S/PV.8428 Security Council

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by the outgoing Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council according to the year of adoption of the related Council decisions: His Excellency Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011); His Excellency Ambassador Taye Atskeselassie Amde, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia and Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Her Excellency Mrs. Verónica Cordova Soria, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, on behalf of the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); His Excellency Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006); and His Excellency Ambassador Olof Skoog, Permanent Representative of Sweden, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, and Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. I now give the floor to Ambassador Umarov.

I would like to thank the delegation of Côte d’Ivoire for having organized this briefing and giving me the opportunity to address the Security Council as outgoing Chair of the following sanctions Committees: the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), on the Taliban; and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia. Since Kazakhstan’s tenure on this important body ends on 31 December, and this is not a regular meeting for the presentation of official reports, I should like to take this opportunity to share some of my reflections with the Council. As the Chair of the 1267 and 1988 Committees, our main objective was to ensure the full implementation of the core mandates of both subsidiary bodies. In steering the work of the Committees, Kazakhstan tried to be transparent, followed the procedural rules strictly and refrained from politicizing the issues. Given the changing and evolving terrorist threat, we are pleased that this year we managed to update and adopt the guidelines for the conduct of the work of the 1267 and 1988 Committees, which we hope will greatly enhance their functioning and make it more efficient. But my message to our successors is: do not relax. There is plenty left to do to improve the work of the Committees. During the Council meeting held on 6 February (see S/PV.8175), held under the Kuwaiti presidency on the issue of the methods of work of the Security Council, a number of States Members of the United Nations voiced a great deal of criticism about the closed nature of the discussions in our sanctions Committees. In particular, opinions were expressed on the lack of transparency of the deliberations and the fact that it was not possible to make objective and realistic assessments, questioning the accountability of the Security Council. Under these circumstances, such views should be taken seriously and responsibly. These issues are being partially resolved through the current practice of the holding of regular open briefings by the Chair for interested Member States. This tradition of holding briefings received positive feedback from the States that attended the meetings, which expressed the hope that this practice would continue. We therefore urge the Chairs that succeed us, as well as members of the Council, to continue with this tradition, which provides an opportunity for Member States to interact with the Committee. Another possible area of improvement in the transparency of the Council’s work could be to invite interested Member States to informal Committee meetings to hear the Chair’s reports and make remarks during a dedicated period of time; that would strengthen mutual trust and confidence. I believe that such an opportunity needs to be given to any Member State whose interests are affected by the listing of individuals or organizations. Currently, according to the rules of procedure, such States find themselves listed in the documents because their territories have been used by terrorists or terrorist groups, but this is only after the official publication has been issued. Such States are not able to present their evidence to the Committee before a decision is made or to challenge the information provided by another State, for one simple reason: the listing State is not on speaking terms with that country. Moreover, members of the Committee and Monitoring Team experts are bound by the privacy policy, which is not considered to be a fair or transparent procedure. In this context, transparency is essential in the work of the Committees, particularly in the area of sanctions. The Member States concerned should be aware of the process of listing and delisting, contribute their information in a way that ensures maximum objectivity and fairness of the process, be informed on the status of consideration of cases and be able to understand with complete clarity the obligations that they must fulfil. Without proper transparency, the work of the Committees will increasingly be prone to politicization or to the settling of scores among countries. We are convinced that it is necessary to take every measure to contribute to ensuring the highest standards of transparency when the Council discusses issues that have serious and far-reaching consequences for Member States. This is not something new; I broached that issue in the Committee and have discussed it previously. In addition, the Chair’s visits to select countries enhances the engagement of the sanctions Committees with Member States. The visits help to inform Member States about the activities of the Committee and ensure their knowledgeable engagement in the Committee’s work. The 1988 sanctions Committee was specifically designed to help the Afghan Government to bring about peace and stability through the use of the sanctions regime imposed on the Taliban. The regime’s effectiveness is evident because the lifting of the sanctions on the Taliban is one of the key conditions for the movement to start negotiations. However, the overall effectiveness of the 1988 sanctions measures relies on close coordination with the Government of Afghanistan and its work on listing and delisting procedures. Such a practice, in our opinion, will further contribute to obtaining more accurate first-hand information and an understanding of the current situation on the ground, which would enable us to make more effective use of sanctions regimes so as to begin a peaceful dialogue in Afghanistan. For me, the most memorable point of my chairmanship in the Committee on Somalia and Eritrea was my visit to the region of the Horn of Africa in May. That visit was the first since 2010 and included a number of significant and meaningful meetings with the regional leadership at the highest level, United Nations country teams and other key actors. Following the visit, the Committee adopted important recommendations aimed at strengthening the implementation of the arms embargo and the charcoal ban on Somalia. The visit resulted in a better understanding of current local misconceptions and expectations during the sanctions regime. I therefore encourage future Committee Chairs to continue the practice of regularly visiting Somalia and the region. It must be clearly understood that the existing sanctions regime is not a punishment for Somalia. On the contrary, the arms embargo is a useful tool for improving control over a large flow of weapons into the country, through both official channels and smuggling. On the issue of improving weapons and ammunition management, it is important for the Secretariat and the relevant United Nations agencies on the ground to continue to provide support to the Somali authorities. The Committee also should support and assist that conflict-ravaged country in its efforts to recover through constructive guidance, rather than punishment. The commitment and coordinated actions of all United Nations States Members towards the implementation of the ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia will also have a positive effect on the fight against terrorists and significantly reduce their financial income. This year’s most important development — and I hope all members of the Council will agree — was the historic normalization of relations between the countries of the Horn of Africa region, which was initiated and promoted by Ethiopia. We have witnessed how peaceful dialogue, political will and commitment to people’s best interests can dramatically change situations between countries that have been in confrontation for many years. It is gratifying to note that that positive wave swept through the entire Horn of Africa region and culminated with the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea. My delegation had the great honour and privilege of being part of that process. In order to preserve and multiply those achievements, the coordinated efforts of the African Union and the United Nations are now needed to strengthen economic cooperation among the countries of the region and create favourable conditions for their prosperity. We note and support the decision of Secretary-General Guterres to appoint a Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa for that very reason. I am also convinced that stricter compliance and more complete implementation of the sanctions regime can be ensured through more effective information outreach and mutual understanding. In that regard, we introduced the practice of issuing regular press releases on the work of the Sanctions Committee in order to inform a wider audience about our work and, in turn, gain further support. In conclusion, I would like to express my delegation’s sincere gratitude to all members of the three Committees for their cooperation. I also express my appreciation to the Ombudspersons, secretariats and experts groups of all three subsidiary bodies for their dedication and professionalism in supporting the Chair in his daily work. I convey special gratitude to the teams of interpreters; we would not be able to fully carry out our activities without their help. On behalf of our delegation, I thank all Member States for their support and cooperation during the two years of our country’s chairmanship, especially the delegations of Afghanistan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Russia and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I would like to assure future Chairs who will replace Kazakhstan on the Committee concerning ISIL, Da’esh and Al-Qaida, the Committee concerning the Taliban and the Committee concerning Somalia that they can count on our unwavering cooperation at all times. We wish them every success in their important assignments.

I thank Ambassador Umarov for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Amde.

It gives me great pleasure to report on the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. This briefing covers the period from 1 January to 31 December. My predecessor served as Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group from January 2017 until September 2018, when I took over from him. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire served as Vice-Chair throughout the reporting period. I would like to commend both of them for their excellent work. I should also note that my briefing has been circulated to the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group, who approve of it. For the sake of brevity, I will highlight only some of its most important elements. The Ad Hoc Working Group met on 9 February to consider its activities for this year. Several members expressed their support for holding meetings on country-specific items. It was suggested that the Ad Hoc Working Group could be guided by presidential statement S/PRST/2018/1, which maps out a regional approach to conflict prevention and resolution. Members also suggested enhanced interaction between the Ad Hoc Working Group and the Peacebuilding Commission as a way to approach conflict prevention. There was also a related suggestion for greater interaction with representatives of regional and subregional organizations. In the spirit of its mandate to examine prevention, early warning and early action, another recommendation was for the Working Group to be flexible enough to take up items that are not necessarily included in its provisional programme of work. But others cautioned against the repetition of meetings on the same topic. The members consequently agreed to the provisional programme of work proposed by the Chair. In addition to its ongoing practice of dealing with thematic issues raised by Member States, during the reporting period the Ad Hoc Working Group held useful discussions on three conflict-specific situations. First, on 11 January, the Working Group held a meeting on the challenges and the way forward concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Secondly, on 2 April, it discussed the challenges and the way forward concerning the situation in Guinea- Bissau. Thirdly, on 31 May, it considered how to avoid a reversal of the gains made and sustain peace concerning the situation in the Central African Republic. Those discussions gave Member States a platform outside of the Security Council to exchange their views frankly. I can also say with confidence that those discussions generated useful information to be provided for the consideration of the Security Council. The Working Group held a meeting on 8 June on the way forward concerning cooperation between the United Nations Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU). That was convened in connection with a visit to New York by the Committee of Experts of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union for a workshop on Security Council working methods, the United Nations peace and security architecture and related issues and cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Other attendees at the meeting included representatives of the peace and security secretariat of the AU and the United Nations Office to the African Union. It was the first meeting of its kind and offered an opportunity for useful exchanges between expert-level representatives of member States of both Councils on ways and means to strengthen their cooperation on peace and security issues in Africa. Representatives welcomed the meeting and stressed the importance of continuing to improve cooperation. They underlined the need to work towards a common understanding of issues, including the root causes of conflict, and suggested enhanced information-sharing and cooperation between the AU and the United Nations. They drew attention to the need for cooperation with regard to the timing of briefings and decision-making. Speakers also suggested an institutionalization of exchanges between the Chair of the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the President of the United Nations Security Council, possibly via video-teleconference, and a harmonization of the programmes of work of the two Councils. Speakers also emphasized the value of the role of the African members of the Security Council in conveying information to other members of the Council about the work of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Another important suggestion was to convene joint consultative meetings between the members of the two Councils in order to establish clearly defined topics and be results-oriented. Exchanges on proposed agenda items and draft joint communiqués well ahead of the meetings would allow representatives to concentrate on their deliberations. Another proposal was for the two Councils to hold more frequent meetings, including via video-teleconference. Speakers also shared their views on the twelfth annual joint consultative meeting to be held the next month, calling for a slimmed-down agenda, encouraging joint field visits and discussing the modalities of such visits. The Ad Hoc Working Group held a joint meeting in July with the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations on the theme “Institutional reform of the African Union and its contribution in enhancing Africa’s capacity in the area of peace and security”. The meeting included a statement from Mr. Donald Kaberuka, AU High Representative for Financing of the African Union and the Peace Fund. He outlined the ongoing reform processes at the African Union and the Peace Fund — including its objectives and financing — and highlighted the efforts to establish a continental free trade area in Africa. Mr. Kaberuka also emphasized the advantage of regional organizations and their value for regional legitimacy, their experience and local knowledge and their ability to act fast. He pointed out the need to ensure that the African Union had the capacity to benefit from those advantages, adding that military means and financial resources were not enough to build peace and stability. Economic prosperity, job creation and development projects are also needed. In the course of the discussion, members commended reform efforts and identified areas that should be highlighted and stressed the need to enhance cooperation and improve the distribution of tasks between the United Nations and the African Union. They also underlined the difficulties presented by the lack of sustained financial support for African Union peace support operations. In November, a joint meeting of experts from the Ad Hoc Working Group and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations considered the progress of the African Union’s human rights compliance framework for AU peace support operations. They were briefed by the Deputy Head of the Institutional Reforms Unit and the Chief of the Policy Development Unit of the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union Commission, as well as by representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. They provided updates on the African Union’s efforts with regard to the Peace Fund, financial rules and regulations, predeployment training and the compliance framework related to human rights and sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as cooperation between the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat. That meeting offered members an opportunity to exchange views on those and related issues, including the important question of financing African Union peace support operations. Throughout my own tenure in the Working Group, as well as that of my predecessor, the significance of country-specific discussions has been underscored. In addition to thematic discussions, we have both been clear about our hope that this would revitalize the work of the Working Group. Our assessment is that the country-specific meetings held into 2018 allowed for rich and constructive discussions. They proved particularly useful when held prior to relevant decision-making deliberations in the Security Council or other bodies. The Chair strongly recommended that the Working Group also continue to include country- specific issues in the future programme of work. There is no doubt that the Working Group continues to play an essential role in facilitating preparation and exchanges on joint consultative meetings and other activities of the members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Chair of the Working Group would recall that, in paragraph 18 of its resolution 2033 (2012), the Security Council decided to follow up on the communiqué of the annual consultative meetings of the two Councils, including through the Working Group. The Chair strongly recommended that the Working Group should continue to exercise that mandate. The Chair also notes, in that respect, that the discussion held with the members of the Committee of Experts of the African Union Peace and Security Council in 2018 was indeed a valuable contribution to strengthening cooperation between the two Councils on peace and security issues in Africa. It specifically helped to prepare for the twelfth joint consultative meeting, which took place on 19 July this year. The Chair recommends that opportunities to hold similar exchanges should be encouraged in the future. As we finish our term and hand over the chairmanship of the ad hoc Working Group to South Africa, I would like to wish Ambassador Jerry Matjila of South Africa and his team all the best in the effective discharge of their responsibilities. As I think our report has made clear, the Ad Hoc Working Group is of particular importance to Africa and to the relationship between the United Nations Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council. I am confident that Ambassador Matjila and his team will do everything possible to enhance the role of the Working Group and contribute to the further strengthening of cooperation between the two Councils in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

I thank Ambassador Amde for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mrs. Cordova Soria.

I shall take this opportunity to deliver a brief report on the activities carried out by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the future prospects for, and challenges to, the work of the Committee in its task of supervising the implementation of that resolution. After assuming chairmanship of the Committee, the work was undertaken in the framework of the broad and comprehensive review of the five-year implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and based on resolution 2325 (2016), which was adopted in December 2016 and highlighted the importance of providing States, at their request, with effective assistance to meet their needs. In that context, efforts were intensified to promote the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States. Our main concern was also to continue focusing on preventing the proliferation to non-State actors, including terrorists, of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. I must emphasize here that it was always kept in mind that resolution 1540 (2004) is a platform of cooperation to prevent non-State actors from accessing precisely those types of weapons of mass destruction. We wanted to make it clear that, without cooperation, it would be impossible to address the problem globally. Regarding national reports, we continued to intensify efforts to encourage the 17 Member States that had not yet submitted their first national report by January 2017 to do so. Through dialogue with those States, including by sending written letters, as well as direct interaction and bilateral meetings with the Permanent Representatives of the relevant Missions to the United Nations here in New York, we encouraged them to send their first report to the Committee in accordance with resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016). I am therefore pleased to inform the Council that during 2017 we received the first national reports from Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe. In the current period we received the national reports of Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste and the Comoros. The total number of States that have submitted such national reports is now 181 out of the 193 Member States. Regarding cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations, we can say that, in order to achieve several of our objectives, we worked closely with several international organizations, as well as regional and subregional organizations, that were able to respond to requests for assistance. In terms of national focal points, States were encouraged to inform the Committee about their focal points for resolution 1540 (2004), both to their capital cities and to their Permanent Mission to the United Nations here in New York. Regarding the voluntary implementation of national action plans, that was another priority for the Committee, working with the support of regional and subregional organizations. The Committee continued to promote the exchange of experiences, including through peer reviews, to evaluate and strengthen effective practices in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In terms of assistance, the Committee, with the support of its Group of Experts and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, is ready to cooperate and, when requested, to facilitate assistance to States in their resolution 1540 (2004) implementation efforts. That will contribute to achieving the common goal of preventing the catastrophic use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. With regard to the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) before the end of its mandate in 2021, the work of the Committee and its Group of Experts during this period was carried out in the context of the resolution’s upcoming comprehensive review, which will take place before the end of the mandate of the 1540 Committee on 25 April 2021. That is why, following the complete revision of the matrices in 2016 and the revision of the matrix format in 2017, the existing matrices of the Committee were converted to a new format in 2018 to allow for updates and a systematic review of all required information. In that regard, the working group on assistance discussed and approved a method for systematically reviewing the matrices before the next comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which will be completed before 25 April 2021. With regard to the appointment of experts and the Coordinator of the Group of Experts, on 24 December 2017 the Secretary-General appointed six new experts to the 1540 Group of Experts, which supports the Committee. They assumed their functions in April 2018. It is also worth mentioning that the Secretary- General also appointed a new Coordinator on the recommendation of the Committee. With regard to the use of the website, it is a space that is constantly updated and very helpful in ensuring that States that require remote access to information on the Committee’s work have access to it. It is important to note that the Chair, the members of the Committee and the experts participated in various outreach activities during the reporting period. In order to participate as much as possible in fulfilling his or her functions, the Chair sent recorded messages when he could not attend a relevant event. Those messages became an important tool under the circumstances and were all uploaded to the website. In conclusion, in accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 2325 (2016), we believe it is important to develop an approach to implementation and reporting that takes into account the specificity of States, inter alia, with respect to their ability to manufacture and export related materials, with a view to prioritizing efforts and resources where they are most needed without affecting the need for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). It is important to encourage expansion and undertake initiatives to strengthen the capacity of national points of contact. It is imperative to develop a more effective assistance process, in cooperation with international partners, to support Member States. As to the short term, we believe it is essential to bolster additional strategies, such as the updating and continual use of the Committee’s website, as well as the recording of messages, which allows the Chair to cover a greater number of events. It is important to bear in mind the deadline for the adoption of the programme of work, which will conclude on 31 January. It is also important to appoint new experts in advance to replace those who will complete their mandate during the 2019 term. That also involves the appointment of a new Coordinator of the Group of Experts since, in Bolivia’s experience, just the appointment of new experts took seven months, during which time the Committee worked with the help of only three experts. On behalf of the delegation and the Government of Bolivia, I would like to thank the Group of Experts for their support and contribution throughout the past two fruitful years. I would also like to highlight the work carried out by Secretariat and all the members of the Committee. I thank them for the support and cooperation they have provided over the course of the two years of my country’s chairmanship. Finally, I congratulate the Indonesian delegation on being elected the new Chair of the Committee. We are sure it will demonstrate outstanding leadership at the head of this important Committee.

I thank Mrs. Cordova Soria for her briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Van Oosterom.

I have had the honour this year to serve both as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), on sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), on Iran. I thank the Council very much for this opportunity to share my reflections on the past year, as we prepare to pass the baton to my German and Belgian colleagues. We have built our work on the excellent work and efforts of Italy, which we succeeded as part of the split Council term between our two countries in 2017 and 2018. Let me pay tribute to the work of Sebastiano Cardi as Chair of the 1718 Committee and Facilitator of the 2231 format in 2017. I will use this occasion to highlight three issues: the work of the 1718 Committee, the work of the 2231 format, and, adding to that, some personal reflections on the system of the subsidiary organs in the improvements we see as advisable for the Council. In line with the representative of Bolivia’s recommendation just now, they will be of a practical nature. Let me start with the first issue, the 1718 Committee. With the significant expansion of the sanctions regime based on resolutions adopted at the end of last year, the scope, relevance and magnitude of the work of the Committee increased this year immensely. I will briefly highlight three major aspects of the work we performed in the Committee. First, the Committee continued the ensure the implementation of the sanctions regime. That in itself proved to be a tremendous challenge given the complexity of the sanctions regime, which is of a very comprehensive nature. We try to provide guidance to Member States, held open briefings for the wider United Nations membership and held outreach meetings for the five regional groups. We are convinced that those efforts will continue to lead to greater implementation of the sanctions. Secondly, this year the Committee facilitated diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to the situation on the Korean peninsula. We granted exemptions to the sanctions regime to allow the participation, for instance, of officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea officials in diplomatic talks in Pyongyang, Panmunjom and Singapore. Of course, the Committee also supported the implementation of the Panmunjom declaration by granting several exemptions, such as for an inter-Korean railway survey. Thirdly, the Committee made efforts to further mitigate adverse humanitarian consequences of the sanctions, which is something that was of importance to all of us in the Committee. We connected with various humanitarian actors, including the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Pyongyang, and provided humanitarian actors with further guidance on obtaining humanitarian exemptions. The Committee also granted various humanitarian exemptions for humanitarian aid to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and continues to consider further exemptions. I now turn to my second issue, the facilitation of resolution 2231 (2016). We all know, as we discussed last week in the Council (see S/PV.8418), this resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and marked a fundamental shift on the Iranian nuclear issue. As Facilitator this year, we have aimed to support and improve the implementation of the resolution through the facilitation of talks, transparency and trade: talks through engagement with all the relevant parties and discussions on possible violations of the resolution, transparency through comprehensive and balanced reporting and trade by encouraging the use of the procurement channel. As we also discussed last week, the JCPOA faced challenges following the withdrawal by the United States and the re-imposition of United States sanctions against Iran. But the unanimously adopted framework of resolution 2231 (2016) remains in place, and the procurement channel is operational and effective. I mentioned last week the numbers we are considering this year. Let me conclude on this point by saying that resolution 2231 (2016) and the JCPOA enjoy broad support among the wider United Nations membership. That brings me to my third point, concerning some personal reflections. I will mention seven points this time, not three. First, a look at the work of the 1718 Committee will reveal that it has concrete impact on the ground by preventing further evasion of the sanctions, facilitating the diplomatic process and working towards mitigating adverse humanitarian consequences. Second, the importance of the unity of the Council cannot be overstated. When the Council is united it wields enormous power and has great impact on peace and security. It is crucial that unity be maintained, especially on the issues under consideration by the 1718 Committee. Third — I think this is a wider observation — the Panels of Experts, and in particular their reports, are the cornerstone of United Nations sanctions regimes. Their reports are essential for the decision-making of the Committee, the Council and Member States. Panels should be able to do their work in an effective and secure manner, while safeguarding their integrity. Additionally, we feel very strongly that the selection process for Panel members should be based on merits. All candidates with the required expertise and skill sets should be taken into account, regardless of their nationality. In general, the Panels that are functioning under the Council would profit from having more experts from the wider United Nations membership. Fourth, the effective implementation of sanctions is a challenge for many Member States, especially those that are unaware of their obligations or are unable to meet their obligations owing to a lack of capacity. The world of the sanctions committees is sometimes a subterranean universe for the wider membership, as our Indian colleague called it during a Council debate under the Kuwaiti presidency earlier this year (see S/PV.8175). Further outreach from the Council therefore remains essential, including through an informative website, as some of the other members mentioned as well. The Council cannot underestimate the workload of the accumulated reporting and implementation requirements that other Member States face. That is certainly a challenge for the smaller Member States. Further streamlining and harmonizing of the reporting and implementation requirements among the Committees would be useful and helpful, because currently there is a challenge in implementation for a large part of the membership. Fifth, when it comes to chairing a subsidiary organ, it can also be challenging. We commend Sweden for the initiative to start a best practice guide outlining the Committee working methods of the committees. Together with Belgium and Australia, we are supporting Sweden’s efforts and look forward to the result. We hope that tool will contribute to the effectiveness of the Security Council and its subsidiary organs. Sixth, returning to the Committee pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), the workload of that Committee far exceeds that of any other Committee, as the Security Council Affairs Division has informed us through its statistics. The Committee received more than 337 notifications and requests for guidance, while 649 formal notes have been circulated to members of the Committee so far this year. Those numbers show the significant burden of a chairmanship on the Chair’s team, the Secretariat and the Panel of Experts. It is just an enormous amount of work. That brings me to my seventh, and last, point, namely, the system around the sanctions committees. The total number of all subsidiary organs under the Council significantly increased since 2000, from 10 to 30. If the Council continues the practice of allocating chairmanships exclusively to elected members, it will continue to put a disproportional strain on the Permanent Missions of the elected members, especially those with smaller teams. Frankly, that is not sustainable. In our view, therefore, it is essential that the Council agree to a new system. Let me give some potential characteristics of a new system. First, it could be a system that ensures a fair distribution of chairmanship among permanent and elected members alike. Secondly, it could be a system that allows for a two-year rotation of chairmanships taken up by permanent members. It could be a system that would allow Deputy Permanent Representatives to fulfil the mandate of the Chair. Lastly, it could be a system that allows Chairs, if they want, to also serve as co-penholders on draft resolutions relevant to the subsidiary organ they chair. We think that the discussion on such a new system would best be further conducted in the Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions, under the able guidance of our Kuwaiti colleague. In conclusion, we would like to express our gratitude for the professionalism and dedication of Secretariat colleagues, whose support has been invaluable. We would also like to especially mention the Panel of Experts of the 1718 Committee. Let me also thank the experts of the 1718 Committee and those of the Iran format for their contribution to the work of the committees. Of course, we wish every success to our successors — Ambassador Christoph Heusgen of Germany, at the 1718 Committee, and Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve of Belgium, at the 2231 Committee. We have already been working closely with their teams to ensure a smooth transition and will remain at their disposal in the days of transition and beyond. I want to conclude by thanking my own team, especially Mrs. Lila DelColle and Mr. Joost van Dieren. They have worked incredibly hard this year, served the Facilitator and the Committee, and have served the Council, but certainly they have served the cause of peace and security above and beyond the call of duty.

I thank Ambassador Van Oosterom for his briefing. I now give the floor to Ambassador Skoog.

I will try to be brief. I realize that it is very late in the day and that it has been a long meeting. I would like to say a few words on our leadership of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), on Libya sanctions, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017), on Mali sanctions, and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. I will share some experiences of chairing those subsidiary bodies and provide some remarks on the general functioning, or not, of subsidiary organs and the role of the Chairs. First of all, I want to pay tribute to the Secretariat, the Security Council Affairs Division and the Panel of Experts for the support they provided, as many here have mentioned. I also want to pay tribute to the 12 loyal and dedicated colleagues from Member States outside the Council who are present and taking interest in this debate at this time of the day. Let me say a few words about the Libya Sanctions Committee. That Committee is very labour-intensive, perhaps not as much as the Committee pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), but still, it is active and operates in a politically complex environment. At times, political divisions inside the Security Council have made it difficult to agree on even quite minor issues. Despite those divisions, we have tried to enable the Committee to be active and attuned to the political situation in Libya itself. For example, this year the Committee listed several individuals for the first time since 2011, inter alia for involvement in human trafficking, migrant smuggling and attempts to illicitly export oil. We have adopted a separate listing criterion on sexual and gender-based violence, which is a development that we encourage Member States to continue to consider in the context of other sanctions regimes. A third issue has been adopting Implementation Assistance Notices in relation to the assets freeze, which we hope will facilitate the effective implementation of the sanctions. We have listened very carefully, in our national capacity, to Libya’s concerns regarding the management of the frozen funds — a considerable amount of money. We have very actively pursued a way forward on that in discussions with other members of the Committee, Libyan representatives and the Libyan Investment Authority, as well as at the highest level in Tripoli, beginning with the President. I believe that working with the World Bank is the best way forward on that particular issue. The people of Libya need to be satisfied that their funds are managed in the best way possible. We encourage Libya to continue engaging with the World Bank and the incoming Committee Chair. Despite great difficulty in reaching consensus, I led the first visit by the Committee to Libya since the inception of the sanctions regime, in 2011. I thought it was a very useful trip, about which I have given some personal impressions here in the Council. Regrettably, we were not able to visit the eastern part of Libya, as envisaged in the terms of reference, but I hope that the second part of the trip can be realized soon. The exploitation of Libya’s resources for personal gain continues to do huge harm to Libya and to peace. Understanding those detrimental undercurrents is something that I recommend the Committee, and other committees, to look more closely into to more effectively deal with it: How do war economies work? Who benefits? And what can we do to go after those interests more forcefully? Turning to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017), on Mali, that sanctions regime was set up at the request of the Government of Mali. The aim of the sanctions is to advance peace, security and stability for the benefit of the Malian people, in support of national efforts, not least through the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The Government has been very good in its cooperation with the Committee, but so have the other signatories of the agreement. Engagement with the region has been another important component of our work, including through informal consultations with countries neighbouring Mali. I visited Mali just a few days ago and would like to reflect on a few things there. Many actors, including the parties to the peace agreement, pointed to the positive impact of the sanctions regime in maintaining pressure to move forward in the implementation process. There was also a general awareness of the expectations of the Council, as put forward in resolution 2423 (2018), including the evaluation of progress needed before March of next year. Of course, there is a time when expectations and words must translate into concrete action if deadlines are not met. There are some positive dynamics among the parties since the elections this summer and the signing of the pact for peace. At the same time, spoilers and violators of international humanitarian law need to be contended with and the momentum seems not to have been matched by concrete results. We remain ready, in the last few days of our term on the Council, to consider listing individuals in accordance with the designation criteria. I was also the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. I would like to thank countries for their support of the Working Group and our efforts to work towards a more proactive chairmanship of the Working Group. We are witnessing utter disregard for international humanitarian law and human rights, as reflected in the increase in violations and abuses against children in many conflicts around the world and under many Council agenda items. I believe that reality demands a strengthening of engagement, both in the field and in dialogue with States. United Nations efforts must also be reinforced at the country level in order to reverse that very negative trend. The Working Group is now efficiently adopting country conclusions within a one- to two-month time frame and making regular field visits, focusing on countries that are ready to engage but need a push, as was the case in Darfur in the Sudan and in South Sudan, most recently. I see room for improvement with more engagement from all Council members and better follow-up and implementation by the Council as a whole, in a more determined and consistent manner. I believe that the questions related to children and armed conflict are central to prevention and sustaining peace, and efforts must not be limited to the Working Group. I want to come back to the Council later on with a more extensive list of lessons learned and recommendations as the Council moves forward without Sweden. Finally, I think that the Working Group’s collaboration with civil society has been absolutely crucial, as is so often the case for many other issues on the Council’s agenda. I would like to turn now to some general remarks about the working groups. I agree with most, if not all, of what our Dutch colleague just suggested in his recommendations on moving forward. Sanctions can never be successful in isolation. They must always be part of a broader political strategy. Sanctions committees should not operate in a vacuum, disconnected from their political context. The Council needs to become better at discussing country-specific items and sanctions regimes together, and there should be closer interaction between Chairs of sanctions committees and the penholders of draft resolutions mandating sanctions, as the two are mutually reinforcing. Chairing subsidiary organs is an important and demanding task that comes with great responsibility. Sanctions remain one of the most intrusive instruments available to the Security Council, apart from the use of force, and the sanctions committees are mandated with the important task of ensuring the effective use of that instrument, with direct effect for sanctioned individuals and entities. Chairs should therefore enjoy greater trust and cooperation from all members of the Council. They have been appointed by the Council and should be entrusted with a higher degree of independence, without being hamstrung or micromanaged in the discharge of their mandates. That holds true when it comes to travelling on behalf of their committees, communicating about their work or interacting with the Council itself. The fact that any committee decision, no matter how minor, must be taken by consensus, has in essence conferred the right of the veto on all Council members. Of course, as we all know, in most cases it is the permanent members that block effective committee action. Effective stewardship of subsidiary organs is a challenge and a responsibility that requires resources and extensive knowledge of the United Nations sanctions system. Given the extent of that responsibility, Sweden, as my Dutch colleague has just mentioned, together with other Member States, have developed a best practices guide for Chairs and delegations of subsidiary organs to help incoming delegations prepare for that important task. We hope that the guide will be published before the end of the year. Since we are leaving, we hope that it can be a legacy for our colleagues and their delegations in trying to make the overall work of the Council, as it relates to sanctions, more effective and efficient.

I thank Ambassador Skoog for his briefing. On behalf of the Security Council, I would like to thank the outgoing Chairs for the manner in which they have discharged the important duties mandated by the Council.