S/PV.844 Security Council

r have asked to speak with the thought in mind that my deep involve- ment witb. the developments in the Middle East and my daily contacts with those developments may make it appropriate for me to explain to the C:ouncil how I envisage that present situation in the Huleh region, which ill reflected in the question now before this body. 1. Le SECRETAIRE GENERAL (iraduit de l'an- glais) : J'ai dem:mde la parole parce que, prenant profondement, a ereur les evenements du Moyen-OrieLt, que je suis jour apres jour, j'ai peuse qu'il serait peut- ~tre opporttm d'exposer au Comeil la manif~re dont j'envisage la situation actuelle dans la region de HouIe, puisqu'elle est Me a la question dont le. Conseil est pn~sentement so.isi. 2. J'ai toujours ete fermement eonvaincu qu'aucune action :nilitaire contraire aux. clauses de suspension d'ar.:nes figurant dans les conventions d'armistice general et l'flnfirmees dans les en,l;!agements de 1956 ne pouvait se justifier, m~me en reponse A une action militaire de la partie adverse, sauf lorsqu'U y a incon- testablement h~gitime defense, daus l'acception la plus stricte au terme; et meme dans ce cas, "action doit se Iimiter (lUX mesures que l'on pent raisonnablement considerer comme exigees par res neccssites de la 2. It bus always been my firm view that no military action in contravention of the cease-fire clauses of the General Armistice Agreements. as reconfirmed in the undertakings of 1956, can be justified, even by prior military action from the other side, except in the case of ubviullS self-defence, in the most acr.urate sense 0: the word, and even then limited to what the actua~ defencp, need may reasonably be considered as having warranted. Any wavering by the United Nations ill the applieatic>n of this principle would lead to a situation President: M. G. JARRING (SuMe). Presents : Les repnlsentants dffi pays suivants Canada, Chine, Colornbie, France. Irak. Japan, Panama, SuMe, Union des Rcpubliques soeialisl;e;s sOvletiques, Royaume-Uni de Graude-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Etats-Unis d'Ameriqlle. Ordre dn jour pl'ovisotre (SfAgendaf844) L Adoption de l'ordre du jour. 2. Question de Palestine; lettre, en date du 4 decembre 1958, adress~e U\1 P]'e~ident du Conseil de securire par le representant d'Israel (814123). Adoption de l'ordre du jour Question de Pale8hne ; lettl'e, en date du 4, decemhre 1958, adreaaCe au President du c<'oseil de 8&urite par le representant d'IsraeJ. (814123) Sur /'inllilativn du President, M. A bba Eban, repre- sentant d'Israel, et M. Omar LOl.lt{l, represenlanf de la 3, As the use of armed force in contravention of the cease-fire. clauses in anything but self-defence cannot, in my view, be justified by the use of force by the other party, it is obvious that it can be ju,~lified even less by a local conflict of interest, or a dispute about the legal situation, 4. It is, of cours~, for the members of the Council themselves to form, 011 the basis of the report presented by ttle Chief of Stan of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [5/4124], their own judgement as to whether, how and to what extent the principles mentioned apply to the developments under consid- eration, Without in any way auticipating tIle findings and conclusions of ~he Council ~ in doing so I obviously would be out for order - I feel that, so as to avoid any misunderstanding of the restraint which thus is imposer! on me, I may be permitted to state that, personally, T note the incident before the Co'.mcil with the deepesl: concern. 5. One matter h the consideration of the principles to be maintained and the judgements which they may caU for in the case which is beforlO the Council. Ano~her matter, to which I as Secretary-General have to give most serious attention, is the underlying problems which have led to the present state of tension and to the use of force. Whatever these problems, if they are not considered as j ustifyin~ the use of force, they call, 011 the other hand, for serious efforts toward a peaceful solution eliminating thl: cause of friction. In my opinion, the Chiei of Staff has already made commendable efforts to come tu grips with those underlying problems. I urn convinced that his con- tinuing work in this direction "nas the fullest support of the Secnrity Council. It is my h.ope that the parties, likewise, will co-operate with him fully, in a spirit of frankness and rec.onciliation <'\lid guided by the necessity to restore and nHl.intain pe.aceful condiLlons, 6. I am concerned about the deterioration in conditions arouad the I-Iuleh region and the northern seclor of the demilitarized zone which has tal<en place over the year and has led to serious incidents in November and December, I am even morc concerned about symptoms indicflting that the deterioration is con- tinning, Although I may understand the security reasons which prompt a nat~o\1 to proceed with measures, like a military build up, in an area \vilicll has proved to be explosive, I know from experience that in adu- ality such sleps, in such a situation as the present one, tend to increase -the insecurity. What has happened, therefore, must be the starting point for a turn of developments in a more favourable direction, It cannot be permitted to continue as a chain-reaction, involving ~teadily increasing risks, 3. Etant donne que I'usage de la force par la partie adverse ne saurait, selon loai, justilicl" LIne viOlation des clauses de suspension d'armes, sauf en cas d~ legitime defense, il va de soi que pareillc violation se justifie mains encore si elle se foude sur lIn conmt cl'intcr~ts a l'echeloll. lOcal ou sur un clifferend d'ordre juridique. 4, Bien entendu, c'est aux membres du Conseil Clll'il appartient, en etudiant le rapport du Chef d'ctat-majllr de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de 13 surveillance de la treve [814124], de juger si les princip~ dont je viens de faire etat s'appliquent aux evcneOlenls conside.res, et, dans I'affirmative, de queUe maniere et dans queUe mesnrc. Sans prejnger en quoi que ce soit le~ constatations et les conclusions dn Conseil - si je le faisais, j'agirais manifestement de maniere criti- qm,ble ~ je pense qu'il me sera pennis, pour eviter tout malentenclu sur la reslOrve qui m'est ainsi impos~e, dc declarer que, pour ma part, c'est avec beaucoup d'inquielude que je considere l'incident dont le Conseil est saisi. 5. It y a lieu, d'une part, c]'envisager les princillcS A suivre et les cQnclusions qu'on peut en tirer dnns ['afTaire examinee ici. Il y a lieu, d'autre part, et c'est la lllle que_sLion a laquelle, en ma qualite de Secrel.'l.ire general, je me dQis d'accorder la plus grande attention, d'titudier les problemcs sDus-jacents qui sont a I'origine de la tension 3ctueUe et du recours it la force. Quels que scient ces problemes, si I'on estime qu'ils ne jllsLiflent pas I'emploi de la iorce, ils cxigeat par contre qU'on ne ni!.gligc aUCUl1 eHart pour parvenir it nne solu· tion pacifiqlle qui fasse disparaitre les causes de friction, A mon avis, le Chef d'etat-major a deja fait des efIorts lIIcritoires pOllr s'nttaquer aces problemes sousvjacents. Je suis cDnvaincll que l'<Euvre qu'il ponrsuit dims cc sens n le plein appui du Conseil de securite:. Mon espoir c,'it que les parties en cause, soucieuses de rctablir cl de maintenir des conditions pacifiques, lui flpporleront, elles aussi, dans un esprit de franchise et de Conci- liation, leur cooperation sans reserve. 6. Je sui:; preoccupe de voir que la situation dans la region de Houl6 et dans le secteur septentrional de la zone dCmilitarisee s'est deterioree nu cours de l'annee et qu'clle a donne lieu en novembre et en clccembre a des incidents graves. Ce qui me prcoccupe davant::tge encore, ce sont les indices qtLi montrent que ceUe aggravation se pOllrsuit. Bien que jc puis8e compremlre que, par sond de securitc, un pays sait amene il prendre des mesures telles que le renforcement de ses positions militaires dans IIn secteur qui s'est rev6le nevl"algiquc, je sais par experience qu'en pratique deS mesures de cc genre Lendent, dans une situation commi'. celle que nous aVOll3 en ce moment, it accroltre I'insecurite, I1 faut done que ces cvenements marquent le point de depart d'une evolution nouvelle et plus favorable. On ne saurait les laisscr continucr comme une reaction en chalne, q'.li presente des dangers de plus en plus grands, 8. Finally, J wish to inform n,e Security Council a~ol1t the following: By letters addre~sed to~he Israel and Syrian authorities, the Chief of Staff reqnested on 11 December 1953 that arrangements be made as early as possible for visits by UnitGd Nations mirtul'Y observers to the areas wLhin th/? north-eastern region, whic1\ ill Llds case ate of interest and which arc spf'dfi- cally mentioned in article V of the General Armistice Agreement between IsrBel and Syria) Of relevance in this context is, of course, also the g~oeral rigl1t of United Nations observers Lo freedom 0: n10YCmcnt in fulfilment of their task, a right which lw.s been ccnsis- tcnUy emphasized by this Council and which was re-confirmed by special \llldertaldngs ~/y the puLies in May 1%0. Positive replied have been recelveu from the Syrian and the Israel authorities, and I can infor::n the Council tllat in."pecti0ns started this morning.

The Unitf'd Stntr.i'> has stuJied C~trefllHv :he statements made by the representatives or Israel and the United Arab Republic and the reports presented by the Chief of Staff oi the United Nt.tions Truce Supervision Orga~ nization on recent developments in the ::.rCfl extending along the Israel-Syrian armistice demarcation line. We think it is appropriate for the Council to address itself to these matters. The position of the United States Governrncllt has been m;tdc abundantly dear in the past, 10. \Vhen th" COll:lCilwet on 28 May 1057 to consider developments in this area [782nd mceliu!fJ, the Unitet States pointed to tlle need for greater respect for the provisions of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement and for greater resort to tbe machinery pl\Jvidcd for by that Agreement. It is due to neglect of the Armistice Agreement by the parties themselves tlw.t incidents along the demarcation line IJave assumed serious proportions. 11. We here in the Security Council have the respon- sibility of upholding the ill:egrity and auLhority of the Armistice Agreement and of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The parties bave the rcsponsibility of enrrying ont faithfully the provisions of the Armi&tice Agreement and of co-opera Ling fully with tlle Uuited N~tions Truce Supervision Organiza- tion. As we have seen, if this is not done, conditions get wurse. I Official R~~ords of the SeclirUy Council, F()Ilftll Year, Special SupplGment No. 2. 8. Enfin, je voudrais don:lcr au Conseil de sjcurite les renseignernents suivants : le 11 deeembre 1958, le Chef d'etat-major a cerit aux autoritcs israeJicnnes et syriennes pour leur demander de prendre le plus t6t possible les dispositions voulues pour que des obser- vateurs militait'es des Nptions Unics se rendent dans le~ secteur.s de la regioli du nord-est qui presentent en l'occurrenCe un interet particlIlier et qui 5Dnt expre.sse- ment n:entionnes al'arUc1e V de la Convention d'armis- tice general syro-israeliennc 1. A ce propos, it convient, hian entenl:b. dl' mppf'Jcr Jp (koH g~neral qu'ont les observateufS des ~aUons Unies de se dCplacer libremcnt pour s'aequitter de leurs fonctions, droit que le Conseil a prOclall1l~ a maintes repri,es, et que les engagements sfeciaux pr:5 en mai 105G pnr les parties sont venus conflrmer a nouveau. Des repollses affirmativcs Ont tite reyucs des autorites syricnnes et israe:iennes, et je puis informer le Con:;;eil que lcs ino;pections ont commence cc matin. 9. 1'[. LODGE (Etats-Unis d'Ameriqne) [tmduit de l'anglais] : Le Gouvernemcnt des Etats-Unis a ctuclie aveC le plUS grand soin les declaratiom des lCprC5entants rI'Israel et de In Repllhliqlle ambe lmie ainsi que les rapports du Chef d'etat~major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la ~urveillance de la tr~ve sur leo cv€nements qui se soot recemmcnt produits dans la zone situee le long de la ligne de demarcation de l'armistic(': entre Israel et lr1 Syde. NcJUs cstimons qu'i! est ball quI' le COllseil se penche sur ees proble:lles. Le GOllve~neme-nt des Etats-Uni~ a deja precL5e sa position a maintes reprises. 10. Lorsque le c'omf'.il s'est remu le 28 In!li 1957 p,)ur Etudier les evenements qui avaient IoU lieu clans cette zone [7821l Sellnce}, les Etats-Unis ont fait valoir qJ'il hIl.'l.it respecter plus strictemellt les clispositions tl~ la Con",entioll d'annistice general syro-ismelif'nnc e': foire davantuge appel aux orgallismes prcivus pm cette conVerltioll. Cest paree que les parties elles-memes n'observent pas la conventio:l d'armistice que les i'ncidents survenus au vobinage dc la ligne de dem:l.r- c<ltion ant pris des proportions gruves. 11. Le Cot1seil de securite a le devoir de faire rc.specter la conventioll d'armistiee et ue iail'e prevaloir l'autoritc de l'Organisme des N3tions Unies charge de la 5l1r- veilkmee de la tl'cve. Les parties ont le devoir d'appli- quer fidelement les dispositions d8 la convention d'armistice et de cooperer plcinement avec l'Organlsme charge de la surveillance de la tr~ve. Comme nous l'avoll3 vu, 10rst[\I'il n'cn est pas ainsi, la situation s'aggnlve. 1 Proccs-vcrbau:r officids du Consl!i! de sl!curiU, qua- Iri~me ann~t, Suppl~mml special n° 2, 13. Wc condone none of the actions of force which have taken place in this troubled area !lOW or in the past. We mmnot agree with those who seem to suggest that acts of violence in the past jllsLify other acts of violence in the present or future. This can lead us only into a morass of force and violence from which none can escape. We believe in peaceful recourse lJlfough the mcchanisms pl'ovid~d, specitically the Mixed Armistice Commission, and we are graUrted that when the Mixed Armistice Commis.sion was unable to function, recourse was had to the Security Council rather than to furUler military action. 14. In considering what should be done in the circum· stances, we should give great weight to the remarks we have just heard from the Secretary-General. The United States believes that the Council will llavc dOne well if it encourages caution to prevail, thus allowing the Secretary-General an opportunity to address himself directly to the points at issue during his fOl'thcoming trip to that part of the world. We hope that his efforts will hear fruit and will result in enhancing securi t)' there. At lhis point it is importan~ for all concerned to excrcise restraint and to avoid any intemperate action. The Security Council wU! follow with great interest the course of the discussions which tlte Secre- tary-General will have with the parties. 15.. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): The events wluch occnl'l'ed on 3 December on the border norLh of Lake Hulch are described in the re-porl of the Chief o~ St~ff of tile Unitcd Nations Truce Supervision Ol'!;a. mzatlOn as .. 11 very serious incident" [8/4124, pam. 11. I .am s~J'e that. al~ members of the Conncil will agree With tlus descnptlOn. It torms one of a long s~,ries of clashes in tlns horder region. t6. It is dist~rbing to read in paragrapll 28 of the report of the Chlef of Staff that the llumber of complaints lodged by Israel and the Unitt:u Arab Republic has been ~\lbstantially higher since July tllan it was durin<l the first six months of 1958. The climax of the incidcr{t on ~ December, when a nmnber of villages on Israel ~lTlto.t'y :",e~e bombarded with artillery, emphasizes In 11 dlsqulellng way the dangers of the situation. We must ?c.disturbed by onc particular feature of this latest mCldent: t~e use of arLillery, and e.specially by its employment against centres of civilian population. 13. Nous n'excusons aucun des coups de force qui ant eu Heu et qui continuent a avail' lieu dans ceUe region troublee, Nous ne pouvons partager les vues de ceux. qui semblent croire que les actes de violence du passe jus- tiflent d'autres actes de violence dans le present ou dans l'avenir. Cela ne peut nous menel' qu'iJ. un decllat- nement de force et de violences auquel nul ne pourra cchapper. Nous avons confiance duns le recours pacifique nux rouages prevus, en ['occurrence ~ la Commission mi:<te d'arrnistice, et nons sommes heureux que, lorsque cette commission n'a pu fonctionner, on ait fait appel au Conseil de securitc au lieu d'entreprendre de nouvclLes operations militaires. 14. En envlsflgeunt les mesures A prendre duns les circonstances actlLelIes, nous <!evons accorder la plus grande attention aux observations que vient de formulcr le Secretaire genernL Les Etats-Unis cstiment que le Consell de securite agiruit sagement en lllissant prcvaloir la prudence, ce qui donnerait au Secretaire general l'occasion de s'occuper directement des pl'oblcmes en cause lors du voyagc qu'il fera prochainemcnt dans la region. Nous esperons que ses efforts seront COll- ronnes de succes, et qu'ils Ullront pour eITet de rellforcer la seeurite dans cette region. Au stade actuel, il importe que toutes les parties interessees fassent prellve de moderation et Bvitent tout £\cte irl'(~flechi. C'est avec le plus grand intcn~t que le Conseil de sccuritc suivra les ponrparlers du SecreLaire general. 15. Sir Piel'son DIXON (RoyaumcMUni) [lraduit de l'anglais] : Duns son rappor l sur lcs evencments Sl1l'venllS le 3 decell1bre duns la region frontaliere un nord du lac de Houle, le Chef d'ctat-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies cllarge c.le la surveillance de la tnlve dit que ccs cvcnements constituent un «tres grave inci- dent 11 [S/4124, par. 1J. le suis certain que tous les membres du Conseil partageront cet avis. Cet incident fnit partie d'une longue serie d'echuuflounies dont ccttc region frontaliere a ete le theatre. 16. Au paragrapllc 28 du rapport du Chef d'etat- major, on lit avec inquietude que le nombre des pJain1cs d<Sposees par Israel et par la RepuLliquc arabe unic a ete sensiblemcnt plus eleve depuis juillet qll'il ne l'avait <Ste au cours des six premiers mois de 195a. Le fait le plns grave de J'incident du 3 decembre, a savoir le bombardement par un tir d'artilleric d'un certain nombre de vill<lges situes en territoire israelien, .~ouligne de fayon inquictantc les dangers de la situation. Cl'. recent incident prcscnte Uti aspect particulierement troublant : l'utilisation de l'artillcrie, et surtout SOn 18. The imperfecL Chal'<lctCI' of the armistice arrange- ments in Litis region has been painfully brought home to my GOVernment by the s~lOoting there last month 01 the wile of tIle British Air Atl:ache ill Israel, Mrs. Dorall. Her Majesty's Goverr.ment hflS studied a factual report made by a military observer of the United Nations TrlJ(~e Supervision Organization on 20 No·"cmber. On the evidencc, and having regard to the failure of the Syrian authorities to co-operate promptly in the investigation of Mrs. Domn's disap~ pearancc, Her Majesty's Government can only COIt- clude tbat she was shot by a person Jr persons crossing from Syrian territory. In the cireJmS~allces, und in t.he absence of any satisfactory explanalion, I-ler ]\'lajesty's Governmenl must therefore hold the Govern- ment of the United Arab Republi~ responsJ>le, uud they are taking appropriate action to raise the matter with that Government. 19. As the Secretary-Gelleral has indicated, the situa- tion in this area calls for a determined attempt to arrest the process of det~rioration in local secnrity. I would again em1hasize our concern at the slwlling of villages, which is the particnlarly disturbing feature of the climax to the series of incidents which have taken place in this sensitive area over the past six months. Tlte imperfect operation of the machinery established for the maintenance of the armistice regime between Israel and the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic has a long history, into which it would serve no pm'puse to culeJ' now. [am Slue that the Council would prefer, rather than discussing this prohlem in dew,] here, to assure the Secretary-General of its full support in the efforts ])€ illtends, as we have just heard from [tim, to make to reverse the trend towardll increasing violence and to seellft' the (:0- operation of the Governments concerned in stabilizing conditions and enabling the POpuhluon on both sides of the demarcatlon line to live and carry on their daily tasks in peace and security. 20, :Mr. GEORGE5-PICOT (Frame) (translated fram French): In the documents submilted to th~ Security Council on the incidents of 3 December in tile Lake Huleh area, one fact is to my mind of particular signi- ficance, "Heavy artillery and mortar sllelling " - I am bOlTOw1rrg tllC phrase from the report of t.he Chief of Staff - was directed at villages ill Israel and it was only due to a combination of fortuitous circumstances that the cffect~ of the bombardment were not more tragic, 21. This incident is too serious in itself and too fraught with danger to be ignored and buried in the long series of bloody incidents which have occurred in the course of the years on the frOntiers of Israel. 22. For that l'eason I lnllst inform the Council that my Government vicw~ WiLll declJ concern the' cn~c 18. Man gouvernilment a eu la preuve douloureuse de l'impcrfecti.on avec laquelle le r6gimc cl'armistice fonc- tionne clans celte region lorsque, le mois demicr, Mme Doran, femDe de l'Attache de ['air britannique en Israill. y a ett~ tuee acoups de feu. Le Gonvernement de Sa Majeste a 6tndie I1n expose des faits etlbli le 20 novembre pal' un obscl'vahmr mHitaire de l'Organisme des Nations Unics charge de la surveillance de la tre-ve. Compte tenu ~ la fois des donnees recuemies et du manque d'empressement dcs autorites syriennes pour par,ticiper a I'enqt:.il;te sur la disparitioll de Mme Domn, le GOllvernement de Sft Majeste ne peut que conclure que Mme DoraIl a <Stc tuce par llne ou plugieurs per- sonne:; venues (h: ten"itoire syricn et ay~lnt traverse la hontiere. Oans ces conditions, et en l'absellce de taule "xplicatiQll satisfaisantc, le Gouverncmcnt de Sa Majestc dait tenir panr responsable le Gouvernl'.ment de In P.epubliquc arabe unie, et il prcnd actuellement les mesures voulues pour le saisir de l'aITaire, 19. Comme le Secretairc generall'a indique, la situa~ tion daus Cl'. secteur exige qU'on fassc des errorts etlcr~ giques pour mettre un terme a nnl'. insecurite qui va croissant. Je voudrais redire I'emotion que nons epl'OU~ vons devant le bombardement de villages; c'est la un aspect particulierement inquiMant Ull pIllS grave de tou::; le;; incldent.s qui sc :micnt produits depuis six mois dans cette zone nevralgique, Que les organcs cnMs pour maintenir le regime d'annistice entre Israel et la r~gion S)'11elme de la Rcpublique arabe unie fonctio:ment de fal,(on imparfaite n'est point muveau, et il e2c inutile d'y l'eveTlir maintr,nant. le suis certain que, au licu de discuter ce probleme e:l detail, le Conseil prefcrcra assurer le Secretaire general de son appul total dans les efforts qu'it se propose de faire, commc il vlent de nOlls le dire, pour renverser la tendarrce a la violence, et pour obtenir le concours des gouvernements interesses en VUe de stflbiJiser la situation et de per- mettre ala popu:ation de part et d'autre de la :igne de demarcation de vivre et de vaquer it ses U\ches quoti~ diennrls dans la paix et dans la secllrite, 20, M. GEORGES--PICOT (Fral1re) : Dans Ics docu~ ments qui ont ete soumis au Conseil de securite sur les incidents survenus le 3 <.lecembre dans la region dll lac de HouIC. Ull fait a nos yeux dominc les alltres et doit avant tout retenir notre attention : (I un violent tir d'artillerie et de mortier» - j'emprunte cette expression au rapport du Chef d'ttat-major - a lite dirige 3ur des villages israeliens et si les effet'i de cc bombardement n'ont pas ete plus tragiques, c'est gri1ce 4 un conceurs de circonstances inesperee5, 21. eet eveneml',nt est trop grave en soi et trep lourd de dangers pour qu'on puisse l'ignurer et le confoodre dans la longue serie d'incidents sanglants qui se soot produits depuis des annees aux frontieres cl'Israel. 22. C'est pourquoi je dei.'! exprimer au Conseil les vives preoccupations gll'inspire a mon gouvernement 23, From the report (lf the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [S/41241 it is possible to form an idea of what happened ill the Lake Huleh area on 3 December from the time small arms fire was opened from the Syrian side until the bom~ bardmcl1t of the villages in Israel. When we look at these events in their context, as the report invites u:. to do, we cannot fail to be struck by the recurrence of incidents on the Syrian-Israel frontier, some of which could have develoned into actual acts of war, as was the case on 3 Derember. 24. While it is the duty of the Serurity Council solemnly to draw n.ttention to the exceptional gravity of this incident, the matters which give rise to such incidents are hy their very ntLture in principle and in the ftrst insLaJll:e within the jlll'sdiction of the Mixed Armistice Commission, whose funetion it is to investigate them, deal with them and prevent any recnrrencc. In this conllexion, we can only share the repeatedly expressed regret, echoed hy the Chief of SLal! in his report, that the Coltunissioll hus been unable to hold regular sessions since June H)~l, thus preventing tlle normal operation of the machinery established under the General Armistice Agreement. 25. The very helpful statement which the Secretary- General made at the beginning of this meeting shows that he shares the concern I have just expressed. We share his view that no effort ~hOllld be spared to put an encl to a situation the seriousness of which is clear fmm the incident of ::I December, We agree that the present trend must be reversed by attacking causes aud not effects, HecoUl'se to force, however jnstifiahle it may appear in certain cases, cannot lead to a lasting settlement. 26. ]n this area of tile Middle b:ast, where the United Nations had already made such great efforts and saerilices to maintain the peace, there can be no question of abandoning hope for the future. The visit which the Secretary-General proposes to make will enable him to examine the situation 011 the spot and to consider ways and means of remedying it. V'hth that prospect and an expression of the Council's grave concern concerning the incident which occasioned its meeting, we might, I believe, usefully conclude our debaLe today. 27, In closing, I would addl'e.~s an urgent appeal to the parLi('.s involved to refrain from any action that might giw rise to fm'ther incidents. 28, Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) (translaled from Spanish): This is the second meeting the Security Counc.ll has held to consider the complaint made by IS1'ael against the United Arab Hepublic which forms the subject of document S/4123, It is stated in this document that the attacks perpetrated "have no·w developed a 23. La lecture ciu rapport etabli par le Chef d'etat- major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve [8/4124] permet de se faire une idee de ce qui s'est passe le 3 decembre dans la region du lac de Houle. depuis le declenchement d'un tir de mousqneterie du cOte syrien jusqu'au bombardement des villages israeliens. Quand on replace ces faits dans leur contexte, comme le rapport nous y invite, Oil ne peut s'emperher d'elre frappe par la repetition, a la frontiere syro-isrnelienne, d'incidents dont certains auraient pu degenerer, comme ee fut le cas le 3 decembre, en de veritable::; nctes de gucrre. 24. S'H est du devoir du Conseil de securite d'appel~r solennellement 1'1ltLention sur l'exceptionnelle gravite de cct evenement, de pflr leur nature meme, les affaires qui conduisent ade pare-its incidents rete-vertt en princip~ et d'abord de la competence de la Commi~sion mixt~ d'armistice, dont c'est precisement le rNe de les instruil'e, de les traiter et d'en prevenir le retonr, On ne peut, acet egard, que s'associer au regret maintes fois exprimc, et dont le Chef d'Ctat~major se fait I'eeho dans lion rapport, que la Commission n'ait pu se reunir rcgulie- rement depuis juin 1951 et que le fonctionnl.'ment normal des organes prevus par la Convention d'armistice general ait cite de cc fait paralyse, 25. L'intervention si pertinente que le Secrctaire gen.cral <l. [lrotloncec au debut de la presente seance correspond aux preoccupations que je viens d'exprimer, Nous estimons aver lui qu'aucun effort ne doit etre neglLge pour meUre fm a la situation dont J'incident du 3 decembre demontre la gravite. Nons sommcs cl'nccord sur la necessite de redresser la tendance actuelle, en s'attaquant aux causes, et non aux effets, du mal. Le recours a la force, si justifie gu'il puisse paraitre en certains cas, ne saurait condnire a des solutions durables. 26. Dans eette region du Moyen-Orient ou l'Organi- sation des Nations Unies a deja consacl'C a son ceuvre de paix taut d'elTorts et de sacrifices, il n'est pas pennis de desesperer de I'avenir, La visite que projette le Secretaire general lui permettra de reprendre sur place l'examen de la situation et des moyens d'y reme-dier, et cela nous parart, au stade actuel, avec l'expression des graves preoccupations d'J Conscil sur l'incident qui a motive sa reunion, une conclusion utile de notre debat d'aujourd'hui. 27, Qu'il me soit permis, en terminant, d'adresser un uppel pressant aux parties en cause pour qu'elles s'abstiennent, dans les jours qui viennent, de tonte initiative susceptible de provoquer cle nouveaux inci- dents. 28. M, ILLUECA (Panama) [tradail de l'espagnol] .- C'est la deuxieme reunion que le Conseil de :,;ecurlte tient pour examiner la plainte d'Israi!1 conLre la Hepu- bliqlle arabc unie qui fait l'objet du document S/4123; d'apres cc document, des attaques se sont produites qui llrevetent maintenant un tel earactere qu'elles 29. Without going into the question of estabJshing who i~ responsible, my delegation dee;Jly regrets any act of violence which thrE"atens human life, in particular the lives or women and childl'en. It especially regrets those wbich occurred in nortlt-eastern Galilee, described by Major-Gelleral Carl CarlsslJll \1011 aom, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Orga- nization in Palestine as .. a very serious incident which took place on 3 December 1958 in thl" llrea of the armistice demarcation lille b2tween Israel and Syria, north-east, east and south-east of th~ former Lake Huleh" [S14124, para. J1. 30. Le point inscrit a I'ol'dre dn jour de la presente seance stintitule oc La qUEstion de Palestine n. Per- mel:tez-moi, Monsieur le President, de faire nne breve digression. En Cl' fiois de decemLr€, la « question de Palestine \) devrait cesser d'etre la designation d'un contHt entre Isl"aCl tt lcs Etats arabc2 paUl' dc"Vcnir une occasion de manifestation des sentiments de paix et de fraterni te qui coraderisent !'lllle des grandes religions qui, pour 18 ben de l'Imrnanite, est nee preci-' sement en Palestine. C'est pourquoi nla deMg2tion desire lancer un appcl aux partie:; interess6es et leur demander de redoubler d'efforts en vue de rechercher, dans un esprit de conciJiEtion, le.~ Iormules qui pcr- mettront de regler p"cifJqucment les problemes com- plexes connus SO\1S le nom de (( ques~ioll de Palestine J>. 30, The agenda item for today is entitled "T:1(~ Palestine question ". Mo.y I be Il1lowed to digress briefly? We are now in December, a monlh in whkh .. the Palestine question" ceases to be a description of a ~.nnflict between Is~ael and the Arab States and becomes a matter associated with the sentimeds of peace and of the brotherhood of man charactel'istic of one of the great r~Iigion~, which, to the g~eilt benefit of mankind, /irst saw tlie light in this ve:s rtgillH- Palestine. That is why my delegation feds impelled to appeal to the parties cOllcerned te intensify their dTort5, io a spirit of conciliation, to find a peacdul way of settling the complex problems Imown flS " The Palestine question ". 31. Apres avoir entendu los declarations dll Secretaire general, de~ repr&;entants :l'hl'ai'l et de la Rcpubliql1e arabe unie, et de plus~eurs alLtres rnemble5 c1u Conseil, je crois devoir rappeler que, (Ians la derni~re resolution qu'il a adoptee 5\11' la question de Palestine, le 22 jan- vier 1958 [Sf3042], le Confleil a invite les pllrties a utiliser le mecallh:;Jlle lnevu dtlllS In COu\'clltialt d'armis- tice general pour la mise en ceUVTC des dispositions de ladite convention. 31. After listening to the statements of the Secretary- General, the representatives of Israel and the United .iuab Republic, and other members of tne COlln('.il, I feel I should recall that the Security Council, in its last resolt:tion on the Palestine quesLiol1, adopted on 22 ./anllmy 1958 [Sj3942], called upon the parties to use the machin~ryprovided for in the General Annist:ce Agrcemen~ for the implementation of the pfcvisions of that Agreement. 32. Pour conclure, mu delegation exprime l'espoir que, grace aux instnulleuts que la Charte des Nations Unies et la Convention d'armistke g~ncral mettel1t a la disposition des parties interessces, il se,'a jJ0.ssibJe de parvenir a une conciJiahOl: entre le8 deux pays voisins du Moyen-Orient. que separe ce difierenc, pour le bien de la paix t:t dc lu tranquillitc unherse]le_~. 32. In condusion, my delegation ventures to 3xpress the hope that, by'the use or the fllcilities p_aced at the di!;posal of the partie,<; in the United Nations Charter and in the General Armistice Agreement, a settlement will be reached which will reconcile the two neighbouring nations of The Middk East concerned in this displlte and thus strengthen international peace and security. 33, M, JA\VAD (Irak) [lrllduil de l'anglai,~] : Le ConseD a certainement ente-ndu avec le pIns grand interet la declarulion que le Secretaire general a faite cet apres-midL Cette dec!Rl'nHon temoigne de son inquietude devant la situation tencue dans le secteur un lac de HuulC eL dc"Vanl 163 mcthodcs suivies quam] un differend sllrvient entre les deux p<irtLes. dans ce l'iecteul' ou dans d'autrcs. Comme le Secretaire general 1'::1 lAi!S"lP. enip.ndl'e. d811S l;a Mclaration, 1l0llS t:StblOll5 que rapplicaLioll strictt'o de la Convention d'armistice general et I'utilisatioll du mccanismc qu'elle prevoit empccht:ront le retour de coni/its ct d'incidcnts, Ell tout cas, nOllS sornmes d'accord pour reconnaitn que le recours aux. arffies cons'itue un dangtf pour la paix 33, Mr. JAWAD (lra(:): The Council has no doubt :istcned with great interest to t.h8 statement of the Secrdary-Generat this afternoon. Tllis statement; shows his anxiety regarding the state of tensioll eXbting in the Hl1lt!l area and the policy and. rJrflcUcc b~il1g I"ollnwed with rcgr:rd to dirl'erenccs arisLlg betwt<cn the two parties in that al'e~ aoel elsewhere. As the Secrdary-General has :mplied in his litalernent, we feel that a strid implclnentation of the General Armis- tice Agreement Dnd the use of the machinery p:oovided thereunder would prevent t:le recurrenCe of conflicts and incidents. rn any Cilse, we flgree that resort to the use of foree constitutes a danger to the peace in that region. We sincerely bope that the forthcoming 35. My delegation has sllldied mOSL ('arefully the report of the Chief of Staff of t.he United NaUons Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine on the incident of 3 December 1958 [SI4124], as well as the statement made here on 8 December by the representatives of the United Arab Hepulllic and Israel respectively [84181 mecling). A carefull examination of these docu- ments reveals that the incident of 3 December was only one in a long series of incidents precipitated by Israel activities in the demilitarized zone of the Huleh area, activities which indicate clearly the non-obser- vance by Israel of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreemelll, particularly, u.rllcles V and VII. 36. We have no intention of wasting the timc of the Council with descriptions of the vflriolls activilies of Israel which have led at one time or another to friction and Jiring incidents in the Huleh area. The various reports of the Chief of the UnHed Nations Truce Supcl'vision Organization contain sulficient detailed information confirming the conclusion we have just stated. It seems, however, essential forthe consideration of the present Israel complaint that the Council should endeavour to detect the existence of a pattcrn which these incidents follow, renecting a premeditated plan of action which. in the process of its implementation, leads to the occurrence of firing incidents. 37. It will be rec<llIecl that article VII of the General Armistice Agreemen t entrnsted the supervision of the execntion oE the Agreement to the Mixed Armistice Commission and consequently all claims and complaints by either party were to he referred to it. It is the duty of tlle Commission to take action Oil such claims and complaints by means of its observation find invesli· gation machinery. The various reports of the Chief of StalI of the United Nations Truce SupervisiDn Orga- lli~atiOI\ show that the Mixed Armistice Commission was not able to operate accordin~ to article VII, para~ groph 7, because of Israel's unwillingness to attend regularly. 38. The present report. to which I have refencd, therdorc states that: "As a result of the fflilnre of the Israel~Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to hold regular sessions since June 1951 and to hold emel'gency meetings save in very exceptional circumstances. the Chairman of the Commission and the Chief of Stall of the Truce Supervision Organization cannot speak on behaH of the Commission when they ask fill' the implementation of tlte General Armistice Agr00ment. In the case of the demilitarized zone they rely, in some cases successfully, on the special powers con· ferred on the Chairman under article V of the General 35. Ma delegation a etudie tres attentivement le rapport du Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve sur l'incidellt du 3 decembre 1958 [814124} ainsi que les declarations que les representants de la Rcpublique arabe unie et d'Israe..l ont faites ici le 8 deeembre r84l'~ seance], Un examen attentif de ces documents montl"e qne l'incident du 3 decembre n'a ete qu'un maillon de la longue chaine d'incidents provoques par les agissements israeliens dans la zone demilitarisee de la region du lac de I-!oule, agissements qui. indiquent clairement qu'Israel n'observe pas la Convention d'armistice general syro-israelienne, notamment ses articles V et VII. 36. Nous n'avons pas l'intention dc faire perdre du temps au Conseil en decrivunt les activites variees d'Israel qui ont provoque it diverses reprises des fric- tions et des ecltanges de coups de feu dans la region dn lac de Boule. Les divers rapports du Chef d'etat-major de 1'0rganisme des Nations Unies charge dc la sur- veillance de la treve contiennent des renseignements suffisamment detnilles pour confirmer la conclusion que je viens d'enoneer. Toutefois, pour examiner la plainte actnelle d'Israel, il est indispensable, a mon sens, que le Conseil s'efforce de discerner l'existence d'un certain processus qui est comillun a ces incidents et correspond a un plan d'action premedite dont l'execution aboutit a des echanges de coups de feu. 37. On se souviendra qu'aux termes de l'article VII de la Convention d'armistice general le contr6lc dc l'application de la convention etait con lie a la Commis- sion mixte d'armistice; par consequent, tontes les reclamations et toutes les plainLes de chacune des parties devaient etre adressees a eette commission. Celle-ci est tcnue de donner suite aces rcclamations et aces plaintes au moyen des organes d'observation et d'enqu~te prevus. Les divers rapports du Chef d'etat- major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la tr~ve montrent que la Commission mixte d'armistice n'a pu agir conformement au para- graphe 7 de !'uticle VII parce que les autorites israeliennes n'etaicnt pas disposees a assister regulie- rement aux se.aoces. 38. Ace sujet, nous trouvons dans le dernier rapport, anquel j'ai deja fait allusion, le passage suivant : «La Commission mixte d'armistice syro-israelienne n'ayant reussi ni a tenir des sessions regulieres depuis jllin 1951, nl a se reunir en seance extraordinaire, sauf dans des circonstances tout afait exccptionneltcs, le President de la Commission mixte d'armistice et le Chef d'etat-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve ne peuvent parlcr au nom de la Commission lorsqu'ils reclament l'application de la Convention cl'armistice general. Lorsqu'il s'agit de la zone demilitarisec, ils invoquent, avec succes dans certains cas, les ponvoirs speciaux 39. Anssi le rapporl til'e~t-il de eet etnt de choses la conclusion suivante : 39. Under these circum"tances, the repor!; draws the following conclllsion: .. The facL that the l\'lixed Armistice Commission does oat meet and that the Chairman nnd the Chief of StalT arc considered as inlermcdiaries who should obtain the s-Loppage of 'illegal' practices by the other party has created a state of mind contrary to the letter and the spirit of the General Armis\.ice Agreement." [Ibid., para. 19.] 40. Israel utilise egalement Ulle autre melhode con- traire a l~ lettre et a I'esprit de la Convention d'armistice general; cUe s'ex:prime par des actes qui demontrcnt nettemcnt qu'lsrael entend meconnanre les attrihnticos de la Commission mixtc d'arrnistice et la rClHrre ainsi absolument inutiie. Le dernie!" rapport donlle quelque.s exemples rccents de cette attitllde et montre clairement comment les activitcs frontalieres d'Israel ant provoque des echanges de eoupfl de feu. 40. Another method used by Israel in contradiction to the letter and spirit of the General Armistice Agree- ment is revealed by acts which aml:'ly demonstrate its intention to ignore the role of the Mixed Arnlisticc Commission and thus render its exislence totally useless. The present report provides a few recent illstances in this connexion and SllOWS clearly how Israel's border activities have led to firing incidents. 41. For example, in paragraph 22, the report cites how the mine-clearing operations led to exclHltlge of fire because "". the hraeli delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission had given no indication to the Chairman that mine-clearing operations would be carried out." [Ibid., para. 22.] 1L Au paragrapbc 22, pal' exemple,le rapport indiqlle que les OIJel'ations de ctelninage ont provoque dC3 echanges de coup~ de feu puree que {( ... la delegation israelienne a la Commission mixte d'armistice n'avait pas indiquB all President de la Commission que des op~.rations de deminage auraient lien. )1 [Ibid., par. 22.] 42. Furthermore, the two incidents in March relating to the work by Israel of digging all irrigation ditch in the Jalabina area show again that because of Israel's ignoring tlle macl!inery of the Mixed Armistice Com- mission, firing incidents resulted. These incidents merit special attention. 42. En outre, lcs dClLX incidents dll mois dc nUll'S relatifs !iU creusement par Israel d'un ennal d'irrigation dans le secteur de Jalabina montrent h\ encore que, si des coups de feu ont ete echanges. c'est parCe qu'Israel n'a pas voulu avoir aITaire avcc la Commission mixte d'armistice. Ces incidents meritcnt une attention particulie.re. 43. Des divt<rgences de vues existaient entre Israel et la Syrie quant a l'emplaccment exact de la limite occidentale du secteur central de la zone demilitarisee. Bien que la question ll'efit pas ete resollic, IsraiH avait commence des travaux c1'irrigation. Le- rapport contient a ce sujet le passage sldvant : "A la dcmande du President de la Commission mi:xte d'armistice, Ies travaux ant lite suspendus pour permettre de determiner sur le tcrrain rempla- cement exact de la IbniCe oc:cidentale de la zone demilitariseI'.. Les IsnH~liens ont r,{lnsenti a slIspendre les travalL': pendant trois jaurs. Le 29 mars an soil', le President a demande de prolonger la suspension, leg argument::; presentes par les Israeliens et les Syriens en ce qui concernc l'emplacement exact de la ligne ne s'accordant toujours pas. Les Israeliens ont refuse de renvoyer la reprise des travanx au~deln dll 30 mars a 12 heures (hellre locale). Ils se sont remis a crenser le canal al'aide d'une grue, le groupe de travaiJleurs etant accompagne d'une voiture blindee pour transport de personnel. BientOt, des coups de feu isoles provenant dn c~te syrien ant etc tires sur la gruc. Les Israeliens ont riposte... " [Ibid., par. 23.] 43. Divergencies existed between IsrQel and Syria as to the exact location 01 the western limits of the centra! sector of the demilitarized zone. Despite the unsettled nature of tlle question, Israel started carrying out irrigation work. The report states: .. At the request of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, 'worl{ was suspended to permit a determination on the ground of the exact location of the western limit of the demilitarized zone. TIle Israelis agrecd to postpone work for three days. On the evening of 29 March, the Chairman llsked for II further postponement of work, al) the discrepancies between the data submitted by the Israelis and the Syrians with regElrd to the exact location of the line had not vet been eliminated. The Israelis refused to postpone the resumption of work beyond 1200 hours local time on 30 March, The digging of the ditch was resumed with a crane, the working party being accompanied by an armoured personnel carrier. Soon single shots were flred at the crane from the Syrian side. The Israelis returned fire, ... " [ibid., para. 23.J «( Le. fait que la Commissicn mixte cl'armistice ne se renuit vas, et que le President et le Chef d'etat- major sont consideres cornme des intermedi3ires qui devraient obtenir de lu partie adverse qu'elle mette fin a des praliques «( ilIegales :', a cree un ctat d'esprit qui est contraire a la lettl'e aussi bi~n qu'a l'esprit de la Convention d'[1rmistice general. }j [Ibid.,par. 19.] 45. The central point in this ~robll:m concerns the Chairman's proposals for fl. provisional solution with a view to reducing th~ possibHities of friction. The attitude of Israel in this connexion was stated as follows: .. No reply had been received from the Israelis to the Chairman's proposlll - it had been accepted by the Arabs - when on 6 November tile Israelis decided to start working on onc of the parcels involved in this proposal." [Ibid., para. 26.J In order to carry out tlle work, the report irrdicates that" An Israeli working party returned to the parcel with au armed bulldozer," [Ibid,] 46. A uumber of other incidents of varying degree of importance have been mentioned in the present report, all of which seem to follow the same paUem. The conclusion to be drawn from these and other Israel activities is that, first, Israel refuses to co-operate with the Mixed At'mistice Commission, and secondly, defIes its mediation and recommendations, and thirdly, employs force in carrying out its objectives irrespective of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement. 47. We have tried ill brief to give the Council certain facts the impat:t of which has a direct bearing on the present complaint of Israel regarding the shepherd and the cows, This incident, it will be remarked, is neither different nor more serions than a number of others which preceded it. That is why we were very much snrprised when the Council was (~alled into an emergency session. It would have been appropriate for Israel to submit the complaint to the Mixed Armis- tice Commission; that is the nonnai procedure, not just in this regard but with regard to all difIel'ences and incidents of this character. Bnt such action was Hot in line with Israel policy vis-a.-vis the l\lixed Armis- tice Commission. Israel asked for the meeting of the Council in order to appear as a victim of aggression, and thu~ pose as the defender of peace in Palestine. Such Lactics have become well known to the world and cl\n delude none but the naive, It is apparent tbat tllC. emergency meeting of the Security Council had no other objective than that of propaganda. 48, A brief examination of the facts of the incident of 3 December will reveal the nature of the policy followed by Israel. Now, what are the facts of the incident of 3 December? In the first place, I wish to draw the Security Council's attention to paragraph 20 of the Chief of Staff's rcport. This paragraph sums 45. L'ch~ment essentiel de ee probleme, ce sont les propositions du President en vue d'une solution provi~ soire qui pcrmcttrait de n;duire les possibilites de friction. Voici comment le rapport expose l'attitude d'Israel a cet egard : cc La proposition du President n'avait pas relju de reponse dcs Israeliens - clle avait ete acceptee par les Arabes - lorsque. le 6 rrovembre, les Israeliens deciderent de commencer:l. exploiter l'un des terrains uont il etait question dans cctte proposition. ), [Ibid., pal". 26,] Le rapport indique que, afm d'cx~cuter le travail, « un groupe de travailleurs israeliens est retourne sur le terrain avec un bulldozer blinde)) [ibid.]. 46. Un certain nombre d'alltres incidellts de gravite variable sont mentionnes dans le mcme j'apport, ut tous semblent se derouler selon un processus identique. La conclusion qu'il faut tirer de ccs actes et de certains fl\ltre~ commis cgalement par des Israeliens est la sui- vante : d'unc part, Israel refuse de cooperer avec In Commission ffiixte d'al'mistice; d'autre part, il fait fi rll'; la mediation et des recommandations de cet orgauc; enfin, il recourt a la force pour atteindre ses objectifs, au meprjs dc la Commission mixte d'armistice et des dispositions d~ la Convention d'armistice general. j 47, Nous avons essaye d'ex.poser brievement au Conseil certains faits dont les repercussions ont. un rapport direct avec la plainte actuelle d'lsrael au 8ujet du bonvier et des vaehe~. On notcra que cet incident n'esL pas difIerent d'un certuin nombre d'autres qui l'ont precede, et qu'il n'est pas plus grave. C'cst pourquoi nous avons ete extremement surpris lorsque le COllseil a tte eonvoque d'urgence. Israel aurait del logiqllemcnt soumettre sa plainte a la CommLssion mixte d'armistice: c'est la la procedure normale, non sculement pOUT cct incident, mais aussi pour tous les diITercnds et incidents de cette nature. Cepcndant, une telle d~marche n'anrait pas lite conforme a la politique que suit Israel envers lu Commission mixte d'armistice, Israel a demand6 cette rennion du ConseB afin de se preselltcl' en victime d'une agression et de se poser ainsi en defensellr de la paix cn Palestine. Le monde est desormais familier avec cc genre de procedcs, qui ne sauraiellt tromper que [e5 naifs, Il est evident que la rcunion d'ul'gence du Conseil de securite n'avait qu'un but de propaganda. ·18. En ce qui concerne l'incident du 3 decembre, un bref examen des faits suffira a reveler la nature de. la politique poursuivie par Israel. Quels sont done ces faits? En premier lieu, je voudrais appeler I'attention du Conseil de sCcurite sur le paragraphe 20 du rapport du Chef d'Ct<lt-major. Ce paragmphe resume la dcu- ., It is this pattern: u~e o[ artillery aUer the use of small arms, which may endanger the peace, already threatened by the tension which has dcy~l()ped in the growing disrespect [or the obligations agreed to iu 1949, when the General Armit\tice Agreement was concludeC," [5/4124, para. 20.J This mal{es it a:nply cle!'.]' that tIle really dangerous element in such incidents is the use of artillery. ~(C'est cet enchainement: tirs d'artillerie sUCCedall~ 'lUX tirs de mousqueterie, qili ;·isqlle de compromettre la paix, d6ja menacee par la tension qui s'est ~rcee du fait que les obligations acceptees en 1949, IOIsque In Convention d'armistice general a He conclne. ~I}nt de mains en moins respeetees. » [5/4124, par. 2O.J L'clement vraiment dangereux de ces incidentsestdollC bien l'emploi de I'artillerie, 49. C'est maintenallt qu'il faut en venir a l'alpect le plus important de tOll'Le l'aITaire que nous examinons: qui a commence les tirs d'artiJIerie? It nous sulllt de nous reporter 311X paragrapl1es 4 et 5 dll rn~me rapport pour y trouver une reponse fort simple: le paragraphe 4 nous prouve de fa\;on concluante Que les autol'ites frontalieres syriennes ant C'oope-re pleinement avec l'Organisme des Nations Ullies charge de la surveillance de La treve, et c.c meme lors des tirs de rnousqlleterie. Ce paragraphe contient les !ignes suivf1ntes : ,lB. There now arises the most crucial question of th3 entire case under review: which side started the artillery fim? All we have to do is turn to pt'll'agraphs 4 and :) of the above~mentioned report to fmd the simple answer. III paragraph ,t wc fmd conclusive proof that the Syrian border authorities co-operated fully with the United Nations Truce Supervis:oll Orga- nization, even in the middle of the exchange of small- arms fire. The paragraph ~tates: .. During a lull in the firing, a United Nations military observer arrived at Darbashiya, on the SYl'i2..ll side ... , with a Syrian linison officer, and started down towards tlle area where, aceording to the Syrian, the Israeli wounded man ..,,,,as lying. " [lhid., para. 4,] What happened nAxt? The fonowing two sentences of the report give us the answer: "The ttlilitary observe.r was, however, unable lo reach the are.a in question, since at about 1600 hOllrs, artillery and mortar fire started from the Israeli side towards Syrian positions at Darbashiya and Jalabina [...1. The Syrians immediawly answered with the same type of fire ... " (l bid., para. 5.] Que s'r.st-it passe enwite? Les deux phrases suivantes du rapport nOlLS fournissent la reponse : "Tolltefois, l'observatcnr mm-mire n'a pad pu atteindre l'enclroit en qnestion car, vel'S 16 hture~, un tir d'nrtillerie et de mOl"tiers a ele declencM du cMe i.'uaeJien sllr les positions syriennes de Dar- bashiya et de Jalahina [...J. Les Syeiens ant imme- diatement riposte... n [Ibid., par. 5.} 50. II est bien evident qu'aucuD elTet oratoire ne sauxait jeter un voiJe sur ces faits ine(Jn~establC!. Alors qU'Ull incident de L'onticre peu important, au cams dlquel il avaiL ete fait uniquement usage d'acmes portatives, faisait l'objet d'nue ~nquetc de la part cl'un repre- sentant des :;.Julions Unies, les Israel.iens out ouvert soudo.in un br d'urtiIlel'ie, rendant aimi impossible une cnquete scrcine et impadale et t'ompromettant en outre la paix ct la securite. 50. It is quite evident that no amonnt of oratory can obscure these undeniable facts. Whil~ a minor border incident, involving ouly small-arms fire, was being investigated hy a United Nations representative, Israel suddenly resorted to the use of artillery, thus frustrating any chance of a calm and impartial investi- gatiun, 011 the one hand, and ondangering peaee anu security, on the other. 51. In conclusion, may I sum up the points which I have set forth in my statement. Firsl, tlllS incident must be looked upon as the latest in a series of incidents calculated to bring about the annexation of the demili- tarized zone bv Israel, in violation of the General Armistice Agre~ment. Secondly, the direct reference of this question to the Security Council, without first seeking a decision from the Mbl:ed Armistice Commis- sion, i.'i the result of Israel's illegal boycott of the Mixed Armistice ComnLs::Iion. Finally, if this incident Ius assumed a serious character, it is because the Israelis prevented the Ullilcd Nations investigntion on the scene und resorted to artillery fire. to whicll tire Otll~C side was compelled to reply. 51. Pour terminer, je voudrais nkapituler les points essentiels de mon expose. En premier lieu, eet incident doit ~tre considexe: comme le dernier en date d'une serie destinlie a provoquer l'annexion par Israel de la zone demilitarisee, en violation de Ir Conventlun d'armisti':e general. En second lien, si le Conseil de securite a ete saisi Jirectement de cette question san,; que la Com~ mission mixte d'armistice ait ell prealableme:3t la possibilite de se prolloneer, c'est qu'IsraClbo)'cotte ilIegalement la Commission. Enfin, si eet incident a revetn un caractere grave, c'est parce que les lsraeItens ont emptkh~les ohservateurs des Nations Unies d'p.nqll~~ ter sur les Heux et ont ouvelt un tir d'artillerie qui a oblige La partie adverse a riposter. « Pendant une accalmie, un obSlSrvilteur miHaire est arrive a Darbashiya I...), du cbte syrien, avec \lll omcier de liaison syrien, e~ s'est dirige vel'S l'endroit oit, d'apres les Syriens, se trouva.it le blesse isra6:ien.)1 [Ibid., par. 4.] H C'est cet encha':nement; tirs d'urtillerie succeJaut a\lX tirs de rnousqueterie, qui risque de l\OmpIomcttIc la paix, dc,jn menacee par la tension qUi s'est erece du fait que les obligations acceptees cn 19,W, lOl'sqllc la Convention d'armistice general a ete cQnclue, son I: de mains en moins respectees. n [5{4124, par, 2U.J L'c}fment vraiment dnngcreux de ees incidents est done bien l'cmploi de l'arf;ilIerie, " It is this patt('rn~ use of 8rt.illmy after the t:.Se of small arm:;, which may endanger the peace, already threatened by the tension which has developed in the growing disrespect for the obligations agre,~d to in 1\)49, when the General Armistice Agreement was concluded," [8{4124, para. 20,J This makes it amply cleil]' that the really dilngerous element in such incidents is the use of artillery. 49, C'est nlaintenant qn'il faut en venit· it I'aspect le plus important de toute l'affaire qne 1l0US examinllus : qui a commence les tirs cl'artilleric? 11 DOUS suffit de nons reporter aux paragn:.pht:s 4 et 5 du memc rapport pour y trouvel' une reponse fort simple: le paragraphe 4 nous prouve de fa~on coneluantc qu.e l~,; autorites frontalieres syriennes ont coop~re pleinement avec l'Organisme des Nat:olls Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve, et cc meme 10rs des tirs de mousqueterie. Ce paragraphe contient l~s lignes suivant.es : 49. ·i'here now arises the most crucial question of the entir~case under r,:view: which side starLed the artillery fire? An we have to do is tun to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the above-mentioned report. to find the simple answer. It: paragraph 1 we fllld conclusive proof that the Syrian border authorities co-operated fully wilh tlte United NatiOl15 Tmce Supervision Orga~ nization, evell in the middle oi the exchange of small- arms fire. The paragraph stat.es: .. During a 1nl! in the firing, a United Nations military obsef\'er arrived ut Darbashiya, on the Syrian side ... , with a SyTian liaison officer, and ~Lurl.ed down ';owarus the urCll wh~re, according to the Syrian, the Israeli wOlmdeu man was lying. " (Ibid., para. 4,J Que s'est-il passe ensuite? Les deux plm1.ses sltiVfl.l1tes du rapport nous fournissent la repUllStl ; What happl'ned next? The following two sentences of the report give us tile answer: "The military observer was, however, unable to reach thc area i:l question, since at about 1600 hours, ~u1illcry and mortar fire Blarkd from the lsraeli side towards Syrian positions at Darbashiya and Jalabina [...J, The Syrians immediately answered with the same Lype of flrc. , ," [ibid., para, 5.1 50, 11 est bien evident qu'al1CUll dIet oratoirc ne sauJ'aiL jeter un voile gur ces faits iucontestables, Alors qu'un incident de fronW~re pen important, an cours duquel iJ avait elC fait unlquerlllml usage d'armes port<\tivcs, faisaiL l'objct d'une cnquete de la part d'un repre- sentant des Natior.s Udes, Jes hraCliens ont c,uvert soudain un tir d'al'tillerie, rendant ainsi impossible une enqucte sercine et impartiale et comprorriettant en outre la paix et la secnrite. 50. It is quite evident that ne umount of oratory can obscur~ these und~niable facts. While a minor border incident, involving only sm<tll~arms fire, was being investigaterl by a Ullite,j Natims representative, Israel suddenly resorted to thll use of artillery, thu~ frustrating any chance of a calm and impartial investi~ gatien, on the one hand, and endangering peace alld securit.y, on the other, .')1. In conclusion, may I sum up thl.' pointR whieh I have set forth in my statement. First, this incident must be looked upon as the latest in a serie3 of incidents calculated to bring about the annexation of the demili· tarized zone by Jsrael, in viol~L.iOll of the General Armistice Agreement. Secondly, tile direct refurence of this question to the Security GO'mcil, without first seekng a decision from tI,e Mixl:d Annis"jce Commi5-- sion, is the result of Israel's illegal boycott of tlle Mixed Armistice Commission. Pinally, if this incident ha3 assumed a serious character, it is because the Israelis prevented the United Nations invesLigation on th~ scene and resllded to acilIery fire, to which the other side was compelled to reply. .1)1. Pour terminer, je "Voudrais recapituler les points essentiels de mOn expose. En premier lieu, cct inddent dOLl; Hre considerc comrrc le dernier en date cl'une serie destince a provoqller I'tmnexion par Israil.l de la zone dcmilitarisuc, cn violation de la CDllvcntiot1 d'armistice general. En second lieu, si le Conseil de securit~ a cte saisi dircctement ce Cette question sans que la Com- mi.%ion ll1ixtr. d'~rmisticc ait eu prcalabJemt-nt la possibilite de se pl'ononcer, c'esL qu'Israel boycotte illegalement la Commission, Enfin, si cet incic(mt a revetu un caractere gra"e, c'est parce que lcs Isr3eliens ont empech6 les observateurs dl:s Nations Ullies d'cnque- ter sur les Heux et ant Olivert un tir d'al':illerie qlli a oblige 1fi partie ailversc a riposter. {( Pendant une accalmie, un o])servuteur militllirc est arrive a Darb.ashiya (... /, du cdte syriell, avec un omcier de liaison syrien, et s'est dirige vel'S l'endl'oit 0\1, d'apres les Syricns, 3C trouvait le ble~se israelien, II [Ibid., par. 4·1 {( Tontcfois, l'obscrvatcur militaire n'a pas pu atteindre l'endroit en qnestion car, va1i 16 heures, un tir d'artmeri~ et rle mortiers a 6te declenchc du cOte isra6lien su: les positions syriennes de Dar- baslIiya et de Jalabina [...J. Les Syriens ont imme- diatcment riposte.•. lJ [Ibid" pal'. 5.J

We have followed closely the sta.tements made to the Council at its 841st meeting by the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic. We lmve also listened with great interest to tlte observations of the SecretarywGeneral today. We have, of course, studied the reporl submitted by the Chief of StaJI 01 the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization on the incident of 3 December between Israel and Syria in the Hulell area [8{4124]. 53 M. RITCI-IIE (Canada) [lraduii de l'ang1aisl ;, Nous avons suivi attentivement les declarations faites a la 841 e seance par les representants d'Israel et de la Republique arabe unie. NOils avons egalement entendu aujourd'hui avec le plus grand interet lcs observations du Secretaire general. Naturellement, nous avons anssi etudie le. rapport prescnte par le Chef d'ctat-major de l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve sur I'incident survenll le 3 dccembl'e entre Israel et la Syrie dans le secteuf UlI lac de Houle [8{4124]. 54. I have no intention of entering into the details of these events, bllt I think we must ull appreciate ~he help which this prompt and clear report has given us in understanding the facts of the C!l.!'>C. 54. Je n'ai pas l'intention d'entrel' dans le detail de ces evenements, mais je pense que nous devolls tOllS constater avec satisfaction que ce rappoTt clair et etalJli avec diligence nous aide amieux cornprendre les donnees de l'afIaire. 55. ] wish to say at the outset that my delegation deeply regrets this incident. which has disturbed the peace and has taken lives and destroyed property. "We. are also gravely concerned at this manifeslation of increased tension in this unsettled area of the Middle East. 55. le voudrais dire tout de suite que mu delegation deplore profondement eet incident, glli a trouble. la paix, cause des pertes en vies humaines et provoque des degats. Nons somrnes aussi extremement inquiets de voir qlle cet incident revele une situation de plus en plus tenduc dans ceUe region troubIee du Moyen- Orient. 56. I should like to associate the Canadian delegation with the SecretarywGeneral's remarks, parlicularly with respect to three points. First, we consider it desirable that military action on both sides be limited severely to the requirements of selfwdefence in the most re- stricted meaning of the term. Secondly, we agree that it is ncecessary to tackle the underlying problems, both of a shortwterm and a long-term nature, which have led to the present state of tension and to the recent regrettable outbrealcs of violence. And finally, we should like to emphasize the necessity, if peace is to he preserved, of both parties co-operating fully, in a spirit of confidence and compromise, with the inter- national mediation machinery that is available to them, and particularly with the United Nations Truce Super- vision Organization. 50. Je voudrais, au nom de la delegation canadiennc, sOllscrire aux remarques du Sccretaire general, notam~ ment sur les trois points suivants. Tout d'abord, nous jugeons souhaitable que tuute action militaire de part ou d'autre soit rigoureusement limitee aux exigences de la legitime delense dans la plus stricte acception de ce terme. Ensuite, nous. estimons nons aussi qu'j( faut s'attaquer aux problemes sous-jacents, a court tc.rme comme u long termc, qui sont a I'origine de la tension actuelle et des actes de violence deplorables qui se sont produiH, recemment. Enfin, nons tenons a soulignel' qu'il jrnporte, si I'on veut maintenir la paix, que les deux parties cooperent pleinement, dans. un csprit de conftance et de compromis, avec les organes internationaux de mediation qui sont aleur disposition, ct notamment avec 1'0rganisme des Nations Vnies charge de I a surveillance de la treve. 57. We wish the Secl'etarywGeneral godspeed in his forthcoming visit to the area and we hope that his discussions there will pave tile way for further steps by the parties tllcmselves toward an improvement in the situation. 57. NOlls souhaitons au Secretaire general bonne chance dans le voyage qu'il doit faire bientOt dans Ill. region, et nous esperons que les entretiens gu'l! aura prepareront le terrain de fagon telle que les parties el1eswm~mes prennent de nouvelles mesmcs pour ame- }iorer la situation. 59. Le repl'esenlant d'Israel ainsi que plusieurs repre- sentants qui ont pris la parole aujourd'hui ont souligne la gravite de l'inciderrt du 3 decembre. Le Chef d'etat- major. duns son rapport, rJlHllifie egalement cet incident de grave. L'incident it ceci de particuJier - et c'est justement ce qui en fait la gravite - que 1'on a eu recours a un tir d'artillerie. Vne question se pose: qui done a ouvert le tir d'artillerie, tramformant ce qui aurait pu etre un incident de frontiere hanal, commc it en survient souvent, en un incident grave qui a motive le depl'l't d'une plainte devant le Conseil de securite~ Qui a declenche eet incident? Qui a ouvert le tir d'artillerie? .59. In his statement, the representative of Israel, like oth~r representatives who spoke at today's met:ting, emphaSized the seriousness of the incident that took place on i::l December, and the report of the. Chief of Staff also describes that incident as a serious one. The main feature of this incideat was D1C use of artillery fire; {hat is what makes the incident such a serious matter. The question is: who began the artillery fire. anti Lhus turned what might have been an ordinary frontier incident, of whicl} there have heen many. iltLo a serious matter constituLing grounds for a com- plaint to the Security Council? Who precipitated that incident~ Who began the artillery fire? 60. 11 est natureL que les memhres dn Conseil ~c rep:lrtent en premi~r lieu aux documents et aux donnecs qui lenr sont fODrnis aussi bien par le,~ parties que par I'organisme qui est appeIe a exposer objectivement les faits. J'attire I'attention dlt Conseil sur le rappott du Chef d'M..at-major. Au paragraphe 5 de ce document, iI est dit {',e qui suit: « .. , vel'S 16 lteures, un tir d'ar~il­ lerie et de mortiers a ete declenche du c3te israeIien sur les positions syriennes de Darbasltiya et de Jalabina [...]. Les Syriens ont immedilltement riposte... I) [S/41U, pal'. 6.1 Avant 16 helu'es. il ya eu effectivement un feu de mousqucterie peu nomri, un tir d'armes portatives, lllais c'est a IG hellres qu'a commer.ce !'incident le plus grave qui a motive la plainte lJortee cle\'fint -le CouseiJ de securite. 1iV. Members of the Council will natur;tlly refer fir~L Lu the docllments and information made available to them both by the parties cOllcern~d and by the organization which is supposed to provide all objective ac.count of the facts, I wish to draw the COll-neil's attenLiun to Lhe repurt of the Chief of Staff. Pflra~ graph 5 of that document contains the following statement: ", .. at about 1500 hours arWlery illld mortur fire sLarted from the Israeli side towards Syrian positions at Darbasltiya and Jalabina r...]. The Syrians immediately answered witJl tlH~ same type of lire, . ," 15/4124, para. 51. Until 1600 hours, there had in fact been only the usual kind of small-arms fIre, but at 1600 hours began the extremely serious incident which led to the complaint to the Security Council. 61. Le [hef d'etat-major. se fondant SUI' le mpport des observt:lteurs qUl ont sUlvi les evenements, nous indique que le tir d'artilIerie et de morUers a et6 declen- cbe du cOte israelien, et que les Syriens ont riposte. Le rapport du Chef d'ctat~major est donc tout a fait explicite en cc qui ·::oncerne le debut de I'incident et ceux qui I'ont declenche. Gl. On the basis of t.he reports f)[ the observers who watched these events, 1J1e Chief of Staff il\Iorms liS that the artillery and 1110rl.ar fire bcgw on Llle Israeli side Hnd that the Syrian,:; replied to it, Thm it clearly emerges from the report of the Chief of Staff how the incident begrm and who began it. 62, Il est une aulre observation du Chef d'etaL-majol" que I'on ne saurait passeI' sous silence. Voici cc qu'iJ di.t au paragr:Jphe 19 de r;on rapport: c Cc type d'incident s'etait produit pour la prerriere fois le 6 novembre, lorsqu'un echange de coups de feu avait ete suivi d'tlll tir d'artilierie.» Ce sont 1cs paroles merncs du Chef d·ctat-major. L'incident du 6 novcmbre est decrit en detail au paragra-phe 26 du rapport. Get expose montre que, la nussi. le tir d'artillerie a ele declenche du cOte israelien; le 6 novembre. des churs, des ri(~ces d'artilLerie. des mortiers et d'autres armes lourdes ant ete rnises en action. 02. There is another comment by the C!lief of Staff thaL we cannot overlook. I refer to the passage in paragraph 19 of his report which reads: .. The pittlern fol' the 3 December incident was set on 6 November when resort to artillery followed the use of small arms .. ," Those again are the words of the Chief of StaIT himself. III paragraph 26 of tIle report there is a detailed account of the inciden~. or 6 Nnvember. It is clear rrom that statement Dlat once again the artillery fire was lirsl used by the hrael side; on 6 November tanks, artillery, mortars and other heavy weapons were utilized, 63. 1 also wish to dmw aLL(;nlioll to the Chief of Staff's conclusion that the incident of 3 December was of exactly the same kind as the incident of 6 November. Thus the incident of 3 December is not an isolaled case, but parL or a definite plan whieh creates incident-s of this serious lwtl.lre leading to major violation:> of 63. J'appelle encore une fois {'attention sur III conclu- SlOil du Chef d'etat~major seIon laquelle l'incident du 3 deeembre presente les mernes caracteristiques que ceJui du 6 novembre. L'inc:dent du 3 decembre ne constitue donc pas un cas isole; ce n'est que la repetition d'autres incidents de meme nature ttui se d6roulent 64. I accordingly consider that the Security Coullcil should give due attention to this matter and issue a clear warning to both sides, more especially to the side which is the instigator of incidents of this kind. The Security Council cannot remltin indifTerent to the precipitation of such serious incidents leading to vio- lations of the regime established by the Armistice Agreement and to a tense situation not only at thi:'l point of the demarcation line but throughout the area. 65. Wllat should the Security Council do in these circumstances? I believe that the correct course would be for the Council to urge both sides scrupu- lously to observe the General Armistice Agreement and, above all, if nny dispute should arise, to have recourse to the machinery established under that Agreement. In the present case, as in many previous instances, that machinery was not used, apparently because the instigator of the incident, in this case Israel, instead of using the existing machinery, is infringing the establiShed procedure and has appealed to the Security Council, obviously in order to divert possible blame from itself, whereas the actual victim is the one which is entitled to lodge a complaint tllut the Armistice Agreement has been violated. 66. It may also be that Israel is influenced by the fact that in past years it has frequently been blamed by the Security Council for having provoked sedous incidents which have led to major violations of the Armistice Agreement and to a state of tension in the area. Apparently, in the present case ISTal"1 is anxious for the records of the Council to include some mention of its complaint, although that complaint is com- pletely unfounded. 67. The Soviet delegation considers that the visit that the Secretary-General intends to pay shortly to this areu can also serve a useful purpose, since in addition to studying the situation on the spot, he will also be able to offer his services in bringing about a full implementation of the Armistice Agreement and the proper operation 01 the machinery established by the United Nations for the carrying out of that Agree- ment.

The Colombian delegation deeply and sincerely deplores the serious incidents which took place on 3 Deceml>er last in the Hulch area involving the regular troops of two countries with which Colombia maintains friendly relatiom. 69. 1\1y delegation associates itself with the l\opes expressed by the other delegations represented on the Security Council that the two parties concerned in this matter will refrain strictly from having recourse to arms in connexion with their frontier dispntes, since they have suitable means at their disposal for settling those disputes in a pcaceful manner. 64, n me semble que le Conseil de securite doit prendre tout cela en considemtion et adresser un avertissement sans equivoque aux deux parties, surtout a celle qui cree des incidents de cc genre. Le Conseil ne peut demeu- rer indifferent devant la provocation d'incidents graves qui entrainent des violations du regime etabli par la Convention d'armistice et creent un etat de tension non seulement dans ce secteur restreint de la ligne de demarcation mais dans la region tout entiere. 65. Que doit faire le Conseil de securitlW 11 ferait bicn, je crois, d'inviter les deux parties a respecter Hdelement la Convention d'armistice general et, en premier lieu, a recourir, en cas de diflerend, au rnecanisme prevu par cette convention. En I'occurrence, comme cela s'est sOllvent produit dans le passe, ce mecanisme n'a pas He utilise. 11 semble en effet que l'auteur de I'inci- dent - Israel, en I'espece -, au lieu d'avoir recours a cc mecanisme, enfreint la procedure normaIe et s'adresse au Conseil de securite aseule fin de detourner le." accusations possibles, alors que la veritable victime est cene qui pourrait se plaindre d'une violation de la Convention d'armistice. 66. D'autre part, Israel tient lIpparemment compte dll fait que le Conseil de securite, au cours des dernicl'es annees, l'a condamne plus d'une fois pOllr des incidents serieux qu'il avait provoques et qui avaient entratne de graves violations de la Convention d'armistice, creant une atmosphere tendue dans la region. Dans le cas present, Israid voudrait evidemment que I'on retrouve une trace de sa plainte dans les documents dll Conseil, encore que cette plainte soit entierement denuee de fondement. G7, La delegation sOYietique estime que le voyage que le Sccretaire general compte faire prochainement dans la region sera utile, car Ului permettra non sl:ule- ment de se rendre compte sur place de la situation, mais aussi d'oITrir ses services afin d'assurer la stricte application I.le la Convention d'armistice et I'utilisation du mecanisme que l'Organisation des Nations Dnies a cree a cet eITet. 68. M. ARAUJO (Colombie) (fraduit de l'espagnolj : La delegation de la Colombie deplore sincerement et profondement les graves incidents qui ant eu lieu le 3 decembre dans la region de Boule et qui ont mis aux prises des forces reguMres de deux pays amis de la Colombie. 69. Ma delegation, comme les autres membres du Conseil de securite, souhaite que les deux parUes interessees s'abstiellnent rigoureusement de recourir allx armes dans les incidents frontaliers qui peuvent les opposer, etant donne qU'elles disposent de tous les eJemellts necessaires pour regler pacifiquement ces incidents. 71 The Colomhian delegation confidently lIopes that the United Nations representatives in the area in question, helped by the invall1able advice 'Vhich thc Score-tary-General will give them dllring his forth- comlng trip to tite i\{iddle East, will be able to ma:{e a contribution to the achievement of a satisfEctory and speedy 3cttlement of this. eodlkt. 72. Tlte PRESIDENT: As no Oth~T mcmDeI'S o[ the Conncil have indicated their wish to speak, I now caB upon the representative of Israel.

My delegation has listened with interest to the Serious declaraWOlls by the Secl'C- tary-Gencral a:J.d the representatives of the United Strrtes, the United Kingdom, FhnD:!, Pamtma. Canada and Colombia, all of whom have stressed the wavily 01 various aspects of the ccmplaint which Israel has :;;ubmitted to the Security Council. 'VI'. also nole and Welcl!me the inLenticn 'of I:he Secretary-Gene:al to discuss these matters dL'ecUy ,,~th the Governments of IS~R(\l and t~le Unit;ed Arab Hepublic. 74, The cont~ntion of the United Arab Republic expressed at the 84hl meeting that this is not at ::Ill a serious complaint has been clearly refuted both by the letter and the spirit of the majority of addresses which we have heard. It is Lrue, as many delcgations have stressed, that relations between the two signa- tQrie3 of the Ismel-SyJiar: General Arrnistir::e Agreement exist in an atmosphere created by v~u-iou~ his;orbfll, )(gal, political and eConomic problems. There is the state of war which the United Arab Republic maintains as the basis or its jurisprudence in its relatiolll; with Israel: there is the refusal of Syria, as the signatory of the 1949 Agreement, to respond to a request fOT defining a position of non-belligerency; .md there is 3 record going back to 1951 of Syrian efforts to obstruct dewl{lpment projects, and ~speciany water development projt:cts, which Israel considers vital and which a majority of the Security COllllCi! ha.s repeatedly npheLd us legitimate. 74. Le representant de la Republique arabe unie 2. declare a la 841 e seance du Conseil que llotre plainte n'avait aucun cartlC!er€ de gravite, Gctte assertion <i ":Le clairement refutee par la plupa.rt des representants que nOllS aVOIlS entendus, que ron considcre la lettre ou l'esprit de leurs deClarations. 11 est vrai, ainsl que de nombreuses delegations ront fait remarquer, que les relatiol]!'; entre les deux signawires de la Con\'ention d'armistice gencr~l syro-israelienne se situent dans une certainI'. atmosphere, et que cette a~mQs.r>lIere est due it divers probl~mes historiques, juridiques, politiques et economiques, II y El. l'etat de gnerre que la Repllbique 'lrnoe uni€' maintient comme fondement juridique de 51'.5 relations avec lsrad. 11 ya un rcfus, de la pa:t de la Syrie, signatnire de la convention de 1949, de repondre a une demande d'adopter une position de non-belUgerancc. Enfin, il y a :u1 do.<;~ier, re.-nonmnt a 1951. de tous les eftorts que laSyrie a faits pour mettre obstacle DUX divers pl'ojds de developpemcl1t. notalUlllenl aux projcb de mise en valenr des resso'Jrces hydranHqlles qu'IsraeI considere COlnme vitaux et dont la majorite des ffiembrcs dll Conseil ,ie secllritc ont reconnu a IJIainLcs rcpri~cs le caraet~l'e legitime. 75. L'attnque qui a declenchC l'incident du 3 decem.lJre n'a pas eu lieu dans la zone demili~ari56e, et le repre- sedant de l'InlJ( n'c"t done pas bien renseigne SUl' cette question. Mais, meme dans la zone demiJitarisee, l'inteITuption TY.'lr la force de tm'i'allX pacifiques de 75. The attack which initiated the incident of 3 Decell1~ her did not take place in the dcmilitarized zone, and the representative of Iraq is therefore nol well jnformed on that question. But even in the demilitarized ZOne forcible interruption 01 peaceful development Work would be illegal and contrary to the General Armistice Agreen;ent. Indeed, whenever these actiVities, espe- cially those connected with wate; development, have been suspended at the request of the United Nations, they have subsequently been held to be legitimate and have proceeded on that Dasis witt', complel.e int€Tnational validity. mi~e en valeur serait ilIegaIe et contraire a la Con\'en- tion d'armistice general. D'ailleurs. ehaque fois que ces activites, en pll rtielJlier celles qui ont traital' expJoi~ tation des ressources hydrauliques. ont 6te suspcndues a la demande de l'Organisation des Nations Uni€s, elles ont emuite ete reconnues :egitimes, et Ont ~epris apres avoir r€9u une ~anction internation:l./e sans reserve. 76. Tllese are all i:nportant questions in themselves, but these are not the questions which have been broJght 76, Toutes Cl'.; questions son~ importantes cr, soi, mais le CanseD de securite ll'en a pas lite saisi et dies 71. La delegation de la Colombie est convail\cue que les represelltallt~ de l'Organi~atioll des Nlltiort~ Uries d,aos la zone interessee pourront, avec le concou:s rre- cteux que leUT apportera le Secretaire general lors de son prochain voyage au M:0ycll~Orient, aider aresoudre Tflpidement, et de rnani~rc satisfaisa.llte pour tous le conflit dont il s'agit. ' 72. Le PRESIDENT (lradllil de l'u'1g1ais) : Comme allcun autre membre du Conseil n'a demande la parole je donne maintcnllnt la parole au representant d'Isril.el: 73. M. ERAN (Israel) [lradlli! de I'Gllg[aisl : Ma de-le- gntion n ectmte avec illtCnSt les importantes d,~c];\rations du Secretaire general et des representants d~ Et1tS- Unis, dn Royawue-Uni, de la France, dn Panana, du Canada et de la CnIomhiE', fJUi ont taus souliRne la gravite de divers <lspects de la plainte qu'Israel a deposee devant le Conscil de securite. NOlls llotons egalcm~nt nvee ;al:isfaction !'intention que le Secre- mire genernl a exprimec de discute. direetement de ces questions uvec les GOllvcrnemerts d'Israel et de la rtcpuoliquc Il.rubc unic. 77. The pattern and the sequence of events emerge quite clearly from the reports before the Security Council. In the first stage, Israel shepherds go forth on peaceful work in Galilee. They are attacked by Syrian forces, with fatal results. Syria is affirmed, in the report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Snpervision Org£lnilation [8}4124], as having initiated this attack. Four hours then pass during which I.;raeli civilians are under small-arms fire. After four hours ~ and only then - does Israel take action, which even then is limited in scope and directed exclu- sively to the militory positions from which the Syrian attack is proceeding: legitimate self·defence in l~c narrowest possible interpretation o( that term, without the direction of any artillery or mortar flre on civilian villages, and without inflicting damage on anything except military establishments. The third phase: instead of breaking oH the engagement even at this pr.rilous point, Syria develops the engagement into a full-scale artillery bombardment along a front stretching seventeen kilometres in length and five kilometres in depth. 78. These are the facts; they arc set out in the report. Syrian initiative for beginning the engagement, and Syrian responsibility for developing it from a conflict of military character and local scope into an all-out attack involving civilian communities ~ these facts are stated in tlle report. Therefore, when we hear a permanent representative on the Security Council, with this report in his hands, describing Israel as the ini~ tiator of the 3 December incident, we cun only deplore such a groSB deviation from every standard of objective truth. I cannot help thinking Lhat some representatives must have been reading a different version of this report, one that began WitJl paragrapll 5 and which ignored everything set 01..lt in the preced!ng paragraphs, concerned exclusively with the Syrian attack at about 1200 hours and the maintenance of this attack for four hours subsequently. 79. If we could place any credence in the opposite version that has been submitted here, we would have to wonder why there is not a United Arab Republic complaint against Israel upon the table of the Security Council - or indeed, before any organ or tribunal of the United Nations. No, Mr. President, it is the Israel complaint against the United Arab Republic which constitutes the agenda of the Council. As the Secretary-General indicated at the outset of today's proceedings, it is an incident which must evoke the deepest concern. The dimensions of the Syrian bom- bardment of Israeli villages carry the incident far beyond the scope of a local skirmish, and in these circmnstances, recourse to the Security Council was I legitimate. 77. L'enchalnement et la succession des evenements ressortent tres nettement des rapports soumis au Cornei! de securite. Au cours de la premihe phase, des bouviers israeliem vaquent pacifIquement a lenr:; occupations en Galilee. Ils sont attaques par des troupes syriennes~ avec les tl'isles resultats que I'on sait. Le rapport du Chef d'elat-major de 1'0rganisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve [S/4124j affirme que la Syrie a pris l'initiative de I'aUaque. Puis, quatre heures s'ecoulent, au cours desquelles des civils israeliens essuient le feu d'armes portatives. All bout de qUfltre heures - et alors seulement -, Israel intervient, et, meme a ce moment, son intervention n'a qu'une portee lirnitee et elle est dirigee exclusivement contre les positions militaires a partir desquelles est lancee l'aUaque syrienne : il s'agit la de legitime defense dans l'acception la plus stricte du terme, sans qu'aucun tir de pieces d'artillerie ou de mortiers soit ouvert sur des villages habites par des civils et sans qu'aucun domrnagc soit inilige, ~inon A des postes mLlitaires. Troisibnc phase: au lieu de rompre l'engagement, meme a cc stade dangereux, la Syrie le tnlllsforme en un bombar- dement d'arlillerie El grande echelle sur un front de 17 kilometres de long sur 5 kilometres de profondeur. 78. Tels sont les faits; ils sont exposes dans le rapport. Engagement decIenche sur !'initiative de la Syrie et responsabilite de la Syrie, qui transforme tine escar- mOllche purement militaire et de caractere local en une attaque generale dirigee notamment contre des centres habites par la population civile - ces faits figurenL dans le rapport. C'est pourquoi, lorsque nOUs entendons un membre pennanent du Conseil de securite declarer, ce rapport a la main, que c'est Israel qui a declenche l'incident du 3 ctecembre, nous ne pouvons que deplorer que l'on puisse s'ecarter de fayon auasi flagrante de toutes les nonnes de In verite objective. Je ne puis m'emp~cher de penser que certains repre- sentants doiveot avoir lu une version differente de ce rapport, commenyant avec le paragraphe 5 et ne tenant aucuo compte de tout ce que contiennent les paragraphes precedents, lesquels ont trait uniquement a J'attaque syrienne, commencee vers midi, et a la poursuite de cette attaque pendant quatre heures consecutives, 79. Si nous pouvions accorder quelque credit a la version opposee qui a ete presentee ici, nous devrions nous demander pourquoi la Republique arabe uni<l n'a pas depose de plainte contre Israel devant le Conseil de securite - ou devant tout autre organe ou juridiction des Nations Unies. Or, c'est hien une plainte d'Israel contre la Republique arabe unie qui est inscrite al'ordre da jour du Conseil. Comme le Secretaire general I'a indique au debut de la seance d'aujourd'hui, cet incident est de nature asusciter la pIllS vive inquietude. L'ampleur du bombnrdement syrien contre les villages isracliens en fait un evenement inflniment plus grave qu'une simple escarrnouche locale, et, dans ces condi- tions, il etait legitime de recourir au Conseil de securite. 81. Dy f;very onc of the standards referr~d to hy the Secretary-General and by these six: delegations, such ac1s as the shooting of Israeli shepherds off Gonen and the bombardment of seven villages in the Huleh Volley stand clearly condemned. This is the issue, and this is the only issue before the Security Council, 82. In tile address which I was privileged to make on Israel's behalllast week, 8 December [841sl meelin,q}, I ,tated that it was abwlutely axiomatic that such incidents be not repeated: that any Government could lIot resign itself in any circumstances to snch attacks HO its territory and life; that ac~s such as the artillery bombardment of peaceful villages l!ave the classic charactel' of an act of war; and that, for these very reasons, it is vital for the United Arab Republic to be impressed with tlle necessity of avoiding a repetition of such incidents in order that life in Llds part of Israel can proceed in an atmosphere of peace, consonant with its history and wiLh its destiny_ 83. Our object in seeking recourse Lo tll(' Security Council was to make a psychological impact far beyond tLat available to th!'. J\iTixell Armistice Commission. Every Member of the Untted Nations has the right of unconditional recourse to the Secmity Council, and this right of recourse to -UJe Security Council is not lost by ally Member State by reason uf Llther agreement3 into which it may enLer. And even if the Syrian-Israeli a~mi~tiGe machinery had been working in perfect order, we should not have regarded an p.vent of this scope as being appl'opriete for an int"rnational ins'~ance falling so far short of the maximal authority which the Security Council, and it alone, can mobilize in the nllmc of the international community. 81. FoUolving thi.~ discussion, we shall follow devel- opments closely. It is my duty to inform the Security Council that there has been constant small-arms fire directed against us every night since the meeting of the Council on Monday, 8 Decemher, To thb, we have made ni> response. The position, therefore, cannot be regarded as baving been solved, We can only hope that the United Arab Republic will ponder 81. D'apres toutes les nOflnes allxqu~Iles S~ sont reIeres le Se:::retaire general et les representants des six pays que je vi{'.ns de mentiQnncr, des acLes tels que les coups de feu tin~s sur le, bouviers israeliens a quelquc distance de GOncn et le bom:'ardcment de sept villages dans la vallee de I-Ioule ne peuvent etre que condamnes. Tel est le prohleme, et le selll probl&me, (Itll1t le Comeil de secmite soi~ saisi. 82. Dons la declaration que j'ai eu l'bonneu, de fail'(~ au. nom d'Israel la semaine demie.re, le 8 deecmbre \841e sJancl'-], j'fli indique qu'il ~tait absobmeI:t evidellt qlle de tels incidents ne 3evaLent pas ;;c renouveler, ql1'&ucun gouvernement ne sauruit se resigner, queUes que soient les circonstauC€s, a sulJir de :elles attaques eontre son territoire et la vie de StlS ressorli$~nt8, quo des actcs te]s que le bombardement par l'al'tillerie de villages paciiiCjues presentaient les caractercs classiques d'uctl;';s de guarrs, et qllP., pOllr ces raisons ml~.mes, il etait indispensable de fait'e compl'endrc ala Rcpublique arnbe unie ql1'j] fallait eviter le l'Imollvellement de pareils incidents pour que la vie clans tette partle du territoire israelien pnisse se poursuivrc dans une atmosphere de paix conforme ~ son histoire ct a sa destintk 83, Noire Dut, 0n faisant appet .au C(Jnscil de securit~, a ete de creel' un ehoc psychologique d'une port6e bCEmcoup plus grande que celni que nous aurions obtenu en nons ndressant a la COlllllli~siou mi:;;:te d'armistice. Tout E:at i\1ern:hre de l'Organi~ation des Nations Unics a le droit inco:1.ditbnnel de recoul'ir all GOllseH de scDurite. et aucnn Etat yIembre ne perd ce droit ell deyenant partie a d'antres accards. Et, m~me si les rOllages prevus par la Convention d'umistice syro- israelienne r1.vaient fon,~tionnc pnrfaitement, noW; n'aurions pas coosidere ql1'un evcne:ucnl de ccttl". portec relevftt d'unc instance inlernationale qui est bien loin d'avoil' l'a:.ttorite supreme que le Conseil de securite, et lui seul, peut exercer au non de la commu- naute internationnlc. 84, Ce debat termine, nous suivrons:le pres 1es eve- nements. .I'at le devoir d'In(ormcl' ie COllseit de s~cul'iM qu~, depuis sa reunion du lundi 8 decembre,les Israeliens on:: el1 sOllmis tOlltes lcs nuit.~ a un tir inintcrrompu d'armes porbtives, anqul'.l ils n'ont pas riposte. On ue saurait done oonsiderer la question comme reglee. Nous pouvons seulemen: espe-rer quc la :::l.epublique arabe unie pesera avec soin la declaration que mon

I have already had an opportunity in the preliminary slatemeut which I made to the Council on 8 Deeember last [841sl meelillgl to show to what extent Israel's eomplaint and the statements made in support thereof by Ml'. Eban distorted the facts and were obviously made for propaganda purposes. I was also at pains to establish that the Israel anthorities wen'l indisputably responsible for beginning the artillery duel which was the outstanding feature of the incident of 3 December 1958, as also for the state of tension along the demarcation line drawn by the Syrian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. I drew the Council's attention to the nonmll proceulIre which should have been followed in respecl of the hruel complaint, pointing out that uodel' the expl'e~s provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, the Syrian-Isrflel Mixed Armistice Commission was boUl empowered and obligated to deal with the questions raised by Israel'~ complaint and to recommend appropriate solutions. I ncaUed, in support of this course of action, both the provisions of article VII, paragraph 7, of tlmt Agreement and tIle position taken by members of the Council all such matters in the past. I also drew attcmtion to Israel's aggressive attitude and to previous instances of aggres- sion by Israel. My statement was based in the main on the information in my possession and I did nol enter into a detailed discussion of the report submitted by the Chief of Stall of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [Sf4124]. 86. I intended to analyse this report today, but in view of the discussion in the Council, which has clarified tIle situation. and of th" Secretary-General's statement, I shall conLent myself [or the time being with making a few commenls. 87. In his statement today th" United States repre- sentative said that preC(ldents and earlier cases of aggression could in no circumstances justify further aggression. I fully agree with him. I have never said that earlier cases of aggre:;sion could serve as a pretext for further aggression. However, I read in the record of the Council's 841st meeting the following statement by Mr. Eban: .. There mayor may not be States in the United Nations which have suffered the shooting of hun- dreds of shells upon their territory and population from the territory of a neighbouring State. We arc quite certain that there is no instance of any State having sufiered the repetition of such assuults on several occasions," (841sl meeting, para. 26.] 88, When I see these worus I feel obliged to remind the members of the Council of Israel's conduct; it has very frequently had occasion to launch attacks, to shoot shells and to commit other similar acts. Herein 85. M. LOUTFI (Republique arabe unie) : J'ai deja eu l'occasion, dans la declaration preliminaire que j'ai faite devant le Conseil le 8 decernbre [841 e seance], de montrer a quel point la plainte d'Israel et les decla- rations faites a son appui par M. Eban defonnaient Ies faits et dans queUe mesure eUes poursuivaient des buts de propagande. J'avais egalement eu soin d'etablir la respollsabilitc initiale et irrefutable des autorites israeliennes dans le declenchernent du duel d'artillerie qui a constitue l'asped marquant de l'incident du 3 decembre 1958, ainsi que dans 1'etat ue tension qui regne le long de la ligne de demarcation d~finie par la Convention d'armistice general syro-israelienne. J'avais attire l'attention du Conseil sur le coms normal que La plainte israelienne anruit dil. suivrc, en sonlignant la competence et l'obligation de la Commission mixte d'armistice syro-israelienne, en vertu des dispositions expresses de la Convention d'armistice general, de connaitre des questions soulevees par la plainte israe- Iienne et de preconiser des solutions adeqnates. ]'avais rappeIC, pour etayer ces remarques, aussi bien les dispositions du paragraphe 7 de l'articIe VII de ladite c.onvention que I'attitude adoptee a cet egard dans le passe pat' les membres du ConseiL J'avais mis I'accent allssi sur l'attitude agressive d'IsraeJ et sur les prece- dentes agl'essiotls israelicnnes. Je m'etais principalement fouM, dans mn declaration, sur Ies informations dont je disposais, sans di-scuter en detail le rapport presente par le Chef d't~tat-majot· de 1'0rgallisme des Natiolls Vnies charge de la surveillance de la treve [5/4124]. 86. Je comptais analyser aujoLlrd'hui ce rapport, mais etant douut', la discussion qui s'est cteroulee au Conseil et qui a precise les faits. et etant donne la declaration du Secretaire general, je me bornerai pour I'instant a faire quelques observations. 87. Le representant des Etats-Unis a declare, dans SOIl intervention d'aujourd'hui, que les precedents ou les agressions anterieures ne pouvtlient, en aUClUl cas, justifier une agression nouveIIe. Je suis tout a fait d'accord avec luL Je n'ai jamais dit que les agressions anterieures pouvaient servir de pretexte fl de nOllvelles agressions. Cependant, je lis dans le compte rendu de la 841 0 seance du Conseil, les mats suivants, qu'a proTIonc&; M. Eban : «Je ne sais pas s'il y u, aI'Organisation des Nations Vnies, des Etnts dont le territoire et la population aient eu asubir un bombardement de centaines d'obus venant du territoire d'uJl Etat voisin. Mais jc suis tout a fait certain qu'il n'est pas un exemple d'Etat qui ait admis passivement la repetition de telles attaques.11 [8410 seance, par. 26.] 88. Lorsquc je vois ces mats, jc suis oblige de rllppeler aux membres du Conseil le comportcment d'Israel, qui a eu tres souvent I'occasion de lancer des attaques et des obus et tout cc qui s'ensuit. La declaration que 90. Further on, in paragraph 14· it is stated, and this eon(\rms the opinion which we expressed, that the Israel artillery attacks were at least as heavy as ours: .. The Syrian complaint quoted in paragraph la (b) above was investigated on 4 December. TIlI·ce witnesses were interrogated. They stateu Lhat Israel artillery opened flre on Darbashiya when tile Israelis began to withdraw from the area of Wadi el Handhal. The investigating Learn saw physical evidence of heavy artillery and mortar shelling (shell fragments, Lail pieces and fuses of shells of various calibres) .. " [Ibid" pUff!. 14.] I should like to draw attention to tile words" heavy artillery ... shelling". I should J,lso like to point out thnt the village o[ J<llabina is a very long way from tIle plaee where the first incident occnrred. 9 L. It is llIus clear from the report, and in parliculnl' from the passage.~ which 1 have jnst quoted, that it was tlHl Israelis who starl:t::d the artillery fire. There call he no doubt that this fire had to be answered; a soldier cannot be expected to do nothing when he is llred at by enemy nrtillery. When he answers that flre, he is merely exerci.sing the right of legitimate sdf-defence. Consequently, tile side which began the shelling ,mist bear tile responsibility. 92. It has been said that the Syrian answering firc was heavier. Even if this is true, the argument is a poor one, for when one side begins arUllery lire it is very difficult for the other side to judge the intensiLy of the aLtack to which it is being suhjected. The previous incidents [or which Israel has been responsible compel the forces on the demarcation lines to take all neces~ary precautions, for it is impossible to know how heavy the shelling will be or the scale of the ptmishment which Israel is planning to inflict. 93. The United Kingdom representative Lilade refer- ence today to the incident involving Mrs. Doran, the wife of the BritisLI Air Attache. In seeking to explain it, the report rclies entirely on the communique which tlle Israel delegation addressed to the Council, despite tllC fact that the incident was not discussed in the rVIixcd Armistice Commission fllld that the eircumstallecs in whicll Mrs. Doran was killeo are in our opinion still qUite obscure. In making his investigation the United K ••• un'tir d'artillerie et de mortiers a r.t6 declencM du cote israeJien sur les positions syriennes de Dar- bashiya et de Jalabina (...]. Les Syriens ant lmm~.­ dialement riposte... ,) [5/4124, par. 5.] 90. Plus loin, au paragraplle 14, it est 6crit, en C~HlJlr. mation de l'avis que nOlls avons exprime, que les attnques d'arUllel'ie israelielLrlCS ctnient all mains aussi violentes que les nOtres : cl La plainte syrieulle citee a ['alinea b du para- graphe ID d-dcssu!l a fait l'Dbjet d'nne enquete, le 4 deecmbre. Troh lemoins ont etc interroges. lis ont declarc que l'al'tillcrie israelienllc uvait otlvert le feu sur Darbashiya nu moment 011 les Israeliens commelll;aicnt a se retirer de la zone UP; l'oued el I-Iandhal. L'cquipe d'enquetellrs a observe Les traces materielles d'un violent tit d'artillerie et de mortier (eclats d'obus, aHettes el lusees d'obus de mortiers de uivers ctllibres)... » [Ibid., pal'. 14.1 .Ye souliglle les mots "cl'un violent tir d'artillerie. ~ .le voudrais nussi faire observer que le village de Jala- !:lina est tres loin du lieu ou s'est pl'oduit le premier incident. 91. n ressorl done clairement dll rapport, et ell parti- cu1ier des textes que je viens de citer, que er sont le5 lsraeliens qui ont commence le Lir d'artillerie. 11 ne fait anCUll doute que ce tir exigeait une riposte, car on ne peut pas demander it ULl soldat ell.' rester les bras croises lorsqu'il est bombarde par l'f1rtillerie cnnemie. En ripostallt, jJ use tout simplcment de son droit de legitime de[ense. C'est la. partie qui a commence- le bombardement qui, par cOllseqllent, doH supporlcr la responsabilite. 92. On a dit que la riposte syrienne etait plus forte. Meme si cet flrgumenL est vl'ai, il est faible, car lorsqu'nne pal'tie commence un tir de ce genre, il est tres difficile a l'anlre partic d'apprecier l'Lulensite de l'attaque dout eUe e~t J'obid. Les precedcnts don't Israel s'est rendu coupable obligent les forces qui se trollvent sur les lignes de demarcation it prendre tontes les precautions necessail'es, cal' on lle peut janlllis savoir queUe sera l'intcnsite du bombardement Oil queUe sera l'ctenuuc des sanctions nux-qllds IsraiSl compte proceder. 93. Le representant dn Royaume-UllL a parle ~{ljonr. d'lmi de l'incident qui s'est produit all sUJet de Mme DorcH, femme de J'Attachc ell.' l'air britannique. Le rapport sur cette question se fondcsimplement: poul cxpliquer I'incident, sur le communIque adresse au Conseil par la delegation israeliennc, mals ~al15 que l'incident en question ait ttc discute au sein de la Commission mixte d'anuistice et bien que les drcons~ lances dans lesquelles II1me Doran aUl'uit cte tuee 94. Today the representative of Israel asked why we had not lodged a complaint with the Secmity Council. He implied that we did not complain because we are guilty, !Jut the fact is that we did lodge a com- plaint with the Mixed Armistice Commission and asked it to investigate. 95. The Israel representative also said that Syria bas been maintainillg a state of war since 1951, but what has been llappeuing sin('€ then? There has been premeditated armed aggression in the vicinity of both Lake Hulell and Lake Tiberias with a consequent deplorable loss of many human lives. 96. I do not wish to speak at greater length in the debate today, but I should like to make one last point. ]n ;starting the heavy artillery fire which is the main feature of the incident of 3 December 1958 despite the lull which followed the first phase of this incident, Israel was guilty of an act of war and has seriously jeopardized peace in that part of the world. By refusing to co-operate with the United Nations Tmce Supervision Organization and the Mixed Armistice Commission and by continually violating the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, Israel is creating the state of tension to which attention is drawn in the Chief of Staff's report. 97. There is little prospect that this tension will be reduced if the United Nations Truce Supervision Orga- nization is linable, by reason of the authority which is vested in it, to secure Israel's co-operation and its respect for the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. We for out part shall not fail to assist the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in regaining its authority and, us in the past, wc shall co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission, the United Nations and its Secretary-General in carrying Ollt the General Armistice Agreement. But Israel must also respect this Agreement for if it does not, it will, I believe, prove difficult for us to do so. 98. As for the threats which the Israel representative has iust repeated, I would point out to him once again that such threats do not frighten us any more than do troop concentrations and movements; if we are the 94. Le representant d' Isra~l a demandfi aujourd'hui pourquoi nous n'avions pas presente une plainte au Conseil de securiie. n veut tirer comme conclusion que nOllS n'avoilS pas prcsente de plainte parce que nOlls sommes coupables. Or, nous avons presente une plalntc a. la Commission mixte cl'annisticc, la priant de faire une enqnete. C'est un fait. 95. Le representant d'lsrael a egalcmcnt declare que la Syl'ie maintient l'etat de belligerance depuis 1951. Que s'e.st-iL passe depuis cctte epoqne? Une agressioll flTIllee prenulditee sur le lac de HouJe et une autre sur le lac de Tiberiade, an coms desguellcs on a eu a deplorer de nombreuscs pertes en vies humaines, 96. Je ne voudrais pas inte-rvenir plus longuement dans la discussion, aujourd'hui. Toutefois, ie voudrais faire une dernicre declaration. En declenchant le tir d'artillerie violent qui constitue le fait central de !'incident du 3 deeembrc 1958, malgre }'accalmie qui a rcgne apres la premiere phase de cet incident, ISl'llel s'est Hvre aun aell'. de gnerre et a gravement compromis la paix dans cette partie du ffionde. En refusant sa cooperation a l'Orgllnisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve et a la Commission mixoo d'armistice, de meme qu'en violant continuellement les dispositions de la Convention d'armistice general, ]srael cree l'eiat de tension qui est signale dans le rapport du Chef d'etat-major. 97. Cette tension a peu de chances d'etre rCduite si l'Organisme des Nations Unies charge de la surveillance de la treve lie parvient pas, en vertu de l'autorite dont il doit llormalement jouir, a s'assurer la cooperatioIl israelienne et a faire respecter Ies dispositions de la convention d'armistice. Pour notre part, nous ne man- querons pas d'aider l'Organisme charge de la surveil~ lance de la treve areprendre SOll autorite et de cooperer, comme par le passe, avec la Commission mixte d'armis- tice, l'Organisation des Nations Unies et le Secretaire general de notre Organisation pour mettre en ceuvrc la Convention d'armistice general. Mais Israel doH, de son cOte, respecter cetto convention, car s'il ne k fait pas, je crois qu'il nous sera dHHcile de la respecter. 98. Quant aux menaces que vient de repeter le repre- sentant d'lsrael, je tiens a lui dit·e encore llne fois que de telles menaces ne nous efl'raient pas, pas plus que les concenLrations ou les mouvements de troupes, et 100. Whatever the representative of the United Arab Republic may say, we are ourselves drlvell to the conclusion from the evidence available that Mrs. Doran was shot by a person or persons crossing from Syrian territory. In the circumstances and in the absence o( any satisfactory evidence to the contxary, Her Majesty's Government must hold the Governm~nt or the United. Arab Republic responsible. If, of course, an expla~ nation were forthcoming from the Government of the United Arab Hepublic, we would carefully consider it.

I wantto say a f~w words by way of clarification. The report which has been referred to by the representative of the United I<ingdom has not been available to lIS. It seems that it ha~ beell possible for the Government of the United Kingdom to have that report. It would naturally be very useful [01' as to have this report in our hands and to examine the (acts of the sibation. On the other hand, 1should like to say what I said earlier: that this particular question is not under consideration at this moment, 102. T1lc SECHETARY-GENEHAL: I lmvc nothing directly to do myself with the i:J.formatioll concerning Mrs. Damn. hut I suppose the development hns been Lhat tlle Ullitcd Kingdom Government, as responsible for one of its citizens, has asked for tile information which might be av~ilable in the United NntioD-> Truce Supervision Organization on thi'l point. 103. If the representative of Iraq so wishes, of course that information may be embodied in a report and circulated to tlle members of the Council.

I should like to make only one comment on the 5t::rteTlent which tIle United Kingdom repre- sentative has just made. 105. III the flrst place, I fuHy agree with the repre- sentative of Iraq that wc are not discussing thi!; fjllefltion here. The United Kingdom representative lays the blame [01' a certain rleed on u~ and Lells Ll:; that it is for us to prove that it is not true; hut the burden of proof l"e5ts with him, since it is he who is accusing us. 106. Le PRESIDENT (fraduil de l'anglais) : Je voucJrllis, Cll ma quaJite de President dll (ol1seil de securite, faire une breve dliclaration.

Speaking as President, I should like to make a brief statement. 107. I am certain tlle Council agrEes that incidents of the nature we have been discussing are regrettable, but £I1so that they can be effectively dealt with by the Chief of Staff and his Organization. Wc fully recognize the gravity of the action about which Israel has com- 107. Je suis certain que le Conseil sera d'ac~ord avec moi pour reconnaitre que des incidents comme ceux dont nous venous de discuter SOllt regrettables, lUf1ig aussi que le Chef d'E!~at-major et l'Organisme charge de la surveillance de la treve peuvent s'en occuper 100. Quoi que le representant de la Republiqu.c arabe unie puissc dire, les indices dont nOliS dt~poscns DOUS £lmiment a conclure que Mme Doran a etc tuee par une ou plusieurs personnel> venues cln territoire syrien. Dans ces conditioLls et en l'absCrJce de tont element de nature a infirmer cette maniere de voir, le Gouver- nement de Sa Majesto.! doil tenil' le GOltve.rnwnfl.nt de la RepubIique arabe unie pour responsab:e. Bien entendu, si ce gouvernelllent nous fournismit \llle explication, DOUS l'examinerions avec 50in. 101. M. JAWAD (Irak) [ll'aduil de l'anglais] : Je voudrais apporter quelque,~ precisions. Le rappor~ dont vient de parler le representant du Royaumc-Uni ne nous a pas eM cOlnlntmiqu<!. Il sE'_mble que le Gcauver- nement du Royaume-Uni a pu se le procurer, D nOllS serait nnturcllement tl'es utile de pouvoir ell preuure connaissance pour ctudier les faits. D'autre part. je voudrais rcpeLel' cc que j'ai dit prccedemmcnt ~ it sav<Jir que, pour I'instant, nous ne somaes pas saisis de la question. 102. Le SECRB1'AIRE GENI;:RAI. (lmduii de l'aT/- f/lais) : .le n'ni pas eu a m'occup~l' moi-rr.eme des re-nseignements relatifR a ilfme Doran, mais jf suppose que les chases se sont pass~es de la fa<;on suivanLe : le Gouvernement un noyalUllc-Uni, l'espousable de la protecti(1n deses ressortis.<:ants, a du demandera l'Orga- nisme des Nations Unies charge de la S'lrveillance de la trt\.ve ue lui [ollrnir les l'wseignements qu'i1 pouvait possedel" sur ceLie afiai.re. 103, Si le r,:opresentant de l'Irak le desire, c~s rellsoi~ gnc:nents pourront, oien clltendu, £aire l'{)bjet d'un rapport, qLLi ~era distribuc tiUX membres dl~ COMP-il. 104, M. LQUTFI (RBpnblique arabe unie) : Je vou~ dra)g simplcment faire une observation sur la dccla~ ration que vient de fll're Jo:'_ represcntant du Royaume~ Dni. 105. Tout c!'abord, j~ m'3.3socie ace qu'a dit le repre- sentant de l'lrak, it savoir que nom ne discll.tons pas ceUe qucstio::l id. Mais le representant du Royaume-Uni nous impute UIl fait et nous dit que nous devons prollver qll':l n'est pas vrai. Mais c'est a lui qu'incombe de fail'e In. preuve,. C'e~t lll.i qui /lOllS aCCllse. 108. We have listened to the statcment by the Secre- tary~General and taken note of his intention to visit the countries concerned, and there to take up the present situation for most serious consideration by the authoriti.es of Israel and the United Arab Republic, in the hope of breaking the present trend and soliciting their fuU support for our efforts to attack the underlying problems which are at the source of the tension. 109. I venture to express the hope that the incidents of which we have now heard are of an isolated nature. I am convinced that the parties will do everything in their power to prevent recurrences, which would tend to creat new tensions in the. Middle East. 108. Nous avons entendu la declaration du Secretaire general et pris note de son intention de se rendre dans Ies pays interesses et d'amener les autorites d'lsrael et de la Republique arabe unie a examiner de tres pres la situation dans l'espoir de renverser la tendance actuelle et d'obtenir qu'elles soutiennent pleinement les efforts que nous faisons pOur venir about des problemes qui sont 11 l'origine de la tension. 109. J'ose exprimer l'espoir que les incidents dont nous avons eu aconnaitre ont un caractere exceptionnel. Je suis eonvaineu que les parties ferant tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour eviter qu'ils ne se reproduisent, ce qui aggraverait encore la situation dans le Moyen- Orient. La $eallCe C$l levee a 18 ll. 50.