S/PV.833 Security Council

Before making the st[ltement I had in mind when I asked for the floor. I SllOuld like to inform members briefly of the preliminary ob:servations I have just received from my Government on the second interim report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon [S/4062I, now before th.e Council. 2. First: ~he report does not make it clear whether permanent observation posts have been established on the frontier. Secondly: the fact that the ubservers have been able to reach the frontier does not mean that observation has become really effeeLive. Thirdly: the limited observation which the observers are at pre- sent capable of carrying out is, as in the past, confined to the daylight hours; all our official information, how- ever, slJows that the innItration of armcd men <lnd the supply of arms on a large scale take place during the night. Fourthly: in many cases the observers enter rebel territory jn company with the rebels, and at specified times, at which the rebels have nothing to hide from thcm. Fifthly: we have quite recent and very reliable information that the observers have been turned back ia the Baalbek area and have occasionally been fired at, 10 intimidate them, and that, in view of the dangtrs lo which they might be exposed, they avoid carrying out cbservation during the night bnt conduct their investigations in daytime only, when they can be sure that they are safe from any danger. Sixtltly: the Lebanese Governmen l has t1JiR morning published an important communique concerning recent instances of infiltration and the supply of arms to Lebanon, 3. These remarks are not intended as criticisms of the Observation Group, with which my Government is as always anxious to cc-operate to the full, and to which it wishes to give all the assistance necessary to enablc it to discharge its dIIties successfully. They Hre intended rather as a clariflcation to supplement the second interim report which the Observation Group yesterdny submitted to the Council. 4. I turn now to the statement of substance I wish to make this morning to the members of the Council. 5. During the last two days the Soviet Union repre~ sentative has spoken a great deal about tlle events now taking place ill Lebanon ami their possible inter- national repercussions. It seems to me that we ought to make a serious and objective examination of the real situation created by the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the domestic arTairs of Lebanon, so that we may see it as a whole. 6. The argument ptlt forward by the Soviet Union delegation. 50 far as I have been able to lmderstand it, can be summarized as follows: since there is no foreign intervention in lAlbanon, and the Lebanese crisis is 1. M. AZKOUL (Libon) : Avant de commencer la declaration pour laquelle j'avais demande la p"role, je voudrais exposer brievement aux membres du Conseil les observutions preliminaires que je viens de reeevoir de mOll gouvemement sur le deuxieme rapport il1t~~ rimaire du Groupe d'observation des Nations Unies all Liban ISj40J2J, dont le Conseil est saisi. 2. Premiere observation : le rapport n'indique p:\~ de fayon evidente que des postes d'observation fixe!; ont ete etablis sur la frontlere. Deuxieme observaLion: l'acces des observateurs a la frontiere ne signifie pas que I'observation est devenue rcellemclIt effICace, Troi- sieme observation: l'observntion Jimitce :i laquelle les observateurs sont a meme de se livrer actuellement continue d'avoir lieu pendant le jour, comme par le passe; or, tontes nos informationC'i oflicielles assureilt que I'infiltration d'hommes armes et l'envoi d'armes sur line grande echelle ant lien all cours de la mllt. Quatrieme observation: I'entrce des observateurs dans le territoire des rebelles a lieu souvent en compagnie des rrbelk.s ellx-memes et a des moments determines, alors que les rebelles n'ont rien a leur cacher. Cing\li~m~ observation : nous possedons des information.~ tOl1te.~ recentes et Lres stires selon lesquelles les observatcms ont ete repollsscs dans la region de Banlbek et ont de quelquefois l'objet de fusillades d'intimidation, et, premut tOl1jours en consideration les dangers auxquels Us peuvcnL s'exposer, evitent d'cffectuer l'observatioll pendant la nult et ne menent leur cnquete que pendant le jour, lorsqu'ils sOnt stirs d'etre a l'abri de tout danger. Sixieme observation le gouvernement libanais vient de publier ce matin meme un important communique au sujet des actes recents d'infiltration et d'envoi d'armes au Liban. 3. Ces remarqlles ne SOllt pas de:,; critiques adressees au Groupe d'observalion, avec lcquel mOll gouvernement est tuujours desireLlx de coopcrcr pleinemcnt et auqucl il veut fournir toute l'assistance necessail'e pour lui permeLtl'e de mener sa tache a bien. Mais elles COllS~ IHllent UJlC sorte de mise au point dcstince a completel' le dCl:xieme rapport interimaire, que le Groupe d'ohser- vation [\ soumis bier nu Conseil. 4. .Te passe maintenant ala declaration de fond que je voulais faire ce matin devant les membres du COl1seil. 5. Au cours dcs deux derniers jours, le represeutant de l'Ullion sovietiqne a beaucoup pal'lc des ev~nements qui se deroule-nt actuellcment au Liban et des repu_ cussions intern<ltionnles qu'ils pourraient avoir. lime semble qu'il convient de nOlls livrer a un examen serieux et objectif qui nOllS permctte de voir dans son ensemble la veritable sitllalion crece par l'intervenlion de la Republique mabe unie dans les affaires interieures du Liban, 6. La these avancee par la delegation sovietique, telIe que je l'ai pu comprendre, peut se resumer comme suit: du fait qu'il n'y a pas d'intervention exterieure all Liban et que la crise libanaise est pllrement interieure. 7. I have 110 intention of dealing with that part of the argument which concerns ~he United States. The United Stat~.s representative can do so if he wishes and, iJldee~, has already done so witIl success, But since the entire Soviet argumcnt is based on a denial of the Lebanese complaint tlwL there has beel! and :still is massive int~.rVfm:jon i:l Lebanon's intel'nal alTairs 1.Jy \".he enited Arab Hepllblk, it is important that my delegation should deal with this fumlnmenbl aspecL of tile SOVL~,t thesis, 8. Jr. order to judge correctly Uw valnc ane:. validity of Lhis tbesis, we musL seck an al\~l\"cr LO lile following [our basic questions: 0) Ig thl' prescnt Lcbamse GovcrnuellL the legili- nwtc GovernmclIt of the country which alone is olli- dally responsiblc for protecting Le!J,\llon's independcnce ngllillst any onts'de interwdion? (2) If such intervention is in fact taking place, has this legitimate Government the right to ask lite United Nations for help in odel' to avert the dangel" threat- ening Lebanon's independence'l (J) Has lllis legitimate Govcrnment Hie right, if th~ threat to the coulltry's independence becomes imme- diate, and if it is not possible to wait for the United Nations to reach a decision and to recruit and organize the assistanCe asked for, to <leek assistance from frie~clly countries in conformity with ~he United Nations r.h,utcr'l (4) Finally, has there 01' has there 1Iot been intcr- venti')n by the United Arab Republic ill th~ intErnal alIain o[ Lcb:mon'l f1, I believe that no one either here or elsewhere '",ould hesitate to answer thE first two questiolls in the amI' mative; the Lebanese Government is the legitimate l"owrnmenL of the country ._- even tbe rebels whq are opposing it have never disputed this ~ and it has the right and even the duty to seek assistance :rom the United Nations if Lebanon's imlepfllQel1te b really Llm:ntened by foreign intcrvention, 10. As to the third question, concerning the right to aIJpeal to friendly countries, there :Il\ve been somc here WI10 hnve seemed to question tllis right, On the ground that il can only be invoked Lnder Article 51 o[ the Urjtcd Nations Charter if there has been a direct armed attack. In reply I would call t.'lck atten- tion to the fact that Article 51 Jf the Charter speaks not of direct armed attack but of arned attack pure nnd simple. Article 51 is thus intended Lt:! cover all ca~es o[ attack, whether direct or indirect,provided it is flr~m:rl nttack In any case, what dJIercnce is there [ram the point of view of their efIeds between direct and indirect attflck if both are armed and boLlt are directed towards the destruction of a eoun:ry's inde- pendence and could, in inct, threaten it~} Wllaf real difference is there bfll,wl'.l'.ll armed soldiers in uniform making a frontal attack on a certain part of a certain 7. 11 n'est pas duns man intention de traiter de ce qui, dans celle the,e, COllcenle les Etats-Unis. Le rcprC<lentllllt des C;l<lb~Ulll'<; peut le faire s'il le desire, et l'u dejil (nit uvee meces, ;VI.'l.is comme tattle la these sovietique est bnsee, sur la negation cb la plainte liba- nnise selon l<H[uelle il y a eu, et il y a encore, intervention massive dans les affaires intcrieurcs du Lillun de la part de In RepubJiqu~ urabe unje, il L1evicnt i11lportllllt ponr ma diHcgatioll de truiter de ecl aSi)ect fondamcIllal de la these sovietiquc, 8. Pour juger corredelllent (le la va/et(r et de ta validit6 de ceLle these, it fundI'ail se poser les qlwtre questions fondamentales suivantcs : 1) Le gonvernemellt libanais aetue[ est-il le gOll- vernement lcgitime du pays qui, senl, a la responsabilite olIiciellc dl' prol:i~gP.l' l'independnnce dLl Lib,m de tontc inlerventiou exterieure? 2) Si ee-tie intervention existe l'eellemCllt, ce gOll- vel'ncmeJJL legitime a-t~il le droit de demander a l'Organisation des Natiol\s Unies son assistance en vue cl'ecal'ter le (hugcr qui mCllnCC l'independance du Libun? 3) Ce gouvcrnement legHimc a-t-il le drOit, si la menace a l'independancc du pays devient jmminellh et s'iI n'est pas possible d'attendre que l'Organisatiorl decide, recrute et orJ;allise ['assistance adequate voulu.e, de dcmar.c]cl' ccttc ussistnnee a des pays a:nis, eonror- l11crncnt :1 1,'1 Cllurt<o de:; i\atiol1:i Ullk!;? /1) Enfln, y a-I:"il n:rIIeIIlent. Dui Oll non, one intervention de la part de la Rcpubliqlle arabe unie dans Ies aJIaircs illtericlll'('.S <iu Liball'? 9. Je crois qll'il n'est Fcrsonl1c, iei Oll aille1lrs, qui IH~sitc it rp,poIJ(lrc pm l'ailirmative aux dellx premieres questions, it savoir que le gOl1vernement libauais est le gOLfvel'llcment legitime dlt pay:; - d'ailleurs, meme les l'ebeUcs qLfi luttellt c:ontre lui 1iC'. l'ont jamai;;. conteste - et qu'i! a le (lroit ~t me-me le devoir de- dcmundcl' ussistance a I'Org!1l1isntion des Nations Unies si 1'inMpendaace dll Liban est vraiment menacee par line intervention etrangere. 10, Quant a la troisieme question, relative au droit de recourir a des pays amis. certains ici ant semble mettre cc droit etl doule, :;ons pn!Jexte qu'il ne peut eLre invoque, .selon I'Article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unics, que dans le eas cl'une agression 3nnee directc. Pour leur rcpondre, je vOlldrais attirer leur attention sur le fait que I'Artiele 51 dc la ChartR. ne parle point de l'agression arn:ee dll'ccte, mais simplement de l'agression Hrmee lout court. eet article a done voulu embra<lser tous les cas d'agression directe ou indirecte, pourvll qll'clJe soit une ilgression armee. D'aiJIeurs, quelIe diiIerenee y a-i-il, par rapport a leurs, prre.t~, entre l'agression directc et 1'agression indirecte si toutes les deux sont nrmecs et si toutes le~ deux visent a dctrlli:e l'independancc du pays et peuvent, en fait, mcnacer cette independanee? QueUe difference reelle y a-t-il entre des solclat.::> <ll"mes et t)l uniformc nttnqu.ant. 1L It only remains for me to i;onsider the f91.\rlh question, which is the crucial onl'.: has UlCl'e or has there nut been o'.ltside intervention in Lebanon, includ- ing the inliltralioll of armed m~1l and the supply of arms and equipment? To this question the Snviet Union representative replies in the l~egative; he main- tains that the illtervention we are talIdng about is not Laking l)lace. This denial can only be ex:plained in one of two wavs. The first is that the Soviet Union representative knows that the in~erventioll is going on but wishes it to continue and would like to prever.t till)' 'lgsislance being provided which would bring it; to an cnd. Should that be lhe case 1 am sure that no other member of tile Council would want to follow him in that course. There is, however, another possibility. It is lllut the Soviet Union rcprcs~ntative :mows, by Home special and perhap.~ magical :11eanS, Lllot aU the [uels we have related to the Council and aL those we have rliscovered subsequently, as ,veil as all the facts l~onected independently by other States and reported by Lhe wurld JJI'ess, whidl prove the fact of tllis illLerVel1- !,iou, are completely false and unfounded. If that is lhe c~sc, wc should be very grateful to him if he would ~hare his omniscience with us so that we may be able to accept his argument. 12. Defcre J can decide which of tLese two hypotheses is the ecrreet one I must pause a mom(',nt to recall that the Lebanese delegation, in submitting its com- plaint to the Council [823rd meelinal. set. forth ::l. great number of facts which had, with others, served to convince the Lebanese nuthoritiel> of the existence of massive intervention in Lebanon's domestic affairs. These were not all the fach known to us b:lt simply examples and illustrations of tbe varions forms whiell this massive intervention was taking. But it was these lads, plneed before the Council, as well as the facts known directly to certain Governments, which con- vinced the Security Council of the gravity of the situa- tion in Lebanon and persuaded it, on 11 Junc 1958, to send an Observation Group with the task of pre- venting any illegal infiltration of personnel or supply (]f arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders. 13. Since that date the volume of evidence of infil- tration and foreign intervention has greatly increased. My delegation has not yet had an opportunity of sub- mitting examples of these further facts to the Council, but the Lebanese Government has given m03t of them to the Un:ted Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. I~ may be usked here - and, it wonld scem, with reason - why, if the Observation Group was cognizant of these facts, and if they were valid, it did not mention them in its fIrst report to the Counr.il as proof of infll- tration. 11. 11 me reste maintenant a examiner la qllatrieme question, qui est en l'oCCllrrence la quel>!;iol) fom\~\­ mentale, a savoiI' : y a-t-i!, oui ou non, au Liban, unc intervention exh\rieurc comprcnant l'inn.ltratioll d'hommes arm6s et l'cnvoi d'urme3 et de lllllLeriel? A cette question. le represenbnt de l'Union sovicti.q\\e repond par la negative; il affirme que l'inlervention dont nous parlons n'cxiste pas. Cettc nmrmation ne pc-ut s'expliqller que par l'une des deux hypotMse!l suivant.f'..~. La prf'mi(\re hypothesc est qu'il 3l:lit qu'B y a intervention, mais il aurait interet a ce que cette intervention continue et desirerait cmpecher toutc a5si~tanee desLinee il la faire cesser. Duns ce ca", je suis .'iur qu'aucun antre membre dll Conseil nc v(mdrait, le suivre dans eette direction. .M~is il y R line llutrll llypothese. r.'est que le representant de l'Union sovic- tiqnc sail, par des rnuyens particuliers, et peut-etre magiqucs, que tOilS les faits que HallS avans exposes au Conseil et taus ceux que nous possedons depuis, ainsi que Lous les faits rccudllis ind6pendamment par d'autres Etats et tOllS les faits que [<1 presse mondialc a rap?orlcs, et qui prouvent l'existellfCC de cette kwr- vention, sont eornpletement faux et sans fondement. Si te! cst le cas, nous lui sedons reconnai3sants debien vouloir flOUS communiqueI' cettc omniscience afin dll nons permettre de nous rallicr a sa tiles\;;. 12. Avant de pouvoir decider laqLlelle de ces deux. hypotheses devrait etre retenue, il me faudrait m'aIT~ter un mament pour rappcler que la delegation liballatse a expose id, dcvnnt le Conscil, 101'5 de la pn~selltatioll de notre plainte [823° seance], un grand nombre de faits qui avaient, entre autres, convaincu les autorit6s libanaises de l'existence rl'UlHl intervention massive dans les affaires interieures du Li!Jan. ees faits n'etaien~ pAS 1mls les faits eonnus par nOllS, mnis simplcrnent des exemples et des nb~trationS des diverscs formes suus Irsquelles cette inlervention massive s'etait mani- festee. Mais ce sont ces faits presentes au Conseil, ainsi que les faits connus directement par certains gouvcrnements, qui ont eonvaincu 1('. Conseil de securile de la gravite de In situntion 3U Liban et qui I'ont M;er- mine,;o 11 juin H.l58, a envoyer le Groupe d'observation, avee la mission de fnire en sorte qu'il n'y ait pas d'ir.fil- tratiol~ illegale de per,<;o:mel ni d'envoi ille.gal d'armes ou d'autre maleriel a travel's la [rolltiere libanaise. 13. Depuis eette date, le nornbre de ees faits prouvant l'infiltration et I'intervention etrangere a augmente eonsid~ablem('nL. Ma delegation n'a pas eu encore l'occasion de presenter des exemples de ces nouveallx faits au CUIIseil, mais le Gouvernement Jibanais en a soumis la plupart au Grcupe d'observation des Nations Unies au Liban. On peut se demander ici, apparemment avec raison, pourquoi, si le Groupe d'observation a eu connaissance de ees faits et si ees faits etaient valab:es, il ne \cs a pas soumis dans SOil premier rapport au I ConseiJ comrM ~reuve d'lnfiltration. (1) The natun' of Ihe Ohservation Gl'illlP'S fUllcLion, as understood by the Group itscIr. namely, that it wn only report lo the CoulIcil cases or illlilLrution it Itn:; itsel[ nellll\lly observed. (2) The lluLmc of the Lebanese Goverlllllent's fl!ports to the Observation Group --- ill other words, the fHct that for the 1110st parl these reports relate incideuLs observed by agents or Llw Lcl:l:J.llese allthorities and rc,lCh lIle Observation Group only after the iucidents lmve lalwn place and call 110 longer be witnessed pcr- ~onally by the Observers. For instullcc: u report reaches the higher [Jllthorilie~ at Beirut from one of tllr agents of the army or of the Lebanese intelligence S(,Tvice that a convoy of mules with arms and ammuni- tion has crossed the Lebanese frontier at such and such a place on such and such a date. Wlwn this report which, for the Lebanese authorities, is illdisputuble proof o[ infiltration or of the persistence of infIltration, reaches Llll' Observcrs, it hecolllcs vflllleless because they have noL been able themselves to observe directly Lhe facts reported. They cannot, lllcref(Jre, take account of them. (3) The nutme of the Ohservation GrouP'1j fundioll as understood by tIte Security Council ill adopting its resolution of 11 June last, the fact, that is to say, that the Council scnt to Lebanon, not an investigatioll group with the principal or even sole task of reporting to the Council on the results of its investigations, but an Obser- vation Group ,,,,hose mission was to ensure that there was no infiltration or supply of arms to Lebanlln. This means that the Group's duty is not to tell the Council whether infiltration into Lehanoll is ()J' is not taking place but to put n stop lo such infiltration and to report on the results of its action. {n other words, what wc should expect from lhc Observation Group is not a report indicating whet.her or not infiHratioll has taken place 01' listing instances uf infiltration, bnt a repott stating simply whether or not it has been able to eflrry out the task of observation assigned to it, and whetller, in consequence, infiltration 11I.ls stopped or is still going on - for, at least according to the interpretation given to the Council's resolution, it was expected that observation alone would enable the Group to put a stOll to the infiltration of alllled men and the supply of arms to Lebanon. However, the Group stated in its first report that it had not yel been able to carry out its task of observation and, accordingly, thal it was not able to judge wln'.ther or not it would be able to stop the inllltration. 15, It i~ this conclusion in tlte Observation Group's report which should hold our attention :l.lld arouse 1) La nature de l'observation, tellc qu'cllc esL comprise par le GrOllpe c1'observation, c'esl:-a-dire le fait qu'i! ne peut rapporter au Conseil que les incidents d'infiltration qu'il aurait observes lui-meme et direc- tcment. 2) La nnture des rapports que le GouverncmenL libanais soumet nll Groupe d'observalion, e'cst-a-din~ le fait que ces rapports contiennent, pour la plupart, des faits qui ant ete (lbserves par lcs agents de l'autoritlS libanai:;e et qui ne parviennent SOlIvent all Groupe d'observation que IOl'SqllC ccs faits ont deja en lieu et ont cesse d'/!tre un objeL direct d'observation pour les obscrvateul'S, Exemple un rapport parvient aux nutOl'ites superieures, n Deyrollth, de l'un des agents de l'al'rnee OLl dll service de renseigl~ements Hbanuis. sur l'observation <I'Ull convoi de mules charge de munitions et rl'armement, qui aurait traverse la fronticrc Jibanaise t'l tel endroit et a lcllc date, Lorsquc cc mpp0l'l, qui constltlle pour Ics autorites libanaises une preuve indisclltable de l'infiltration OLl de la persistunce de I'infill:ration, parvicnt tlllX ol.Jservateurs, il devient negligcable parce qu'ils n'ont pas pll observer dircc- tement et par eux-memes les faits qui y sontlllentionncs, Ils ne peuvent donc pas en tenir compte. 3) La nature de l'observation te1lc qlle l'a comprise le COllseil de seeurite lorsqu'il a adoptc sa resolution du 11 juin derniel', e'est~a-clirr. le fait que le Conscil a ellvoye atl Liban, non pas un gl'Oupe d'inve.stigation dont la t£lcllC principale et meme unique semit de fail'e rapport all Conseil sur les resnltats de ses investi- gations, mais un grtlllpe <I'observation clont In missioll est de fain'. en sorte qu'illl'y ait ni inliltration ni envoi d'armes all Libull. Celn sigllilie que le devoir dll Groupe n'est pas de dire au Consdl s'il y a ou s'il n')' a pas d'inllltration au LibarL, mais cle fairc cesser' cettc innltration et de faire rapport sur les re.mltats de cettc 8ction, En d'antrcs tcrmes, ee qu'on devrait attendrr: du Groupe d'observatioll, ee ne sont pas des rapports incHquant s'il y a ou s'il n'y D pas d'infiltration nu enumerRnt les dHIcrents ineidellls d'infiltration, mais simpJemcnt s'il a pu ou non exereer la fonction d'obser- vation qui llli a etlS assigllee et si, en consequence, l'infiltl"ation a cesse ou si ellc continue, car, clu moins selon l'interpretation qui a cte donnce a la resolution du ConseU, e'est par l'observation seulement qu'on esperait que le Groupe devrait ponvoir faire cesser J'infiltration d'hommes urmes et l'em'oL d'armes all Liban, Or, le Grot:pe declare, dans son premier rap]JOrt, qu'il n'a pas encore ete en mesure d'observer et que, par consequent, il ne pouvait juger s'il avait ou non la possibilitc £le faire cesser l'inm~raLion, 15', C'est eette conclusion du rapport du Groupc d'observation qlli doil retenir notre nllentioll et 17. If, despite the considerflble and impressive array of facts we have been able to marshal to prove that there is a massive inLervention in our afTnirs, the Soviet Union reprtstntative claims to know that this intervention is llOt taldllg place, this can only be explained by his possession of a unique and extra- ordinary omniscience. If that is so, he should be able to reply to the following questions, which those who, like myself, do not lOlOw everything, are unable to answer. The questions I am going to put to the Soviet Union representative are quile unconnected with the facts we lwve ci'ted or of whicl! we have knowledge, facts which we can, if necessary, place before the Council aL any time. 18, They are in the first place qutsuons raised by the reports and commllniques published by the United Nations Observation. Group in Lebanon and from which Mr. Sobolev draws the conclusion tllal the Lebanese aiTair is purely domestic. I hope that the representa- tive of the Soviet Union will be able to reply to these questions, and I shlllJ be very grateful to him for doing so. 19. First, what was the company of uniformed Syrian soldiers doing, on 25 June 1958, on both sides of the road leading from Deir el Aaeheyer - the headquarters oi onc of the rebel leaders - into Syria? That was a fact observed by the Obstrvation Group and men- tioned in its first report [8/4040 and Add.I, annc;r Dl. 20. Secondly, who were those responsible ior the con- siderable mortar IIring noted by the observers as coming from the vicinity of Halta, 2.4 km inside Lebanese territory near the Syrian border r8/4040 and Add.1, para. 22]? 21. Thirdly, even accepting the statement in tile report that there was little doubt that the vust majority of the armed men seen by the observers were Lebanese [ibid., para. 21], what was the nationality of the mino- rity of lhese armed men? 22. Fourthly, what explanation is there, if not thc 22. Quatriememcnt, comment expliqllcr, sinon pur la proximite de la frontierc syricnne de laquelle le.s rebelles peuvent facilement recevoir l'assistance voulue le fait trcs significatif que les rebelles n'OCCllpent, A part certaines petites exceptions. que les bandes iron~ talieres du Liban et les bandes frontalieres de la Syrie et dll Lib::m, et seulement cette parlie du pays? pro~imity of Syria, from whicl) tlle rebels can easily receive the requisite assistance, of the very indicative fact that, with certain minor exccptions, the rebels are occupying only the frontitr areas of Lebanor:. and the frontier regions between Syria and Lebanon, and no other part of the count!'y? 23. Fifthly, what reasons would the rebtls have for preventing the observers from penetrating into their 23. Cinqlliemement, queUes raisons auraient les rebtlle8 d'empecher les observateurs de penetrer dans lenr 17. Si le representant de l'Union .'lQvietiqut', malgrc le nombre consi(j(~rahle et imprcssionnanl de faits que nous connaissons el qui prollvent l'cxisl:ence d'une intervention massive dans nos ;jm~ires, affirme savoir que cettc intervention ll'exislt pa.~, cela ne pent s'expliquer que par le fait qu'il possede LIne omniscience extraordinaire tlUL lui cst particuliere. S'il en est ainsi, il devraH ponvoir repondre aux questions sLlivuntes, auxquelleil cellC'( qui, comme moi, ne snvcnt pas tout, sont incapaLlts de nlpondre. Ces questions. IjUC je vais poser au representant de l'Unloll sovictiqllc, sonl. complCtement independantes des faits que IlOllS avons soumis Oll que nous connaissons, faits qne nows ponnons, fJ touL moment, soumcttre au Conseil, le cns echeanL 18. Cl'. sont, d'abord, des questions quc posent Jes rapports et communiques publies par le Grollpe d'ob~cr­ vation eles Nntions Unies nu Liban et dont 11. Sal.lolcv tire In conclusion que l'afTaire libanaise est d'ordre purement Lnteriellr. J'espere que le representant de l'Union sovictique pourra repondre aces questiollll, Cl'. dont jc lui serais fort reconnaissant. ID. Premierement, que faisait, le 25 ]UIll 1958, la compagnie de soldats syriens en lllliforme, des deux cotes de la route qui, de D(;lr el AaeltJ.yer, siege dt~ l'uIl des chefs de L1 rebellion, menc en Syrie? Il s'agit la d'un fait observe par le Groupe d'ob"erv<ition et mentionnc dtlns SOll premier rapport lS/404{) cl Add. 1, 20. Deuxiemement, quels ctaient les rC'sponsables dc!> nombrellx tit's de morLicr que les observatcurs aflirmcllL (woir constntes comme provenant dll voisinuge de Haltll, a 2,4 km it I'interieur du tenitoire libanais. pres de la frontiere syrienne [S/4040 et Add. 1, par. 221',1 21. Troisiemement, etant donne que le rapport men~ tionne qll'il y a peu de doute que la grande majorit6 des homrnes <lImes vus par les observatcllrs ctait constituce par des Libanais [ibid., par. 21], quelle 6tait done la nationalite de la minorite de ees hommes armes? 24. My sixth and la3t question of this kind is drawn from the later interim report which the Observation Group submitted to the Council yesterday [5/40521- The Grollp describes its various needs in men, equip- ment, alrcraft and helicopters to enable it to perform the task assigned to it by tbe Council. This prompts the following question: if t]Je Observation Grouf was convinced thaL, as the Soviet Union representative claims, there is no infiltration taking place. Why would it ask for all tllese facilities which, as it says LtseIf. it needs in order effectively ~o carry out its observation nf the Lebanese frontier? 25. That is the fIrst series of questions, based solely on the information in the reports of the Observation Group. 26. I should now Jik~ t.o lmt three other QllestifHls prompted by sheer common sen,e. 27. In the 11rst placc, as is well known, the Lebanese Government has recently been compelled to seek further quantities of arms ~lnrl munitions from the United States of America in order to resist the armed attacks of the rebels. Could the representative of the Soviet Union tell us, since he claims to know that there is no illegal supply of arms to Lehanon. wllere the rebels have obtained the large quantities of arms and munitions which have enabled them to llOld their own against the regular forces of the Lebanl3se Govern~ ment for more than two months? This question is all the more perti:lCnt in that the arms possessed by the rebels include heavy nrms which o:tly Governments can supply and which the rebe},'" themselves have never claimed to have captured fron the Lebanese armed forces. Where do these heavy and light arms come from? 28. In the second place, as is also well knaW.l, the Lebanese Government has recently been compelled to ask for financial assistance from the United States in order to cover the rlericit in :its budget resulting from its efforts to combat the rebellion. Could the Soviet revescntative tell Its where the rebels have been able to obtuin the enormous - and apparently inexhaustible _ sums of money neces~ary to conduct a large-scale rebellion which has lasted for more than two lTIOTlth~ without any sign of financial strain? How is it that the Government, which has all the country's resources at Us disposal, ilnc1s itself in need of money to cover a detlcit caused by a rebellion, whereas the rebels, who are not imagined to have SUell a budget at Ultoir dis- posal, have succeeded in conducting this rebellion without, up to now, showing ~lllY signs of financial strain? . 29. In the third place - and it is my last question - how, if the Lebanese crisis is purely internal, are we to explain the following statement made recently by one of the leaders of the Leballese opposition, tIle former Prime Minister, Mr. Hossein Oueini, to Mr. Jahia 24.. Sixiememcnt - et ~'e5t la derniere question de ce genre, tift~e du rapport intCrimaire soumis hier au COJlseil p<lr le Groupe d'observation [Sj40S2} - le Gronpc de~rit ses divers besoins en hommes, en eq L.ipemcnt, en avions, en h6licoptCres, niln d'etr~ en mesure d'accomplir:8 t:\che que lui n .1ssignee le ConsetL On est donc conduit n poser la question suiyante : si le Groupe d'ohservabon etait convaincu, comme le representant de 1'Union sovictique le pretend, de la non-existence de I'inflltration, jlourqJoi demanderait-iJ toutes ces facilites, qni, seIon ses propres termei>, lui sor.t mkessaiJ'es pour m~ner it bien et etTcctivement I'observation de la [rontiere Jibanaise1 25. Telle est la premiere sene de questions, uni.q~emellt fondees sur les informations contenucs dans ks rapports du Groupe d'obserntion. 26. Je VOUd:alS rnailltcnant poser lrOls aulres ques- tions, inspirees du slTnple bon sens. 27. En premier lieu, il est h:n eonnu qL:e le GouveJ'- nement Jibanais a du, dernierement, demander de nouvelles quanlites d'armes et de munitions .<lUX Etats-UnLs d'Amerique pour pOUVOir resister :lUX attaques armees des rebelles. Le representant de l'Union sovietiqlle pourrait-il nollS dire, puisqu'i! affirme savoir qu'il n'ya pas d'envoi illegal d'arOles uu Liban, cl'au provit'nnent les grandes quantites d'a.rmes et de munitions gr:ic~ ill1xql.lelles les rebelles tienneni t.ete, dep:Iis plus de deux mois, aux forces regulieres du Gouvernement libanaLs? C~tte question se pose d'une fallon d'autant plus insistante que les armes pos~~dees par 1es rcbelles comprennent des armes lourdes que seuls des gouvel'llements penvent fournir et que les rebelles eux-:nemes n'or.t jama.i.'l pretcndn avoir capturees aux forces armee~ libanaises. D'oiI proviennent donc ees armes, lourdes et l~geres? 28. En dCLlxieme lieu, il es': bien connu cgalement que le Gouvernement :ibanais s'est \rU dans J'obli- gabon, rtcernmen1. de demander une a:de 1hwnciere aL:X Etnts-Unis d'Amerique pour eombler le delicit que la lutte contre la fljbellion u cause a son budget. Le representant sovictirjue pourrait-iI nous illdiquer d'OLI proviennent [es enormes sommes d'argcnt - appa- rernment incpuisables -~ necessaiIcs pour entretenir llne fp_bellion de grande envergure, qui dure depuis plus de deux mois. sans qu'il y ait pour autant de signes de difficultes financiere,? Comment le gou- vernement, qui dispOSE de ':outes les reSSOLrces du pays, en arrive-t-iJ a avoir besoin cl'argent pour cOllvrir le deficit cause par une r~bellion. :llors que les rcbelles. qui ne sont ICllS censes dispvser d'Lm budget tel que celui du gouvernement libanais, parvienaent a mener cette rebellion sans donner, jusqu'a present, de s:gnes de djfficultes fi:mncieres? 29. En troisieme lieu - et c'est ma derniere question-- comment eXpli([ller. dans l'Jtypothese que la crise libanaise cst exclusivement interif.ure, la declaration snivante, faite dernierernent par l'un des leaders de l'oppu~jLion libanaisc. \f. HOBs~in Ol1ehi, ex-premier 30. It' the Soviel Union representative cnnnot give liS a convincing reply to these questions he must, as we do, conclude that the rcal nnswer is thal there is n massive intervention in Lebanon. This being so, il is clear beyond any doubl that the Lebanese Govern- ment, the legitimate Government of the country, has every right, in order to defend ilself against a massive intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs, to ask the United Nations to come to ils assistance to safeguard iLs independence find, si.milarly, that it ha~ the right, while awaiting such assistance, to seek the desired help from friendly couutries. 31. III these circumstances the only thing nol j\lslified is tlle attempt o[ those who are trying to deprive Leba R nor. of its inhere.nt right of legitimate self-dcfente and of the assistance necessary to safeguard its tlIreatened indepeEdence. I should lil{~ to declare ~olemnly, at the close of this debate, that the entire historical respon- sibility for the consequences this assistance may have rests with those who, by their massive intervention in Lebanon, have made it necessary and with those who, by their obstructive methods, :l1'e trying to make it impossible.

I wish to inform the Council at a mes- sag<'. I received today from Cairo: .. On 18 July, at 1.30 a.m., Lhe United States Ambassodor in Cairo asked to see Mr, Ali Sobry, the Acting Minister of Foreign Afioirs, who received him ut 3 a.m. The Ambassador delivered a flote oerbale, the contents of which were as follows: " , The landing of United States forces is intended to preserve the independence of Lebanon and Lo protect American citizens.' .. He also expressed the United States Govern- ment's intention to wilhdraw its forces AS soon as circumstances permit: " 'The troops have no lwstile inlentions. It was necessary to come to the assistance of Lebanon becHt.lse of the change of government in Iraq. The United Amb Republic shoLlld realize that if United States forces arc atlackcd by milil:f1ry units of the United Arab Republic or by elemenLs Wllich tlle United Slates knows to he under control of the United Arab nepublic or ready to cnTry out ils instructions, there will be a danger that the prob- lem lllay be enlarged and assume major pro- portions.' " 33. This last part of the nole verbale is very serious. It refers to elements known to be! under our control or 30. Si le represcuLanL de I'URSS ne peu!; pas repolI~\'e a ecg questions d'unc fa~on convaincante, il devr:l condnre avec nous que seule l'existence d'une inter~ vcntion lIJ<lss[ve au Liban permet d'y repondre adcquo_ tement. Dan" c~.s conditions, il app<lra[tra clairement et suns UllCUlh~ equivoque que le Gouvernement du Liban, gouvernement legitime du pays, pour se detcndre conLre lInc intervention massive dans les aiJail'es intcl'ieures du Libnn, a pleillement le droit de demundel' 11. I'Organisatioll des Nations Units de venir a son aide pflur protcgcr l'independuncc du pays. cOlllrne 11 R pleincment It' droit, dans l'attente de cette aid~., de demander it des pays ami!; de lui fournir l'assistnnce vOlllllC. 31. DollS ccs conditions, nOlls pCllsons que senlc est injustifice la lenwtive de ceux qui cherchcnl a privCl' le Liban dc son droit inherent de legitime dMensc et a I'empecher de re~evoir l'assisLance requise paUl' s"uve- garder son independance mcnacce. .le tiens it le dcclal'er solenneJleme.nt, it la {in du debat : toure r{'sponsabilit~ historique decoulant de ccUe assisLfll1ce doil etrc portee et par ceux qui, par !ell!" intervention massive an LilJan, ront rendue nece~saireJ cl por c~ux qui, pur kurs moyclls d'ob$tructioll, chcl'chellt ilia rcndre impossihle. ::12. }I. l.OUTFI (Republique arnbc lI11ie) Je vais [aire parl a'.l COllseil (['ulIe communic"tioil qne j'ni re~ue <Ill Caire aujourd'hui : !< Le 18 juillet, a 1 h. 30 du mnLin, I'Ambassadeul· des Etats-Unis IIU eaire a deItlunde it voir M. Ali Sabry, ministre des affaires Ctrangcres par interim, qui l'a rc~n a. 3 heures du matin. I1 11Ii a communiqut Line note vel'balc dout le contenn est le suivant : If Le d6harquement de troupes des Etats-Unis 1l POlll" but de preserver l'indepenr:lallcc dll LibaJI et dc proteger les ressortissants amcricains.» a Il a fait part llltssi du desir du Gouvcrl1cment d!'.'; Etats-Ul1is de rctirer ses troupes des que les circonstances le permettront : ([ Les tronpes n'ont pas d'intentiolls hostiles. La necessilk de procurer l'assistnnce [Ill l.iban elil motivec pal' le changement de gO\lvcrnemcl1l en Iral<. La Republiqnc ara.be llllie doH cmnprenJre que si les forces des Etats-Uni~ sont atlaqm~e, pnr dcs forces de la RcipubliqUl' arabe unie Oll de, eh~ments que les Etuls-Ullis savcnt etre sous le contn)le dc lfl Hcpubliqllc arabe unie ou que les EtaL~-Ul1is savenL etre enclins a ex.ecllter ses directives, il y aura danger que le probleme DC' s'clargisse et nc prenne de gnmdes P~,?poltion~ 33. Cette derniCre parlie de la nole verbale est tres grave. RUe parle d'cilements qui seraient sous nolre ~H, As I IUlve 011 several uccasions explained to the Council, thi" nutc gives us some idea of the real irrtetl- Uo;"!:; of the United Stntef; Gownuncnt ill regnrd to its general policy in the Middle East, of which J spoke at length yesterdny [831sf meelinrrJ. TrlC position taken by the 'Jnited States, wiLh the backing 01 the United Kingdom, is fraught with Illlllg~ro\lS conscql1entes. It is a sinister augury of tlle dangers to reacr. in this area. ,''It}. In tile rncanliull", according to pre5s report:! froUl Boghdad, the situation in Iraq is completely st3bilized. In The New York Times o~ todny, for cXJmple, there arc the following headlines: .. CapiLal of Iraq back to normal. Rebel regime is seen in fnll control. Banl(s and shops resume business." 1 need not quote any furUter. The arlicle contains a full explanation. However. a radio brondcast lIlis morning reported tIlat the King of Jordan is ~till talking about liiJerating lraq. I need not point out that this attitude i~ a very dan- gerous one and jeopardize: pe!l,~e ill the ~ljddle East, particularly in view or the fact that, as I said yesterday, the Arab Union has ceased 1..0 exis~. When I drew at~elltion to that fnd yesterday, I referred to a state- ment of the present Government of Iraq wltieh, as you sec, is in control of the counlry and IHls flIready been recognized by a number of StaLes. 36, Le representant UU LibUl! <l f<lit etat, flujourd'hui, d'informaliolls que nOlls ne possedons pD.:;. Ou bien il a pose des qnestions f111xque:Jes il " deja etc repOndll, n n tire des conclusions qui, vraiment, n'avlliellt pa~ de premisses qui IT.e perml,~lent de repondre. 3£:. The representative of Lebanon spoke today of information which we do not have, and put questions which :le has already a.nswered, He drew eor.dusions w:lich were not baHctl on rtny premisp.s whir.h would enahle me to l'l~?ly. 37, Wc at'e a small i>talc, we do not have an atomic bomb, flnd nohorly h3S proved that we IIRve any aggressive designs. fhe world bears wltness to our peaceful intentions. Our policy is one of non~alignment. Tt may not plca:-;e cv('.xyone, but we will continue to pursue it in co-operation with the Cniterl NAtions and in accorchlnee with the United Nations Charter, by whtch wc abide. We have proved on sevClral occasions tb.at we are always prepared to co-operate with the United Nations ill settliug il!ternatbual problems and preserving: world peace. 37. NOlls sommes un pctil: Etat, [pi n'f) l}«s de bombc atomique et coni;re lequeJ L n'a He etabli Ullcunc intentioll agressive. NOIlS prenons le monde. a tcmoin de DOS intentjelns pacUiques. Nous aVOllS Hne poliliqUl~ de ~ non-ulignement.» Elle peut ne pas plaire fl tout le monde. Mais nOllS continHerom a poursuivre crtic politique, en cooperatlOll flvec I'Organi;;ation des Nations Unies et conformement a la Charte des Nations Unics, que nons respector.s, Nous flVDl1S a plLlsieurs reprise:> pro live que nous cHons toujo,lrs prets it cooperer avec l'Organisation pour resoudre les problemes illleI'lta- tionnux et preserver la paix mondiale. 38. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amerique) /lraduil de l'anglais] : A la se:mce que le Gonscil a t!'.llue !licr suil" [832e seance], le representant de l'rrak a pose une question touchant le retrait d~s troupes des Etats-Unis dn Liban, au cas oft le Gotlvernement ]ibanais sOllhaj-

At the Council meeting held last night fS32nd meellny], the represeJltative of Iraq raised a que~tion concerning the withdrawal of United States forces fron:. Lebanon, in the event that this was desired by the Government of 34. Comme je l'ai expliquc au Conseil dija :) p]usi~lI!':; "epl'i"es, cette note nous donne une idee des intentions vl\ritahles du (;onvernr,lnent des Etats-Unb; en cc qui coneerne sa politique dans]e ,Moyen-Orienl en gCIH~ral, sur laquel1e je Ine suis ctendu hier [831e seancel. Le danger de ce'tte position des Etats-Unis, nppuyes par le BoymHlH.'..Uni, est tOllrd de. eOllseqlt~nces. Tl eonstituc un sillistre presage des dangers que court la paix dans cette partic du mondt'.. 3.5. Cependant, la situation en Iruk, confonnemel1t aux informations de presse emanant de BLlgdad, s'es~ compJetcl1lent ~tabilisee. On lit par exemple, dans lc New York Times d'alljoltrd'hui: j, La capitale de ]'Irak est revenue a la vie normale. Le regime l'ebelle [larait twoir la ~ituation plcinement en main. Lee; banques et magas:ns rcpl'ennent Ienr activite )). Je n'ai pas besoin de dOllner une plus longue citation. L'articlc contient toutes \cs I.\xplieations vouLtes. Pourtant, rlans les emissions de la radio, cc »latin, il a ete rapporte que le roi de Jordanie parle loujours d~ la liberation de I'Iral.. n esL superflu de sot:ligner que ceUe position est tres dangereuse, qU'eUe r;orte attcintc d la pnix au Moyen~Orient, d'autant plus que, comme je 1'8i deja dit, J'Ullion urabe a cesse d'exister. En rapportn.nt ee filit, IJier, j'ai n:entionne \llle declaratiOTi du gon- vernemenl: nctue! de l'Irak, qui, comme VOll!; ll: vuycz, dirige le ?ays et a :lej:i e'te m'onn:J par de nombreux Etats, requ~t of the lawfully constituted Government of Lebanon would not remain if their withdrawal were requested by that Government.

In his statement yesterday, Mr. Abbas, who is occupying the place of the Iraqi representative in the Council - and I should say from the outset that he is occupying this place ille- gally, because the Iraqi Government has already re- called him and appointed another representative instead of him - said the following; "Both the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic have made the con- tention that the Arab Union no longer exhts [...] I maintain that no change has taken place and that the Arab Union as a constitutional entity still exists." 1 [832nd meeting, para. 21.1 '10. Thus, Mr. Abbas tells us, allegedly on behalf of Iraq, that no change has taken place and that the fed- eration of Iraq and Jordan still exists. But what is the real state of aITairs? 41. The Government of Iraq has declared, and this is known throughout the world, that it is leaving the federation, or leaving the Arab Union. This declaration has been published. In order that there should be no doubts, I shall read it again. Tllis declaration reads as follows: "[The Union] under the old regime was not a true federation with an aim of benefitting the people of the two countries but had been proclaimed to strengthen a corrupt monarchy and to destroy the . unity of the Arabs. .. Therefore the Iraqi republic announces its imme- diate withdrawal from the federation and considerloi all decisions concluded under the federation null and void, The republic considers itself not respon- sible for the fmancial and military obligations which were incurred by Iraq as a rcsull of this federation." 42. 1 read this text in Rllssian, but it is a translation of the English version of the declaration which is known to the v,'ho!c world and was, in particular, published yesterday in The New York Times. 43. Accordingly, Mr. Abbas' assertion that the Arab Union still exists is not in conformity with the facts. The Iraqi Government has announced Iraq's with- drawal and the federation therefore no longer exists. 44.. Why was it considered necessary to assert that the Arab Union still exists? Wc should give some atten- tion to the question, for in this Mr. Abbas is not alone. His statement would not have had much significance if it did not correspond to the position taken by the l The speaker read the text in English. 39. M. SOBOLEV (Union des Republiqucs socialistet;. sovietiques) [tmdl/if du russeJ Dans son intervention, !It Abbas, qui occupe all Conseil la place du repre- sentant de l'lrak -- je dirai POtU commencer qll'i! occupe cette place illegalemenl, car le Gouvernemenl dc l'Irak l'a deja rappele et ~ designe n S<l place Ull nouveau representant - a declare hier cc qui 511it : ~ Les representants de l'Union sovietiquc el de ]a Republique arabe unie ant taus deux pl-etendn flue l'Union arabe n'cxiste plus. [...j. J'alfJrme que rien n'est change et que l'Union arabe existe tOlljOUl'S Cll tant qu'cntite constitntiollnelle 1_" [832e grrmtc, pal'. 27.1 40. Ainsi, M. Abbas, qui pretend parler all 110111 de l'lralc, soutient qu'aucun changemenl ne s'est produil et que la Federation imko-jordanienne continuC' d'exis- ter. Qu'en ~t-il dans la realite? 41. Le Gouverncment irakien a declnrc cL le monde entier le sait -- qu'il se retirait de [a Federation, qu'il se rctirait de l'Union arabe. Le texte de eettC' declaration a ete publie, Pour qll'auculI dcute ne subsiste a cet cgard, j'en donnerai lecture a nouveau. Cette declaration est ainsi conl/ue ; "Sou:,; I'ancien regime, I'Unioll Il'elalt pas une federation veritable ayant pour objet de servir les peuples des deux pay:;; elle fut proc1amcc en vue de rafTermir la monarchie venale et de clctruire l'nniM des Arabes. " C'est pourqnoi la Republique irakienne annOl1ce qu'elle se retire immediatement de la Federation et qu'elle cOllsidere toutes le>; decisions prises par la Federation comme nulles et non avenues. La Repu- blique decline toule responsabilitc quant aux enga- gemenls d'ordre financier et militaire qui onl ete assumes par l'lrak dans le cadre de celte federation. 11 42. J'ai donne lecture de ce texte en rnsse, mais il s'agit d'une traduction, a partir de I'anglais, de cette declaration, connue dans le monde entier, et qui a llotamment ete publiee hier dans le New York Times. 43. Ainsi, l'affirmation de M. Abbas selon laquelle I'Union arabe existe toujours ne correspond pas a la realite des faits. Le Gouvernement irakien a annoncc que 1'Irak se retirait de la Federation, et cette federation n'existe donc plus, 4.1. Pourquoi donc a+on juge bOll d'alIirmer que I'Union arabe continuait d'exister? C'est ce point qu'i! convient d'elucider, et a cet egard M. Abbas n'agit pas isolement. Son intervention n'aurait pas grande importance si elle ne correspondait pas a la these des 1 Texl.e cite en anglais par ,'orateur. l'Irak~. I> [832e seance, par. 28.1 Mais si l'lrak ne fait pas p<.\rtie de :a federation, si l'lrak et la Jordanie constituent des Etats distinets et si la Jordanie attaque l'Irnk, co:nment eJimincr la question de l'agression? Cette question est n et elle ne peut ctre eseamot6e. Donc:, si I'on continue d'admettre la fiction scion laquc:lle l'Unjon nrabe cx.iste toujottrs, c'est pour justiller l'agression qui se prepare contre l'lrak. Et le Conseil de securit6 doit se preoccuper tres serieusement de cette situation. 45. Ni la radio ni la presse ne se genmt pour annoncer qu'une t.clle agression se prepare, Je vOlldrais demander au reprcs:;ntant de la Jordanie si la communication suivante, que l'on attribue a la radio jordanienne, est exacte. Voici le texte de cettc declaration; "D'apres une MclarAtinn faite aujourd'hui a la radio jordanienne et entendue a Jerusalem, le Gou- vernement jordanien prendra a tout prix des mesures pout' liberer l'Irak. La radio jordanienne a souligne que le roi Hussein. en tant que chef par interim de l'Union arabc irnko-jorclanienne, eslla sellle pel'Snnne habilitee a rdablir l'ordre en Iral{ 2. I) Le peuple irakien n'a jamais donne au roi I-Iussein le mandat de rcLablir J'ordre ell Irnk, et nous savClns ce que signiJ1e le retablissement de l'anire clans un pays apres une revolution. La communicaliuu poursuiL en ees I:crlnfS : <15. The fact that such aggrpssion is heing prepared is being openly proclaimed on the radio and in the Press. I should like to ask the representative of Jordan whether a message attributed to the Jordanian mdio is true, This message reads as follows: .. The Jordan raUlI> heard in JeruMlem :;aid todny thaL the Jordanian Govemment will take action at whatevcr cost necessary to liberate Iraq. It stressed that King Hussein, as acting head of the Jordan- Iraq Arab Uni,)n, is the only person with authority t.o restore order in Iraq." t The Iraqi people never gave King Hussein the autho- rity La restore order in Iraq Hnd we kuow what the restorntion of order in a COUlltry after a revolution meam. The mcssage goes on to say: "IInssein might have the Brilish troops cover Jordanian bases while tIte Jordanian army moved agdnst Lhe rebel fo;·ccs." 2 4.6. J'appelle l'attcntioll du Conseil de securite sur 46. 1 draw tile Security Council's attention to these racLs, in order to w:nll all persons interl:sLed in the maintenance of peHep. t.hat Hggression is being prepared againHt Iraq. If it is not being prepared, we should be informed accordingly. If it is not. being prepared, the dispatch o[ troops to t.he Iraqi frontier should cease. If the aggression is not being planned, why are there United IGIlgdolIl troops in Jordan? Why hav~ they not Jleen sent back to t.heir bascs? ce~ fuits pour aviser tou~ cenx qui ont a cccur le maintien de la paix qu'une agression se prepare contre l'Jrak. Et si cIle ne se prepare pas, qll'on nous le cJbe. Si dle ne se pr~pare pas, qn'aD arrcte les envois de trollpes vcrs les fronti~res de I' lrak. Si aueune agress:on ne se prep8re, pourquoi les troupes britanniques se trouvent-eIles en JOl'danie. Ponrquoi n'clIl-elles pas He renvoyecs a leurs bases? 47. L'Union sovietiquc sait par t'experience dc sa propre Itistoire quels sont les prctextes utilises en vue d'une ingerence armee dans les afIaires d'un pay& lors des tent::.tives qui sont faHes pour y relablir L'ordrc ancien. Quand, en 1917, le peuple russe a acwmpli 47. The Soviet Union knows fro:n it<; own experience .:Jnd its own history what pretexts arc used for mili w tary intcrfr.rence in the affairs of countries with a view to restoring the status quo an/e. Within a year of the Russian poplllar revolution of 1917, about a dozen dif- ~ The speaker rcad the text in English. « I-Iussein pourrait f[[:rc en sorte que les toupes briLanniqucs protegent les bases de la Jordanie penclflnt que l'armcc ,jQl'danienne attaCiuerait les forces rebellef! ~. II ~ Texte cil~ en ur.glElis pHr j'OI'UL...,L]". 48. The Secnrity COlmei! should not allow hisLory lo repeat itself in the case of tile countries of the Amb East. ]f Iraq is lwxt in turn, the aggression which is being prepared must be halted in time and tlJosr. intending to commit it must be severely admonishell. 49. Mr. Loutli has just informed the Council of a lIew and very alarming fact. The note whiclL was sent to tlle Government of the United Arab Repuhlic by the United States concerning the landing of troops in Lebanon should also serve as a warning Lo lite Seenrity Council i1nd to all peaee~loving peoples, for it contains 1\ direct thrent of action agninst the United Arah Republic. The pretext for such action would be deter- mined by the United Statcs itself, which would also find gronndil to jllSUfy sHch :tctiOll. 50. The Security Couucil canuot ignore such threats. The correct course would be for the Council to take decisive steps to avert the threat of a new war whieh now exists in the Near and Middle Easl. The only way of doing so is to secure the immcdjale withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom troops from Lebanon and Jordan. The Security Council hns before it ;] dmft resolution which pursues that very objeclive. In my view, the time has come for the Council to take action along those lines and to request the Goverll- mcnts of the United Stales and the United Kingdom immediately to withdraw their troops, which are creat~ ing a serions threat to peace, not only in the Near and Middle East, but throughout the world. 51. ] should now like lo say a few words aboul proce- dure. Mr. Lodge, the United States rcpresentntive, said ycsterday [832nd meeting] that he wOllld request prioriLy for the United States draft resolution. He did not explain to us why that draft resolll bOil should be given priority; no reasons were given for this. Rule 32 48. Le Con:-;eil de scclIrite ne doit pas toIerer que des. exemples historiques de cette serte se reprocluisent d.lTIs le cas des pays de l'Oricnt rtrabe. Si le tOllr de l'Iralc est venu, il faut arreter a temps l'agressioll qui se prepare, et reprimander scverement CClIX qui onl I'intention de declencher cette agression. 49. M. Loutfi vient de porter a la eonnfliss<llleC du Conseil un nouveslI fait tres inquietanL. La nnLe que les Etats~Ullb onl envoyee an Gouverncment de la Hepublique arabe unie :tll snjet de l'envoi de troupe., au Liban doit, elle aL1ssi, mettre en garde le Conseil de securite comme tOllS les penples paciOques, car cctte note contient la menace non dcguisce cl'une action contre la Rcpuolique nrabe unie. Le prctexte devallt ~tre invoque pour cetle aetiol! st'rait fixe par les Etats-Unis eux-memes, et cc seraicnL egalcll1enl Dnx qui rechercheraient les motifs nccessflircs ]lom j\Tstifier line teile action. 50. Le Conseil de sccurite ne 5aurait rester indifferenL iJ. de semblables menaces. Le micllx serait que 1(' Conseil prenne dcs mesures cnergiqueil pour eCflrtCI" la menace d'une 1I0uvelk guerre qui pese actllellemeul sur le PJ'oche·Orien~ et le Moycn-Oricnt. Pour ccla, In senle chose ~ faire est de retircr imlllcdintemenl. les forces amel'iwines et britanniques du Liban et ilt' Jordanie. Le Conseil de 56curite est snisi d'lIn projel de resolution qui tend precisement iJ. cettc fin, et je pense que le' temps est venn pOlir le Conscil d'agir dalls ce sellS ct d'exiger des GouveTllcmenb des Etnl.<;- Unis et du Royaume-Uni qu'ils retirent immcdiatcment leurs troltpes, dont la prcsence cree UllC menace grave pour In prtix, non sculement dans le Prochc-Ol'ienl et le Moyen-Orient, mais allssi d[lns lp Illonde cntier. 51; Je vOlldrais dire mninlcnant queIques mats ::1\1 sUlet de la procedure. Hier [8320 ,w!rlflceJ, le rcpn!- sent~nt des Etats-Unis, M. Lodge, a dit qu'il dcmall- deralt la priorite pour le III'ojet de resolution dr.'i Etats·Unis. 11 ne nous a pas expliqllc pOlU'quoi il convenait d'accorder hi priorite ace projet de resolution The rules make no provision whatsoever for giving prirwity to any resDlutiDlls. Accordingly, thcre i.~ !l0 gronnd for giving priority to the United Stat8s draft (·esolu~i(}ll. 52, J beLieve that the Security COl.:.neil, in votillg on the draft resolutions, should adhl.'.re closely to the pro- cedure established in the Council, a procedure, moreover, Wl1ich was ~pprovcd unanimously and waR also sup- ported by the United States. r therefore jmist that the draft resolutions should be voted on b tll(~ order in which they were submitted to the Security COlUlctl. In that case, the Soviet draft resolution should hI; p·.!t to the VD Le lirst. 53. Tile PRESIDENT ((rarlslated from Spanish): I have no further speakers on my list. In accordance with the rules of procedure, we should now proceed to vote on the draft r~olutioJl5 before the Council. How- ever, I believe that it would be undesirable to divide the voting between two meetings and I shall, tllerefore, if there are no objections, adjourn this meeting now and reconvene the Cound this afternoon at 3.30 p,m., so that we can complete the voting at one metting.

I have no objection to your proposal to adjourn the meeting, but 1 should like to ask a question to wlllch you might be able to give :ne an answer. 55, Yesterday, before the end of the meeliJlg, we heard hints that new draft resolutions might be forth- coming. As the Soviet delegation has no information about this, it does not want to be taken by surprise. Wc do not wish to be forced to vote on a dra~t resolu- tion immediately after its subnission. I should like to ask the President if he knom whether any draft resolutions nre being prepared, or whether at 3 o'clock we shall have before us only the three drafts already submitlcd,

So far as I know, no new draft resolution has been sub- mitted, hut T hHVP. been informed by the representative of Japar. thal he is prep&ring a draft resolution which cannot be submit!:ed until n vote has been taken on the thmc draft resolutions r.QW Ldore the Council. 57. Sir Pierson DIXON (l;nited Kingdom)~ It seems to me a very sellGible idea, it I may say so, to visualize adjo:lrning the n:eeting JlOW and not proceeding at this mo:t:lent to the voting. However, I take it that procedure would not p-xclude any further speeches that the members of the Council might wish to make, when we resume at 3.30. I, myself, migh'~ w:sh to say a little mure, On that understanding, which I fcel <:ertain will meet with his approval, I readily fall 11 n'existe, dans le reglemcnt interieur, ancune dispo- sition pre.voyant que la priorite d)it etre dOllnee a telle on ~e1le n:s,olnt:on, Pal' ~OlneqllCnt, il n'y ,~ a\lCUlle r,lisoll de dom~er la pl'ioritc au projet de reso- ltltion r]PH EL!IJ:s-Unis. 52. Je pense que, lors du vote sur les projets de resolution, le Conseil de secnrite doil: ·respeder fide- lement la pmceaure qlli [l de ~tahlie all COllsel!, qui a ete adoptc!~ a l'unanimite, et qui a donc aussi \"CI,ll l'asscntimcnt des Etals-Unis. C'est pourquoi J'illsiste pour que les projets de resolution ~oier.t mis aux voix dans l'ordre ualls It:quel ils ont ctC prescntes au Conseil de securite. En l'occurrenee, e'e5t le projet de rJsoluticll de l'Unicn sovietiqnc qui doit etre mis aux voix d'abord. 53, Le PRESlDENT (traduit de I'espaunol) : Il n'y a pal> d'autres oratcurs imerits, Le reglement voudmit qae nous passions maintenant all vote sur les projels d~ rb;olution dont le Conseil est saisi. Mais il ne me semble pas souhaitable de repartir I~s votes entre deux seances; c'est pourquoi je propose au Conseil, s'il n'y voit pas d'inconvllnie.lll, de lever la sc,mce et de se reunir cet apres-rr.idi a 15 h. ,30, afil] de procMer it lOllS les \-'o~es en une s;eu)l' f(lis. 54. 1'1. SOBOLEV (Union des He}Jllbliqucs socialistGs S()vh~t1quel;) [iJ'adtlif du rm:sc] : Je ll'ui aucune objection a formuler contre vatre propositiontendant iJ. suspendre 1::1 Reanc,p-. !vlais je voudrais po~er t:ne fJu~tion, it laquelle vous pourrez peut-etre me repondre. 55, Bier, aYal1t 1n fin de la sblnc.e, on nous a laissc entendre que de nouvcaux projets de resohlt:on pOlll'- raient Cire pl'esentes, La delegation sovictique n'm est pas informee, et nous ne VOUrlriOIlS pas et1'e pris a~l d~pO\1rV'.l. Nous ne VOUIOilS pas que I'on nous oblige a voter sur Ull IJroj...t de resolution imme<tiatemcot apres qu'il aura ete presente. Je voudrais savoir, mon- sieur le Pn;~ident, si, a v()tr~ connaissancc, de :1OuveaL\X projetf> de resolution sont en voie d'e.laboratiOll, ou bien si nollS n~ scrOllS saisis a 15 heures qlte des trois projets qui ont deja cte deposes. 56. Le PRESIDENT (iraduil de /'CSPII.tlnol) .. A ffin connaissnnce, ancun 1l011VC3U projet de resolution n'u lite pl'(;sente jusqu'ici. TOlltefois, le represcntflllt du Japan m'a fait l;3voir qu'il pr6pnrait Ull projet c11; resolution, mais ne pn1rl1lit en saisir le Conseil qu'apres que les troi:; )1rojets de resolution aetuels ,mront etc mis aux voix. 57. Sir Pierson DIXON (T{()Y~llnle-Uni) {!raduii de l'anglais] : L'idee de lever la seance maintenant et Of'. n~ pas proceder inunediatement au vote me semble tres raisonnable. Je pense que cette procedure laisS2ra eependant aux. membres du Conseil qui le souhai- teraient la possiIJilit6 de prendre il nouveau la parole lorsque nous nous reunirons de nOllVcau, a 15 h. 30. 11 se peut qw~, pOllr ma part, j'aie quelques mots :i ajouter. Si V(]llS etes d'aecord sur ce point, eomme je 59, I Call1lPOII the representative of the United States. 60. Mr, LODGE (United States of America): Let me say, first, that it is quite agreeable to me that we adjourn until 3.30 p.m., as tile President suggests. 61. Mr. Sobolev said that I had demanded priority for the United States draft resolution - at le<lst that is what I heard in the English interpretation of his remarks. That is not quite correct. J, did not demand priority. I made a motion for priority, which is done regularly in the United Nations, as the records of the Security Council will demonstrate. A member has a right to make that motion; then it is up La thc members of the Council to vote either for or against it. 62. I anJ not demanding anything, I am making a motion. A motion for priority is not precluded by any rules that I have ever heard of in any parliamentary body. Our own rules in the Council are provisional rules. They were adopted in that form, I believe, when Mr. Sobolev wa~ Secretary of the Security Council, jf I am not mistaken. So I am sure he appreciates that fact. Underlying all these consideratioll~ is the fact that the Security Councjl is the master of its own pro- cedure. It can take anything it wants to and put it ahead of anything else. That is an inherent basic right of any parliamentary body. G2. Je n'exige rien : je presente une motion. Je n'~ti jamais entendu dire que le reglement intcrieur d'aucUll organe pnrlementaire interdit les motions de prioritc. Le l"llglement interieur du Couseil est provisoil'e. Il a He adopte sous eette forme alors que M. Sobolev etait. si je ne trompe, secretaire du Conseil de securite. Je s'Llis done sOl' qu'i] sait parfaitement queUe est In situa- tion. Le fait essentiel, c'est que le ConseiI de seeurit6 est maitre de sa propre procedure. 11 pent decider d'examiner en premier lieu toute question qu'il juge bono C'est la un droit fonr.amcntal que posse-de tout organe pllrlementaire. The meeting J'Ose at 12.2/j p,m, 59. Je dOllne la parole all representant des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, GO. M. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Amcrique) /tradail de l'an.glais] : le voudrais d'abore! dire qu'il me convicnt. parfaitemcnt que ]Jous levions la seance jusqu'a 1511. 3D, COJlU11e le President le propose. 61. D'autre par~, M. Sobolev u dit que j'avais c~igc la priorite pour le projet de resolution des Etats-Unis - c'est dll mains ee que j'ai compris en ecantant !'inter- pretation ell anglais de son intervention. Cl.' n'est pus tout a fait cXllCt. lc n'ai pas rcclame la priorite. J'ai prescnte une motion de priorite, sclon une procedure qui, les proces-verbaux dll Conseil de securite I'attestelll. est absolument courantc a l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Tout membre a le droit de presenter une motion de eette nature. Il appartient ellsuitc aux membres du Conseil de securite de votcr pour ou contre. La seance est lcuce Ii 12 h. 25.