S/PV.828 Security Council

I respecUully draw the attention of the members of the Council to the draft resolution submitted at thc pre· ceding meeting by the delegation of the Soviet Union, which appears in doenment S/4047. President: M. A. ARAUJO (Co]omlJic). Pfli.sents : Les representants des PllYS sUlvanLs Canada, Chine, Colambie. France, Irak, Japan, Panama, Suede, Union des Republiques socialistcs sovi~tifJ\l~s, !loyaume-Uni de Grancle-BreLaglle et d'Irlaml<' du Noed, Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Ol'dre dn jour proviaoire (SjAgendaf82~) 1. Adoption. de l'ordre dll jour. 2. Lettre, en dete du 22 mai 195&, udressec au Presi- dent du ConseU de sccurjtc pflr le representant Uti Liban, conccrnant la question suivante ; «Plainte du Liban touch~nt une siLuntion Cl'cee par I'inter- vention de la RepllbJique arabc unie dans les affaires interieures du Liban, et dont In prolon- gation est susceptible de menaeer le maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales II (S/4007). Adoption de I'ordre du jour Lettre en dote dn 22 rnai 1958, adressce an President dn COD8cil de sccwite par le representant dn Lihan, concernant la que8tion suivante : «( PIllwte du Lihan touchant une situation creee par I'intervention de la Repnbliquc llrobe unie dan8 le>! affaires inte- rieul'es dll L:ilian, et (lont la prolongation est 8U8- ccptible de menacer le maintien de la pais: et de la securite inlcrnationalcs» (8/4007, 5/4041) Sur l'invitalion du President, M. Earim Azkoul, representant du Liban et Al. Omar Loutf!, representant de la Republique arabe unie, prennent place cl la iahlc du Conseil. 11 est donnl leCture dcs intuprUalions en anglais et en Iran~ais de la declaration faile par M. Sobolev (Union des Republiques socialistes SOVieliqllCS) d la 8{27e seance. 1. Lc PRESIDENT (tradult de l'espagnol) .' Je signale a l'attention des membrl:s du Coneeil de securite le projet de resolution presenle a la pre.cedente se811ce par la deleg8tion de rUnion sovietirplc. qui a ete publie sous la cote Sj·1047. 3. The Lebanese Government found it necessary Lo bring this problem before the Security Council, which considered it at several earlier meetings. During these discussions, the French delegation has already had occasion to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the magnitude and inadmissible character of this foreign intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs. 4. The Security Council could not tolerate a state of affairs which was contrary to the principles of inter- national law and to the obligations of States Members of the United Nations. In a resolution adopted on 11 June 1958, the Council decided, by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention, to send observers to the Lebanon .. to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of per- sonnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders" [8{4023]. 5. In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary- General immediately took the necessary steps to send to Lebanon more than 100 observers, from eleven dilIerent countries, who began their activities without delay. I am happy on this occasion to express to them and to the Secretary-General our appreciation for the fine work they have already done. 6. It is apparent, however, from the report submitted by the Group [8/4040 and Add.l] that it has been unable to carry out its task completely because of the difficulties encountered by it and, in particular, because, at least until the last few days, it had access to only one-tenth or so of the Lebanese-Syrian frontier. 7. In view of the deterioration of the situation as a result both of the obstacles placed in the way of the observers and of the recent events and bloodshed in Iraq, the Lebanese Government yesterday appealed to other States Members of the United Nations to support its action. 8. As the United States representative announced this morning [827th meeting], the Government of his country decided to respond to that appeal immediately. 9. The Government of the French Republic notes this decision which is, in its opinion, justified under the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. In this respect, my delegation has noted with special interest the infor- mation given by the United States representative con- cerning t~~ spirit in v.:hic~ h!s Government is acting and the conditIons to which It mtends to subordinate that action. 10. My Government earnestly hopes that the mere announcement and initial effects of the United States decision will be sufficient to create the conditions necessary for a lessening of tension and the restoration of public order and constitutional legality. 3. Le Gouvernement libanais a estime indispensable de saisir de ce probleme le ConseB de securite, qui en a traite dans plusieurs seances anterieures. Au cours de ces debats, la delegation fran<;aise a deja eu l'occasion d'attirer l'attention des membres du Conseil sur l'importance et le caractere inadmissible de l'ingerence etrangere dans les affaires interieures libanaises. 4. Le Conseil de securite ne saurait tole1'er un etat de choses contraire aux principes du droit international comme aux obligations des Etats Membres des Nations Unies. Par une resolution votee le 11 jnin dernier, par 10 voix contre zero, avec une abstention, il a decide l'envoi au Liban d'observateurs charges de « faire en sorte qu'aucune infiltration illegale de personnel ni aucun envoi illegal d'armes ou d'autre materiel n'aient lieu a travel'S les frontieres libanaises)) [5/4023]. 5. En vertu de ceUe resolution, le Secretaire general a immectiatement pris les mesures IH~cessaires pour l'envoi au Liban de plus de 100 observateurs appul'- tenant it 11 pays dillerents, qui se sont mis immCdia- tement a l'reuvre. Je suis heureux, a cette occasion, de leur exprimer, ainsi qu'au Secretaire general, notre appreciation de l'reuvre meritoire qu'i!s ont deja accomplie. 6. Il ressort pourtanL du rapport presellte par la mission [8/4040 et Add.i] que celle-ci n'a pu rcmpIir completement sa tfiche en raison des difficultes qu'elle a rencontrees, et notamment du fait qu'elle n'a pu contrtller, au moins jusqu'a ces tout derniers jours, qu'environ la dixieme partie de la, frontiere libano- syrienne. 7. Devant l'aggravation de la situation resultant tant des obstacles opposes aux observateurs que des eve- nements sanglants qui viennent de se derou[er en lrak, le Gouvernement libanais a fait hier appel a d'autres Membres de I'Organisation des Nations Unies pour le soutenir dans son action. 8. Ainsi que l'a annonce ce matin le representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique [827e seance], le gouver- nement de son pays a decide de repondre immedia- tement a cet appel. 9. Le Gouvernement de la Republique franfllmise prend acte .de cette decision, qui trouve, a ses yeux, sa justi- ficatIOn dans les dispositions de I'Article 51 de la Charte. A cet egard, ma delegation a releve avec un intefl~t particulier les indications fournies par le repre- sentant des Etats-Unis sur l'esprit et les conditions dans lesquels son gouvernement entendait exercer son action. 10. Mon gouvernement espere vivement d'ailleurs, que la seule annonce et les premiers effets de la decision des Etats-Unis suffiront a creel' les conditions neces- saires a l'apaisement des esprits et au retablissement de 1'0rdre public et de la Iegalite constitutionnelle. 12. My Government llas, moreover, an imperative duty to protect France's considerable moral and mate- rial inlercsts in a traditionally friendly country and to ensure the safety of its many nationals in the area. It is in this spirit thftt my Government reserves its right to take any measures within tlle i'rameworl, of the United Nations Chllrter which it may deem n<:ces- sary to safeguard its interests.

I need not say that the Canadian Government shares in the concern expressed by other members of the Security Council over the situation which has developed in tJle Middle EnsL. This is not the time to enter inlo an examination of all the many factors which have contributed to the present dangerous tensions. Rather, we must address ourselves to the urgent task of seeking how best the United Nations can assist tIle people of the area in fillding solutions for their difficulties. 14. Since the Lebanese question was first brought to the attention of the Security Council, my Government has given fIrm support to United Nation~ action in that area. We Jluve contributed men to [Jle observcr group in Lebanon as we have previously COlltributed men to the United Nations Truce SupCl'vision Organi- zation in Palestine and to the Uniled Nations Emer- gency Force. We continue to believe in the purposes of the United Nations activit.ies in the area, Wc are proud of what has been accomplished, and we continue to hope that in this and other ways the United Natiolis can maintain Its good influence in that part of the world. 15. Wc trust thal whatever furthcl' measures may have to be taken will huild on the good work already dOlle as a foundation. Wc trust also that due concern will be paid to the well-being of the many agents of the Llniled Nalions who are now serving in this area. 16. In this present grave situation, the Government of Lebanon has called on direct assistance from those in 11 position to give that assistance. As the represen- tntive of Lebanon had explained at the preceding meeting, this call was made in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Cl1arler. 17. In our view, there is no reason why the action reported to tIJe Council by [Jle representative of the United States should not be considered as comple- mentary to the mission whieh the United Nations has already inaugurated. Our confidence that this can be so is based primarily on our confidence that the United States is not pursuing selfish interests in the Middle East. but is seeking to assist the people of the Middle 12. Mon gOllvernement a, d'autrc part, le devoir impcrieux de veiller a la protection des interets moraux et matericls importants de la Fl'llnce dans un pays traditionnellement ami, ainsi que d'assurer la .~ecurite de ses nombrcux ressortissants. C'est dans cet esprit qu'll se reserve de prendre, dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations Unies, loutes mesures qui lui paraitraicnt incJispensables jlQ\ll" la s311vegarde de ccs interets. 13, lH. HQLMES (C::lllada) [traduil de l'anglaisJ : le n'ai pas besoin de dire que le Gouvernt:ment canadien partage !'inquietude exprimec par cl'autres membres elu COI;seil de sccllritc all slljet de la .~iluation qui s'esl ereee all Moyen-Orie.nt. Ce n'est pas le moment d'examiner en detail le~ nombreux factellrs qui ont contribue a faire naitre la dangereuse tension actuelle. Nous devons plut6t nous appliqucr immediatement a rechercher de queUe manierc J'Organisation des Nctions Unies pCLll'rait le mieux aider la population de ceUe region a resoudre ses dimculb~s. 14. Depuis que la question du Liban a ponrla premiere fois ete portee a I'attention dn Conseil de sec'Jrite, mon gouverr.ement a fermement appuye radion de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans cette region. Nous avons foumi des hommes pour le Groupe d'obser- vation qui s'est rendll all Liban, comme nous I'avions deja fait pour l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve en Palestine et la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies. Nous cOntillUons a avoir foi dans l'action entreprLse pal' l'Organisation des Nations Unics duns la region. Nons sommes fler.'! de cc qni a deja ete accnmpli et nous continuons a esperer que, de cette manicre notamment, l'Organisation continuera a exercer son influence bienfaisante dans ceUe region du monde. 15. QueUes que soient le.~ mesures que oous pourrOlls encore avail" a appliquer, elles prendront appui, nous en sommes convainclls, sur l'ceuvre deja accomplie et la renforceronL Nous sommes egalement persuades que 1'00 se preoccllpera cl'assurer la securite des nom- breux agents de J'Organisation actllellement en poste darls cetle region. 16. Devant la gravite de la situation actueIJe. le Gouvernement libanais a demandC llnc aide directc a ceux qui etaient en mesure de la lui fournir. COmme I'll. explique le representant du Uban a la precedente seance, cette reque.'te a eLe faite conformement nux dispositions de I'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations Ullies. 17. Il n'y a, scion 1l0US, aucune rai.son pour que les mesures exposees au Conseil par le representant des Etats-Unis ne soient pas considerees comme venant completer la mission que l'Organisatiou des Nations Unies a deja entreprise. Si, pour nolre part, nouS sommes persuades qu'il pellt en ~tre ainsi, c'est avant tout parce que nous somm{',s convaincus que les Etats- Unis ne visent au MoyenvOrient aucun bllt egoiste. 18. Clear proof that tlIe United States is not seeking ends incompatible with the purpo!>es of our Charter is to be found in Mr. Lodge's firm statement that the United States is not only willing but anxious to with- draw its forces when its mission can be taken over by the United Nations. 19. Wc musl face the facts of the situation. The principles of international law, to which the Soviet representative somewhat inconsistently appeals, must he applied to actual situations and not appeal to an abstraction. 20. It is clear to all that the rights of States and the rights of persons are threatened by the violent distur- bances which are shaking the area. We do not presume La judge the causes of this violence, but we cannot allow violence to spread dangerously. 21. If the intervention of the United States at the request of the duly established Government of Lebanon can hold the ring, check the violent disorders and enable us to help the Lebanese people to find political rather than military solutions to their troubles, I believe that it will serve our purposes. This is not a time, therefore, for this Council to relax its efforts. It is up to llS to meet this new challenge and this new opportunity. That is the ldnd of job for which the Seeluity Council was created by the founders of the United Nations.

In the absence of our per- manent representative I shall make a very brief state- ment. 23. It is shocking to my delegation that Mr. Fadhil AI Jamali, who is so well known and mucll respected in the United Nahons, is reported to have been mur- dered. It was only a few weeks ago that we in this Council heard the remarkable speech that Mr. Jamali delivered on 10 June [8Ulh meetingJ. 111at speech is now the last time his voice will be heard in the United Nations. I remember our permanent; represen- tative saying in this Council that Mr. Jamali's speech deserved not only the attention of this Council, but also the attention of all people interested in the cause of peace and freedom [824lh meeting\. 24. When the Lext which later became the re,~olutiott of 11 June [S140231 was discussed in this Council, my delegation regarded that resolution as the minimum which the Security Council could do in the discharge of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world [824th meeting]. Since the adoption of the resolution, my delegation has hoped, and is still confident, that the United Nations Observation Group will exert its vigorous efforts in 18. La prcuve 6vidcnte que les Etats-Unls ne pour- suivent pus des fms incompatibles avec les buts de la Charte nous est fournie par la declaration tres ferme de M. Lodge, scion laquelIe les Etats-Unis sont non seulement disposes it retirer leurs troupes aussitM que l'Organisation des Nations Unies pourra les re-.lever, mais encore sont tres desireux de le faire. 19. n convient de considerer les faits en face. Les principes du droit international, auxqueLs le repre. sentant de l'Union sovietique se rCrere quelque peu inconsidcrement, doivent s'appliquer a des situations reeDes, et non a des abstractions. 20. 11 est evident pour tous que les droits des Etats et ceux des personnes sont menaces par les troubles graves qui bouleversent la region. 11 ne nous appartient pas de juger les raisons de eette violence, mais nous 1lC! saurions permettre que celle-ci s'etende dangereu- sement. 21. Si l'intervention des EtatSwUnis. demandee par le gouvernement legitime du Liban, pament a jouer le rMe stabilisateur voulu, nmeUre un tcrme aux actes de violence et it aider le peuple libanais il resolldre "es problemes par des moyens politiques I~t non mititaires, j'eshme que cctte inte.rvention aura send les fms de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. L'heure n'est pa3 venue cependant pour le Conseil de reH\cher ses efforts. 11 nous appartient de faire face .a cette nouvelle diffi- culte et de saisir cette nouvelle possibilite. C'est lit le genre de t€tches pour lesqueIles le Conseil de securite a Cte cree par les fondaLeurs de l'Organisation. 22.. M. IGANG (ClIine) [lradllil de l'anglais] : En l'abgence du chef de mn delegation, je ferai une tres breve declaration. 23. C'est avec Hne profonde emotion que ma dcle- gation a n.ppris que M. Fadhil AI Jamnli, si tannu et si respecLe il. l'Organisation des Nations Unies, aurait ete assassine. Il y a seulement qucJques semaines - c'etait le 10 juin -- nOU3 avons entcndu le discours remarquable prononce par .M. Jamali devant le Conseil [824<l seance]. Ce discours est done le dernier qu'il lui ail t\te donne de faire a l'Organisation. Le chef de la d~legation chinoise, je m'en souviens, a declare ici m~me que le discours de M. Jamali meritait non seu- lement l'attention du Conseil, mais encore celle de tous les peuples auxquels la cause de la paix et de la LibertC est chere [8241: Seflr1C~J. 24. Lorsque le textc qui devint la resolution du 11 juin [814023J 6tait discutc au Conseil, ma dele- gation a estime que le Conseil de securite ne pouvait moins faire que l'adopter pour s'acquitter de sa responw sabilite principale : le mainhen de la puix et de la securitc du monde [8Ue seanr:e]. Depuis l'adoption de eette resoLution, ma delegation a espere, et elle continue de le faire, que le Groupe d'observation des Nations Unies ne negligerait aUCUll effort pour rectuire, 21). The response is indeed a good and sel ftess deed. My delegation believes that the action which the United States has now taken is in full accord with the prin~ ciples and purposes of the United Nations and will certainly promote the cause of peace and freedom. Therefore, my delegation wholeheartedly supports the action that the United States has taken, with vision and courage, at this most critical turning point in llis- tory.

I must confess that it was with some sur- prise that my delegation heard that an emergency meeting of the Security Council had been called for today. I have listened very carefully to the statement of the United States representative, who requested this meeting of the Council on behalf of his Government. Although not a member of this Council, I have the honour to come from a country which is in the area of the world concerned and, for this reason, I feel bound to make certain remarks about the fail accompli with whicll we are confronted today and the charges that have been made against us, 28. It appears to me, in any event, that there was no reason for holding an emergency meeting of the Council and still less for landing United States troops. The situation in Lebanon has greatly improved and the disturbances tllere have considerably decreased in magnitude. Moreover, the fighting between the forces of the Government and those of the Opposition has virtually ceased. 29. In addition, negotiations were taking place among the Lebanese themselves in an attempt to reach a political settlement of the question. All the official documents before us, the report of the Observation Group and even the statements appearing in most of the world press, have emphasized clearly and umnis- takably that the Lebanese problem is a domestic issue concerning only the Lebanese themselves and that it is for them to fmd the solution. 30. The armed in tervention of the United States Government, at the request of President Chamoun, can only serve, unfortunately, to increase tension and to mal{c the situation in that part of the world evcn more critical. 31. I do not wish to quote here - I do not think tllat it would be appropriate to do So - the comments made by the international press and by responsible politiciang in the United States, such as Mr. WaIter Lippmann, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Senator Theodore F. Green, showing that tile results of this intervention are unlikely to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that part of the world. 26. A cette demande, les Etats-Unis ont repondu avec beaucoup de noblesse et de desinteressement. Ma delegation estime que les mesures que les Etats-Unis viennent de prendre sont confonnes aux buts et prill~ cipes des Nations Unies et serviront la cause de la paix et de la liberte. C'est pourquoi nOllS appuyons sans reserve les mesures que, nvec sagesse et courage, les Etnts-Unis ont prises en ce tournant critique de l'histoire. 27. M. LOUTFI (Republique arabc unie) : Je dois aVOUtr que e'cst avee surprise que ma delegation a entendu dire que le Conseil de securite etait convoque d'urgence aujourd'hui. J'ai ecoute avec beaucoup cl'attention l'intervention du representant des Etats- Unis, qui a demande, au nom de son gouvernement, la convocation du Conseil. Sans etre membrc de ce Conseil, j'ai l'honneur d'appartenir a un pays qui fait partic de la region du monde inreressee, et c'cst pOllr ce motif que je me vois ohlige de presentG quelques observations sur ce fait accompli en face duquel nous nom; trouvons aujonrd'hlli et sur les accusations dont nous sommes l'objet, 28. II me semble, tout au moim, qu'it n'y avait pas de motifs ponr cette convocation urgente du Conseil, ni surtout pour le debarquement des forces des Etats- Unis, La situation au Liban s'cst beallcoup amelioree, et les troubles qui s'y deroulaient ont sensiblement diminue. De rneme, les combats entre les forces du gouvernement et ceUes de l'opposition ont presque cesse. 29. En outre, des negociations pOUf trouver une solution politique entre les Libanais eux-memes etaient en cours pour le reglement de cette qllestion. Tous les documents officicls dont nOllS disposons, le rapport des olJservateurs, et meme les declarations de la plns grande partie de la presse mondiale, ont, d'une fa\-on llette et precise, souligne que la question du Liban etait 11l1C question interne qui ne concernait reellement que les Libanais el\x-m~mcs, et que c'est a eux seuls qu'il apparlient de trouver UllC solution. 30, L'intervention (ll"lnec du Gouvernement des Etats- Dnis, sur la requlne du president Chamoun, ne pent, malheureusement, qu'aggraver le malaise et rendre la situation plus critique dans cette partie du monde. 31. Je ne voudrais pas citer ici - et je pcnse qlle ce n'est pas le moment - les commentaires qui ont ett faits par la presse internationale et par des politiciens raisonnables des Etats-Unis, comme M. Waiter Lipp- manu, le senateur Hubcrt H. Humphrey, le senateur Theodore F. Green, qui ont demontre que les conse- quences de ces interventions ne peuvent pas contribucr a la paix et a la stabilite dans cetLc region du monde. 33. In the light of the circumstances I have described, there would seem to have been no reason for the uni~ laboral decision of the United Stale~ Government to intervene. Indeed, in our view, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not permit such an inter- vention, As you are aware, Article 51 mentions anned altack as :l condition for its application. In addition, there is Q.lready a Council decision which should be carried out and which is in fact 'being carried out by the Ohservation Group set up by the CounciL 3'1. From Lhe very first day, however, it became clear that this Security Council resolntion of 11 June 1958 did not sOltisfy the present Government of Lebanon. We noted, for example, that the Observation Group and the observers themselves were subjected to severe criticism by the President of the Lebanese ncpublic, who stated in an interview with the Uniled Kingdom newspaper, the Daily Mail, that the observers were not carrying out their duty. He said, jn particular; " It is dilficult for me to commenl OllUle acti- vities of observers because they appear to be doing noth..ing. As far as I can see, they spcnd their time at the Aero Club in Beirut and on beaches and up at the mountain resort." I He went on to say: "The observers contented themselves with quick picnics in crrtain Lebanese areas and at banquets given in their honour here and there." 1 35. It is obvious why the President of the Republic and the members of his Government took this attitude. They were displeased by the foct that the United Nations observers, and in particular Mr. Ga~o Plaza, the Chair- man of the Observation Group, reported that llley were wilnessing a Lebanese civil war. 36. What is more important, however, is thal the matter was brought before the Security Council and tlmt thc Coullcil adopted a resolution whicll the Secre- tary-General is now carrying out. In his statement this morning (827th meeting], Mr. Hammarskjold stressed the efforts made by the Observation Group to imple- ment the Council's resolution of June. He informed us in particular that freedom of access has been granted by the Opposition forces in lhe Tripoli and Bckaa areas. An agreement has apparently been reached with the Opposition whieh controls this part of the territory. It is therefore surprislng to see that, at a time wh~n the Council's resolution is being imple- mented, a member of the Council who voted in favour of it is taking this attitude and has decided to intervene unilaterally. l. The speaker read the quotation in English. 33. n resulte de tout ceb que ricn ne semblait militer en faveur de la decision unilat~rale du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'intervenir. 11 nOllS semble meme que l'Article 51 de la Charle des Nations Unies ne pennet pas cette int.ervention. En effet, it exige, comme vous le savez, une agression armee. En oUlre, it y a deja Hne decision du Conseil qui doH ctre mise en ceuvre, et qld est mise en ceuvre par le Groupe d'observation crM par le Conseil. 34. Des le premier jour, il s'est avere que la resolution du II jllin '958 n'a pas satisfait le gouvernement netuel du Liban. Aussi aVOIlS-IlOllS rcmarque que le Groupe d'observation et les obscrvateurs eux-memes ont etc l'objet de critiques severes de la part du Pre- sident de la Republique libanaise, qui a declare, dans une interview au joufrlal .anglais Daily Mail, que ces derniers n'accomplissaienl pas leur mission. Il a notam~ ment dit : (111 m'est difficile lie commentc]' les activites des observateurs parce que ees observatr:urs semblenl ne rien faire ; Autant que fen puis jugcr, ils passent leur temps a l'Aero~Club de Beyrouth, sur les plages, a la station estivale, ou dans les montagnes I, ' Et plus loin ; «( Les observateurs se sont contentes de rapide, piql\e~niqucs dans certaines regions du Liban et de banquets donnes en leur honneur ici ou la 1. 11 35. Le moW qui a amene le President de la Repu blique et les membres de son gouvcrnement a prendre celle al.titude est tres clair. lis n'ont pas ete s3tisfaits du fait que les observateurs des Nations Unies, notammenl M, Gala Plaza, president du Groupc d'observation, onl declare qu'ils avaient a fRire lace a line guerre civile lib3naise, 36. Cl" qui est le plus important, c'est que le Conseil de securite a ere saisi de la question et a adopte une r6solution, que le Secretaire general est en train de metb'e en ceuvre. Ce matin meme, dans son intervention [827C seance], M. HammarskjOld a mis l'accent sllr les efforts qui ont ete developpes par le Groupe d'obser- vatioll pour appliquer la resolution adoptee par l~. Conseil le 11 juin. Il nous a dit notamment que, dans la region de Tripoli, le libre acces a etd accorde par IBS forces de I'opposilion, de meme que dans la region de la Bekaa. Un atr:ord avec l'opposilion, qui contr~le cette partie du tcrritoire, aurait ete concIu. Aussi est-il elonllant de voir que, pendant que la resolution du Conseil est appliquee, nn membre dn Conseil qui a vote en sa favenr prenne cette attitude d decide d'intervenir unilateralement. 1 Texte cite en anglals par l'orateur. 38. In )jlS statement today [827lh meeting], Mt'. Azkoul tmfortunately repeated the same charges. I shall not reply to the academic exercisc in logic, which he dis· played in his interpretation of the Report of the Obser- vation Group [S/1010 anri Add.l!. My delegation did so immediately after his slaLement to the press, of which you have been informed. I should simply like Lu add that whatever the logic used, it cannot be valid so IOllg as it is contrnJicte<1 by the facts given in the Report of the Observation Group, with which you are all familiar. 39. Tile Observation Group itself, in a communique issued to the press, which I have before me, declared as follows (Press Helease LEB/9 of 26 June 1958): "The Observation Group believes that the pro- gressive implementation of that mandate will contri- bute greatly to the creation of conditions within 1.ebanon whieh will make possible the solution by the Lebanese people themselves of the internal problems which face the country at the present time." 2 Nothing could be more clear and I do not know what I could add. 40, No evidence llas been produced that the United Arab Republic has intervened in the domestic alfairs of the Lebanon. Unfortunately, what is happening now does, in our opinion, constitute an intervention in the domestic afTairs of Lebanon. I can only express regret at the fael that Mr. Chamolln and foIr. Malik should themselves have requested the intervention of foreign armed forces in their country. History will hold them responsible for this action which may have very grave repercllssions in this part of the world. 41. There can be no doubt that the great Power which took this decision, tl decision which is far from justified, when it, marc than any other State, is respon- sible for the maintenance of international peace and securiLy, has thereby set a very dangerous precedent. No one can arrest the course of history. The peoples of the Middle East, like the peoples of Asia and Africa, are fully aware of their responsibilities; they are equally consciuus of L1leir rights. their right to liberty and their right to independence, without pressure from the grent Powers or intervention by them. AllY attempt to ignore these factors in the relationships between the great Powers and the countries of that part of the world will make it difficult to maintain peace and ~ The speaker read the quotation in English. 38, M. Azkoul, aujourd'hui, dans son intervention [827'0 seance], a repris malheureuseml':nt If'A~ m~mes acwsatiolls. Je ne repondrai pas a l'effort de logique, cl'un caractere d'ailleurs a..:adcmique, dont i1 a fait preuve dans son interpretation du rapport du Groupe d'obscrva.tion [5/4040 et Add. 1]. NOlis l'avol1s deja fait immediatement apres SOil expose a la presse, qtli vous a Ate commlllllqlle. Mais je voudrais Lout simplemenl ajoutcr que, queUe que soit cette logiquc, eIle ne peut avoir de valeur tant qu'elle est contredite par les faits qui se trouvent dans le r"pporl que vous connaissez tous. 39. Le Groupe d'observation a declare lui-meme, dans un communique a la presse dont j'ai Lll texte sous les yeux (Press Release LEE/9, du 26 juin 1958) ; « Le Groupe d'observation cmit que I'application progressive de ce mandat contribuera grandement it cnier au Liban des conditions rendant possible la solution, par le peuple libanais lui-meme. du probleme inteme dans lequel le paYfi se troltve pris en ee moment 2.» Cela ne peut pas etre plus clair, et je ne sais pas cc que je pourrais ajouter. 40. 11 u'a pas ete etabli que la Republique arabc unie salt intervenue dans les aITaires int6rieures du Liban. C'est malheureusement ce qui se passe aujourd'hui qui, it notre avis, constitue une intervention dans les affaires intericures du Liban. Je ne puifi que regretter que MM. Chamoun et Malik aient demande eux-memes une intervention des forces ctrangeres dans leur pays. Ils assumeront ue.vallL I'histoire 111. re"p()nsabLlite de ceLte action, qui peut elltrainer des repercussions tres gmves dans eette partie dn monde. 41. Il ne fait pas de doute que la grande puissance qui a pris cettc decisioll, deeifiion qui est loin d'etre iustifH~e, et qui a, plus que tous les autres Etats, la responsabilite du maintien de la paix et de la securite internfltionales, a tree par ceHe decision lln precedent tris dangereux. Pcrsonne ne peut arreter le cours de I'histoirc. Les peuples du Moyen-Orient, comme les peuples d'Asie et d'Afrique, comprennent actuellement lellr re.~pon.~abilite; ils savent aussi qu'ils ont des droits _ droit al'inrlependance, droit ala Jibertc, sans pression des grandes puissances et sans intervention de ces dernieres. Si ron cherehe ane pas respecter ces facteurs dans les relations des grandcs puissances avee lcs pays de cette partie du monde, il sera difficile d'y faire Texte cite en anglais par l'ora.t(,;\lr. 42. I was surprised at the unfounded accusations levelled against us by the United States representative; there is no evidence to support these charges, which are in fact flatly contradicted by the report and the statements of the Observation Group and even by the press. It is regrettable that such statements should be made by a country with which we want to have good relations. If anyone wants to intervene in Lebanon, for motives which I do not know and which in any case are not justified, be it for the sake of prestige or on behalf of private interests, that is still no reason for making unsupported accusations against another State. The United States Government has taken this grave decision; it will be responsible for it. For our part, as I have already told the Council on several occasions, our only wish is for Lebanon's independence and pros- perity. 43. I reserve the right, Mr. President, to speak again at a later stage.

Mr. President, with your permission and that of the members of the Council, I should like to take II few minutes simply to clarify some points and to reply to some of the comments made about my country. 45. First of all, I should like to comment on the state- ment attributed to Mr. Chamoun, the President of the Republic of Lebanon. in his interview with the Daily Mail. I should inform the Council that the Lebanese Minister in charge of liaison with the Observation Group has recently told the press that the statements attributed to the President have been distorted. With regard to the statement attributed to the Chairman of the Observation Group, Mr. Galo Plaza, who is alleged to have said that he did not believe that there was any infiltration of armed men or material into Lebanon, I should like to ask the Secretariat, if pos- sihle, to read out the exact text of that statement, I do not believe I have seen any such statement by Mr. Galo Plaza in any publication. The most he can have said, in any event, is that during the short time it had spent in Lebanon and at the preparatory stage of its work, his Group had not been able to establish the existence of such infiltration. Bul he cannot pos- sibly have said that such infiltration was non-existent. I would like to have, either today or at another meeting, confirmation of the exact text of the statement attri~ buted to Mr. Gala Plaza. 46. As regards the statement in the first press release (Press Release LEB(9) issued by the Observation Group at Beirut, the last paragraph admittedly says that the progressive implementation of the Group's mandate would contribute to the creation of conditions which would make it possible for the Ll'.banese people to 42. ]'ai ete s'Jrpris des accusations du representant des Etats-Unis a notre egard, accusations qui ne sont pas fondees, qui n'ont pas ete etablies, et qui sont ncttement contredites par le rapport des observateurs et leurs declarations, et meme par la presse. II est regrettable que ces declarntions emanent d'un pays avec lequcl nollS desirons avoir de bonnes relations. Si l'on veut intervenir au Liban. pour des motifs que j'ignore et qui en tous cas ne sont pas justifies, que ce soit pour des raisons de prestige ou pour des interHs particuliers, on n'a pas besoin pour cela d'aCCllser un autre Etat sans apportel' de preuves. Le Gouvernement des Etal:.<;-Unis a pris cctte grave decision; c'est lui qui en assumera la responsabilite. Nous ne demandons pour notre part, comme je rai deja affirme ici it plusieurs reprises, que l'independance et la prosperite du Liban. 43. Je me reserve, monsieur le President, de prendre la parole a un autre moment. 44. M. AZKOUL (Liban) : Avee votre permission, monsieur le President, et celle des membres du Conseil, je voudrais prendre quelques minutes, simplement pour preciser certaines observations qui ont ett! faites con- cernant mon pays et y repondre. 45. D'abord, je voudrais commencer par preciser la declaration attribuee au President de la Republique du Liban, M. Chamoun, dans !'interview qu'il aurait accordee au Daily Mail. Je dois informer le Conseil que le Ministre libanais charge de la liaison avec le Groupe d'observation a declare dernierement a la prcsse que les declarations attribuees all President etaient deformees. En ce qui concerne la declaration attribuee au president dll Groupe d'observation, M. Galo Plaza, selon laquelle il aurait dit qu'it ne croit pas qu'il y £lit aucune infiltration d'hommes armes Oil d'envois de materiel au Liban, ie voudrais demander au Secretariat de nous lire, si c'est possible, le texte exact de cetto declaration. Il ne me semble pas avoir lu dans nucune publication line declaration semblable emanant de M. Galo Plaza. Tout ce qu'it aurait pu dire, dans tous les cas, c'est que son groupe, pendant le pell de temps qu'iJ. a passe au Liban et dans IllllO periode preparatoire, n'aurait pas constate l'existence il'une infiltration, mnis il n'aurait certainement pas pu dire que cette infiltration n'ex.istait pas. Je voudrais, si cela est possible, maintenant ou a une autre seance, avoir confirmation du texte exact attribuc il M. Galo Plaza. 46. En cc qui concerne la declaration qui se trO\IVll dans le premier communique que le Groupe d'obser- vation a publie a Beyrouth, il est vrai que le dernier paragraphe de ce communique (Press Releasc LEB/9) dit que la mise en application progressive du mandat du Groupe permettrait de creer de!> conditions suscep- 47. I should lih to conclude my statement by asSo_ ciating myself fully with my friend, Mr. Loutfi, when he speaks of the right of peoples to independence and of the need to ensure that this right is respected by the great Powers and Llle major countries. 48, 1 am speaking as the representative of a very small country and I am addressing myself to the repre- sentative of the United Arab Republic whicll is, COm~ pared to Lebanon, a great Power, and 1 fully agree with his principles concerning respect for the right of peoples and the fact that the small countries must be respected by their neighbonrs and by those countries which are, by comparison, large and all-powerful. 49, The SECRETARY~GENEHAL:Therepresentative of Lebanon referred to a statement by the represen~ tative of the United Arab Republic which, in turn, referred to a statement made in a press conference by Mr. Gala Plaza. It will be a pleasure for us to clleck what was really said by Mr. Galo Plaza and put it. at the disposal of the two gentlemen who have talked aboul the statement. I myself do not recall exactly his wording, but I think that this matter can be cancelled out by giving the exact text to the two gentlemen, 50. Since I have the floor, 1 might perhaps add one word about sometlling which it has been said that 1 have said myself. The represenlative of the Soviet Union referred to a statement according to which I would have said that the events in Lebanon were "the domestic affairs of the Lebanese people" [827/h meeting, para. 971. I have never made a publie statement to that effect. I thinl~ that the Soviet representa~ive has been misled by somewhat imaginative and free interpretatLons in the press of what was a statement with an entirely different overtone and undertone.

In my statement [827t1l meeting], I quoted a statement made by Mr. Gala Plaza. The Lebanese representative said that he was unaware of any such statement and asked for confir- mation of it. 1 should like once again to quote tills statement from the United Nations Press Release LEBJ15 of 7 July 1958. ,17. Je voudrais terminer en m'associant Cl)mpletement avec mon ami, M, Loutfi, lorsqu'il pade du droit des peuples a l'indcpendance et au respect de ce drDit par les grandes puissaaces et par les grand. pays. 48. Je pade maintenant en tant que representant d'un tout petit pays et je m'adresse au representant de la Republique arabe unie, pays qui, par rapport au Liban, constitue une grande puissance, el je sui. completement d'accord avec lui en ce qui concerne ses principes du respect du droit des peuples, pour que taus les petits pays soient respectes par leurs voisins et par cellX qui, par rapport a eux, sont eonsideres eomme grands et tout-puissants. 49. Le SECRETAfRE GENERAL (Iruduil de l'an~ glais) : Le representant du Liban a mentionne unc declaration du representant de la Republique arabe unie, qui, a son tour, a rappeIe une declaration faite lors d'lIne conference de presse par M. Galo Plaza. Le Secretariat ne manquera pas de verifier le texte exact de la declaration de M. Gala Plaza et de le mettre a la disposition des deux representants qui en ont fait mention. Pour ma part, je ne me souviens pas des termes exacts que M. Plaza a employe., mais je crois qu'it suffira, pour regler la question, de donner le texte verifie aux deux representants. 50. Puisque j'ai la parole, qu'il me soit permis d'ajou- ter un mat all sujet d'une declaration que J'on m'a pretee. D'apres le. representant de I'Union sovilWque, j'aurais dit que les evenements qui se deroulent au Liban sout " des affairf'.'l interieures du peuple libanais )) [827" seance, par. 97], Je n'ai jamais fait pareille declaration. Je crols que le representant de l'Union sovietique s'est laisse induire en erreur par l'interpre_ talion un peu trop libre et fantaisiste que la presse a donnee d'unc declaration faite dans un esprit enti~­ rement different. 51. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Reptlbliques socialistes sovietiques) [traduil du russe] : Au cours de mOll inter- vention [8278 seance], rai cite une declaration de M. Gala Plaza, Le representant du Liban a affirme qu'il n'avait pas connaissance de cette declaration et il a demande qu'on lui confirme son existellce. Je me permets de donner lecture de cette declaratlon telle qu'ellc figure dans le communique de presse de

I sincerely thank the Soviet Union representative for having produced a text which makes it possible to clarify the situation. When I spoke a few moments ago, J said that my pllrpose was to clarify the situation. 54. The statement by Mr. Galo Plaza is entirely accep- table to the Lebanese Government for the simple reason that my Government has never claimed that there was massive infJltmtion into Lebanon. No represell~ tative of Lebanon, no spokesman of the Lehnnese Government, has used the term" massive infiltration ". The expression wc have used is "massive intervention in the internal affairs of Le!:lanon " and we maintain that this massive intervention is taking place in the six forms which I described at the preceding meeting and whicll add up to what we call "massive inter- vention". What we have in mind is the supply of arms, the training of personnel, radio propaganda, pro- pagandA by the press, etc. Infiltration by armed men is only one of the forms of massive intervention. 55. We have merely said that there was continuous infJItration, but we have never spoken of massive infJItration because, in our opinion, such an expression would be contradictory. Inflltration is the act of a small group of men who secretly enter a counlry singly or in groups. Mass inliltration, if it were to occur, would amount to an invasion and we have never said that Lebanon has been invaded. 56. All this shows, therefore, that Mr. Galo Pla7,a is in complete agreement with the Lebanese view that there is infiltration but not an invasion. By stating that there is no massive infiltration, he admits the existence of infiltration pure and simple, That is predsely what we have always claimed. I am there~ fore grateful to the Soviet Union represcntative for having given me an opportunity of clarifying the situu- tion.

I do not wish to embark on a discussion on interpretation with the representative of Lebanon. I merely wish to note that he agrees with the statement made by the Chairman of the Observation Group, Mr. Galo Plaza, a The speaker read the quotation in English. 53. M. AZKOUL (LilJan) : Je remercie sincerement le representant de I'Union sovittique d'avoir produit un texte qui rennet d'eclairer la situation. Lorsquc j'ai pris la parole il ya quelques instants, j'ai dit que mon but etait de rendre la situation plus claire, 54. La declaration de M. Galo Plaz,a est parfaitemcllt acceptable pour le GOuvernernent libanais, pour la simple raison que cc dernier n'a jamais pnitendu qu'i! y avait des infiltrations massives au Liban. Aucun representant du Liban, aueun responsable du GOIl- vemement libanais, n'a employe le terme I< infIltration massive 11. L'expl'ession clont nous nous sommes scrvis est «intervention massive dans les affaires interienres dll Liban ». Et cetle intervention massive, nollS main- tenons qll'elle existe, sous les six formes que j'ai exposees a la preeedente seance et qni eontribuent a ereer co que nous appelons 11 inLervention massive~. Il s'agit de ]'envoi d'armes, de l'cntrainemenl de personnel, de la propagande radiophonique, de la propagal1de par la presse, etc... L'innltration d'homrnes armcs n'est que l'une des [onm's de l'intervention massive. 55. Nous avons simplement dit qu'iJ y avait infil- tration continue, mais llOUS n'avoIls jamais paric d'infiltration massive, parce que l'expression est, a notre avis, contradictoire. L'illJJltration est l'action d'un petit groupe d'hommes, qui passent clandesti~ nement, isoJes 0'.1 ensemble, dans un pays. S'i1 se pro- duisait une inflltration de masse, ce serait lIllC invasion. Or, nous n'avons jamais dit qu'il y avait invasion an Liban. 56, Cela prouve done que M. Galo Plaza est en complet accord avec la theorie libanaise selon laquelle il n'y a pas invasion, mais hien infJItn.:.tioll. S'il nie l'existem:e d'une infiltration massive, c'est qu'il admet I'cxistence de I'infiltration tont court. C'est ce qne nous avons touJours soutenu. C'est pourquoi je remercie le repre- sentant de l'Union sovietique de m'avoir fourni l'occasion de tirer la situation au clair. 57. M, LOUTFI (Republique arabe unie) : Je ne vellX pas m'eng<Jgcr dans une discussion d'interpretation avec le representant du Liban. Je desire simplement prendre <lete qu'il est d'accord sur la declaration qui a ete faite par le president du Groupe d'observation, M. Galo Plaza. 59. I should like to quote from U ([ocu:ncnt sub- mitted by Mr. Azkoul. This doc'1meut is dated 8 July and bears the symbol 5/4013. Mr. Azlwul refers here Lu three conclusions reached by tile Observation Group in section I of the dowment and he himself calls them " fUJ.damental conclusions ". I shall now read them, again in English. .. 1. It has not been possible te esta3lish from where the~e arms [nam,'!y, tlR nrms sem bv the Observation Groupl wer~, acquired, , , , - ., 2, Nor was it possible to establish if any of tIle armed n,en observed had inmtraLed from out- side." ., Any" ." not h mnssive ", but" any". I unllcl",land j t mu)' be evcn single, "il any". And, la5tJy, which is much more imponant to me and 1 think for every- body: '. 3. There is Jiltle doubt, however," concluded the Ob~ervation Group, "that the vast majority was in any case composed of Lebanese." uQ. With tllose three conclusions the representative of Lebanon was not in agreement, and in the document whic!l I mentoned now he touk great [Jdins lo argue with these conclusions, To my mind, these arguments were unsuccess:uL ti1. M.. AZKOUL (Lebanon) (trans/cried Irnm Fren~!l): I am sorry to llUve to speak again but certai:l questions have been a!>ked and I mllst amwer them, 62. The Soviet Union reprcsentative has given me a further opportunity of proving our thesis. We criti- cized thc nr~t and ::Iecond conclu13ions - which we call",d th~ positive conclusions - of the Observation Grollp in its first report [,\'14fJJO ami Corl'.1J. We criticimd tllO~C conclusions as inconclusive or, at least, pre:nat.Jlrr.. 53. What does the liest conclusion say? "It has not been possible to establish from where tbese arms Ina:nely, the <trms seen by the Observation Group) were a.cquired." III the document quoted by the Soviet Union representative (8/4043), we have shown tha.t no positiv'..l conclusion as to the origin of the arms can be drawn irom a distant view of the arms carried by the rebels, withont any investigation ~nd without handling the t'iflcs, sf'.dug their nakc, etc, It is there- fore possible, i:l a sense, to accept the statement that, for the observers, with their limited facilities and lnck of access to rebel-heLd territory, it was not possible to establish from where these arms were acquired, G4. This remark applies also to the second conclusion, which states: "Nor was it possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infJItrnted from ou.t- ",ide." You have only to fead the document submitted 59. Je cit(\ le document prescntc par M, Azkoul. U s'agit du document S/4043, Cll date du 8 juillcl. M, Azkolll y produit, dUllS la section I du document, trois conclusions du Gl'Oupe rl'obscrvation. 11 le~ qualifie lui-memc l1e it prilleipale.'l". .le vnis en Ilonner lecture en anglais ; ~ 1. 11 n'a pas 6tc possible d'ctahlir la proVCIHlIlC(~ de ces ::mnes [c'est-a-dirc de:> armes qu'a vucs 1(' Groupe d'observation] I:; [2. Illl'a pas non plus et~ possible de detcnniner si certains des homme~ armes s'etaient illfiltres dt' l'cxterieur ); On dit «ccrl'.llins" dcs homrne£; il ll'~t pas qHe.'ltiOll d'illfHtration ~ mas~ive ~ ~ il pcut mcrl1e s'agir d'ull seul hommc. Dernicl'e conclusion, hcaucotlp vIm importante pO'Jr moi, et, je pell5c, pOllf tout le mUildc: «3. Toutefoi:o;, il o'csL gllcre douteux que, pour la grande majorit(\, i1 s'ugbsait tIe Lihanais. " 60. Le representant du Liban n'a pas acccpte ccs tro:s conclusions, et il a rait tOllS !>es eflcrl" pOllr ks contester dnm le docllnJBnt qlli'. j'ai mentiortno. A mon nvis, it n'y est pas arrive. 61. M, AZKOUL (Liban) : Je m'excuse de devoif rcprendre la parole. Mais. etant donne fJue certaines questions ant ete p':Jsecs, jc suis dans l'obligatirm d'y repondrc, 62. LCl representant de I'Union sovietique me uonllc une nouvelle occasion de prollver notre these. Nons avons critique la pn~micrc et la dcu::dcrno cou~lusion - que oous ayons appetecs des conclusions ro~itives - que le Groupe d'observation a tirces clans son premier rapport [S/4040 el Corr. I]. Nous les avons critiquces en tant que jllgement!> non COncllLfl.nts, OU, du mains, pr6matures. 63, Que dit la premiere conclusion? « 11 n'a pus eM possihle d'etablir la. provenance de ces armes [~·cst~a· dire des armcs qu'a vues le Groupe d'observlltion].)) D:m~ 11'- docmnent qu'a dl~ le representant de I'Unioll sovietique IS/4M3]. nOllS avon.~ demontrc que cctic vision de loin d'arrnes portecs pa.r des rebelles, sans in\'"Cstigation, sans prendre. le iusil en main et en etudier la marque, etc... , ne pr-ut pas permdtre tl'affinner ou de ne pal; ilffirm~r !'origine de ecs armcs, Pal' con- sequent, dalls Ull S2ns, on peut accepter cettc phrase selon laquelle, pour les (}hservR~etlr.'j, avc.c leurs moyens limites et l'impossibilire pour eu,,- d'entrer en territoirc. rchclle, il n'a pas th~ possible d'etahlir la provenance de ces armes. 64, Cala s'appliql1c egalement a la deuxieme coneIu· sion, selon laquelle uit n'll pas nOn pillS ete possible de dcteITIlinN si certaim des hommes urmes s'etaient infiltrea de l'exterieur~. 11 sufi'tt de lire le document 65. I accept, on tlle other hand, the third conclusion, lo which the Soviet Union representative attached the greatest importance; it confirms what we have always claimed. According to that conclusion: .. There is little doubt, however, that the bast majority was in any case cor.lposed of Lebanese." The" vast majo- rity" refers to those rebels seen by the observers, b<lcausc this sentence is the closing s<lntence in the paragraph in which the observers speak of the men actually observed. We accept this bt.crpretation because it establishes, in the first place that, while the vasL majority were Lebanese, there was a minority which was not Lebanese. This is. therefore, a definite conclu'sion on the part of the Observation Gronp. Secondly, we must note that the rebels seen by the observers were, as I have already said, those rebels whom they saw because they accompanied the observers to a particular area, chiefly in order to ree the rebel leaders. Those rebels were no doubt especially chosen i.n order to give the observers tile impression that the rebel forces were Lebanese. Any Syrians, Egyptians or Palestinians would certainly not have shown them~ .'leh'es to the observers, since the observers' task was precisely to note the presence of foreign elements. 66. Accordingly, this third conclusion confirms ratller than contradicts the Lebanese thesis that the mass of tl;e rebelS includes a very large number of foreigners. We have nenr said that the majority of tile rebels were foreigners, We have even suggested that the percentage of foreigners was 20 to 30 per cent and we added that the majority were Lebanese. Here again, therefore, the conclusion is exactly in line with what we have said. 67. The S£CRETARY-GENERAL: I have now been able to check the quotations to which reference has been made in the course of the debate. and r think that a good way to end this Gebate may he to prt on record what was said by Presidcllt Plaza. 68. I wish, in the first inslance, to refer to note to correspondents No. 1831 of 20 Jllfle 1958. I read the following sentence: "The Ch~irmao of the Group recalled that its task ,was only to determine whelher there was any inflltration; if this eould be done it would be easier for the Lebanese themsdvl;:s to solve their internal trouble. " The other quotation is from Press Release LEB/15 of 7 July 1958: .. Mr. Plaza waS asked whether thc Lebanese Government had provided iliformation whi.ch the 65. M::lis la troisieme conclusion, a laquelle le r~Fe­ sentant de I'Union sovielique a attache la plus grande importance, je l'acceJlte; eUe confLrme ('-c que no LIS avans toujollrs pretendu. Ene declare: «Toutefois, il n'est guere douteux que, pour la grande majorite u - la grande majorite d~s rehe.l1es ViiS par lea obs~r­ vateurs. pl'lrce que cette pame e:'lt la fill d'un paragrat:hc dans Icquel on pade des hommes qu'on a vus - (il s'agissait de Libanais. ~ Nous acceptons cctte interpre- taU,m parce qu'elle prouve, en premier lieu, que, SI la grande mf!jorite ~Hait des Libanais. il y Iwait une minorite qui n'etuit pas des Libanais. VoiLa done Une constatation definitive de la part du Groupe d'obser~ vatbn. En second Lieu, il faut noter que les rebelles Vll~ parIes observateurs etaient, je le repete, les rebellrs qu'ils ont pu voir parce qu'ils les ont accompagnr.s dans une region determinee, smtout pour aBer voir leurs chefs. Ccs rebelles devaient etre choisis spcch. lement pour n'indiquer aux obser.ateurs que la qualite libanaise de ees rebelles. Des Syricns, ou des Egyptiens, ou des Pales~iniens, n'auraient sans doute pas pam uevRnt les observateurs pOll}' que ceux~ci les voient, puisque la Hche des observatl'urs est de constater I'existence rIe ces eJCments etrallgers. 86. Par consequent, cette Lroi~i~me conclusion con- firme. plutl'lt qu'elle ne ar:mr:nt, la these lib:m::lise sclon laquelle, panni la masse des rebelles, il y a un tres grand nombl'e d'etrangers. Nous n'avons jamais dit que :a lllujorhe des rebelles ctait des etrangers. No~s avom meme ir.dique une proportion de 25 a30 pour 100 d'etnngers et dil que la majorite e.tait oe~ Lihanaii. Par conseqnent, c'est exactement ce que nous disons aussi. 87. Le SECRETAIRE GENERAl.. (lraduii de l'ar:- glafs) : Je suis maintenant en n:esure de verifier lcs textes qlli ont 6t6 cites au cour/; tIn ddml, et je pense que le meilleur moyen de clare eette discussion serait de faire figurer dans le compte rendu stenographique Ies paroles memcs du president Plaza. 68. Je rappellerui tout d'abord la note No 1831, dll 26 juin 1958 (" Note to correspondents D). J'y li, la phrase suivanLe : 11 Le President du Groupe a rappeU: que la tflche du Groupe consistait uoiquement a determiner s'il y avait infiltration; s'il y parvenait. cela permettrait aux Libanuis eux-memes de reso:Hlre plus facnernell~ lems difficulte~ interieures. » 69. L'autre citation est tiree du communique de presse du 7 juillet 1958 (Press Release LEB/15) : "On (l, dem.mdc a ]1.'1. Plaza ~i le Gouvernemcn1 libanais avait fourni des renseigr,ements sur lesquel~ 70. It seems to me obvious that thL, last mentioned statement is not a statement on the question of sub- sbnce hut just a registration of the fact that there was not sufficient evidence for a positive judgement.

At the beginning of this afternoon's meetiltg, the President drew the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that they hud before them the draft reso!tttlOl1 suhmitted by the Soviet Union [3/4047]. In accor- dance with the rules of procedure, if !lO other member of th~ COllncil wishes 10 ~pe<lk or to submit another draft resolution, the Soviet Union draft resolution should now be put to the vole. However, in view of thf cum- plexi.ty and exbeme gravity (Jf the problem before the Security Counci:, I would suggest that thi3 discussion should be continued tomorrow morning. 72. If there is no objection, I shall consider that my suggestion is adopted. If WQS SI) decided. 73, Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I simply wish to say, Mr. President, that 1 am glad to accept your suggestion that we recess until tomorrow, particu- larly because. as I said in my staterr.ent this morning L827fJ! meeting). the United States intends to introduce a draft resolution of ih own on this subject for consider- ation at that time. '1'1u meeting rose at 4.55 p.m. 70. II mc semble eviilent que celle dcruierc decln- ration ne porte pas sur la question de fond; M. Plaza se contenle de eonslater qu'il n'y a pas eu de preuve,., suffisantes pour ~met1:rt'. un jugement positif. 71. Le PRESIDENT (traduil de Cespagnol) : All debut de' la seance, j'ai signale aI'attention de.'! rncmbres du Conseil qu'ils etaienl saisis d'un projcl de resoJu~ioll prcst'.nte par If] delegation de l'Ullion sovietique [5/4047]. Confol'luemcnt au r~glement interieur, je devrais·- ~i pef!;aJlJle d'autre ne prend la parole ou nC'. depose de p~ojcL de resolution - mctlrc aux voix le projet de resolution de l'URSS, Cependant, etant donne la complexite du problCmc donl le Conseil est saisi et son extr~me gravite, jc propose que le vote soil remis :l dernain matin. 72. S'il n'y a pClS d'objection, je cOllsidercrai Cl'.tJp proposition comme ailoptee. It en est ainsi dcicide. 73. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) [iraduit de taflytuisJ . Je Liens sirnplement n dire, monsieur le President, que j'aecueille avec plaisir wtre suggestion tendant a cc que nous ajournions nos travaux jusqu'a demain matin, et cc d' autant pins que, ainsi que je l'ai dit ce matin (827e .~eance], les Etats-Unis entendent deposer un projet lie resolution sur cette question pour qu'il soit examine a la seance de demain. La stance tst levee a 16 h. 55. "l.QI\l",,"!E~~IOUE Ago 0' M....g.,r" d. I. P,."o. lll.~. pg"·D"·P,I.". ~ 14-22, n• .I" P.,,1I, a,•••~••. W. H. S",lj~ &. Son, 11-7S, b"I....,d I(O~DUU.i L1b..,I" Po.a"'""<O"o. l.Godoolpa. HoNG KONG.HCtlG-I(O~<l Ih. S"lndon 10.' Co" ~s Na'ha" 1,0&, Kawloo,. ICElAND-15LA,folCt k~a....I"" 51,1,,", Ey,..~d,..,~~, H. f.. """on,,••11 11, I.)'lo.·,• .;~. INCI...·INC~ 0,1,,' Lo";m.'" , ..,,,liD. 10~oy,1II0' "",, N." O.IM " H,.d...bod. C.'v"j "0" ... S,.,'o••'Y C•.• ,,,.. 1).1h! " Colwrl., P. Varodoch..,,." Co.. Mod,... Ad.I~"•.M'" 8,",.11••, IOLl~IA.IOLIVIE Llb,.rr. 5.1.«",••,. (;0,111. 91'2, l' P". UAtlL.IRESIL LI..orl. Agl" R". M•.J,o ,..~, C.l.o Po,lol )291. R.. o. " ••1.., IUUIA,.BIRMANIE C"....,. 00,1. B"", Dopol, 1"000'. CEYLON,CEYU,H Lo~. Ho.'o I.al"hop. A"of. tool.","o.... 01 c.yl••, P.O. Box 2l4. Cola~bo. CHILl·CHILI Edlt"lol .1.1 '0<1fi,., ...~"...d. 51, S.n'l.go. llb,.rio I•••" ::..1110 ~OS. Sa.llog.· CUlN...·CHI"'! Th. World !o,,~ Co., .,.1.• 99 Ch",g I~OOHl'SI....' folElONESII r...bo,g"".n. ",,_. v"""" S~\'o,l U. Dj.k.,la. IRAN "Cl ,,... lB2 ~",d.",l",""JO, To~"'"' ~I.g lood. hi 5.<11.". ".lp.h, T.lw••. rh. C......"'I.. P,.". L'd. 211 Ho••• Ild., 50aogha1. COIOMIIA.CQl.OMBIE li"'''';o BII<~h.I•• Ba~OI~. lib..,io .....',1..., Mod.Wo. Ub,.,1a Nod.nol, Ltdo., ~o" •• ~"~la, COU'" RiCA. con...·!'u, I..~,.".. 1 11'0..,1. 1"\0', 4p<lrl"0, II Q·IUto: Mo<k.nzl.'. ~.oh'op, hOkd.d_ IRQ...NO_IRLA,NOI S"'lia••ry 0111«, ',b'I•. IIRAU "",,,,,.In·, Ig.k,'.,.., Ud., 35 Allorby ,.ad, T.I ....1>. 114lY·ITALIE. IIb..,lo Co",..I..I,"orl~ 5.n<onl. "10 a''' Coppo.1 26,11"0"'& .ungo,",,'" .."aid, do a,..do IS, R",.o, '31~. S<,A J~... CUBA, Lo C.... 1.lgo. O'R.illy _IS, l« I!ol>o.~. J.......N-J....ON .'I.,"'on Compony, L'd_. 6 1.t1·NI,~."'•. CUCHOSl.OV"'lI4.1CI\I'~lOV-.QUIE ~"'."•••m~Y lplto,...I.I, l'l~,.d,IT1lda 9. P,ah. 1- Who,,~",ol. To',o, JOID"'I'l·JOROANle DEI'lM"'R~·gAHF.MAR~ ta"P~ I. 1,,00., 5 C•., O"·vl.~",,b, e.. 66, ....mm••. KOU....COREE !oH•• ~...bj;.],lo. C... I'd" ~, ~."". Chn,....., 5.,,"1. 111...NON.lIMN ~]n~' lI\un"g~"d, lId., t<.'''0\l'0~' ~. K_b'A'"'''' K. DOMINiCAN UPUBLlC· REoUILIQlJl OOMINIC ,"'I llbro,'o Do..l"',o••, «.do. ~9. Cl,,· d~d r"llIla, ECUACOR·EOl/AnIJR L1b,.,I. Cl••UIl,,,, Gu.,.~vll &. Q.I",_ 11 JAIV",DOI44WACGI Mn.".1 N~•• , y <:1"., 1"• .....nld• ..., Jl, Son Sal,ado<. ETH'OPI...·ETIIICP1E 1""00110"01 1'to>o Atl.""I'. 0.0. ~. 120, AJdl. "'bo'•• FINl....NO·fINLANDI ........ ~I••n XI.j,kauppa. 2 K"k.,k.ID. ~h"Y"', C~II'g. &o.k C.op"o,I.., J2. ~•. '0. 811". B.I,"" ~llfll.l. J, Mo"'ol" KaMO'o, M.".lia. LIIXEMIOURG IIb..I';. J. ~,humm". \".m"'o,;. "IX\(O,~EX\QUE EO;'o,lol H.....,. ~...., I,.""" M~,IK,I ~" M'.I",. D.P. NllROCCQ."''''ROC ",,.ou d'OI"d•••, <I. pa"l,ip~llb" le.•"",I.II"" 8, "" MI,"oIX·lollol". R.b.l. I\.~w.k;, FU."'cE Edlll••, A. P,,""o. 13. "'. $ou'rt.l, r.,I, I~.). GUM.....y·..\U"'..<>NI R. 1"""h",ld', S,h""."'or.. ~tI."o 59, f,..k'u'I!M,lo. II".,! , M.u,"" 1I""f'hl,.". lOT 1o.u•.S<hQ••k.,,,,. ' AI....ndor ...,•• Spl,g.IIF"'" 9, Wl,,· bo'o" W. E. Saa'bo<h. Oo,,,.,o,n<l'a'" Jg. UI. (I). NfTI([RI~NOl.....VI_lA' ".\'_ 1oI.o<~,., W1il..>r, lo~~. y...h..\ 9, ·'·G'OY.o~ag •. i'llI'< 2EAUNo.N(]IJVmE.IEUlOOI 1I,j"d No'ln", A"adoll" 01 N.", 2.,. Iona. C,P.Q. 1£1',1, '0'1.111",,'0" NORWAY·NORVEOE J,hon G'vnd' ra,,", FarTo;. K,....,- ;"I,gl. rA, O,la. 0,0." ••0 ;nq""I., "0"' <0".,,1., wh.,. ,.1" ag'nl, loo,. ,~, ~.t b... ~ppolo,.d "oy b...., '" Sol., onO CI"ol.I;." S.dl.., Uollo<l t;g,tO", t;.", re,l, U.S.A.I " S~I" S.d;on, U.;'.'/ Nol1oo' om.., Pola~ rI., N.'''", G.'''', S",I!z.rl"Go. 'ERU.~EROU LI,..,;' 1""""".nol ~.l ,,,~. $.A. L1mo. PHILlPPINU AI.",o'" Boo~ SI.,e. 7~9 RI,._ A••• ~., M,.no, po_rUG...l Li".,I. Ro",I~"", Tld J"a """a, ~h. .•. $11jGA.~~ "SlNGJ.'QUR Ih. Clly ! ••k 5,.,., ~,d.• Call)lO' Q."y. IP"'I~H5.AOHE mwlo M"odl,P,.",", <':o,l.lla ]f. ""a. di,a_ L1'ro,l. 80..],. 11 I.n•• Unl.."ldGd. 8.....1.,.. SWIDiN.sUIO! C.!. f,I'••', K~l. 1la.""••••d.1 A·B. r"J,""'OO 1. ~,,,,l<h,rm, SWITZERLAHll.SUISSE L1b,.I,I. Po"",. S...... I.u,o..o, G••h., ~...,Io"n}".d', KI1<~~'" 17, l:UrI,h 1. 'fi"rL"'ND·lIi""L"'Nlll' p,o"uo" loll', Lr ••• SS C".j"~,,o' ~ood, Wo, To,. D,"gkol. TUIJ(ty.lU~::lllIE Lihtol'l. II"~'II" ~61 ilOIU,,1 Ca;d.,1, ~.,...Iu, ",,,b,,l. LIMON Of IOllrH AFRICA. VN10M WO·MRICAINI v.' S,holb ~""l<,'a" IPI,.), Lld., Ju 7", P,",odo_ u",'oN O~ IOI'IET SOCI",LISf RUllII.lCS.UHIO!'L IIU tErOIUQUit IllCtl\LIlTU SOVI!nOUU Mo,hd""o oy~ ~.yI,a. 5m.I•••~.ya Plo,~,~.d, M . UN,no "IU InUIUC· U,IJ,L1QU[ "'R"'U Utll~ L1b'old. "La R."~I"ao'. d'EaY~,"", 11 Sf!....dly '0"0, Col,•. 1JN\lI~ ~I/ojaaO"'.ROY"'UIoIE-~OjI ~ ",.S'olion.ry 0'11". '.0. hx 569, Lo.d••, S.[.1. LINing STAlE! O! AMERiCA· ........\l/oj'l D'A,MiRIO\l1 1".'.,lIo".T Oo<om.~~ S.",I.o, Colom- bia U.i.."I', P,.". 1960 8'ood"oy. " .... yo,k 'JP, N. V. URUa~4V •• ~ro,••'",r., d. ldl'.,'.I.', P,.'. w. o·EI'a. PI.,.. C.g,,",". lJ~2. I" pho, M.n1.,ld... VI/olE!IlELO Llb"". d.1 bt., "'V. IoII'o,da. H•. l1, td!. ~llp<I', C.ro,.., VllfI·NAM lib,.I,I•.~09.'"I. ~ud, Th., Il~. tu. 1••0', 8,P, 2!J, SolVbn_ YLI(lOlL...V1A_VOI,IGOSLAVIE Canlo,j."" Zol.;'ba.qobll.na, 51 10_ ",:_". ~"d•••<., J.Db,I n.l. Knllga, T"..I:. 27/11. a.o~,..d. ~.."i.I•• 5, r'D I""". , jodln,l.o, lOIl"h, (""121 I., ,goon••d.' .. d...."~., J. '••••'Dn....,," .",~"," d. pay. o~ 11 0'..1... P" _.",. O. ~'p.,II"i,.. p,,,...! .,.. nd,."h.l C I. ~.."•• lot "".,..., ,/. I• .1;01';'""0", O'g.n',,,Il,, do, N.,io" ~"i". N.~·Vo,k la.I,U"!••'......,- ';Qo,), <0 ~ ;a 5..fib" d., V"",, <:l'DG""o~," do< I'o,;an' (1nl.., P./ol. dOl No';a"" G..... (>,I".). 1200l)-.~OcLobl'r 19S9-1,67[)