S/PV.858 Security Council

I should like to point out that, in addition to the cable {S/4314] requesting the consideration of the question now before the Council and an explanatory memorandum on the subject [S/4315], the Council has also before it the draft resolution submitted at the last meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union [S/4321]. 2. M. BERARD (France): Le Ministre des affaires etrangllres de 1'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques a demande, le 18 mai, au nom de SGn gouvernement, que le Conseil de securite se reunisse et delibllre d'urgence au sujet d' "actes agressifs" commis par les forces aeriennes. des Etats-Unis d'Amerique contre 1'Union sovietique et de la menace que ces actes constitueraient pour la' pave univer- selle.

On 18 May the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Soci8.list Republics, on behalf of his Government, requested that the Security Council should meet immediately to discuss "aggressive acts" committed bythe Air Force of the United States of America against the Soviet Union and the alleged threat to universal peace constituted by those acts. 3. Dans son intervention d'hier, M. Gromyko a developpe les considerations qui justifient ~ ses yeux nos deliberations et indique 1'issue qu'll souhaite leur voir prendre. Le representant des Etats-Unis a expose, de son cot0, le point de vue de son gOll- vernement en reponse aux imputations sovietiques et s'est attache ~ replacer dans leur vrai jour les faits qui ont provoque notre reunion. 3. In his speech of yesterday Mr. Gromyko out- lined the consideration which in his view justified the present discussion and stated what he hoped would be its outcome. The United States representa- tive, for his part, explained his Government's views in reply to the Soviet imputations and endeavoured to place the facts which led up to our meeting in their true perspective. 4. J"'aimerais, ~ la lumillre de la requ~te et du memorandum qui nous ont ete distribues et des ex- 4. In the light of the request and the memorandum which were circulated to us and the explanations we Pdsident: sir Claude COREA (Ceylan). Ordre du jour provisoire (5/Agenda/ 858) 2. C/lblogramme, en date du 18 mai 1960, adresse au President du Conseil de securite par le Ministre des affaires etrangllres de 1'Union des Republiques socialistes sovi€ltiques (S/4314, S/4315). Adoption de I'ordre du jour L'ordre du jour est adoptee 6. Since the incident in question occurred eighteen days before the USSR Minister addressed his re- quest to the Council, my delegation doubts whether the matter was as urgent as it was alleged to be. m fact, the USSR Government delayed making its request to the Council until the Summit Conference was due to open in Paris. It stated that it had hoped that on that occasion the United States Government would give certain guarantees and express certain regrets. My delegation is surprised that after President Eisenhower's statement that United States overflights had been and would remilin suspended, the USSR Government should have continued to insist on the urgency of the question it is submitting for our examination. 7. What then does it hope to gain by appealing to the Security· Council? Its request of 18 May asks us to examine the alleged threat to peace constituted by aggressive acts of the United States Air Force. This appeal to the Council seems to have been made by the USSR on the basis of the provisions of Chapter vn of the Charter, and in particular of Article 39, which states: "The Security Council shall determine ,the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken". It is incumbent upon each one of the members of the Council individually to reach an objective decision on the facts and to take part in the re- quired conclusion, whether it be positive or negative. 8. I am bound to say that my delegation has serious doubts about the aggressive nature of the acts which are brought to our attention. Even the version given by Mr. Gromyko does not appear to provide a suf- ficient basis for the Soviet argument. 9. The incident of 1 May and the overflights de- nounced by the USSR Government really come within the category of intelligence activities. Undoubtedly they are regrettable and admittedly they imply in- terference in the internal affairs of a country. My Government would like States to be able to refrain from such activities. In the present world situation, however, in the opposition or at least the mutual distrust between two groups of countries, such ac- tivities are unfortunately the normal practice. Is there any country which is not involved and which would be entitled to cast the first stone? Is the Soviet Union, which today is so indignant, sure of being any more above reproach than any other country on that point? If the rule it advocates today had been applied to it, might it not have been frequently sum- moned before the Security Council ever since 1945 to answer for numerous incidents, proved by in- contestable facts, in which it has been involved in 6. S'agissant d'un incident qui remontait dejh h 18 jours lorsque le Ministre sovietique a adresse sa demande .au Conseil, ma d€llegation doute que ce cas ait presente 1'urgence qui nous a ete indiquee. En fait, le Gouvernement sovietique a attendu, pour s'adresser au Conseil, la Conference au sommet qui devait avoir lieu h Paris. n a indique qu'il avait esp€lre obtenir, h cette occasion, du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, certaines garanties et 1'expression de certains regrets. Ma di31egation est surprise qu'h la suite de la declaration du pr6sident Eisenhower annonQant que les vols americains etaient et reste- raient suspendus, le Gouvernement sovietique ait maintenu comme urgente la plainte qu'll soumettait h notre examen. 7. Que recherche-t-il donc en ayant recours au Con- .seil de s6curit6? Sa requate du 18 mai nous demande d'examiner la menace que representeraient pour la paix les actes agressifs qu'auraient accomplis les forces aeriennes des Etats-Unis. En faisant ainsi appel au Conseil, 1'URSS semble donc avoir en vne les dispositions du Chapitre vn de la Charte des Nations Unies et, plus precisement. celles de l'Article 39 qui stipule que le Conseil "constate 1'existence d'une menace contre la paix, ·d'une rup- ture de la paix ou d'un acte d'agression" et fait les reconJ,mandations ou prend les decisions necessaires. n rElsulte des obligations qui nous ont ete confiees que \.~hacun des membres du Conseil doit individuel- lement se prononcer de mani~re objective sur les faits de la. cause et particiPer h la constatation, positive ou negative, qui est requise. 8. Ma delegation, je dois le dire, a des .doutes serieux sur le caract~re agres~if des faits qui se trouvent soumis h notre attention. Mame la version qu'en a donnee M. Gromyko ne 1111 paran pas assurer h la th~se sovietique un Iondement suffisant. 9. .A la verite,' 1'incident du 1er mai et les survols que denonce le Gouvernement de 1'URSS rentrent dans la categorie des activites de renseignement. Celles-ci. h n'en pas douter. sont regrettables, et lIon peut admettre qu'elles impliquent une ingerence dans les affaires interieures d'un pays. Mon gouvernement souhaiterait que les Etats puissent s'2.bstenir de pareilles activites. Mais dans la situation actuelle du monde. dans l'opposition qui place face h face deux groupes de pays ou tout au moins dans la mefiance avec laquelle ceux-ci s'observent, ces activites sont, helas, pratique courante. Quel pays ne s 'y est trouve im!plique et lequel serait en droit de jeter le premier la pierre h l'autre? L'Union sovietique, qui aujour- d'hui s'en indigne, est-elle certaine d'etre, plus que tout autre, h l'abri de reproches sur ce point? Si la r~gle qu'elle preconise aujourd'hui lui avait ete appliquee, n'aurait-elle pas risque, depuis 1945, d'etre frequemment citee devantleConseilde securite peut-~tre critiquable, mais generalement admise, veut que parellle activite ne donne pas lieu ~ recours aux instances internationales. Le droit des gens ne se· prononce pas, en temps de paix. sur la recherche du renseignement. La preuve meme quIll n'y a pas delit international est illustree par le fait que 1'Etat victime ne peut pas reclamer reparation ~ I'autre Etat en faveur duquel l'agent de renseignements a travaille. 10. La d6l6gation.fralll;aise ne peut, dans ces con- ditions, admettre que les fait incrimines repr6sentent des actes d'agression au sens de l'Article 39 de la Charte ou selon les r~gles du droit international applicables. 10. That being so, the French delegation cannot agree that the facts protested against represent acts of aggression within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter or under the rules of international law. 11. The Soviet Union is basing its appeal on another element as well, that is to say the alleged "threat to universal peace" constituted by these actions. Such a statament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR cannot be a matter of indifference to the Members of the United Nations, signatories of a Charter whose first words express their determina- tion to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. However, after hearing the explanations of both sides, my "delegation does not consider that evidence of a threat to universal peace has been produced. It is true that the overflights denounced are regarded by the Soviet Union as a violation of its frontiers, but it should be borne in mind that these flights; carried out by unarmed aircraft, were not made for the purpose of changing the established international order. The undertaking given in Paris by the President of the United States, which has been reiterated here by the United States representative, has put an end to what the Soviet Union looked on ;as a danger to peace. 11. L'Union sovietique fonde, d'autre part, son recours sur un deuxi~meelement, surla "menacepour la paix universelle" que ces actes constitueraient. L'affirmation du Ministre des affaires etrang~res de 1'URSS ne saurait, sans aucun doute, laisser indif- ferents les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, signataires d'une Charte dont les premiers mots expriment leur resolution de preserver du £leau de la guerre les generations futures. Mais, apr~s avoir entendu les ex:plications donnees de part et d'autre, ma delegation n~~ pense pourtant pas que se trouvent reunies les preuves d'une menace ~ la paix universelle. S'il est vrai queles survols d(monces ont pu etre consideres par l'Union sovietique comme constituant une violation de ses fronti~res, on ne saurait oublier que ces actes, accomplis par des appareils d6pourvus de tout armement, n'avaient pas pour objet de changer l'ordre internationalement etabli. La declaration faite ~ Paris par le President des Etats-Unis, et quIa :::'appe16e ici le representant des Etats-Unis, met effectivement un terme ~ ce que 1'Union sovi€~tique a pu ressentir comme cons- 4:ituant un danger pour la paix. 12. Dans son memOire explicatif, le Gouv6rnement sovietique declare que des survols de son territoire comme celui du ler mai sont d'autant plus dangereux que des bombardiers amePicains effectuent constam- ment des vols avec des charges atomiques oil ~ 1'hydrog~ne, particuli~rement en direction des fron- 12. The USSR Governmen1; in its explanatory mem- orandum states that flights over its territory, such as that of 1 May, are particularly dangerous because United States bombers are continuously making flights with atomic and hydrogen bombs on board, especially in the direction of the frontiers of the USSR. 13. This observation brings to mind the debates in the Security Council in April and May 1958, at the close of which the Soviet complaint was dismissed. On that occasion it was obserVed once again that whenever constructive proposals designed to elimi- nate the danger of a surprise attack are submitted by the Western Powers, the Moscow government nnfortunately rejects them either by holding them up to ridicule or by interpreting them as attempts to extend espionage and make it official. ti~res de l'URSS. 13. Cette observation nous ram~ne aux debats du Conseil de sllcurite d'avril et mai 1958, ~ 1'issue desquels la plainte sovietique n'a pas ete retenue. On a constate une fois de plus ~ cette occasion que chaque fois que des propositions constructives sont presentees par les puissances occidentales pour eliminer le danger d'attaques par surprise, le gOll- vernement de Moscou, malheureusement. les re- pousse, soit qu'il les tourne en derision, soit qu'il ne veuille y voir que des tentatives pour etendre et rendre officiell'espionnage. 14. Certes, 1'etat de choses signale et les dangers d'accidents qu'il comporte sont de nat.ure ~ repandre un sentiment d'angoisse et rien ne devrait etre ne- glige pour tlicher d'y apporter un terme. Mais, comme le soulignait dej~ en 1958 le representant franQais 14. The state of affairs indicated and the danger of accidents inherent in it are certainly such as to give rise to anxiety and nothing should be neglected which might put an end to them. As the French representative pointed out in 1958 [817th meeting], however, the effects of an evil should not be re- presented as its cause. The direct cause of the present situation is the threat periodically revived [817~me seance], on ne saurait presenter comme les causes d'un mal ce qui n'eD. est qu'un effet. La cause directe de la ·situation actuelle est la menace que 16. In truth it is not the overflight objected to which constitutes a threat to peace and security. Any discussion, any debate like the present one will be in vain if we do not go to the root of the evil. What should be eliminated is the threat of mass destruction presented by nuclear weapons. The peo- ples hoped that the intended meeting in Paris of the four Heads of Government would bring about a re- laxation of the existing tension and make it possible to tackle controversial questions in a spirit of con- ciliation and, above all, to take the first impatiently awaited steps in the direction ofnuclear disarmament. In view of that impatience the refusal of the USSR Government to p~.rticipate in the Summit Conference which it had itself advocated and for which it had many times insistently pressed had caused deep disappointment. Is there not a flagrant disproportion between the incident of 1 May and the resulting action by the Soviet Union which led to the collapse of the Summit Conference and so dashed the hopes of all mankind for a beginning of relaxation in a situa- tion which constitutes the real threat to peace? 17. In view of these considerations the French del- egation will be unable to support the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. 18. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): I listened with close attention to the statements made to the Council yesterday by the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the repre- sentative of the United States on the item which has been brought before the Council by the Soviet Union. 19. The Foreign Minister of the SQviet Union sought to concentrate our attention on the particular incident of the U-2 complaint and on the implications of that incident in Soviet eyes. I must say at' the· outset that 20. In your opening remarks yesterday afternoon, Mr. President, you sought to set our discussion around this table in the context of the present in- ternational situation and, in particular, in the context of the breakdown of the Summit Conference. If I may say so, I thought that your wise words were a re- flection of the way in which most of us regard this debate. 21. The Soviet GoverIiment is surely aware of the hopes which the people of the world placed on the recent meeting in Paris. There seemed to be a real chance of overcoming some of the fears and lack of confidence of the past and of moving forward towards a solution of some of the problems which divide the world. These hopes were deeply felt both by the Government and by the people of the United Kingdom. However strong the feelings which the incident of the U-2 plane may have aroused or have been whipped up to arouse in the Soviet Union, we cannot agree that the Soviet Union was justified in bringing to nothing a conference on which so much depended. 22. I now turn to the Soviet complaint. I am bound to say, in parenthesis, that this complaint comes somewhat strangely from the Soviet Union, whose wide-spread activities in the sphere of collecting intelligence are well known. Since the complaint has been made, it is the responsibility of the Council to examine not only the incident complained of but also the political facts which form its background. ~~~n~~~e::n~efv~::~cie~~~s:~ ~:i~o~~O~~:.amn:~~~ aussi les realites politiques dans le cadre desquelles' II sePlace.] 23. A notre avis, le Conseil doit tenir compte de. deux realites politiques. Premi~rement, depuis la fin de la deuxi~me guerre mondiale, une absence tr~s nette de confiance a prevalu entre les deux grands groupes de puissances dont depend en grande partie le maintien de la paix mondiale. Jen'aipas l'intention d'analyser aujourd'hui les causes de ce manque de confiance. Je signale simplement que son existence dolt necessairement influer sur notre debate nest: evident que la politique suivie par un pays sera in- fluencee par le degre de confiance qu'il ressent envers ses interlocuteurs.: 24. Now, Mr. Gromyko in his speech yesterday 24. Or, M. Gronlyko a formule dans son discours 23. In our view, the Council must take into account the follOWing two political facts, which I shall explain. First, since the end of the Second World War a marked lack of confidence has existed between the two major-Power groups on whom rests a great responsibility for the peace of the world. I do not intend today to an~'.yse the causes of this lack of trust. I simply point out that its existence must affect our discussion. The policies of any nation must necessarily be affected by the degree of trust which it feels towards those with whom it has to deal. ~t:~h~nv~~~e~~:-~~~:~~eci~~~~::t ~~ t~~gr;~;.i~ :~-:'hd~~o~~~U~~ti~:::c~~~~a~~~~;:~~~e~~~~~~e~ [~~ ~~~i~~:~1~§rr:g~ W.EM"l~~;);n:~:t~~~ charges. M. Lodge a r6fu~ hier tr~snettementces accusations. 25. Certainly it is my view that the Minister for 25. n ne fait aucun doute h mon avis que le Ministre Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union entirely failed des affaires 6trang~res de l'Union sovi6tique n'a to make out a case for branding the act as ag<T1"esive. nullement r6ussi h nous convaincre qu'll s'agissait It must be perfectly clear to all of us thattIns act d'un acte d'agression. n doit nous apparaftre par- involved no use of force or threat of the use of force faitement 6vident h tous que cet acte ne comportait against the Soviet Union. aucun recours h la force ouaucune menace de recours '~ ---':""""""':"''':''''':':~=-'''''=---...i..=..;....:....:..:...:..::.:....:~5...;,.;;b._l a ;£ ; ;O ;"rllllcellll;''IIII·lIIIootr e 1 'Ulllnio.nIllSIll01llil~1II,6I11tiqullllillle ·IiI""'''''''''''''IIIII IIIIIII'"'~"~'III", 20. Dans vosobservations preliminaires d'hier apr~s-midi, vous avez cherche, Monsieurle President, h placer notre debat ici dans le cadre de la situation internationale actuelle et notamment en relation avec l'effondrement de la Conference au sommet. Qu'il me soit permis de dire que vos paroles empreintes de sagesse ont traduit la mani~re dont la plupart d'entre nous envisagent ce debate 21. Le Gouvernement sovietique se rend certainement compte des espoirs que les peuples du monde entier plaQaient dans la recente reunion de Paris. n semblait y avoir une grande probabilite de surmonter dans une certaine mesure les craintes et la mefiance Pdeass6es bet d'avancervdiers une solutionde quelques-uns s pro l~mes qui visent le monde. Ces espoirs etaient tr~s profondement partages, tant par le Gou- vernement que par la population du Royaume-Uni. Quelle qu'ait pu ~tre la violence des reactions, spontan6es ou non, provoqu6es en Union SOvi6tiQUe par 1'incident de 1'avionU-2, nous ne pouvons admettre que l'Union sovietique ait eu raison de reduire he neant une conference dont les consequences auraient pu ~tre si importantes. 22. Je passe maintenant h la plainte de 1'Union soVietique. Je dois dire, entre parenth~se, qu'll est un peu etrange que cette plainte vienne de 1'Union sovietique, dont les services de renseignements sont si actifs, comme chacun sait. Etant donne que la· 27. Let us then look at the wider charges I mentioned a moment ago. I think it is relevant, in order to put the whole matter in perspective, to remind mem- bers of the Council that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was brought into being only in 1949, and after the Western Powers had to a very great extent disarmed after the Second World War, as a purely defensive alliance in reaction to the policies at that time of the Soviet Union in Germany and Czechoslovakia. And the same considerations apply to the nature of the Central Treaty Organization. 28. These defensive alliances never have had and, by their nature, and the nature of their members, never could have aggressive intentions. This back- ground must be borne in mind in assessing the true value of Mr. Gromyko's charges about aggressive intent. There is certainly no aggressive intent on the Western side, and it is our hope, which we have in the last year or two had some encouragement to believe may be well founded, that there is none, at any rate in the military sense, on thf:l other side. This, however, does not alter the fact that a state of confidence between the two groups has not existed. It is only realistic to acknowledge that this fact must affect the policies and actions of Governments on which rests the responsibility to protect their peo- ples against the dangers of the modern world. 29. I now come to the second political fact which we in this Council should take into account. The advance of science has led us into a situation in which war of the most destructive and terrible kind can be unloosed upon the world by the giving of a single command or the pressing of a single button. These two facts, the lack of confidence among the great Powers of the world and the progress of the science of destruction have led to a greatly increased fear of surprise attack. 30. Both the United States in December 1941, and the Soviet Union, in June 1941, suffered the conse- quences of a surprise attack. Everybody knows that the risks are much greater and the consequences would be much more terrible today than they were in 1941. It is not therefore surprising that the major Powers have felt it necessary to spend much energy in seeking to protect themselves and their allies against surprise attack. One of these means of pro- tection is the collection of intelligence, a means which, as the representative of the United States illustrated yesterday, has been so widely employed by the Soviet Union. Such incidents as that of the U-2 plane over the Soviet Union cannot therefore be treated as if it had occurred in the 18th century. It must be considered in relation to the political and scientific realities of 1960. This incident, there- 27. Examinons les accusations plus larges que j'ai mentionnees il y a quelques instants. Je pense que pour placer la question dans une juste perspective, il y a lieu de rappeler aux membres du Conseil que l'Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique nord n'a ete creee qu'en 1949, apr~s que les puissances occi- dentales avaient desarme dans une tr~slarge mesure, apr~s la seconde guerre mondiale, comme )1ne_. alliance purement defensive con~ue en reaction contre les politiques menees h l'epoque par l'Union sovie- tique en Allemagne et en Tchecoslovaquie. Les memes conside:rations s'appliquent au caract~re de l'Organi- sation du Traite du Centre. 28. Ces alliances defensives n'ont jamais eu et, en raison de leur caract~re meme et du caract~re de leurs membres, ne pourront jamais avoir d'in- tentions agressives. C'est ce qu'il ne faut pas oublier lorsque l'on veut donner leur valeur reelle aux accusations formuIees par M. Gromyko. n n'y a certainement pas d'intentions agressives du ct>te occidental, et nous entretenons 1'espoir, que nous avons eu certaines raisons de croire bien fonde au cours des deux derni~res annees, qu'il n'y en a pas non plus, du moins au sens militaire, de l'autre ct>te. n n'en reste pas moins, toutefois, que la con- fiance n'a 'pas regne entre les deux groupes. C'est etre simplement realiste que de reconnaftre que cette donnee doit affecter les politiques et les actions des gouvemements h qui incombe la responsabilite de proteger leurs peuples contre les dangers du monde modeme. 29. J'en Viens maintenant h la deuxi~me realite politique dont les membres du Conseil doivent tenir compte. Les progr~s de la science nous ont places dans une situation dans laquelle il suifit d'un seu! ordre ou d'une pression sur un seu! bouton pour qu'une guerre des plus destructives et des plus terribles se dechafue sur le monde. Ces deux faits, le manque de confiance entre les grandes puissances mondfales et les progr~s de la science de la des- truction ont accru considerablement la crainte d'une attaque par surprise. 30. Les Etats-Unis, en decembre 1941, et 1'Union sovietique, en juin 1941, ont toutes deux subi les consequences d'un attaque par surprise. Chacun sait que les risques sont beaucoup plus grands et que les consequences seraient bien plus terribles aUjourd'hui que ce n'etait le cas en 1941. n n'est donc pas surprenant que les grandes puissances aient juge necessaire de consacrer beaucoup d'energie h se proteger elles-memes, ainsi que leurs allies, contre une attaque par surprise. L'un des moyens utilises h cette fin consiste h recueillir des ren- seignements et ce moyen a ete, comme le repre- sentant des Etats-Unis I'a demontre hier, tr~s large- ment employe par 1'Union sovietique. Des incidents tels que ceux du vol de I'avion U-2 au-dessus de I'Union sovietique ne peuvent done etretraites comme s'ils s'etaient produits au XVITI~me si~cle. n fau! 31. This is why Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have in all their approaches to the disarmament problem attached such great impor- tance to making a beginning with a system of inter- national control and inspection. We consider that the key to the problem of East-West relations is the establishment of confidence, and we have believed that agreement on measures, even modest measures, of control and inspection could lead to a growth of confidence which woul.d eventually make possible the really comprehensive .measures necessary to elimi- nate the fear of surpri~e attack. 32. Together with the Governments of France, the United States and others, we have put forward a series of proposals to this end. Unfortunately, these proposals have not met with a helpful response from the Soviet side. In November 1958, a conference of experts was held in Geneva in an attempt to discuss some of the scientific precautions which could be taken against surprise attack. Unfortunately, this conference came to nothing. 32. Nous avons pr6sent6, de mame que les Gouve~ nements de la France, des Etats-Unis et d'autres pays, une serie de propositions ~ cette fin. Mal- heureusement, ces propositions n'ont pas requ un accueil favorable de la part de 1'Union sovietique. En novembre 1958, une conference d'experts s'est reunie ~ Gen~ve pour essayer d'etudier certaines des prec:mtions scientifiques qui pourraient etre prises contre une attaque par surprise. Mal- heureusement, cette conference n'a pas abouti. 33. Nous ll'avons toutefois pas renonce pour autant 33. We have not, however, been deterred from making further proposals. In his speech to the Gen- eral Assembly, on 17 September 1959, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd proposed that "... we should follow up the not very successful conference of experts on measures against surprise attack with a further conferen..:.e to consider the political as well as the technical aspects of this particular problem".Y ~ presenter de nouvelles propositions. Dans son discours ~ I'Assemblee generale du 17 septembre 1959, M. Selwyn Loyd a fait la proposition suivante: "••• nous devrions. faire suivrela Conf€lrence d'experts sur les moyens de prevenir une attaque par surprise, qui n'a pas ete tr~s fructueuse, d'une autre conference qui etudierait les aspects politiques aussi bien que techniques de ce probl~meparticulier ft !/. 34. Le 16 mars 1960, un plan commun de desar- mement general a 6t€l presente par les dlllegations du Canada, de la France, de 1'ltalie, du Royaume-Uni et des Etats..Unis ~ la Conference du Comit€l des dix puissances sur le desarmement 1l. Gen~ve. Ce plan proposait notamment que des €ltudes communes soient entreprises immediatement sur les mesures necessaires pour assurer aux Etats participants une plus grande protection contre les attaques par sur- prise, assorties de procedures efficaces de controle, comprenant entre autres 1'inspection aerienne, des observateurs au sol ~ des points convenus et des equipes mobiles, des radars croises, des notifications de yol des aeronefs, ainsi que toutes installations et dispositions necessaires aux transmissions. 34. On 16 March 1960, a joint p1an for comprehen- sive disarmament was submitted by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States at the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Among other things, this plan propnsed that joint studies should be undertaken immediately on measures to give partici- pating States greater protection against surprise attack with effective verificationprocedures, including aerial inspection, ground observers at agreed points, mobile ground teanis, overlapping radar, notification of air- craft flights .and appropriate communications facili- ties and arrangements. 35. Je crois qu'il est juste de dire que si un plan de ce genre avait ete en vigueur l'incident que nous examinons actuellement ne se serait pas produit et que si l'on veut eviter que des faits analogues se renouvellent, le meilleur moyen. serait que 1'Union sovietique participe 1l. I'elaboration d'un accordinter- national tel que celui que les puissances occidentales ont propos€l ~ Gen~ve. . 35. I think it is fair to say that if some such plan had been in operation the incident which we are now discussing would not have occurred, and that the best means for ensuring that such incidents are not repeated would be for the Soviet Union to co-operate in the establishment of some such international arrangement as the Western Powers proposed at Geneva. 36. It would be a great day for the peace of the world if the Soviet Union, which in many ways has made, such great contributions to modern advances 36. Quel grand jour pour la paix mondiale si I'Union sovietique qui, de 'bien des mani~res, a contribue de fa~on si marquante aux progr~s delasciencemoderne, !/ Documents officiels de l'Assemblee generale, guatorzi~mesessIon, Seances pleni~res, 798~me seance. par. 53: !I Official Recorrl" of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 798rh meeting, para. 53. 37. To conclude, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom can only regret the manner in which the Soviet Union has chosen to handle the incident of the U-2 plane. We deeply regret that the Soviet Union decided on this issue to destroy the arrange- ments for the Summit Conference, on which the nations of the world had built so much hope. It persisted in this course even after President Eisen- hower had given a categorical assurance that the aircraft flights had already been suspended and were not to be resumed. This assurance was the most categorical and definite which any President of the United States could constitutionally give. By refusing to accept this assurance and pressing humiliating demands on the United States, which could not rea- sonably be accepted, the Soviet Union made thebreak- down of the Conference inevitable before it even began. 38. The United Kingdom and its allies do not intend to be deterred by the breakdown of the Summit Con- ference from the search for solutions to the problems which divide the world. The communique issued on 17 May in Paris by the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom stated that they remained unshaken in their conviction that all out- standing international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiation. They themselves remained ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future." 39. It is significant that when the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, reported to the House of Commons on 20 May on the breakdown of the Summit Conference, his statement of the policy of Her Majesty's Government was welcomed in all parts of the House. The leader of the Opposition, Mr. Gaitskell, said: "1 am sure that the Prime Minister is right in implying in his statement that we should not make any change in our g",neral approach and policy. Our policy must surely remain as before- always ready and anxious to secure and negotiate agreements while at the same time maintaining our defences and alliances. 40. We hope that on reflection the Government of the Soviet Union will decide to resume with us the search for lasting solutions to the problems of the world, and especially to the problems which cause distrust and incidents between the great Powers. In particular, we still hope for a fruitful outcome of both the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests and the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament which continue inGeneva. d~passe. 37. Je dois dire, en conclusion, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique ne peut que deplorer la fagon dont 1'Union sovietique a juge bon de traiter l'incident de 1'avion U-2. Nous deplorons vivement que 1'Union sovi~tique aft decide ~ cette occasion d'annuler les dispositions qui avaient ete prises en vue de la Conference au aommet sur laquelle les nations du monde entler avaient fonde tant d'espoir. L'Union sovietique s'est obstinee dans: cette attitude meme apr~s que le president Eisenhower eut donne 1'assurance categorique que les survols avaient ete suspendus et quIlls ne seraient pas reprise C'etait l'&ssurance la plus categorique et la plus nettle qu'un president des Etats-Unis puisse donner en se con- formant ~ la Constitution. L'Union sovietique, en refusant d'accepter cette assurance et en exigeant des Etats-Unis des decla.rations humlliantes quIlls ne pouvaient raisonnablement accepter de faire, a rendu inevitable 1'echec de la Conference avantm€lme que celle-ci ne commeng~t. 38. Le Royaume-Uni et ses allies ne veulent pas se laisser decourager par 1'effondrement de la Confe- rence au sommet et continueront de s'efforcer ~ r~soudre les probl~mes qui divisent le monde. Le communique publie ~ Paris le 17 mai indiquait que les Gouvernements de la France, des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni demeuraient convaincus que toutes les questions en suspens devaient €ltre reglees, non par 1'usage ou la m(~nace de la force, mals par la voie des negociations, et quIlls restaient prets ~ prendre part ~ de telles negociations dans 1'avenir ~ tout moment qui paraitrait favorable. 39. n convient de souligner que lorsque le Premier Ministre britannique, M. Macmlllan, a rendu compte de I'effondrement de la Conference au sommet le 20 mai h la Chambre des communes, celle-ci a ete unanime ~ approuver sa declaration sur la politfque du Gouvernementde SaMajeste. M. Gaitskell, chef de l'opposition, a declare: "Je suis sill' que le Premier Ministre a raison de laisser entendre dans ses declarations que nous ne demons rien changer ~ notre fagon de voir et ~ notre politique generale. Notre politique doit certainement rester ce qu'elle etait ll.i1paravant: nous souhaitons toujours arriver ~ de'; accords en negociant et nous demeurons prets ~ le faire, tout en maintenant, d'autre part, notre syst~me de defenses et d'alliances." 40. Nous esperons qu'apr~s avoir reflechi, le Gou- vernement de 1'Union sovietiaue decidera de recom- mencer avec nous ~ chercher A des solutions durables aux probl~mes mondiaux, notamment ~ ceux qui pro- voquent mefiance et incidents entre les grandes puissances. Nous continuons d'esperer en particulier que les travaux tant de la Conference surla cessation des essais d'armes nucleaires que de la Conference du Comite des dix puissances sur le desarmement qui poursuivent leurs travaux ~ Gen~ve, aboutiront ~ des resultats fructueux. 42. It is only satisfactory international arrange- ments for security commensuratewiththe discoveries of science that can provide the international con- fidence essential for peaceful and harmonious re- lationships between nationso We had hoped that nego- tiations at the summit would give an impulse in that direction. That the need is urgent has been brought home to us all by the recent unfortunate developments. That is why Her Majesty's Govern- ment is determined to do all in its power to ensure that the progress towards a solution of these prob- lems which had recently begun, should be resumed and accelerated as soon as possible.

In the case we are considering there is one preliminary question to be settled: do the acts complained of-of which the most important is the flight of a United States aircraft over Soviet terri- tory-constitute an act of international aggression? 44. It :is important to realize that it is not for this Council to decide whether these acts were legal or illegal. We have before us a specific complaint- a complaint of international aggression-and we have to pass judgement on the precise terms of this com- plaint. We have not been .asked to pass a legal or moral judgement on the act, to say whether it was right or wrong. All we have been asked is to decide whether or not this is an act of aggression, and whether we should condemn it as such. 45. We think it is important to make this clear. because, if the incident under examination did not constitute aggression, the Soviet complaint would have no legal foundation. In fact, we have not been asked to say that the flight of an aircraft over for- eign territory is legal or illegal, desirable or un- desirable, favourable or unfavourable to the relax- ation of international tension. Both in the note by which the Council was convened [S/4314] and in the draft resolution which is before us [8/4321], we have been asked specifically to condemn the act complained of as beingone ofinternationalaggression. It is from this point of view, and only from this point of view, that we must now appraise it. 46. As we have been reminded, it has not yet been possible to draw up a specific international rule defining the cases which constitute aggression. The Charter of the United Nations has nothing to say on the subject, and no existing agreement has yet developed into a rule of positive law. 47. But since there is no valid rule of positive law, we must be allowed to invoke the generally accepted doctrine and, in particular, the draft agreements which have been prepared on the subject. Although these documents have no binding force, they are nevertheless valuable aids and, in the absence of a id{:e~ et aux: anciennes methodes. 42. Seuls des accords internationaux: satisfaisants garantissant une s€lcurit€l h. la mesure des d6cou- vertes scientifiques peuvent faire regner la confiance internationale indispensable pour qu'existent entre les nations des relations pacifiques et harmonieuses. Nous avions espere que les negociations au sommet permettraient de faire des progr~s dans cette di- rection. Le besoin en est urgent, comme les recents 6venements, que nous deplorons, nous en ont fait prendre conscience. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est d6cid6 h. faire tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour assurer que les efforts recemment entrepris pour trouver une solution i\ ces probl~mes seront repris et redoubles le plus totpossible. 43. M. AMADEO (Argentine) [traduit de 1'espagnol]: L'affaire dont nous sommes saisis soul~veune ques- tion prealable: il s'agit de determiner si les actes incrimines - somme toute, le survol du territoire sovi6tique par un avion des Etats-Unis - constituent ou non un acte d'agression internationale. 44. n convient toutefois de noter que le Conseil n'a pas i\ se prononcer sur le caract~re licite ou illicite des actes en question. Nous sommes saisis . d'une plainte formelle, une plainte pour agression internationale, et c'est sur le bien-fonde de cette plainte, avec sa portee bien precise, que nous devons nous prononcer. Nous ne sommes pas invites i\ quali- fier juridiquement ou moralement l'acte incrimine, ~e:::deS'~t~~~e~~~ ~~ '::te~~~~ ~i~\~:s~:: ou non un acte d'agression, et si nous devons le con- damner en tant que tel. 45. C'est li\, i\ notre avis, un point qu'il importe d'6lucider, car si 1'affaire qui nous est soumise ne constitue pas une agression, la plainte sovietique est denuee de fondement juridique. En effet, on ne nous a pas demande de dire si le survol d'un territoire etranger est licite ou illicite, justifie ou injustifie, favorable ou defavorable i\ la detente internationale. Ce que l'on nous a exclusivement pries de faire, tant dans la note de convocation du Conseil [8/4314] que dans le projet de resolution dont nous sommes ~;l:~i:::!;:~~riI:~;~~;::~!:~~~~:F~~FL1~~ et sous cet angle seulement, que nous devons main- tenant apprecier cet acte. ::~0;eo~:~e:a~t::p~:~n~n~6~0X:~ i~~~:~~:~: pour definir avec prllcision les cas d'agression. LaW. Charte des Nations Unies est muette sur ce point, et aucun instrument contractuel nJa r€lussi jusqu'ici i\ se transformer en r~gle de droit positif. 47. Dans ces conditions, faute de pouvoir invoquer une r~gle actuelle de droit positif, qu'il nous soit permis de nous appuyer sur la doctrine g€meralement ::~~se~~:~:~~C;~i~~.e~tn:~~~~~:~:~o~'=:~~: n'aient pas force obligatoire, ils peuvent nous ~tre 49. We have examined the Soviet draft resulution of 1956 carefully and, I should add, quite objectively. If we consider the present situation in the light of the Soviet Union's draft, we must conclude that it does not come within any of the cases of aggression envisaged in that draft. 50. We agree with the general idea behind the Soviet draft definition. And because we agree with it, we consider that a single overflight by an unarmed aircraft is not an act of international aggression, no matter how it may be regarded from other points of view. Therefore, if we are not faced with a case of international aggression, we believe that the Soviet complaint, in the form in which it has been submitted, must be rejected. If the Soviet delegation had thought that the flight in question was a threat to peace for other reasons than because it was an act of aggression, it should have submitted its complaint in a different form. We, for our part, must always have regard to the precise form in which a case is submitted to us. 51. As a circumstance aggravating the act com- plained of, the Soviet delegation asserts that, ac- cording to statements made by the United States authorities, the act is part of the national policy of the United States. 52. We cannot agree with the Soviet Union from this point of view either. We must point out that President Eisenhower declared categorically in Paris on 16 May 1960, before three Heads of Government, that these overflights would not be resumed. At yester- day's meeting, the permanent representative of the United States quoted this declaration by the President of his country and formally reaffirmed it on two occasions. 53. Previous statements by other United States of- ficials, even if we interpret them as the Soviet del- egation does, would therefore have been cancelled and annulled by the statements we have just men- tioned. We should add that the United States repre- sentative did not mention any period, time-limit or condition when he said yesterday that the flights would not be resumed. . 'lJ Ibid•• Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 16. annex 11. 49. Nous avons lltudie avec toute 1'attention voulue, et je dois ajouter en toute objectivitll, le projet sovi& tique de 1956. Si nous rapprocbons les faits dont nous sommes saisis des cas prevus dans le projet de 1'Union sovietique, nous sommes amenlls ~ conclure qu'ils ne repondent ~ aucun des types d'agression qui y sont enumeres. 50. Nous partageons 1'idee generale qui inspirait le projet sovilltique; et, parce que nous la partageons, il nous semble qu'un cas isole de survol d'un ter- ritoire par un avion non arme - quel que soit le jugement que 1'on puisse porter sur ce survol ~ d'autres points de vue - ne constitue pas un acte d'agression internationale. En consllquence, s'il n'y a pas agression internationale, la plainte sovilltique - sous la forme ou elle est presentee - doit, ~ notre avis, ne pas etre retenue. Si la delllgation sovilltique avait estime que ce survol menaQait la paix, non pas en tant qu'acte d'agression, mais pour d'autres motifs, elle aurait d1i presenter sa requete sous une autre forme. Quant ~ nous, nous avons le devoir de nous en tenir, dans chaque cas, ~ la forme prllQise sous laquelle la requete nous est presentee. 51. Comme une circonstance aggravante des agis- sements dont elle se plaint, la delllgation sovietiqu.e declare que, selon les declarations des autorites americaines, ies actes incriminlls font partie de la politique nationale des Etats-Unis. 52. Sur ce point aussi, il nous est impossible de partager 1'opinion de 1'Union sovietique. Nous rap- pellerons simplement que le pr6sident Eisenhower a declare catllgoriquement devant les trois cbefs de gouvernement reunis .~ Paris, le 16 mai 1960, que les vols ne reprendraient pas. Pour sa part, au cours de la seance d'bier, le reprllsentant permanent des Etats-Unis, citant la dllc1aration du President de son pays, en a solennellement confirme 1estermes ~ deux reprises. 53. Les declarations faites antllrieurement par d'autres fonctionnaires des Etats-Unis - meme si on 1es interpr~te comme la dll1egation sovietique - sont donc nul1es et non avenues du fait de celles que je viens de rappeler. n faut ajouter que, dans son intervention d'bier, le representant des Etats- Unis n'a assigne aucun terme, de1ai ou condition ~ la decision de ne pas renouve1er 1es survo1s. y Ibid., douzil!me session, Supplement No 16. annexe 11. 56. In the light of this view of the Council's task, it is appropriate to ask whether the statement which the representative of the Soviet Union is proposing we should adopt would in fact help to relax tension and to remove the obstacles to this relaxation, or whet••er. on the contrary, it would tend to worsen the existing international situation. In our opinion, there can be no doubt about the answer. We are convinced that if the Security Council approved the draft re- solution which the Soviet Union has submitted, the international situation would become so grave that the Soviet leaders themselves would undoubtedly be the first to view it with anxiety and alarm. 57. We must face the situation realistically. In some cases, the right solution is not to follow the procedure of a court of law. In this particular case, we believe that we should not seek to apportion blame, but. should do everything in our pOwel" to establish a basis for agreement which will remove the causes that provoked the incident. In the present circum~ stances, we believe our task is to do this, and not to take theoretical sanctions which would merely have the effect of making the atmosphere more oppressive than it already is. If the Security Council were to concentrate on the achievement of such a basis for agreement and to use its authority to provide the parties to the dispute with an opportunity for calm discussion, it would have discharged its function under the Charter much better than by using strong words which would frighten no one but which could only exasperate those against whom they were di- rected. In view of the gravity of the situation, we think it is much more important to look to the future and to try to relieve the present international tension rather than to dwell on the past. 58. My delegation would like to draw attention to another side of the question. We wish to affirm our support for the principles of international law and our. fervent hope that all States will regulate their 55. Nous avons jusqu'ici examine la question d'un point de vue strictement juridique. Mais nous devons egalement l'etudier sous un autre angle, dont!'impor- tance est ericore plus grande 11 nos yeux. En effet, le Conseil de securite n'est pas un organe judiciaire au sens oil 1'est par exemple la Cour internationale de Justice. Le ConseU de securite est un organe executif superieur, de caract~re politique, dont la mission est, comme le rappelle la communication sovietique, de veiller au maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales. Son devoir primordial est donc d'agir de mani~re que ses decisions, loin d'aggraver la situation, contribuent 111'ameliorer en creant, dans la mesure du possible, une atmosph~re de detente et d'harmonie. 56. n convient donc de se demander, 11 la lumi~re de cette interpretation du mandat du Conseil, si la de- claration que le representant de 1'Union sovietique demande d'adopter contribuerait veritablement 11 cette detente et 11 l'elimination des facteurs qui y font obstacle, ou si au contraire elle risqueraiJ d'aggraver le climat international qUi r~gne actuel- lement. A notre avis, il ne peut y avoir aucun doute sur la reponse. Nous sommes persuades que si le Conseil de securite adoptait le projet de resolution propose par l'Union sovietique, la situation interna- tionale s'aggraverait tellement que les dirigeants sovietiques eux-memes - et de cela nous sommes sl1rs - seraient les premiers 11 en eprouver de l'apprehension et 11 en etre alarmes. 57. Notre seule ressourceestd'envisagerlasituation avec un realisme total. Dans certains cas, la solution n'est pas d'agir comma si nous etions un tribunal. En 1'occurrence, il faut, 11 notre avis, s'efforcer moins de dllcouvrir des coupables que de rechercher par tous les moyens des formules de compromis capables d'eliminer les causes qui ont provoque 1'incident. Tel est notre rOle dans le cas present, et non pas de prononcer des sanctions theoriques dont le seul effet serait de rendre I'atmosph~re encore plus irrespirable qu'elle ne 1'est actuellement. Si le ConseH de securite s'efforc;ait de rechercher de telles formules de compromis et mettait son autorite au service des parties de mani~re 11 servir de cadre 11 des conversations sereines, U s'acquitterait bien mieux de la mission que lui confie la Charte que s'il brandissait ses foudres menac;antes, incapables d'ef- frayer personne, mais capables d'irriterprofondement leurs destinataires eventuels. Nous croyons qu'€ltant donne la gravite de la situation, il vaut mieux nous occuper de l'avenir que du passe, et essayer de reduire l'actuelle tension internationale. 58. Ma delegation voudrait profiter de l'occasion qui lui est offerte pour exposer avec clarte un autre aspect de la question. Elle tient 11 exprimer sa foi indestructible dans les principes du droit internl!~ 59. We hope that this incident will give the parties concerned an opportunity to reaffirm, by their deeds, their loyalty to these legal principles, which are essential to coexistence. We also believe that it demonstrates the need to remove the underlying cause of these incidents-mutual fear and distrust-and that it shows how urgent it is, until this distrust is completely eliminated, to establish impartialsystems of control which would provide against individual acts of inspection and the Wide-spread practice of spying. 60. We are accordingly satisfied with the statements by the United States representative which I mentioned a moment ,ago, and we should welcome an equally precise statement from the Soviet representative, repudiating any kind of interference in the internal public life of States. 61. For the reasons I have given, the Argentine delegation will vote against the proposal of the re::' presentative of the USSR. We reaffirm our conviction that the Security Council will continue to act as an instrument for international harmony, and we are ready to support any effective proposal which will enable it to act in that capacity in the present dif- ficult circumstances. We believe that this is what the public opinion of the whole world expects of us at this moment of mingled hope and anxiety. 62. Mr. C. M. CHANG (China): The representative of China on the Security Council, Mr. Tsiang, is away from New York on a specialmission. He regrets that he is unable to retuIn in time to take part per- sonally in this debate. 63. We are dealing with an item in which one per- manent member of the Security Council accuses another permanent member of committing acts of aggression, of violating international law and the United Nations Charter, and of enclangering world peace and security. 64. This is a very serious charge-a charge which, if true, entails grave consequences. But the question is: What are the faots to sustainthe charge? A single- engine, unarmed plane belonging to the United States was shot down while flying over the Soviet Union. This is a simple case of collecting intelligence or, if you like, of espionage. Espionage is, of course, not a new phenomenon; nor is it a rare phenomenon. It has been practised from the beginning of organized society. Until now no country has yet classified espionage under the heading of aggression. 60. Dans ces conditions, nous nous f6licitons des d€lclarations du reprllsentant des Etats-Unis, que j'ai rappelees il y a un instant, et nous nous feliciterions d'entendre, de la bouche du representant de 1'Union sovietique, une dllclaration non moins categorique qui repudierait toute forme d'ingerence dans la vie publique interne des Etats. 61. En consequence, la dlllegation argentine votera contre la proposition du representant de PUnion s,ovietique. En rllaffirmant sa confiance dans Paction future du Conseil de securitll comme facteurd'har- monie internationale, elle se dllclare prate h appuyer toute initiative efficace destinee h determiner cette action dans la situation dlllicate oil nous nous trouvons actuellement. Nous croyons que c'est ce que l'opinion du monde entier attend de nous en ces heures dif- ficiles, oill'inquilltude le dispute h 1'esperance. 62. M. C. M. CHANG (Chine) [traduit de l'anglais]: M. Tsiang, reprllsentant de la Chine au Conseil de s6curite a 6t6 appe16 hors de New York pour une mission spllciale. n regrette de ne pouvoir revenir h temps pour participer personnellement h ce d6bat. 63. La question dont nous nous occupons est la suivante: un membre permanentdu ConseU de s6curite accuse un autre membre permanent d'avoir commis des actes d'agression, d'avoir vio16 le droit inter- national et la Charte des Nations Unies et d'avoir menac€lla paix et la s6curit6 mondiales. 64. n s'agit d'une accusation fort grave qui, si elle 6tait fond6e, entraiherait de graves cons6quences. Mais une question se pose: sur quels faits cette accusation s 'appuie-t-elle? Un avion monomoteur des Etats-Unis qui n'etait pas arme a et6 abattu alors qu'il survolait l'Union sovietique. C'est un simple cas'de mission de renseignements ou, si I'onpr6:Rlre, d'espionnage. L'espionnage n'est 6videmment pas un ph€lnom~nenouveau ouextraordinaire. L'espionnage existe depuis le debut des socilltlls organis€les. Aucun pays n'a encore jusqu'ici classll 1'espionnage sous la rubrique "agression". 66. As regards the U-2 affair, theword "aggression" clearly does not apply. The proper question to ask is: What prompted the United States to make such a flight? The representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, in a concise and cogent statement yester- day said that it was undertaken for the purpose of forestalling surprise attacks. The harsh law of sur- vival in this nuclear age dictates it. The United States had been the victim of surprise attacks before. The possibility of a surprise attack from a country which has a stockpile of nuclear weapons and mis- siles, capable of dealing annihilating blows, w..'se code of conduct is based upon the proposition that aims justify the means and whose aggressive pro- clivities are well known, cannot be ruled out. 67. However, the United States has already suspend- ed flights over the Soviet Union, and these flights will not be resumed. This is another instance of the democracies' concern for world peace in con- trast to Soviet defiance. 68. The world atmosphere is today poisoned by suspicion and mistrust among great Powers. Who is responsible for this sad state of affairs? The responsibility must be laid squarely at the door of the Soviet Union. 69. Those great Powers who are now suspicious of Soviet intentions are no other than those who not very long ago were loyal allies of the Soviet Union. This was at one time called the "grand alliance". But the lustre of that alliance was somewhat tar- nished even before the end of the war. Yet, as soon as the war ended, great hopes were entertained by men of goodwill that peace and security among nations could be built on a working agreementbetween the Soviet Union and other Powers. Leaders of the free world went to great length to cultivate Soviet friendship and to meet Soviet wishes. Great sacri- fices were made towards that end. There was a general feeling that in spite of the differences be- tween the Soviet and other ways of life, fruitful and peaceful coexistence was possible. The atmos- phere then was not one of suspicion and mistrust but of goodwill and hope. Had this desire for co- operation, this goodwill, been reciprocated, the world would certainly have been a much better and happier place to live in; and the cold war, which has plagued mankind to this day, would not have come about at all. 70. But the Soviet Union did not see fit to recipro- cate. Instead, it preferred to commit one act of 13 66. S'agissant de 1'incident de 1'avion U-2, il est evident que le terme "agression" ne s'applique pas. Ce qu'il faut chercher ~ comprendre, ce sont les motifs qui ont pousse les Etats-Unis ~ effectuer ce survol. Dans la declaration br~ve et convaincante qu'il a faite hier, M. Lodge, representant des Etats- Unis, a dit que ce survol avait ete entrepris afin de prevenir des attaques par surprise. C'est a une necessite que la loi cruelle de la survivance impose ~ notre ~re atomique. Les Etats-Unis ont dej~ ete victimes d'attaques par surprise. n n'est pas impos- sible qu'un pays qui a des stocks d'armes et d'engins nucleaires capables de porter un coup fatal, qui fonde son code de conduite sur le principe selon lequel la fin justifie les moyens et qui a, on le sait, une forte tendance ~ 1'agression, declenche une attaque par surprise. 67. Cependant, les Etats-Unis ont dej~ suspendu les survols de 1'Union sovietique; ils ne serontpas repris. Voil~ un nouvel exemple du contraste qui existe entre la fa~on dont les democraties se preoccupent de la paix mondiale et l'attitude de defi de l'Union sovietique. 68. De nos jours, l'atmosph~re mondiale est em- poisonnee par les souwons et par la mefiance qui r~gne entre les grandes puissances. Qui est res- ponsable de ce deplorable etat de choses? C'est, il faut le reconnaitre sans equivoque, 1'Union sovi6- tique. 69. Les grandes puissances qui doutent maintenant des intentions sovietiques sont celles-a mames qui, il n'y a pas tellement longtemps, etaient des allies loyaux de 1'Union sovietique. On parlait alors parfois de la "grande alliance". Mais l'eclat de cette alliance s'etait dej~ quelque peu terni avant mame la fin de la guerre. Pourtant, aussitot les hostilites terrninees, les hommes de bonne volonte ont nourri l'espoir d'edifier la paix et la securitemondiales ense fondant sur un accord entre l'Union sovietique et les autres puissances. Les dirigeants du monde libre ont fait de grandes concessions pour cultiver l'amitie de l'Union sovietique et repondre ~ ses vceux. De grands sacrifices ont ete consentis dans ce sens. Onestimait g€meralement qutune coexistence fructueuse et paci- :'''Ue etait possible malgre les differences qui exis- talent entre le mode de vie sovietique et les autres modes de vie. L'atmosph~re n'etait pas faite alors de souwons et de mefiance, mais de bonne volonte et d'espoir. Si ce desir de cooperation, cette bonne volonte, avaient trouve un echo, il aurait sans nul doute fait meilleur vivre dans le monde, et la guerre froide qui sevit aUjourd'hui encore n'aurait pasmame existe. 70. Mais l'Union sovietique n'a pas juge bond'yfaire echo et a prefere commettre agression sur agression li~h a system for the regulation of armaments, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, has come to nothing. Had the Soviet Union agreed to accept controlled disarmament and inspection pro- posed by a number of nations, and endorsed by the majority of the United Nations, the U-2 affair would never have happened. 71. Disarmament and other urgent problems relating to peace and security were to be discussed at the meeting of the Heads of States in Paris. The world, of course, had no great illusions about what that Summit Conference might accomplish. At least, it was hoped, there would be a lessening of inte!"na- tional tension. That hope was, however, unceremo- niously dashed when Mr. Khrushchev, whohadbrought so much pressure to bear to bring the Conference into being, torpedoed it even before it had formally begun. The astonishing thing is that Khrushchev used the U-2 affair to do it. 72. It is idle to speculate about Khrushchev's mo- tives. It suffices to say that by wrecking the Summit Conference he did incalculable harm to the cause of peace. His strange performance in Paris raises once more the question of his sincerity in regard to peace and security. 73. It seems to my delegation that Khrushchev does not really want peace, as we understand the word. The Soviet objective remains world domination. ltpeaceful coexistencelt, the ltspirit of Genevalt, the ltspirit of Camp Davidlt, and so on, are just so many empty phrases, so many propaganda devices to be- fuddle a world longing for peace and security. 74. The Soviet Union is a great Power. It has a vast territory, a large and disciplined manpower and a revolutionary aggressive ideology. It seems that Mr. Khrushchev is determined to use all these assets to accelerate the triumph of the Communist system. He has in fact spelled out this over-all objective in no uncertain terms. His moves and his proposals are coldly and carefully .calculated to advance this objective. This being so, tl1e non-Cp~unist coun- tries cannot be blamed for being apprehensive about Soviet intentions. It is not without reason that they formed various defensive alliances, which the Soviet Union dislikes so much. 75. The Summit Conference in Paris died a violent death at the hand of Khrushchev. His bizarre be- haviour alienated world public opinion. For this reason he has now shifted the front of the cold war from Paris to the United Nations. In so doing, he has been aware of the scruples in Western thinking. To create division and to arouse uneasy conscience has always been the principal aim of Soviet propa- ganda. 72. n est vain de sp6culer sur les motifs qui ont inspir€l M. Khrouchtchev. n suffit de dire qu'enfaisant ~chouer la Conf€lrence au sommet, il a fait un tort incalculable h la causedelapaix. Son €ltrange compor- tement h Paris met une fois de plus en question sa sinc6rit€l touchant la paix et la s6curit6. 73. Ma d6l6gation estime que M. Khrouchtchev ne veut pas vraiment la paix, au sens que nous donnons h: ce terme. L'objectif de l'Union sovi€ltique reste la domination dn monde. "La coexistence pacifique", "1'esprit de Gen~ve", "l'esprit de Camp David", ne sont que des formules creuses, des artifices de propagande' destin€ls h berner le monde entier qui aspire h la paix et h la s€lcurite. 74. L'Union sovi~tique est une grande puissance. Elle dispose d'un vaste territoire, de travallleurs nombreux et disciplines et d'une ideologie revolution- naire agressive. n semble que M. Khrouchtchev soit decide h user de tous ces atOllS pour h~ter le triomphe du syst~me communiste. En fait II a €lnonce ce but ultime sans aucune ambiguil€l. Ses actes et ses propositions sont froidement et soigneusement calcules pour parvenir h ce~seul objectif. Cela €ltant, les pays non communistes n'ant pas tort de manifester des appr€lhensions hI'6garddes intentions sovietiques. Ce n'est pas sans raison qu'lls ont constitu€l diverses alliances d6fensives, qui d6plaisent si fort h 1'Union sovi6tique. 75. A Paris, M. Khrouchtchev a lui-meme mis fin vfolemment h la Conf6rence au sommet. Son com- portement bizarre lui a ali6n6 1'opinion publique mondiale. C'est pourquoi II a transport€l le front de la guerre froide de Paris h 1'Organisation des Nations Unies. n a par Ill. tenu compte des scrupules de 1'opinion occidentale. La propagande sovi€ltique a toujours pour principal souci de cr€ler des dis- sensions et de susciter des tr<JlJl::\les de conscience. 77. Are his hands so clean, is his soul so pure? There can be only one answer to this-an emphatic "No". The fact is that no country on earth has spawned such a gigantic, world-wide network of espionage as the Soviet Union. If the U-2 incident is to be con- demned, it is certainly not for the Soviet Union to cast the first stone. 78. Viewed from another angle, one wonders whether the Soviet Union has not made too much of the whole affair. In this day and age, air sovereignty has be- come more or less a myth and has been violated right and left by man-made satellites. The Soviet Union has a number of these' in orbit. No one has complained about them. Nor has the Soviet Union complained about United States satellites. There are now satel- lites capable of sending back photographs. In the not too distant future this kind of intelligence-collecting carried out by the U-2 would be rendered obsolete by science. The hue and cry raised by the Soviet Union is in fact much ado about nothing. The Soviet draft resolution [S/4321] is purely a propagandamove and unworthy of serious consideration. It should be rejected without ceremony. My delegation will vote against it.

The question en- titled nAggressive acts by the Air Force ofthe United States of America against the Soviet Union, creating a threat to universal peace", which has been sub- mitted to the Security Council by the Soviet Union, is a matter of the greatest importance. This has been proved by recent events. The case has gone far beyond the definition of "an incident" and it is to be expected that further developments, in particular the attitude of the Security Council towards the case will bring about serious consequences of a political, legal and military nature and will most certainly influence further development of international relations. 80. The course of events is well known to all of us and I do not intend to restate it. Nor shall I discuss the various side aspects connected with it.. Let us, 77. Quand on se demande si M. Khrouchtchev a vrai- ment les mains si nettes E!'t l'mne si pure, on n'hesite pas ~ repondre IInon11, categoriquement. Le fait est qu'aucun autre pays au monde n'a organise de reseau d'espionnage aussi gigantesque, aussi parfaitement universel que 1'Union sovilltique ella-mame. S'U faut condamner 1'incident de 1'avion U-2, ce n'est cer- talnement pas ~ 1'Union sovi6tique de jeter la pre- mi~re pierre. .. 78. Envisagee d'un autre point de vue, on peut se demander si 1'Union soviatique n'a pas demesurement grossi toute 1'affaire. A notre epoque, la souverainete de 1'espace aerien est devenue plus ou moins mythique. Cette souverainete a ete et est constamment violee de tous cotes par des satellites artificiels. L'Union sovietique en a ella-mame lance plusieurs qui de- crivent leur orbite. Personne ne s'en est plaint. L'Union sovietique n'a pas non plus proteste contre 1'existence de satellites americains. n existe desor- mais des satellites en mesure de nous transmettre des photographies. Dans un avenir assez proche, pour obtenir des renseignements, les moyens du type de 1'avion U-2 seront scientifiquement compl~tement perimes. Si bien que les violentes protestations de l'Union sovietique ne constituent en fait que beaucoup de bruit pour rien. Le projet de resolution presente hier par l'Union sovietique [S/4321] n'est qu'une manceuvre de pure propagande qui ne merite pas d'atre serieusement prise en consideration. n faudrait le repousser sans ceremonie. Ma delegation votera contre ce projet de resolution. 79. M. MICHALOWSKI (Pologne)[traduitde l'anglais]: La question que 1'Union sovietique a presentee au Conseil de s€lc.urite sous le titre "Actes agressifs de l'aviation militaire des Etats-Unis d'Ameriquecontre 1'Union sovietique, qui constituent une menace pour la paix universelle" est de la plus haute importance. C'est du reste ce qu'ontprouve de recents ev€mements. L'affaire depasse de beaucoup le cadre d'un "incident" et il faut s'attendre ~ ce que la suite des ev€mements, et notamment l'attitude qu'adoptera le Conseil de securite en la mati~re, ait de profondes consequences d'ordre politique, juridique et militaire et influence sans aucun doute l'evolution des relations interna- tionales. 80. Le deroulement des evlmements nous est ~ tous bien connu et je ne vais pas le retracer. Je ne vais pas non plus examiner l'affaire sous les divers 81. This is in short the essence of events which occurred between 1 and 17 May. AlloVl me to con- sider these facts and their consequences from the legal, military and political point of view. I believe such consideration to be the duty of our Council and I think that it should serve as the basis for action of the Security Council. 82. As regards the legal aspect, let us start from a legal appraisal of the very first in the series of events, namely the flight of the United States U-2 aircraft over Soviet territory. 83. International law has never concerned itself with peacetime espionage. There is no doubt, however that the way in which the United States acted in this case constitutes a violation of international law which recognizes complete and exclusive sovereignty of States over their air space. This principle which has been acknowledged in both common international law and in the domestic legislatures of most coun- tries is also clearly formulated in many international agreements. We can find it in article 1 of the Con- vention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Naviga- tion signed in Paris on 13 October 1919, in article 1 of the Convention on Commercial Aviation signed at Havana on 20 February 1928, and also in article 1 of the Convention on International Civil AviatiOll signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944, which reads: "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." Both the Havana and the Chicago Conventions have been signed and ratified by the United States. 84. The principle of complete and exclusive sover- eignty of each State over its air space ma.~esflights of foreign planes over the territory of any State illegal without the State's consent. Each State has the exclusive right to establish the procedure of such flights and of granting permission. This principle is clearly expressed in article 11 of the Chicago Con- vention. 85. Any flight that takes place withoutthepermission of the State concerned, particularly an espionage flight, is a drastic breach of treaty obligations; it is also a violation of the principle of sovereignty and of State frontiers; and finally it is a violation of the United Nations Charter, particularly Articles 1, 2 and 78. compl~te de cb:que Etat sur son espace aerien rend illegaux les vols dlavions etrangers au-dessus du territoire d'un Etat s'lls se produisent sans le con- sentement de celui-ci. Chaque Etat a le droit exclusif de fixer la procMure relative ~ des vols de ce genre et dlaccorder des autorisations It cette fin. Ce principe est clairement exprime h. I'article 11 de la Convention de Chicago. 85. Tout vol entrepris sans I'autorisation de l'Etat interesse, particuli~rementlorsqu'il s'agit d'un vol d'espionnage, constitue une rupture flagrante des obligations contractuelles; c'est aussi une violation du principe de la souverainete et des fronti~res nationales; c'est enfin une violation de la Charte des Nations Unies, en particu).ier de son Article premier et de ses Articles 2 et '78. 87. Finally, may I stress that domestic laws of the United States also fully recognize the complete and exclusive sovereignty of the State over its air space. In both the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the United States recognized its sovereignty in the air space above its lands and waters. The Act of 1926 also says that: ".•. aircraft, a part of the armed forces of any foreign nation shall not be navigated in the United States... except in accordance with an authorization granted by the Secretary of State." The recognition of air sover- eignty and principles contained in the earlier acts of Congress have been confirmed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 88. En Union sovietique llgalement, le droit interne reconnart le principe de la souverainete aerienne. L'article premier du code aerien de l'Union sovie- tique de 1935 stipule que celle-ci a une souverainet€l complete et exclusive sur son espace aerien. L'Union sovietique, comme les Etats-Unis, n'ajamais reconnu que sa souverainete s'arrete ~ une certaine limite supllrieure. 88. In the Soviet Union, also, the principle of air sovereignty is set forth in domestic law. Article 1 of the Air Code of the USSR of 1935 recognizes complete and exclusive sovereignty in the air space above the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, like the United States, has never recognized any upper limit to its sovereignty. 89. Je voudrais aussi appeler 1'attention du Conseil sur le fait que 1'un des objectifs essentiels du vol du 1er mai, c'est-A-dire la prise de photographies aeriennes, est tout aussi illegal. L'interdiction de la photographie aerienne dllcoule logiquement du prin- cipe de souverainet6, commeil est dit aux articles 3 Q, 3 9, 4 et 9 et particuli~rement ~ l'article 36 de la Convention de Chicago. 89. I should also like to draw your attention to tfie fact that one of the main purposes of the flight of 1 May, namely the taking of aerial photographs, is equally illegal. The banning of aerial photography is a logical consequence of the principle of sover- eignty and it has been so stated in the Chicago Con- vention, in articles 3 (Q) and (g), 4 and 9, and par- ticularly in article 36. 90. To conclude, the flight of the U-2 aircraft for purposes of espionage on 1 May as well as all previous flights of similar character, constitute a breach of important international agreements duly signed and ratified, as well as a violation of essential domestic laws known and valid. This act was com- mitted in violation of the sovereign rights and the boundaries of another State, in a way which is in- consistent With the obligations undertaken by the Government of the United States through the United Nations Charter. 90. Pour conclure, le vol de 1'avion U-2 aux fins d'espionnage, le 1er mai, ainsi que tous les vols anterieurs de caract~re semblable, constitue une violation d'accords internationaux importants dilment signes et ratifies, et une violation des lois nationales essentielles reconnues et en vigueur. Cet acte a ete commis en violation des droits souverains et des fronti~res d'un autre Etat, d'une fa~on qui est con- traire aux obligations incombant au Gouvernementdes Etats-Unis aux terroes de la Charte des Nations Unies. 91. Telle est notre attitude quant aux aspects juri- diques du vol du 1er mai. 91. Such is our attitude towards the legal aspects of the flight of 1 May. 92. Ainsi, le droit a llt6 viole. Ceux qui ont commis cette violation ont d'abord essayll de nier. Cependant, le 9 mai, en prllsence de preuves accablantes, le Secretaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis a reconnu officiel- lement que le survol avait eu lieu. On aurait pu se 92. ;rhus, law has been violated. Those who have done it tried first to deny it. On 9 May, however, under pressure of unquestionable evidence the Secre- tary of State of the United States officially acknowl- edged the flight. One could have welcomed his an- nouncement if he had also condemned the flight as an act of lawlessness and promised an apology and the punishment of those responsible. If this had hap- pened, we could safely assume that the case would have wound up as a serious and unpleasant incident, but only an in" ldent. f~liciter de cette d~clarations'iI avait ~galementcon- damn~ ce vol comme un acte il1~gal, s'iI avait promis des excuses et le cM.timent des responsables. S'iI en avait 6te ainsi, nous pourrions penser ~ coup stir que 1'affaire aurait et€l un incident grave et pllnible certes, mais seulement un incident. 93. Malheureusement, tel n'a pas 6te le cas. La dllclaration du Secrlltaire d'Etat que nous avons en- tendue le 9 mai etait sans precedent dans 1'histoire puisqu'elle attribuait aux Etats-Unis le droit de se livrer ~ des vols d'espionnage au-dessus duterritoire de 1'Union sovietique pour des raisons de securite. 93. Unfortunately, this was not the case. The state- ment of the Secretary of State which we heard on 9 May was unprecedented in history, as it attributed to the United States the right of espionage flights over the territory of the USSR for reasons of security. We also learned from the statement that the flights 17 Congr~s a 6te confirmee par le Federal Aviation Act de 1958. 95. At this point what actually happened was that a great, powerful State raised the violation of inter- national law to the rank of its official policy. Espio- nage has been declared an integral part of the foreign policy of one of the permanent members of the Security Council whose particular obligation is to act in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Charter. The new doctrine expressed in the state- ment of the Secretary of State is an attempt to re- place international law by the law of the jungle. 96. The statement of the Secretary of State-and if nothing drastic should be done to eradicate it, it runs the risk of becoming known in the annals of history as the Herter Doctrine-negates the fundamental principle of international law on which the whole system of international relations ib basep, namely,. the principle of the sovereignty of States without which there would be no waY. of international co- operation or of normal relations between States. 97. The principle of sovereign rights and the sover- eign equality of States is the basis of the United Nations Charter as well as of all fundamental docu- ments regulating international relations in our times, All these documents call for close co-operationamong States regardless ofdiTidingboundaries or differences in their political and social systems. At the same time, however, these documents expressly forbid any violation of State frontiers on land, sea and in the air. 98. A violation of these principles cannot and should not be justified by the interest of one State or even a group of States. Usurpation of such rights woulf lead us stl-aight into chaos and lawlessness; it enters dangerously into the realm of aggression, andtouches the borders of open hostility. One of the reasons for the existence of international law and its generally recognized principles is the prevention of wilfulness in international relatio~ and the prevention of'vio- lation of the rights of one nation by another nation. 99. It is true that there are a number of limitations of State sovereignty in international relations for the sake of effective co-operation among nations. But this limitation of sovereignty is always and without exception agreed upon by the States concerned and results from an agreement or from an international obligation. In no case can one State ever limit the sovereign rights of another State by its ownunilateral decision, violating a law in the name of its own 95. A ce moment-l~, ce qui s'est produit en realite, c'est qu'un grand et puissant pays a fait de la violation du droit international sa politique officielle. L'espion- nage a lltll d~clar~ partie int~grante de la politique ~trang~re d'un des membres permanents du Conseil de s~curit~, qui se trouve dans 1'obligation parti- culi~re d'agir conformement ~ la lettre et ~ l'esprit de la Charte. En ~non~ant cette nouvelle doctrine, le Secr~taire d'Etat essaie de remplacer le droit international par la loi de la jungle. 96. La d~claration du Secretaire d'Etat - qui, si 1'on ne s'efforce pas s~rieusement d'en effacer le souvenir, risque de rester dans 1'histoire sous le nom de "Doctrine de Herter" - va 11 I'encontre du principe fondamental du droit international sur lequel reposent toutes les relations internationales, c'est-~-dire ~ 1'encontre du principe de la souve- rainet~ des Etats, sans lequel il n'y aurait pas de cooperation internationale ni de rapports normaux entre Etats. 97. Le principe des droits souverains, de 1'~galite souveraine des Etats, est ~1a base de la Charte des Nations Unies et aussi de tous les documents fondamentaux qui r~glent ~ notre ~poque les relations internationales. Tous ces documents impliquent une cooperation ~troite entre les Etats, queUes que soient les fronti~res qui les s~parent ou leurs divergences en mati~re de syst~me politique ou social. Mais, d'autre part, ces documents interdisentexpress~ment toute violation des fronti~res des Etats sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs. 98. L'interet d'un Etat, ou memed'ungrouped'Etats, ne peut pas et ne doit pas justifier la violation de ces principes. Si une puissance s'octroyait ce droit, cela nous m~nerait directement au chaos et ~ 1'illegalitej nous toucherions dangereusement au domaine de l'agression et de l'hostilite ouverte. L'une des raisons pour lesqueUes i1 existe un droit international et des principes generalement recooous est d'empecher 1'artitraire dans les rapports internationaux et la violation des droits d'une nation par une autre nation. 99. nest vrai qu'il existe un certain nombre de limitations h la souverainete des Etats dans les rapports internationaux en vue d'une cooperation efficace entre les nations. Mais cette restriction h la souverainete est toujours sans aucune exception l'objet d'un accord entre les Etats int~ress~s, ou le resultat d'un accord oud'uneobligationinternationale. En aucun cas un Etat ne peut limiter lea droits sou- verains d'un autre Etat par une decision ou par une 100. Le 16 mai, une declaration du pr3sident Eisen- hower relative A la suspension des survols du ter- ritoire de 1'Union sovietique par des aeronefs ame- ricains a ete publiee. Je dirai respectueusement que cette declaration n'a modifie en rien la situation juridique que je viens de decrire. Non seulement parce que cette declaration n'est que l'une des nom- breuses declarations contradictoires auxquelles a donne lieu cette affaire. Mais le fait le plus important est que le president Eisenhower n'a pas repudie la 100. On 16 May President Eisenhower's statement concerning the suspension of American flights over USSR territory was published. I respectfully submit that this statement did nothing to change the legal situation described above, and not only because it was just one of many contradictory statements on that subject. The most important fact is that Presi- dent Eisenhower did not repudiate Mr. Herter's thesis, did not withdraw the atf;ribution of the right to flyover foreign territory, did not return to legal principles and to respect for the sovereignty of other States, did not condemn lawlessness. On the contrary, the word "suspension" in the statement confirms that the President still considers the flights permissible and possible. In the next sentence the President stated that the flights would not be re- sumed; but how can we be certain that another one .of those surprising statements which have kept us breathless in the last two weeks will not appear? How can we be certain, since the very principle of non-admissibility of such activities has been shaken, since the breaking of international commitments has been promoted to the rank of official policy? th~se de M. Herter, il n'a pas refuse de prendre le droit de survoler un territoire etranger; il n'a pas reaffirm€l les principes juridiques ni le respect de la souverainete des autres Etats, et il n'a pas co11"'" damne 1'illegalite. Au contraire, le mot "suspension" qui figure dans sa declaration, confirme que le President continue de penser que de tels vols sont possibles et sont permis. Dans la phrase suivante, le President a declare que les vols ne seraient pas repris; mais comment pouvons-nous etre certains que nous n'entendrons pas une autre de ces sur- prenantes declarations qui nous ont tenus en haleine au cours des deux derni~res semaines? Comment pouvons-nous etre certains, puisque le principemame selon lequel de telles activites sont inadmissibles a ete ebranle, puisque la violation d'engagements inter- nationaux a ete clevee au rang de politique offici~lle? 101. Dans sa deplaration d'hier, M. Lodge a egale- ment essay€l de nous convaincre que les vo~s d'aeronefs militaires au-dessus du territoire de 1'Union sovi€ltique ont cesse de faire partie de la politique des Etats-Unis. Mais lui aussi a parle de "suspension" - et, malheureusement, il s'agit d'un terme bien clair et qui ne peut faire l'objet de plus d'une interpretation: une cessation temporaire et non permanente. Cette semantique politique est de la plus haute importance. C'est pourquoi, doutant de ma connaissance de l'anglais, j'ai consulte le Webster's International Dictionary. A l'article "suspend" j'ai releve des definitions equivalant ~: "retirer tempo- rairement ses fonctions A une personne", "inter- rompre", "differer", "remettre A plus tard", "inter- dire pour un temps 11, "tenir dans 1'indecision", "tenir en attente, en suspens". Eh bien, nous ne voulons pas atre tenus dans 1'indecision. 101. In his statement of yesterday, Mr. Lodge also tried to convince us that flights of military aircraft across the territory of the USSR have ceased to be a part of United States policy. But he also used the word "suspension"-and unfortunately this happens to be the same thing, no matter what language you use, namely, a temporary cessation and not a per- manent one. These political semantics are of the utmost importance. TheJ.~)i:G."El,. having no confidence in my English, I examir.~'1d T'\\:Jbster's International Dictionary and, for the word "suspend", I found such definitions as "to withdraw temporarily from any funCtion", "to stop temporarily", "to postpone", "to defer until later", "to withhold for a time", "to hold in an undecided state", "to keep waiting in suspense". Well, we do not want to be kept in suspense. 102. M. Lodge s'est ensuite lance dans une defense si chaleureuse des droits et des m/§rites de la poli- tique du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis en ce qui con- cerne ces survols, dans un plaidoyer si sinc~re pour ces actes de violation du droit international, que nous avons eu peine A croire que ceux qu'il defendait puissent juger bon de cesser des activites d'esoion- nage qui leur paraissent si indispensables ~t si meritoires. 102. Mr. Lodge then embarked upon such a fervent defence of the rights and merits of the United States Government's policy with respect to those flights, upon such a sincere defense of those acts of violation of international law, that we found it hard to believe that those whom he defends could bring themselves to cease those-in their opinion-necessary and bene- ficial spying activities. 103. M. Lodge a egalement parle de la proposition d'-inspection A "ciel ouvert", en ajoutant que, si elle etait adoptee, elIe "ferait disparaftre A jamais la necessite de telIes mesures de protection". Mais 103. Mr. Lodge also mentioned the proposal for an "open skies" .inspection and added that, should this proposal be accepted, it would "obviate forever the necessity of such measures of self-protection". But 19 104. In the course of all negotiations, various pro- posals are made. The USSR, for instance, has re- peatedly proposed to the United States a ban on atomic weapon tests. The United States has stolidly refused to consider such an agreement. This is its right. Does till:; mean that it is permissible to send planes over the territory of the United States and to break treaties that have been voluntarily agreed upon? It seems to us that such an attitude towards negotiations and proposals can lead nowhere at all. 104. Toute nllgociation donne lieu h des propositions diverses. L'Union sovilltique par exemple a proposll h maintes reprises aux Etats-Unis d'interdire les essais d'armes nuclllaires. Les Etats-Unis se sont syst6matiquement refus6s h envisager un accord sur ce point. C'est leur droit. Mais est-il permis pour autant d'envoyer des avions survoler le territoire des Etats-Unis, de violer des traites mutuellement consentis? n nous semble que si 1'on envisage les negociations et les propositions dans cet esprit, nous n'aboutirons h rien. 105. Lorsque le president Eisenhower a promis de faire suspendre les vols, il a pr6cise, on s'en souvient, que cette promesse n'engageait en rien ses successeurs. Cette declaration de principe, qui pre- sente pourtant la plus haute importance, M. Lodge 1'a fort commodement oubUee mer. Si nous com- prenons bien, tout en annongant son intention de ne plus violer de traites, le President declare en mame temps qu'il ne peut prendre pour son successeur 1'engagement de respecter le droitinternational. 105. It must be remembered that President Eisen- hower qualified his promise to suspend the flights by adding a reservation, namely, that it did not bind his successors. This most important statement of policy was very conveniently ignored yesterday by Mr. Lodge. But what we understand by that is tlutt the President, while announcing his intention not to break any more treaties, states at the same time that he CaIUlot commit his successor to non-violation of international laws. 106. n f~'iut reconnaitre qu'une telle attitude ~l'egard du princ!Lpe pacta sunt servanda rend les relations internationales ~ tout le moins difficiles, pour ne pas dire impossibles. Nous n'avons pas 1'intention de discuter ici des principes sur lesquels repose la Constitution des Etats-Unis, et nous concevonS que les dllclarations politiques du Prllsidentpeuvent ne pas engager ses successeurs. Mais dans le cas present, il ne s'agit pas d'opinions politiques. 106. We have to confess that such an attitude to- wards the principle pacta sunt servanda makes in- ternational relations at the very least difficult, if not impossible. We do not intend here to go into the principles of the United States Constitution, and we understand that political declarations of a United States President may not be binding on his succes- sors. But in this case we are not dealing with political opinions. 107. As I said before, the inadmissibility of es- pionage flights over the territory of another State stems from fundamental principles of international law, particularly of the Chicago Convention, which was signed by President Roosevelt and ratified by the United States Senate. Therefore, it became bind- ing on all the Presidents of that country and all its governments until the Convention is formally de- nounced and the United Nations Charter rejected by the United States. Is that how we should understand the statement? If not, no change in the person of the President can justify the change towards treaty obli- gations voluntarily agreed upon. The fact that one chief executive has broken them does not mean that they have ceased to exist. 107. Comme je l'ai dejh dit, l'i1legitimite de vols ;:!'espionnage au-dessus de territoires etrangers de- coule de certains principes fondamentaux du droit international, et notamment de la Convention de Chicago, signee par le president Roosevelt et ratifille par le Senat des Etats-Unis. Ce texte engage donc tous les presideI.1ts et tous les gouvernements des Etats-Unis jusqu'h ce que ce pays le denonce of- ficiellement et rejette la Charte des Nations Unies. Est-ce ainsi qu'il faut interpreter cette declaration? Si tel n'est pas le cas, ce n'est pas parce que la personne du President change qu'on a le droit de changer d'attitude h 1'egard d'obligations volon- tairement acceptees aux termes d'un traite. Si un chef d'Etat a manque 11 ses obligations, eUes n'ont pas dispa~ pour autant. 108. As you see, the statement of 16 May entangles us even more deeply in the mesh of contradictions and, far from clarifying it further, confuses the issue. That is the attitude of our delegation towards the legal aspect of the recent events. 108. Comme vous le voyez, la declaration du 16 mai dernier ne fait que compliquer 'plus encore ce reseau de contradictions et, bien loin d'eclaircir la situation, ne sert qu'a la rendre plus obscure. TeUe est l'opinion de notre delegation sur 1'aspect juridique des evene- ments recents. 109. Qu'il me soitpermismaintenantdedirequelques mots de leurs aspects militaires. Nous vivons mal- heureusement 11 une epoque de course aux armements acceleree oil le moindre incident, lamoindreviolation de fronti~re constitue un danger. Depuis quelques annees, ce peril n'a fait que croure avec l'accrois- sement constant de la rapidite d'action et de la puis- sance formidable des moyens militaires modernes qui peuvent atre employes comme moyens de defense ou de represailles. Autrefois, quand un pays se sentait 109. Now may I be allowed to say a few words about their military aspects. We live, unfortunately, in times of an accelerated armaments race, and there is danger in every incident, in every frontier en- croachment. This danger has been rapidly growing over recent years as a consequence of a steady in- crease in the speed of action and in the tremendous power of modern military means that may be used against any a.ttack or as retortion. In the old days, a country which felt threatened with aggression pasted ) 110. In these circumstances, what can possibly be the meaning of sending a military espionage aircraft 1,500 miles into the territory of the USSR? Who can be sure that a plane-no matter how small- appearing on the radar screen carries only an amateur photog- rapher and not a load of ~om bombs? Who can be sure that it is unarmed? What would the Strategic Air Command have done, one is entitled to wonder, if its radars reported a Soviet plane penetrating into the United States? We know already that the flight of the U-2 has caused grave political consequences. It D".ight have caused, however, military dangers which would threaten not only the United States but the whole world. 111. Since a single flight like the one which took place on 1 May causes military dangers, what could be the possible military consequences of the prin- ciple expressed in the declaration of Mr. Herter on 9 May and confirmed by President Eisenhower on 11 May? Should this principle remain in force as the official policy of the United States Government, the whole world would never know a moment of peace. We would live in a state of constant uncer- tainty and alarm. Actions like those sanctioned in these two statements, namely, "take such measures as are possible unilaterally" or gatheringinformation "in every feasible way", would eventually not only precipitate a military incident but cause retaliation in order to put an end to further provocations, and finally lead to irrevocable actions. 112. The statement that these activities are neces- sary for the safety of the United States is absurd, ":0 say the least. In reality it creates danger. It is wrong to maintain that the photographing of military installations on the territory of another State is necessary for purposes of defence. On the contrary, such photography pinpoints objectives and targets for a possible future attack, and therefore it is not a defensive but an offensive action. Finally, it must be said that assurances about the non-aggressive character of such flights are equally fallacious. We have heard those assurances before while discussing constant United States bombe:r flights towards the boundaries of the USSR. We were assured that they invariably turn around at the very borders. Now we learn about aircraft which do not stop at the boun- dary. What will the next move be? 113. Allow me to discuss one more military aspect of the case. It puts before our eyes the danger and ~ he threat to peace resulting from maintainil1g United 110, Dans ces conditions, que penser d'un avion mi- litaire que I'on envoie faire de l'espionnage ~ plus de 1.500 milles ~ l'interieur du territoire de I'Union sovietique? Comment savoir que l'avion, si petit soit-il, qui se dessine sur un ecran de radar, ne porte qu'un photographe amateur et non une cargaison de bombes atomiques? Comment savoir quIll n'est pas arme? On se demande ce que le Strategic Air Command aurait fait si ses radars lui avaient signale la pr€lsence d'un avion sovietique au-dessus du ter- ritoire des Etats-Unis. Le vol de l'avion U-2 a dej~ eu des consequences politiques graves, nousle savons. n aurait pu creer aussi des dangers militaires qui auraient menace non seulement les Etats-Unis mais le monde entier. 111. Puisqu'un seul survol comme celui du 1er mai risque de provoquer un conflit arme, queUes pour- raient etre les consequences du principe lmonce par M. Herter dans sa declaration du 9 mai et confirme le 11 mai par le president Eisenhower? Si ce prin- cipe devait rester en vigueur en tant que politique officielle du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, le monde ne connaftrait pas un instant de securite, nous vivrions dans un perpetuel etat d'anxiete et diincer- titude. Des actes tels que ceux qui ont ete approuves dans oes deux declarations: "prendre des mesures unilaterales lorsqu'eUes sont possibles", recueillir des renseignements "p1?r tous les moyens possibles" risquent ~ la longue, non seulement de precipiter un conflit militaire, mats aussi de provoquer des represailles destinees ~ mettre fin ~ toutes nouveUes provocations; ils pourraient en fin de compte conduire ~ des actes irrevocables. 112. Quant ~ declarer que ces activites sont indis- pensables 11 la securite des Etats-Unis, c'est ~ tout le moins une absurdite. En fait, ce sont eUes qui creent le danger. nest errone de soutenir qu'un pays a besoin de photographier des installations militaires en territoire 6tranger pour assurer sa defense. Bien au contraire, ces photographies pre- cisent les objectifs et les cibles possibles d'une attaque 6ventlleUe, et constituent donc un acte de nature offensive, et non de nature d6fensive. Et quand on nous assure que ces survols nfont pas un earaet~re d'agression, ces arguments sont tout aussi fallacieux. Nous avons dej~ entendu des affirmations de ee genre ~ propos des vols incessants de bom- bardiers americains en direction de l'Union sovie- tique. On nous a assures alors qu'ils faisaient in- variablement demi-tour ~ la fronti~re. Voiei main- tenant qu'ils ne s'arretent plus aux fronti~res. Que va-t-il se passer ensuite? 113. Permettez-moi d'examiner encore un aspect militaire de la question. Cette affaire nom:: fait toucher du doigt le danger et la menace ~ la paix que constituent les bases militaires des Etats-Unis situees sur le territoire d'autres Etats. Bien qu'on 114. The political aspect of the case clearly results from the legal and military analysis of those events which took place between 1 and 17 May in connexion with the flight of the U-2 aircraft. The immediate consequences are known to all of us. The attitude of the United States Government made a Summit Conference imppssible. Such a conference could have brought further easing of internat~onal tension and might have brought nearer the solution of a number of important problems in the relations among the big Powers, particularly in the question of disarma- ment. But at the moment progress in this direction is, unfortunately, at a stop. Only the advocates of the cold war, the "revanchists" and the partisans of a policy of a position of strength can draw sOIp.e satis- faction from thts state of affairs. 114. Les aspects politiques de 1'affaire ressortent clairement de 1'analyse juridique et militaire des ev€mements qui se sont produits entre le 1er et le 17 mai h la suite du vol de l'avion U-2. Les conse- quences immediates, nous les connaissons tous. L'attitude du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a rendu impossible une conference au sommet qui aurait . permis de faciliter encore la detente internationale, qui aurait pu h~ter la solution de certains probl~mes importants que posent les rapports entre les grandes puissances, notamment dans le domaine du desar- memento Pour 1'instant, cette evolution est mal- heureusement h 1'arret. Seuls ceux qui pronent la guerre froide, les "revanchards", les partisans d'une politique fondee sur une position de force, peuvent tirer quelque satisfaction de la situation actuelle. 115. The Polish Government is following the course of events with deep concern. Poland always has been and is now activelysupporting all efforts to ease inter- national tension and improve understanding among nations': The aim of our policy always has been and still is the principle of close co-operation among nations on the basis of equality, respect of sover- eignty, and active and peaceful coexistence, regard- less of differences in political and economic systems. This policy has not been changed and it will be con- tinued persistently. 116. We cannot in any circumstances accept the imposition of the principle that differences between social systems authorize anybody to break interna- tional law and disregard State sovereignty. The United States Government, in its statements of 9 and 11 May, tries to justify the espionage flights by explaining that the United States is supposedly an open society with no military secrets to hide and that no military action can be prepared here without the knowledge of public opinion. 117. We could quote a number of examples where military activities in this supposedly open society were initiated without the knowledge not only of pub- lic opinion but even of political leaders. Who in the United States knew, for example, of the plan to land American forces in Lebanon in 1958, until it hap- pened? Who, before 6 May 1960, knew in this country that American military planes were flying across fronti~re de 1'Union sovietique, il a aussi viole les fronti~res d'autres Etats, viole des accords bila- teraux sur 1'utilisation des bases militaires, nui aux relations de bon voisinage entre 1'Union sovietique et d'autres pays. n a compromis lapaixet la securite dans une vaste region du monde. Si les bases situees en territoires etrangers continuent de servir auxbuts definis dans les declarations officielles du Gouver- nement des Etats-Unis, les c0nsequences militaires qui peuvent en decouler risquent indirectement de mettre en peril la paix du monde. Nous voyons done tous plus clairement que jamais que la liquidation de ces bases est une condition necessaire du desar- mement et de 1'evolution pacifique des relations internationales. 115. Le Gouvernement polonais suit le cours des evenements avec une grande inquietude. La Pologne n'a jamais cesse d'appuyer activementtous les efforts tendant h diminuer les tensions internationales et h ameliorer la comprehension entre les nations. L'objet de sa politique n'a jamais cesse d'etre une cooperation etroite entre les nations, fondee sur les principes d'egalite, de respect de la souverainete, de la coexistence active et pacifique, et ne tenant pas compte des divergences politiques et economiques. Cette politique n'a pas change, elle continuera ~ @tre suivie. 116. Mais en aucun cas nous ne pourrons nous laisser imposer le principe selon lequel les dif- ferences de regime social autorisent qui que ce soit ~ violer le droit international et faire fi de la sou- verainete des Etats. Dans les declarations des 9 et 11 mai, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a tente de justifier ses vols d'espionnage en alleguant que les Etats-Unis seraient une societe ouverte n'ayantaucun secret militaire ~ cacher et qu'il serait impossible dry preparer une action militaire sans que 1'opinion publique soit au courant. 117. Nous pourrions citer un certain nombre de cas ot. des activites militaires ont ete entreprises dans cette societe pretendument ouverte h 1'insu, non seulement de 1'opinion publique, mais aussi de ses chefs politiques. Pour dOIm.er un exemple, en 1958, qui donc aux Etats-Unis etait au courant du plan de debarquement de forces americaines ..au Liban avant que ce ne rot chose faite? Qui donc aux Etats-Unis 118. The task before the Security Council is clear. There is convincing and irrefutable evidence in favour of the Soviet complaint of aggressive acts of the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union which are a threat to the peace of the world. As we have attempted to prove so far, the real danger of this sort of activity. lies not only in the threat of military incidents but mainly in the undermining of the rules of international law and the breach of the principle of sovereignty of all big and small States, as well as in violating treaties and obligations. The plain consequences of this state of affairs are dis- trust, international tension and a threat to peace. Therefore the task of the Security Council can be defined simply as follows: we have to reinstate the rule of law, respect for obligations and proper con- duct in international relations. d 119. This, in our oplIDon, is the aim of the draft resolution presented by the Soviet Union. By voting for the draft resolution the Security Council will fulfil its obligation resulting from the United Nations Charter. Therefore the Polish delegation supports the draft resolution and will vote for it.

The Italian delegation has listened with the utmost interest to the state- ments made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by the re- presentative of the United States and by the other speakers who have taken the floor, and wishes to make its contribution to the debate by clarifying the position of the Italian Government on the issues before Ul? 121. The debate originated in a specific complaint by the USSR relating to a specific incident and fol- lowed an event more general in scope and more serious in nature. I refer to the breaking down in Paris of negotiations between the four great Powers, on which the whole world had pinnedits highest hopes. This failure of the Paris Summit Conference to make any step forward, or even to make a cautious and moderate start, seems to have been caused by the incident which is today the object of the Russian complaint. 122. However, in this complaint, as is shown in the cable to the President of the Security Council [S/4314] and in the explanatory memorandum [S/4315], no re- ference whatsoever is made to the regrettable events which have developed in Paris. In other words, the incident on which the complaint is based is isolated from the larger issues which at present beset the world, with the purpose on the part of the USSR of making of it the basis of an accusation directed at the so-called aggressive policies of the UnitedStates. ? 118. La tache qui s 'offre au Conseil de s~curit€l est claire. La plainte sovi~tique au sUjet d'actes agressifs de l'aviation militaire des Etats-Unis d'Am~rique, qui constituent une menace pour la paix universelle, est lltayee par des preuves convaincantes et irr€l- futables. Comme nous avons tente de le d€lmontrer, si ces activites sont v€lritablement dangereuses, ce n'est pas tant parce qu'elles risquent de provoquer des conflits militaires, mais parce qu'enes ruinent les bases mames des regles du droit international, violent le principe de la souverainete des Etats, petits ou grands, et meprisent enfin les trait€ls et leurs obligations. Les consequences evidentes de cet etat de choses sont la mefiance, la tension inter- nationale, la menace ~ la paix. La tache du Conseil de securite peut donc tout simplement se r€lsumer comme suit: assurer le respect du droit, faire en sorte que chacun satisfasse ~ ses obligations et observe dans les relations internationales la conduite qui convient. 119. Tel est ~ notre avis 1'objet du projet de reso- lution present~ par 1'Union sovi~tique. En l'adoptant, le Conseil de s~curit~ remplira les obligations qui lui incombent aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies. La d~l~gation polonaise appuie donc ce projet de r~solution sur lequel elle votera affirmativement. 120. M. ORTONA (Italie) [traduit de l'anglais]: La d~l€lgation italienne a ~cout~ avec le plus vif int€lrat les d€lclarations du Ministre des affaires ~trangeres de 1'Union des R~publiques socialistes sovi~tiques, du repr€lsentant des Etats-Unis et des autres orateurs, et voudrait apporter sa contribution au d€lbat en pr€lcisant la position du Gouvernement italien sur les questions dont nous sommes saisis. 121. Notre debat, dont l'origine est une plainte pre- cise de 1'URSS, ~ propos d'un incident pr€lcis, vient apres un €lv€lnement d'une port~e plus g€lnerale et d'une nature plus grave. Je veux parler de 1'~chec, ~ Paris, des n€lgociations entre les quatre grandes puissances, negociationssur lesquelles le monde entier avait fonde les plus grands espoirs. Si la Conference au sommet qui s'est tenue ~ Parisn'a pas pu avancer, ni mame prendre un depart prudent et mod€lr€l, il faudrait, semble-t-il, 1'attribuer ~ 1'incident qui fait aujourd'hui 1'objet de la plainte russe. 122. nest vrai que cette plainte ne fait aucune allusion aux regrettables €lv€lnements qui se sont deroules h Paris, si j'en juge par le cablogramme adresse au President du Conseil de securitll [S/4314] et par le memoire explicatif [S/4315]. En d'autres termes, la plainte isole 1'incident sur lequel elle se fonde des problemes plus vastes qui preoccupent actuellement le monde; crest que 1'URSS veut en faire la base d'une accusation dirigee contre ce qu'elle appelle la politique agressive des Etats-Unis. 124. If aggression were the purpose of Uriited States activities, the alliance would not stand; the alliance would crumble. Nor, I am sure, can the aims and purposes of this alliance be considered different today from yesterday because of the incident to which the Soviet complaint refers. I have no doubt that the intentions of the United States Government, as amply emphasized yesterday by the United States represen- tative, were far from being inspired by desires or plans of an aggressive nature. 125. In substance, the Italian delegation, quite frank- ly, fails to understand the purposes which the Gov- ernment of the USSR intends to pursue in calling this meeting of the Security Council. The practical aim of the Soviet request that the Council consider the matter would appear to be the halting of the allegedly aggressive flights of United States planes. However, these flights have already been halted, as was clearly stated by the President of the United States at the meeting in Paris of 16 May. It appears that this statement has not succeeded in allaying the mis- givings of the Soviet Government. 126. As for such a misgIvmg, I would like to be permitted by my colleague from the United Kingdom to repeat the words used by him today and by the British Prime Minister before the House of Com- mons on 20 May with regard to the breakdown of the Summit Conference and the statement made by President Eisenhower. He said that the "statement contained a categorical assurance that the aircraft flights had already been suspended and were not to be resumed". He added: "I should perhaps say here that Mr. Khrushchev subsequently made some ,play with the fact that this assurance was limited to the President's own tenure of office. It was, however, made clear that this assurance was the most categorical and definite which any President of the United States could constitutionally give." 127. I have dwelt on these assurances, borrowing also from a statement by an authoritative witness at the time they were given, because of the fact 124. Si 1'agression lltait le motif de 1'action des Etats-Unis, 1'alliance ne tiendrait pas, 1'alliance s'effondrerait. D'autre part, je suis stlr qu'on ne saurait considllrer aUjourd'hui que les objectifs et les buts de cette alliance sont, en raison de 1'incident auquel fait allusion la plainte sovilltique, diffllrents de ce qu'ils lltaient hier. Je ne doute pas que les intentions du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, comme le representant des Etats-Unis 1'a soulignll nettement hier, n'aient ete loin de s'inspirer de visees ou de projets de caract~re agressif. 125. Pour aller au fond des choses, la dlllllgation italienne n'arrive tr~s sinc~rementpas hcomprendre les objectifs que le Gouvernement de 1'URSS avait en vue en demandant la reunion du Consell de securite. Le but pratique que 1'Union sovietique visait en de- mandant au Conseil d'examinercette questionsemble- rait etre d'arreter les vols pretendument agressifs d'avions des Etats-Unis. Or ces vols ont dejh cesse,: comme le President des Etats-Unis 1'a declare net- tement lors de la reunion qui s'est tenue h Paris le 16 mai. n semble que cette declaration n'ait pas rElUssi a dissiper les doutes du Gouvernement sovie- tique. 126. En ce qui concerne ces inquilltudes, mon coll~gue du Royaume-Uni me permettra de rllpllter lea paroles qu'il a rapportees aujourd'hui et que le Premier Ministre britannique avait prononcees devant la Chambre des communes le 20 mai, h propos de 1'echec de la Conference au sommet et de la decla- ration faite par le president Eisenhower. n a dit que la "declaration comprenait 1'assurance catllgorique que les vols d'avions etaient dejh suspendus et qu'lls ne reprendraient pas". n a ajoute: "Je devrais peut-etre direici queM. Khrouchtchev a, par la suite, quelque peu exploitll le fait que cette assurance se limitait h la periode durant laquelle le Pr~sident serait en fonctions. On a toutefois bien precise que ces assurances etaient les plus cat6gorlques et les plus d6cisives qu'aucun president des Etats-Unis pourrait constitutionel- lement donner." 127. Je me suis 6tendu sur ces assurances, en citant la declaration d'un temoin autoris6 present au moment oil elles ont lltll donnees, parce qu'elles 129. In other words, those same satellites which are now gyrating in orbit and. which, whatever their altitude, are certainly passing over territories of sovereign States, could one day easily perform tasks which are similar to the ones that have motivated the Soviet complaint about the U-2 incident. Actual- ly, I just heard a few moments ago that the United States has launched-and it appears successfully-in orbit, a 3,600-pound satellite, a Midas type, designed to test the feasibility of establishing a network of satellites to provide almost instant warning in the event of a ballistic missile attack. In a situation of this kind, countries which are not in a position to compete with those who put satellites into orbit should already, as of now, view such activity with concern if they are to apply the same yardstick which the Soviets apply in the case oftheir complaint. But, we have instead to realize that we are con- fronted with a new dimension in photographic activity from high altitudes and that it is in this realistic perspective that any such activity should be eval- uated. 130. I have brought to the attention of the members of the Council these technical aspects, because I do think that, instead of focusing on the purport or the character of. flights like the one which is the object of )the Soviet complaint, we should address ourselves mpre to the constructive aims of furthering initia- tives in the field of "open skies" and outer space. Actually, the recent technical developments have already gone beyond the legal and political set-up of the international community and it is to them that we should look if this community, including there- fore all countries, big, medium and small, has to find adequate discipline, guarantees and protection. 131. I would like now to analyse further the Soviet complaint in the light of the record of past meetings of the Council. We lmow that the incident of the U-2 has not only become the reason for the calling of the Security Council, but it has also brought about the breakdown of the Summit Conference. With 129. En d'autres termes, ces mames satellites qui dllcrivent maintenant leur orbite et qui, quelle que soit leur altitude, passent certainement au-dessus du territoire d'Etats souverains, pourront un jou.r exe- cuter ais~ment des tliches similaires ~ celles qui ont justifie la plainte sovilltique relative ~ 1'incident de 1'U-2. En fait, je viens d'apprendre que les Etats- Unis ont lancll, avec succ~s apparemment, un satellite de pr~s de deux tonnes, du type Midas, qui doit ~:~~~;:slad~~~:~~tep~:s;~e~n~a~~::~~~~:~t,~~~~~: en cas d'attaque par engins balistiques. Dans une telle situation, les pays incapables de rivaliser avec ceux qui mettent des satellites en orbite devraient d~s ~ present s'inquillter de tels aetas, s'ils usaient du mame erit~re que 1'Union sovietique dans sa plainte. Mais ce dont il faut au contraire nous rendre compte, crest que nous avons affaire ~ une nouvelle dimension de la photographie d'altitude et qu'il con- :i:td:~ej~::~e.dans cette perspective realiste tout 130. J'ai appelll l'attention des membres du Conseil sur ces points techniques parce que j'estime qu'au lieu de nous concentrer sur l'intention oule caract~re de vols tels que celui qui fait l'objet de la plainte sovietique, nous devrions nous pr~occuper davantage de l'esprit constructif dont on pourrait faire preuve en favorisant des initiatives dans le domaine du "ciel ouvert" et de 1'espace extra-atmosphllrique. Au reste, les r~cents progr~s techniques dllpassent d~ja les concepts juridiques et politiques surlesquels se fondait jusqu'ici la collectivitll internationale et c'est sur ces progr~s que nous devons nous pencher pour que cette collectivit€l, faite de tous les pays, grands, moyens et petits, trouve la discipline, les garanties et la protection voulues. 131. Je voudrais maintenant poursuivre l'analyse de la plainte sovietique en fonction des seances ante- rieures du Conseil de securite. Nous savons que l'incident de l'avion U-2 n'a pas seulement motive la convocation du Conseil de securite, mais qu'il a €lgalement entrain€l l'llchec de la Conference au th~.t is, an alleged threat to international peace and a serious situation requiring the adoption of urgent measures. 132. At that time the Soviet delegation stated that the situation arising from the flights of United States military aircraft was so serious and urgent as to require necessarily a Summit Conference to discuss a number of urgent problems, including the question of drawing up means to preclude the danger of surprise attacks. The Soviet representative stated that effective measures to avert the threat of war, to bring about a change towards a healthier interna- tional atmosphere and to create proper conditions for the peaceful co-operation of all States, could best be taken. at a conference of Heads of Govern- ment. In the course of the same meeting, the Soviet representative added: ltIf the United States Government is really in- terested in business-like consideration of the question of preventing surprise attack, it knows full well that the only way-I repeat, the only way- to achieve this is to discuss the matter at a con- ference of the Heads of Government." [814th meet- ing, para. 82.] 133. Two years ago, we in the United Nations were thus warned-following an incident similar to the one on which we are labouring these days- that the proper forum to discuss all problems connected with the lessening of international tension was a Summit Conference. 134. Now, two years later, we witness what, to say the least, appears to be a sudden change of mind and policy on the part of the Soviet Government. In fact, I do feel that, according to the opinion expressed by the So·fiet delegation two years ago, any occurrence of the seriousness which the Soviet Government attributes to the U-2 flight, should have added new reasons for having a Summit Conference and given that Conference a new urgency. Today we note, on the contrary, that the Summit Conference is being wrecked only on that account. 135. My delegation feels in sum that the flights problem should have been put in its proper perSpec- tive and not so magnified that its political implica- tions and effects become unrelated to the event. It has already been said in this room that the disease has to be attacked at its roots. Actually we have to avoid performing like doctors who, having beencalled to the bedside of a patient with a major ailment, "Si le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis desire vrai;' ment un debat serieux sur la question de la pre- vention d'une attaque par surprise, il sait fort bien que le seul moyen " - le seul moyen, je r6p~te - " d'y parvenir est d'en saisir une conf6rence des chefs de gouvernement." [814~me seance, par. 82.] 133. n y a deux ans - Il la suite d'un incident ana- logue Il celui avec lequel nous sommes aux prises ces jours-ci - nous avons 6t6 ainsi avertis, Il l'Organisation des Nations Unies, que le cadre qui convenait pour discuter de tous les probl~mesrelatifs Il une reduction de la tension internationale etait une conf6rence au sommet. 134. Maintenant, c'est-ll-dire deux ans plus tard, le moins que l'on puisse dire de ce dont le Gouver- nement sovi6tique nous rend temoins est qu'il semble avoir subitement chang6 d'idee et de doctrine. Si j'en juge d'apr~s l'id6e exprimee par la delegation sovietique il y a deux ans, je dois conclure que toute situation de la gravite que le Gouvernement sovietique attribue au vol de l'avion U-2 devrait avoir cree de nouvelles raisons de r€mnir une conference au sommet et donne Il cette conference une nouvelJe urgence. Nous voyons aujourd'hui, au contraire, la Conference au sommet torpillee Il cause de ce seul incident. 135. Ma d6legation estime qu'il auraitfalluenvisager sous son vrai jour l'affaire des survols, et non la grossir au point que ses incidences et effets politiques deviennent sans rapport avec l'evenement lui-mame. On a dejll dit ici qu'il faut attaquerle malllla racine. Nous devons eviter d'agir comme les medecins qui, appe16s au chevet d'un patient atteint d'une maladie grave, se bornent Il ie guerir d'un symptome mineur 137. Now it has appeared quite obvious and been proven time and again that we all live on the same earth and that a surprise attack with the present potentialities of destruction would be fatal for the whole of humanity. This state of affairs can be properly coped with not through building higher and higher walls of misunderstanding, but by guarantee- ing national sovereignty through international secu- rity. This is a crying need which was amply empha- sized by preceding speakers and echoed all over the world, first of all by three Heads of Government on the day of the failure of the Summit Conference and again on 20 May by the Prime Minister of India and the President of the United Arab Republic, all of whom wished a resumption of high level talks. 138. That is why my delegation would view with great interest and favour any initiative aimed at stressing unity of purpose instead of a division of feelings, and at advocating a strong resumption of international activities on all possible planes and at all possible levels. 139. It would be very serious indeed if the dramati- zation of an incident which we have seen developing and whose presentation by the USSR is still, to say the least, baffling to our eyes should conceal the intention of the USSR to withdraw from active in- ternational co-operation. And if suspicion and lack of confidence have arisen out of that incident to the extent of denying the good faith of the President of the United States or of questioning his ability to make permanent commitments, the answer is, in the opinion of the Italian delegation, very simple: let us accelerate the international dealings on surprise attack and on outer space which have unfortunately been stalemated since last year. It is in fact sad- dening that, while we are discussing the infringe- ment on national sovereignty from high altitudes, no progress should have been possible on the question of the limits of outer space, which was hardly broached in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of last year. It is in fact sad- dening that the proposal for "open skies" advanced as far back as 1955 should have been set aside ever since, and it is saddening indeed that on the 137. C'est une veritemaintenantmanifesteetmaintes fois prouvee que nous vivons tous sur le mame globe et qu'une attaque par surprise serait, avecles moyens actuels de destruction, fatale pour toute 1'humanite. Ce n'est pas en dressant de plus en plus haut des murailles d'inconiprehension que l'on remediera h cet etat de choses, mais en garantissant la souve- rainet€l nationale par la securite internationale. C'est un besoin criant que certains des orateurs qui m 'ont precede ont amplement mis en relief et qui a eu des :;~i~s :::a r:e ~~~~:~~~~~t,d~:bf~:rp~: i~c~~~ ~: la Conference au sommet, et ensuite le 20 mai, par la voix du Premier Ministre de l'Inde et du President de la Republique arabe unie; ils ont tous exprime ~~v~e:;.r de voir les entretiens reprendre au plus haut 138. C'est pourquoi ma d€ll€lgation envisagerait avec beaucoup d'interat et de faveur toute initiative qui viserait ~ souligner 1'unite des objectifs, et non la division des sentiments, et i\ preconiser une reprise vigoureuse de 1'activite internationale sur tous les plans et ~ tous les niveaux. 139. n serait vraiment tr~s gravequel'URSSdrama- tise un incident - que nous lui voyons presenter d'une fa90n dont le moins que 1'on puisse dire est qu'eHe nous deconcerte - uniquement parce qu'elle aurait 1'intention de se retirer de la cooperation internationale active. Et si cet incident a suscite de tels souP90ns et une teHe mefiance que 1'URSS doute de la bonne foi du President des Etats-Unis et de sa faculte de prendre des engagements perma- nents, la reponse est tr~s simple, de 1'avis de la delegation italienne: accelerons les negociations in- ternationales relatives aux attaques par surprise et ~ 1'espace extra-atmospherique, ces negociations qui sont ma.lheureusement dans une impasse depuis 1'an dernier. n est en verite attristant'de pensel' qu'alors que nous discutons d'une infraction i\ la souverainete nationale i\ grande altitude, nous n'avons pas pu faire avancer la question des limites de l'espace extra-atmosph€lrique; cette question a ete ~ peine abordee 1'an dernier au Comite sp€lcial des utilisations pacifiques de 1'espace extra-atmospherique. nest vraiment attristant que l'on ait toujours ecarte la proposition de "ciel ouvert", faite d~s 1955 et qu'en ce 140. These are the feelings which were strength- ened in Italy by the authoritative statement made at the Foreign Commission of the Italian Chamber of Deputies by the Italian Foreign Minister when he said on 19 May 1960 that: "The Italian Government continues to entertain the hope that the recent events in Paris have not darkened irremediably the possibility of a resump- tion of negotiations with the USSR and that an es- sential element of fu1:ure developments must be the commitment by all sides to abstain, until such resumption of negotiations, from any action which might constitute a unilateral change in the present situation." . ' 141. Bearing in mind the considerations which I have outlined, my delegation does not feel that it will be in a position to vote in favour of any draft resolution which does not look ahead to constructive, positive steps in the field of international co-opera- tion.

there are no other speakers on my list, and I therefore propose that we adjourn until tomorrow at 3 p.m. The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m. 140. Tels sont les sentiments qu'est venuerenforcer en Italie la declaration que le Ministre des affaires etrang~res d'Italie a faite, avec toute son autorite, ~ la Commission des affaires etrang~res de la Chambre italienne des deputes. Le Ministre adeclare le 19 mai 1960: "Le Gouvernement italien continue ~ esperer que les recents 6venements de Paris n'ont pas irre- m6diablement assombri la possibilite d'une reprise des negociations avec 1'URSS. nest essentiel aux progr~s futurs que toutes les parties s 'engagent ~ s'abstenir, jUsqu'~ cette reprise desn6gociations, de tout acte qui pourrait modifier unilateralement la situation actuelle." 141. Etant donne les considerations que je viens d'exposer, la delegation italiennen'estimepaspouvoir voter pour un projet de resolution qUi n'envisagerait pas des mesures constructives et positives dans le domaine de la cooperation internationale. 142. Le PRESIDENT (traduit de 1'anglais): Aucun autre orateur n'etant inscrit sur la liste, je propose de lever la seance et de nous reunir demain ~ 15 heures. La seance est levee a18 h 55. K~benhavn, K. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. REPUBLlQUE DOMINICAINE Libreria Dominicana, Mercedes 49, Ciu- dad Trujillo. ECUADOR-EQUATEUR Libreria Cientifica, Guayaquil & Quito. EL SALVADOR-SALVADOR Manuel Navas y Cia., 1a. Avenida sur 37, San Salvador. ETHIOPIA-ETHIOPIE !ntemational Press Agency, P.O. Box 120, Addis Ababa. FINLAND-FINLANDE Akateemi~en Kirjakauppa, 2 Keskuskatu, Helsinki. FRANCE Editions A. Pedone, 13, rue soufflot, Paris (Ve). GERMANY-ALLEMAGNE R. Eisenschmidt, schwanthaler strasse 59, Frankfurt/Main. Elwert & Meurer, Hauptstra..e 101, Berlin.schoneberg. Alexander Horn, Sp.iegelgasse 9, Wies- baden. W. E. saarbach, Gertrudenstrasse 30, Koln (1). MOROCCO·MAROC Bureau d'etudes et de participations industrieltes, 8, rue Michaux-Bellaire, Rabat. NETHERLANDS·PAYS-BAS N.V. Martinus Nijhoff, Lange Voorhout 9, 's-Gravenhage. NEW ZEALAND-NOUVELLE-ZELANDE United Nations Association of New Zea- land, C.P.O. 1011, Wellington. NORWAY-NORVEGE Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, Kr. Au· gustsgt. 7A, Oslo. Orders and inquiries from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed may be sent to: Sales and Circulation Section, United NaUons, New York, U.S.A.; or Sales Section, United Nations Office, Palais des NaUons, Geneva, Switzerland. Price: $U.S. 0.35; 2/6 stg.; Sw. fr. 1.50 (or equivalent in other currencies) Lith~ in U.N. YUGOSLAVIA·YOUGOSLAVIE Cankarjeva Zalo~ba, Ljubliana, Slovenia. Drzavno Preduzete, Jugoslovenska Knjiga, Terazije 27/11, Beograd. Prosvjeta, 5, Trg Bratstva i Jedinstva, Zagreb. [60B1] Les commandes et demandes de renseignemenfs emanant cIe pays ou iI n'existe pas encore de' aeposifaires peuvenf etre adressees a la Sedion des ventes et de la distribution, Organisation des Nations Unies, New·York (Etat.·Unis d'Ame· rique); DU a la Section des ventes, OrganisaUon cIes Nations Unies, Palais des Nations, Geneva (Su;ss~). 22762-December 1960 1,675