S/PV.8127 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council according to the year of adoption of the related Council decisions: Ambassador Fodé Seck, Permanent Representative of Senegal and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) and Chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations; Ambassador Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta, Permanent Representative of Egypt and Chair of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1373 (2001), 1518 (2003) and 1533 (2004); Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko, Permanent Representative of Ukraine and Chair of the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1591 (2005) and 2127 (2013); Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi, Permanent Representative of Italy and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006); Ambassador Elbio Rosselli Frieri, Permanent Representative of Uruguay and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) and of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals; and by myself, as Permanent Representative of Japan and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1636 (2005) and 2140 (2014) and of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions. I now give the floor to Ambassador Seck.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to reflect on our collective efforts regarding the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan, which Senegal has had the honour to chair for the past two years. I would also like to thank the troop- and police-contributing countries, the Security Council Affairs Division, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support for their generous and efficient support of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. My thanks also go to the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, the staff of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the sanctions secretariat for their commendable efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the Security Council sanctions regime for South Sudan. With regard to the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, I would like to share with the Council some lessons that we have learned during the two years of Senegal’s chairship. The main point to be made is the renewed interest in dialogue with the Security Council and the Secretariat, particularly on the part of the troop- and police-contributing countries, which has been demonstrated by major active participation in the work of the Working Group. The Working Group agreed ahead of time on its programme of work for both 2016 and 2017, since it was essential to arrive at a consensus on the various issues, most of them complex, to be put on its agenda. The major issues included the role of technology in peacekeeping operations; the partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations and how to strengthen regional stakeholders during peacekeeping operations; the issue of complementarity between United Nations counter- terrorism entities and peacekeeping missions; the political frameworks for intelligence in peacekeeping operations and the issue of strengthening the links with political strategies for the protection of civilians. That was the programme for 2016. In 2017, the Working Group considered the subject of developing synergies in consolidating and sustaining peace in Africa and addressing ways in which the United Nations, the African Union and regional mechanisms could continue to build on their strategic partnership. The second major issue for 2017 was that of compiling and analysing information for updating and getting feedback from the Secretariat about developments regarding policies on intelligence in peacekeeping. The third major issue was the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the challenges and prospects involved. The fourth was the special meeting with the troop- and police-contributing countries on the reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. It will be important to capitalize on this positive dynamic with a view to further strengthening the strategic dialogue between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing States, especially in the context of the feelings of trust and frustration shared by all parties. Needless to say, we need a more substantial dialogue between the various stakeholders if we are to improve our impact on the ground. That is the point of reflecting on ways and means of improving this triangular dialogue, in synergy with the ongoing initiatives in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), with a view to combining our efforts and taking better account of the views of the troop- and police-contributing countries. The meeting of the Working Group on 10 November — on this issue of improving the triangular dialogue, which was held in partnership with the United Kingdom and Pakistan, the facilitators of the C-34 consultative process — and the Group’s 3 October meeting with the United States on the reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations helped to initiate a push for greater cooperation between the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat. In our view, we must maintain that dynamic if we are to lay the foundations for renewed trust, which is crucial to ensuring a more productive dialogue that meets the various stakeholders’ expectations. The Security Council, the C-34 and the Secretariat should work to strengthen that triangular cooperation in order to ensure frank and permanent dialogue between the various actors and to promote productive discussion based on in-depth and objective analysis of situations on the ground and the capacities needed to deal with them. As the conclusions of the most recent meeting of the Working Group made clear, the challenges to achieving a more inclusive and substantial triangular dialogue include a lack of timely information, insufficient time for stakeholders to prepare for meetings, and the frequently perfunctory nature of the informal meetings. In our view, therefore, it will be important to ensure that the following procedures are observed for triangular dialogue discussions. Enough notice should be given for the consultations so that there is time to consult with the relevant stakeholders and gather information from them prior to the meeting. The purpose of the meeting and the documents to be discussed should be agreed and clear to all parties before the meeting. Whether formal or informal, meetings should be conducted in the most effective format possible. Lastly, meetings should be announced early enough to enable all the parties concerned to prepare to participate actively. Regarding the format for meetings, it was suggested that triangular consultations be held in the format of regular informal and private meetings between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the major troop- contributing countries. Those are the recommendations and proposals that we have focused on with regard to improving the triangular dialogue, in addition to those contained in the revised note on the working methods of the Security Council (S/2017/507) formulated under Japan’s efficient presidency. But what matters most, in my humble opinion, is that troop- and police-contributing countries should be able to express their concerns and that they should receive the welcome and attention they need. Finally, better use should be made of the work of the Working Group by ensuring that its recommendations and conclusions are better reflected in the decisions of the Council. As Council members know, Côte d’Ivoire will chair this Working Group starting on 1 January, and I therefore wish its delegation every success in leading it. With regard to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan , I would like to note first of all that Senegal assumed the chairmanship of the Committee six months after the first and only designation of sanctions by the six- person Committee and several months after the Panel of Experts first recommended that the Security Council impose an arms embargo on South Sudan. We have all seen that, between 2016 and 2017, the conflict in South Sudan deteriorated dramatically. There is no need to return to this in detail at this time, since briefings and consultations have already allowed us to take the full measure of the gravity of the situation. In December 2016, I visited Juba, Malakal and the countries of the region so as to better understand the situation there and to have a better idea of developments on the ground. In 2017, we have witnessed a resurgence of fighting in many parts of South Sudan. On several occasions, the Security Council has turned to the region for advice on the possible impact of an arms embargo and new sanctions on South Sudan. We should consider whether the Council should gather and take into account the views of the region before considering further measures. This discussion led to the preparation of a draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on 23 December 2016, which proposed the establishment of an arms embargo with an annex containing a list of four additional names to be designated for immediate sanctions. As this text did not receive the necessary nine votes, it was not adopted. During 2017, I briefed the Committee, in particular on 18 January, on my visit to South Sudan and the region, and on 21 March the Committee heard briefings by Special Representatives on children and armed conflict and sexual violence. On 10 November, the Committee held a joint meeting with the Committees on Libya and on the Sudan on the activities of armed groups from Darfur in the region. I would like to note that in my 2017 interim report, which the Committee recently considered, the Panel of Experts reiterated its August 2015 recommendation to impose a general arms embargo on South Sudan and to mandate the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to monitor the implementation of such an embargo, if adopted, and allocate the means to do so effectively. In this document, the Panel also recommended that the Committee identify those responsible for actions and policies that threaten peace, security and stability in South Sudan. In addition to the confidential annex submitted by the Panel to the Committee in 2016, the experts indicated in their interim report and previous reports that they had provided evidence of several individuals responsible for or complicit in the actions and policies described in paragraph 9 of resolution 2290 (2016). As you know, Mr. President, Poland will chair the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) starting on 1 January 2018. The delegation of Senegal wishes the Polish delegation every success in this endeavour.

I thank Ambassador Seck for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Aboulatta.

Over the past two years, I have had the honour of chairing the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003). I would like to use this special occasion to reflect both on my role as Chair of these Committees over the course of the past two years and the work accomplished in that time. Before assuming our chairmanship of the Counter- Terrorism Committee (CTC), we were expecting the ongoing battle against terrorism to be a long one. We also expected that in the following stage we might witness intensified terrorist attacks by Da’esh and others that would send the message that terrorism exists, is effective and can distract attention away from efforts aimed at achieving development and prosperity. Accordingly, there was a dire need for the international community to act swiftly and robustly, using a comprehensive, coordinated and consistent approach. In this context, we have intended for our tenure as the Chair of the CTC to be creative, pragmatic and action-oriented as it could be. As the Chair of the CTC, our main objective was to ensure the full implementation of the core mandate of the CTC in monitoring, facilitating and promoting the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014). Against this backdrop and over the past two years, the Committee has conducted 22 assessment visits to Member States in all five regional groups of the United Nations. These visits have enabled the Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to engage in direct dialogue and interaction with Member States on their counter-terrorism implementation efforts and identify progress, shortfalls, technical-assistance needs, good experiences and effective practices. Two further useful tools for understanding Member State progress and needs are the detailed implementation survey and the overview of implementation assessment prepared by CTED experts. Over the past two years, the Committee has approved over 30 overviews of implementation assessment and detailed implementation surveys on Member States’ implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014). As the main policymaking body within the Security Council with regard to counter-terrorism, the CTC, in Egypt’s view, needed to have a serious and in-depth discussion of some of the most important and top-priority aspects in relation to coumtering terrorism efforts. In this regard, the CTC, with the full support of CTED, held in 2016 and 2017, 21 special meetings, open briefings and technical-assistance meetings, in addition to 24 plenary meetings. These meetings covered a wide range of issues, including preventing the use of information and communication technologies for terrorist purposes, terrorism financing and the role of financial institutions and other entities in preventing terrorism financing, aviation security, international judicial and law-enforcement cooperation in counter-terrorism matters, preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, implementation of resolution 2178 (2014) by States most affected by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, legal challenges related to the treatment and prosecution of returning foreign terrorist fighters, developing national and regional comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorist strategies, and denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts. The technical guidance of CTED assists with the implementation by Member States of relevant Security Council resolutions, and I encourage Member States to make the best possible use of that guidance as an important reference tool. That includes the technical assistance follow-up in Iraq, technical assistance identification in Afghanistan, challenges of countering terrorism in Libya and in West Africa, as well as integrating human rights, the rule of law and gender as cross-cutting issues. It also includes the comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives and meeting with academic institutions and think tanks. In order to ensure transparency and the full participation of all stakeholders, Egypt has been keen to have most of the CTC’s meetings open for the participation of the wider membership, relevant organizations and other partners. We urge the incoming Chair and Security Council members to continue to follow that approach. We believe that open meetings and events provide an excellent platform for interactions between members of the Committee and the wider membership, and help to strengthen dialogue between United Nations entities and international and regional organizations, as well as external partners, through the analysis and discussion of emerging issues, trends and developments relating to resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014), as well as subsequent resolutions. Speaking of Council resolutions, over the past two years the Council has adopted nine resolutions on counter-terrorism. Those resolutions cover several thematic areas, including promoting international law enforcement and judicial cooperation in matters relating to counter-terrorism, the use of biometrics, the downgrading of intelligence, trafficking in persons for terrorist purposes, protecting critical infrastructure, countering terrorist narratives and welcoming the comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives, the use of data and battlefield evidence, new border control measures, including application programme interfaces and biometrics, the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, and the links between human trafficking and the financing of terrorism. Those resolutions clearly reflect the commitment of the international community to combating terrorism. The CTC and CTED are mandated with a number of tasks pursuant to those resolutions. In that regard, I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the necessity of providing CTED with the necessary financial and human resources to make it capable of untertaking and fulfilling its core mandate, as well as its new and evolving task mandate, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. As the Council is aware, the creation of the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) represented a significant evolution in the counter-terrorism architecture of the United Nations. The Counter-Terrorism Committee, CTED and UNOCT should continue to take steps to strengthen their coordination with a view to enhancing the impact of our counter-terrorism technical assistance programmes and activities. The three subsidiary bodies of the Security Council — the CTC, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) — continue to share common objectives within their respective mandates. I recommend that the three committees continue to explore ways to further strengthen their cooperation. I have chaired a meeting with my peers to discuss areas of cooperation among those three bodies and their experts. I would like to make four general observations. First, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, with the support of CTED, plays a unique role and convening power in monitoring, facilitating and promoting the implementation efforts of Member States. In that regard, I would like to thank CTED, as well as all Security Council members from the 2016-2017 term, for their full support to the Egyptian chairmanship of the CTC. We really appreciate the support. Secondly, with the recent reform of the counter- terrorism architecture of the United Nations, United Nations entities have a new opportunity to work in a coordinated, coherent and effective manner and to avoid the duplication of efforts and competition. Thirdly, Member States must continue to take steps to fulfil their obligations pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions on terrorism. The United Nations has an obligation to assist Member States in that regard, including by mobilizing the necessary resources. Fourthly, contemporary terrorist threats are enormous and exceptional. Our actions should be at least on the same wavelength. Let me now turn to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) on Iraq. Although the Committee did not hold any meetings over the course of the past two years, there was a flurry of delisting during that period. No individuals or entities had been delisted since December 2011, but since August 2016 the Committee has delisted a total of 39 entities, pursuant to delisting requests that the Government of Iraq submitted. Regarding the Committee pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I started out my service as the Committee’s Chair with a clear motivation. Like many of my colleagues here today, I wanted to move the file forward in order to demonstrate that over the course of two years, it would be possible to make progress. That was particularly important for my country, Egypt, which, as an African State, has a keen interest in peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region. Throughout our work, we have been convinced that the success of the sanctions regime in attaining its ultimate goal would depend on the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and regional States. Therefore, their continued engagement with the Committee’s work and their understanding of the Committee’s role and objectives have been at the forefront of our priorities. To that end, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and regional States have been regularly invited to meetings of the Committee. Their views have been integrated into the Committee’s deliberations on several subjects that ranged from regional support and the neutralization of armed groups to combating illicit trafficking in natural resources and discussions about the reports of the Group of Experts. Those meetings, together with the two visits that I conducted to the region in 2016 and earlier this year, have helped to maintain a constructive dialogue, which promoted a better understanding of the implementation of sanctions. Moreover, we firmly believe that many of the challenges that the Democratic Republic of the Congo faces can be effectively addressed only through a holistic approach involving a wide range of regional and international partners. In that light, we have been eager to broaden the Committee’s engagement with all relevant partners, including those in the United Nations system. Therefore, the Committee regularly has received briefings and held focused thematic discussions with all relevant United Nations offices and seniors officials. In addition, the Committee has broadened its engagement with the region to include important subregional organizations and frameworks, in addition to regular interactions with regional States. Committee members have had two opportunities to interact with the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on regional efforts to address illicit trafficking and natural resources. During my most recent visit to the region, I had the opportunity to observe the ministerial meeting of signatory States and guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, which took place on 17 October in Brazzaville. The Committee has also also keen to promote synergy between its work and that of other relevant regional and international stakeholders. For example, in the area of natural resources, the Committee held its first open briefing , which was available to all Member States. The meeting ended up facilitating a better understanding of the challenges related to the effective management of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It also promoted collaboration among regional and international actors and the Committee in reducing the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During the two visits that I undertook to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, I was able to hold focused discussions with local authorities, civil society organizations and United Nations representatives in the capitals of the countries that I visited. Based on those interactions, I believe that I acquired a clear vision of the manner in which the effective implementation of sanctions can help facilitate building a space for peace. More than ever, I am certain that the work that we do here in New York has an impact on the ground. The sanctions regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo affects armed groups in a number of ways. The arms embargo reduces the potential of armed groups to obtain weapons and ammunition. In addition, the possibility of being included on the Committee’s sanctions list serves as a deterrent from engaging in destabilizing activities. That could possibly lead to being the subject of investigations and prosecution by Governments of the region. Therefore, the sanctions can serve not only as a preventive tool, but also as a tool to combat the rampant impunity of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally, I note the importance of supporting the work of the Group of Experts that supports the 1533 Committee. During my tenure as Chair of the Committee, the Group of Experts has provided the Committee with a considerable amount of information concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The experts went to great lengths to obtain credible information with a view to improving the situation and bringing peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that context, members of the Committee continue to mourn the loss of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan and continue to expect that their killers will be brought to justice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I therefore urge all Member States and stakeholders, in particular within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to work towards providing full support and collaboration with the Group of Experts as well as the Senior Officer and his team of four technical experts appointed by the Secretary- General to assist the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In conclusion, I should like to take the opportunity today to convey my sincere thanks and appreciation to all who have worked well and supported us during the implementation of our mandate, notable our fellow members of the Committee I had chaired and our colleagues in the Sanctions Secretariat.

I thank Ambassador Aboulatta for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Yelchenko.

I would like to thank you, Sir, for having organized this briefing to share our experiences as outgoing Chairs of the Security Council subsidiary organs. After joining the Security Council in January 2016, Ukraine assumed the chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and recently extended pursuant to resolution 2339 (2017) concerning the Central African Republic. However, in May 2016 the Security Council adopted resolution 2288 (2016), which terminated the arms embargo against Liberia and dissolved the 1521 Sanctions Committee. During my short tenure as the Chair of that Committee, I focused on maintaining the positive momentum in its work, created by my predecessors, particularly the former Jordanian Permanent Representative Dina Kawar. In January 2017, Ukraine began to chair the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan. In my personal assessment, one of the main tasks of a Chair is to deepen dialogue between the Committee and the authorities of the government in question. This is meant not only helping to strengthen the implementation of sanctions regimes, but also pushing forward the resolution of root causes of a respective crisis or conflict, and to contribute to post- conflict rehabilitation. Bearing that in mind, during the past 24 months I have dedicated myself, among other things, to strengthening interaction between the Committees that I chair, on the one side, and the Sudan and the Central African Republic, on the other. Furthermore, I also worked on enhancing the Committees’ contacts with other Security Council subsidiary bodies, relevant neighbouring countries and other stakeholders, considering the latter as key in ensuring proper implementation of the sanctions regimes. My visits to the Central African Republic in 2016 and the Sudan in 2017 were of great importance in building up trust between the parties concerned and the Committees. While on those visits, I also tried to strengthen the cooperation between the Committees and the United Nations entities on the ground. The most important lesson, therefore, that I learned was the value of dialogue. It is my firm belief that if ones wishes to be an effective chair of a sanctions committee, one must engage in dialogue, build bridges of trust and mutual understanding, speak frequently with all relevant stakeholders and be ready to listen. The time and effort invested in such endeavours will ultimately determine one’s success in achieving one’s goals as chair. Secondly, I tried to keep the Committees as up-to-date as possible about the dynamics of conflict resolution in the Central African Republic and the Sudan. This allowed the Committees’ members to take better-informed decisions on how to ensure full implementation of the respective sanctions regimes. For this purpose, with the valuable support of the Secretariat, in both Committees I convened meetings with the Special Representatives of the Secretary- General for Children and Armed Conflict and on Sexual Violence in Conflict, as well as informal meetings with civil society representatives, who briefed members on the areas of their expertise. Worth mentioning are also briefings by the United Nations Mine Action Service and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research for the 2127 Committee on weapons and ammunition management in the Central African Republic. No less important were interactions with the Special Representative, Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, and the Joint Special Representative, Head of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. They in their turn, and to the extent possible, kept the Committees informed regarding the evolution of the security situation and political process in the Central African Republic and Darfur, respectively. It is also difficult to overestimate the role of the respective Panels of Experts in keeping the Committees informed about the current political and security situation in the countries concerned as well as, most importantly, the current status of the implementation of sanctions measures. Such up-to-date information from the ground was especially valuable for those Security Council members who do not have their own diplomatic missions in these countries. I strongly encourage incoming Chairs to maintain close cooperation with the Panels of Experts and support their challenging work in collecting such information. In September, I initiated an open briefing of the Central African Committee Committee with the participation not only of the delegations of regional States, but also of the broader United Nations membership to discuss that challenges that the country and the region were facing, in particular in the sphere of implementing the sanctions regime. This event confirmed, among other things, the crucial role of regional cooperation in ensuring the proper implementation of the travel ban and in countering illicit arms-trafficking and cross-border smuggling of natural resources in the region. In November, the Committee on the Sudan held its first-ever joint informal consultations with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan to discuss the spread of Darfuri armed groups into Libya and South Sudan and to develop a common approach to addressing the issue. I am convinced that the holding of such joint informal consultations should be viewed as the start of a holistic approach to addressing the threats posed by those armed groups. Key here is the diversity of sources of expertise and openness to broader United Nations membership and different United Nations entities. I advise incoming Chairs not to assume that chairing a sanctions committee is an easy task. There are many challenges down the road. Despite all the positive developments that I have noted above, much remains to be done in order to advance the role of the chair. In many instances, a committee can be paralysed by totally unavoidable politicization of its work and the abuse of the consensus rule. It is from such abuse that, for example, in recent years the Sudan Committee was unable to present its 90-day report in an open format to the entire United Nations membership. It was just yesterday that we managed to break this negative trend and I was able to brief the Council about my recent activities in this Chamber. I hope that this practice of open briefings will continue by default. The same relates to decision-making. Given that the Committee reaches all decisions by consensus, sometimes the Chair finds himself lacking a certain level of autonomy. Almost all Chair’s actions must go through a no-objection procedure. It starts with the content of the Chair’s communications and ends up with a format of meetings that the Chair proposes to convene. However, according to the existing guidelines, decisions on convening “informal informal” meetings and inviting participants are left to the discretion of the Chair, and I tried to do my best to use this valuable procedural opening to increase transparency. I believe that the chair of a sanctions committee should not be considered exclusively a troubleshooter. He or she can play a much more relevant role, particularly given the evolving nature of conflicts in assigned countries and the need to ensure the full and effective implementation of sanctions regimes. Ukraine is among those countries that fully recognize the importance of undertaking continuous efforts, including periodic reviews, to further improve the proper design, implementation, evaluation and follow-up of sanctions regimes and to increase the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. To this end, we are in favour of further endeavours aimed at the independent review of crosscutting issues and trends in sanctions’ application, best practices and challenges in their implementation as well as preparing recommendations, including with regard to practical options to better support Member States’ capacities in this area. I want to underline that serving as a committee chair is a privilege and responsibility. Among other things, it allows each individual Permanent Representative to contribute to bringing peace to affected countries and people. Finally, I would like to thank the Secretariats of the Committees I had the honor to chair for their dedication and professionalism in supporting the Chair’s work. My special appreciation also goes to the interpreters: without their help, our work would not be accomplished. I wish the best of luck to Poland and Côte d’Ivoire as the incoming Chairs of the Sudan and the Central African Republic Sanctions Committees.

I thank Ambassador Yelchenko for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Cardi.

I welcome this opportunity as an outgoing Security Council member to give a briefing on the work I have done in leading a subsidiary body of the Council and on the lessons learned. I will try to draw some conclusions from my activity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) for the implementation of sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. I will also briefly refer to my experience as facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), which endorses the Iranian nuclear deal. I would like to touch upon three main concepts that inspired a reaction this year: effectiveness, unity and transparency. Acting as Chairman and facilitator, I felt that our main responsibility was to lead the work of the 1718 Committee in the 2231 format by making a constant effort to achieve consensus, not only because of the decision-making rules that apply to all subsidiary bodies, but also because of the importance we have always attached to the principle of Council unity when taking action. A Council that can act in unity at the time of adoption and throughout the implementation of its resolutions is a stronger Council. As Chairs of subsidiary bodies, we are tasked to provide crucial inputs for the second part of the equation: implementation. The wide articulation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions regime and the quick succession of new measures in recent months required the Committee to make a special effort to assist United Nations Member States and international organizations. Likewise, the innovative set of provisions established by resolution 2231 (2015) needed to be better understood and assimilated in their second year of life. I could always count on the constructive cooperation of other Council members in these efforts, and today I wish to thank them all for their continued support. While unity is essential for the Council to deliver effectively, transparency is key to fostering a better understanding and, ultimately, a better implementation of Council resolutions. This is where I have decided to invest more time and resources for the benefit of the United Nations membership as a whole. By organizing two open briefings and five regional meetings in 2017, we have tried to shed light on the evolving Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sanctions regime while at the same time providing Member States with a platform to raise specific issues and establish a dialogue to discuss implementation challenges. I have received words of appreciation for this outreach initiative, and I therefore wish to encourage future Chairs to follow this path. Increased efforts can be made to build the most solid relationship and a more proactive engagement of Member States with the Council in working together on implementation. Let me also recall the June open briefing on resolution 2231 (2015) (S/PV.7990), with a particular focus on the procurement channel — a mechanism that continues to be underexploited and which I believe requires further attention. At last year’s briefings by the Chairs of the Security Council’s subsidary bodies (S/PV.7845), the former Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (2006) said that the greatest joy of his mandate had been to see that Committee disappear. I can only second those words today, reiterating Italy’s unwavering support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the need for the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Unfortunately, I cannot express myself in similar terms on the 1718 Committee. While we hope for a surge in diplomacy, Member States must redouble their efforts for the full implementation of sanctions in order to lead the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea back to the negotiating table. That is the crucial purpose of the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — to create conditions conducive to restarting negotiations, while at the same time hindering the development of the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As repeatedly stated, in no resolution have sanctions ever been meant to have a negative impact on the North Korean people or affect the humanitarian situation in the country. During our next meeting on 11 December, Committee members will hear a presentation on United Nations humanitarian operations in the field and have a discussion dedicated to the subject. At the same time, it remains entirely in the hands of Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and return to international legality. We are also nearing the end of a mandate; there is still work to be done. In closing, allow me to wish my Dutch colleague, Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, the best of luck. I am sure he will do a superb job in his capacity as the new Chair of a subsidiary organ. True to the spirit of our split term, my team and I have been working hand in hand with our Dutch colleagues to ensure a smooth transition, and from 1 January we will be in the front row to support their work from the other side of the table. Finally, allow me to express my gratitude for the invaluable assistance received from the Subsidiary Organs Bransh of the Secretariat and give a special mention to the tireless work of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Panel of Experts. Their cooperation and advice have been fundamental to our task.

I thank Ambassador Cardi for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Rosselli Frieri.

I will address the Security Council in my capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau and Chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals. I will share some exclusively personal opinions with members regarding my responsibility within these organs. With regard to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Bissau is experiencing a political crisis and the root causes of instability in the country remain unresolved. International and regional efforts to find a lasting solution to the political crisis seem to have no effect on the ground, as none of the provisions of the Conakry Agreement has been implemented. This is mainly due to a lack of political will. The international community could encourage the use of different tools such as dialogue, good offices, maintaining special political missions in the field, sanctions and so on. Ultimately, however, the solution to end institutional instability and achieve peace in Guinea-Bissau lies in the hands of its leaders. The country continues to be affected by the uncertainty of the political situation, without clear indication of substantive progress towards the achievement of a solution in the near future. Next year will an electoral year in Guinea-Bissau, and the stability, transparency and legitimacy of its institutions will be the cornerstone of the democratic process and crucial to consolidating peace in the country. In June, I paid a visit to the country, where I met with various political, military and civil society representatives of Guinea-Bissau. It should be highlighted that, in the five years since the sanctions were approved, this was the first time that a Chair of the Committee had visited the country. The visit on the ground showed me that there is a need for greater dialogue between the Committee — in fact, the Council itself — and the citizens of Guinea-Bissau. In this regard, I encourage the new Chair of the Committee to make at least one visit to the country in order to obtain information on the situation in Guinea-Bissau first hand. I have no intention of reiterating what I already conveyed to the Council on 24 August (S/PV.8031), but I would like to highlight some of the findings of my briefing that are still valid. First, the lack of political will to reach a solution is based on personal interests and ambitions, and not on religious, ideological, ethnic or philosophical differences. Secondly, since 2012 the sanctioned military officers have maintained a conduct that respects the constitutional order and the laws of the country, and abstained from interfering in the political life of Guinea- Bissau. It should be noted that these people continue to rise in the ranks of the army and that some have been promoted to higher ranks. This has contributed to a certain climate of impunity. Thirdly, since last year two persons listed on the sanctions regime have travelled outside Guinea- Bissau. However, both were arrested at the airport of destination and repatriated to Guinea-Bissau. I have received no other information that other persons have violated the travel ban. This is a positive indication that Member States are maintaining the proper attitude and are increasingly vigilant in enforcing sanctions. Fourthly, the mission of the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Guinea-Bissau has played a vital role in contributing to preventing the constitutional order from being threatened. By way of striking a balance, I would like to say that sanctions have played an important role in maintaining the constitutional order in Guinea Bissau, but they are not driving the current political situation. As I have said on other occasions, I believe that it is necessary to consider the sanctions list cautiously, taking into account the current situation and events in Guinea-Bissau. The imposition of sanctions as a means or tool available to the Security Council to achieve an explicit goal. Their maintenance or revision must work to achieve that end. In conclusion, it is important for the international community to continue to support Guinea-Bissau through various means, as has been done to date. However, it is also vital that this support be accompanied by positive signals and tangible progress being made by the political leaders of Guinea-Bissau. I shall now turn to my role as Chair of the Informal Working Group on the International Criminal Tribunals. During the past two years, the Group has met regularly. As is its practice, it has also met before presenting the semi-annual reports of the Courts to the Security Council and when the situation required it, in order to discuss various cases, some of which have been brought to the Council’s attention by the Presidents of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. The Group also prepared and negotiated the text of various Security Council resolutions, such as that referring for example to the appointment of the Prosecutor of the Residual Mechanism, the amendment of the ICTY statute, or the extension of the mandate of the President and Judges, among other examples. The annual reports of the Informal Working Group on the International Criminal Tribunals have provided detailed information on its activities. The Group has also been able to monitor the work of these institutions and their operation through its comprehensive and detailed reports. Specifically, if we consider the ICTY, we witnessed progress in the implementation of its completion strategy. The Tribunal has been able to successfully overcome the difficulties that arose and complied with its forecasts and calendar of closures. I note that on 31 December, the ICTY will reach the end of its mandate, and we are currently drafting a consensual press statement to mark that historical event in a positive way. Allow me to say in my personal capacity that the Tribunal, in serving international justice, has allowed States to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide and war crimes. It has contributed to the development of international law and has pioneered certain areas of international humanitarian law. It has defined the concept of armed conflict and contributed to a more precise definition of the crime of genocide. It has developed important jurisprudence regarding sexual crimes and crimes against cultural patrimony. It has contributed to the elaboration of a concept of command responsibility by stating clearly that justice applies to everyone, whether they be Head of State or Government or other high- ranking official. It has contributed in that manner to the establishment of historical truth. I also call on the Security Council, and especially States, to continue to work with the Residual Mechanism, since, as indicated at the Security Council debate that took place on 6 December (see S/PV.8120), the prosecution of all perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia is not over. Many victims still await justice. Finally, I thank the Office of Legal Affairs and the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat for their valuable support over the past two years of our chairmanship of the two subsidiary bodies of which I have spoken. I wish every success to those who will succeed me in this task: the Permanent Representative of Equatorial Guinea, Ambassador Anatolio Ndong Mba, who will chairing the Guinea-Bissau committee, and the Permanent Representative of Peru, Ambassador Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, who will chair the Informal Working Group on the International Tribunals.

I thank Ambassador Rosselli Frieri for his briefing. I shall now make a statement as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. I would like to share some of my thoughts and observations on the activities I have conducted during these two years as Chair of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council. First, the 2140 Committee met four times in informal consultations this year. The Yemen sanctions regime can assist in arriving at a political solution to the conflict. While Yemen’s political situation is extremely fragile, I believe that it is all the more important for Council members to discuss how the Committee can contribute to the political process. The Panel of Experts has been very active and achieved meaningful work. For example, it has presented helpful case studies, in addition to its mandated reporting. The Chair has made efforts to ensure the independence of the Panel and to support its activities. Unfortunately, I have not been able to travel to Yemen during my tenure. I believe that it will be useful for the next Chair and the Committee members to undertake a visit to the region so as to acquire first-hand information from the ground. Allow me now to say a few words in my capacity as Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. Japan assumed the chairmanship of the Informal Working Group for the third time. This time, we decided to make a focused effort on two things: first, improving the transitional arrangements for newly elected Council members; and secondly, revising the note by the President in document S/2010/507. In so doing, we desired to make an impact both through codification and actual practice. We first tackled the issue of improving transitional arrangements for newly elected members. After intensive discussion, the note by the President S/2016/619 was adopted in July last year. The note outlined measures to facilitate the preparedness of newly elected members by inviting them to observe the work of the Council for an expanded period of three months. The note also set out a more defined and advanced timeline with an emphasis on inclusiveness in the selection of the Chairs of subsidiary bodies in response to the strong call of many outgoing Chairs of subsidiary bodies. Facilitation for the selection of the Chairs was carried out both in 2016 and in 2017, in accordance with the new note, with Japan and one permanent member serving as co-facilitators in both years. We are now in the process of conducting the handover to the incoming Chairs, also in accordance with the note. The Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Matters went on to explore some useful ideas and proposals that emerged from our open debate (see S/PV.7740) during our last presidency in July 2016 for revising note 507. There were rich discussions on lessons learned and challenges relating to past practices. During the course of that process, I updated members of the Council on the work, and also exchanged views with interested non-Council members. Thanks to the contributions of members of the Council, as well as those of the wider United Nations membership, I believe that the revised version of presidential note 507 (S/2017/507) represents a comprehensive and balanced text. It is indeed a truly collective achievement. We must stress that improving the working methods of the Council does not end with the adoption of the revised version of note 507. It is an open-ended, ongoing process of collective endeavours, and what is most important is the implementation and actual practice of the Security Council. During the presidency this month, I will try my best to implement some useful measures contained within the note, such as suggesting a few areas for Council members to focus upon, at least one day prior to informal consultations and attending press stakeouts following every session of informal consultations. We recently issued the 2017 edition of what is known as the Green Book on the working methods of the Council. I have brought 100 copies with me here today, and they have been placed in the quiet room for anyone interested in taking one. In conclusion, I express my gratitude to the members of the Security Council and the wider membership, as well as the Secretariat, for their cooperation over the past two years. I am confident that the incoming Chairs will bring their enthusiasm and ideas to further the work. I convey my best wishes to them, and assure them of my full cooperation from outside the Council. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. On behalf of the Security Council, I take this opportunity to express appreciation to the outgoing Chairs for the manner in which they have discharged their important responsibilities on behalf of the Council.