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). The Libyans I have spoken to want an end to uncertainty and instability, and they respect those who are working to bring the situation under control. In Tripoli and certain other parts of the country, the security situation has truly improved. Oil production has increased markedly, enabling the Presidency Council and Central Bank of Libya to work together to deliver on the budget. These are positive steps, but the key to lasting stability requires addressing the overarching political situation. In this regard, the main issues that dominate the political landscape are as follows. First, with regard to the upcoming two-year anniversary of the Libyan Political Agreement on 17 December, there is uncertainty over what the end of the transitional period outlined in the Agreement actually means. One of the most immediate tasks is to help build a consensus among Libyans on the legal and political significance of that date. An institutional vacuum at this crucial time will not serve Libya’s interests. Most of my interlocutors have raised with me their thoughts on amending the Libyan Political Agreement. A consensus is emerging on this issue and I hope to be able to announce some movement on it in the coming days. Secondly, with regard to the prospect of adopting a constitution, the vote by the Constitution Drafting Assembly on 29 July to finalize the draft text was an important milestone. However, at the moment, the legality of the vote is being considered by the courts. Thirdly, there are growing and widespread calls for fresh elections. Before these take place, it would be wise to ensure that the political and technical preconditions for successful elections be addressed and in particular a commitment on the part of all parties to accept the election results. Elections are not about accumulation, but about peaceful and organized rotation. Finally, a political package is required to bring these three elements together coherently. In that regard, sequencing is the name of the game. Libyans can successfully go into these three processes only if they define in what order and with what urgency they should do so, and if we help them combine the three into one single package which most, if not all, players consider acceptable. In any case, any efforts to forge a solution must be Libyan led and Libyan owned. The United Nations is here to support them in their endeavours and certainly not to replace them. We will in particular work with them to promote the rapid reunification of their political and financial institutions. Libya’s problems are not just confined to the Libyan people. The presence of ISIS, Al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist groups, foreign fighters and mercenaries, the trafficking of arms and the cross-border black market economy are challenges which extend across Libya’s borders and impact its neighbours and the wider international community. Three days ago, deadly clashes near the border with Chad reminded all of the regional sensitivity of Libya’s present conditions. Irregular migration, and the revenue it generates for smuggler networks, has also proven to be a direct threat to stability in parts of Libya. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees who are stuck in Libya often suffer abuses and detention in inhuman conditions. We need to act, we need to act together and we need to act now. We are not starting from zero. Thanks to my predecessors and the concerted efforts of Member States, we have the political framework of the Libyan Political Agreement. There is fairly widespread recognition in Libya that the current situation cannot drag on indefinitely. The commitments to a ceasefire and a political rather than military solution to the crisis made in the Paris communiqué need to be supported by concrete actions to avoid renewed military escalation. To deliver on our mandate, we continue to prepare to ramp up the presence of the United Nations family in Tripoli and from Tripoli across the country, as security conditions allow. A convoy of UNSMIL personnel was attacked with gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades on 28 June. One staff member was injured and we are really fortunate that there were no further casualties. The United Nations presence in Libya is already significantly larger than any other diplomatic mission, and it will soon expand further. We must remain aware that there are real risks in operating in Libya, and it is incumbent on me to ensure that those risks are mitigated as effectively as possible. I would like to thank all the Member States that have worked to support the Libyan Political Agreement since its signature, who have contributed to fighting ISIS and other listed terrorist groups and who have contributed to stabilizing the country. I look forward to working with all of those Libyan and international stakeholders to bring together our political, security and economic efforts in a coherent and coordinated manner. I appreciate the efforts of all Governments and organizations working to promote peace and reconciliation among Libyans. But a proliferation of initiatives to mediate somehow risks confusing the political landscape. There is a window of opportunity, and it is in the hands of the Libyan people to seize it. I would not have assumed this role if I did not believe that a peaceful and positive end to the Libyan crisis were possible. For that reason, during the upcoming meeting of the General Assembly, Secretary-General António Guterres plans to convene a high-level meeting where an action plan will be presented. I will not go into further details as it would be premature prior to the conclusion of my round of consultations with the Libyans. The United Nations stands willing and able to act in the best interests of all Libyans and with all parties equally. I very much hope that with the trust of our Libyan partners and the confidence of the regional organizations and concerned Member States, we will be able to strengthen and unify our collective efforts and together restore Libya to its rightful place in the family of nations — as one united, stable and prosperous country.

I thank Mr. Salamé for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Skau.

In accordance with paragraph 24 (e) of resolution 1970 (2011), of 26 February 2011, I have the honour to report to the Security Council on the work of the Committee established by that same resolution. The current reporting period is from 8 June to 28 August 2017, during which time the Committee met once in informal consultations and conducted additional work via the silence procedure. At the outset, I would like to recall that on 29 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 2362 (2017). By that resolution, the Council inter alia expanded the applicability of the measures aimed at preventing illicit exports of crude oil from Libya to cover petroleum, including refined petroleum products. The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Libya to 15 November 2018. Both of those elements have had an impact on the activities of the Committee during the current reporting period. With respect to the first element, following notifications received from the Libyan Government, the Committee included on its sanctions list two vessels — the Capricorn and the Lynn S — for attempting to illicitly export gasoil from Libya. The flag States of the two vessels, Tanzania and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, respectively, now have certain obligations vis-à-vis those vessels, and all Member States are required to prohibit the vessels from entering their ports unless such entry is necessary for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to Libya. The listings, which were accomplished in a matter of days from the time of notification, on 21 July and 2 August, are valid for a period of three months, unless terminated earlier by the Committee. In addition to the flag States, the Committee has written to several other Member States, such as the reported States of origin and destination, seeking any further relevant information. Concerning the second element, the Committee met on 21 August to hear a presentation by the newly reconstituted Panel of Experts on its work programme under the extended mandate. In the discussion, Committee members addressed questions or comments to the experts, who provided additional information and clarifications. As some may recall, at its last briefing (see S/PV.7961), the Chair informed the Council that the Committee was considering the recommendations from the final report of the Panel under its previous mandate. Of the 16 recommendations, five were addressed to the Council, six to the Committee, and five to Member States, including Libya. The Committee has since agreed to take action on five recommendations, one of which was also discussed during the informal consultations of 21 August. With respect to the arms embargo, during the period under review, the Committee approved a request for exemption under paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 1970 (2011) from the Netherlands. The Committee also responded to a request for guidance received from the United Nations Support Mission in Libya concerning the scope and application of paragraph 10 of resolution 2095 (2013), which relates to supplies of non-lethal military equipment, and the provision of any technical assistance, training or financial assistance, intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan Government. The Committee further received an initial report and a final report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2292 (2016), by EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA, of a vessel inspection undertaken on 19 June on the high seas off the coast of Libya. Arms and related materiel were found on board this vessel — the same vessel, on the same route, which had been inspected by EUNAVFOR once before, on 1 May. The Committee again notified Libya of the inspection. During the reporting period, the Committee also received the final report of the 1 May inspection from EUNAVFOR. I should recall here that the authorizations as set out in resolution 2292 (2016) were extended by the Council in its resolution 2357 (2017) of 12 June 2017, for a further period of 12 months. Also in the context of the arms embargo, the Committee received the names of the authorized signatories from Libya for requests for exemptions from the arms embargo and for end-user certificates, as per the requirements contained in the Committee’s implementation assistance notice No. 2 concerning the arms embargo. A response is now under consideration. Concerning the assets freeze, the Committee received a notification from Greece under paragraph 16 (a) (i) of resolution 2009 (2011). In its response, the Committee encouraged further bilateral contact between Greece and Libya on the matter, and provided guidance on the requirements of the notification procedure. The Committee’s consideration of an exemption request submitted by Canada, pertaining to an asset owned by a listed individual, is still ongoing. Two of the five Panel recommendations on which the Committee agreed to take action also related to the assets freeze, albeit one is pending further information from the Panel. The recommendations pertain to the Stolen Assets Recovery Unit of the Central Bank of Libya, and the Committee considers that a well-functioning Unit could be an important partner in monitoring the assets freeze and preventing the misappropriation of funds. On the travel ban, the Committee approved an advancement of the return travel of Ms. Safia Farkash Al-Barassi, who had been authorized to travel between Egypt and Oman The Committee also approved an extension to the exemption request for Mr. Sayyid Mohammed Qadhaf Al-Dam, who had been authorized to travel between Libya and Egypt. Both listed individuals were authorized to travel on the grounds of humanitarian needs. Lastly, on 27 June, in my capacity as Chair, I participated in a joint open briefing of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, on challenges in countering terrorism in Libya. A summary of the discussions is available on the 1373 Committee’s website. The Committee also received one implementation report from a Member State.

I thank Ambassador Skau for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.

At the outset, Bolivia wishes to express its condemnation of yesterday’s attack in Afghanistan, which took the lives of 13 people and wounded numerous others. Moreover, Bolivia wishes to express its solidarity with the families of those deceased or injured in the passage of Hurricane Harvey in Texas, in the United States. We are grateful for the briefing provided by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Mr. Ghassan Salamé. We take this opportunity to welcome him and wish him the greatest success in the delicate tasks that have been assigned to him. We are also grateful for the briefing provided by Ambassador Carl Skau on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya. We take note of the progress made by the Constitution Drafting Assembly, the work of which resulted in the approval on 29 July of a new draft constitution that should be subject to a popular referendum before entering into effect. We believe that the commitment to political dialogue demonstrated by the parties during the reporting period should be maintained and reflected in the holding of a transparent popular consultation process that would enable the Libyan people to define their future and to carry out a peaceful, orderly and inclusive transition. In that context, we also highlight the mediation and reconciliation efforts that are being developed by various regional and international actors, such as the African Union, the League of Arab States and, of course, the United Nations to promote the Libyan political process and provide impetus through the strengthening of cooperation mechanisms. We also recognize the initiatives developed by Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia during the months of June and July to support and promote that process. Despite those significant steps, we are concerned by the sporadic clashes between the parties, which come at a high cost for the civilians trapped in the middle of the conflict. According to the 22 August report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/726), from April to July there were 66 and 78 reported deaths and injuries, respectively, adding to the scores of fatalities caused by the conflict since 2011. In addition, according to the report on civilian casualties published on 1 August by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, during the month of July 21 people were wounded and 15 killed as a result of bombings, in crossfire or due to the presence of explosive remnants of war and explosive devices, which constitute a serious threat to the safety of the population and negatively impact the return of internally displaced persons to their places of origin. In that regard, we encourage the Libyan national institutions and the agencies and services of the United Nations as a whole to continue, within the framework of resolution 2365 (2017), to do their utmost to neutralize the threat of improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war that are still scattered throughout Libya, which threaten the security of thousands of returning civilians and refugees, as well as the humanitarian staff providing assistance on the ground. We also note with concern the terrible plight of refugees and migrants who, according to the Secretary- General’s report, continue to be arbitrarily detained by the parties, subjected to degrading treatment, torture, sexual violence and the denial of medical care. That is further exacerbated by the proliferation of criminal organizations and trafficking networks, which, according to the report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), referred to in the Secretary- General’s report, could be linked to slave markets. Added to this is the alarming number of migrants who have lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea, which, according to the report also published by the IOM, exceeded 2,200 fatalities from January to August. We welcome the efforts made by Italy in that regard. In that respect, we remind the actors and parties involved in the conflict that they have an obligation to respect and to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law, to avoid causing greater suffering to the civilian population and to refrain from violating their fundamental rights. We reiterate that a political transition is the only solution to this conflict. It has already begun and must continue. We therefore urge them to abandon any belligerent attitudes or claims that arms can be used as a means to resolve this or any other conflict. On another note, we wish to express our support for the progress reported today by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) with respect to the implementation of the Committee’s mandate, which, in accordance with resolution 2362 (2017), now includes the illegal export of petroleum and its by-products. Finally, it is important that the Council take into account the impact the Libyan conflict has on the volatile security situation in the region. The consequences of interventionism and regime change policies have had a great impact on the Sahel, particularly in Mali, bringing with them the emergence of chaos, terrorism and militarization, with regrettable results being experienced to this day. Let us not forget that the final report of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, submitted in the year 2015, established that weapons from Libya considerably strengthened the military capacity of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel subregion, and are currently used to carry out attacks against national security forces, civilians and members of peacekeeping missions in the field. In that regard, the Council should be able to analyse the causes of conflicts in sufficient detail, avoiding misguided assumptions and fully assessing the evidence before it. The Council should understand the magnitude of the actions taken and, above all, take responsibility for the results achieved. If we do not learn from these lessons, we should refer to such activities not as calculation errors, but as actions intended to destabilize.

I should like to welcome Mr. Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, in his first appearance before the Security Council. We wish him a successful tenure, which would be reflected in the future and well-being of all Libyans. He can count on the full support of Uruguay. We would also like to thank the previous Special Representative, Mr. Martin Kobler, for his valuable and courageous administration. If I may, an appropriate metaphor to describe his competencies would be to say that Martin had to pedal uphill and against the wind. He did that enthusiastically until the last day of his mandate. We would also like to thank Ambassador Carl Skau for his briefing on the activities of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya. Moments of change are usually a good opportunity to review what has been done as well as to reflect on the way forward. After six years, it is very difficult to say that the intervention of the United Nations in Libya is a success story. Humanitarian intervention, regime change and nation-building are all expressions used with respect to the situation in Libya; however, the facts leave no room for doubt. Libya remains mired in a situation of institutional ambiguity, in which there are at least two structures that give the appearance of Government, several armed structures with effective control over different areas of Libyan territory, frequent and bloody armed clashes, and a still visible presence of terrorist elements of the self-styled Islamic State that constitutes an additional threat to any peacebuilding or national reconstruction plans. The Government of National Accord envisaged in the Libyan Political Agreement has never materialized, and the Presidency Council has not succeeded in gaining the legitimacy necessary to become a valid actor that was respected by the parties. On previous occasions, with respect to other matters considered by the Council, we have maintained that continuing to do the same things over and over again can only lead to the same result. Sometimes the most serious things can be said through humour. In his celebrated book, The Peter Principle, the author Laurence Peter describes this situation in a sentence that I will read out in English because it does not translate very well into Spanish: (spoke in English) “If two wrongs don’t make a right, try three.” (spoke in Spanish) Let us avoid the temptation to repeat mistakes. Let us keep an open mind and be forward-looking. Let us give Mr. Salamé our undivided support so that he feels free to explore new alternatives. This necessarily means that the Security Council will also be prepared to explore new avenues, keeping in mind what has been successful up until now, but also accepting the challenge of trying new options. The Council can choose to ignore reality, but it cannot ignore the consequences of having ignored reality.

I now give the floor to the representative of Libya.

At the outset, Mr. President, it is a pleasure for me to congratulate you on your presidency of the Security Council this month. I also take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Ghassan Salamé on his assumption of the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), and to thank him for his important briefing, wherein he reviewed the report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL (S/2017/726). As the report was published with some delay, we have not add enough opportunity to examine it fully and discuss it in detail it with our capital. We greatly appreciate Mr. Salamé’s efforts to communicate with all parties in Libya in order to bring together the points of view among political stakeholders and we would like to wish him every success in his work. I should like to confirm once again to the Council that the Government of National Accord is committed to supporting all of United Nations efforts to achieve a solution for the political crisis in Libya. I would like to thank Ambassador Carl Skau, Permanent Representative of Sweden, for his briefing as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011). In his briefing, he talked about recent developments regarding sanctions imposed upon Libya. In this context, I would like to express my appreciation for his outstanding efforts in guiding the Committee. Since the last briefing by Mr. Martin Kobler, the previous Special Representative of the Secretary- General (see S/PV.7961), the political scene in Libya has remained ambiguous, despite all the communication undertaken by Mr. Kobler and taken up recently by his successor, Mr. Ghassan Salamé, since his arrival in the post. Furthermore, we take note of the ongoing efforts deployed by our friendly brotherly countries aimed at bringing the points of view of political stakeholders together in Libya in order to achieve reconciliation. In the context of the ongoing ambiguity of the situation and of the deadlock in the political process in Libya, the concerned Libyan parties need to achieve agreement on some amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement, which was signed in Skhirat, Morocco, on 17 December 2015, in a manner that will ensure that all parties will strive to meticulously implement the Agreement, which could in turn pave the way for forming a Government of National Accord that can carry out its work effectively, particularly to alleviating the ongoing suffering of the Libyan people, who experience it on a daily basis and in different areas, deal with a variety of challenges in the country, ranging from terrorism to illicit migration and the smuggling of Libyan assets, namely, oil, oil derivatives and other natural resources. The Government has to address other harmful challenges,such as human rights violations and the absence of the rule of law. In this context, we note the road map proposed by Mr. Faiez Serraj, President of the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord, in a statement to the Libyan people on 15 July 2017. In his statement, which was published as a document of the Security Council (S/2017/622, annex), Mr. Serraj took stock of the current situation and talked about the different types of suffering that the Libyan people are facing as a result of the impasse in the implementation of the Libyan Agreement. At the end of his statement, he proposed an initiative to resolve this situation, saying that he wanted to communicate with all parties in Libya, without exception, in order to achieve peace and stability in the country through dialogue and reconciliation with all actors. His statement contained no menacing language nor did it threaten the use of violence or force. Everyone needs to understand that there is no military solution to the crisis in Libya. The solution can come about only through dialogue and a political process under the auspices of the United Nations. This could be the only clear and positive aspect of the current situation that we are all aware of, given that all parties have said that they are ready to participate in the political process. Despite a lack of capacity to deal with the enormous challenges with which the Government of National Accord is confronted, the most important of which is achieving security and stability in Libya, it has nonetheless managed not just to significantly hamper the illicit militias that took control of part of the capital, Tripoli, but to dismantle their arsenal and chase them out of the capital, which has had a positive impact on the security situation there. We welcome the desire of UNSMIL to make a progressive return to Libya in the future. We hope that this return will take place as soon as possible. We believe that it will enable UNSMIL to deal with the issues before it by cooperating and communicating directly with the legitimate State authorities. We further hope that it will bolster the Libyan people’s confidence and trust in the role played by the United Nations. While we appreciate the role played by the sanctions committee, in particular in terms of banning the illicit export of Libyan oil, in line with resolution 2146 (2014), amended by resolution 2362 (2017), which added refined petroleum products to the list of sanctioned items — and we note how the committee has been keen, through considerable interaction and interest, to preserve the assets of the Libyan State, namely, oil and petroleum products — we hope that the members of the committee will display the same interest in the issue of improving the management of the frozen Libyan assets, which have been subject to annual erosion, as foreign banks do not manage them in the same way they manage other funds. High negative interest rates are imposed by these banks, resulting in a depletion of capital of the frozen assets. This is a very serious situation, as it is draining away the value of Libyan frozen assets, which are funds that belong to the Libyan people and to future generations. The main purpose of the asset freeze under resolution 1970 (2011) was to protect these funds and not to punish the Libyan State, but what we are seeing today runs counter to this objective and even contributes to the depletion of assets. We believe that it makes no sense to try to justify the loss of Libya’s frozen assets by connecting it to political differences and divisions. The legitimate Government of National Accord has not asked for the freeze to be lifted at this critical juncture, but to find a particular formula that would help it to protect and preserve these funds and investments, even as they remain frozen — I repeat, even as they remain frozen. In that regard, I would refer to document S/2017/629, which contains a letter from the President of the Presidency Council, Mr. Faiez Serraj, in which he went over the deplorable situation of the assets frozen under the current sanctions regime. We cannot ignore the fact that the existence of dual institutions in Libya has had the negative effect of perpetuating an interim Government that is a parallel Government, according to resolutions of the Security Council, which have asked other States to refrain from dealing with illegitimate parallel entities. What wonder, in that respect, whether it is enough to refrain from dealing with parallel entities or if more effective measures should be taken to eliminate them. In conclusion, I would like to once again wish Special Representative Salamé every success in his work. We are confident that his exceptional expertise will enable him to achieve great results.

I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.