S/PV.819 Security Council

It is my pleasant duty to express the thanks of tlu~ Security Council lor the: services 'JI Ambassador Ritchie of Canada, who presided over the Council during the month of May. If my memory is correct, that was the first time he presided over the COlinciI. However, he presided with a tact Bull a sureu~::;.s of touch worthy of a veteran. We are grateful to our distinguished colleague from Canada. 2. M. RITCHJE (Canada) [traduit dt. t'anglaisJ : All nom de man pays, je remercie le President des paroles trop aimablcs el e.Iogit:uses qll'il a prononcees a mon egard.

May I express my apprecia- tion, on behalf of my country, of the much too generou~ and kind words which the President has addressed to me. President: M. 1', F. TSIANG (Chine). Ordre du jour prori8oirt (S/Agends./819) anne~ commis contre elle par les forces militaires fran~aiscs stationnees sur san territoire et en Alg~­ tie dcpuis le 19 mai 1958 a (S/4013). a) 11 La plainte formulee par la France contre la Tunisie le 14 fevrier 1958 (S/3954)>> [S/4015] ; b) (' La situation creee par .la rupture, du fait de la Tunisie, du modus vivendi qui s'etait etabli depuis le mois de feyrier 1958 sur le station- nement de troupes franyaises en certains points du lerritoire tuuisien)) (S/4015). ReDlerciementl! nu President Imrtaut Letter dated 29 May 19Sa from the representative of I'rance to the President of the Security Council eoncerning: (a) .. The complaint brought by France against Tunisia on U February 1958 (5/3954) ,. (S/4015); (b) The 8ituation arisillg out of the diBruption, by Tunisia, of the modus vivendi which had been established since February 1958 with regard to the stationing of French troops at certain points in Tunisian territory" (5{4015)

In voting for the adoption of the agenda, I was not signifying approval of the wording of the Tunisian complaint, which refers to acts of aggression. In our view, there can be no question of acts of aggression when discussions are being held and are continuing in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of tIle United Nations. Moreover, as I shall show in the course of my statement, the incidents to which the represcnt<l- tive of Tunisia refers do not Constitute aggression on the part of France.

The Council will now proceed to the discussion of the items on the agenda. The first name inscribed on my list of speakers is thllt of the rC]lrcsentative of Tunisia.

I should like to begin by thanking the Council for allOWing the Tunisian delegation to participate for the secund tim~ in these di~cussions on a question 3fl'ecting the ind£:pendence and very existence of Tunisia. 6. At the request of Tunisia, the Security Council is today culled upon to express its views on a complaint mIating to a series of acts of armed aggres~ioncommitted against Tunisia since 19 Mny 1958 and to decide what lllcnsures should be taken to restore int.ernational peace ulld sccurity, with particlilar reference to tllC measurt~ which 1 shaU have the honour iormally to reqllest in the course of this discussion. 7. Three months ago - on 18 February 1958 to be precise --- the Council met [811 th meeting] at the request of Tunisia to examine a complaint entitled" Complaint by Tlmisia in respect of an act of aggression committed against it by France on 8 February 1958 at Sakict-Sidi_ Yousscf '.' [S/J952]. The complaint was accompanied by a memornndum the last paragraph of which was Leure, en date dn 29 mu 1958, Ildressee an Prc8ident du CoBseil de lIeeurit6 pIU' le repreflcntant de la Frame, eoneernant : a) ({ La plninte formuUe par la France eonlre la Tunisie le 14 fevrier 1958 (8/3954) » [5/4015] ; b) (( Lu situation ercec par la rupture, du tait de la TuniBie, du modus vivendi qui s'etait elnbli depui!~ le ntois de fCVl'ier 1958 sur le stationne_ ment de troupes fran~aise8 en certain" poinu du territoire tuWsicn)1 (5/4015) Sur l'invitalion du Presidenf, AT. Alangi Slim, repre- sentant de la Tunislc, prend place d la lable du Conscil. 3. M. GEORGES-PICOT (Fraacc) : En votant lJOl!I' l'adoption de I'ordre cia jam, j('. n'ai pas approuvc pour 3utant la reduction de la plainte tanisicnne, OU il est question d'net('s d'a.gre:;sion, car, a nnlre avis, on ne sllurait puder ri'aete:; d'agrc~sion lorsquc des conversations onl lieu d .,c pour,<;uivcut conformement a l'Article 33 de In Charle des Nations Unies. D'aillems, COll1l1lC nous J'indiquerolls au cams de llolre interven- tion, les incidents auxquds fait allusion le rcpresen- ront de la Tltnisie ne constituent. pas ane agression de la part de la Fr&l1cc. 4. Le PR1~SlDENT (Iraduil de l'anglais) Ln dis~ ellssion des questions imcrite., a l'ordrc clu jour e.,l ouvcrtes. Le premier orateur inscrit (',<;t le representant de la Tunisie. 5. M, SLl}l (Tunisie) : Je lit~n~ tout d'abMd a. re!JlCl'- cier le Consei] d'nvoir permis aln delegation tunisienllc, ponr la dCllxirme fois, dlJ pal'ticiper 1\ ces diSCUSSions sur unc que~tion qui interesse In vic rnemc et I'indr'.- pendanee de In TUllisie. 6. Le CQnseil de sccuritc est appele nujlmrd'hui, il ia reqllefc de la TUllisie, Et. se pl'onollcer sur une plainte temlant u constater une ,<;cl'ie d'agl'l'ssiol1s arTTlees dont elle a etl~ l'oLjct depuis le 19 illai 1958 et it decider t~nes mes,ares qn'il estimera Iltik de prcndre pOllr l'etabIir la paix et la sccurite ilJtA.~rJl[ltionales, et notllm- mellt relIes que j'aucni l'honncur dt: lui demander formdlcmcnt all CaUl'S de ces debats. 7, Dcj~, il y a trois mnis --le 18 kVl'icr cxactement- le Conseil s'ctait rCllni [Sl1 o sennce), n la dcmandc: de la Tunisie, [lour cxamim']' IIlW ]JlainLe ({u'elle .wait introduite sous la cote S{:1D;,2 d ainsi libeller: " Plainte d~ la Tunisie all sujet dl: l'arte d'agression commis par la Franc!; COJJtn: cUe a Snltiet-Sidi-Yousscf le 8 fCvriC'r 1958 \l. La [Ilnint~ dedt accompagnce d'Ull -8. J do not wish to recapitulate in detail the causes of the complaint of 13 February 1958. I shall confwe myself to recalling certain facts whieh point to a persistent intention of aggression and to a similarity in the methods employed. 9. In the morning of 8 February 1958, the peaceful Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, which was holding its weekly murk:t, was heavHy bombed and machine-gunned for more than an hour by twenty- five B-26 aircraft coming from Algeria. As a result three-quarters 0: the village was destroyed or damaged. International Red Cross lorries were reduced to a heap of scrap-iron, and tlle provisions they were carrying for Algerian refugees were completely destroyed. Casualties amounted to 71 dead, including 11 women and 20 children, and 130 wounded, of whom 100 required hospi- tal treatment; all the victims, incidentally, were Tunisi,m civilians. The children irtdllded eight school- boys, who were machine-gul1l1ed while trying to escape from their school, which was hit during the bombing. This happened on 8 February 1958. 10. On the following day, 9 February 1958, the pennanent representative of Tunisia to the United Nations infonned the Secretary-General that the Govcrr.mcnt Q{ the Republic of Tuni!';i~, exerdsing its right of self-defence and its prerogatives as Cl seve- reign State, had inforned the French Government that Ei'reneh troops stationed in Tunisia we;,e prohibited from leaving their barracks. 11. Iu a letter of 13 February 1958 [5/3951J, the Government of Tunisia explained to the President of the Security Council that these mea~ll~es had been taken in the exercise of its right of self-defence under Article 51 of tlle Charter, The measures comprised in particlllar the prohibition of any French troop move- merits it! Tunisia, the sending of French t!avaI u:Jits into Tunisian ports, the landing or parachuting of reinforcements and any flights by French military aircraft over Tunisian territory. 12. On 15 February, at the instance of the Secretary. General of the United Nations, the Tunisian Govern- ment authorized local deliveries of the necessary food supplies for the immobilized French troops, having previo1\sly received an assurance that these facilities would not be abused and t}Ul:t their sole purpose was to permit "dispatch of the foodstuffs and suppLit:s necessary for the mainte:lance of the troops". I should like to make these points cleur from the outset, since I may have to revert to them later. 13. On 18 February HoS, the Security Council, after adoptbg its agenda, adjourned the debate on learning that the United Kingdom and the United States of America had offered their good offices to settle the 8. Je ne vais pas I'eprendre avec tOllS leurs details les causes de la plainte dn 13 fevtler 1958. Je me contenterai seulement d'en n.ppeler cel'tains elements, qui marquent la continuite dans l'in:ention agressive et la similitude dans les moyens, 9. Le 8 fevrier 1958, au matin, le paisiblc village tunisien de Sakict·Sidi-Youssef, qui tenuit son marcbe llebdomadaire, etait soumis pendant plttS d'une heure, de la part de 25 avions B-26 venant d'Algerie, a tlU bombardement et a un mitraiHage intenses. Le resultat fut que le village a He aux trois quarts detruit ou en- dommElge. Des canlions de la Croix-Rouge intcrnatio- nalc ant eM transf(lrmes en ~mas de fermille, et les vivre~ qu'ili trat!sportaient a l'intention des refugie.s algeriens completement perdus. Le bilan en pertes humaines fut de 71 marts (pnrmi Iesquels 11 femmes et 20 enfants) et de 130 blesses, dont 100 ant dfi ctre hospitalises - tons etaient d'llilleurs des civils tunisiens, Panni les enfants llguraient notamment huit petits ccolicrs mitrailles alors qu'ils essayaient de fuir leur ccolc atteinte par le bombardement. C'Hait le 8 fevrier 1958, 10. Le lcndemain, 9 fevrier 1958, le representant permanent de la Tunisie aupres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies informait le Secretaire general que le Gouvernement de la Republique tunisienne, usant de son droit de Iegitin:e defense ct de son droit legitime d'Etat souverain, avait llotifiC au Gouvcrnement frangais l'interdictiO:l aux troupes frangaises stationnees en Tunisie de sortir de leurs casernements. 11. Par une lettrc du 13 feYrier 1958 [5{3951], le Gouyerncrnent LUIli5kn precisait E. l'inleution au President du Consoil de seeurite que ees mesures etaient prises en vertu du droit de legitime defense prevu i:t l'Article 51 de la Charte. EIles eomportaient notamment l'intcrdiction de tout mouvement de troupes irf1n~ai5esen Ttmisie, de tout acces d'unites de la marine de guerre frangaise £lUX ports tunisiens, de tont debar- quement ou parachutage de renforts ainsi que de tout survol du territoire par l'aviation militaire fran~ise. 12. Le 15 fevrier, a la suite d'une intervention (lu Secretaire general des Nations Unies, le Gouvcrnement tunisien autorisait les livrai.'>ons locales de vivres necessaires aux truupes frangaises consignees, s'etant assure au prealable c;ue les facilites envisagees ne seraicnt PflS utilisees d'une faC;.on abusive et qu'elles avaient peur objet uniqucment ( l'envoi des produits alimen- taires et d'l ravitaillement neeessair€-3 it la subsistance des troupes n. Je tiens it preciseI' ces points des mainte- nant POlll' la suite du debat. J'aurai it y revenir peut~~tre per l:k 9uite, 13. Le 18 £evrier 1958, le Conseil de securite, apres avoir adopte son ordre du jour, ajournait le debat, ayant appris que le Royaume.Uni et les Etats-Unis d'Amerique avaient oITert leurs bans offiees pOllr regIer 14. The Security Council adjourned, and the Rood oiHces mission, consisting ol Mt. Robert lHllrphy and Mr. I-Iarold Beelcy, immedi<l.tely undertook its mediation between France and Tunisia. After s~vern.l jcurneys hetween the capitals of the two countrjes and contacLs heh'icen the two Governments, the mission was ab:e, on 15 March, to p:opose to th€ Tunisian Government Q draft compromise agrr.emp.nt on the procedure for the evacuuUon of the French troops in Tunisia. 15. This agreement provided for a first stage, during which all French military personnel olltside the Bizcrtc perimeter were to be withdrawn from Tunisia as SOOI1 as possible. TIle General OfUcer commanding the French forces was to draw up a timetable for the movement of the trQops and their equilJll1t:nt, which was to be the subjcct of agreement between the Tunisian and the French authorities. The Tunisian authorities were to take the necessary stens to enS:.Ire the dignifted and unimpeded departure from Tunisia ol the French troops. On the date on which this r:lOvement began, the Tunisian Government W:lS to revoke t1:e restrictive measures taken on 8 Febrll.'lry with regard to French forces outside the Bizerte perimeter. In a second stage, during which the good offices oi tl1e Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States would remain available to Tunisia and Prance, " provisional regime for the Bizerte base was to be worked out by the Prer.ch and Tunisian Govenments. This compro- mise agmement was accepted by the Tunisian Govc.tn- meat on 15 1~arch 1958 and was to be approved by the government of Prime Minister Gaillard on 14 April 1958. 16. I wish to cmph:l.size that under -::his agreement of 15 March no [reedom of movement for thc French troops stationed in Bizerte could be contemplated until the cvoeuutjt>n of all forces otltsic:~. tl:e rerim~t{'.r had been completed. Then, and then only, would such freedom be accorded to the forces at Bizf;rle, penlling the outcome of the conversations wUch were to tqke place concerning that base. In order La preclude allY misunderstanding on this point in tlle subsequcnt discussion, I also wish to stress that th~ san;e agreement, in providing for the return to Tunisia of military air- fields, if. particular, those at El-Aouilla, Sfax, Gabes, ~fsa, and Remada (I repeat: Gafs<l and Hemada) indicated that arrnngc:nent5 would he made to enable the ambassadors of tile United St.ai'.E'l'l find the United Kingdom to satisfy themselves that tl:ese airfields would be used for peaceful purposes only. It was even stipulated that ..... to facilitate the task of the obser- vers, thc nir:lelds at Remada and at Galsa would be --------- 4 rapid~ment fin a la gucrre d'Algeric, dont 10s debor· demellts S'.lr le sol rie la Tunisie et dont la prolongation constituent une menac!', ala paix et a la securite init·r· nationales dans ceUe region du monde. 14. Le Conseil de secuite s'etant a:ors ajoume, In mission des bons offtces, comp0see de :MM. Hobert :him. phy et Harold Beeley, a entrepris aussitM son action entre la Franoe et la Tunisie. Aprcs p:usicurs voyages entre les capitale~ des deux pays e-t des cont,acts pntrE.'. les deux gouv~rncmcnb, MM. Murphy ct Beeley ant [:Iu, le 15 :llarS, propos~r au Gouvernement tunisien un projet de compromis portant sur les modalites d'evn. cuatioll des trQupes frnnyaises de Tunisic. 15. Scion Ce compromis, pCl:dant line premiere phase, J'ensemble du personnet militaire frano;ais se trouvant hors du perimetrc de Bizerte sera retire de la Tunis:c dans les meilleurs delais. Le command,mt supcrieur des forces frano;aises etablira pour le mouvement des troupes et de lenr matcrip.l Ln horairc qui fera l'objet cl'un accord entre les autorite.; tunisiennes et franr;;:aises. Les alttorites tunisiennes prendront des mesurcs aptes agarantir aux troupes francaises la possibilitC de quitter la Tunisle cl'une far;ou digne et sans c.ntraves. A partir de la date ou commencera cc Illouvement, le Gouver- nemEnt tunisien rapportera, en cc qui le eoncerne et en cc qui touche les forces fran<;aises hors du perimetre de B:zerte. les mesures de restrictions prises le 8 fevrier. Dans une dellxieme p~1ase, au COUts de laquelle les bons offices des Gouwrnements du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-Ullis Cf':stcrant A. J~ disposition de la Tunisie ct de la France, un regime provisoire de la base de Bizerte sera defini entre le Gouvernement frnncais et le Gouverncment tunisien. Cc compromis, accepte par le Gouverncmenl tunisien le 15 mars 1058, dcvait etre agree par le gouvernernent de M. GailIard le 14 avril 1958. 10. Je bens a signaler que, sdou cet accord du 15 mars, la libette de mouvement des forces fran<;aises basees a Bizerte ne pouvait et:-e envisagee qu'ur.e fois que l'p.nscmble de l'evacuation des troupes existant hors de Cl: perimetre auraH pl"is fir.• Alars, et alars seulemer.t. cette UberM serait accGrd6e nux forces de Bizerte, en attendant le resultat ries conversations qui devaient avoir lieu au sujet de cctte base. Je tif'n.~ ~ Mllligncr par aillcurs, pour mieux cclairer la suite des debats, que le mcme accord prcvoyant la remi1\c a la Tunisie des terrsins d'avtation militaire, notamment de El-Aouina, Sfax, Gabes, Gufsa et Rcmada Ge r6pCtc ; Gafsa et Remada), impliquait que des mesures seraient prises pour permettre nux ambassadcurs des :t:tats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni de s'ussurer que lesdits terrains ne scrv:r.aient qll'a des fms pacifiqucs. n y est memc stipule, et je cite; « ... en vue de faciliter la tAche des observateurs, le8 terrains d'aviation de Remada €t dc Gafsa seront mis, a titre provisoire, hors d'etat .(1 few hours after this acceptance a governlIlental crisis broke out in France, delaying the implementation of the agreement. For this reason, too, the gond offices mission of the United Kingdom and the United States was suspended. 18. I should like to pay a sincere tribute to the repre~ 5cntative.". of thp. Hoited States and the United Kingdom Governments for the unwearying devotion they dis- pluyed in carrying out their mission. With remarkable persistence and objectivity, :hey moved between 'funis and Paris in their untiring efforts to find a partial compromise which might pave the way for a more complete settlement of the dispute. It will be for others to appraise the readiness of the Government of the Republic of Tunisia to compromise and come to terms, as reflected in its provisional agreement not to press its entirely legitimate claims, which arc completely in accordance with justice and with the prir..ciples of the Charter of the United Nations. The praise and the blame will be apportioned by posterity. r 19, My Governrr,ent tht:u awaited the formation of a French government so that the situation could be restored to normal. It was under:;tood that in the mean- time all the security measures taken by the Tunisian GOvernment after the bombing of 8 February 1958 would remain in force. Although there were sume frontier incidents caused by the invasion of Tunisian territory by French forces from Algeria and by viola- tions of Tllnisian air space, my Government, while protesting to the French Embassy against snch viola- tions, did not wish to bring them to the attention of the Security Council. With regard to the provisioning of the French troops in Tunisia, my Government took a very generous attitude, confining itself to observing tht:l approaches to the barracks, in onier to avoid any possible sortie by the troops. 20. As a result of the establishment of the so-called Committee of Public Safety in Algeria on 13 May 1958, the situation became extremely disturbing. The mem- bers of the CQuncil will readily Lllldcrstand why, under a just and proper interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter, I must refrain from commenting on the ch2racter of this Committee of Public Safety, The fact remains that this event - I might almost say" advent " ~ could rightly be con- sidered to be threatening and dangerous for the North African conntries. The positiorl~ previously taken with regard to Tunisia, among other mattera, by the person~ constituting the Committee were not likely to set at rest the legitimate apprehensions of these countries. 21. Yet, although serious incidents had alre~dy oc- curred, Mr. HabibBourguiba, President of t~ RepubliC 18. Je tiens ici a rendre un hommage sin<:ere aux representants des GOuvernements des Etats~Unis et dll Royaume-Uni pour le devouement inlassable qll'ils onl montre au cours de leur mission. Avec une tenacite 121 une objectivite remarquables, i1s se sont depenses entre Tunis et Paris pour tronver un com?romis partiel qui put ouvrir la voie a ..me solution plus complete du conflit. O'autres que moi diront jnsqu'a quel point le Gouvernement de la Republique tunisiellne a ele vel'S la conciliation et l'arrangement, consentant a mettre provisoirement en sDurdine ses revendications Les plus legitimes et les plus conformr.s a la justice et aux prin- cipes de la Charte des, Nations Unies. L'histoire situera les responsabilites. 19. Depuis, IT.on gOllvr.rnement ~vait attelldu la constitution d'un gouverncment en France pour voir se normaliser la situation. Il etait cntendu qn'entre- temps tontes les mesures de securite prises par le Gouver- nement tunisien a la suite du bombardcment dll 8 revrier 1958 scraicnt maintenues. iJ y cut bien quel- ques incidents Qe frontieres provoquees par l'irruption sur le gal tunisien de forces franc;aises venad d'Algerie, ou des survols de l'espace aerien tmisien, mais mon gouvcrnement, tout en protestant aupres de l'ambassade de France contre de lelles violations, n'avait pas voulu cependant les porter it la connaissance dn Conseil de seeurite. Quant au ravitaillement en vivrt.:s alimentaires des trou?es franc;aises de Tunisie, man gouvernement avait temoigne de la plus grande mansuetude, s'atta~ chant seulement a sUiVeiller Ies abords des easct'Uements pOUf eviter toute sortie possible de ces troupes. 20. Le 13 mai 1958, la situation a:Iait devenir e:dre~ mement inquietante, par suile de la cOl13titulion en Algetie de ce qu'on a cOllvenu d'appeler le Comit6 de saIut public. Les membres du Conseil comprelldront aisement que, faisant une juste et saine interpretation de l'Article2, paragraplle 7, de la Charte des Nations Unies, je m'ab5tienne de toute remarque sur le carac- tere de ce Cornite de saiut public, It n'en demeure pas mains vrai que cet evenement - j'a]ais dire cet avene- ment - pouvait a jl(~te titre etre considere comme lourd de menaces et de dangers pour Ies pays nord- africains. Les prises de position anterieures des person- nalites qui composent ce comite, notamment it l'egard de la Tunisie, n'etaient nullcment de nature a calmer les apprehensio:lS Icgitlmes. 21. Pourtant, alors que des incidents graves avaient deja surgi, M, Habib Bourgniba, president de I.a Repu- 22. 'The Tunisian Government did eveI)'thing in its power to avoid aggt<Jvating the situation. Thus, nine French colonists who had been arrested for possessing arms in February follow;ng the Snkiet-Sidi-You:mf iJ.cident were released on 13 May. 23. Although the French representative at Tlli1is informed my Government on the morning of 14 May that the French troops stationed in Tunisia under the command of General Gambicz remained l()yal to the Paris Government, the course of events soon proved that those troops took action parallel to that 01 tlie troops in Algeria. and soon after collaborated with them. Since 14- May Tunisian territory has daily been the sCene of French militar:y operations of an increasingly aggressive and serious char:w.tl'.r. 24. 0[1 15 May, French reconnaissance and bombing planes violated Tunisian air space. 25. On 16 May, tanks of the French garrison at Gabes tried to leave their barracks. 26, On 18 May, thirty armoured vehicle.s left the Remada camp and travelled forty kilometres towards Bir Amir and Ain Delwuk. French forces took by s-.tr- prise and captured six Tunisian soldiers guarding the Bir Amir post, but lhey soon had to release them. They Eet up a barrier at Bir Dek011k I'llla kept 5nb- stantial French forces there alter the troops occupy.ng Bir AmiI.' had withdrawn to Remada, 27. This Remada incident, about which I kept the Secretary-General fully informed, began to turn into a larger-scale action with the support 01 French air- craft from Algeria. On 21 May, more French units (rom Hemada moved fi::ty kilometres to Fatnussa, where a Tunisian army unit was stationed, flnd occupied the pcsition, They then occupied the crossroads and heights on the paths from Rcmada to Bordj-le~Bceuf nnd Tnbouine. Another military column marched toward Oued Dckouk. Four Prench jet aircraft landed at Gafsa and on the following day, 22 May, flew over the city firing their machine-guns. 28. French aircraft from Algeria continued to operate during the following days. On 23 May, flights of twin- engine bombers and reCOllllaisSlIJ1Ce aircraft from Alg~ria were seen over many points in Tunisian territory: 22. Le Gouvernement tunisien fit tout son possible pour eviter une aggravation de la situation. C'est ainsi que neuf colom franc;ais, arretes durant le mois de fevrier it la suite des evenements de Sa kiet~Sidi-Youssef pour detention d'armes de guerre, furent rel~cMs le 13 maL 23. Le matin du 14 mai, le representant de lE. France aTunis a fait savoir amon gouverr.ement que les troupes fran~,aises stationnees en Tcnisie sous le commandement du general Gambiez restaient fideIes au gouvernement de Paris, Mais les faits n'allaient pas tarder a demontrer que Cel> troupes agissaicnt parnllelement, et bientM e:I collaboration, avec celles d'Algerie. En eITet, it p3rtir du 14 mai, le territoire tunisien a ere quotidie:l- nement le theAtre, de la p8.rt des troupes franc;aiscs, d'une serie d'operations militaires a caraetcre de pbs e:l plus agressif et dont le gra.vite a1l8it en s'arnplifiar.t. 24. Le 15 mai, l'espacc aerien lunisien est viole par des avions de reconnaiss~nce ft de hombardcme:lt fram,aig, 25, Le 16 mai, des tanks de la garnison frangaise de Gabes tentent de sortir de Ieur casernement. 25. Le 18 mai. 30 vehicules blindes quittent le camp de ReIllalla et se diligent, 40 kilometres plus loin, vers un point qui s'appel1e Rr Amir et un autre point nomme Ain Dekouk Les elements franc;ais s'emparent par surprise de six soldats tnnisicns qui tenaient le poste de Bir Ami;. et qu'il£ ant df! rcMcher par la suite. fls Ctablisscnt un barrage a Bir Oekouk, all d'impor- tantes forces fraOl;aises sont mainte:Jues, apr~s le retrait it Remada des forces qui avaient occupe l'autre point, Bir Amir. 27. Cctte aftaire de Remada, dont j'ai tenu le Secrl~­ taire general rcgulieremellt informe, dcvait e.vo!l:er d'aillClI1's verB une action de plu.'J grandc envergure, avec l'appui de l'aviation frant;:aise venant d'AIgerie. Ell efIet, le 21 m!li, de nouveoux elements francais partnnt de Remada se portent, 50 ldlometres plus loin, sm un point qui s'appelle Fatnassa., OU se trouve line unite. de l'armee tUl1isienne, et occupent la position. 11s pOllrsuivcnt le·.!r mCl\vement d'occupation de5 carrefours eL des hauteul's sur les pistcs reliant Hemada a Bord~-lc-Bceuf d'un cote et tl Tataonine de l'autre. Dne IlQuvelle colonne militaire £'acherr.ine vers l'olled Dekouk. Quatre avions a reaction franc;ais atterrissent a Gafsa. Lc lcndemain 22 mai, ils en dccollen-l et evolllfnt au·dessus de la villI' en elTectuant des mitraiIlages. 28. Les operations de l'aviation franyaise d'AIgerie devaient se poursuivre les jours s\\ivants. Le 23 mai, des .'IurvoJs de hombardic:s bi-moteurs et d'avions. df': recollnaissance venant d'AIgerie sont reperes sur de 29. On Saturday, 24 May, in the evening, Tunisian and Frencl1 forces clashed at Ain Kambou-: when French raiding parties £1'00 nemada opened fire on El. barrier and tried to force it. Ain Kumbout is about ten Jdlomctrcs south of the Remada barracks. There were a number of ldlled and wounded. 30. On Sunday, 25 May, waves of four B-26 bombers from Algeria bomLe,d and machine-gunned the Hcmada and Oued Dekouk area for four hours. A working area was attacked and two Red Crescer.t cars w~re hit, even civilians not ieing spared. There were six wounded and elev'~n missing, 31. On 26 May, Frencll troops committed acts of vandalism at Remada. (You realize, gentlemen, that I am weighing my words carefully.) These troops burned warehouses containing wheat set aside to combat unemployment. They broke open the doors of private homes and shops, which they sacked and pillaged, together with the head offices of the gover:ll1lelltal delegation :md the National Guard. They searched and robbed pussers-by. A scJlOo1master on un impection trip was savagely mishandled, The headmaster of the Remada school, l:is wife and his three chi.ldren died as a result of maltrentment by the French Army. All Lhis HIm: aeroplanes continued to violate the RiI' spuce of Tunisi3. 32. ]n fact, violations of the Tunisian air space have persisted up to the present time. 33. These are the painful facts. It will be claimed that they were provoked by alleged actions on the part 01 the Tunisia!l Government. I will not reply to this 8ssertion nOW, but reserve my delegation's right to do so with all the earnestness at its command after we have heard all the arguments which the Freudl representative may see flL to submit in support of his complaint. 34. But there a.re certain irrefutabk conclusions that I will v'~nture to state now. .:\5. First, no ,Q'flrrison of French treaDS was disturbed in any way by Tunbian civil or military authorities. 36. Secondly, since 13 May the Tunisian people has maintained the remarkable calm and lI1e dignity re- quired by the circumstances despite its first jastillable apprehensions and the repeated aggressions it has sufl'ered since. The Tunisian people has respected, and will continue to respecL, all Prench or 10reign nationals living in Tunisia, who will be assured of tranquillity and the free enjoyment of their pl'oIJt:rLy. 29, Le samedi 24 mai au soil', un accrochage a lieu a Arn Kambout entre les forces tunisiennes et les troupes frnnc;:rrisc5, ql\i, sorties de He:nad<l, Olwr('[J!: le fen !>lIr un barrage en vue de le forcer. AIO Kambout est un point qui se trouve a U3e dizainc de kilometres au sud rlu casernement de Remada. On a eu a deplorer dc,~ morts et des blesses. 30. Le dimanche 25 maL des vagues de quatre bom- bardiers B~26, vcnant d'Algeric. bombardent et mitrail- ll'nt, quatre heures (Jurant, la region de Remada eL de roued Dekouk. Un chanticr de travailleurs est :tttaque, deux voitures du Croissant-Rouge sOllt touchees, les civils eux-memes ne sont pas epargn6s. On compte 6 blesses et 11 disparus. 31. Le 2G mai, les troupes franc;:aises se I:vrent it Remada El des actes de vandalisme (V011S savcz, Mes- sieurs, qlle je meMll'C mcs mots). Elks brulcnt le depot ou etait entrcpose lc ble destinc i1 la lutte contre le cll6mage. Elles deloncent les partes des maisom privees et des magasins, qu'elles saccogent el pillent, ainsi que les sieges de la delegation gOllvcrnmTJentale et de la garcle na tionalc. Elks fouillent les passants, ks deva~ lisenc. Un institutenr en rr:ission d'cxamen est sanva- gement maJmene. Le directeur de l'ecole de Remada, sa femme et ses trois enfants sont morls des suites des sevices que l'armcc Iranr,:aisc leur a fait subir. Pendant cc temps, les avions continnaient a sllrvnler la region. 32. Les violations de l'espace aerien tunisi~n n'ont d'ailleurs pas cesse, eL les survols de oohe tcrritoire se sont poursliivis jusqu'a cc jour. 33. Tels sont les faits dans leur cmdite doulollreuse. On sQutiendra qll'ils avaienl elc provoques p8r de pre- Lenrlues mesUl'CS ~rises par le Gouvcrnement tunisien. Je m'abstiens ponr le moment de rcpondrc il. cette assertior., reservafll it llla delegation le .~oin de le fuire ilvec Lout le scrielL'C: dont ellc est capable. Elle y rcpondra des que nous auroIls de la part du representant de la France tons les arguments qu'il lui scmblera bon d'apporter a l'appui de sa requ~.te. 34. Moos un cerLain non:bre de conclusions, irrecu- sables celles-la, dellleurenL, et je me permets de les souligner mainter.ant. 35. Prcmierement, ,lUCllll cascrnement de troupes franl(aises n'a 6te inquiete en qlloi que cc soit par les 8utoritcs tunisiennes, tant civiles que militaires. 36. DeuxicmemeIlt, dcpuis le 13 mai jllsqu'a e~ jour, le peuple tunisien, malgre les legitimes sl1jets d'appre- hCllsion, uu debul, et U1dg:l'I~ le5 agrc'ssions repctees dont n a ete victime pOll' la suite, n'3, cesse de garder un sang-froid rernarquable et la dignitc qu'exigent les circonstanccs. 11 a respectc, et continuera a le faire, tans les habital1ts de uationalitc frartl;aise ou etrangere viv[Jnt en Tllnisic, !cur assnr:>nt hi quietude et la fibre jouissance de leurs biens. 38, My third conclusion is that all the attacks, skir- mishes and other aggressivt'. acts which have occurred in. Tunisia during this critical period which began 011 14 May have taken placf drw;r,ns of kilometres away from FrcDch military instnllations. This is indisput- able prod of the aggressive attitude of tllC French troops in Tunisia, supported, 0: perhups spurred on, by the French [orccs in Alger:a. 39. In this connexion I should like to mention the po.~iti(Jn taken by the French High Conmand in Algiers witll regard to Tunisia. A communique published by the High Command 00 21 May provides clear eviclence of lhe assumption of respoosibJity for French troops stationed in Tl1nisia by the Tenth Military District (Algiers), and oJ ao intention Lo supp)rt tlie aggressive operatiolls of these troops. 40. On the same d<ly, 21 IY:ay, Colone[ Lacheruy, spokesman fol' General Salan, Comrnander-in~Chief of the French forces in Algeria, stated the position even more clearly at {l prcss eonfere::t('.f. When f1sk~d about the possibility of military action against Tunisia, Colonel Lacheroy s£lid thai, should tllC necessity arise, General Salan would act" without consulting Paris" and" without authorization from Paris ", This plainly demonstrates that the situation ill Tunisia was and still is dangerous. 41. I 'would like to add that, according to one pres~ agency, a communique published in Algiers announced thllt the spol,csman of the Committee of Public Safety had said that tile government of Prime Minister Pt1imlin was seeking to exploit the situation aCid to ohtnin inter~ national sanclions against tlle authorities in Algiers; the spokesman nddfld that" the 22,mO Rn~nch ~oldi('.r~ in Tunisia under the ccmmand of GCllend Gambiez orc working in very dose contact with us for opera~ tional reasons". 42. I apologize for this digression and ~hall proceed with my statement I do not wish to expatiate on the various statements made before 13 May by the me~l who are at present - or were yesterday - the leaders of tlle Algiers Committee of Public Safety. 43. At various times - particillarly during the debates in tIle French Parliament - v[~ws which were patently hostile, if not actually aggressive, have been expressed with regard t~ Tunisia. POl· mor" th::m fl yl'llr now, arguments which havc no connexion with the we[- estnblis·hed pl'inciples of international law havc been put forwnrd with refercnce to my c:mntry in order to justify acts of aggression or invasions ol' its t~lTitory or air space, either planned or executed. There has been talk of tile right of pursuit, the right of retaliatiot\ and the right of reprisal. «( Oll essaie de nOlls provoquer ~n disant que le pel1ple reste calme. Mais cc calme est Le signc le plus evident de sa force et de son poids. Il 38. La troi!'>it'-,me conclusion que je tire est la suivante : tOlltes les attaques, E.ccrochages ou 3utres aetes agrcsliifs. qui ont eu lieu en Tunisie uu cours de cette periode critique eommen9unt le 14 mai,l'ont etc it des dizaines de kilometres des installatioE::i militaires fran9aiscs - re qui est une preuve irrefragable de l'agressivite des troupes lralll;.aises en Tunisie, 3ppUyees, OU, peut~etre, poussces, par les forr.es franc.aises d'Algerie. 39. Je voudrais a ce sujet faire meJ1tiol1 des prises de position du commandemcnt militaire franvais d'Alger au sujet de la Tun:sic. Un communique public par l~ commandemellt le 21 mal marque r-ettcrrent la prise en charge, par la Xe rcgioll militaire (Alger), des troupes fr:tn(;'.abes stationnees en TUllisie, et la volonte d'appuyer- lcs operations agresEivcs de ces cernieres. 40, Le mem~ jou:, le 21 md. le colonel Lnl'.hr.rny, po:te-parole du general Salan, commandant en chef des forces fmnl;:sises en Algerie, dait encore plus expressif au cours d'unc conference de prcsse. Intrrroge sur la possibilite d't:ne action militaire contre la Tunisie, le colonel Lacheroy a declare que, dans cctte cventualite, le general Salan agirait «sans cO:lsulter Paris» et l( :lUllS ayoir la permission de Paris ". CeJa VOll~ mont.rf. bien que la ::iituation, en Tunisie, Hait et demeure dangereuse. 41. Je voudrais ajoutcr que, selon line agence de presse, un communique pllbliC a Alger allnonce que le porte-parole du Comite dc salut public a u6clare que le gouvernement pflimlin s'efIol'l;ait d'cxploiter la !'>ituation et d'obtenir des sancticllS internationales cadre les autorites d'AIger j ce porte~Jlarole ajoute que (( les 22.000 soldats francais de Tur.isie, sous le commande- ll1cnt dll goneful Gambiez, travaille:lt en contact trts etroit avec nous pour des l'aisons opcrationnelles 11. 42. Je m'excuse de cette pareilthese et je reprencs. mon expose; je ne youdrais pas m'ctendre outrc meSllLC sur les differentes declarations faites aV3::tt le 13 mai par des hommes c:ui dilig~nt actuellement le cUlllil(·. d'Alger DU le dirigeaient hier. 43. A l1iffenollLc::; rcpriS(:s - et notmllrncnt Jors d<:s debuts elu Parlcment fl'fm~ais - des intentions ncttc~ ment hostiles, sinon agrl'ssives, se sont fait jour a l'rflard de la Tunisie, Des formulcs qui 11'ont aucun rapport avec les rdncipes bie:l eLablis du droit inter- nRtional ont apparu, clcpuis plus d'un an dejii, a l'en- contre de mon pays, pom cmnouf1er des agressions Oil des violations t[;}'ritoriales Oil aerieJ:ncs, envisngecs eu consommees. On a parlc dc droit de poursuite, de droit de riposte, de droit de l'eprcsaUes. f r 45. A series of acts of armed aggression have thus been wmmitted Oil Tunisian soil by tile French troops atatioltcd in Tunisia in co-o[Jeration wilh troops from Algeria. These acts moreover are parts of a very long series of similar acts committed in Tunisia either by the Fl"C'lleh troop.~ stationed there, who adopt the attitude of occupying forces, or by French troops from Algeria, the most serious incident being the onc at Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef on 8 February, which was HIe cause oJ Tunisia's first complaint to the Security Council. 46. The presence of French troops in Tunisia, however, hUB been n constant cause of concern sinr.e my country became independ~nt. In the course of a ~ingle yeaT, from April 1956 to May 1957, almost 200 incidents of all kinds have been provoked by the French Army stationed in Tunisia, incidents involving searches, entry into private homes, raids, 9.bductions, lootir.g, skirmishes with the Tunisian Army, machine-gunning and mortar-fire. [ shall recall the fairly large-scale skirmish 0031 May 1957, in whieh Mr, Khamais I-Iaject. Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreig:>. Affairs of Tunisia, was severely wounded while inspec:tiug a camp for Algerian refugees, By 7 February 1958, i.e., just before the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, the number of civilians abducted had risen to 141, of W:10m 37 are still missing. 47. I should like to stress that several of these incidents took place with the help of thc French Army in Algeria, which made sorties into Tunisian territory for the purpose of carrying out raids, destroying properLy and abducting individuals, Its aircraft flew over Tunisian air space, carrying out machine-g~nningand bombing operations on numerous occasions; the mo:;;t importar.t and sy:;;tematic oj these operations took place at Sali:iet-Sidi-Yollsscf and rightly incurred the censure of world public opinion, Apart from the bombing of Sakiet-Sidi·Yousscf, by 8 February 1958, operations in Tunisia by French troops and French aircraft from 45. II Y a done la une scrie d'agressiorrs armees eom- mises sur le sol tunisien par les troupes frangaises stationnees en Tunisie, en cooperation avec eelles d'A:gerie. Ces ngressions se plaeent d'ailleurs uans le eadtc d'une serie tres longu€ d'ades d\;,. meme nature commis en Tunisie, soit pal' lea troupes frangaises qui y stationnent avee la mentalitc dc I'Qccupant, soit par les forces fran~aises venant cl'Algerie, et dont le plus important a ete l'attaque de Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef, le 8 fevrie)', qlli a provoql1€ la prcmiere plainte de la Tunisie au c.Jnseil de secUTitc. 46, La presence des troupes frangaises en Tunisic n'a d'ailleurs cesse d'etre unc cause de proioccllpatio:l depuis l'independar.ce de mon pays, 3:n un an, du mois d'avril 1955 nu mois de mais 1957, on a eu it compLer pres de 200 incidents de tonIes natures, provoques par l'armee fran~aise station nee en Tunisie, et consistant en des perquisitions, de!! violations de domicile, des ratissages, des enlevements, des pillages, des accrochagefl avee l'armee tunisienne, des miLraillages et des tirs de morHer. Je rappellerai l'accroehage assez important qui a Cll liell le 31 ll1ai 1957, au COUl'S dutll1el fut grievement blesse 1VL Khamais I-lajeri, sccrelaire general du j\[illislcrc des aiIaires etrangeres de Tutisie, alors qu'il in.c;pectait un centre d'hebcrgement de refugies algeriens. Le bilan des enlevements de ci,ils s'ele'l,'ait, au 7 fewier 1958 _. c'est-a-dire la veille du bombul'dement de Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef - a HI, dont 37 sont jusqu'a cc jour demeures dispams. 47. Je liens a souligner que plllsieurs de ces incident.s ont eu lieu avec la p<lrliciplltion de l'arrnee fran~<'lise cl'Algeric. qui, de son cOte, faisait des incursions dans le territoire tunisier. pour s'y livrcr it des raLissages, des destructions de biens et des enlevcments de per- SOlmes, cL dont l'aviation SUl"volail l'espaee uerien tunisien, ou elle cffectuail, A de notllbreuses repri~es, des Illitraillages et dc bomhal'dcmeds, dont le plus important et le plus systematique dcvaiL ctre celui de Sakid-Sidi-YousseI, qui a legitimement soulev6 la reprobation de l'opinion mondiale. Cependnnt, en dehors de ee bomhardcme.nL de Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef, les o[Jc- 49. Thus, all these ncts, of which tlte Sakiet-Sidi- Youssef incident of 8 February 1958 W8S the most na~rant, inevitably lead us to the conclusion that the numerous and bIooey attacks, with which the present appeal is concerned, constitute unqualified and prcmerlitated ermed aggr€ssion. J say armed aggrcSSiOJl and add that it is t10t possible in all honesty to nvoic desclibing it as such. 'We liave before us a typic::!l t:ase of nggression, on which tllere is no possible room for doubt. All the qnalifications arc rr.ct: armed attacks on a sovereign and independent State, Tunisio, by the regulnr armed forces of unothe!' Stare. France, earned out on the territory of the State which is the victim of the attacks. There caOl be no possible doubt that these qualifications arc met in this particular case. I should B.lso like to point out that one qualification is met which is not esselltit.l. In the Case of the aggression ion Korea in 1950, there was 11') need for the Security CO"jllcil to determine wIlether or not the 3ttacking forces were regular forces under the control of a State. The C<luncil decided that aggression had taken place anJ luuk all the appropr:ntc sleps to repel it, 50. During the course of this discussion my delegation has tried to be as brief ns possible. J shall now proceed to Ollr conclusions. 51. The statement which I lUive jmt made (Lo Wllich r shall add furLher argualents drawn from the facts, should subsequent interventions make this lleCess<llY) leads the delegation of tIle Republic of Tunisia to request the Security COLncil, under Article 39 of the Chflr-ter of the United NH tions. to determine the existence of the act of aggression I have just defined. Tbat is my first request. 52 My second nrise.q logical:y from t.Jl~ first: it is that t1le aggression should be ended by removing its c:.nses and that its victirr:, Tunisiu, s:lOttld be protectcd against its continu:\tion 01' resumption. 53. The statement of the facts which Thave submitted slwws that for almost two years Tunisa has bCt::l subjected to sporadic but persistent acts of aggressio;) by French troops sbtio:led in Tunisin 0:- eng~ged i:l lwstiJiLies in Algeria who have viollltcd the tcrd.Lorir.J integrity or the air space of Tunisia to commit £lcb of aggression there. 54. The Secnrity Cour.cil is accordingly hound to help Tunisia, a Member State, to locpcI aggres~ion by providiug assistance in accordance with Article 30 of for,~es fmn(faises stationnces en Tunisie ou Vt:llant d'Algefic. 19. Aiusi done, tous ees actes, dont le plus saillant fut cclui de Sakiet-Sidi~Yoll:'lsel (~ fcvrier 1958), !le pcuvmt que nous mener a la conclusion que les mul~ liples ct sanglantcs attaques qui font l'objet de la prcscntc requCle constituent un~ ngrr.ssion ::!rmce camcterisce et premeditc.,~. Jc dis bien : agression armee j et j'ajoute que cette qJulific'ttion ne st.urait ~trc hor.llctement livitce. Now:, ~ommes en presence du cas typiquc de l'agression, alL sujet duquel aucune conLroverse n'est possible. Touhs les conditions neccs~ saircs sont n~\lnics ; attui]ues arm~es d'un Etut indlj~ pcndant et suuvcrain - la Tunisic p"r lm; forces armees regulir.res d'un atl~re Etat - la Fmnee lJortees sur le: sol de l'Eto.l. attaque. Ces cond:tiuns !';ont. sans contestation possible, r0unie~. Je me pe,mets de souligncr d'ailleurs qu'il y ell n memc une de trop. Dnns le cus de l'agression en Conic, en 1950, le Conseil de secllritd n'~ mcme pas ell a chel'cher si les forces ll.uaquontes ucpembicllt rcguJitrc!lwnt ou non d'un Ebt. 11 avail estime qu'il y nVDil agression et il avait pris toutcs les mesur,~s utiles Cll vue de la repousser. 50. Ma delegfltion s'est utt.achee au caurs de ce debat il. &re Il\liiSi breve qu~ possible. J'en UlTivc flUX conclu- sions. 51. L'exposc que ~e vicns de fain: - et que je me permettrni de reprendre aVCG plus d'argurnellts, tires des faiLs, si lc~ inlerventiOlls ultcl'icnres en fonl nppit- rnltre la necessite - amene la uo!ltigation de la Repll~ blique tnnisienne a dcmander au COBseil de sccurite la conslntaticn, con[onnclllclll h. I'Article 39 de la Charte des Nations Unies, de l'agl'es~ion que JC viens de definir. C'est il\ ma prcmiere demandc. 52. La deuxicme ell est In consequence logiqlle : rC:Jollsscr l'llgression, en s\\pprimcl' les causes, et assurer le pays agrcJoisc, la Tunisie, contre 5[\ PO~ll'suiLe ou sa reprise. 53. L'exposc des faits qlie j'ni presentc'. dcmontre que lfl Tnnisie fl eu pendant pres de deux ans a faire face D. une agl'c!';siOll int.ermiu'mlLl', lllfds continuclle, de la p:-:rt des troupes fl'an~ni~~s Rllllion\le~s CII Tunisic au faisflnL la guerre Cll Algl'rie, et vio18ut l'intligrile territoriale ou l'espce a~l'jen dl' la Ttlni~jc, pour y commettre des actes tlgrcssifs. 5<1. Le Consdl de sccuritc ne pellt dOlle aider la Tunisie, Etat r-,'I\~mbre, a TCpousscr l'flgrcssioll qu'en l'assitant, conform~-melltDl'Articlc 30 de h Ch,de, et en mettllnt 55. The statement which I have just made shows that the aggression of which Tunisia is a victim has two main causes: the first of these is the presence of French forces in Tunisia against Tunisia's wishes and the second is the spreading of the Algerian war into Tunisia because of the many acts of aggression committed by the French Army against Tunisian territory, of which the most bloody examples have been the attack on Sakiet - Sidi - Youssef on 8 February 1958 and the heavy bombing of the Remada region on 23, 24 and 25 May 1958. 56. I intend, at the present stage of the discussion, to confine myself to the first of these two causes: that is the presence of French troops in Tunisia. 57. On 20 March 1956 France signed a Protocol with Tunisia recoguizing its independence and the full exercise of its sovereignty in all spheres. This nullified all previous agreements between Prance and Tunisia which were incompatible with Tunisia's position as an independent and sovereign State and in particular those of which the main purpose, explicitly stated in the preamble, was the grant to Tunisia of a status falling short of complete sovereignty. The Protocol of 20 March 1956 provides for the revision of these previous agreements, as is required by both logic and justice. 58. Since April 1056, the Tunisian Government has repeatedly requested the French Government to settle the thorny problem of the presence of its troops in Tunisin. It has always met with evasions or with an attitude of increasing ill-will. Some months after it beGame independent, it clearly informed the French Government of its desire that the French forces evacuate Tunisia. 59. There has admittedly been a reduction in the strength of these troops from the figure of 45,000 before March Hl56 to the present figure of 22,000. We consider, however, thnt this !"eduction was duc to the operational requirements of the war in Algeria rather th3n to any real desire to withdraw troops stationed in Tunisia. 60. Finally, as a result of tIte bombing of Saldet- Sidi-Yollssef on 8 February 1958, the Government of the Hepublic of Tunisia asked for the complete, totEd and immediate withdrnwal of all Prench forces from Tunisia. 61. This legitimate unwillingness of an independent State to tolerate the continued presence in its territory of foreign troops who show little respect for its sovereignty and integrity was officially communicaled to the Security Council in document S/3957 dated 17 February 1958. 62. It was also communicated to the good offices mission of the United Kingdom and the United States. As I pointed out at the beginning of my statement, 55. L'expose que je viens de faire demontre que l'agression dont la Tunisie est victime a deux causes essentie11es : premiercment, la presence des forces frani;aises en Tunisie, contre sa volonte ; deuxiemement. la guerre en Algerie, qui s'est dcversee en Tunisie, du fait des agressions multiples de l'armee fran<;aise contre le territoire tunisien, et dont les illustrations les plus sanglantes ont ete Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef, le 8 fevrier 1958, et les bombardements massifs de la region de Remada, les 23, 24 et 25 mai 1958. 56. Je vais me limiter, au stade actuel dn debet, :'I la premiere de ces deux causes: la presence des troupes fran<;aises en Tunisie. 57. Le 20 mars 1956, la France a signe avec la TUllisie un protocole reconnais!>ant son independance lOt la plenitude de l'exercice de sa souverainetC dnns tous les domaines. De ce fait sont devenus caducs tous les accords anterienrs entre In France et la Tunisie, non compatibles avec la situation de la Tunisie, Elat inde- pendant et sonveraiu, et nolamment ceux qui avaicnt pour but essentiel, explicite dans leur preambule. l'etablissement pour la Tuni!>ie d'une situation d'Etat ne jouissant pas de la plenitude de sa souverninete. Cela est tellement conforme a la logique et an droit que le protoeole du 20 mars 1956 stipule qu~ de tels accords doivent etre revises. 58. Or, depuis le mois d'avril 1956, le Gouvernement tunisien a demande <l maintes reprises au Gouvernemcnt franlf<lis de regler ce probleme epineux de la presence de ses trO'llpeS en Tunisie, Il s'est toujours heurte a des derobades ou a une mauvaise volonM de plus en plus manifeste. An bout de quclques mois apres l'indepen- dance, il a nettement manifeste au Gouvernement fran((ais son dCsir de voir les forces franQaises evacneI: la Tunisie. 59. Il Y a bien en un allegement des effectifs de ces troupes, qui ont ete ramenes de 45.000 hommes, qu'ils comptaient avant mars 1956, a 22.000, qu'ils comptent maintcnant. Mais eet allegement nous semble ~tre beaucoup plus dicte par les necessites operationnelles de la gucrre en AIgerie que par le desir reel de retrait des troupes stationnces en Tunisie. 60. A la suite du bombardement de Sakiet-Sidi- Youssef, le 8 fevrie!" 1958, le Gouvernement de la Republique tunisienne a fini par reclamer l'evacuation complete, totale et immediate de l'cnsemble dcs fOl'ces franQaises de Tunisie. 61. Cette volonte legitime d'un Etat independant de ne plus tol6rer SUI' son territoire la presence de troupes etrangcl'es qui font si peu de cas de sa souve- rainete et du respect da a son integrite a eM mani- festee officiellement au Conseil de securiLe par le docu- ment 8/3957, en date du 17 fevrier 1958. 62. Elle a ete manifestee aussi a la mission des bons offIces anglo-americains. En dIet, ['accord du 15 mars 1958 realise par cette mission prevoit, comme je l'ai (;3. It was tllerefore reasonable to assume that the French forces in Tunisia would continue to resped tlle security regulations which Twlisia made in respect of them 011 8 February 1958, and that they would not provoke incident;;, muc:lless Ctlrry out sorties from their headqua~tcrs to tiUa,:k the Tunisian Army and occupy IIew 3i"CaS in Tunisia. Unfortunately that was not the case. I}.I. Tunisia tas been the victim of armed aggression by the French troops stationed on its territory against its \vishe~. In the circumstanccs, thc presence of these troops in Tllni.~ia clearly i::onsututes a tllreat Lo the peace within the meaning lIf Article 39 of the Charter and a threat to the security of Tunisia itself. CS. T]le Govcrnmcllt of the Republic of Tunisia has Lried every method of reac:ling an amicable agreement 01 the liberatlon of its tenitory from the illegal pre- sence of the French troo[Js, which are contiilually attacking it. It has tried direct negotiation, but without success. It has accepted the good oJIices mission and has shown HseIf H patient and as conciliatory 8.S can hLlmanly be expected. It has now no alternative but to appeal to the Security CcuncH as the body responsible for the maintenullce of internatiolll'll peHce rlml security. 66, Tl:e Tunisian delegation therefore requests bc Security Council to take, ill accordance with Alticle 39 of the Chnrte" aU tippl·opriate measures provided [or In ArUcles 40 awl ,11 and subscquent Al:"ticlcs to 3.sslst i: to obtain the withdrawal of the }-;'rench troops which arc stationed in Tunisia against iLs wishes siTltc their presence c.ons-jtutes one oi the fundamental causes of the genuine aggres.sioll Tunisia has suITcred. €7. Pending such withdrawal. my delegation calh for provisional security measurcs and requests the Council, acting under Article 40 of the Charter, formally to request Fr:mc" : ilrst. 1:0 ensure tllat its troops stalioned i.1 Tunisia observe the preventive security mcasures taken in respect of them by the Governmetlt of thc Republic of Tunisia on 8 February 1958 and cornrnuJi- cated to the Prcsident of the Security Councj] on 13 Fe- bruary 1958, measures wl1ich included a prohibition of all French troop movements in Tunisia; and secondly. to ensure that 3Jl other French forces observe the dec.ision taken on 8 Februnry 1958 to prohibit naval unih from entering Tunisian ports, and to prohbit 2ny landing or parachuting of rcinj'orcements and all fl.ights over Tunisian terril:ory. In this connexiOll I should like to Tecall once again that these p1'Ovisional mcasures were the mbjecl of a communication to the Presi<1<::C1t of Lhe Security Council dated 13 Februory 1958 [5/39511. 68. These are the requests which my delegation feels compelled to submit Lo Lhe Security Council at the present stage of the discussioll. Is this too much to llsk frall~ais definirorrt it'un COlllllLlJn accord un regime provisoire pour Bizel'te. 63. 11 etait alors permis d~ croire que les forces fran- ~aises do:: l\lllLsie alhiiellt contLnuer a respecter les iHs~ tructions de securite les wllcernant, prises par la Tunisie le 8 fevner 1~58, et cviter de provoquer des incL~ dwts, encore moins de se Jivrer a des 50rties de Ieurs casernements pour occuper de nouveaux pOints du territoire tunisien en attaquant l'armee tunisieulIl'. Malheurellsement, CElfl ne fu! pllS. 64. La Tunisie a etC agrcsse,e violemment par ks troupes fl'alll~llises stationnees, contre sa volonte, SLr son tt'ITit.oire. D:ms ces conditions, Icur presence en Tunisie constilue bien une menace a la paix et a la sccurite propre de la TlInis'e, menace pn~vue pflr l'A~~ tide 39 de la ChartC';. 65. Lt' Gnl1vernp.nlent de la Republique tunisiennc a cpuise tous les moyens amiables pour arriver a liMrer son territoire de la f,resence ilMgittme de troupes fran- yaises c;ui l'agrcsser.t continuellement. 11 a tente la negociation direete : il n'a pas rCLlssi. Il a accepte les b:ms offices, eL 1l cite plus loin dans la voic de]o. patience e: de la concession qu'it e~t humainemcnt pOSSible de le faire, II ne lui reste plus que le recours au Conscil de securite, responsable du maintien de la paix eL de IB sikunt.c intcrnationales. 66. En conseqllence, la delegation tunisienne demande tl'J Conseil de securite de prendre, clll1formement a l'Article 39 de la Charle, tout.es mesures prevues par les Artides 40. 4-1 et .<mivallt.s propres a l'assis';er dans l'evacuaLion des troupes franyaises statiollnecs en Tuni- sic contre sa volonte - ce fait constiluant l'une des C,lUses cssent:elles de l'agression efl'ective dont la Tnnisie est l'objet. 07. Par ailleurs et en attendant cette evacuation, ma delegation demrmde des rr,esures provi~oires de secu- rite. ct elle demande au Conseil. agissallt en appli- cation de I'Article 4D de la Charte, d'illvitcr solennel- lement la France: premierement, a laire obse:-ver par ses troupes stationnees en Tunisic les mesures preven- Lves de sccul'ilc prises a lell: egal'd par le Gouvernement de la Republiquc tunisienne le 8 fevrier 1958 et noti- MC's /lll President du Conscil de securite d!>.s le 13 revrkr 1958, comporlRllt not.<'l.mment l'int.erdiction de tout mouvcment d,~ troupes fral1<;aises en Tunisie ; deux.i~­ rnemenl, a fairc observer par toutes autres forces fran- ~aiscs l'interdietion qui !eur a ete faite le 8 fevrier 1958 de toul ncccs d'uniLes de la marine de gucrre aux porl8 t'.lnisiens, de tout debarqncmenl ou pflrachutagc de renIorts, ainsi que de tout slIrvol rlu tcrritoire tunisien, Je rappellc it cc sujet, encore une fois, que ces mesures provisoires ont fait l'ohjet cl'unr. r.ommunication au Presiden.t du Conseil de securite a la date du 13 fevrier 1958 [5/3951]. 68, 'Ielles sont les demandes que ma delcgaLion croit devuir }rescnter au Conscil dc sccuritc im J'etat ncttlel du dcb(l.L Serait-ce trop d~mandcr au Conseil ? Je ;le 69. The Tunisian people is aware that its security is now in the hands of the Security Council, which h",s taken efTective action on previous occasions of this kind. I <llll confident that iL will not be disappointed.

By giving an incomplete account of the facts, the Tunisian repre:;entative has represented the Saldet- Sidi-Youssef incident as an act of aggression by France against an innocent civilian population. Since this incident has been raised again, I consider it my dllty, in order to moble tilt Council to fOfm an objectiveappraisal of the situation, to fill in the gaps in the Tunisian state- ment and 1;0 correct certain points which will make it clear to the Presidcnt and the merrbers of Lie Council that Snkiet-Sidi-Youssef was not an open town, but a military centre of the Algc:oian rebels, supported by the Tunisian Army anti administration,. a centre from which attacks w~.re continually launched against the French forces. 71. Lor.g before the incident of 8 February 1958, Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef and its mine were used as a training centre for the rebels and as a transit point forthe supply of 81ms to the AIgerinn rebellion. What amounted to a rebel gllrrison - averaging 500 to 700 men - was permatlcntly established at the mine, while the families lived in the village. Units of recruits were stationed there, urew arms and for six weeks carried out intensive military training consisting of teclmicaJ insuucllon on the spot, combat exercises in the hills to the north of the mine buildings, firing practice in the hills to the south-east and parades at which the flag of the FLN [National Liberation Front] WClS carried. When this tmining was completed, the recruits Idt in army convoys. A detachment of the Tunisian Natior:al Guard - thirty men under the command of a lip.ll I:e- nant - was stationed at the approaches to the mine. Food sllpplies for the camp were brought in by 10lTy from Tadjerouine or were obtained from local traders. We have receipts for goods supplied to the PLN com- mand bearing the stamp of the unit which was stationed at Saldet-Sidi-Yollsbef. This rebel centre was protected not only agninst land attack, but also against observa- tion from Lhe air. Anti-aircraft guns wp.re set IIp in tile centre of the village and on the l'oofs of public buildings. The National Guarrl, and even the Tunisian Army, helped tD provide this protection against l<:nd and ~\iL' attack. 72. An army which ~ets up machine-guns in the cen:re of an arca occupied by civilians aSCiumcs a 11eavy responsibWty with n:ganl to this civili<:ln population. A town :rom which guns are fired on troops elsewhere Cannot claim to be an open town, immune from bomb- ing. In appraising Tunis:a's responsibility in regard to the incident of 8 February, it is nece9sUI)' to bear 69. Le pellple tunisien a conscience qu'a partir de Cl' jour sa securite est entre les trains du Conseil de secu- rite, qui a eJricaccment agi en pareille3 circonstances. J'ai confiunce qu'it ne sera p<'.s de';-.I1. 70. M. GEOHGES-PICOT (France) : Le representant de la Tunisie a pnisente j'incident de Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef cOlllme une agression de la France contre une popu- lation civile innocente, en decrivant les faits d'une maniere incomplete. le crois de mon devoir, pour per- mettre au Conseil d'ap[1l'ccier objectivement la situation, puisqu'il y a ete fait de nOllveau rCIcrem;e, de completeI' les lacunes de l'exposc tunisien et de redresser certains fait.~ qui permettront au President et aux membres dll Conseil d~ constater que Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef n'etait pas une ville ouverte, mais une place d'anues des rebdles Illgeriens, appuyes par l'armee et l'adminis- tration tunisieunes, place d'oD. ne cessaient de partir des agressiolls conLre les forces fran~aises. 71. Bien avant l'incident du 8 fevrier 1958, Saldet- Sidi~Youssef et sa mine constituaiellt un centre d'en- trainement pour les reLelles et Ull centre de transit d'arrncs an pront de la rcbelllon algcrienne. Dne veri- table garnison rebelle - de 500 a 700 hommes en moyenne - etait instaIlce en permanence a la mine, les fftmilles residant duns le village. Les unites de recrues y tennient ga.rnison. y rccevaient leurs anne- ments, et y suivaieut pendant un mob et demi un entratnement militaire intensif : instruction technique sur place, exercices de combat dans le djebel au nord des bfltiment::> de la mine, tirs dans les djebels du sud- est, dtdiles avec drapeau FLN [Front de liLcration natlOnale] en tete. ClOt entrronement termine, les l'ecrues repul'taient en detachements de transports d'annes. Un rlr.t.af'.hement. rlp la garde nationale tunisienne - 30 lIoIDmes commandcs par un iieutenmlL - stalionnait aLlX abords de la mine. Le ravitaillement d'.! camp etait assure par camions vcnrmt dc Tadjercuine et par le commerce local. Nous avollS des re!tus de mar- chandises delivrees au commandement I7LN. avec les cflcllels de J'unite qui etait a Sakiet-Sidi-You3~ef. La proLection de ce centre rebelle etait assurce non seu- lement contre les incursions terrestres, mais egalement contre l'observation aerienne. Des mitl'ail1ellSes anti- aCl'ienllcs 6taient ins-~alllies all centre dll village et sur les toits des btltiments pltlJlics. La garde nationale et meme l'armee tunisiennc pretaient lenrs concours a cctte protection terrestl'e et antiaerienne. 72. Vne armre qui instalie ses mitrailleuses n'.! milieu de la population civJe }lrend une responsabilitc grave a 1'6garc1 de ccHe populntion. Dne vilk d'oll des pieces tircnt sur d'autres troupes ne peut pnHendre elre une ville ouvene, al'ubri des bom':.Jardements. Pour me5urer la l'Csponsabilite dc 12. Tunisie dans l'incident du 8 fcvrier. il faut se souvenir du grave incident du 11 janvier, 73. Before concluding my remarks on this subject, I slwuld Wee to point out that, on Lem'ning of the Sakiet-Sidi-Yollssef incident, hoth the Prime Minister of France and the Natiouu] Assembly deplored tlIe fact that casllolties bad been inflicted on the civilian popu- lation. Mr. GaiUa:-d added that France was ready to make good the damage caused and to pay com;Jensation. 71. There cen be no doubt that He support given to the FLN by Tunisia constitutes aggression. We need only rcfer to the definition of aggn'lssion contnined in the ?roposaLs submitted te the United Nations by the majority of the African and Asian States and by certain Latin·Americall States. The delinition contllins the following statement: "In an international conflict that StClte shall b~ decllll'ed illP. Iltb,cker w1Jicll supports armed bands organized in its territory which invade the territory of another Stllte-, or refllses, on being requested by the invaded State, to take ill its own terri~ tory any action within its power to deny s;lCh bands any aid vr protection." 75. Arlic1c { of the l;ollvention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, adopted nt HaVfllHl. on 20 FcbJ'llary t928 by the VIth Interna- tional Conference of American States, reads as follows: "The contmcting States bind thcmsctvcs to observe the following rules with regard to civil strife in another one of them: "First: To use all menns at thcir disposal to prevent the inhabitants of their territory, nationllls (I':' aliens, from par~icipaling in, gathering clemcn15 crossing the boundary or sailing from their territory for the purpose of starting or promoting civil strife. "Second: To disarm and intern every rebel forC(l c:-ossing tlleir boundaries, the expBnses of internment to be borne by tllfo St,rte where public order mi'ly have been disturbed. The arms found in the hands of the rebels may be seized and wilhdrawn by the Government of the country granting asylum, to be returned, once the struggle has ended, to the State in civil strife. "Third: To forbid the traffle in arms and war material, except when intended tUI' the GovenUllent, while the belligerency of the rebels has not been recognised, in which latter C<'lse the rules of neutru- lity sllUJI be applied, ". l League Ql Nnt'ons, TrealiJ SerIes, vol. CXXXIV, 1932-HJ33, p. ~t. 73. :e tiens, avant de clare ce chapitre, u rnppeler qal". le President dll Conseil fl'anl/ais et l'Assemblee natiollalo, des qu'ils ont cte snisis de l'inci(]pnt' elf: SakiehSirli~Youssef, ont deplore qu'it y ait ell des viclirr.es dans la popnlation eivi1e_ M. Gaillard a Hjoute que lJ Fr.<mce etait pretc a envtsagcr :a reparation des dommages camcs et le vcrsement d'indemniLes. 74. Que J'appui donne pal' la Tunisie ail FLN cons- titue unc agrcssion, cola ne fait. p:::tS Jp. ol"lute. Il sumt de nous en rapporter a la. tWinitiOll dormee de l'agres- sion duns des propositions qui ont elc presentees a ]'OrgEnisation des Nlltions Units par la pluparL des Etats africains ct a"iatiqu<:o, et CGrlains Etnts I~tino­ americains. II cst dit dans cette definition : lr Sera reC()n:lll pour agressell~ dans UIl conJlit inte~national J'Etat qui aura rlonne son appui it Le;; uundes arOlees ('U[, !ormees sur son territoire, lHJI"Cnt envnhi le 1er- rhoirc d'un alltrc Et<'lt, ou qui aur<'l rcfuse., malgre la delIlande de I'Etat cll\'ohi, de prendl'e sur ,>on prOprie territaire les mesures en san pouvoir pour priver les· dites bandcs de toutc aide et protection Cl. 75. L'article premier de la Conventiun conccmant lcs devou-s et droits des Etat, en cas de Illttes civiles, adoptee it La Havane, le 20 fevrier 1928, par la VIe Conference internntionulc arrH~ric8ine, est ainsi ref!iee : "Les Etats contractan:s s'obtigent a observer les regles sllivantes eOIlcernant la luLte civile dans l'un cl'cntre eux : f. Premicrement : Employer les moyens en leur pOllvoil' pour hitcr que les /labitanls de leur terri- toire, nfll:ionflllx ou etrangcrs. ne prennent par:, ne ras:;;cmblent les elements OU DC p;:ssellt la frontiere, ou ne s'cmbarqucnt sur leur telTitoil'e pour com- mencer 011 soutcnir une lntte civile. (Secondement : Dcsar'l1er ou interner toute force rebellc qui traverse leuTS fronti~rcs, les cJepenses de ],intCl'l1Cmcllt etant au compte de l'Elat all l'ordre a ete bOllleversll. Lcs arme.~ trouv~e:; uu pouvoir des rebeJ]es pourror.t etr£! .~aisies et gardees par le gou~ ve~nement du pays de reIugc pour Nre rendues a J'Etat en llltte civile, une fois que ID lutle sera ter- minee. il Tl'oisiemement : l)efendre le 1rafic des urmes et clll maLericl de gucrl'e, sauf !orsqu'i!s s('l".<1ient. rlestines all gouvcrnemcni. et uussi longtemps que la condi~ tion de bclllgel't'.l1ts ne sera pas reCDnnuc aUK rebclles, r.flS clans lequel seront appltquccs les regles de la neutraJitc. I Socield nC5 N!llhms, R,Ullflil des Tral'Us, VQi. cxxxrv, 1932-1933, p. 53 et 59. 77. An independent and sovereign country must not allow people to take cover behind its frontiers and attack others, even if these others are their enemies. Moreover, in different circumstances President Bour- guiba upheld the same principle in regard to Tunisia. Did he not reccntly recaU his ambassador from Syriu rnerdy because one of his political opponents, Salah ben Youssef, had been admitted to and given asylum in tbnt country? 78. More recently, President Eourguiba expressed the following views On Tunisia's participation in the African-AsLan Peoples' Conference, held at Cairo in December 1957: "As regards onr participation and tlle sending to the Afric:an~Asian Congress of a Tunisian people's deLegation which does not represent the Government, we have said that it was impossible for I1S to parti- cipate as long as Salah ben Youssef and Youssef TIouissi were regarded as the representatives of Tunisia. I hnve received a promise that these indivi- duals will be excluded, On this basis, that is to say, on the basis of respect for Tunisian sovereignty, the exclusion of these agitators who are fishing in troubled waters, ancI respect for diplomatic usage, which precludes countries maintaining diplomatic relations from encouraging or assisting the activities of an enemy, we will take p art in the Congress." 79. I think that this position demonstrates clearly the situation which ltaS resulted from Tunisia's support of the Algerian rebels. Mr, Slim has told us that the Algerian affair lias encroaclled upon Tunisia. ]n actual fact, it is the stand taken by Tunisia which is causing Tunisian policy to encroach upon Algeria. For what Tunisia is doing is to support a group of Algerian rebels. 80. Solutions can be enVisaged in Algeria which would not give the prepondenlllt influence ond power to the PLN. In that event, given Tunisia'~ attitude, it is obvious that that country will continue to support the FLN and to interfere in the internal political affairs of Algeria, It is not the events in Algeria which are the underlying cause of the present situation; but Tunisia's infringement of the principle of non·· intervention. This sit"Gation should bc borne in mind, as it is, so to spellk, the background to all the events I am about to describe, 81. Before beginning my account, however, I would like to draw the Council's attention to a situation which was brought to our notice yesterday evening. 77. Un pays illdependant et souverain ne doit pas permettre a des gem de se proteger derriere ses fron- tieres et de frapper d'autres gens, meme si ces derniers sont leurs ennemis. D'ailleurs, en d'autres cirtons- tances, le president Bourguiba a su dCfendre Le meme principe quand il interessait la Tunisie. N'a-t-il pas recemrnent rappele de Syrie son ambassadeur simple- ment parce qll'un de ses adversaires politiques, Salah ben Youssef, avait etc admis et re~,u dans ce pays? 78. Plus reccmment, au sujet de la participation de la Tunisie a la Conference des pcuples d'Asie et d'Alrique, tenue an Caire en decembre 1957, le presi- dent Bourguiba s'est exprime en ccs termes : «En ce qui concerne notre participation, I'envoi d'unc delegation populaire tunisienne, ne represen- tant pas le gouvernement, au Congres arro-asiatique, nous avons dit qu'U nous etait impossible d'y partl- ciper tant que Salall ben Youssef et Youssef RouIssi seraient cOllsideres comme representants de la Tuni- sie. J'ai obtenu la parole que ees gens seraient ccurtes. Sur ces bases - c'est-a-dire le respect de la souve- rainete tunisienne, l'eloignement de ccs agitateurs qui pechent en eau trouble et le respect des usages diplomatiques qui interdisent aux pay" qui sont en relations dipJomatiques d'encourager ou d'alimenter l'activite d'un ennemi -. nous participerons au Congres. I1 79. Il me semble que cette position indique claircmcnt queUe est la situation resultant de l'appui donne par la Tunisie aux rebelles nlgcriens. M, Slim nous a dit que l'afIairc algerienne debordait :linsi sur la Tunisie. En realite, c'est la position pri~e par la Tunisie qui fait deborder la politique tunisiennc en Algerie. Car que fait la Tunisie ? Elle donnc son appui a un groupc de rebeHes algeriens, 80. On pent imaginer des solutions en Algeric qui ne donneraient pas I'Mgcmonie et le ponvoir au groupe FLN. Si eela se produisait, il e~t manifeste, elant donne la position de la Tunisie, qu'ellc continuerait a sout~nir le FLN et a s'ingercr dans la politique interiellre de l'A/gene. Ce ne sont done pas les evenemcnh d'Algeric qui sont a la base et il l'origine de la situationactnelle, mais bien l'atteinte [lortee par la Tunisie all prindpc de la non-intervention. CeUe situation doH ctre rnp- peICe, car cUe constitue en quelque sortc la toile de fond sur laquelle se sont derou]Cs taus Ics 6venements dont je vais vallS parler maintenant. 81. Toutefois, avant de comlllencer eet expose, je voudrais attirer l'attention du Canseil sur une sitnation qui nous a 6t6 signalee hiel' soir. 83. The French Command has instructed French units to do their utmost to avoid any contact. However, if the Tunisian begin an engagement, the French units will obviously be compelled to tn.ke l"_ounter_ action in .~d[-dcfencc with nil the men.ns at their disposaL Troops cannot he asked to allow themselves to be cut~o['f, encircled, disarmed afld :wnihilated. All those of you who are acquainted w:.th milita.ry matters or who have !'lerved in the army are aware that this is the first duty of a force, U sacred duty which it cannot repudiate. when attacked. It is therefore for the Tunisian authorities to re-establish the status quo ante and lo refrain from Tlloving their forces towards tlU:l suuLh. 8,1. I now come to the statement of our complaint and to an initial reply to the arguments pot forward lly the Tunisian representative. After making this statement and studying his intervention, I reserve the right to add to what I have said. 85. I should flrst lIke Lo draw Lhe attentior. of members of the Council to certain points in the explanatory memorandum submitted by the TLlrllsian representative in support of hi!> complaint ISj40J.'J!. 86. Mr, Slim first recalls the measures taken by the Tunisian Government in February 1958 to limit the movement of French troops and to reglll:lte food supplies for those troops. He asserts that in taking these measures, his Government was merely exercising its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 87. Certn.in members of the Council must have observed at the time, ::IS we did ourselves, Utat this was an unwarranted use of that Article, interrded to justify a series of arbitrary dedsions tal{en at that time with regard not only to French troops in Tunisia, but also to the French civilian pupulation and certain consulates in the frontier area. Such an argument is in fact legally untenable. Article 51 a~thorizes the exercise of the right of sp.lf-Jefence only" if an armed attack OCWTS against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has takefl measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." The text, therefore, provides for an eventlHJlity, namely armed attack, that had not occurred at the time W:len Tunisia invoked Article 51, the terms of which have hitherto bC!en vel)' strictly int~rpreted, It might be pointed out, furthermore, that the problem had not yet been referred to the Council when the measure" in question were taken. frall~aises en Tunisie, crainL, Jans ccs conditions, qu'une nouveHe attaque ne soit declenchee contre nos forces U Remada et, peut-~tre, en d'autres points. 83, Le wmmandement frall(;ais a tloun6 instructioJl aux unites fnw«aises de s'efforcer de refusl:r le contact. Mais il est evident que, si l'action tunisienne s'engagG, les forces frnngaises sex-ant ohligees de ripostt:r, pour se deIendre, par tous les moycns dont eUes disposent. On ne pent demander a des troupes de se laisser isolcr, entotlrer, desarmer et anr.iltiler. TJUS ceux d'entrl~ vous qui connaissent I'annee Oil qui oul appartenu a l'armce savent que c'est le premier devoir d'une troupt:, un devoir sacre auquel elle ne peut renoncer, quand elle est nLtaquee. 11 appartient done aux autoritL'-S tunisicnnes de retablir le statu quo anterieur et d'eviLcr le mouvement de ses forces vel'S le sud. 84, J'en viens maintenant a l'expose de notre plainte. et a une premiere reponse aux arguments utilises par le representant de la Tunisie. Je me reserve, apre:i avoir fait mon expose et apres avoir etllc!ie ses decln~ rations, de completer cc qlle jc vais dire. 8S. .re vOlldrais, au debut de mon expose, attirer I'attention des membres du Conseil ~ur certains points du memoirc explicatif remis, a l'ap;mi de sa plainte, par le repre!)Cntant de la Turusic (S{40131, 8G. M. Slim rappelle, tout d!abord, les mesures p:-ises par le Gouvernement tunisien, en Jcvrier 1958, pour limiter les mouverncnts et reglementer le ravitaillement des troupes fraw;aise.s. IJ atnrme que son gouvernement ne faisa;t en cela qu'exercer son droit de legitime dcfense, cOflformem.ent a l'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unics. 87. Il Y avait hI. - et certail:s membres dll ConseiJ ant dti le remarquer B ce momcnt comme nous - une reference abusivc ll. I'arlicle CJl question, destinec G justifier toute une serie de dec:sions arbitraires prises a cc moment, non seulement eontre les troupes fran· l;aises en Tunisie. mais aussl codre la population civile Iram;aise et certains consulats de la zone fronti~re. Juridiqucment meme, une telle attitude est insoutc· nable. L'articJe 51, en eITet, n'autorise l'exercice du droit de legitime defense que (( uallS le l,;a:s oil un Membr(: des Nations Unies est l'ohjet j'une agression annee, jusqu'i\ ce que le Conseil de secIlrite ait pris des mesures nece.ssaires pour rnairotenir la pnix '. Cl'. texte pr&voit done une evcntuaUte, ceUe de l'agression armee, qui n'existait PflS au roomen: oil la Tunisie a invoque ]'article 51, dont les termes ant, ju:;qu'it present, ete illterpretes d'une [a~on trios stricte. On pourrait, de plus, faire rcmarquer que le Conseil n'avait pas encore ete saisi du probleme lorsque les mesures en question ant eta prisos. c()n~idered tit" t the problem" involved could be settled only hy negotiation and co-operation between France find Tunisia. However, wc are not preparcd to remain silent and thercby giVf'. the imprcssion tllat wc approve the case put forward by the representative of Tunisia. gg. Mr. Slim also states tilnt, at the instance of the Secretary-General of the United N;\tions, the Tunisian Government uccorded very liberal facilities to ensure food supplies for the immobilized troops. He fails to add, however, that in recent days, at least at certain points, it hus been possible to provision our posts by air only -- a fact Wllich has given rise to several incidents. 90. [n speaking of the French troops, I feel I should point out that nil impartial observers of the situaLion, including the persons entrusted witll the good oIHces mission, have paid tribute to the patience, discipline and spirit of self-denial of these troops and that tbe compromise agreement to which Mr. Slim has referred recognizes that no action can be taken which (lnes not respect the dignity of these troops. 91. Finally, it would appear from the explanatory memorandum submitted by Mr, Slim that the com- proll\is~ agreement of 15 March 1958 "laying down, infer alia, the procedure for the evacuation of the French troops from Tunisia" is now a dead letter because of the failure of the French GOvernment to ratify it. 92. I must make it clear that we cannot accept this point of view, which is at variance with the very defi- nition of good offices and also with the facts. The basic purpose of this. procedure is not to fllld a direct solution o[ the dispute in which it is being employed: that is precisely what distinguishes it from mediation or arbitration, in which a settlement is either proposed to, or imposed upon, the parties to the dispute. The function of those who nccept a good offices mission is no less important. hut its SCope is more restricted: it Consists in finding an area of agreement as a basis for th<.: resumption of direct negotiations between the coulltries concerned. That appears to me to be the manner in which the United States and the United Kingdom have always interpreted the good o1TIces procedure; I trust that their representatives in the Security Council will correct me if I am mistaken. 89. M, Slim declare, en outre, qu'a la suite de l'intcr- ventil1n du Sc,crctairc general des Nations Vnies, les plus larges facilites ont ete consenties par le Gouver- nement tunisien pour assurer le ravitaillement des troupes immobilisees. Il n'ajoute cependant pas que, en certains points tout au mains, au cours de ces der- lliers jours, le ravitaillement en vivres de nos posttS n'a pu etre asslIre que par la voie des airs, fait qui a ete cause de pll1sieurs incidents. 90. Je crois devoir rappeler, au moment OU je parie des troupes fran~aises, que tous les observnteurs impar- tiaux de la situation, notamment les personnalitcs qni ont ete chargees des bans offices, ont rendu hommagc a la patience, a l'esprit de discipline et a l'abneglltion de ces troupes, et que, dans le compromis m~me auquel a fait allusion M. Slim. il est reconnu qu'aucune mesnre ne pourrait etre prise qui ne rcspecte la dignit~ de ces troupes. 91. Il semble, enfin, ressortir du memoire expHcatif presente par M. Slim qu'un compromis du 15 mars 1958. !( etablissant llotamment lcs modalites de l'eva- cuatioll des troupes franC;aises de Tunisie". est actuel- lement lettre morte du fait de sa non-rahfication par le Gouvernement franc;ais. 92. Je tiens a bien declarer que nous ne saurions accepter ce point de vue, qui est eontraire tant a la definition me-me des bOilS otnces qu'a la realite des faits, Le but essentiel de la procedure qui nons occupe n'est pas, en cITet, d'obtenir directemcnt une solution du differend apropos duquel elle s'exerce ; c'est la justement ce qui la disullgue de la mediation all de l'arbitrage, dans lesquels un rl:glcment est. soit pro- pose, soit impose, aux parties en cause. Le rOle de cellX ql.!l acceptent une mission de bans offices est non mains important, mais il a un champ cl'application plus restreint : il consiste <\. trouver un terrain d'entente permettant la reprise de negociations directes entre les pays interesses, Telle me parait ~tre l'interpretation qu'ont toujours donnee les Etats-Unis d'Amcrique et le Royaume-Uni de la procedure des bons offices; leurs representants au Conseil de sccurite voudront bien me corriger si je me trompe. 94, I consid~ it necessary at this point, before placing in theit· true perspective the Tunisian representative's <l.:;sertions regarding the r~cent incidents whieh h::\vp. unfortuna tely once again pitted Frenchmen against Tunisians, to retrace briefly the events which lie at the rool of the present situalion. 95. Under the conventions between Franeeand Tunisia, signed ~t Parts on .3 June 1955, France recognized lhe internal aulollOmy of Tunisia, retaining special prero· gatives only in regard to defence and toreigtl atrairs. Certain responsibilities relatina to public order were also temporarily entrusted to France. These couventiol,s, which - and I stress the fact - were freely negotiated <md freely concluded, afforded France the certainty- or so at least it believed - that its interests would not be threatened from Tunisian territory; at the sa.me time,. they allayed Tunis!.'ln anxieties, as shown by speeches made at that time by the present head of the Tunisian Government, 9B. On 8 find 10 October 1955, the conventions of 3 June 1955 were described by Mr. Bourguiba - oud J quote his own words - as "a triumph of reason" and, on the occasion of their ratiHcation by France, he went so far as to say: " I am profoundly convinced that France will Ilt,ver regret having placed so high a tmst in the Tunisian people." ~7. It wus jn the same spiril: t.hat Franee, in another act of good will, met the new demands of the Tl1nisi.m authorities by recognizing the independence of Tunisia on 20 March 1956 [Protoeol of Agreement between France and TunisLaJ. The othilr party, in turn, formally undertook to negotiate agreements with France est!lb~ lishing interdependfmce in the neld of defence. This commitment in principle was not embodied in any specific legal provisions, because the Tunisian l'tJJnistcrs had expresser! the wish that their country's tuil sove- reignty should first he recognized. France met this wLsh. 98. Since June 1956, in conformity with the Protocol of 20 March, :France has helped to build up a Tunisio.n Army by providing material and equipment and by ~raining its officer corps. 94. Il m'appuralt maintenant indispensable, avunt de r~tablir sous leur vrai jour les assertions du repre~ sentant de la Tunisic quant allX recents incidents qui ant malhcllrellsement, llne fois de pLus, oppose Fr::mt;ais et Tunisiens, de retracer brievement I'historique des faits Cjui sont a l'origine de la presente situation. 95. Par les conventions entre la France et la Tunisie, signces it Paris le 3 juin 1955, la France reconnaissait l'antonomie interne Ul:l la Tunisic en ne conservant dCl prerogatives particuliercs qu'en matiere de defense et d'affaires exterieures. Certaines responsabilites COIl- cemant !'onJrl:l public lui eroicnt temporairement reconnlles. ecs textes, librement negocies, librement conclus - je le souligne - assuraient a la France la certitutJe ~ uu mains le croyait-olle ~ qu'aueune menace ne s'exercerait eOntre ses int~rets a partir du territoire tunisien, et repondaicnt err meme temps aux preocl,;upations tunisicnnes, COIDlUe en font foi les rliSCOU1'5 prononces :i. l'epoque par l'actuel chef du Gouvernement tunisien. 96. Le:> 8 et 10 octabre 1955, les textes des conventions du 3 juin 1955 etaicllt qualifies par M. Bourguiba - jc cile lies pl'opres C'xpressions - de «triomphe de la raison )), et, a l'occasion de lellr ratification par la Frflnce, il declarnit meroe : (( Je suis pro£ondement convnincll que II'! France ne regrettera jamais d'avoir place une telle confiance dans les Tunisii'IH.» 97. C'cst dans le me.me esprit que la France, le 20 nlars 19S1:i, par un autre actc de banne volonte, rcpou- daH encore unc fois aux nouvelles delhandes des auto- rites de la Regence en reconnaissant J'independance de la Tllnisie [Protocole d'accord entre la France et la Tunisie]. Nos interlocuteurs p.renaient, en contrepartie, l'engagemcnt formel de oegocicr avec la France des accords d'interdependance en matl1'1re de deftJllse. Si cct engagement de principe u'etait pas assorti de clauses jnridiques detailIees, c'etait en raison du souhait exprime pnr Jes rninistres tunisicns de voir ta sou verai- nete totalc de leur pays reconnue au prealable. La Prance a repondu a ce souhait. 98. Des le mois de j uin 1956, et conformement au protocole du 20 mars, la France apportait son concoun a la constitution de I'armee tunisieull(J par l'apport de ma.tcriel et d'equipemeat et par !'instruction des cadres. 100. Non seukment la Tunisic ne respecte pas les engagements ains~ souscrits, mais eIle s'est servi~ des annes cedees par la Francc pour s'opposer li. l'aTmec fralll;aise, pour proteger sur son t!'ITitoire l'implantation d'unc orgallJ:'!ation rchelle et favoriser, soit dircctement, soit par unc collusion evidente, le trafic des anncs et le passage de groupes nrm~_s a travers ses frontii-.res. ees faits sont bien connus, et j'cn t.i~ns au surplns les details a la disposition des membrcs du Conscil, mais je ne veux pas abuscr de Icur patience. L'Assemblee gencrale de l'Organisation des Naticns Unies en a cu d'ililleurs connflissance a sa douzieme session. 100. Not ouly is Tunisia failing to futtil the commit- ments tllus entered into, but it has USl\(] arms supplied to it by Francc to take action against the French Army, to pn;Lect the establishment of H re.bel organization on its territory, and to facilit[lte, either directly or by obviolls collusion, thc arms lraHic and the passage ot' armcd groups ucro~s its frontiers. These facts are well known; I call make further details [Ivnilable to the members of the Council, but I (1.0 not wish to impose ullon their pntiencc, I1'1orcover, the question was before Lhe United Nations General Assembly at its twelfth session. 101. La France est ell droit de pretendrl: que le Gou- vernement tunisien a cxploite toutes les facilites qu 'elk lui avait donnees pOUf apporter. d'une mal1ien~ san,; ccsse croissante, un applli otlvert :'lUX lJartisanil d'une rebellion sur un territoire lram;ais, et que, ce faisant, la Tunisie s'est livr~e a un veritable abus de confiance. Le Gouvernemcnt tunisien a egalement failli aux obli- gations de la Cbarte des Nations Unies. qui lui com- mande de "ivre en paix, dans un esprit de bon voisinage, avec les autres Etats Membrcs des Nations Unies. Son attitude est directemer.t contrnire a I'esprit des decisions de l'Assemblee generule, qui, dans sa reso- lution 288 A (IV) notamment, a propos de la situation en Grece, a invite Il1'Albanie, la Bulgarie et It's nutres Etats intcresse~ a cesser immcdialemenl d'apporter toute aide ou tout appui aux partisans dans leur lutte contre ICl Grece, et notamme-nt de leur accorder I'usage de leur tcrritoirc COlnme base pour la preparation Oll le. 101. France is justified in contending that the Tunisian Government bas taken advantage of all the facilities uecorded to it by France in order to give open and constantly increasing encouragcment to s~ppor~ers of U rebellion 011 Frcnch ten-itory and that, 1Il domg so, Tunisia has committed a defmite breach of faith. The Tunisian Government has also failed to fulfil its obli- ~ations under the United Nations Charter, which requires it to live in peace and as a good neighbour with the other Mcmbers of the United Natium. Its attitud(' is directly contrnry to the spirit of decisions taken by the Geneml Al\sembly, which, in its resolution 288A (IV) conccrnillg the situation in Greece, called upon" Albania, Bulgaria and the other Statcl\ concerned to cease forthwilh rcndering any ul\sistance or support to Lhe guerillns in fighting Hgainst Greece, includ~ng the USl~ of their territories as tl. base for the preparahon or launching of arml'd actions ". Are we not facing a similnr situation? 102. Tltese preliminary obs('.rvaliom secm to me to be necessary for an undcrst<:lnding of the two aspeets of the matter which the Council is today considering at the requcst of the Tunisian delegation~ onr. concerns thlO remaining French military foret1~ in Tuni~b; the uther relates to the inciuents at Remada. 103. It- will Lake me abouL another half-hour to com- plete my statemenL. 1SliOUld lil!c to know, Mr. President, whether you wish me to proceed or to interrupt my statement at this point and reSUIlle after lunch. 104. Tile PHESmENT~ It seems to me that since tile representative of l'rance requires [lIloLher half~ hour to complete his speech, and since the interpre~ dl:klem;hem~nt d'une action armee ll. Ne nOLlS trouvons- nous pas exactement dans nn cas analogue ': 102. Ces obs<'.rvations prcliminaires me parai!;sent necc.ssaires pour la cOlllprej}'wsion des deux aspects de l'afiaire dont le Conseil est aujourd'Jlui saisi par la delegation tunisienne : l'un conc.erne ce qui subsiste de la pn~sc.ncc militairc. rranr;:aise erL Tunisic, I'autre Cl trait aux incidents de Rcmada. 103. J'en aurais encore a pell pres pour une dell'i- heure. Je voulais vou.s demander, monsieur le President, si vous de."irez que je termine, ou que j'interrompe ici mon expose pour le reprenJrc apres le dejeuner. 104. 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